[00:00.210 --> 00:08.290]  Is an organization that advocates killing people a worse terrorist group than one that advocates destroying property to preserve environmental laws?
[00:11.380 --> 00:14.740]  Not according to Homeland Security's list of domestic terrorist groups.
[00:15.180 --> 00:22.760]  Tune into Tuesday's Ecologic for a discussion with Ken Gale and Joel Kupferman of the National Lawyers Guild and some experts Joel is bringing with him.
[00:22.960 --> 00:24.260]  No, you didn't miss this show.
[00:24.380 --> 00:27.260]  It's Tuesday, June 25th at 8 p.m.
[00:27.340 --> 00:31.010]  here on WBAI New York, 99.5 FM and WBAI.
[00:33.420 --> 00:36.660]  And you are listening to Radio Station WBAI New York.
[00:36.800 --> 00:38.060]  The time is 7 o'clock.
[00:38.170 --> 00:39.940]  Time once again for Off the Hook.
[02:05.920 --> 02:07.440]  And a very good evening to everybody.
[02:07.560 --> 02:08.220]  The program is Off the Hook.
[02:08.300 --> 02:11.800]  Emmanuel Goldstein here with you, joined tonight by Mike.
[02:12.180 --> 02:12.860]  Good evening.
[02:12.980 --> 02:13.340]  Rob T.
[02:13.560 --> 02:13.980]  Firefly.
[02:14.220 --> 02:14.620]  Good evening.
[02:15.220 --> 02:15.660]  Alex.
[02:16.100 --> 02:16.980]  Good evening, everyone.
[02:17.300 --> 02:17.580]  Kyle.
[02:18.020 --> 02:18.320]  Hi.
[02:18.980 --> 02:21.280]  And Bernie S., someplace in Pennsylvania.
[02:21.600 --> 02:22.780]  Greetings from Pennsylvania.
[02:23.520 --> 02:23.960]  Pittsburgh?
[02:24.580 --> 02:26.260]  No, I said greetings from Pennsylvania.
[02:26.340 --> 02:27.440]  Yeah, I'm trying to guess.
[02:27.540 --> 02:28.400]  I'm trying to guess where you might be.
[02:28.720 --> 02:29.720]  We'll say northeastern Pennsylvania.
[02:30.040 --> 02:30.880]  Northeastern Pennsylvania.
[02:31.080 --> 02:32.100]  Okay, we have that to work on.
[02:32.180 --> 02:33.020]  We have one hour to find him.
[02:33.660 --> 02:34.200]  All right.
[02:34.360 --> 02:36.660]  Can we just, like, triangulate his phone?
[02:36.760 --> 02:37.920]  Well, if we can do that.
[02:37.920 --> 02:38.920]  Do we have that technology here?
[02:39.360 --> 02:40.380]  Or did you leave it at home?
[02:40.480 --> 02:41.640]  He's calling us from a landline.
[02:41.760 --> 02:42.680]  We can probably just get the address.
[02:42.680 --> 02:43.880]  How do you know he's calling us from a landline?
[02:43.900 --> 02:44.560]  How can you tell that?
[02:44.860 --> 02:47.100]  Yeah, but I blocked my caller ID for what that's worth.
[02:47.100 --> 02:47.460]  That's okay.
[02:47.460 --> 02:48.760]  We don't get caller ID here anyway.
[02:48.940 --> 02:50.120]  So, yeah, did that for nothing.
[02:51.640 --> 02:55.580]  Okay, I'm going to ask you, Bernie, do you know where Kyle and I were two days ago?
[02:56.960 --> 02:58.780]  I'm hoping you were not locked in prison.
[02:59.020 --> 03:00.040]  Well, in a way we were.
[03:01.120 --> 03:05.640]  We were at the court-martial of one Bradley Manning in Fort Meade, Maryland.
[03:06.080 --> 03:07.120]  What do you think about that?
[03:07.660 --> 03:08.300]  That's impressive.
[03:08.600 --> 03:10.000]  Did you actually get into the courtroom?
[03:10.320 --> 03:11.780]  Yes, we actually were in the courtroom.
[03:12.000 --> 03:13.420]  I was close enough to Bradley Manning.
[03:13.460 --> 03:17.980]  I could have hit him with a spitball, but I figured that would probably cause all kinds of overreactions.
[03:18.080 --> 03:26.060]  So I was just happy to be there to witness one of the true travesties of our judicial system, which is not even our judicial system.
[03:26.180 --> 03:30.640]  But it was something to be a part of, just to actually go there.
[03:30.700 --> 03:32.760]  I had no idea it was that easy to get in.
[03:33.160 --> 03:36.100]  And, folks, if they let me in, they'll let anyone in.
[03:36.100 --> 03:39.800]  And so there's absolutely no reason for people not to attend this.
[03:39.920 --> 03:40.380]  It's history.
[03:40.380 --> 03:41.040]  It's important.
[03:41.260 --> 03:44.560]  And showing up means so much.
[03:44.820 --> 03:45.280]  It really does.
[03:45.500 --> 03:46.640]  Wouldn't you say so, Kyle?
[03:46.880 --> 03:47.120]  Yes.
[03:48.140 --> 03:48.400]  Thanks.
[03:49.000 --> 03:53.100]  Does anyone have any questions as to what we went through?
[03:53.280 --> 03:54.240]  What did you see?
[03:54.300 --> 03:54.680]  What happened?
[03:55.580 --> 03:56.520]  What did we see?
[03:56.580 --> 03:57.200]  Well, it's kind of vague.
[03:57.300 --> 03:58.220]  You mean in the military base?
[03:58.320 --> 03:59.260]  No, in the courtroom.
[03:59.460 --> 04:03.340]  What were the important goings-on?
[04:03.340 --> 04:06.100]  Well, we basically...
[04:06.100 --> 04:10.380]  First of all, it's not like any other courtroom because, well, there's no jury for one thing.
[04:10.440 --> 04:11.560]  There's a judge.
[04:11.720 --> 04:13.720]  There's all kinds of military people standing guard.
[04:14.780 --> 04:18.480]  And what we didn't really see very much in the way of back and forth.
[04:18.660 --> 04:27.260]  In fact, we didn't see any back and forth because we were there for the morning session and the prosecution, the government, was just reading testimony of people who weren't even there.
[04:28.060 --> 04:33.140]  So we didn't really get a good sense as to how the back and forth would work in a situation like that.
[04:33.220 --> 04:40.100]  But it was very different insofar as, well, the people were not the same type of people you would see in a courtroom.
[04:40.220 --> 04:42.600]  They were all military in uniform and all that.
[04:42.720 --> 04:48.800]  And we had to be very careful going into there, what we could bring, what we couldn't bring.
[04:48.800 --> 04:50.780]  You couldn't even bring a cell phone into the building.
[04:50.940 --> 04:52.840]  You had to leave it inside your car.
[04:54.560 --> 05:01.860]  And you couldn't wear any kind of clothing that might indicate support or, I guess, lack of support for Bradley Manning.
[05:01.900 --> 05:03.480]  There's nothing political, anything like that.
[05:03.960 --> 05:04.220]  I don't know.
[05:04.260 --> 05:05.600]  Kyle, do you have anything to add on that?
[05:05.940 --> 05:08.380]  Yeah, it was a really amazing experience.
[05:08.380 --> 05:12.480]  We got to go in and check out this courtroom.
[05:12.480 --> 05:23.780]  It's basically on a military base, like a normal, functioning military base, which speaks to what you were saying about how anybody can really join and go on.
[05:23.860 --> 05:27.920]  You can get onto a military base as a visitor as long as you meet their guidelines.
[05:28.140 --> 05:31.380]  And they welcome the public on these kinds of places.
[05:31.620 --> 05:34.980]  I mean, people live there and they invite their friends and all that kind of thing.
[05:34.980 --> 05:43.460]  So, we had a lot of apprehension or just a little bit of getting used to, like, the idea of, like, wow, we're really going to be checking out this place.
[05:43.500 --> 05:46.300]  I had been on a military base when I was a little bit younger and stuff like that.
[05:46.340 --> 05:52.640]  So, once we got there, I was a lot more at ease, especially after we met with the people that were holding a vigil outside.
[05:53.160 --> 05:57.180]  We were able to talk to them a little bit about, well, okay, so how does this really work?
[05:57.180 --> 05:58.180]  Where do we go?
[05:59.060 --> 05:59.780]  What's okay?
[06:00.000 --> 06:00.860]  What's allowed?
[06:01.320 --> 06:03.280]  What kind of things should we really avoid?
[06:03.280 --> 06:04.740]  Is this really that serious?
[06:04.860 --> 06:05.400]  All that kind of thing.
[06:06.480 --> 06:11.280]  But even the initial gait, just getting onto the base was fairly low-key.
[06:11.460 --> 06:16.660]  I mean, they definitely checked your registration, like, wrote you down as somebody who's entered the base that day.
[06:17.600 --> 06:20.140]  And they asked for what, you know, why you're going on.
[06:20.340 --> 06:23.660]  But really, it wasn't like they tore apart our car or anything like that.
[06:23.760 --> 06:26.760]  There was a long line of people entering the base in the morning.
[06:26.760 --> 06:29.520]  It's, like, 9 a.m., so a lot of things are going on on the base.
[06:30.140 --> 06:36.200]  And, yeah, I think after that, we kind of felt like, wow, this is a government property.
[06:36.200 --> 06:37.660]  And, well, we're citizens.
[06:37.660 --> 06:39.980]  We can, you know, enter this property as visitors.
[06:39.980 --> 06:42.740]  And, well, this just happens to be why we're here.
[06:43.140 --> 06:43.640]  Right, right.
[06:44.820 --> 06:45.640]  One of the things...
[06:45.640 --> 06:46.140]  One second, Bernie.
[06:46.280 --> 06:52.820]  One of the things that was particularly interesting was that, yeah, we had directions from the people at the vigil as to where to go.
[06:52.820 --> 06:56.320]  But they weren't very good directions, and we got completely lost on the campus.
[06:57.580 --> 06:59.400]  And once you're let in, you're not escorted.
[06:59.420 --> 07:01.980]  So we basically were driving all over the place for about 25 minutes.
[07:03.020 --> 07:07.240]  We were at DISA at one point, Defense Information...
[07:07.240 --> 07:08.260]  Security Administration.
[07:08.540 --> 07:09.240]  Yeah, those people.
[07:09.660 --> 07:10.920]  We turned around in their parking lot.
[07:10.920 --> 07:13.440]  We kept asking for directions, and we just were going all over the place.
[07:13.460 --> 07:14.740]  It was a huge, huge place.
[07:14.900 --> 07:15.600]  So we could have spent...
[07:15.600 --> 07:17.040]  We almost did spend all day there.
[07:18.060 --> 07:21.620]  But, of course, we were there for the actual hearing.
[07:21.900 --> 07:22.260]  Alex?
[07:22.540 --> 07:25.300]  Yeah, I think it's fascinating that you guys were down there.
[07:25.400 --> 07:29.840]  And I have to ask you, did you notice any high-ranking officials in the courtroom?
[07:29.960 --> 07:32.500]  Did you see any Fulbert colonels, any stars?
[07:32.720 --> 07:37.080]  I don't know if you remember, but I actually used to work for the Army JAG Corps.
[07:37.740 --> 07:40.060]  You know, I've sort of tried to put that out of my mind.
[07:40.100 --> 07:40.380]  That's right.
[07:40.380 --> 07:41.460]  But I'm sure you have, too.
[07:41.740 --> 07:41.820]  Yeah.
[07:42.580 --> 07:42.940]  But...
[07:42.940 --> 07:51.500]  And, you know, to give you a contrary point, I think that the attorneys in the military were absolutely fantastic, both as defense counsel and trial counsel.
[07:51.740 --> 07:54.120]  Trial counsel is what the prosecution is called.
[07:54.280 --> 07:57.980]  And I spent one summer working with the Army JAG Corps.
[07:58.720 --> 07:59.380]  Excuse me.
[07:59.440 --> 08:02.220]  I was in the Labor, Employment, and Civil Rights Division.
[08:02.380 --> 08:07.500]  And then subsequent to that, I actually clerked for a judge on the U.S.
[08:07.620 --> 08:14.560]  Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces, which is the highest military court in the country, which this case will definitely be going to if there is a conviction.
[08:14.560 --> 08:18.880]  Basically, the route will be, you know, it'll be appealed to the Court of Criminal Appeals.
[08:19.080 --> 08:21.180]  Every service branch has a Court of Criminal Appeals.
[08:21.360 --> 08:22.400]  And then to the U.S.
[08:22.540 --> 08:28.060]  Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces, which is federal judges that's one level below the Supreme Court.
[08:28.620 --> 08:34.960]  Yeah, I think as lay civilians, we could definitely sit here and talk about all the people that we saw.
[08:35.140 --> 08:38.940]  I could describe everything I saw on one side or the other and how the courtroom was laid out.
[08:39.760 --> 08:49.040]  But as far as, like, picking out this person is this particular rank or anything in particular, or even faces in any kind of government side or, like, who on...
[08:49.040 --> 08:50.580]  It seemed like there were a couple sides.
[08:50.680 --> 09:05.460]  There was a lot of people in the back rows, but the first two rows of the people who were witnessing or that were not a part of the actual courtroom, I guess, on the other side of the wall there, the first two rows seemed to be devoted to, like, one side or the other.
[09:06.640 --> 09:13.000]  And there was a couple guys, yeah, like, maybe one or two people in the first row on the government side.
[09:13.200 --> 09:16.880]  They had three attorneys, JAG attorneys, I presume.
[09:17.940 --> 09:22.620]  There was this woman in camouflage in a ponytail that kept handing papers to the prosecution.
[09:22.900 --> 09:27.820]  And other guys in camouflage would come running into the courtroom, hand her the paper, and she'd hand it over to the railing.
[09:27.860 --> 09:31.840]  And it was just a really bizarre sight to see all these people in camouflage in a courtroom.
[09:32.020 --> 09:33.780]  And they just had it going like a machine.
[09:33.780 --> 09:38.940]  So, basically, the JAG guys would, you know, send a note card back and write a note or whatever.
[09:39.420 --> 09:43.260]  She would run back to the back room, get something, and come back, that kind of thing.
[09:43.720 --> 09:45.360]  How could you see them if they were in camouflage?
[09:45.800 --> 09:47.440]  Yeah, you know, I was thinking that myself.
[09:47.840 --> 09:49.600]  But, you know, it wasn't that good.
[09:49.660 --> 09:56.340]  That's how you know who they are, because we learned there's a different kind of camouflage for Navy, different kind for Army, different kind for all kinds of other people.
[09:56.600 --> 10:00.280]  Is there, like, wood paneling camouflage for people who want to blend into courtrooms?
[10:00.280 --> 10:01.880]  There might have been, and we would not have seen that.
[10:01.980 --> 10:02.400]  Yes, Rob?
[10:03.780 --> 10:07.020]  Tell us a little bit about the measures you underwent to get onto the base.
[10:07.200 --> 10:10.380]  Were there any additional measures to get into the specific courtroom where this trial was?
[10:10.920 --> 10:11.620]  Absolutely, yeah.
[10:11.840 --> 10:16.260]  So, getting onto the base and sort of navigating around, poking around, finding our way was one thing.
[10:16.420 --> 10:20.460]  We actually asked for directions at one point and found the actual courtroom.
[10:21.300 --> 10:23.140]  There was kind of a small lot.
[10:23.140 --> 10:26.360]  And then, so we parked and we're walking around trying to find the entrance to that.
[10:26.900 --> 10:37.300]  There were a lot of event gates, kinds you'd see at maybe a concert going around the one side of the building, around what was the roadside, and then probably all the way around to a larger back lot.
[10:37.300 --> 10:49.460]  But the civilian parking or whatnot would have a driveway in the very back side of it that was also lined with gates that went to a series of trailers.
[10:49.840 --> 10:57.740]  There was a stop sign, so you'd go into that gated area, sort of a lane, and then there'd be a stop sign.
[10:57.740 --> 11:00.260]  And it said, stop until you have an escort.
[11:00.480 --> 11:11.180]  And we were a little confused because we didn't see anybody until a uniformed security soldier jumped out of the trailer and walked down and guided us into the security screening trailer.
[11:11.660 --> 11:15.040]  At that point, we hop up into the security screening trailer.
[11:15.200 --> 11:17.880]  There were two other security guys in fatigues there.
[11:18.240 --> 11:27.100]  One was operating a metal-detecting wand, and the other was sort of had a table for us to empty our pockets.
[11:27.100 --> 11:28.260]  So we emptied our pockets.
[11:28.600 --> 11:32.560]  They would ask and confirm, yes, you don't have anything in your pockets anymore.
[11:32.560 --> 11:34.920]  Then they would wand each of us individually front and back.
[11:35.160 --> 11:42.040]  And then after that point, they would issue us a numbered guest ID that clearly stated we were to be escorted at all times.
[11:42.860 --> 11:51.680]  After that, we put stuff back in our pockets, jumped out of the trailer, and we're in sort of a waiting area where they had a bathroom trailer, and it was sort of fenced in.
[11:52.120 --> 11:56.860]  And there were other people that we had seen at the vigil prior to sort of getting lost.
[11:57.100 --> 11:58.820]  And we were there just in the nick of time.
[11:58.960 --> 12:02.660]  I mean, it was about 10 minutes until 9.30, and we just milled around there for a little bit.
[12:02.940 --> 12:07.440]  And another series of security guys would request us to come in.
[12:07.520 --> 12:12.620]  Some of them were in full fatigues, revolvers, stun guns, you name it, fully armed.
[12:12.760 --> 12:22.560]  And then there were a couple guys in, like, black coats who were basically the same type, but looked a little more low-key, a little bit more like they're on, like, a bit quieter detail with radios and all that.
[12:22.560 --> 12:28.700]  And they were guiding us into an initial waiting area before we were actually allowed to come into the courtroom.
[12:28.940 --> 12:30.360]  Real photographic memory there.
[12:31.000 --> 12:32.760]  It's incredible, but that's pretty much how it was.
[12:32.960 --> 12:33.600]  Bernie, I'm sorry.
[12:34.280 --> 12:35.860]  You had something to contribute as well?
[12:35.860 --> 12:41.660]  I mean, you guys are doing a really good job describing the trappings of this going there and getting into the courtroom.
[12:41.660 --> 12:45.240]  But I'm really interested in what was happening in the courtroom.
[12:45.420 --> 12:47.960]  Was this an evidentiary proceeding?
[12:48.200 --> 12:53.860]  You said that someone was reading documents about people saying things about Bradley Manning.
[12:53.980 --> 12:56.140]  But was this evidence being presented against him?
[12:56.180 --> 12:57.260]  And I have another concern, too.
[12:57.440 --> 13:28.240]  With this whole Ed Snowden affair going on, with the NSA right there on Fort Meade where you were, all the heightened national security implications that are being floated around about this new case, I'm wondering if this is going to have an impact on Bradley Manning's prosecution just by guilt by association of the same kind of a leaking thing right there in the same place.
[13:28.500 --> 13:30.860]  Well, hopefully, yes, Bernie.
[13:30.860 --> 13:33.700]  They did seem like they were sort of on autopilot.
[13:34.060 --> 13:44.880]  Just basically what we saw was the government side piling on, entering things in, piling on evidence, quote, evidence.
[13:45.320 --> 13:53.240]  And basically what they were doing is reading reports that were produced by people in the CIA and other departments.
[13:53.640 --> 14:11.600]  On this particular day, the reports pretty much had to do with creating logs from a Solaris box with how they created some code to query MySQL databases and get logs on Bradley's particular ID.
[14:11.980 --> 14:13.000]  And that was it.
[14:13.060 --> 14:15.000]  It was like three different things from different people.
[14:15.020 --> 14:16.640]  It was like watching Paint Peel, really.
[14:16.800 --> 14:17.780]  The guy, what was he reading?
[14:17.860 --> 14:19.240]  He was reading a log of some sort.
[14:19.300 --> 14:23.180]  And the judge eventually had to cut him off and say, can you just read the numbers that change, for God's sake.
[14:23.180 --> 14:35.160]  He was reading the file names of the program that he created that queried the MySQL database for logs of every time Bradley had entered or copied something from a database with his passport government account, whatever that is.
[14:35.320 --> 14:48.300]  And so this guy's basically reading some guy's stuff that came back from his program that he made to create logs of this activity for the government to build a case and whatnot.
[14:48.300 --> 14:49.820]  So he's reading every single file name.
[14:49.900 --> 14:51.880]  The file name was like really, really long.
[14:52.000 --> 14:55.040]  And then the last like three characters would be a day or a number changing.
[14:55.260 --> 14:59.600]  And finally, the judge like interrupted him and was like, is it safe to say that this file is all the same?
[14:59.660 --> 15:00.860]  You don't have to read that every single time.
[15:00.980 --> 15:03.320]  It was just a lot of like wasting time.
[15:03.440 --> 15:11.280]  All we saw basically was the prosecutor, one of the prosecutors, reading testimony from people who were not there.
[15:11.540 --> 15:18.100]  We didn't get to see the defense really say anything other than, and yes, we accept this or we have a question.
[15:18.600 --> 15:28.660]  At one point, almost as soon as we got into the courtroom at the beginning, they had to clear the courtroom because there was some confidential information that was about to be talked about.
[15:28.880 --> 15:33.360]  And we actually had to stand outside in the parking lot for about an hour in the blazing hot sun.
[15:33.480 --> 15:36.240]  Actually, we could have gone into the trailer, but we chose to mill around outside.
[15:36.700 --> 15:41.360]  But those are the kind of things that are a little bit different than a normal courtroom.
[15:41.660 --> 15:43.040]  Alex, I have a question for you.
[15:43.120 --> 15:45.220]  You're familiar with these kinds of proceedings, I would imagine.
[15:45.860 --> 15:58.940]  It sounds to me like the people doing the accusing were not there in the courtroom, that they were just reading affidavits and stuff and documents written by accusers.
[15:58.940 --> 16:05.900]  Is that different than how it happens in civil court, civilian court?
[16:06.060 --> 16:08.980]  Well, Bernie, it's a good question.
[16:08.980 --> 16:15.460]  This sounds like it was absolutely mind-numbingly boring, and oftentimes court can be mind-numbingly boring.
[16:15.780 --> 16:18.240]  This sounds like it might have been deliberately boring, though.
[16:18.640 --> 16:20.760]  I mean, I think that...
[16:20.760 --> 16:21.500]  You know, we thought that.
[16:21.560 --> 16:25.460]  We thought it was a tactic to sort of get people not to come or something.
[16:25.500 --> 16:26.020]  Well, absolutely.
[16:26.160 --> 16:28.740]  I mean, and that leads me to ask you guys a question.
[16:28.940 --> 16:30.580]  I mean, did you see the media there?
[16:30.580 --> 16:33.300]  This sounds like an incredibly unsexy part of the trial.
[16:33.320 --> 16:38.380]  There was a guy from the Associated Press taking notes, but I didn't really see him covering the trial.
[16:38.520 --> 16:39.960]  He was interviewing people outside, mostly.
[16:40.200 --> 16:40.780]  Wasn't there...
[16:40.780 --> 16:48.140]  I've heard there's a separate media area where they can do a little bit more than you can in terms of note-taking than you can in the public area.
[16:48.280 --> 16:48.980]  So maybe...
[16:48.980 --> 16:54.080]  They can talk, they can take notes and things like that, and they can't bring recording devices.
[16:54.320 --> 16:56.420]  But, yeah, it's a bit more comfortable where they were.
[16:56.500 --> 16:57.520]  We didn't actually hang out there.
[16:57.640 --> 16:59.900]  Yeah, we didn't go into the media trailer.
[17:00.160 --> 17:03.160]  I guess that's where the courtroom...
[17:03.160 --> 17:03.920]  What is that called?
[17:05.420 --> 17:06.220]  The stenographers.
[17:06.400 --> 17:06.940]  I'm sorry.
[17:07.040 --> 17:07.620]  That's the word.
[17:07.740 --> 17:09.760]  That are not the official court stenographers.
[17:09.960 --> 17:10.860]  We've covered this in the past.
[17:11.220 --> 17:17.340]  But the Freedom of the Press Foundation is funding stenographers so that those of us who can't be there can know what's going on.
[17:17.340 --> 17:20.200]  Yeah, it was really hot.
[17:20.280 --> 17:24.800]  We would rather have been outside, and we wanted to actually get access to the main courtroom.
[17:24.820 --> 17:28.500]  We didn't want to be sort of in this trailer and have that be good enough.
[17:28.660 --> 17:35.840]  And the other thing is, we didn't want to get into long, protracted discussions while we were there with other people that were visiting.
[17:36.160 --> 17:39.800]  And, you know, running off into the trailer just didn't seem like a great idea.
[17:40.700 --> 17:43.040]  It would have been neat to check out, but it wasn't our prerogative.
[17:43.040 --> 17:49.560]  We really wanted to be in the courtroom and just see this, hear Bradley, maybe get a glimpse of him, all of that kind of stuff.
[17:49.620 --> 17:50.280]  And we sure did.
[17:50.400 --> 17:51.620]  Yeah, here's what we got out of it, though.
[17:51.820 --> 17:54.580]  There just aren't enough people showing up to this thing.
[17:54.920 --> 17:58.080]  There's a very dedicated group, and they seem to know each other.
[17:58.180 --> 18:00.160]  And they're there every Monday morning at 7 a.m.
[18:00.220 --> 18:01.400]  outside the Fort Meade gate.
[18:01.840 --> 18:03.160]  And then they go to the courtroom.
[18:03.360 --> 18:04.220]  And I believe they're there.
[18:04.320 --> 18:05.620]  A lot of them are there every single day.
[18:13.240 --> 18:20.260]  But even if you can't get into the actual courtroom, being in one of the satellite booths is certainly worth it as well.
[18:20.440 --> 18:25.020]  But I would like to just appeal to people, especially people in the area, especially young people.
[18:25.300 --> 18:28.960]  I mean, most people were over 50 who were there, which is great.
[18:29.020 --> 18:30.560]  But where are all the young people?
[18:30.720 --> 18:32.940]  Where are all the people around the area?
[18:33.040 --> 18:33.740]  There are so many of them.
[18:33.820 --> 18:34.660]  We have listeners there.
[18:34.660 --> 18:41.640]  I would love to hear from our listeners who can just simply take a ride over and sit in for a couple of hours.
[18:42.000 --> 18:43.080]  It's not a hardship.
[18:43.240 --> 18:44.060]  It's really simple.
[18:44.200 --> 18:46.380]  Yeah, you have to open up your trunk.
[18:46.500 --> 18:48.280]  You have to empty your pockets when you go in.
[18:48.540 --> 18:59.880]  These are things we can deal with because not showing up, not adding to the group of people who are there, showing their support just by being there, the price of that happening is far too great.
[18:59.960 --> 19:03.380]  And in a moment, I'll give out information about exactly how that works.
[19:03.480 --> 19:03.620]  Rob?
[19:03.620 --> 19:12.760]  And that's why it's important, I think, to talk about the trappings you guys went through going in and finding where you needed to go and stuff, because anybody can do this and anybody needs to do this.
[19:12.880 --> 19:14.460]  We're not getting official transcripts.
[19:14.600 --> 19:17.800]  We don't have cameras in there that, you know, we can access the footage from.
[19:18.320 --> 19:30.220]  This is history happening right now, and we're not privy to it unless we go there or unless enough people go there who can then talk about the experience, blog about it, publish what they can about it, because more of this needs to get out there.
[19:30.320 --> 19:33.400]  And not every day, as you guys learned, is going to be the sexy law and order.
[19:33.400 --> 19:42.540]  We're a denouement of the thing, but there are going to be very important parts of this trial, and they're going to be talked about, and this is the only way we can make that happen.
[19:42.900 --> 19:43.260]  Absolutely.
[19:43.440 --> 19:45.120]  They certainly have capacity.
[19:45.280 --> 19:46.180]  There's huge tents.
[19:46.380 --> 19:48.460]  It looks like something you'd see for a festival.
[19:48.620 --> 19:52.120]  We didn't even go in them, I guess, for overflow and that kind of thing.
[19:52.700 --> 19:57.360]  And as much as there was a huge security presence, those guys were really respectful.
[19:57.660 --> 19:59.780]  They're, you know, pretty serious guys.
[20:00.080 --> 20:01.740]  They are looking you up and down.
[20:01.940 --> 20:06.080]  They tell you exactly what to do and when and all of that, and you want to listen to them.
[20:06.580 --> 20:09.120]  And they are watching you when you're in the courtroom.
[20:10.620 --> 20:15.700]  They're, but they're not, I don't think, they treat you with the utmost respect, that you belong there.
[20:15.840 --> 20:20.780]  And I didn't really feel any sort of qualms or, like, attitude from them at all.
[20:21.060 --> 20:25.380]  And it's certainly good to remind people, if you do go there, please don't do anything crazy.
[20:25.580 --> 20:28.020]  Like, it's, you're basically going to get thrown out immediately.
[20:28.340 --> 20:29.400]  It's bad for Bradley, too.
[20:29.500 --> 20:33.700]  It's not, it's not something that he would really appreciate at all.
[20:33.800 --> 20:35.120]  And I don't think it would help him at all.
[20:35.240 --> 20:41.820]  The thing to also remember is that this is a huge machine that we're talking about, the whole military machine that's in there.
[20:41.920 --> 20:44.040]  But Bradley is a part, he still is a part of that machine.
[20:44.080 --> 20:45.600]  And he respects that machine.
[20:46.340 --> 20:50.580]  And one thing we can tell you by being there that you don't see in the transcripts is how Bradley looks.
[20:50.700 --> 20:51.320]  He looks good.
[20:51.700 --> 20:52.760]  He's sharp.
[20:52.780 --> 20:57.660]  He's paying attention to every single detail of the evidence that's being presented against him.
[20:58.060 --> 21:00.300]  And he knows how it all works.
[21:00.440 --> 21:03.560]  He's, he's, doesn't look despondent.
[21:03.620 --> 21:06.920]  He looks like he wants to fight this as, as much as possible.
[21:07.380 --> 21:10.400]  At the same time, respecting the system, respecting the judge.
[21:10.660 --> 21:13.280]  And I know that people showing up means the world.
[21:13.460 --> 21:19.020]  So by all means, people, I sure hope a lot of people continue to, to go to this.
[21:19.380 --> 21:20.480]  The crowd has to get bigger.
[21:20.660 --> 21:20.780]  Alex?
[21:21.020 --> 21:22.220]  I entirely agree.
[21:22.220 --> 21:32.780]  And I, I really want to echo the sentiments that everyone else has, has, has basically set forth here, which, which is that it's very important to go and, and show your support of these types of things.
[21:33.140 --> 21:43.120]  And maybe we didn't do such a great job selling it at first by mentioning entirely boring, you know, legal evidence related proceedings, but it's not always going to be like that.
[21:43.320 --> 21:47.140]  Once the prosecution starts to call more witnesses, it's going to be very, very interesting.
[21:47.280 --> 21:50.900]  When the defense makes their case, it's going to be even more interesting to watch.
[21:50.980 --> 21:52.360]  It's going to be very, very high drama.
[21:52.560 --> 21:55.260]  I think it would behoove everyone to be there.
[21:55.660 --> 21:59.980]  And, and to report back, because as Rob mentioned, we don't have official channels.
[22:00.220 --> 22:07.680]  And as an incidental byproduct, I think, if I'm not mistaken, that the National Cryptological Museum is pretty close by.
[22:07.780 --> 22:10.740]  Well, that's, that's on the other side where, where the NSA actually is.
[22:10.820 --> 22:14.260]  Let me point out that Fort Meade, actually, there's, there's two parts of it.
[22:14.360 --> 22:18.700]  There's the National Security Agency, and then there's the, the Army base.
[22:19.980 --> 22:23.020]  So it's not like they're just walking back and forth from one to the other.
[22:23.160 --> 22:24.400]  They're two huge complexes.
[22:24.700 --> 22:25.300]  It's pretty close by.
[22:25.400 --> 22:26.380]  It's pretty close by, yes.
[22:26.660 --> 22:32.020]  They're distinct in that the, the, the people that are on the Army base are doing sort of regular duty things.
[22:32.200 --> 22:35.120]  They could be from all parts of the military and all parts of the world.
[22:35.460 --> 22:39.040]  The NSA complex, I think, is, is probably separate.
[22:39.360 --> 22:44.000]  I think even within the base, there's probably some checkpoints you'd have to go through to get anywhere near it.
[22:44.160 --> 22:52.160]  Well, interestingly enough, years ago, when I was visiting the National Cryptological Museum is when I was actually working for the Army in 2003.
[22:52.600 --> 22:53.880]  So my God, it was 10 years ago.
[22:54.020 --> 22:55.980]  It's right near there that we got stopped by four different cops.
[22:55.980 --> 22:56.320]  Oh, is that right?
[22:56.320 --> 22:58.340]  While taking pictures for the surveillance calendar.
[22:58.740 --> 22:59.940]  Well, this, this is very, this is really funny.
[23:00.180 --> 23:05.160]  So I'm at the checkpoint, Charlie, to, you know, go over towards the museum.
[23:05.540 --> 23:08.740]  And I say to the woman at the checkpoint, Charlie, I said, you know, I'm here.
[23:09.460 --> 23:10.680]  You know, my name is Alex.
[23:11.140 --> 23:13.700]  I am here to see the National Cryptological Museum.
[23:14.040 --> 23:15.900]  She said, okay, sure, let me see your ID.
[23:16.420 --> 23:18.160]  And then she just waves me on through.
[23:18.560 --> 23:19.640]  I go and I park the car.
[23:20.080 --> 23:23.380]  I get out and I'm walking towards the building where I think the museum is.
[23:23.460 --> 23:25.000]  And I have a digital camera with me.
[23:25.280 --> 23:29.780]  And there's a guy, an older senior security guard who comes out.
[23:29.920 --> 23:31.900]  And I'll never forget, he had a pipe in his hand.
[23:32.040 --> 23:33.340]  He said, sir, can I help you?
[23:33.700 --> 23:38.960]  I said, yes, I'm here to, I'm here to, to, to see the National Cryptological Museum.
[23:39.120 --> 23:41.660]  He said, wait, he said, is that a cell phone you have in your hand?
[23:42.160 --> 23:43.300]  I said, no, it's a camera.
[23:43.680 --> 23:44.680]  He said, that's a camera?
[23:45.240 --> 23:46.460]  I said, yes, it's a camera.
[23:46.580 --> 23:48.260]  He said, why do you, what are you bringing a camera here for?
[23:48.360 --> 23:50.740]  I said, well, I'd like to take a, take a picture with the Enigma.
[23:50.900 --> 23:52.200]  I said, the Enigma, what are you talking about?
[23:52.260 --> 23:54.620]  I said, you know, the German cryptological device from World War II?
[23:54.620 --> 23:57.480]  He said, are you looking for the museum?
[23:57.760 --> 23:59.640]  I said, yes, sir, I am.
[23:59.740 --> 24:01.700]  And he said, this is not the museum.
[24:01.700 --> 24:03.160]  This is the National Security Agency.
[24:03.500 --> 24:08.700]  The woman just let me write in when she heard national, cryptological, whatever, and waved me straight through.
[24:09.020 --> 24:10.180]  And I parked the car.
[24:10.180 --> 24:11.800]  But then I very politely left.
[24:12.080 --> 24:16.460]  And I found the museum, which is apparently in an old gas station that's converted into a museum.
[24:16.500 --> 24:18.800]  It's down the block from a real gas station, too.
[24:18.940 --> 24:19.580]  Yeah, I know it well.
[24:19.620 --> 24:21.880]  It's where we spent quite a bit of time answering questions.
[24:22.080 --> 24:23.240]  It's an old hotel, actually.
[24:23.400 --> 24:23.780]  Is it?
[24:23.920 --> 24:24.120]  Really?
[24:24.620 --> 24:25.780]  Wow, that's...
[24:25.780 --> 24:33.740]  It was like a... it was like where family... it was kind of like a fleabag hotel, like a Super 8 or one of those kinds of places, Motel 6.
[24:34.480 --> 24:42.660]  But I think about 20 years ago or something, the NSA bought it and turned it into a museum, which was only open to employees.
[24:43.260 --> 24:50.840]  But then once the secret got out, they had... it was an... I think there's an article in the Washington Post at one point that kind of blew the cover on the museum.
[24:51.100 --> 24:54.040]  And then they ended up opening it to the general public.
[24:54.040 --> 25:02.320]  Well, anyway, so just to give out the information for people who are interested in attending, first of all, quarters in recess until next Tuesday.
[25:02.320 --> 25:03.220]  They do this a lot.
[25:03.220 --> 25:07.680]  They only have hearings for a few days, and they take a lot of days off for some reason.
[25:07.740 --> 25:09.220]  I'm not exactly sure how that works.
[25:09.340 --> 25:14.580]  But they have yet to hold hearings on Thursday or Friday of any week, and it's been going on for three weeks now.
[25:15.080 --> 25:20.140]  It takes place at the Army Base at Fort Meade, which is in Fort Meade, Maryland.
[25:21.140 --> 25:27.920]  And basically, all you need to do to get onto the base is bring a government-issued ID, like a driver's license or a passport.
[25:28.040 --> 25:30.300]  If you're not a citizen of the United States, non-U.S.
[25:30.360 --> 25:31.740]  passports are perfectly fine.
[25:31.740 --> 25:41.280]  And when you drive onto the base, you just have to have your vehicle registration, up-to-date vehicle insurance, make sure you obey the speed limits, things like that.
[25:42.100 --> 25:48.660]  You know, I'm reading the instructions from the website BradleyManning.org, which is a great resource for information.
[25:48.660 --> 25:56.840]  They recommend that you be prepared to cover political bumper stickers on your vehicle with tape, which I think is outrageous, if that is true.
[25:57.360 --> 26:04.300]  I didn't see any indication that it was, and they told me that they really haven't been aware of that actually happening.
[26:04.300 --> 26:10.080]  But it's a safety precaution, which I don't know if I believe in.
[26:10.220 --> 26:14.120]  We did see a particular vehicle on the base in a parking lot.
[26:14.240 --> 26:14.600]  Yes, we did.
[26:14.600 --> 26:16.000]  And it wasn't by the courthouse.
[26:16.000 --> 26:19.500]  We saw the WikiLeaks truck, the big WikiLeaks truck.
[26:19.620 --> 26:21.140]  It was just parked in a parking lot.
[26:21.320 --> 26:22.220]  Do you remember what building was?
[26:22.240 --> 26:23.900]  Was it near Deesa or was it someplace else?
[26:24.160 --> 26:26.060]  It was not.
[26:26.400 --> 26:27.860]  It was adjacent from there.
[26:28.040 --> 26:37.380]  It was near, just up the road from where the courthouse is in one of the larger parking lots near the barracks.
[26:37.540 --> 26:40.000]  Yeah, they had so many different places.
[26:40.580 --> 26:44.940]  But the thing to remember is also that people were outside at 7 a.m.
[26:45.660 --> 26:48.440]  for the weekly vigil, which happens every Monday from 7 to 8.30.
[26:48.800 --> 26:53.060]  And a lot of people passing by on the highway were honking their horns in support.
[26:53.120 --> 26:57.460]  But a lot of people going into Fort Meade were also honking their horns in support.
[26:57.740 --> 26:58.860]  And that means something.
[26:59.140 --> 27:03.260]  You know, these are people in there, part of that machine, that support this.
[27:03.260 --> 27:10.800]  And you have to wonder how many Ed Snowdens are out there being inspired by all this, saying, yes, I'm going to be in a situation where I can tell the truth.
[27:11.340 --> 27:12.940]  And that's going to be the thing to do.
[27:13.260 --> 27:15.000]  So, folks, it's important to show up.
[27:15.080 --> 27:19.960]  And we'd love to hear from our listeners who go to the trial because it's not an unpleasant thing.
[27:20.100 --> 27:22.300]  And, yeah, Alex was saying before, it's boring.
[27:22.300 --> 27:23.100]  I will agree.
[27:23.220 --> 27:24.560]  Kyle will agree it was boring.
[27:24.580 --> 27:25.940]  But we're not there to be entertained.
[27:25.940 --> 27:36.640]  We're there to show our support, to fill those seats, to make sure that the government knows, that Bradley knows, that everybody knows, that there are a lot of people paying attention to this.
[27:36.880 --> 27:39.660]  And there are people all around the world paying attention to this trial.
[27:39.800 --> 27:42.160]  It's extremely important, extremely historical.
[27:42.600 --> 27:45.140]  So it's vital that we get out there.
[27:45.280 --> 27:46.380]  Yeah, it really is.
[27:46.460 --> 27:51.880]  It was really, when they read the minutes when we first went in, it was a bit disconcerting to hear how many tents they had.
[27:51.880 --> 28:00.560]  They went through all the different facilities they had, and to hear that there were, you know, a dozen or a little more in the courtroom, and they had more space in the courtroom.
[28:00.720 --> 28:02.980]  That was really kind of tough to hear.
[28:03.060 --> 28:07.520]  It was good to be a part of that, but it was like, wow, you know, there should be tons of, there should be a swell of people here.
[28:07.600 --> 28:08.340]  And I want to make two points.
[28:08.400 --> 28:10.520]  I think we should get more media there.
[28:10.520 --> 28:25.360]  I think if you had major organizations really covered it and petitioned, worked with the court there, as much as that's practical, but just anything to get people outside there, you know, getting some video of the people, giving the vigil, any type of,
[28:25.400 --> 28:31.280]  like, organization or coordinating some more access, I think that would be really, really interesting and good to see.
[28:32.700 --> 28:33.340]  Excuse me.
[28:33.940 --> 28:37.320]  And I was... I lost my train of thought.
[28:37.420 --> 28:37.620]  I'm sorry.
[28:37.740 --> 28:38.320]  Okay, Manuel.
[28:38.480 --> 28:38.960]  It's pretty exciting.
[28:39.120 --> 28:39.780]  Yes, go ahead, Bernie.
[28:41.240 --> 28:54.700]  I asked earlier, I think one of the reasons there aren't, those tents aren't overflowing with people right now is because the story has been overshadowed in the mainstream media by other stuff, like the Ed Snowden NSA document leaked stuff.
[28:54.700 --> 29:15.060]  And I'm wondering, do you think that that current case, which allegedly has much greater national security implications, according to the president and on down from our top government officials, do you think that's going to have a negative impact on Bradley Manning's case,
[29:15.060 --> 29:24.260]  just because of its, you know, its leaking classified documents, and you're in the same physical ballpark as the NSA?
[29:24.640 --> 29:25.620]  What do you think about that?
[29:25.620 --> 29:28.900]  You mean, and so far as attendance at the trial, it'll have a damaging effect on that?
[29:29.080 --> 29:47.040]  No, just because it's a court of public opinion, and, you know, judges and so forth are not, you know, not blind to hearing about this other case, which it's not directly related to that, but it is another whistleblower type case, and it's in the news,
[29:47.040 --> 30:01.820]  and instead of things sort of dying down with Bradley's case, now there's all this new agita floating around about more leaked documents, and I'm wondering if that's going to have a negative impact on Bradley Manning's trial.
[30:01.820 --> 30:15.960]  When the Snowden case first became known, I thought it would have an effect on Bradley's case, a positive effect, because I thought people would see finally that, yes, this stuff needs to be known, and that the people who release this information are heroes and should be celebrated.
[30:16.700 --> 30:27.780]  But I'm always disappointed by public opinion, because it seems to be going the other way, and people seem to be saying, yeah, you know, it doesn't really matter, I've got nothing to hide, which is exactly what the governments and the big corporations want you to say,
[30:27.780 --> 30:29.560]  so they can spy on you all the more.
[30:29.560 --> 30:32.960]  And Bernie, I think you make a very great point there.
[30:33.460 --> 30:42.200]  And I think it's very important to remember that this proceeding is occurring under the Uniform Code of Military Justice, and it's not a normal criminal proceeding.
[30:42.480 --> 30:54.700]  And so you have a military judge who's sitting at the helm there, and that military judge has to take into account certain factors that we wouldn't normally account for in our normal civilian life, things like unit cohesion.
[30:55.660 --> 31:07.320]  This is a, you know, a major issue under the UCMJ, you know, something that can actually curtail your constitutional liberties when it comes to criminal matters and your ability to speak freely in the military.
[31:07.620 --> 31:21.820]  And with this panoply of different factors that the military judge has to take into account of, I think that these leaked documents, as you mentioned, could actually have a negative impact on it, because they don't want to encourage people to do the same thing.
[31:21.820 --> 31:24.760]  They want to use Bradley Manning as an example.
[31:25.840 --> 31:28.500]  Hypothetically, this is what I believe could happen.
[31:28.640 --> 31:34.720]  They could want to use Bradley Manning as an example to deter other and future whistleblowers.
[31:35.180 --> 31:38.080]  And I think it could be a very, very unfortunate consequence.
[31:38.080 --> 31:40.700]  And it might not bleed through overtly.
[31:40.800 --> 31:42.540]  We might not see absolute prejudice.
[31:42.540 --> 31:53.680]  But you could start seeing the military judge rule in favor of the trial counsel or the prosecution in cases where maybe it's on the fence or there should be some leniency given to the defense counsel.
[31:53.820 --> 32:01.940]  But if there is overt prejudice and it's really bad, then that could work to Bradley Manning's... that could work to his benefit on appeal.
[32:02.500 --> 32:15.420]  Because one of the things that's very interesting about the military courts and the UCMJ, as opposed to the civilian system, and a lot of people don't realize this, is that you have the right to effective assistance of counsel, so you have the right to an attorney,
[32:15.760 --> 32:18.860]  only at the trial level as a civilian.
[32:19.320 --> 32:24.020]  Most places will not... most states will not give you the right to counsel on appeal.
[32:24.300 --> 32:27.420]  In the military, however, you have the right to counsel on an appeal.
[32:27.580 --> 32:33.540]  And I think if things go the wrong way for Bradley Manning, that's going to be a very, very important point in his favor.
[32:34.180 --> 32:39.620]  Well, I mean, in Manning's case, his counsel is paid for by donors.
[32:39.620 --> 32:41.800]  So I don't think that's relevant here.
[32:42.060 --> 32:44.760]  But the larger point still stands, I think.
[32:44.980 --> 32:47.600]  I really do encourage people to go and check it out.
[32:47.760 --> 32:49.080]  And yeah, absolutely.
[32:49.160 --> 32:55.360]  It would be great to see for him to get, you know, have that support insofar as counsel.
[32:55.520 --> 32:57.740]  And I'd like to know that he's getting more support.
[32:57.900 --> 33:04.840]  His government attorneys looked... yeah, I mean, they were basically saying no objections to everything that was being entered.
[33:05.060 --> 33:12.980]  And I know his other attorney was there, but there were two of his government attorneys that were fairly active, but they didn't seem all that together.
[33:13.080 --> 33:17.940]  I mean, I just want to know that they have that support, that that money's actually, you know, getting there and that they're good.
[33:18.040 --> 33:20.120]  But the other form of support really is just numbers.
[33:20.280 --> 33:26.460]  We know that from the minutes in the beginning of the trial that he gets to hear how many people have showed up, how much space there is in the courtroom.
[33:26.700 --> 33:29.460]  He cannot even look at the witnesses.
[33:29.460 --> 33:32.700]  He must, you know, pay attention to the judge, obviously, when she enters the courtroom.
[33:32.700 --> 33:42.580]  And, and as we remarked, and there were, you know, guys blocking, we didn't even realize he was sitting there until the judge entered and some of the security stepped away for the proceedings to begin.
[33:42.800 --> 34:03.700]  And it just, it was only after we left and came back when this classified information was being entered in and that Bradley had to look at it and had to be 90 degrees, sort of change his position to be a side of the judge's bench, that he could confirm that he had read the unredacted versions of this,
[34:03.700 --> 34:04.760]  you know, document and stuff.
[34:04.940 --> 34:10.780]  That was the only time he got to sit sideways and perhaps even see the witnesses in the back.
[34:10.900 --> 34:14.580]  For every other moment that we were there, he was facing forward and could not look.
[34:14.780 --> 34:21.800]  We never, you know, there was no way you could, you could, you know, he would know that there's people there other than these minutes at the very beginning.
[34:21.980 --> 34:28.420]  So, you know, he does know that there's support there, but we need people to really increase those numbers so he can at least hear that people are out there.
[34:28.860 --> 34:32.260]  And likewise, with legal support, you know, every bit counts.
[34:32.520 --> 34:33.000]  All right.
[34:33.060 --> 34:35.920]  I'd like to talk about PRISM a little bit today, because that's important.
[34:36.100 --> 34:38.940]  And all the other leaks that have been taking place, the Ed Snowden affair.
[34:39.520 --> 34:49.320]  Do you guys follow the question and answer that Ed Snowden gave to basically people all around the world?
[34:49.320 --> 34:49.700]  Yeah.
[34:49.800 --> 34:52.540]  Was it the South China Daily Press?
[34:52.920 --> 34:53.460]  It was Guardian.
[34:53.920 --> 34:59.880]  Well, the Guardian invited people from around the world to submit questions and Snowden answered them.
[34:59.960 --> 35:00.760]  And it was very good.
[35:00.960 --> 35:01.360]  Yeah.
[35:01.520 --> 35:18.380]  And one thing that on the subject of this, how it relates to Bradley Manning and being labeled a traitor and all that kind of a thing, he addressed quite directly the issue of being thought of as a traitor by releasing the information that we talked about last week and that we'll talk about this week.
[35:18.500 --> 35:23.180]  And hopefully we'll take some phone calls as well and talk about people's concerns and things like that.
[35:23.740 --> 35:27.560]  But basically, I don't know if anybody called Dick Cheney over the last few days.
[35:27.600 --> 35:30.560]  I know it's kind of hard to listen to him, but sometimes it can be pretty entertaining.
[35:31.160 --> 35:41.040]  He basically has been putting forth the theory, his theory that Ed Snowden is an agent working for China and a spy working against the U.S.
[35:41.120 --> 35:45.180]  government by revealing all these truths, things that are actually happening.
[35:45.980 --> 35:50.920]  I just really got a kick out of Ed Snowden's response to this.
[35:51.680 --> 35:56.160]  It's important to bear in mind, I'm being called a traitor by men like former Vice President Dick Cheney.
[35:56.300 --> 36:10.400]  This is a man who gave us the warrantless wiretapping scheme as a kind of atrocity warmup on the way to deceitfully engineering a conflict that has killed over 4,400 and maimed nearly 32,000 Americans, as well as leaving over 100,000 Iraqis dead.
[36:10.640 --> 36:14.360]  Being called a traitor by Dick Cheney is the highest honor you can give an American.
[36:14.620 --> 36:21.240]  And the more panic talk we hear from people like him, Dianne Feinstein, Peter King, the better off we all are.
[36:21.300 --> 36:26.840]  If they had taught a class on how to be the kind of citizen Dick Cheney worries about, I would have finished high school.
[36:27.420 --> 36:27.900]  Yeah.
[36:28.060 --> 36:30.260]  Now, I like this guy.
[36:30.400 --> 36:33.180]  This guy has got some guts.
[36:33.480 --> 36:33.580]  Yeah.
[36:33.760 --> 36:35.500]  But we got to support him as well.
[36:35.520 --> 36:39.640]  And anybody else who in the future reveals the truth.
[36:39.980 --> 36:47.260]  And that's, that's something that I really, um, I'd like to ask some questions about this because we've been hearing a lot from, uh, from people defending the government.
[36:47.260 --> 36:48.740]  We've been hearing from Google apologists.
[36:49.220 --> 36:49.800]  Yeah, that's a thing.
[36:50.200 --> 36:52.820]  Uh, people saying, yeah, you know, this is old news.
[36:52.920 --> 36:53.820]  This isn't anything big.
[36:53.960 --> 36:55.140]  We're not spying on everybody.
[36:55.340 --> 36:57.460]  It's, uh, it's, it's not a big deal at all.
[36:57.580 --> 37:03.280]  And then in the same breath, you have people saying this has caused irreparable damage to the United States.
[37:03.380 --> 37:04.040]  Well, which is it?
[37:04.100 --> 37:14.000]  Is this something new that has, uh, has, has basically revealed all this information that was unknown before, or is it the same old thing that we've known about for a decade or more?
[37:14.200 --> 37:15.160]  Any, any ideas?
[37:15.400 --> 37:23.700]  I think, uh, for those of us, those of us who are not generally speaking government apologists, um, what's new, there's a, there's a new level of technical detail.
[37:23.840 --> 37:30.580]  We, we suspected that our calls and call metadata were being given to the government, but now we have proof of this.
[37:30.860 --> 37:35.840]  Um, and so that's new for us, at least maybe people in the government have known it for decades.
[37:36.480 --> 37:44.760]  Um, and I think this has been, uh, not as effective as I might hope, but more effective than I would have thought at starting a debate.
[37:44.900 --> 37:54.240]  Obama is coming out and trying to defend these programs, uh, which is, you know, depressing that he's defending them, although hardly unexpected, but at least he has to defend them.
[37:54.420 --> 37:57.620]  And that is, I would argue, extremely worthwhile.
[37:58.720 --> 38:04.840]  So I don't, I don't, I can't get into the minds of the people who defend these programs, but from my perspective, there's a lot going on.
[38:05.420 --> 38:11.520]  Uh, there is, um, also the reaction of the mainstream media, which had Snowden addressed in that, in that dialogue.
[38:11.740 --> 38:13.920]  Uh, initially he said, I was very encouraged.
[38:14.120 --> 38:25.380]  Unfortunately, the mainstream media now seems far more interested in what I said when I was 17 or what my girlfriend looks like rather than say the largest program of suspicionless surveillance in human history.
[38:25.560 --> 38:30.820]  And that's a very important phrase because suspicionless surveillance is something we are going to have to get used to.
[38:30.940 --> 38:32.000]  That is what we are living with.
[38:32.100 --> 38:35.160]  That is what, uh, we are victims of every single day, it appears.
[38:35.320 --> 38:35.480]  Alex?
[38:35.960 --> 38:37.800]  I think that's a fantastic point.
[38:37.920 --> 38:51.140]  And I think that, uh, you know, this goes back, this, this knowledge of the surveillance goes back to the issue of, well, in Europe, they've, they've had this European data retention directive and the same metadata has been being stored for, for several years now.
[38:51.380 --> 39:00.540]  And in 2008, I did a lot of research on this new data retention directive and whether or not it would be useful to have in the United States.
[39:00.920 --> 39:07.540]  And one of the things that I uncovered was that there was some political discourse about whether or not data should be retained in the United States.
[39:07.540 --> 39:11.160]  And Congress appeared to be uniformly against that kind of thing.
[39:11.300 --> 39:15.580]  So here we are in 2008, our political leader saying, no, we don't need data retention.
[39:15.800 --> 39:16.820]  We have data preservation.
[39:16.820 --> 39:18.180]  That's fine enough.
[39:18.360 --> 39:25.240]  We, we can target basically bad actors by saying to communications providers, hold onto this data of this bad person.
[39:25.380 --> 39:26.140]  We'll take a look at it.
[39:26.420 --> 39:29.980]  But behind our backs and behind everyone's backs, they were doing it already.
[39:30.120 --> 39:31.460]  They were doing it since 2007.
[39:31.520 --> 39:36.580]  I feel personally cheated that I didn't know about that when I was doing my research on the data retention directive.
[39:36.580 --> 39:41.260]  And I think this has particular bearing on things like the ACLU's lawsuit that we talked about last week.
[39:41.420 --> 39:45.520]  Now that we know the surveillance exists, we may have the ability to contest it.
[39:45.700 --> 39:51.580]  And we always go back to this philosophical issue about how, how we can determine and how we can quantify the harm from surveillance.
[39:52.040 --> 39:56.460]  But I, and I, I think that the knowledge of it now is it's bringing it to the, to the forefront.
[39:56.760 --> 40:10.480]  Uh, and I think there's a lot of business issues that, that people like Google and any data driven business are going to have to wrangle with and are going to ask the administration and the politicians to answer for things like this is going to impact the U S and EU trade negotiations.
[40:10.680 --> 40:17.360]  It's going to impact the way in which the EU reforms and revamps its data, uh, protection directive.
[40:17.380 --> 40:24.580]  It's going to cause people to reconsider whether or not the safe harbor provisions and, and sending data over to the United States is actually protected.
[40:24.760 --> 40:35.440]  And it's going to, to give a lot of the EU politicians pause when they went in thinking about whether or not they can actually trust the words of U S politicians.
[40:35.540 --> 40:37.280]  We've lost a lot of credibility, I think.
[40:37.520 --> 40:37.800]  Absolutely.
[40:38.140 --> 40:52.200]  And, um, we, we talked about the harm that this has caused us as, um, as, as individuals, but there are companies that are feeling it as well, namely, uh, companies like Facebook and Google, and they want everybody all around the world to trust them with the most intimate details of their lives.
[40:52.560 --> 40:55.340]  But that's not, uh, happening as easily anymore.
[40:55.560 --> 41:04.460]  Uh, they both are vigorously denying that they gave the U S government special access to their servers or comply with broad requests for users, information and communications.
[41:05.120 --> 41:07.580]  And, uh, they're trying to quell criticism overseas.
[41:07.600 --> 41:13.880]  And especially this, you know, eight in 10 Facebook users is from a different country, not the United States.
[41:13.960 --> 41:14.520]  I didn't know that.
[41:14.860 --> 41:25.800]  Uh, so basically what they're trying to do is, uh, is put pressure on the Obama administration, uh, to shed light on the number and scope of, uh, national security requests they get under the foreign intelligence, uh, surveillance act.
[41:26.080 --> 41:34.060]  And, um, I'm sensing a kind of, uh, desperation on their part because they really, uh, are afraid of, of, of losing, losing trust.
[41:34.440 --> 41:47.220]  Now, um, Ed Snowden was asked this also in the Q and a session about the, um, the whole direct access, direct access to, uh, to servers, uh, of, of Google and Yahoo and all that, what specifically that means.
[41:47.300 --> 41:52.300]  He says more detail on how direct NSA's accesses are is coming.
[41:52.600 --> 41:54.340]  But in general, the reality is this.
[41:54.440 --> 42:04.320]  If an NSA, FBI, CIA, DIA, et cetera, analyst has access to query raw SIGINT, uh, databases, that's, uh, SIGINT signal intelligence.
[42:04.540 --> 42:04.820]  Yes.
[42:04.980 --> 42:05.180]  Okay.
[42:05.660 --> 42:08.260]  Um, they can enter and get results for anything they want.
[42:08.340 --> 42:13.760]  Phone number, email, user ID, cell phone, handset ID, the IMEI, and so on.
[42:13.860 --> 42:14.480]  It's all the same.
[42:17.060 --> 42:20.520]  The data is not technically based and can change at any time.
[42:20.960 --> 42:25.320]  And additionally, audits are cursory, incomplete, and easily fooled by fake justifications.
[42:25.760 --> 42:28.780]  Uh, for at least, uh, GCHQ, Alex?
[42:29.120 --> 42:31.300]  That's the, uh, the UK's spy service.
[42:31.440 --> 42:32.140]  Oh, thank you, Alex.
[42:32.440 --> 42:35.700]  Government's community, government communications headquarters, I think, something like that.
[42:35.940 --> 42:41.200]  Well, for at least GCHQ, the number of audited queries is only 5% of those performed.
[42:41.420 --> 42:49.160]  So it seems to me that, um, uh, there is something real here, despite what we might be hearing from corporate America that there's nothing to see here, move on.
[42:49.600 --> 42:50.260]  I don't know.
[42:50.320 --> 43:00.040]  Do we have any, any, uh, any response to that particular, um, um, allegation that, uh, this is all overblown and, and there's nothing really to be revealed here, Alex?
[43:00.340 --> 43:10.840]  Well, if it's really, if it's all overblown, then I, I think, you know, that raises the question, why was Obama today meeting with Angela Merkel and trying to reassure her that U.S.
[43:10.980 --> 43:17.260]  intelligence agencies aren't rifling through the emails of European citizens and, uh, in Germans in particular.
[43:17.260 --> 43:21.240]  I mean, I think in Europe, they see this as, as a very, very serious infraction.
[43:21.480 --> 43:29.420]  They are beginning to believe that, uh, the United States and the government in particular takes their privacy concerns.
[43:29.640 --> 43:36.860]  What doesn't even take them into consideration is basically an afterthought, you know, that they are treated as if they don't matter in the eyes of our legislation.
[43:37.100 --> 43:53.400]  But then this raises the issue with, well, everyone has to pay attention to what happens in the legislative forum here because these laws have been on the books and this program does appear to be actually legal in terms of the various sections of FISA that,
[43:53.400 --> 43:55.960]  um, that, that warrant these types of activities.
[43:56.140 --> 43:57.240]  The program seems legal.
[43:57.460 --> 44:02.320]  It just seems a lot broader and a lot more nefarious than what we had originally thought.
[44:03.040 --> 44:12.260]  It's really interesting to question though, what legal means when the, uh, the entities who, who run these programs refuse to tell Congress what the programs are.
[44:12.360 --> 44:14.480]  So Congress cannot effectively regulate them.
[44:14.720 --> 44:21.180]  Uh, so it's really almost meaningless to ask if these programs are legal under that definition of legal.
[44:21.680 --> 44:26.500]  Uh, our phone number is 2 1 2 6 5 0 5 7 8 2.
[44:26.720 --> 44:27.760]  I hope I got that right.
[44:27.860 --> 44:29.520]  I'm reading it off a little piece of tape.
[44:29.800 --> 44:32.960]  Uh, and we'll be taking phone calls, uh, in, in, in just a moment.
[44:33.020 --> 44:46.080]  But I want to talk for a second about, um, the testimony, uh, by the, uh, the head of the, uh, National Security Agency, uh, uh, General Keith Alexander, uh, who talked about how these programs help prevent terrorist attacks.
[44:46.400 --> 44:48.400]  Now, supposedly there are more than 50 of them.
[44:48.460 --> 44:51.460]  He only told, uh, uh, Congress about four.
[44:52.300 --> 44:54.060]  And I don't know if he's going to tell about any more.
[44:54.260 --> 45:00.860]  Uh, did anyone have a chance to, uh, to listen to what he actually said and to, to, uh, uh, to see if there was any sense made out of all that?
[45:01.060 --> 45:01.720]  Oh, I did.
[45:01.880 --> 45:02.480]  I'll go ahead, Bernie.
[45:02.880 --> 45:15.480]  Um, well, the, the, the, the alleged 50, uh, terrorist plots that, uh, NSA director, uh, uh, Keith Alexander, uh, referred to before, uh, uh, uh, Congress today to try to justify this program.
[45:15.720 --> 45:24.160]  Um, apparently only about 10 of them were, were plots against the U S the other 40 or supposedly European, uh, nefarious actions.
[45:24.480 --> 45:40.440]  But I think only a couple of the, of, of, of those cited were of the 10 from the U S and both of them, uh, uh, uh, media, U S media is, is largely debunking as intelligence having come from other sources, uh, like British sort of just gumshoe kind of detective work and,
[45:40.520 --> 45:41.860]  and that sort of thing.
[45:42.100 --> 45:55.120]  So the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the specifications are, are, are, are dubious at best, particularly in light of today's testimony, where, um, did you, did you catch this where there was an open microphone and, uh, you know, NSA director,
[45:55.460 --> 46:02.900]  uh, general Keith Alexander, uh, was whispering to, uh, uh, uh, the FBI, uh, uh, uh, spokesperson.
[46:03.080 --> 46:03.740]  Did you catch that?
[46:03.880 --> 46:04.760]  Oh, tell me this is real.
[46:05.180 --> 46:06.140]  Yeah, I did, I did not.
[46:06.220 --> 46:07.860]  I was, I was in traffic jam all day long.
[46:08.380 --> 46:09.880]  Tell me, tell me what, tell me what was said, please.
[46:10.120 --> 46:11.600]  Oh, this was a, this is a great story.
[46:11.820 --> 46:16.860]  It's like, um, well, here, let me, let me try to read this, uh, uh, article in the, the Atlantic Wire today.
[46:17.200 --> 46:18.480]  Um, um.
[46:19.640 --> 46:23.860]  And while you're looking for that, uh, 212-650-5782 is our phone number.
[46:23.900 --> 46:25.080]  We'll be opening our phones in just a moment.
[46:25.200 --> 46:25.400]  Go ahead.
[46:25.940 --> 46:27.680]  I'm going to, I'm going to read a very brief article.
[46:27.780 --> 46:35.500]  If you were wondering how the NSA and FBI felt about the very friendly hearing the House Intelligence Committee invited them today, a hot microphone has their answer.
[46:35.900 --> 46:43.520]  Quote, tell your boss, uh, NSA director Keith Alexander told the FBI deputy director that I owe him another friggin' beer.
[46:44.060 --> 46:55.940]  Um, a reporter named Ben Dornberg caught the exchange, which we've clipped, uh, clipped, uh, Alexander being, uh, General Alexander being photographed at the bottom center of speaking with the FBI director, Sean Joyce, to his left.
[46:56.060 --> 47:02.100]  Throughout the hearing, the two worked together with General Alexander frequently setting up topics upon which Joyce expounded.
[47:02.400 --> 47:09.520]  When General Alexander said that the government's surveillance tools had stopped over 50 terror attacks, Joyce described four of them and so on.
[47:09.520 --> 47:10.800]  It was sort of like a softball game.
[47:10.900 --> 47:15.760]  And over the course of three hours, the two faced little in the way of critique from, from Congress.
[47:16.000 --> 47:17.500]  Nonetheless, they were ready for a beer.
[47:17.880 --> 47:22.340]  Their more informal exchange came after Representative Mike Rogers of Michigan banged the gavel.
[47:22.500 --> 47:22.980]  Here it goes.
[47:23.420 --> 47:25.300]  Uh, General Alexander, thank you, Sean.
[47:25.860 --> 47:27.780]  Uh, and Joyce says, good to see you.
[47:28.220 --> 47:30.900]  Tell your boss, tell your boss I owe him another friggin' beer.
[47:31.320 --> 47:31.620]  Him?
[47:31.840 --> 47:32.020]  Yeah.
[47:32.520 --> 47:33.400]  Tell him to give it to me.
[47:33.580 --> 47:34.700]  You want him to give it to you?
[47:35.100 --> 47:35.580]  All right.
[47:35.900 --> 47:43.960]  Well, in other words, uh, it says, after today's performance, you're pretty sure that either Rogers or Obama would be happy to buy a round of beer for all three of these guys.
[47:44.240 --> 47:50.900]  So this is all it takes to buy testimony before Congress is, it's a friggin' beer, apparently.
[47:51.460 --> 47:51.780]  Wow.
[47:52.340 --> 47:53.640]  And it did say friggin', right?
[47:54.160 --> 47:54.520]  Friggin'.
[47:54.520 --> 47:55.080]  Friggin' beer.
[47:55.180 --> 47:55.420]  Okay.
[47:55.680 --> 47:56.000]  All right.
[47:56.120 --> 47:59.200]  Well, that would be the big news story if they said something else, believe me.
[47:59.520 --> 48:02.200]  But, uh, that's, um, that's something that's, that's revealing.
[48:02.380 --> 48:06.540]  And the irony, though, is that they're, they're, they're caught in this exchange by an eavesdropping device.
[48:07.180 --> 48:10.140]  You know, it's like, which was right in front of their faces.
[48:10.620 --> 48:11.380]  I love it.
[48:11.480 --> 48:12.320]  You couldn't write this stuff.
[48:12.440 --> 48:13.140]  That's great, Bernie.
[48:13.300 --> 48:17.040]  Well, it does tell us, I mean, beer, uh, is a universal currency.
[48:17.480 --> 48:19.080]  So it's terrible, though.
[48:19.780 --> 48:19.920]  All right.
[48:20.000 --> 48:21.940]  Let's, uh, open up those phone lines again.
[48:22.160 --> 48:31.480]  The, uh, phone number 212-650-5782 will hear the nasty noise when somebody does call in because we only have one phone line and, uh, we have no way of muting that, uh, that awful noise.
[48:31.700 --> 48:34.220]  And while we wait for that call to come in, then, oh, there it is.
[48:34.300 --> 48:40.720]  Well, I guess, uh, I did want to just read one, one, uh, piece of email from one of our listeners who, uh, asked us a favor.
[48:40.900 --> 48:46.740]  Uh, the foreign intelligence surveillance, uh, surveillance court, uh, known as FISA, uh, is not in fact a court.
[48:46.920 --> 48:47.740]  This is a misnomer.
[48:47.920 --> 48:54.260]  FISA is a rubber stamp administrative body, which, as you know, approves 99% of the matters that come before it.
[48:54.440 --> 48:56.240]  Unlike every bona fide U.S.
[48:56.340 --> 49:00.980]  court, FISA's decisions are not subject to review by any other court because they are a secret.
[49:01.220 --> 49:03.460]  Please don't perpetuate this lie.
[49:03.700 --> 49:04.660]  What do you think about that, Alex?
[49:05.420 --> 49:13.400]  Well, there is, I guess, some veracity to the notion that the foreign intelligence surveillance court, uh, acts as a rubber stamp.
[49:13.620 --> 49:24.060]  And 2012, I think the statistic was, um, 1,788 applications were made to the FISC, the foreign intelligence surveillance court.
[49:24.300 --> 49:26.180]  And guess how many of them were denied?
[49:26.620 --> 49:27.340]  Uh, zero.
[49:27.540 --> 49:29.040]  Zero is absolutely correct.
[49:29.200 --> 49:29.660]  How about that?
[49:29.700 --> 49:40.160]  And so in this sense, you know, there is a lot of criticism directed to the foreign intelligence surveillance court because they are, um, they operate in secret and they operate in an ex parte fashion.
[49:40.280 --> 49:47.280]  What that means is that they only hear one side, they only hear the government said, they only, you only basically have one chance to, to submit.
[49:47.640 --> 49:52.140]  Uh, the government has one shot at submitting these applications and they, they often grant them.
[49:52.640 --> 49:56.720]  It's, uh, it's something that the ACLU is trying to pry the door open from.
[49:57.300 --> 49:57.700]  Okay.
[49:57.900 --> 50:05.900]  Uh, well, I'm sorry, uh, the person who called in, uh, you've timed out, but, uh, we have a very, uh, low tolerance on this phone system for, uh, for phone calls.
[50:06.020 --> 50:10.280]  I think they time out after five rings again, the phone number 2 1 2 6 5 0 5 7 8 2.
[50:10.580 --> 50:13.980]  Uh, and, uh, we, uh, hope to get another phone call in just a moment.
[50:14.220 --> 50:17.580]  Uh, I know lots of people are trying, but only one can, can squeeze through it once.
[50:18.580 --> 50:20.300]  Uh, there it is.
[50:20.380 --> 50:20.540]  Okay.
[50:20.680 --> 50:22.920]  Let's not talking from somebody else.
[50:22.980 --> 50:23.300]  Good evening.
[50:23.760 --> 50:24.880]  You're on off the hook.
[50:24.980 --> 50:25.300]  Yes.
[50:25.600 --> 50:27.060]  Uh, Tom from the Bronx here.
[50:27.120 --> 50:28.220]  So glad you called.
[50:28.380 --> 50:41.720]  I like to say this, that other stations, you know, with the talk shows, I think people are afraid actually to call in cause a lot of people just don't seem to be calling other talk shows, you know?
[50:41.960 --> 50:43.860]  You think people are afraid to call talk shows?
[50:44.180 --> 50:44.440]  Huh?
[50:44.680 --> 50:46.260]  You think people are afraid to call talk shows?
[50:46.500 --> 50:56.740]  In my opinion, because, uh, because, uh, uh, like in the afternoon on another station, the, uh, the AM, they, they have some talk shows.
[50:56.880 --> 51:01.180]  Well, Tom, we only have a couple of minutes, So let's just try to get through as many calls as possible.
[51:01.320 --> 51:03.940]  Ask a question, and we've got to move on right after that.
[51:04.060 --> 51:04.240]  Right.
[51:04.340 --> 51:08.000]  They are, unfortunately, sneaking on, all of us.
[51:08.040 --> 51:13.600]  I know years ago when I retired, I had two finks call me, mysteriously.
[51:14.160 --> 51:15.400]  And they said, what's the matter?
[51:15.400 --> 51:18.540]  You don't have Facebook, or you don't have something else?
[51:18.620 --> 51:19.680]  I said, what's your problem?
[51:20.400 --> 51:21.300]  They hung up.
[51:22.080 --> 51:23.000]  Well, good for you.
[51:23.000 --> 51:26.060]  That must have been... and I retired in 2002.
[51:26.520 --> 51:30.180]  So they must have been doing this then.
[51:30.880 --> 51:37.140]  Well, Tom, please keep listening and spreading the news and encouraging people to not become victims of this.
[51:37.360 --> 51:38.360]  Thanks again for calling.
[51:38.540 --> 51:42.100]  212-650-5782 is our telephone number.
[51:42.220 --> 51:48.180]  Do you have any thoughts on PRISM or spying or Bradley Manning or Ed Snowden or any of that?
[51:48.260 --> 51:49.180]  Let's see who's out there.
[51:49.240 --> 51:49.520]  Good evening.
[51:49.640 --> 51:50.220]  You're on Off the Hook.
[51:50.940 --> 51:51.460]  Hi.
[51:51.680 --> 51:52.220]  I was curious.
[51:52.280 --> 52:03.620]  I believe in one of the copies of the magazine, I thought that there was some... what was it?
[52:03.680 --> 52:08.880]  I think there was something about putting a box in the ISPs right after the Patriot Act.
[52:09.460 --> 52:12.860]  And I was kind of wondering if maybe this was the start of PRISM.
[52:13.460 --> 52:17.560]  It very well could have been, because this has been going on for quite some time.
[52:17.560 --> 52:20.540]  It was the carnivore program, and that was well before the Patriot Act.
[52:20.620 --> 52:28.980]  Remember, that was another Booz Allen Hamilton project, where they were putting these email eavesdropping devices at internet service providers' head ends?
[52:29.120 --> 52:30.940]  I didn't know it was them that was doing it.
[52:31.120 --> 52:32.240]  Yeah, that was Booz Allen Hamilton.
[52:32.380 --> 52:34.200]  It was the same contracting firm, believe it or not.
[52:34.520 --> 52:41.080]  And these different programs could easily become components of other programs or rolled into other programs, or just the names completely drop off.
[52:41.080 --> 52:46.740]  They call it one thing to get it installed, and then it's adapted and becomes a part of another system.
[52:46.840 --> 52:48.380]  Remember, total information awareness.
[52:48.580 --> 52:49.200]  What ever happened to that?
[52:50.060 --> 52:51.700]  That was post-Patriot.
[52:51.920 --> 53:05.000]  But several years before the Patriot Act, the FBI had their carnivore program, which was, again, deployed by Booz Allen Hamilton, our friendly wiretapping government contractor.
[53:05.740 --> 53:16.460]  I do want to caution against making the mistake of calling what we're learning now the PRISM scandals, because it's fairly clear that PRISM is just a tiny piece of the government's spying apparatus.
[53:17.140 --> 53:29.180]  The program, for instance, to look at the internet traffic and slurp up the internet traffic over all the international cables is not part of the PRISM program, but it's much more frightening.
[53:29.360 --> 53:29.940]  What's it called?
[53:30.220 --> 53:31.000]  I don't know.
[53:31.020 --> 53:31.780]  Well, we need a name.
[53:31.880 --> 53:35.720]  You see, that's the only way people will pay attention is if there's a catchy name that they can latch on to.
[53:35.820 --> 53:36.680]  Yeah, well, that's part of the problem.
[53:36.800 --> 53:39.960]  And PRISM has this amazingly ugly logo that we've seen.
[53:40.580 --> 53:45.400]  But that doesn't make it the most important or the most evil thing that the NSA is doing.
[53:45.600 --> 53:47.040]  So I do want to be a little bit careful.
[53:47.280 --> 53:47.560]  All right.
[53:47.800 --> 53:48.620]  Caller, any other questions?
[53:49.140 --> 53:50.220]  No, thank you very much.
[53:50.300 --> 53:50.880]  Thanks for your call.
[53:51.460 --> 53:55.380]  Once again, 212-650-5782 is our phone number.
[53:55.460 --> 53:56.440]  We only have a couple of minutes left.
[53:56.700 --> 54:05.960]  You can also write to us, OTH at 2600.com, if you have any questions or comments on things that you've heard during this hour or any other hours that we're on the air.
[54:05.960 --> 54:06.820]  Go ahead, Alex.
[54:07.440 --> 54:19.600]  Just to go back to this notion of, you know, the bad things that are happening underneath the intelligence agencies, regimes, I think that, you know, just to give a contrary point, FISA is basically about foreign intelligence.
[54:19.600 --> 54:21.520]  And it's not about criminality.
[54:21.680 --> 54:28.880]  The point of FISA is to detect and deter terrorist activity and counter espionage activities.
[54:29.160 --> 54:32.700]  It's not to basically slurp up any kind of criminal data.
[54:32.980 --> 54:38.340]  In the UK and in the EU, the data retention over there can be used for criminal purposes.
[54:38.560 --> 54:41.740]  But here, I think the bulk of it is supposed to be used for foreign intelligence.
[54:41.900 --> 54:47.260]  There is some overlap in terms of it being used in criminal proceedings, but there's supposed to be a lot more scrutiny.
[54:47.620 --> 54:55.940]  And that's how I think that some of this FISA scrutiny will eventually come out into play and come out into the open, is if some of this data is going to be used in criminal proceedings.
[54:56.280 --> 54:57.300]  Okay, let's take another phone call.
[54:57.720 --> 54:58.580]  And good evening.
[54:58.720 --> 54:59.420]  You're on Off the Hook.
[54:59.920 --> 55:17.100]  I guess what bothers me most about the Stone story, now that the NSA has claimed that they stopped a certain number of specific terrorist attacks, is that there's been no follow-up, no news organization, even the ones that have known that the reporters have been basically spied on,
[55:17.260 --> 55:22.620]  have asked for evidence, have asked for what kind of false positives have you been getting, what kind of false negatives.
[55:22.740 --> 55:23.500]  There's no follow-up stories.
[55:23.640 --> 55:25.700]  It's like, oh, okay, I guess we're all okay with this.
[55:26.840 --> 55:27.540]  They're scared.
[55:27.760 --> 55:28.360]  It's fear.
[55:29.260 --> 55:33.860]  They're scared to do what they're supposed to do as the fifth estate, right?
[55:33.960 --> 55:49.340]  And it's their job, and yet they're afraid because, I don't know, you blame it on media consolidation, but, you know, people have to get comfortable talking about this stuff because it's certainly something is going on, and I don't know, we need more information out there so that people can scrutinize it and,
[55:49.360 --> 55:50.720]  yeah, share and discuss it.
[55:50.720 --> 55:57.740]  There is a really good story that I saw in the Associated Press called The Secret to Prison Program, Even Bigger Data Seizure.
[55:57.840 --> 56:03.520]  So if you look that up on the net, you'll find a very extensive article about background to all of this.
[56:03.660 --> 56:05.640]  Also, read some foreign media, too.
[56:05.780 --> 56:10.000]  Read BBC, read Russia Today, and you'll find different perspectives.
[56:10.120 --> 56:11.480]  And, of course, Democracy Now!
[56:11.640 --> 56:14.280]  and the news programs here at Pacifica.
[56:15.440 --> 56:16.380]  Al Jazeera is good, too.
[56:16.460 --> 56:17.180]  Al Jazeera is great.
[56:17.260 --> 56:17.840]  Yes, absolutely.
[56:18.060 --> 56:19.400]  So it's out there, but you're right.
[56:19.520 --> 56:23.060]  The mainstream media here in this country is more interested in what Ed Snowden's girlfriend looks like.
[56:23.360 --> 56:24.240]  And that's a fact.
[56:24.420 --> 56:25.780]  That's what they're covering.
[56:26.320 --> 56:28.300]  Let's try and take another phone call.
[56:28.740 --> 56:32.240]  212-650-578.
[56:32.340 --> 56:36.660]  I can't seem to get rid of that call there for some reason.
[56:37.440 --> 56:37.840]  Okay.
[56:38.140 --> 56:39.000]  Well, now I got rid of Bernie.
[56:39.080 --> 56:39.720]  I'm sorry, Bernie.
[56:40.240 --> 56:43.020]  There's no way to get rid of just one without getting rid of both.
[56:43.440 --> 56:44.700]  Great system we've got here.
[56:44.800 --> 56:46.500]  Now, of course, we can take two phone calls at once.
[56:50.160 --> 56:50.860]  We'll be the last one for tonight.
[56:50.940 --> 56:51.220]  Good evening.
[56:51.380 --> 56:52.540]  You're on Off the Hook.
[56:53.520 --> 56:54.360]  Speak up, please.
[56:55.000 --> 56:55.380]  Hi.
[56:55.540 --> 57:08.660]  My name is John, and I'm calling in because the point of a lot of this spying seems to me is setting up the ability to head off domestic protests.
[57:08.960 --> 57:16.540]  There's been things that I've been reading about how these same type of programs were used to monitor and coordinate the suppression of Occupy Wall Street.
[57:16.980 --> 57:19.280]  And what do you guys comment to that?
[57:19.920 --> 57:20.320]  Okay.
[57:20.400 --> 57:21.040]  Anybody want to take that?
[57:21.260 --> 57:23.200]  This speaks to people saying they don't care.
[57:23.380 --> 57:25.660]  You know, they don't care what, you know, information is out there.
[57:25.780 --> 57:26.080]  Well, fine.
[57:26.160 --> 57:26.260]  Yeah.
[57:26.320 --> 57:28.500]  If you didn't care about it yesterday, that's one thing.
[57:28.580 --> 57:43.320]  But what if something really ticks you off or a new administration comes in and you're angered by that or corporations take over something that was once public or whatever it is, you might become, you know, part of a large group of people that have something to say about it and then information is used against you and,
[57:43.320 --> 57:47.820]  you know, maybe compromises your ability to talk and discuss and organize.
[57:48.980 --> 57:53.180]  Unfortunately, that's going to have to do it for us here tonight as we only have an hour.
[57:53.400 --> 57:54.640]  But we'd love to hear from you.
[57:54.740 --> 57:56.420]  OTH at 2600.com.
[57:56.540 --> 58:00.680]  No doubt this story will have new developments in the week ahead.
[58:00.840 --> 58:09.760]  We'll be back again in one week to talk about those as well as whatever else is going on in the hacker world, in the technological world and all sorts of other things.
[58:10.380 --> 58:13.700]  So, Emanuel, for Off the Hook, stay tuned for the Personal Computer Show here on WBA on New York.
[58:13.840 --> 58:14.020]  Good night.
[01:00:14.010 --> 01:00:14.410]  Woo!
[01:00:15.110 --> 01:00:16.890]  Peter Gunn.
[01:00:17.570 --> 01:00:17.970]  Wow.
[01:00:18.290 --> 01:00:19.770]  And with the police.
[01:00:20.550 --> 01:00:22.230]  You know, that has a theme there.
[01:00:22.430 --> 01:00:24.330]  Peter Gunn and the police.
[01:00:24.330 --> 01:00:26.090]  He was a private investigator.