[00:13.460 --> 00:22.480]  And you're listening to WBAI New York, where the time is just about 7 o'clock.
[00:22.640 --> 00:25.680]  Time, once again, for Off the Hook.
[01:43.830 --> 01:45.230]  And a very good evening to everybody.
[01:45.350 --> 01:46.170]  The program is Off the Hook.
[01:46.270 --> 01:51.310]  Emmanuel Goldstein here with you, joined tonight by Mike, who just made it into the door.
[01:51.430 --> 01:51.910]  I'm here, though.
[01:52.230 --> 01:52.510]  Great.
[01:52.990 --> 01:53.530]  Rob T.
[01:53.630 --> 01:53.990]  Firefly.
[01:54.210 --> 01:54.690]  Good evening.
[01:55.010 --> 01:56.250]  Is that Cheshire Catalyst, I say?
[01:56.330 --> 01:56.990]  Hi there.
[01:57.190 --> 01:57.510]  Wow.
[01:58.370 --> 01:59.770]  Finally recovered from hope, I see.
[02:00.090 --> 02:00.710]  Finally, yes.
[02:00.710 --> 02:01.110]  Good.
[02:01.570 --> 02:02.590]  And Bernie S.
[02:03.130 --> 02:04.910]  Greetings from Philadelphia.
[02:04.910 --> 02:05.670]  Hi, Cheshire.
[02:06.030 --> 02:06.590]  Hi there.
[02:06.690 --> 02:07.290]  Good to hear from you.
[02:07.710 --> 02:07.950]  Yeah.
[02:08.270 --> 02:11.510]  Well, it's good that we're all gathered here today on the eve of winter.
[02:11.690 --> 02:12.710]  Yes, it's coming tonight.
[02:13.630 --> 02:20.270]  Because we have all kinds of important things to talk about, not the least of which is the big news about net neutrality.
[02:20.810 --> 02:23.230]  But we'll get into that in just a little bit.
[02:23.330 --> 02:27.350]  First, a few items that I thought might be fun to focus on.
[02:27.430 --> 02:33.430]  And, of course, if anybody else has something they'd like to bring up that they think might be interesting, well, by all means do so.
[02:33.670 --> 02:39.550]  But the latest tally in who got hacked, who had their information taken.
[02:39.710 --> 02:40.930]  Are we keeping track of this?
[02:41.310 --> 02:42.030]  The U.S.
[02:42.170 --> 02:43.270]  Postal Service now?
[02:43.270 --> 02:44.730]  And today I heard Kmart.
[02:45.710 --> 02:46.650]  Did I miss anything?
[02:46.850 --> 02:47.370]  I'm sure I did.
[02:48.490 --> 02:50.950]  It's, yeah, it's a free-for-all out there.
[02:51.050 --> 02:54.150]  It's pretty difficult to keep track with the pace of things.
[02:54.390 --> 02:55.550]  Yeah, yeah, it certainly is.
[02:56.350 --> 02:58.430]  Well, let's look at the post office for now.
[02:58.870 --> 02:59.490]  The U.S.
[02:59.530 --> 03:12.370]  Postal Service said Monday it had been hacked, potentially compromising sensitive information about its employees, such as names and addresses, social security numbers, emergency contacts, and other information.
[03:12.930 --> 03:15.650]  FBI is leading a multi-agency investigation.
[03:15.990 --> 03:22.710]  Intrusion was supposedly similar to those reported by other federal agencies, as well as some in the private sector.
[03:23.370 --> 03:30.310]  The agency isn't recommending that its customers take any action because it apparently doesn't affect the customers, it only affects the employees, which...
[03:30.310 --> 03:30.910]  Wait a second.
[03:31.190 --> 03:31.490]  What's that?
[03:31.490 --> 03:34.750]  You mean the Postal Inspection Service has allowed somebody else to take over jurisdiction?
[03:34.750 --> 03:35.850]  Yeah, it looks that way.
[03:35.950 --> 03:38.270]  Well, I don't think the postal police are going to jump on this.
[03:38.590 --> 03:40.190]  No, they're pretty serious, those guys.
[03:40.450 --> 03:42.710]  Well, that's regarding mail fraud and things like that.
[03:42.810 --> 03:43.490]  I don't know about hacking...
[03:43.490 --> 03:52.070]  Anything related to post office security, these gun-toting postal inspectors, they're all the thing.
[03:52.310 --> 03:52.570]  Uh-huh.
[03:52.910 --> 03:53.270]  Okay.
[03:53.690 --> 03:56.750]  From personal experience, they're mean, the postal people.
[03:57.030 --> 03:58.370]  I was once at a...
[03:58.370 --> 04:00.650]  How do you manage to run afoul of them?
[04:01.130 --> 04:02.690]  It's really easy, is the thing.
[04:02.690 --> 04:12.050]  I was once at a voter thing, and we dropped off a bunch of voter registration forms at, you know, the main post office above Penn Station.
[04:12.330 --> 04:21.870]  And, you know, there were a bunch of excited people, but no one with any mind to cause any damage or disrupt the flow of the post or anything like that.
[04:21.870 --> 04:22.570]  Back up a second.
[04:22.690 --> 04:23.490]  Not cause any damage?
[04:23.690 --> 04:32.310]  You wanted people to vote for, I guess, another candidate, a different candidate, oppositional candidate, and you say you don't want to cause any damage to our system, our status quo?
[04:32.470 --> 04:32.970]  Of course.
[04:33.090 --> 04:34.930]  Of course the gun-toting postal police will be after you.
[04:35.150 --> 04:42.890]  Well, I mean, the summary is that the New York Police Department, in general, no friend to protest, showed up and told the postal police to, like, calm down already.
[04:44.210 --> 04:44.810]  Wow.
[04:45.210 --> 04:46.470]  I've seen their cars.
[04:46.770 --> 04:56.130]  I haven't actually... that's one group of law enforcement people I have not gotten into a conflict with, but I'm aware of their presence, so I thought that was kind of interesting.
[04:56.630 --> 04:56.810]  Yes.
[04:57.690 --> 05:03.550]  I'm wondering if the Postal Service's mail cover database was hacked as well.
[05:03.730 --> 05:05.610]  That's the system where the U.S.
[05:05.670 --> 05:10.450]  Postal Service takes a digital photo of the front and back of everything that's mailed.
[05:10.830 --> 05:11.270]  Everything.
[05:11.510 --> 05:12.630]  It used to be just suspects.
[05:12.970 --> 05:14.550]  Now everybody is a suspect.
[05:14.830 --> 05:21.330]  And who they share that information with is probably FBI or whoever else asks for it in the federal circles.
[05:21.510 --> 05:21.630]  Yeah.
[05:21.690 --> 05:26.050]  This was mentioned at Hope, I know, and a bunch of other places, but it bears repeating.
[05:26.190 --> 05:27.030]  It bears emphasis.
[05:27.290 --> 05:37.090]  And let me just... I'm going to ask you to verify, Bernie, that the way it stands right now, every single piece of mail, the front and the back of it, that goes to the U.S.
[05:37.130 --> 05:40.270]  Postal Service, is photographed, digitized, and stored, correct?
[05:40.650 --> 05:43.750]  Hard to believe, but leaked documents have borne that out.
[05:43.970 --> 05:46.750]  So I'm waiting for that database to get hacked into.
[05:46.950 --> 05:48.150]  It's only a matter of time, I think.
[05:48.250 --> 05:50.230]  Well, that would be one massive database, wouldn't it?
[05:50.230 --> 05:51.770]  How would you even find anything in that?
[05:51.790 --> 05:52.690]  It's got to be huge.
[05:52.750 --> 06:07.910]  And I'm sure they probably do an optical character recognition, but a friend of mine mails me stuff with fake return labels, like ACLU of this whatever city they're sending it from, but, you know, to throw them off.
[06:08.050 --> 06:14.570]  But it's pretty amazing, that level of surveillance that everybody who mails anything is under.
[06:14.770 --> 06:25.950]  Well, I mean, if you want to test it out, I guess, on the back of an envelope, scribble something like ISIS meeting tonight, or give them some time next Wednesday at 7.30 at the public library, and see who shows up.
[06:26.470 --> 06:27.350]  No, don't do that, kids.
[06:27.650 --> 06:29.050]  That'll get you in a lot of trouble.
[06:29.170 --> 06:31.870]  But, you know, we do have the technology.
[06:31.870 --> 06:32.850]  This can be done.
[06:32.970 --> 06:36.650]  Things can be scanned en masse and stored and gone through.
[06:36.890 --> 06:38.890]  So, yeah, let's not be surprised by this.
[06:39.010 --> 06:39.150]  Mike?
[06:39.270 --> 06:43.270]  I mean, so Bernie says it's only a matter of time before this database gets leaked.
[06:43.310 --> 06:59.970]  I'm not so sure, because this is a classified program, and the government in general spends a lot more effort in keeping classified programs hidden from the citizens who pay for them than it does from, you know, caring about its employees' private financial data.
[07:00.050 --> 07:01.470]  It's a classified program.
[07:01.470 --> 07:02.610]  It's a classified program.
[07:03.190 --> 07:04.290]  Why are we talking about it?
[07:04.370 --> 07:04.970]  How do we know about it?
[07:05.050 --> 07:05.810]  It's not classified anymore.
[07:06.190 --> 07:12.230]  Things get leaked occasionally, but the content itself... I mean, even Snowden didn't leak any content.
[07:13.070 --> 07:13.450]  Uh-huh.
[07:13.750 --> 07:14.030]  Okay.
[07:14.130 --> 07:17.590]  But, I mean, the program is known about, so it's not a secret program anymore is what I'm saying.
[07:18.530 --> 07:22.550]  And I'm just... Again, where is this information being stored?
[07:22.650 --> 07:23.310]  That's what I'd like to know.
[07:23.410 --> 07:24.530]  How much... Think about it.
[07:24.590 --> 07:25.750]  Every single piece of mail.
[07:25.910 --> 07:26.730]  I don't know how they do packages.
[07:26.910 --> 07:28.970]  I guess they do four sides of a package.
[07:29.910 --> 07:33.270]  They have to store that someplace, and it keeps getting bigger and bigger and bigger.
[07:33.930 --> 07:41.770]  And I imagine they keep improving the technology and doing better scans, but they have to keep this data someplace and analyze it someplace.
[07:42.650 --> 07:44.510]  I guess that's the part we don't know yet, right?
[07:45.510 --> 07:47.790]  I mean, Utah is one guess, but I don't know for sure.
[07:47.910 --> 07:49.010]  Well, that means they're working with the NSA.
[07:49.450 --> 07:52.550]  Are they, in fact, working with the NSA on this particular program?
[07:53.570 --> 07:55.730]  Again, something... They won't tell me is all I know.
[07:55.770 --> 07:58.810]  Well, we just need to... We're just conjecturing.
[07:59.030 --> 08:01.230]  They'd have the computing power to go through that stuff.
[08:01.450 --> 08:01.690]  Mm-hmm.
[08:02.310 --> 08:02.670]  Absolutely.
[08:02.850 --> 08:03.350]  But would they?
[08:03.430 --> 08:06.270]  Just because they have the computing power doesn't mean they're the ones doing it.
[08:06.350 --> 08:06.550]  I know.
[08:06.650 --> 08:07.690]  I'm curious about these things.
[08:07.890 --> 08:10.410]  These are the questions we need to have answered.
[08:10.650 --> 08:11.730]  Yes, we know they're doing it.
[08:12.550 --> 08:13.950]  Now, what are they doing with it?
[08:14.010 --> 08:15.990]  Where are they doing the actual work?
[08:16.790 --> 08:17.150]  Okay.
[08:17.270 --> 08:17.990]  Interesting story.
[08:18.470 --> 08:20.750]  Actually, this took place in your neck of the woods, Bernie.
[08:20.950 --> 08:24.770]  You heard about this kidnapping that took place about a week or so ago.
[08:25.090 --> 08:25.210]  Yeah.
[08:25.310 --> 08:26.930]  Actually, not far from my home in Philadelphia.
[08:27.330 --> 08:27.490]  Yeah.
[08:27.770 --> 08:33.270]  A 22-year-old woman was abducted off the street, I think it was a week ago, Sunday.
[08:34.130 --> 08:43.130]  And this is the kind of story that I think we should focus on because it really makes some of the positions that we take kind of difficult and we need to address them.
[08:43.690 --> 08:49.030]  You have a situation here where this person was abducted and then later, thankfully, found safely.
[08:50.450 --> 08:58.510]  And all the technology that was used to track this person down are the things that we have problems with, such as surveillance video.
[08:58.750 --> 09:00.630]  They had surveillance video of the street.
[09:00.790 --> 09:01.990]  You could see her being abducted.
[09:02.050 --> 09:03.130]  Everybody was watching this.
[09:03.290 --> 09:04.690]  It was a trending video and all that.
[09:05.010 --> 09:12.470]  Then there was a GPS tracking device on the vehicle that she was abducted in.
[09:12.870 --> 09:14.870]  I'm not entirely sure how they did that.
[09:15.490 --> 09:21.190]  There are all kinds of little bits of technology that are used to spy on people, but it had a happy ending.
[09:21.310 --> 09:35.150]  And I think anybody that would be involved in this story would be very opposed to the kind of privacy that we are constantly advocating for because, well, if you didn't know where this person was, you never would have found her.
[09:35.670 --> 09:36.510]  Bernie, what do you think about that?
[09:36.510 --> 09:38.410]  I think this was actually good police work.
[09:38.710 --> 09:44.010]  What happened was that after the woman was kidnapped on video, the video was put online.
[09:44.370 --> 09:49.430]  And through crowdsourcing, someone recognized the vehicle, not the kidnapper.
[09:49.930 --> 09:58.090]  And that led to somebody who sold the guy the vehicle or leased it to him or something.
[09:58.270 --> 10:01.710]  And the purchaser, the kidnapper, had really bad credit.
[10:01.710 --> 10:13.090]  So the only way he could buy this vehicle was to agree to have a GPS tracking device in the vehicle so that it could be repossessed if he didn't make payments on it.
[10:13.370 --> 10:25.790]  So once they knew what the vehicle was, just from recognizing it, they researched through the company that does the tracking for leased vehicles or sold vehicles, and they found out where he was.
[10:25.890 --> 10:28.210]  And that's how they found this woman in another state.
[10:28.210 --> 10:36.310]  So if I understand correctly, the vehicle had a GPS unit on it that could be tracked.
[10:36.430 --> 10:44.670]  And the reason that was put on it by the car dealer was because the person getting the car had bad credit and they were worried the car might disappear.
[10:45.870 --> 10:50.010]  Was this done with the knowledge of the person buying the car or leasing the car?
[10:50.790 --> 11:03.230]  Presumably, when you take out a car loan and your credit is sketchy, the contract says, you agree to have this GPS thing put in your car so that we can repossess, find it, and repossess it if you don't make your payments.
[11:03.430 --> 11:05.550]  And then you go abduct somebody in that same car.
[11:05.710 --> 11:08.310]  I mean, that doesn't... He wasn't too bright, obviously.
[11:08.430 --> 11:08.630]  Yeah.
[11:08.730 --> 11:10.510]  Now, imagine someone who was bright.
[11:10.590 --> 11:19.130]  Imagine somebody who did a little bit of thinking and people will advocate, well, you can't tell them the GPS is there because if you do that, they'll know enough not to use the car.
[11:19.370 --> 11:22.130]  He'd have to have wrote the contract and he obviously didn't.
[11:22.130 --> 11:23.230]  Yeah, I guess not.
[11:23.390 --> 11:23.490]  Yeah.
[11:23.590 --> 11:27.310]  I mean, Bernie, I can't believe you are almost implying that you think this is okay.
[11:27.870 --> 11:30.510]  I mean... Well, it was voluntary.
[11:30.850 --> 11:32.050]  It's not voluntary.
[11:33.930 --> 11:45.190]  It's... poor people are coerced into accepting these kind of agreements that Cheshire's right, they probably don't read, may or may not fully understand, and have no choice but to accept even if they do read and understand.
[11:45.830 --> 11:52.570]  I do not support, you know, tracking the locations of vehicles of people with bad credit.
[11:52.710 --> 11:54.990]  I don't think that's the kind of society we want to build.
[11:55.150 --> 12:02.590]  Well, okay, but how do you argue that in the face of this overwhelming success for the people who advocate the opposite?
[12:03.010 --> 12:06.130]  They would never have found this guy were it not for that tracking device.
[12:06.330 --> 12:10.630]  But they wouldn't have looked for it if he hadn't done something.
[12:11.610 --> 12:12.110]  Okay.
[12:12.450 --> 12:17.130]  I mean, this technology is not installed to stop kidnappers.
[12:17.390 --> 12:20.690]  Most people with bad credit, in fact, are not kidnappers.
[12:20.790 --> 12:23.190]  I don't think I need to tell the BAI audience that.
[12:23.890 --> 12:29.550]  And this technology is just used to, you know, take the cars of people who can't pay.
[12:30.070 --> 12:43.310]  If this technology is the one that worked out in this instance, and let's be clear, I'm glad that this victim was was found and found quickly, but their police have been finding people who are kidnapped before this technology existed.
[12:43.610 --> 12:47.670]  They find people who are kidnapped by rich people who can afford not to have this technology.
[12:48.130 --> 12:54.230]  I, you know, I don't know what would have worked in this particular case, but it is not like this is the only way to catch kidnappers.
[12:54.470 --> 12:58.250]  Wasn't this guy already suspected of kidnapping somebody in the past?
[12:58.610 --> 13:03.070]  And, and, and he was out, he was still out and about and able to do it again.
[13:03.430 --> 13:08.690]  Uh, so yeah, it's, it doesn't seem like relying on, on police work here is really the best bet.
[13:08.890 --> 13:15.030]  Um, and I think you're going to see more turning to technology as a bit of a crutch to solve these cases.
[13:15.590 --> 13:18.790]  But, um, it's, it's the slippery slope, the slippery slope argument.
[13:18.990 --> 13:29.030]  I mean, you could take the most unjust, uh, social implementation of, uh, bad technology to, you know, that you could possibly think of, and you could think of one instance where it might end happily.
[13:29.590 --> 13:36.970]  And, uh, you know, the existence of that one little silver lining on this massive cloud cannot really justify all the other bad applications of it.
[13:37.070 --> 13:38.390]  Well, I think that's the key.
[13:38.530 --> 13:44.230]  That's what needs to be focused on are the bad applications where this was used to hurt people and not help people.
[13:44.510 --> 13:48.430]  And if you outweigh the good with the bad, then you have a chance of convincing people.
[13:48.470 --> 13:51.110]  But I think we have to recognize that this kind of thing happens.
[13:51.210 --> 13:53.830]  It makes it very, very difficult to present that case.
[13:53.830 --> 13:58.470]  And we can't fool ourselves and think that, uh, we're, we're going to have an easy time of it.
[13:58.470 --> 14:00.210]  We need to have our arguments laid out.
[14:00.330 --> 14:02.330]  And, uh, this case demonstrates that.
[14:02.610 --> 14:03.050]  Emmanuel?
[14:03.270 --> 14:03.430]  Yes.
[14:03.790 --> 14:17.770]  I think the point to take from this is that once you, uh, agree to, um, maybe under coercement because you can't afford a car otherwise without this GPS tracking thing is, um, you no longer have a legal expectation of privacy.
[14:17.910 --> 14:24.770]  I'm not saying the law is fair, but, um, I think it was, um, uh, Maryland v.
[14:25.090 --> 14:36.410]  Smith or something was the case where any, any information about yourself that is, that is turned over to a third party in this case, the leasing company, I guess, um, or the, the used car dealership.
[14:36.970 --> 14:44.950]  Um, once it's turned over to a third party, you, you, it's no longer requires a warrant to obtain by law enforcement.
[14:45.250 --> 14:52.030]  So if you've got one of these things in your car, be aware that you have no idea who has access to where you're going and that data.
[14:52.910 --> 14:57.150]  And let's face it, this fellow was just being stupid and you can't stop people from being stupid.
[14:57.590 --> 15:03.790]  Well, I mean, I, I think, uh, law enforcement, uh, it counts on people being stupid because that's how so many of them are caught.
[15:03.910 --> 15:10.610]  Uh, and, and, and I guess another argument, um, to help us out here is that word will get out of this, you know, from this.
[15:10.810 --> 15:17.070]  And, uh, people who are intent on kidnapping, uh, will check their cars now to make sure there's no GPS units on them.
[15:17.170 --> 15:18.730]  So this can't happen again.
[15:19.010 --> 15:24.510]  So it's kind of a flimsy argument, but it's, it's, it's definitely an argument in favor of, uh, of not doing this kind of thing.
[15:24.530 --> 15:26.910]  But, uh, we just have to have a, a strong case.
[15:27.070 --> 15:27.470]  Okay.
[15:27.610 --> 15:31.370]  Uh, we're going to get our special guest, but I wanted to leave people with this, uh, one other story.
[15:31.530 --> 15:35.330]  And Bernie, I imagine, uh, you were shocked and stunned to find this out.
[15:35.430 --> 15:37.190]  This is a story in the New York Times the other day.
[15:37.750 --> 15:45.870]  Uh, it turns out that police departments have a wish list, uh, that they use when they decide which assets they would like to seize.
[15:45.870 --> 15:47.130]  Uh, yeah.
[15:47.410 --> 15:52.510]  There are seminars that, uh, offer police officers useful tips on seizing property from suspected criminals.
[15:52.750 --> 15:58.610]  Um, in one seminar captured on video, uh, back in September, Harry S.
[15:58.730 --> 16:08.550]  Connolly Jr., the city attorney of Las Cruces, New Mexico, uh, called items such as, uh, flat screen TVs, uh, cash, cars, nice cars.
[16:08.750 --> 16:10.890]  Uh, it calls those items, little goodies.
[16:10.910 --> 16:18.050]  And then he described how officers in his jurisdiction could not wait to seize one man's exotic vehicle outside a local bar.
[16:18.250 --> 16:19.090]  These are his words.
[16:19.190 --> 16:22.630]  A guy drives up in a 2008 Mercedes, brand new, just so beautiful.
[16:22.790 --> 16:27.790]  I mean, the cops are undercover and they were just like, ah, and he gets out and he's just reeking of alcohol.
[16:27.910 --> 16:29.890]  And it's like, oh my goodness, we can hardly wait.
[16:30.170 --> 16:36.630]  He was talking about a practice known as civil asset forfeiture, which allows the government without ever securing a conviction.
[16:36.810 --> 16:44.670]  Let me repeat that, without ever securing a conviction or even, even filing a criminal charge to seize property suspected of having ties to crime.
[16:44.890 --> 16:48.390]  Uh, the practice was expanded during the war on drugs in the eighties.
[16:48.530 --> 16:52.190]  It's become a staple of law enforcement agencies because it helps finance their work.
[16:52.670 --> 17:06.110]  And, um, and, and what they are doing, and it's really no surprise with something we've known about for many years with, uh, computer hacker raids is that various departments have a wish list of equipment that they would like to have, uh, toys they would like to have for their department,
[17:06.410 --> 17:07.870]  uh, or themselves personally.
[17:08.150 --> 17:12.850]  And, um, and, and, and this is how they, they conduct their, their investigations and their raids.
[17:12.950 --> 17:13.710]  Bernie, are you surprised?
[17:14.170 --> 17:14.870]  Not at all.
[17:14.990 --> 17:27.310]  In fact, Philadelphia is one of the worst offenders of this with some really egregious examples of, uh, the district attorney's office seizing people's homes where there wasn't even a criminal charge filed.
[17:27.730 --> 17:31.870]  Say maybe one of the kids that lives in a home might've been selling drugs out in front of the house.
[17:32.390 --> 17:40.190]  But there, it has to be, there doesn't even have to be a criminal charge against the property owner for these civil asset forfeitures to happen.
[17:40.310 --> 17:52.050]  And the procedures, even if the people did nothing wrong who own the house, um, the procedures that they have to go, they have to stand on their head for like many months or years and go to court many, many times.
[17:52.370 --> 17:56.430]  You, you, it's the case is, it's the, the legal cases in these things.
[17:56.670 --> 17:58.590]  It's, it's, it's against the property.
[17:58.770 --> 17:59.510]  It's not against the people.
[17:59.750 --> 18:11.730]  So it's like, uh, you get these weird cases, like a, uh, as you said, a, uh, a 2008 Mercedes, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, Pennsylvania versus a 2008 Mercedes is, is what the case is called.
[18:13.010 --> 18:18.690]  And it's a bizarre legal netherworld, which is very difficult to get your property back, even if you've done nothing wrong.
[18:18.810 --> 18:20.710]  And it's getting worse in Philadelphia and other cities.
[18:21.390 --> 18:26.710]  Yeah, there's a comedian named John Oliver who was on The Daily Show and he's got his own show now.
[18:26.830 --> 18:29.770]  And there's a very good clip of him talking about civil forfeiture.
[18:30.050 --> 18:39.530]  I encourage people to punch it up on YouTube or whatnot because it actually explains how ridiculous it is and it does so in a very appropriate way, I think.
[18:40.430 --> 18:48.090]  Bernie, I don't know if you know where these laws came from because they're, my understanding, fairly new or at least the wide application of them is fairly new.
[18:48.090 --> 18:51.110]  And they're like, obviously unjust.
[18:51.570 --> 19:00.130]  I mean, it seems to me, you know, the libertarian wing of the Republican Party, if they have any, you know, attention to their own principles would oppose this.
[19:00.810 --> 19:06.750]  Certainly people who care for the rights of the unjustly accused would oppose this.
[19:07.770 --> 19:14.950]  And yet somehow, you know, everyone who hears about this, in my view, is, you know, enraged.
[19:15.270 --> 19:19.150]  But there doesn't seem to be any legislative opposition that I'm aware to it.
[19:19.150 --> 19:37.390]  They were put into law during the Reagan era, war on drugs thing, and it became so popular with law enforcement agencies, who was basically, they could just go on shopping sprees and grab this stuff, homes, cars, money, you name it, bank accounts, without even filing charges against people,
[19:37.650 --> 19:44.210]  that the law enforcement lobby is really preventing Congress from passing any laws against us.
[19:44.210 --> 19:48.910]  I think it's going to have to take some rich people to have their civil assets, powerful rich people.
[19:49.050 --> 19:52.490]  I think enough of them get targeted, then the laws might change.
[19:52.610 --> 19:54.550]  But as we know, those people are rarely targeted.
[19:55.350 --> 20:00.610]  I mean, and the thing is, when they are targeted, they can hire the lawyers to get their property back.
[20:01.490 --> 20:02.610]  Normal people cannot.
[20:03.210 --> 20:03.390]  Yep.
[20:16.130 --> 20:27.410]  You know, you know, you know, you know, you know, a thousand dollar fine, which is nothing to some people and a lot to to most people.
[20:28.950 --> 20:44.550]  So, you know, in the case of, for example, a drunk driving charge, it seems fair that if you are convicted, you know, in my view, maybe seizing your car is an appropriate penalty, but just seize the car and then maybe you get around to filing charges,
[20:44.550 --> 20:46.670]  maybe you don't, is obviously insane.
[20:47.130 --> 20:48.290]  Let me just break in here for a moment.
[20:48.450 --> 20:50.770]  I'm having a battle with the phone here, trying to get our guest on.
[20:50.930 --> 20:52.190]  Is our guest with us?
[20:52.490 --> 20:52.710]  Okay.
[20:54.010 --> 20:55.050]  Bernie, you're not the guest.
[20:56.490 --> 20:57.330]  No, I guess not.
[20:57.770 --> 20:58.130]  Okay.
[20:58.150 --> 20:58.630]  Oh, I'm sorry.
[20:58.730 --> 20:59.630]  I overspoke you.
[20:59.750 --> 20:59.990]  Yes.
[21:00.170 --> 21:01.750]  Please let me hear if the guest is there.
[21:01.870 --> 21:02.570]  Is the guest there?
[21:03.230 --> 21:04.070]  No, the guest is not.
[21:04.190 --> 21:04.330]  Okay.
[21:04.330 --> 21:06.010]  I have to go back and fight this phone some more.
[21:06.010 --> 21:06.010]  Sure.
[21:06.510 --> 21:07.930]  Emmanuel, I just wanted to say...
[21:07.930 --> 21:10.310]  I can't listen to you because I have to deal with the phone.
[21:10.470 --> 21:11.370]  Oh, don't listen to me.
[21:11.750 --> 21:13.330]  If I'm on the air, I'll just talk.
[21:13.730 --> 21:27.210]  One of the worst things about these civil asset forfeiture is if you're facing criminal charges and the government seizes your home and all your assets, you can no longer afford to retain effective legal counsel to defend you.
[21:27.470 --> 21:33.370]  So they take away not only your freedom, but your ability to defend yourself, which I think is intentional.
[21:40.510 --> 21:42.030]  Yes, it's quite intentional.
[21:42.390 --> 21:51.830]  And, you know, it's basically police departments using a resource that they see as just something that's available to them, like sort of pennies from heaven, I think, was the term used once.
[21:53.910 --> 21:55.230]  Hello, phone recording.
[21:55.990 --> 22:02.190]  But, okay, while Emmanuel continues to battle with the phone system, there's something else going on.
[22:02.370 --> 22:10.210]  People who know Joy Bubbles, formerly known as Joe Ingressia, High Rise Joe, he was interviewed on this show in 1991.
[22:11.670 --> 22:16.390]  One of the original old-school phone freaks who sadly passed away in 2007.
[22:16.390 --> 22:19.090]  There is now a documentary being made about his life.
[22:19.450 --> 22:25.690]  So you can get the information on that, the production and how it's going, at joybubblesthemovie.com.
[22:26.690 --> 22:28.130]  That's joybubblesthemovie.com.
[22:28.290 --> 22:32.130]  And, Chesh, you're not unfamiliar with Joy Bubbles, as we were talking about earlier.
[22:32.130 --> 22:37.510]  Well, as a matter of fact, the middle of one night, I get a phone call because of my funny phone number.
[22:38.270 --> 22:40.290]  And it's Joy Bubbles on the line.
[22:40.690 --> 22:44.970]  And once I realized who it was, I identified myself as a Cheshire Catalyst.
[22:45.150 --> 22:49.730]  And we sat around for at least an hour, three or four in the morning, in a mutual admiration society.
[22:52.310 --> 22:53.050]  It's quite fun.
[22:53.230 --> 22:54.090]  Okay, guys, I'm sorry.
[22:54.150 --> 22:56.370]  This phone is really pissing me off, no end.
[22:56.450 --> 22:59.810]  I keep getting people, I can't get them on the air, so I have to keep battling the phone.
[22:59.810 --> 23:02.230]  Bernie, I'm going to have to drop you, and I'm going to ask you to call back in.
[23:02.310 --> 23:08.210]  Hopefully, we can pick you up that way, because this phone is having such difficulty getting a second call in.
[23:08.730 --> 23:10.510]  So, please continue with your riveting discussion.
[23:11.030 --> 23:12.970]  Rob, do you know who's making this film?
[23:14.510 --> 23:15.630]  Who is making this film?
[23:16.650 --> 23:18.150]  No, that was a serious question.
[23:18.470 --> 23:20.370]  I thought you were setting me up.
[23:20.650 --> 23:22.810]  No, off the top of my head, I don't recall.
[23:23.070 --> 23:27.330]  But, yes, that information is also on joybubblesthemovie.com.
[23:27.330 --> 23:30.310]  And I encourage people to check that out.
[23:33.790 --> 23:35.270]  We're told it's Rachel someone.
[23:38.070 --> 23:39.250]  So, that...
[23:39.250 --> 23:40.310]  Okay, well...
[23:40.310 --> 23:41.190]  Speaking of...
[23:41.190 --> 23:45.730]  If your name is Rachel and you're making the film, then your project sounds fascinating.
[23:46.630 --> 23:54.490]  In other media around town, I'm told that Citizen Four is a movie on Edward Snowden that's either out or coming out soon.
[23:55.090 --> 23:56.830]  That one, of course, we do know who made it.
[23:56.830 --> 23:58.630]  Yeah, that's Laura Poitras' film.
[23:59.230 --> 24:02.070]  It's in some theaters, at least in major cities.
[24:03.130 --> 24:07.310]  I had a ticket to the premiere, actually, and I was too busy to actually attend.
[24:07.310 --> 24:09.730]  So, I'm really sad to have missed it.
[24:09.850 --> 24:12.450]  But I will see it soon, and I'm really excited about it.
[24:12.530 --> 24:17.010]  And, of course, it's the film about Edward Snowden, about whom we've spoken very much on this program.
[24:17.010 --> 24:18.850]  Okay, I have won my battle with...
[24:18.850 --> 24:21.110]  Well, I've won my battle with the phone, but at a terrible cost.
[24:21.110 --> 24:21.950]  I've lost Bernie.
[24:22.310 --> 24:25.530]  But I have Eva from the Electronic Frontier Foundation.
[24:25.710 --> 24:28.590]  Eva Galperin, thank you for joining us, and I'm sorry for the phone hassles.
[24:29.570 --> 24:30.810]  And do you hear that noise?
[24:30.950 --> 24:31.190]  Do you hear that?
[24:31.190 --> 24:32.050]  That's actually...
[24:32.050 --> 24:35.610]  We have call waiting on this line, but we can't pick it up because it's...
[24:36.090 --> 24:37.610]  I just cannot believe this telephone.
[24:38.590 --> 24:44.290]  Bernie, if you're out there, call on a line and then text one of us and tell us you're calling, and then we'll pick up the right line.
[24:44.350 --> 24:44.670]  How's that?
[24:45.470 --> 24:47.370]  Yeah, please don't do that, whatever that noise is.
[24:47.850 --> 24:48.650]  Eva, are you with us?
[24:49.030 --> 24:49.770]  Yes, yes, I am.
[24:49.770 --> 24:57.010]  So, this was a real milestone as far as the battle for net neutrality.
[24:57.430 --> 25:03.230]  Over the past few days, people have been talking all about this, and Bernie continues to call in on that line.
[25:03.310 --> 25:03.750]  Okay, great.
[25:05.210 --> 25:16.150]  We have a statement from President Obama saying that net neutrality is something that he supports and that he encourages the FCC.
[25:16.830 --> 25:18.490]  Okay, I can't do this.
[25:19.230 --> 25:22.010]  With that tone, Eva, are you hearing that?
[25:22.450 --> 25:23.190]  Yes, yes, I hear it.
[25:23.250 --> 25:24.110]  That's not coming from you, right?
[25:24.170 --> 25:25.970]  That's coming from our stupid system here?
[25:26.270 --> 25:27.450]  It is definitely not me.
[25:27.590 --> 25:27.810]  Okay.
[25:28.990 --> 25:32.350]  We're going to have to try this yet again because this phone is completely useless.
[25:33.210 --> 25:33.810]  I'm sorry.
[25:34.410 --> 25:37.890]  We'll call you from a different line, and hopefully we can get a line that works.
[25:38.310 --> 25:38.950]  That's quite all right.
[25:39.050 --> 25:39.570]  All right, sorry.
[25:40.510 --> 25:42.070]  You know, it's times like this.
[25:42.070 --> 25:43.090]  I just feel like giving up.
[25:43.150 --> 25:43.570]  I really do.
[25:44.070 --> 25:45.070]  How do you know it's live radio?
[25:46.230 --> 25:47.330]  Live inept radio.
[25:47.330 --> 25:49.150]  I mean, I feel like smashing this.
[25:49.250 --> 25:50.750]  I wish Bernie would stop calling on that line.
[25:50.890 --> 25:51.750]  He's causing all these problems.
[25:52.630 --> 25:55.470]  I'll continue with another discussion while I try and make a phone call.
[25:55.730 --> 25:56.090]  Okay.
[25:56.210 --> 25:58.510]  Well, we're talking a little bit about net neutrality.
[25:58.870 --> 25:59.790]  The Battle for the Net.
[26:00.650 --> 26:07.030]  Battleforthenet.com is where you can find info on protests that are popping up nationwide tomorrow evening.
[26:07.030 --> 26:09.430]  Tomorrow being Thursday, November 13th.
[26:09.770 --> 26:13.650]  And it's happening in all sorts of major cities, including here in New York.
[26:15.070 --> 26:21.010]  The statement from Fight for the Future, which is the organization behind this, says, We just won the president's support.
[26:21.070 --> 26:26.650]  Now we need to make sure the FCC moves fast and votes on Title II net neutrality December 11th.
[26:26.730 --> 26:29.030]  I can talk over all the recordings you can throw at me.
[26:29.030 --> 26:31.990]  I can't press the damn button to indicate the extension.
[26:32.310 --> 26:33.150]  You know, I...
[26:33.150 --> 26:36.150]  I'm entering you to the EFF operator.
[26:36.750 --> 26:37.150]  Excellent.
[26:37.770 --> 26:38.530]  You know...
[26:38.530 --> 26:39.990]  Okay, well, um...
[26:39.990 --> 26:41.470]  Maybe I get a human here.
[26:41.590 --> 26:43.110]  If I get a human, I can...
[26:43.110 --> 26:44.870]  Otherwise, I have to do it by hand.
[26:46.110 --> 26:48.670]  And apparently, you can't press buttons while you're in speaker mode.
[26:49.310 --> 26:50.290]  EFF, this is Joanna.
[26:50.290 --> 26:50.990]  How can I help you?
[26:51.050 --> 26:52.570]  Hi, can you transfer me to Eva, please?
[26:53.070 --> 26:53.890]  Yeah, one moment.
[26:54.050 --> 26:54.790]  Thank you so much.
[26:55.090 --> 26:55.550]  No problem.
[26:55.550 --> 26:57.030]  See, this is why you need humans.
[26:57.290 --> 26:59.030]  This is why you have to have humans around.
[26:59.090 --> 27:02.290]  Because if you didn't have a human there, there'd be no way for me to transfer that phone.
[27:02.470 --> 27:03.330]  Humans get things done.
[27:03.850 --> 27:05.030]  Eva, is that you, Eva?
[27:05.490 --> 27:06.490]  No, hold on one second.
[27:06.490 --> 27:06.750]  Oh, okay.
[27:08.790 --> 27:09.510]  I just...
[27:09.510 --> 27:12.490]  I will never underestimate what humans can do.
[27:13.290 --> 27:14.010]  This is...
[27:14.130 --> 27:14.730]  Eva, okay.
[27:14.910 --> 27:15.650]  We finally...
[27:15.650 --> 27:16.250]  What a nightmare.
[27:16.810 --> 27:17.670]  We have you now.
[27:17.810 --> 27:18.530]  We're not going to let you go.
[27:19.050 --> 27:21.970]  Please tell us everything you know about this.
[27:23.070 --> 27:24.410]  Oh, about net neutrality.
[27:24.410 --> 27:46.950]  Well, we've had some really interesting recent developments, the most important of which was this statement from President Obama, which essentially supported the EFF position on net neutrality and urging the FCC to, you know, sort of reclassify these broadband providers and also to engage in forbearance,
[27:47.010 --> 27:52.070]  which is something that, like, nobody was talking about as recently as a few months ago.
[27:52.750 --> 27:54.590]  So we're very excited about that.
[27:54.790 --> 28:03.710]  But this absolutely does not mean that the battle has been won or that we're done in any way, because as it turns out, President Obama is not the boss of the FCC.
[28:04.170 --> 28:04.310]  True.
[28:04.310 --> 28:08.230]  And it's still up to the FCC to make the actual decisions.
[28:09.430 --> 28:16.430]  The FCC is considering a number of what they call hybrid plans about what to do about broadband providers.
[28:16.570 --> 28:22.990]  And these are all compromises that EFF thinks are potentially very dangerous.
[28:23.090 --> 28:31.310]  I'm sure that your listeners already have a fairly good idea of what net neutrality is and what's at stake here.
[28:31.470 --> 28:53.230]  But I think that really the most important thing to keep in mind when you're looking at all the different proposals is that we're... we are trying to convince the FCC not only to actively not do a bad thing, which would be to empower the broadband providers to charge money to companies in order to give preference to their internet traffic,
[28:53.430 --> 28:57.110]  which is something that they have essentially said that they intend to do.
[28:57.870 --> 29:19.750]  But also to make sure that there aren't a lot of other bad consequences by making sure that the FCC does as little as humanly possible, as little governing of broadband providers as possible, you know, sort of in keeping with the libertarian spirit of EFF,
[29:20.030 --> 29:40.230]  where we want... we want a few rules as possible and as few limitations as possible without actually breaking the internet in this fundamental way of creating internet slow lanes and having people... having people and companies have to pay to play in order to get their bandwidth equal treatment by broadband providers.
[29:40.770 --> 29:43.250]  So that's sort of where we're at right now.
[29:43.510 --> 29:48.410]  Well, it's interesting because this has had quite an effect already on on corporate America.
[29:48.550 --> 29:58.570]  In fact, I just saw a story today about AT&T saying that they're going to stop work on their fiber spending until this is all settled.
[29:58.570 --> 29:59.990]  Sounds kind of like a threat.
[30:00.830 --> 30:03.190]  It's throwing their toys out of the pram, certainly.
[30:04.070 --> 30:13.810]  And it's a sign that they're genuinely threatened by the possibility that the FCC may take Obama's statement under advisement, which I consider to be a good fund.
[30:14.090 --> 30:17.330]  They say this somehow will limit innovation.
[30:17.530 --> 30:23.710]  Can we at least try and explore what that logic is that they're throwing out at us so that we can counter it?
[30:24.790 --> 30:29.990]  Like, how in any interpretation would net neutrality limit innovation?
[30:30.290 --> 30:31.090]  I have one.
[30:31.350 --> 30:32.070]  Go ahead, Barney.
[30:32.070 --> 30:55.390]  I think mandatory net neutrality could limit the kind of innovation where cable companies and phone company ISPs can find innovative new ways to rip off the public by charging content providers to prioritize their traffic over maybe my website.
[30:55.670 --> 31:00.010]  So that kind of innovation is, I think, what these companies' opponents are talking about.
[31:00.250 --> 31:00.610]  Financial innovation.
[31:00.610 --> 31:01.670]  Yeah, that's not what they mean.
[31:01.850 --> 31:03.070]  That's not how they would phrase it.
[31:03.190 --> 31:03.270]  No, I think it is.
[31:03.270 --> 31:04.430]  I think it is what they mean.
[31:04.570 --> 31:06.290]  What, ways of ripping off consumers?
[31:06.310 --> 31:07.190]  That's how they're going to phrase it?
[31:07.310 --> 31:07.690]  They're not going to admit that.
[31:07.690 --> 31:08.730]  They're not going to admit that.
[31:08.750 --> 31:10.790]  But what kinds of innovations are they really talking about?
[31:10.790 --> 31:11.990]  I think that's what they're talking about.
[31:12.090 --> 31:12.950]  Okay, we know that.
[31:13.030 --> 31:16.090]  But I'm trying to get into their heads and see how they would express it.
[31:16.330 --> 31:22.270]  They're specifically talking about their right to charge a premium for moving certain types of traffic.
[31:23.850 --> 31:26.670]  This is something that Comcast has come out and said that they want to do.
[31:26.670 --> 31:42.970]  And one factor... If you pass laws making this impossible or the FCC gets the right to regulate it, then they don't get to engage in this innovative new way of making revenue.
[31:43.150 --> 31:43.310]  Right.
[31:43.370 --> 31:54.030]  And these companies that are doing this, AT&T, Verizon, the telecom giants, they know full well what it is to be regulated like a utility because they come from the world of the telephone, where this all came from.
[31:54.030 --> 31:58.510]  So this isn't some new industry finding its feet in a strange new world.
[31:58.510 --> 32:08.290]  This is existing companies trying to avoid something that they've already dealt with in previous generations of technology and also managed to somehow keep innovating in their way.
[32:09.370 --> 32:10.870]  Eva, this is the Cheshire Catalyst.
[32:11.490 --> 32:15.730]  I'm of the thought that perhaps the Internet should be considered a common carrier.
[32:16.110 --> 32:19.170]  What's your feelings on that, EFF statement on that?
[32:21.410 --> 32:30.870]  Well, EFF's official position on that is not so much that the broadband should be reclassified as a common carrier, but that they should be reclassified.
[32:31.010 --> 32:47.570]  And then just about all of the common carrier rules should then be subject to forbearance so that we have the least possible regulation that we can in order to prevent this bad outcome.
[32:47.570 --> 32:51.630]  Eva, can you explain the principle of forbearance to our listeners?
[32:52.570 --> 32:52.830]  Sure.
[32:53.130 --> 33:08.890]  When you reclassify the broadband carriers as common carriers, then they become subject to a whole restaurant menu of rules, many of which make no sense or simply don't apply.
[33:10.290 --> 33:20.390]  So what we're asking the FCC to do is to say that they are not going to impose those rules, but they're only going to impose a very small subset of those rules.
[33:20.510 --> 33:27.510]  For example, rules about transparency, which we think would be really great for consumers.
[33:28.350 --> 33:39.830]  I noticed that one thing that Obama kind of stressed was that under this title, there would not be regulation of billing.
[33:40.650 --> 33:42.110]  They'd keep their hands off there.
[33:42.310 --> 33:43.390]  Is there a reason why?
[33:45.630 --> 33:47.850]  That is actually something I'm not entirely sure about.
[33:48.110 --> 33:48.230]  Okay.
[33:48.750 --> 33:49.190]  He has.
[33:49.310 --> 33:51.330]  I'm reading an article here in the New York Times.
[33:51.490 --> 34:00.430]  It says, Mr. Obama said in particular, the government should not try to regulate or dictate the prices that broadband companies charge for their services.
[34:00.430 --> 34:06.350]  The problem I have with that is that in many cases, these broadband providers are effectively monopolies.
[34:06.710 --> 34:14.470]  And they can charge as much as they want to poor customers who have no other choice in an Internet service provider.
[34:14.470 --> 34:18.710]  Or they kind of collude in pricing with the only other broadband provider in a market.
[34:18.830 --> 34:22.270]  In most markets, there's only one or two providers of broadband.
[34:22.270 --> 34:36.270]  And you'll find that there's very little difference in the pricing, even though the pricing may be several times what it is in other industrialized democracies that have much faster Internet for consumers.
[34:36.270 --> 34:42.190]  But they pay a fraction of what we pay here because they have better regulation over there, I guess.
[34:43.630 --> 35:06.770]  Well, that's actually not something that I know a whole lot about, aside from that EFF did actually look into whether or not we could go the route of going after the broadband providers by claiming that they are a monopoly and therefore actually being able to circumvent the whole problem of having the FCC regulate them.
[35:07.010 --> 35:11.210]  And we discovered that this was actually going to be a very difficult legal argument to make.
[35:12.550 --> 35:15.290]  Effectively, they are a monopoly, absolutely.
[35:15.490 --> 35:16.990]  And you will hear no disagreement from me.
[35:17.030 --> 35:19.530]  But from a legal standpoint, this turns out to be a little bit more complicated.
[35:19.850 --> 35:35.630]  I think what consumers aren't missing in this whole Internet neutrality debate is that if broadband providers like Comcast and Verizon and Time Warner and others of their ilk can charge many millions of dollars to content providers like Netflix, for instance,
[35:35.810 --> 35:56.230]  which was strong-armed by Comcast recently, who throttled the speed of their movies so that their customers couldn't watch movies without all this choppy video, and then as soon as Netflix said, Uncle, and paid millions of dollars to Comcast, oh, suddenly the speed of their content wasn't throttled anymore.
[35:56.990 --> 36:02.890]  Who do you think is going to pay that many millions of dollars that Netflix had to pay to Comcast?
[36:03.910 --> 36:05.110]  Netflix isn't going to eat that.
[36:05.250 --> 36:07.570]  They're going to turn around and increase the prices to the consumer.
[36:07.750 --> 36:17.770]  So the bottom line is all of this, all these extra charges that these broadband providers are going to charge, content providers, ultimately are going to get charged to the public, and we're all going to pay more in the long run.
[36:18.010 --> 36:21.930]  Yeah, I've heard that example raised several times, Comcast and Netflix.
[36:22.230 --> 36:24.430]  And I'm wondering, how did they get away with that legally?
[36:24.590 --> 36:30.190]  Because this issue has not been settled yet, and it seems like they're already engaging in that practice.
[36:30.190 --> 36:32.270]  Eva, do you have any insight on that?
[36:32.490 --> 36:42.250]  Well, they're getting away with it legally, because right now the FCC actually has not said that it has the authority to...
[36:42.250 --> 36:48.250]  Well, it has only recently said that it's considering the possibility that it has the authority to regulate broadband providers.
[36:49.330 --> 36:53.270]  There were simply no rules saying that they could not do this.
[36:53.270 --> 37:09.470]  This had been a mutual understanding between all the broadband providers and between all ISPs, that the way that you run the Internet is by simply treating all traffic the same.
[37:09.670 --> 37:13.590]  But there was no rule saying that this absolutely had to be done.
[37:14.090 --> 37:18.850]  And so Comcast's, hey, that's a nice website you've got there.
[37:18.850 --> 37:26.710]  You wouldn't want anything to happen to it trick, was simply what you might want to call financial innovation on their part.
[37:27.830 --> 37:37.030]  And up until recently, the FCC had been indicating that they thought that this was perfectly fine, and that they were not going to do anything about it.
[37:37.090 --> 37:41.370]  This is one of the reasons why we are so excited about this statement from the Obama administration.
[37:42.970 --> 37:51.650]  One of the reasons that I like having you on the program is that I don't have to pretend to understand the FCC, because we make you do it.
[37:52.070 --> 37:53.630]  Maybe you actually understand, I don't know.
[37:53.790 --> 38:03.490]  But Obama made this statement in which he took substantially the position of the EFF and the organizations that you work with that we all love.
[38:04.610 --> 38:08.230]  But Tom Wheeler, the head of the FCC, has been a bit cautious.
[38:08.570 --> 38:12.190]  Do you have any insight into what effect Obama's statement might actually have?
[38:13.270 --> 38:18.170]  Well, right now it's unclear, because as I have pointed out, Obama is not the boss of the FCC.
[38:19.230 --> 38:49.590]  But one of the things that we did in the last couple of months, we actually launched a project called Dear FCC, and we inundated the FCC with letters of what we felt were very high quality from consumers all over the country, voicing their concern about what would happen if the FCC allowed broadband providers to continue acting in this way and asked them to please reclassify broadband,
[38:49.590 --> 38:51.410]  but also to engage in forbearance.
[38:51.490 --> 38:54.590]  This was sort of our whole take on this.
[38:55.010 --> 39:14.110]  And we think that we might see them turn around, but I think that the most likely thing that we're likely to see, barring some quick action on our part, is the consideration of these various hybrid approaches, most of which involve reclassification, but not forbearance,
[39:14.230 --> 39:19.870]  or limited forbearance, or all kinds of other things that I'm sure are extremely boring to your listeners.
[39:20.330 --> 39:28.970]  Generally, trying to explain net neutrality to an audience involves a lot of what our IP director, Corinne McSherry, calls the boring words.
[39:29.610 --> 39:29.890]  Yes.
[39:30.070 --> 39:31.890]  So it is a little bit complicated.
[39:32.170 --> 39:41.110]  But all in all, it looked like the FCC was going to support a position that was going to screw consumers.
[39:42.230 --> 39:52.530]  Now, after our flood of letters and also the statement from the White House, it looks like they're considering a position which will screw consumers less.
[39:52.770 --> 39:56.610]  And we are holding out for the no-screwing consumers position.
[39:57.270 --> 39:57.830]  Wow.
[39:58.090 --> 39:59.590]  Well, Eva, let me ask you this.
[39:59.590 --> 40:03.930]  Because we just voted in a Republican Congress all around.
[40:04.070 --> 40:06.650]  And those of you who didn't vote at all, you voted for them, too.
[40:08.130 --> 40:09.690]  Is that going to have any effect on this?
[40:09.790 --> 40:13.950]  Could that have any effect on this next year when they actually start messing around with things?
[40:15.790 --> 40:22.790]  Well, the recent election actually is one of the reasons, I think, why we're seeing this statement come out of the White House this week.
[40:22.790 --> 40:28.630]  And that it is widely considered that the White House would like an easy win right now.
[40:29.150 --> 40:36.510]  And they would like something that is kind of bipartisan, that they can score easy points on.
[40:36.950 --> 40:40.210]  And net neutrality is one of those things.
[40:40.370 --> 40:54.990]  It is extremely popular among consumers, even if it is rather unpopular among the people who run, say, large technology companies or telcos or broadband providers.
[40:55.710 --> 41:00.070]  So it's kind of a populist move on their part.
[41:00.250 --> 41:13.490]  I don't think that the Republican Senate is really going to change anything in this calculation, because this is not one of those things that can be solved with legislation.
[41:14.210 --> 41:16.810]  This is really up to the FCC.
[41:16.810 --> 41:21.910]  And legislation is not going to play a real key role here.
[41:22.490 --> 41:26.150]  We're already beginning to see some fallout, I think, in the political sphere.
[41:26.730 --> 41:37.630]  Recently, there was Senator Ted Cruz, a Republican senator, who posted to his Facebook and Twitter feeds that net neutrality is Obamacare for the Internet, and said the Internet should move at the speed of government.
[41:37.890 --> 41:44.610]  And it was pretty funny watching this, and watching Twitter and Facebook and the Internet in general turn on this guy.
[41:44.610 --> 41:51.590]  Basically, he claimed the clueless crown left behind by the late Senator Ted Stevens when it comes to the Internet and how it actually works.
[41:51.810 --> 41:59.990]  And I think even the Oatmeal, the popular webcomic, who we've spoken about in the past, posted a very long and involved comic about exactly what was wrong with this statement.
[42:00.730 --> 42:06.190]  And so, Eva, what do you see happening in the political sphere as a result of all this?
[42:06.190 --> 42:11.710]  Is there hope of sort of educating the people who might adversely affect this otherwise?
[42:12.690 --> 42:18.830]  Well, the good news is that I don't think that these are people who are really going to have much of an effect on the process.
[42:19.610 --> 42:30.050]  And so the fact that they don't understand the way that the Internet works and that they're yielding to pressure from large companies with lots of money is less worrying to me than it would be otherwise.
[42:31.130 --> 42:35.130]  I am much more concerned about what the SEC itself is actually considering.
[42:36.570 --> 42:37.010]  Emmanuel.
[42:37.290 --> 42:37.690]  Go ahead, Bernie.
[42:38.110 --> 42:42.370]  I wanted to point out that President Obama ran back in 2008.
[42:42.730 --> 42:46.210]  He ran on a platform of net neutrality, among other things.
[42:46.270 --> 42:49.270]  He promised that this was going to be one of his biggest priorities.
[42:49.830 --> 42:55.110]  And I just kind of thought he was a liar when he didn't address it at all, substantially, in his first term.
[42:55.110 --> 42:57.650]  But now he's coming around.
[42:57.850 --> 43:02.910]  And he was re-elected after having made that promise.
[43:03.190 --> 43:16.070]  So I think that our federal government may, those in the Senate and the House, might want to take a look at that, because that was one of the reasons the president got elected.
[43:16.070 --> 43:22.230]  Of course, he got elected on a running floor on the Affordable Care Act as well, so called Obamacare.
[43:22.230 --> 43:33.750]  But he also voted against renewing the FISA amendments and then turned around and did all kinds of terrible things on surveillance law for the next six years.
[43:34.290 --> 43:34.690]  Right.
[43:34.730 --> 43:36.950]  Well, politics is full of examples like that.
[43:37.030 --> 43:43.730]  But I think one thing that we need to pay close attention to as people, people who allegedly support this kind of thing, is that we have to speak out, too.
[43:43.830 --> 43:57.130]  The same thing will happen, and this is where the comparison is kind of apt, the same thing will happen that happened to Obamacare, where it gets sliced and crippled because people didn't speak out strongly in support of national health care.
[43:57.450 --> 43:59.250]  And that's the real reason why that happened.
[43:59.430 --> 44:02.970]  This could go the same way if people aren't strongly supportive.
[44:03.150 --> 44:11.970]  And I'm reading about a series of protests that will be taking place tomorrow in over 30 cities around the country.
[44:12.350 --> 44:15.250]  If you go to Battle for...
[44:15.250 --> 44:17.390]  Hang on, what's the website here?
[44:17.570 --> 44:19.230]  I'm sorry, Fight for the Future.
[44:19.530 --> 44:20.370]  Is it Fight for the Future?
[44:20.670 --> 44:22.230]  Or, yeah, fightforthefuture.org.
[44:22.310 --> 44:26.890]  You will see that there are a lot of demonstrations planned all around the country.
[44:27.150 --> 44:29.270]  Eva, is EFF involved in this at all?
[44:29.950 --> 44:30.390]  Yes.
[44:30.590 --> 44:35.950]  Actually, one of the other interesting events that is happening is happening in the San Francisco Bay Area.
[44:35.950 --> 44:41.250]  Next week at City Hall, we're holding an open forum on net neutrality.
[44:41.370 --> 44:44.630]  The event is called Bay Area Speaks, a people's hearing on the future of the Internet.
[44:45.070 --> 44:50.950]  And the public is invited to testify at City Hall about why net neutrality matters to Bay Area communities.
[44:51.830 --> 44:54.490]  So that will be happening at 5.30 p.m.
[44:54.790 --> 44:55.950]  in San Francisco.
[44:55.950 --> 44:59.030]  And I invite people in our area to please come.
[44:59.170 --> 45:02.090]  I realize it's possibly less interesting to people in New York.
[45:02.810 --> 45:05.090]  But this is, I think, a very big deal.
[45:05.090 --> 45:06.610]  It should be interesting to people everywhere.
[45:06.710 --> 45:11.270]  And if it's not, it's our fault for not explaining it in a way that gets you riled up and passionate.
[45:11.630 --> 45:16.510]  And I think, you know, going to one of these things is a good way to learn about it and to get riled up yourself.
[45:17.250 --> 45:20.270]  I don't know if this is going to work, but we're going to give it a shot anyway.
[45:20.470 --> 45:23.110]  We're going to try and take phone calls on this stupid phone we have here.
[45:23.790 --> 45:28.230]  Who knows what will happen, but our phone number is 212-209-2900.
[45:28.630 --> 45:32.210]  We're speaking with Eva Galperin from the Electronic Frontier Foundation.
[45:32.390 --> 45:34.010]  Eva, what's your official title over there?
[45:34.010 --> 45:36.890]  I am a global policy analyst.
[45:37.310 --> 45:38.090]  That's awesome.
[45:38.230 --> 45:38.690]  That's awesome.
[45:38.790 --> 45:44.490]  So I imagine you're keeping track of similar types of things happening in other parts of the world as well.
[45:45.790 --> 45:46.670]  A little bit.
[45:46.810 --> 45:50.810]  Net neutrality is less of a big deal in many other parts of the world.
[45:52.090 --> 45:57.830]  Mostly I've spent a lot of time working on privacy and surveillance on the global scale.
[45:57.830 --> 46:04.550]  But I'm particularly interested in what happens with net neutrality because I am a broadband internet user in the United States.
[46:04.690 --> 46:06.470]  So I definitely have a stake in it.
[46:06.610 --> 46:07.350]  Well, I'm curious.
[46:07.610 --> 46:09.990]  Our neighbors to the north, Canada, how does it...
[46:09.990 --> 46:11.410]  Is net neutrality an issue up there?
[46:12.950 --> 46:15.030]  Not that I recall off the top of my head.
[46:15.030 --> 46:15.510]  Okay.
[46:15.770 --> 46:20.390]  Well, I'm sure we'll hear from Canadian listeners if they have any updates on where that stands.
[46:21.350 --> 46:22.390]  We have a few phone calls.
[46:22.530 --> 46:23.290]  Let's see if this works.
[46:26.530 --> 46:27.870]  And no, it does not work.
[46:28.010 --> 46:28.270]  Okay.
[46:28.350 --> 46:29.290]  Let's try this one over here.
[46:30.010 --> 46:31.090]  No, that doesn't work either.
[46:31.230 --> 46:31.450]  Okay.
[46:31.570 --> 46:31.870]  You know what?
[46:31.870 --> 46:32.950]  I gave it a shot, folks.
[46:33.070 --> 46:33.430]  I'm sorry.
[46:34.190 --> 46:35.450]  Do you want me to say goodbye, man?
[46:35.450 --> 46:36.230]  Your voice will not be heard.
[46:36.370 --> 46:38.270]  I don't think you saying goodbye would help, Bernie.
[46:38.750 --> 46:39.110]  Okay.
[46:39.270 --> 46:42.550]  I'll keep pressing buttons and see if any of them turn orange, but they're all turning green.
[46:43.170 --> 46:44.810]  And I even pressed a button that...
[46:44.810 --> 46:46.190]  I'm sorry for the people I'm hanging up on.
[46:46.450 --> 46:48.190]  This phone, there's something wrong with it.
[46:48.770 --> 46:49.830]  It's not picking up calls.
[46:50.050 --> 46:51.990]  It's picking up calls, but it's not putting them on the air.
[46:52.110 --> 46:53.490]  And that's a real problem for us.
[46:54.110 --> 47:00.830]  So I guess we just have to continue with what we have right now, which is our esteemed guest, Eva Galpern from the Electronic Frontier Foundation.
[47:00.910 --> 47:03.290]  While you're fighting with that, I will mention that BattleForTheNet.
[47:03.290 --> 47:06.950]  BattleForTheNet .com is the site to get info on tomorrow's protests everywhere.
[47:07.210 --> 47:10.070]  The one here in New York is happening at Columbus Circle.
[47:10.690 --> 47:15.210]  And you can find more information about that at BattleForTheNet.com.
[47:15.330 --> 47:16.810]  It's tomorrow, 6.30 p.m.
[47:17.310 --> 47:20.610]  at Columbus Circle, 59th Street, across from Time Warner.
[47:22.090 --> 47:23.390]  Here in New York, New York.
[47:23.990 --> 47:30.030]  They suggest you bring a cell phone, laptop, tablet, flashlight, glow stick, or candle to shine light on the corruption unfolding in our government.
[47:30.170 --> 47:34.130]  If you can, hold the device you use to connect to the Internet over your head in protest.
[47:34.590 --> 47:36.130]  Okay, thank you, Max, for coming in here.
[47:36.430 --> 47:37.590]  Apparently, I have to jiggle the phone.
[47:37.850 --> 47:39.050]  I didn't know that.
[47:39.390 --> 47:41.530]  You have to jiggle the phone, and then all of a sudden it works.
[47:41.850 --> 47:42.470]  Good evening.
[47:42.490 --> 47:43.670]  You're our first caller.
[47:44.030 --> 47:44.750]  Oh, very good.
[47:45.590 --> 47:46.510]  My name is Chris.
[47:46.530 --> 47:48.890]  I'm a former telephone man.
[47:48.890 --> 47:50.770]  John, I saw the Snowden movie.
[47:51.150 --> 47:54.370]  I've got the weapon to use against civil asset forfeiture.
[47:54.650 --> 48:00.470]  And on the net neutrality thing, I've got a libertarian perspective on that.
[48:02.530 --> 48:04.250]  So what would you like first?
[48:04.810 --> 48:06.310]  Well, let's talk about net neutrality.
[48:06.430 --> 48:07.330]  That's the topic tonight.
[48:07.370 --> 48:12.330]  Well, of course, the libertarian view is that we like to not have things regulated.
[48:12.330 --> 48:20.570]  But the fact is that all these things are coercive monopoly, the last mile of Internet service to your house.
[48:20.910 --> 48:23.430]  And so some regulation is necessary.
[48:23.430 --> 48:30.830]  But you've got to be careful because common carrier could be used as the excuse for the federal government to be regulating every aspect of the Internet.
[48:31.150 --> 48:34.210]  Okay, let's let Eva address that concern.
[48:34.770 --> 48:37.450]  Well, I think that there's a very important distinction.
[48:37.450 --> 48:56.030]  Well, let me begin by saying that I am extremely sympathetic to the libertarian perspective on this, which is that you want to have as little regulation as possible and as little government as possible, which is one of the reasons why EFF is extremely wary about supporting the FCC's right to regulate anything.
[48:56.250 --> 48:59.890]  We had a very bad experience with the broadcast flag many years ago.
[48:59.890 --> 49:11.730]  We feel that the FCC is one of those organizations that is basically the textbook case for regulatory capture, and we don't trust them to regulate a goddamn thing.
[49:12.330 --> 49:34.110]  Having said that, what we're trying to avoid is an especially bad outcome in which the FCC essentially blesses broadband providers' stated desire to charge companies in order to move their traffic faster, or rather to put everybody else in the slow lane.
[49:34.110 --> 49:43.470]  And we think that's extremely worrying, and so we support the absolute minimum amount of regulation we think that it will take in order to stop this one very bad outcome.
[49:43.630 --> 49:44.610]  That's a very good approach.
[49:44.790 --> 50:00.770]  You know, as maybe less of a libertarian than either of the people we have on the phone, I would just point out that the very existence of corporations like AT&T and Verizon and Time Warner is a legal fiction created by our government.
[50:00.970 --> 50:16.290]  Without regulation, we would not have protections for these corporations to be able to run wires under your home and legally block out competitors who might also wish to run wires to your home.
[50:16.410 --> 50:21.890]  We have already gone very far down the path of regulating the existence of these corporations.
[50:22.330 --> 50:29.590]  And I think it is important that we regulate, you know, we stop them from doing things we don't want them to do, too.
[50:31.090 --> 50:32.070]  Yeah, I think that's true.
[50:32.170 --> 50:42.470]  Now, there is a downsizeddc.org website where you can easily write to your congressman, and one of the sites is Hands Off the Internet.
[50:42.770 --> 50:49.610]  So that's downsizeddc.org slash ETP for Educate the Powerful.
[50:50.090 --> 50:50.450]  Okay.
[50:50.530 --> 50:52.510]  Listen, I want to thank you very much for calling in.
[50:52.590 --> 50:56.650]  And I also, since I know how to jiggle the phone now, I'd like to invite more people to call in.
[50:56.670 --> 50:58.030]  I'm sorry for all the people I hung up on.
[50:58.410 --> 50:59.590]  We only have a few minutes left.
[50:59.690 --> 51:01.630]  212-209-2900.
[51:02.010 --> 51:08.150]  If you have questions about net neutrality, questions for the Electronic Frontier Foundation, we have Eva Galperin joining us tonight.
[51:08.290 --> 51:09.750]  And by the way, we're not on next week.
[51:10.170 --> 51:12.550]  Pacifica National is doing a special presentation next week.
[51:12.670 --> 51:15.450]  So this is our last show for a couple of weeks.
[51:15.570 --> 51:16.690]  So let's take another phone call.
[51:17.450 --> 51:18.250]  And good evening.
[51:18.430 --> 51:19.170]  You're on Off the Hook.
[51:20.210 --> 51:20.850]  Hey, yes.
[51:21.150 --> 51:21.630]  Go ahead.
[51:22.610 --> 51:24.350]  Just meeting you, going through here.
[51:25.390 --> 51:38.390]  I was primarily worried that the FCC regulation could be a government sweetheart deal, particularly in relation to the pricing and the tiering that we could and would probably continue on without any real overhead.
[51:38.730 --> 51:44.830]  In relation to that, I appreciate the concerns that everybody's mentioning, too, with the FCC kind of getting carte blanche on that.
[51:45.550 --> 51:56.850]  And I wonder and worry if it'll be along the same lines to how the oil companies, particularly BP with its name shuffles, and then the telephone splinter companies, we're going all that.
[51:56.850 --> 51:59.250]  But... and that's pretty much all I got.
[52:00.490 --> 52:00.850]  Okay.
[52:01.090 --> 52:01.330]  Thanks.
[52:01.450 --> 52:02.070]  Thanks for your call.
[52:02.670 --> 52:03.190]  Hey, thank you.
[52:03.850 --> 52:05.090]  Any... any response to that?
[52:07.850 --> 52:08.430]  Oh, no.
[52:08.510 --> 52:08.870]  Okay.
[52:09.010 --> 52:09.150]  Oh, really?
[52:09.230 --> 52:10.950]  I'm not sure there was a question.
[52:11.110 --> 52:13.730]  There was more a statement than a question, but let's see if there's a question here.
[52:13.790 --> 52:14.050]  Good evening.
[52:14.170 --> 52:14.850]  You're on Off the Hook.
[52:15.610 --> 52:16.450]  Hey, good evening.
[52:16.690 --> 52:25.630]  And, um, I, um, I guess that the FCC can do whatever they want because Colin Powell's son's in charge of it, right?
[52:26.410 --> 52:26.990]  Not anymore.
[52:27.370 --> 52:28.070]  Oh, he's not.
[52:28.210 --> 52:28.890]  Yeah, that was a while ago.
[52:29.330 --> 52:34.710]  The guy in charge of it now is a, uh, is a cable, is a former cable and telecom industry lobbyist.
[52:35.550 --> 52:36.150]  Yeah, okay.
[52:36.370 --> 52:36.690]  So that's even worse.
[52:36.690 --> 52:37.470]  From bad to worse.
[52:38.730 --> 52:39.310]  That's even worse.
[52:39.310 --> 52:41.770]  This is exactly what we mean when we say regulatory capture.
[52:42.810 --> 52:45.050]  Well, it sounds like the FCC needs to be regulated.
[52:45.810 --> 52:46.050]  Yeah.
[52:46.750 --> 52:47.230]  I don't know how that...
[52:47.230 --> 52:48.130]  Tom Wheeler.
[52:48.270 --> 52:48.770]  Tom Wheeler.
[52:49.670 --> 53:04.830]  I'll make it real quick and get off the air so you can talk, but just remember, like, the post office, right, wherever you go in the country, the post office, they're usually like DEA is in there, CIA, ATF, because my ex-girlfriend worked for them.
[53:05.490 --> 53:11.730]  And, um, you know, I found out much later through a detective, right, what she was all about, right?
[53:12.050 --> 53:18.190]  And she's a thief to begin with, but they're in all the post offices pretty much all around everywhere.
[53:18.790 --> 53:20.450]  Well, yeah, I can't deny that.
[53:20.930 --> 53:22.210]  Definitely a post office in every town.
[53:22.530 --> 53:23.670]  Thanks, uh, thanks for that call.
[53:23.770 --> 53:24.550]  Thanks for that insight.
[53:24.830 --> 53:26.350]  Uh, let's see if we can squeeze in a couple more calls.
[53:26.390 --> 53:26.630]  Good evening.
[53:26.750 --> 53:27.490]  You're on Off the Hook.
[53:28.150 --> 53:28.510]  Hello.
[53:28.730 --> 53:29.010]  Hi.
[53:29.470 --> 53:29.790]  Hi.
[53:30.030 --> 53:36.670]  Uh, I just wanted to tell you that the name of the woman who's making this film, Joy Bubbles, is Rachel Morrison.
[53:39.010 --> 53:39.730]  Rachel Morrison.
[53:40.010 --> 53:40.190]  Yes.
[53:40.390 --> 53:41.050]  Thank you very much.
[53:41.150 --> 53:43.230]  And she's on Kickstarter now.
[53:43.550 --> 53:44.030]  Yes, indeed.
[53:44.110 --> 53:46.630]  And you can find all that stuff via joybubblesthemovie.com.
[53:46.630 --> 53:47.170]  Yes.
[53:47.650 --> 53:49.130]  Okay, did you have any other, uh, questions?
[53:49.270 --> 53:49.890]  No, that's it.
[53:49.930 --> 53:50.470]  Okay, thanks.
[53:50.550 --> 53:51.230]  Thanks for that information.
[53:51.550 --> 53:52.370]  Let's take another call.
[53:52.430 --> 53:52.750]  Good evening.
[53:52.930 --> 53:53.630]  You're on Off the Hook.
[53:55.750 --> 53:56.090]  Hello?
[53:56.270 --> 53:56.610]  Speak up.
[53:58.310 --> 54:00.170]  Okay, there's a shy person there who's not talking.
[54:00.630 --> 54:11.670]  Uh, you know, we only have a couple of minutes left, so I want to give Eva the opportunity to give out any contact info or web pages or things that people should, uh, access if they want to get more information on this or any other important projects you guys are working on.
[54:11.970 --> 54:17.990]  And Eva, what can we all do, our listeners, what can we all do to, uh, help make net neutrality a reality?
[54:18.970 --> 54:22.050]  Well, uh, I think there are, there are definitely a couple of things that you can do.
[54:22.190 --> 54:27.910]  The first thing, uh, that I strongly recommend is, uh, to come out to the upcoming protests, uh,
[54:40.250 --> 54:47.230]  if you want me physically showing up to a protest is, is by far, you know, one of the, the greatest and most effective things that you can do.
[54:47.850 --> 54:53.550]  Uh, the other thing that I recommend that you do is that you go to www.eff.org and go to our action center.
[54:53.990 --> 55:00.490]  Uh, and, uh, there we have an action based on the, um, uh, on, uh, the net neutrality right now.
[55:00.670 --> 55:06.850]  Uh, we also have a bunch of articles about sort of our latest developments and what's going on with the FCC.
[55:07.330 --> 55:16.630]  And finally, we have, uh, uh, we have a new project that, uh, that we have recently, uh, relaunched that I think you guys should all take a look at, which is, uh, called surveillance self-defense.
[55:16.870 --> 55:20.770]  And you can get there at ssd.eff.org.
[55:20.950 --> 55:31.290]  And, uh, this is our, uh, privacy and security advice for, uh, for internet users, which is a project that we launched, uh, just a couple of weeks ago.
[55:31.410 --> 55:33.950]  And I think would be of great interest to your, uh, listeners.
[55:33.950 --> 55:47.050]  While you're wandering around the EFF site, please folks contribute and donate because these are the guys that make these, um, these victories for, uh, for freedom and liberty possible, uh, by, by doing all the mundane and, and difficult work.
[55:47.210 --> 55:50.410]  And I just want to thank you and everybody over there for, uh, your continued efforts.
[55:50.410 --> 55:52.370]  I don't know where we would be without you.
[55:52.890 --> 55:55.470]  We, we understand net neutrality, so you don't have to.
[55:56.090 --> 55:57.690]  Well, you should, you should understand.
[55:57.810 --> 55:58.730]  You should try to understand it.
[55:58.750 --> 56:01.990]  It is more interesting than, uh, than most people can, can express.
[56:02.230 --> 56:08.270]  Uh, more information on the demonstrations can be found, uh, a different website, battleforthenet.com.
[56:08.670 --> 56:09.170]  Try that one out.
[56:09.270 --> 56:10.610]  You get a list there as well.
[56:10.910 --> 56:12.290]  Eva, again, thank you so much.
[56:12.390 --> 56:16.870]  And, uh, we'll certainly be in touch with you in the future as this, um, as this evolves and progresses.
[56:17.650 --> 56:17.830]  All right.
[56:17.890 --> 56:18.130]  Thank you.
[56:18.210 --> 56:18.610]  It's my pleasure.
[56:18.870 --> 56:19.250]  All right.
[56:19.290 --> 56:24.750]  And, uh, we will see you again, uh, listeners in about, uh, two weeks as we are not on next week.
[56:24.930 --> 56:27.010]  And by then, who knows what will have changed?
[56:27.810 --> 56:30.370]  It's coming up next is the personal computer show.
[56:30.590 --> 56:32.350]  It's a manual for off the hook.
[56:33.210 --> 56:36.090]  Stay free, stay informed, and, uh, have a good night.
[56:36.270 --> 56:36.510]  Take care.
[56:37.670 --> 56:40.910]  The soldier boycott, the soldier's pay.
[56:41.310 --> 56:41.330]  Oh,
[57:04.270 --> 57:06.290]  well, you must not relent.
[57:06.890 --> 57:09.830]  What are the neighbors and the prophets involved?
[57:10.730 --> 57:13.910]  What are they seeing in the public bazaars?
[57:21.210 --> 57:28.290]  At every stroke of the bell in the tower, there goes another boy from another side.
[57:46.580 --> 57:50.040]  Those guns, tassel, a roll on the drums.
[57:50.600 --> 57:53.780]  No one mentions the neighboring walls.
[57:54.320 --> 57:57.360]  No one knows what their fight is for.
[58:00.580 --> 58:04.300]  With a tile of the tube, you must not relent.
[58:04.880 --> 58:06.900]  There's this different kind of chemical system.
[58:07.320 --> 58:08.400]  Two thousand flushes.
[58:08.540 --> 58:10.040]  Keeps the water crystal clear.
[58:10.220 --> 58:13.500]  Keeps the balls sparkling clean continuously for about four months.
[58:13.760 --> 58:15.620]  No rings, no strings, no stains.
[58:15.960 --> 58:18.180]  Just put the container in your tank and forget it.
[58:18.240 --> 58:21.320]  Every time you flush, the chlorine crystals dissolve away, rust and venom.
[58:21.520 --> 58:23.120]  T4, dirt rings and stains appear.
[58:23.360 --> 58:24.640]  Flushing, sure beat brushing.
[58:26.880 --> 58:29.580]  The generals bow to the government.
[58:30.100 --> 58:31.800]  We're tired of the tube.
[58:32.100 --> 58:33.480]  We must not relent.