[00:00.000 --> 00:03.600]  Spoken word, music, or comedy to share.
[00:03.860 --> 00:07.360]  We want to hear about your rage, resistance, and liberation.
[00:07.700 --> 00:11.900]  From Palestine to Ferguson and Detroit to NYC.
[00:11.900 --> 00:18.520]  Be prepared to share, cry, laugh, sit back and relax, or stand up and give a snap.
[00:18.900 --> 00:22.420]  Again, Saturday, December 20th from 7 p.m.
[00:22.560 --> 00:23.480]  to 11 p.m.
[00:23.960 --> 00:29.360]  at the Church of St. Luke and St. Matthews at 520 Clinton Avenue in Brooklyn.
[00:30.020 --> 00:31.280]  NYC to Palestine.
[00:31.640 --> 00:32.820]  Solidarity open mic.
[00:33.180 --> 00:34.820]  People are coming together.
[00:35.460 --> 00:37.760]  And this is WBAI New York.
[00:37.860 --> 00:39.240]  The time is 7 o'clock.
[00:39.460 --> 00:41.600]  Time once again for Off the Hook.
[01:05.600 --> 01:07.500]  I hope that's understood.
[01:07.660 --> 01:08.680]  Monday, Monday, Monday, Monday.
[02:18.890 --> 02:20.550]  And a very good evening to everybody.
[02:20.670 --> 02:21.690]  The program is Off the Hook.
[02:22.250 --> 02:24.750]  Emmanuel Goldstein here with you, joined tonight by Mike.
[02:25.030 --> 02:25.570]  Good evening.
[02:25.690 --> 02:26.110]  Rob T.
[02:26.350 --> 02:26.790]  Firefly.
[02:26.990 --> 02:27.350]  Good evening.
[02:27.830 --> 02:28.270]  Alex.
[02:28.750 --> 02:29.330]  Good evening.
[02:29.510 --> 02:30.110]  Welcome back.
[02:30.290 --> 02:30.950]  Thank you, sir.
[02:30.970 --> 02:32.030]  And Bernie S.
[02:32.570 --> 02:33.650]  Greetings from Philadelphia.
[02:34.010 --> 02:36.370]  You know, I had something planned for the beginning of the show.
[02:36.590 --> 02:37.870]  We're going to get into the whole Sony thing.
[02:37.990 --> 02:38.990]  Don't worry about that.
[02:39.410 --> 02:40.350]  But I had something planned.
[02:40.510 --> 02:41.590]  A little featurette, if you will.
[02:41.670 --> 02:44.750]  But I got to the point where I was ready to dial the number.
[02:44.830 --> 02:49.510]  And then I realized we don't have the ability to do something that everybody else has the ability to do.
[02:49.570 --> 02:50.330]  At least I don't think so.
[02:50.630 --> 02:53.350]  Do you guys mind if I try this live on the air, even though it probably won't work?
[02:53.490 --> 02:53.950]  Go for it.
[02:54.050 --> 02:54.330]  All right.
[02:55.370 --> 02:57.350]  Because we're all about demonstrations.
[02:57.490 --> 02:58.010]  Here's a dial tone.
[02:58.110 --> 02:59.290]  Now we're going to get an external dial tone.
[03:00.010 --> 03:02.590]  And I'm going to dial star six, seven to block our number.
[03:03.270 --> 03:05.130]  But I don't think we can do that.
[03:05.390 --> 03:12.830]  And then I'm going to dial a number that I was going to call to demonstrate a ridiculous feature that I just learned about.
[03:13.410 --> 03:14.390]  Let's see if it works.
[03:15.530 --> 03:16.390]  Probably won't, though.
[03:18.230 --> 03:19.310]  Probably just get silence.
[03:19.970 --> 03:21.730]  Yeah, like we're getting right now is silence.
[03:22.570 --> 03:24.190]  But at least I didn't disconnect anybody.
[03:24.330 --> 03:25.110]  Usually that happens.
[03:25.110 --> 03:29.510]  Okay, so I'll just tell you what the feature is, since it's not going to work.
[03:29.690 --> 03:31.110]  Why can't we dial star six, seven?
[03:31.190 --> 03:32.470]  There's no way for us to block our number.
[03:32.590 --> 03:33.130]  Do you realize that?
[03:33.630 --> 03:34.850]  That's just not right.
[03:35.590 --> 03:42.490]  Okay, so the feature, I discovered this because our colleague Kyle just got a new number out in Washington State.
[03:42.830 --> 03:48.330]  When I called that number, I was calling from a block line, a line where all numbers going out are blocked.
[03:48.510 --> 03:49.550]  Your number is never transmitted.
[03:49.550 --> 03:55.650]  And I got a recording saying the person you're calling does not wish to receive blocked calls.
[03:56.030 --> 04:01.790]  Press one to unblock your number for this call only, which I thought was interesting right there.
[04:01.950 --> 04:08.390]  Because when you dial star six, seven, or have your number by default blocking, you assume that it's blocked from the point of origin.
[04:08.510 --> 04:10.670]  But they can unblock it after you make the call.
[04:10.810 --> 04:13.450]  I kind of knew that was possible, but I never actually heard it as a feature.
[04:13.450 --> 04:17.970]  The second feature, though, press two to enter your phone number.
[04:18.610 --> 04:21.730]  And you can enter any phone number you want.
[04:21.890 --> 04:22.970]  What is the point?
[04:23.170 --> 04:25.530]  You're calling somebody who doesn't want to get anonymous phone calls.
[04:25.710 --> 04:29.770]  You're blocking your number, and they tell you, you can't do this.
[04:29.890 --> 04:30.730]  What's your phone number?
[04:30.850 --> 04:33.050]  And we're going to trust anything you tell us.
[04:33.050 --> 04:45.450]  This is a boon for stalkers and abusive husbands and who knows who else that needs to get through to a block number, to a number that doesn't take blocked calls without revealing their phone number.
[04:45.650 --> 04:46.190]  Emmanuel?
[04:46.430 --> 04:46.610]  Yes.
[04:47.070 --> 05:00.230]  This may run afoul of the New Jersey state bill that's pending that would criminalize caller ID spoofing more stringently than the federal regulations do.
[05:00.230 --> 05:04.350]  So Verizon may be unwittingly violating state law pretty soon.
[05:05.170 --> 05:06.710]  Yeah, but who's saying anything about Verizon?
[05:06.710 --> 05:07.890]  This is in Washington State.
[05:08.210 --> 05:09.850]  Well, you're in Washington State right now.
[05:10.090 --> 05:11.450]  I thought you were in Washington State right now.
[05:11.450 --> 05:12.650]  I'm not in Washington State.
[05:12.650 --> 05:13.290]  I'm in Harlem.
[05:13.290 --> 05:13.590]  No.
[05:14.390 --> 05:16.730]  Listen, the phone number is in Washington State.
[05:16.770 --> 05:19.330]  I called the phone number in Washington State, and that's the message I got.
[05:19.910 --> 05:22.550]  Yes, but you're calling from...
[05:22.550 --> 05:23.690]  Okay, so you'd be...
[05:23.690 --> 05:24.270]  I understand.
[05:24.270 --> 05:25.890]  You'd be going through Washington State.
[05:26.510 --> 05:28.450]  I'd be ending up in Washington State.
[05:28.750 --> 05:29.870]  This is not that complicated.
[05:29.870 --> 05:31.070]  Yeah, this is really a simple concept.
[05:31.210 --> 05:31.710]  It's a phone call.
[05:31.810 --> 05:33.070]  It's a phone call to Washington.
[05:33.150 --> 05:34.750]  I don't know if other states have this.
[05:34.950 --> 05:36.870]  This is the only time I've ever heard this feature.
[05:37.030 --> 05:38.770]  And we've already spent way too much time on it.
[05:39.090 --> 05:41.070]  But I just never heard of that before.
[05:41.230 --> 05:43.230]  And I've been playing with phones for a long, long time.
[05:43.450 --> 05:49.950]  And that just seems like a really stupid move by the phone company to allow somebody to basically have a spoof card without having a spoof card.
[05:49.950 --> 05:52.250]  Does it even count as spoofing?
[05:52.350 --> 06:02.630]  Like, if this New Jersey law passed, and none of us know the answer, but could you possibly be convicted under this law for, you know, following the prompts that the person you call gives you?
[06:02.750 --> 06:03.530]  Well, I don't know.
[06:03.730 --> 06:08.750]  The New Jersey law, basically, that's supposed to stop stalkers, even though we know it won't.
[06:08.870 --> 06:16.310]  But it's basically saying that you won't be allowed to do things like spoof your number through a spoof card or, I imagine, other services.
[06:16.310 --> 06:21.130]  It's just kind of weird when the phone company itself is offering you that service after you've made the phone call.
[06:21.310 --> 06:25.350]  Now, I haven't heard or seen the display when the call does go through.
[06:25.450 --> 06:29.270]  Maybe it says, this is the number the person gave, and this is the number he's actually calling from.
[06:29.330 --> 06:31.930]  I don't know where to get the extra line to do that.
[06:32.050 --> 06:36.270]  But it just seems like a really silly feature.
[06:36.270 --> 06:51.090]  You know, back in the old days of phone freaking, about 100 years ago in the 1990s, there was a little trick called optiverting, or operator diverting, where you would make your way to an operator that, for some reason or another, didn't have access to the number your call was originating from.
[06:51.450 --> 06:56.150]  The operator would ask you, as he or she were putting your call through, you know, what number you're dialing from.
[06:56.150 --> 07:00.530]  You could tell them anything, and that would come up as the calling number on the other end.
[07:00.910 --> 07:06.410]  And the trick you're talking about seems to be just sort of an automated way to do that.
[07:06.610 --> 07:10.270]  But it's kind of interesting, because nowadays, we really...
[07:11.370 --> 07:12.390]  Hang on, I got it.
[07:15.090 --> 07:17.950]  Okay, for some reason, I'm not getting a speaker on this phone.
[07:19.650 --> 07:20.210]  Here we go.
[07:23.560 --> 07:24.440]  It's going to repeat.
[07:25.760 --> 07:28.880]  The number you are calling does not accept unidentified calls.
[07:29.160 --> 07:31.800]  If you are a solicitor, please hang up now.
[07:32.260 --> 07:37.960]  To automatically unblock your name and number for this call only, and complete the call, press 1.
[07:38.440 --> 07:41.640]  To enter the telephone number you are calling from, press 2.
[07:41.960 --> 07:42.820]  Okay, I'm going to do that.
[07:42.900 --> 07:44.060]  I'm using my cell phone now, by the way.
[07:44.120 --> 07:46.000]  That's how I got around the AI phone restriction.
[07:46.180 --> 07:47.260]  The number you are calling...
[07:49.410 --> 07:53.090]  Please unblock your telephone number to complete your call.
[07:54.030 --> 07:59.810]  Okay, I don't know if something changed, or maybe I took too long to hit the number, but the last time I did this, it allowed me to enter a number.
[07:59.910 --> 08:01.430]  I'm not going to keep trying, though.
[08:01.710 --> 08:09.410]  I have to say, I love the fact that it tells you if you're a solicitor to hang up, because having just come back from England, that could be slightly misinterpreted.
[08:10.150 --> 08:12.130]  Obviously, solicitors there are lawyers.
[08:12.710 --> 08:13.790]  Maybe that's what's desired.
[08:13.810 --> 08:14.870]  I think that's a good feature.
[08:14.870 --> 08:14.990]  Possibly.
[08:15.130 --> 08:15.550]  Maybe it is.
[08:15.630 --> 08:17.670]  Maybe it's directed towards English lawyers.
[08:17.870 --> 08:19.090]  Yeah, I thought I hung this thing up.
[08:19.090 --> 08:19.830]  I can't hang up.
[08:19.930 --> 08:20.150]  Wow.
[08:20.530 --> 08:22.750]  I hit end call, but it didn't end the call.
[08:22.750 --> 08:23.910]  So, hitting it again.
[08:24.010 --> 08:24.530]  Okay, it's gone.
[08:24.730 --> 08:26.170]  It really wants to know where you are.
[08:26.350 --> 08:27.330]  Yeah, it's getting scary now.
[08:27.770 --> 08:31.610]  All right, so other things that have been going on in the world.
[08:31.710 --> 08:32.170]  We'll get to Sony.
[08:32.270 --> 08:33.090]  We are going to get to Sony.
[08:34.150 --> 08:36.270]  So, we talked about the New Jersey bill.
[08:36.690 --> 08:39.030]  Did we talk about the Pirate Bay being sort of back again?
[08:40.310 --> 08:42.070]  There wasn't any development to see yet.
[08:42.130 --> 08:56.390]  There were fake sites that were purporting to be the Pirate Bay, but now, thanks to ISOHUNT, which is another torrent tracking site that's well-known, they managed to get hold of an archive of the Pirate Bay as it stood and basically started it up again.
[08:56.410 --> 09:01.450]  They're allowing new content, and for all intents and purposes, the Pirate Bay is back up.
[09:01.550 --> 09:03.410]  That's at oldpiratebay.org.
[09:04.530 --> 09:05.530]  Oldpiratebay.org.
[09:05.850 --> 09:07.210]  Oldpiratebay.org, all one word.
[09:07.210 --> 09:14.730]  And, yeah, there are still a bunch of sites up there, new ones popping up now with the old Pirate Bay name that are scams of one type or another.
[09:15.070 --> 09:21.170]  But oldpiratebay.org does now seem to be a mirror of the Pirate Bay that's being brought back to life by ISOHUNT.
[09:21.270 --> 09:25.190]  Now, is this something that the original Pirate Bay people are endorsing or condemning?
[09:25.350 --> 09:27.790]  I don't think they've endorsed it at all.
[09:28.850 --> 09:42.510]  I know last week we mentioned that the one Pirate Bay founder who is not imprisoned, I think his name is Peter Sund, had posted a blog post about how he thought the Pirate Bay had done what it should and should not be brought back.
[09:42.830 --> 09:49.830]  So I'm guessing the original Pirate Bay hasn't endorsed or unendorsed this on any level since they haven't been around.
[09:50.050 --> 09:51.230]  Their site's still down.
[09:51.450 --> 09:56.610]  So it'll be interesting to hear from them if we do what they think about ISOHUNT starting it up again.
[09:56.610 --> 10:11.130]  Now, there's also a story that has been circulating in the last day or so about a shadowy organization with ties to the Koch brothers that was spearheading an anti-net neutrality form letter that tipped the scales against net neutrality proponents.
[10:11.670 --> 10:20.930]  Basically, they somehow were able to, with this form letter, make it seem as if most people were against net neutrality.
[10:21.090 --> 10:22.990]  Didn't we discuss this some time ago?
[10:23.190 --> 10:24.850]  I don't know if it's exactly the same thing.
[10:24.850 --> 10:26.710]  It's the same tactic they used.
[10:26.750 --> 10:33.510]  There was some announcement that they had suddenly discovered all these letters to the FCC opposing net neutrality.
[10:33.650 --> 10:37.530]  What I'm wondering is, how is this different than signing a petition?
[10:37.830 --> 10:40.170]  It's basically you're not writing anything unique.
[10:40.530 --> 10:45.290]  Did these letters actually come from people or did they just generate a bunch of nonsense addresses?
[10:46.430 --> 10:50.630]  I mean, either way, the technical implementation can be very hard.
[10:50.630 --> 10:59.250]  I can write you a software in an hour that, if you type in your name and address, will generate a letter with prefilled content.
[10:59.470 --> 11:00.910]  Well, I mean, this is what I would expect them to do, though.
[11:00.990 --> 11:04.410]  I'd expect them to do a mass campaign with form letters.
[11:04.750 --> 11:09.890]  So I'm not sure what people are surprised about or why this was effective as opposed to the other side.
[11:09.990 --> 11:11.090]  Bernie, did you have anything else on this?
[11:12.350 --> 11:13.030]  Not on this story.
[11:13.230 --> 11:13.350]  We did.
[11:13.450 --> 11:13.950]  Mike is right.
[11:14.010 --> 11:15.390]  We did talk about this a few weeks ago.
[11:15.390 --> 11:18.030]  But this is new information on that same story.
[11:18.230 --> 11:25.110]  It was basically right-wing groups that were astro-turfing the FCC.
[11:25.130 --> 11:33.410]  It's a term for, like, fake grassroots organizations with anti-net neutrality requests.
[11:33.830 --> 11:35.730]  And we shouldn't be surprised.
[11:35.950 --> 11:43.170]  But I think we played an audio clip of a right-wing organization that was just bragging that they just totally spoofed the system.
[11:43.170 --> 11:44.010]  And so we win.
[11:44.550 --> 11:45.270]  They win.
[11:45.910 --> 11:47.950]  Well, they don't win, but they could win.
[11:48.050 --> 11:48.930]  Well, that was what they were saying.
[11:49.030 --> 11:52.630]  If this is a plebiscite where the most votes win, then they win.
[11:53.450 --> 11:54.850]  So it's ludicrous.
[11:54.850 --> 12:01.970]  But it's worth knowing that this kind of astro-turfing is going on against the FCC or against people through the FCC.
[12:02.290 --> 12:11.850]  What are the arguments they use to convince ordinary humans that they should support the cable companies in their quest to make it more expensive to watch Netflix?
[12:11.850 --> 12:12.630]  We've covered this before.
[12:12.630 --> 12:14.070]  It will stop innovation.
[12:14.330 --> 12:15.130]  Yeah, it's innovation.
[12:15.130 --> 12:15.950]  It's about innovation.
[12:15.950 --> 12:16.910]  It's about competition.
[12:16.910 --> 12:19.010]  It's about getting the government off our backs.
[12:19.370 --> 12:19.970]  I'm sorry.
[12:20.130 --> 12:20.370]  I'm sorry.
[12:20.430 --> 12:22.170]  I was listening to Fox on the way in.
[12:22.250 --> 12:23.190]  I'm all riled up.
[12:23.330 --> 12:28.170]  It basically boils down to, but if we have less money, then we'll be innovating less, and that would make us sad.
[12:28.910 --> 12:29.270]  Yeah.
[12:29.530 --> 12:30.110]  We like money.
[12:30.310 --> 12:34.870]  Hey, there's a new technology that we're all going to become very familiar with in years ahead.
[12:34.890 --> 12:38.870]  I'd like to devote more time to this in a future show, but I just wanted to give a glancing mention to it.
[12:38.870 --> 12:50.030]  But it's basically smart cars, not the kind I have, but actual cars that communicate with other cars and with a central headquarter.
[12:50.290 --> 12:51.050]  Could it be the government?
[12:51.210 --> 12:51.990]  Could it be the manufacturer?
[12:52.130 --> 12:52.470]  Who knows?
[12:52.470 --> 12:54.150]  It's called V2X.
[12:54.790 --> 12:56.670]  It's a shorthand for two related concepts.
[12:56.930 --> 13:02.170]  V2V is vehicle-to-vehicle communications, and V2I is vehicle-to-infrastructure communications.
[13:02.570 --> 13:10.890]  Now, V2V, which is cars talking to other cars, and that's really going to be kind of crazy when you think about it, it has obvious potential to improve traffic safety.
[13:11.030 --> 13:18.530]  Imagine if your car could warn the other drivers around you on the highway that you were about to change lanes or planning to take the next exit.
[13:19.030 --> 13:22.910]  I don't know how it would read your mind, but apparently that's in the technology as well.
[13:23.210 --> 13:35.050]  Those drivers or their smart cruise control systems, because drivers apparently won't be driving anymore, could help make sure that they stayed out of your way, or they could warn you to hang on a minute while the car in front of you makes its own move.
[13:35.130 --> 13:38.990]  They can get into all kinds of V2V arguments, I suppose, and see who is dominant.
[13:39.170 --> 13:43.750]  But the thing that's of concern here is that you could get speeding tickets.
[13:43.970 --> 13:48.210]  You could get a speeding ticket if you go one mile over the speed limit without even knowing it.
[13:48.210 --> 13:48.950]  Everywhere.
[13:49.090 --> 13:50.990]  Everywhere could be a speed trap.
[13:51.270 --> 13:52.330]  What do you guys think about that?
[13:52.490 --> 13:53.830]  I have a proposed solution.
[13:53.950 --> 13:54.090]  Yes.
[13:55.310 --> 13:57.050]  Obey the speed limit, at least occasionally.
[13:57.430 --> 13:57.650]  Okay.
[13:58.050 --> 14:01.890]  But how do you feel about the technology that penalizes you every time you don't?
[14:02.250 --> 14:05.910]  I think that as a pedestrian, that's great technology.
[14:06.170 --> 14:06.530]  Okay.
[14:06.610 --> 14:08.910]  Well, as you're a pedestrian, then how about jaywalking?
[14:08.970 --> 14:11.230]  How about every time you jaywalk, you also get a ticket?
[14:11.510 --> 14:13.850]  Who is harmed by my jaywalking?
[14:13.850 --> 14:14.390]  Well, that's not the point.
[14:14.470 --> 14:15.930]  It's about breaking the law, Mike.
[14:15.930 --> 14:17.710]  It's about following rules.
[14:17.850 --> 14:19.050]  That's how we live as a culture.
[14:19.350 --> 14:24.490]  And I find that we tend to want to penalize the people that break the rules that we don't agree with.
[14:24.670 --> 14:28.430]  But when we break the rules, we want to be left alone.
[14:29.030 --> 14:32.430]  And, you know, it's the same basic thing that we've been discussing with surveillance.
[14:32.690 --> 14:36.110]  How, you know, surveillance for the cops, that's the solution.
[14:36.790 --> 14:39.030]  And surveillance on people, that's not the solution.
[14:39.030 --> 14:46.350]  I know cops are people, but it's basically, we're all pointing to the same kinds of technology to use against other people.
[14:46.350 --> 14:48.510]  And it winds up being used against all of us.
[14:48.690 --> 14:49.590]  It's not only that.
[14:49.690 --> 14:59.930]  There's the basic fundamental idea of the technology we use being actively used against us, being loaded with content, code, instructions, whatever, that we don't have control over.
[15:00.470 --> 15:05.310]  You know, my game console wants me to only play games bought in this country from approved vendors.
[15:05.590 --> 15:13.130]  My, you know, if my car only, you know, if my car wants to be able to send messages I don't necessarily want it to send, you know, what's, what are my rights regarding this?
[15:13.370 --> 15:23.270]  You know, I would be interested to find out what folks like our friends in the Open Auto project and things like that, who have been looking into car computers as they exist now, feel about, feel about this development.
[15:23.530 --> 15:32.010]  I mean, I think there's an important difference between your game console and a car, which is that if you abuse your game console, you might be able to hurt yourself, although it's not really clear.
[15:32.210 --> 15:35.310]  If you abuse your automobile, you might kill someone who's not in your automobile.
[15:35.610 --> 15:46.190]  And so I think, not to say that all uses of all technology are great in this regard, but I think there is an important consideration that like your car is not just your car.
[15:46.310 --> 15:50.990]  It's part of a car road system that all of us as a society share.
[15:51.190 --> 15:57.290]  And so there's more need for rules in such a system than there is in a game console.
[15:57.330 --> 15:59.250]  And I don't think that's a crazy position to take.
[15:59.330 --> 16:05.470]  I think Sony might disagree with you as far as the seriousness of game consoles and how much it can hurt.
[16:06.110 --> 16:10.710]  We're not even going to get into the game part of Sony and how they've been hacked.
[16:11.050 --> 16:14.990]  But wow, this story, this story just will not stop.
[16:15.610 --> 16:18.690]  Okay, if you look at the headline of CNN right now, it's unbelievable.
[16:18.910 --> 16:21.310]  In big, bold letters, North Korea did it.
[16:21.990 --> 16:24.730]  Apparently, the government has concluded that North Korea did it.
[16:24.730 --> 16:26.010]  I find it kind of hard to believe.
[16:26.190 --> 16:26.990]  But you know what?
[16:27.270 --> 16:31.550]  If North Korea actually found out about this film, which I didn't know anything about.
[16:31.670 --> 16:33.570]  Do you guys know about the interview before this month?
[16:33.730 --> 16:34.330]  It's great public.
[16:34.530 --> 16:37.430]  I mean, I know all kinds of things.
[16:37.530 --> 16:41.430]  I have no interest in seeing this film except that, you know, apparently I can't see it.
[16:41.470 --> 16:42.530]  I do have an interest now.
[16:43.450 --> 16:47.230]  And yeah, they basically, that little publicity stunt worked on me.
[16:47.570 --> 16:50.730]  But North Korea found out about this film a long time ago.
[16:51.010 --> 16:58.790]  I guess somebody probably told them, hey, by the way, these idiots at Sony are going to make a film, a comedy about assassinating your beloved leader.
[16:59.550 --> 17:05.430]  And yeah, they kind of reacted badly to that because it was very offensive and nasty to them.
[17:05.770 --> 17:20.070]  If this is their response, their response is to completely own Sony, take them to their knees and embarrass them, release films that aren't supposed to be released for months and basically make this the biggest disaster the company has ever faced.
[17:20.550 --> 17:22.590]  All I have to say is well played.
[17:22.990 --> 17:26.130]  I mean, this is a hack like no other hack.
[17:26.270 --> 17:33.810]  And considering North Korea is so cut off and their connectivity is not the best, they are doing their homework, if that is true.
[17:33.850 --> 17:34.770]  And I'm not sure it is.
[17:34.870 --> 17:36.150]  I was listening on the way in.
[17:36.450 --> 17:38.230]  You know, there are a lot of things going on today.
[17:38.370 --> 17:40.590]  We're talking about normalizing relations with Cuba.
[17:40.830 --> 17:46.350]  There was this massacre of school children in Pakistan, all kinds of like terrorist things going on.
[17:46.430 --> 17:57.570]  But everybody's talking about this movie and whether or not people should feel safe going to theaters because somebody mentioned 9-11 and North Koreans are going to be attacking us on Christmas Day.
[17:58.010 --> 18:00.490]  That is what everybody is freaking out about.
[18:00.670 --> 18:10.250]  And it's just the whole thing is so ridiculously absurd that if I was a North Korean hacker right now, I would be laughing harder than I've ever laughed in my life.
[18:10.750 --> 18:11.450]  I'm laughing.
[18:11.670 --> 18:12.110]  Are you laughing?
[18:12.230 --> 18:13.030]  Are you a North Korean hacker?
[18:13.350 --> 18:14.510]  Well, I'm not in North Korea.
[18:14.710 --> 18:16.090]  I'm not a hacker in North Korea.
[18:16.190 --> 18:18.010]  But I still think it's funny.
[18:18.110 --> 18:30.590]  But one thing to point out is that if this is truly a war between a nation state, North Korea, and Sony Corporation, no people were physically harmed in this war.
[18:33.290 --> 18:36.130]  Well, how about the people whose private information was released?
[18:36.130 --> 18:37.050]  They weren't physically harmed.
[18:37.150 --> 18:39.150]  Yes, their financial stuff may be harmed.
[18:39.270 --> 18:45.230]  But that was really, I got to put the blame on Sony for that, for not securing their employees' information.
[18:45.690 --> 18:47.390]  I mean, there's no way around it.
[18:47.510 --> 18:50.970]  And apparently some employees are taking them up.
[18:51.110 --> 18:52.350]  They are holding them responsible.
[18:52.850 --> 18:56.870]  I'm hearing reports of class action lawsuits being filed by ex-Sony employees.
[18:56.990 --> 19:02.330]  I'm not sure why it's not by current Sony employees against them for this grievous lack of security.
[19:02.510 --> 19:04.830]  Bernie, I'm a bit of a traditionalist when it comes to war.
[19:04.970 --> 19:05.750]  This is not a war.
[19:06.470 --> 19:18.330]  Well, if you believe that, just watch the mainstream media, because they're talking about, well, we can respond militarily to this now, because you canceled a movie that is going to be playing in our theaters.
[19:18.870 --> 19:20.770]  That is an attack on all of us.
[19:20.830 --> 19:24.070]  And you said 9-11, and that's a trigger word right there.
[19:24.770 --> 19:28.930]  I'm saying this, I can imagine what Fox is saying, but CNN is calling it an act of war.
[19:29.370 --> 19:31.370]  And when you think about it, you got to put it in perspective.
[19:31.370 --> 19:39.270]  If you put out a comedy about assassinating your leader and your hostile foreign nation, isn't that sort of an act of war right there?
[19:39.470 --> 19:39.870]  You know?
[19:40.090 --> 19:40.250]  No.
[19:40.670 --> 19:43.550]  Well, it's more of an act of war than hacking.
[19:43.790 --> 19:45.310]  They're equally not acts of war.
[19:45.410 --> 19:45.670]  All right.
[19:46.010 --> 19:46.870]  I'll give you that.
[19:47.190 --> 19:48.930]  I did not say it was a war.
[19:49.010 --> 19:57.610]  If this is a war, and second of all, we discussed many years ago on this show that the Department of Defense or whatever administration it was, probably the Bush or W.S.
[19:58.130 --> 20:04.550]  administration, that there were new rules in place regarding what could, under the U.S.
[20:04.710 --> 20:10.590]  rules of engagement, authorize or legitimize dropping bombs.
[20:11.090 --> 20:18.690]  And a cyber attack like this was on that list of acceptable things that could be responded with by bombs dropping.
[20:18.910 --> 20:22.190]  So, you know, we could laugh at this, but who knows where it's going to end.
[20:22.190 --> 20:33.110]  Well, before things really spiral out of control, I just want to pass along the offer we made earlier today to Sony, because if they're too afraid to distribute the film, we'll be happy to do it for them.
[20:33.670 --> 20:35.190]  We might already have a copy, in fact.
[20:35.310 --> 20:35.910]  I'm not sure yet.
[20:35.910 --> 20:38.150]  We have to go through a few terabytes of information.
[20:38.290 --> 20:48.190]  But the point is, if hackers are being blamed for this film not coming out, I think hackers should prove that wrong and just basically expose it to the world.
[20:48.410 --> 20:50.010]  Let them decide how bad it is.
[20:50.110 --> 20:53.490]  But man, what a stupid idea in the first place to even make this thing.
[20:53.790 --> 20:54.830]  But they made it.
[20:54.930 --> 20:57.450]  So let's see how bad it is and let's condemn it for what it is.
[20:57.610 --> 20:59.670]  I mean, you guys think it should be shown, at least?
[21:00.230 --> 21:00.590]  Yeah.
[21:00.710 --> 21:09.550]  I mean, there was a line in one of the notes that purportedly came from the hackers saying, we'll all see how terrible this movie by Sony is.
[21:09.750 --> 21:13.790]  And, you know, they got what they want by not getting this movie released.
[21:14.390 --> 21:19.050]  The release of the film, which was, I believe, supposed to happen this week, is now being pushed back.
[21:19.050 --> 21:19.930]  No, it's canceled.
[21:20.050 --> 21:21.250]  They canceled the whole release.
[21:21.450 --> 21:24.450]  There's supposed to be an official release, I think, tomorrow in New York.
[21:24.530 --> 21:25.290]  They had one in L.A.
[21:25.750 --> 21:26.790]  and everybody survived.
[21:26.970 --> 21:28.590]  But it was supposed to be released on Christmas Day.
[21:28.670 --> 21:29.410]  They've canceled that.
[21:29.510 --> 21:30.990]  I don't know if they're ever going to release it.
[21:31.130 --> 21:31.270]  Right.
[21:31.350 --> 21:36.090]  But we already have a traditional mechanism in place to show how bad the movies these companies make are.
[21:36.150 --> 21:37.050]  And that's the movie theaters.
[21:38.050 --> 21:43.490]  When we were protesting Takedown, way back, the film about Kevin Mitnick, we got it early.
[21:43.590 --> 21:44.730]  We got it before they started shooting.
[21:44.870 --> 21:48.230]  And we were outside the Miramax offices saying, this is unfair.
[21:49.010 --> 21:51.530]  And people were afraid then.
[21:51.750 --> 21:52.770]  Hackers are targeting us.
[21:52.850 --> 21:55.850]  They actually thought that we were going to do all kinds of horrible things.
[21:55.970 --> 21:57.130]  And, well, we didn't.
[21:57.250 --> 21:59.870]  Well, we did sort of make the film have to change.
[21:59.870 --> 22:03.030]  And it was a disaster as far as box office.
[22:03.450 --> 22:05.310]  But it was a dialogue.
[22:05.630 --> 22:07.850]  In this particular case, there was no real dialogue.
[22:08.030 --> 22:09.710]  They just went ahead and did this.
[22:09.870 --> 22:12.210]  And they offended people a lot more powerful than us.
[22:12.610 --> 22:17.170]  So it's definitely getting more and more interesting.
[22:17.430 --> 22:17.630]  Yeah.
[22:17.750 --> 22:20.250]  I still believe the antidote to bad speech is not censorship.
[22:20.430 --> 22:21.070]  It's better speech.
[22:21.250 --> 22:25.030]  But an attack like this, obviously, is not done by people who feel that way.
[22:25.330 --> 22:30.050]  But the other side to the whole attack, besides the film, is the horrible security that Sony had.
[22:30.150 --> 22:40.270]  The fact that they basically had a wide open door that somebody could figure out how to get through and access all this information that had no business being stored in the clear.
[22:40.270 --> 22:44.930]  I mean, I'm not very familiar with corporate structures.
[22:45.110 --> 22:54.890]  But do you guys think this is kind of like something that maybe Bradley Manning era, where all these documents are available to millions of people?
[22:55.070 --> 22:59.510]  Do you think all of this information was available to many, many people within Sony in the first place?
[22:59.670 --> 23:03.610]  I think this information was possibly made available to people who didn't necessarily need it.
[23:04.010 --> 23:11.290]  No one with a need to know basis would have access to every single thing that's been released in this massive hack so far.
[23:11.450 --> 23:21.050]  But I think on a grander scale, it's actually comparable to what happened a few months ago with the celebrities who had photos of themselves getting out that they didn't want.
[23:21.210 --> 23:32.890]  Because it's another case of people not being cognizant of how the security is in places where they leave this information, and then suffering on a grand scale when it gets out.
[23:33.030 --> 23:44.410]  And I think every other studio, all of Sony's competitors, and now Sony themselves are completely clenching up, possibly as a result of this, adopting some better data practices, doing things to prevent something like this happening to them.
[23:44.850 --> 23:49.310]  And maybe society will be richer for it.
[23:49.530 --> 23:56.090]  I mean, I'm not sure that making people more paranoid all the time is exactly the society we want to build.
[23:56.250 --> 24:06.630]  I mean, Sony, I don't know anything about their corporate IT practices, but they presumably have some people who are at least moderately competent and failed to protect the data.
[24:06.910 --> 24:17.830]  But, you know, if they lock everything down such that people, you know, it makes it harder to communicate across departments in such a company, like, that's bad.
[24:17.930 --> 24:19.090]  That's bad for Sony as well.
[24:19.290 --> 24:20.550]  So, I don't know.
[24:20.750 --> 24:21.510]  Yeah, there's limitations.
[24:21.610 --> 24:26.470]  But I mean, having unreleased films available to download, that's kind of stupid.
[24:26.630 --> 24:31.230]  Having salaries of people you have no business with available to peruse.
[24:31.670 --> 24:32.710]  We've seen this all before.
[24:32.970 --> 24:48.710]  I mean, all year long, we've been hearing reports of corporate America not learning their lessons, very basic lessons on security, security of customers, security of employees, security of the basic operating systems so that they can't be manipulated and infiltrated.
[24:49.030 --> 24:50.430]  They don't seem to be learning.
[24:50.650 --> 24:54.010]  I don't see how after this it can be ignored any longer.
[24:54.370 --> 24:56.070]  I think you're absolutely right.
[24:56.230 --> 25:03.090]  And I think another corollary of this is that people are going to be thinking long and hard about how they write emails and how long they're stored.
[25:03.090 --> 25:10.130]  And there are, I think, a couple of points to make here with regard to Sony security, and one of which is, you know, documents are one thing.
[25:10.290 --> 25:18.450]  Documents on a major document management system like SharePoint can generally be accessed by probably more people than likely have a need to know, as Rob had mentioned.
[25:18.570 --> 25:27.350]  But the fact that all of these emails have been exfiltrated terabytes of emails implies to me that they didn't have a document retention policy that they were probably following.
[25:27.570 --> 25:35.570]  And the document retention policy is going to say something like, after six months, all of our emails are purged, or they're put on backup tapes and held for two years and then destroyed.
[25:35.870 --> 25:40.250]  Here, we've got Sony holding onto these things for what appeared to be an indefinite period of time.
[25:40.630 --> 25:43.350]  Terabytes of this information that had then been exfiltrated.
[25:43.570 --> 25:49.350]  And last week, when I wasn't here, you guys discussed whether or not this could be done via a regular broadband connection.
[25:49.650 --> 25:58.830]  And I discussed this with a couple information security colleagues of mine, and I thought this indicated to me that this is probably an inside job.
[25:58.990 --> 26:02.630]  They knew where this data was, and they probably just walked out with it.
[26:02.830 --> 26:09.230]  But given the speeds that we have today, I mean, think about going back to hope, how fast the network connection there was.
[26:09.430 --> 26:14.270]  And hey, maybe there's a connection between, you know, July and, you know, and when all this happened.
[26:14.290 --> 26:14.530]  Wait a minute.
[26:14.670 --> 26:16.190]  What are you implying here?
[26:16.230 --> 26:17.950]  I'm just saying, you know, post hoc, I'll go propter hoc, right?
[26:18.070 --> 26:19.630]  You know, a logical fallacy, who knows.
[26:19.790 --> 26:24.810]  But I do think over a certain period of time, all that data could be exfiltrated.
[26:24.970 --> 26:29.370]  So companies are going to be really thinking long and hard about what they put in writing and how long it's stored.
[26:29.590 --> 26:35.010]  So you think someone may have gone in there with a Lady Gaga disc and copied it all and walked out?
[26:35.190 --> 26:36.390]  You know, it's happened before.
[26:37.090 --> 26:39.390]  I mean, go ahead, Bernie, then Mike.
[26:39.410 --> 26:41.870]  I just want to ask sort of a legal question to Alex.
[26:42.030 --> 26:44.550]  Hey, Alex, thanks for coming back to the show for a little bit.
[26:45.070 --> 27:07.090]  We have an analogy, I think, in the Fair Credit Reporting Act, where, correct me if I'm wrong, but I think it provides for a fine and a civil liability for any consumer reporting agency that reports something wrong and doesn't correct it, or reports something that's like an expired debt.
[27:07.450 --> 27:08.810]  And U.S.
[27:09.130 --> 27:19.430]  citizens can successfully get compensated when their information is put out or wrong information is put out of them.
[27:19.510 --> 27:21.770]  Do you think it's time for some federal legislation?
[27:21.770 --> 27:24.170]  As much as I cringe, there's more federal legislation.
[27:24.350 --> 27:39.270]  But in this case, it sounds like maybe a law would be a good idea that would provide a penalty for any company that allows private information of their employees to escape their corporate walls.
[27:39.450 --> 27:40.170]  Does that make sense?
[27:40.670 --> 27:54.610]  You know, Bernie, it's a very interesting point you raise here because essentially the law under which the three sets of class action plaintiffs are suing Sony currently is actually the federal law that allows class actions to be brought in federal court.
[27:54.730 --> 28:00.890]  And when you look at the complaint, the complaint is actually a cause of action for negligence.
[28:01.150 --> 28:12.650]  And it's exactly what you were talking about before that, you know, they have a duty to safeguard this personal information, the PII, the personal identifying information of its employees and former employees and its colleagues and third parties.
[28:13.150 --> 28:15.590]  And that's a legal duty to safeguard that.
[28:15.710 --> 28:16.810]  They breach that duty.
[28:17.130 --> 28:21.330]  And the breach of that duty is the proximate cause of these people's damages.
[28:21.610 --> 28:33.270]  And so I would say, I don't know if we need more laws, but I think we need to think about applying the common law that we already have on the books, something like negligence, in a more technological context.
[28:33.410 --> 28:35.030]  And we're seeing that done right now.
[28:35.090 --> 28:37.650]  And I think it's, I think it's gonna be interesting to see how this plays out.
[28:37.790 --> 28:48.690]  Well, one very interesting development over the past week has been one of the reactions from Sony, where they're demanding that journalists not report on the leaked information.
[28:48.730 --> 28:59.510]  And it's kind of interesting because every day, it's sort of like the Edward Snowden leaks, except you're seeing what a particular film executive said about some actor someplace, and it's being released as if they were national secrets.
[28:59.510 --> 29:00.410]  I couldn't care less.
[29:00.650 --> 29:07.150]  But it's, it's, it shows to me how, how Sony just doesn't get it.
[29:07.230 --> 29:12.250]  They don't get a lot of things, but they really don't get what, what free press is all about.
[29:12.250 --> 29:17.790]  For one thing, you can't just tell the press not to report on something that's been released.
[29:18.130 --> 29:23.990]  I mean, that's, you know, maybe North Korea, you can do that, but not, not in a supposedly free press.
[29:24.250 --> 29:26.490]  Well, you can absolutely tell the press not to report anything you want.
[29:26.590 --> 29:27.370]  They just don't have to listen.
[29:27.550 --> 29:30.550]  And Sony's lawyers have to be smart enough to understand that distinction.
[29:30.730 --> 29:31.690]  They, they, they must be.
[29:31.790 --> 29:34.310]  But let's, let's look at this from a more moral perspective.
[29:34.310 --> 29:37.250]  So we have all this private information that's now gotten out.
[29:37.330 --> 29:40.150]  We have emails about people saying nasty things about other people.
[29:40.610 --> 29:47.290]  Is this the kind of thing that, that should be printed, should be spread around or, or should we take the high road and just say that's private?
[29:47.490 --> 29:49.390]  We shouldn't even judge somebody on what they said.
[29:49.870 --> 30:01.010]  Well, the, the law says that if a journalist is in possession of stolen information, uh, so long as they acquired that information by legal means, it was given to them.
[30:01.090 --> 30:02.130]  They didn't steal it themselves.
[30:02.450 --> 30:05.490]  Uh, they can publish it so long as it's newsworthy.
[30:05.490 --> 30:07.650]  So you, you've really hit the issue on the head here.
[30:07.810 --> 30:12.970]  And what we're dealing with in, in some of these leaks, I would, I would submit is in fact newsworthy.
[30:12.970 --> 30:18.070]  When you have high level executives banding around racial slurs about the president, I think that's interesting.
[30:18.270 --> 30:23.990]  When you have, uh, pay disparities between genders being reported, that I think is quite newsworthy.
[30:24.130 --> 30:32.130]  Whether or not a, a, a script being released out into the public, you know, the new James Bond Skeptor script, I, I, I don't know if that's newsworthy.
[30:32.130 --> 30:35.750]  That may border on, uh, being a trade secret.
[30:35.950 --> 30:40.250]  And this is what I think the letter from Sony's counsel is actually the, the intent of it.
[30:40.370 --> 30:43.470]  And, and, and the attorney is actually David Boyes, who's a very prominent attorney.
[30:44.050 --> 30:49.470]  Uh, most people will remember him as the lawyer who represented Al Gore in Bush v.
[30:49.590 --> 30:49.750]  Gore.
[30:50.110 --> 30:55.390]  And, uh, he actually also represented Napster when they were being sued for copyright infringement as well.
[30:55.570 --> 30:58.190]  So very, very smart guy is here in Manhattan.
[30:58.190 --> 31:00.190]  Boys Schiller is, is, is his law firm.
[31:00.350 --> 31:09.570]  But the intent of this letter, some people are reporting is that it's putting, it's to put the media outlets on notice that this information contains our trade secrets.
[31:09.710 --> 31:18.010]  And if you publish these trade secrets, uh, or if you publish information that interferes with our contracts with third parties, then we're going to sue you later on.
[31:18.130 --> 31:20.230]  It's basically putting them on notice that they're watching them.
[31:20.410 --> 31:22.150]  That's what I think the intent of it is.
[31:22.150 --> 31:31.390]  I think, uh, it may have a chilling effect on some, some media agencies, but, uh, those media agencies probably just need to grow bigger, um, spines, something like that.
[31:31.550 --> 31:35.630]  Well, the way Sony has, has, uh, reacted is very spine less.
[31:35.870 --> 31:39.570]  I think as, I mean, if I were Sony right now and God, what a nightmare that would be.
[31:39.810 --> 31:42.270]  If I were Sony, I would not back down.
[31:42.270 --> 31:44.290]  I would, I would say, okay, you know what?
[31:44.310 --> 31:47.670]  You got us, but we're releasing the damn film and it doesn't matter who threatens us.
[31:48.050 --> 31:51.430]  And instead they're just saying, okay, you know, we were worried about liability.
[31:51.590 --> 31:58.190]  We're worried about if, uh, uh, if we're told there's going to be a 9-11 attack in every theater in America or whatever they're, they, they think is going to happen.
[31:58.350 --> 32:01.250]  If they show this film, uh, what does that say for the future?
[32:01.430 --> 32:05.830]  Every time somebody is upset with something they do, they're going to have to, um, uh, be intimidated by it.
[32:06.290 --> 32:08.830]  Uh, the film is probably really awful.
[32:09.150 --> 32:11.790]  It probably should never have been made, but it has been made.
[32:11.890 --> 32:13.790]  It's out there and they should back it up.
[32:13.890 --> 32:15.630]  That's, that's what they're there for.
[32:15.770 --> 32:19.670]  And, uh, they're showing just how, how spineless they actually are.
[32:19.950 --> 32:21.550]  Well, and, and, and they're losing money.
[32:21.710 --> 32:29.030]  I mean, I was listening to the show last week when, Mike, you brought up the issue of, you know, whether this could be a, you know, a very well-placed publicity stunt.
[32:29.070 --> 32:42.110]  And I think it's absolutely reasonable to think about it in those terms, but now when they've actually yanked the film, which I, I believe they were thinking they were going to rake in, you know, $90 million in, in that first weekend alone, you know, this is,
[32:42.110 --> 32:54.190]  they're taking a gigantic hit here and, and they're doing so, uh, you know, I think to, well, who knows why really, but you know, it, it's really about, I think the preservation of their reputation.
[32:54.970 --> 32:55.790]  And, and...
[32:55.790 --> 33:01.710]  What I don't get is why isn't this film among the films that was, was packed, was, was found on their servers?
[33:01.850 --> 33:06.490]  Was it deliberately deleted or did they some, for some reason, not even have it on their own system?
[33:06.750 --> 33:14.910]  Well, if it's the goal of the people who did this to not let that movie get out, then they're not going to put it out with their own, uh, with their own trophies from, from, uh, this hack.
[33:14.950 --> 33:15.570]  Oh, that's censorship.
[33:16.090 --> 33:17.170]  We have to fight that.
[33:17.330 --> 33:18.210]  We have to fight that.
[33:18.390 --> 33:18.890]  I would agree.
[33:19.030 --> 33:22.970]  So if anyone has a copy of the interview, please email us, OTH at 2600.com.
[33:23.130 --> 33:26.130]  Maybe we can take over Times Square and New Year's and show it on the big screen.
[33:26.530 --> 33:29.670]  Just to show that hackers are coming from all different directions on this.
[33:29.750 --> 33:29.890]  Mike.
[33:30.030 --> 33:38.630]  Our friend and colleague Junes writes to report that it is not Sony's decision not to release it, or at least not entirely, but also the theaters who fear something unclear.
[33:38.850 --> 33:39.730]  Well, okay, fine.
[33:39.890 --> 33:43.710]  So a certain theater chain isn't going to show... And by the way, Junes, you should not be texting and driving, all right?
[33:43.890 --> 33:45.170]  That's... He's driving on his way over here.
[33:45.170 --> 33:45.610]  Is he driving?
[33:45.810 --> 33:46.970]  Well, how does he get here?
[33:47.070 --> 33:48.170]  He's driving right now, I think.
[33:48.290 --> 33:48.570]  I don't know.
[33:48.630 --> 33:49.270]  How long does it take?
[33:49.570 --> 33:49.930]  All right.
[33:49.970 --> 33:50.890]  We're not going to get into this.
[33:51.310 --> 33:52.910]  Tune to another station to find out what the traffic is.
[33:53.290 --> 33:59.910]  Uh, but yeah, it's, um, it's the theater chain, but another theater chain could easily show it, or they could simply release it en masse.
[34:00.210 --> 34:06.410]  What I would do if I were Sony, other than drink a lot, is, uh, is basically just release it for free on Christmas day.
[34:06.750 --> 34:07.850]  And say, here you go, America.
[34:08.030 --> 34:11.670]  Here's, here's your second 9-11 for you, you know, and, uh, and see what happens.
[34:11.850 --> 34:15.370]  I think it's pretty clear that, uh, no one is ever going to put you in charge of Sony.
[34:15.530 --> 34:15.950]  No, no.
[34:16.030 --> 34:16.650]  But you know what?
[34:16.990 --> 34:19.570]  And, and honestly, they would not be in any worse shape if someone did.
[34:19.830 --> 34:22.010]  So that's saying a lot about their current management.
[34:22.830 --> 34:27.450]  But, but going back to this, this spineless comment you meant, uh, that you just mentioned, I...
[34:27.450 --> 34:28.810]  Have I already been sued for that?
[34:29.010 --> 34:29.810]  Uh, not yet.
[34:29.950 --> 34:30.310]  Not yet.
[34:30.410 --> 34:30.770]  I think...
[34:30.770 --> 34:32.210]  I'm bitter because Sony did sue us.
[34:32.470 --> 34:33.030]  And, you know...
[34:33.030 --> 34:33.550]  Well, that's true.
[34:33.550 --> 34:35.070]  I'm kind of, like, relishing.
[34:35.230 --> 34:37.790]  I said we'd, we'd, you know, we'd see the flip side of this one day.
[34:37.950 --> 34:40.270]  Well, uh, the legal defense for slander is the truth.
[34:40.550 --> 34:44.030]  So if there's truth to what you're saying about them being spineless, then, then you're all set.
[34:44.410 --> 34:45.190]  They're a corporation.
[34:45.470 --> 34:47.810]  Corporations don't, they're not humanoids, so they don't have spines.
[34:48.010 --> 34:48.670]  No, well, that's true.
[34:49.090 --> 34:49.790]  That's a very good point.
[34:49.790 --> 34:51.510]  Well, they are, they are people.
[34:51.750 --> 34:53.690]  Yes, they are people, but without spines.
[34:53.850 --> 34:54.550]  Yeah, that's a good point.
[34:54.950 --> 34:56.870]  But, uh, God, what were we saying before?
[34:57.090 --> 35:05.270]  Oh, but what they, what they are doing in this spineless sense is that, you know, poorly drafted terroristic threats.
[35:05.550 --> 35:22.630]  And what I think is particularly, uh, dangerous here is that, uh, that's effective and that people then in the future are going to conflate hacktivism, which is, you know, a portmanteau I'm not really, you know, a fan of, but hacktivism and terrorism.
[35:23.610 --> 35:25.210]  And, and... Or hackers and terrorists.
[35:25.350 --> 35:25.870]  Well, exactly.
[35:26.130 --> 35:26.470]  Exactly.
[35:26.730 --> 35:29.230]  That, that, that's a, that's a really bad association to have.
[35:29.230 --> 35:36.930]  Which is why I think we, we have to make sure that it's clear that, uh, hackers aren't speaking in one voice on this and, and threatening anyone.
[35:37.490 --> 35:42.870]  This is, I find it highly amusing what's going on out there, but it's about, it's about bad security.
[35:43.130 --> 35:48.910]  It's about stupid decisions, but, um, hackers are not declaring war on freedom.
[35:49.050 --> 35:52.270]  And that's what you're hearing in the mass media now that there's got to be a crackdown.
[35:52.430 --> 35:53.770]  And we're the ones that are going to feel that.
[35:53.930 --> 35:59.630]  Not North Korea, individual hacker type people are going to feel the clampdown that comes down the road.
[35:59.710 --> 36:06.710]  Well, if, if you're amused by what's going on and, you know, if like me, you're entertained by what's going on, then isn't Sony Pictures Entertainment really just doing what they're out there to do?
[36:06.850 --> 36:07.850]  They are entertaining us.
[36:07.970 --> 36:08.390]  I'll say that.
[36:08.570 --> 36:19.070]  So I, I think Alex, it's really interesting that you, um, you know, opposed the, as we all should, the conflation of, uh, hacking and terrorism because they're not the same thing at all.
[36:19.610 --> 36:27.590]  Uh, but, uh, just a few moments ago, you were saying, you know, using the word exfiltrate, which is a word that like normal people don't use.
[36:27.870 --> 36:31.390]  And, uh, I might use it, but normal people don't.
[36:31.650 --> 36:46.950]  Um, and, and, uh, saying, you know, we have to beef up this sort of like security, uh, culture, security, uh, industry and, and who are the opponents of the security industry, the people who wish to exfiltrate data.
[36:47.090 --> 36:49.250]  So I think it's, it's difficult.
[36:49.510 --> 36:51.570]  It's a difficult situation, but an interesting one.
[36:51.730 --> 36:57.630]  It is, you know, but I, but not all exfiltrations of data result in terroristic threats.
[36:57.830 --> 37:05.930]  I mean, I think that there are people that go and steal data, um, like Edward Snowden and that didn't, and it was released and that didn't have anything to do with terrorism.
[37:06.570 --> 37:20.050]  Um, but, and so I, I think it's, yeah, there are people that are breaking the laws and, and taking this data, but they're not so bad as to cross the line into becoming some kind of, you know, uh, making terroristic threats.
[37:20.210 --> 37:20.730]  That's, that's what I think.
[37:20.890 --> 37:28.210]  And I also think that Sony and the media are really jumping on this terrorist angle by, by exaggerating it to the degree of absurdity.
[37:28.570 --> 37:36.050]  Uh, basically if you read the, the poorly worded statement that somebody made somewhere, we don't have any, uh, real indications to where that was seen.
[37:36.210 --> 37:45.290]  Uh, they said something about the whole world will see how bad this, that's basically saying the whole world will see the film and we'll be afraid or something at how bad it is.
[37:45.430 --> 37:48.430]  Remember 9-11, just really, uh, disjointed statements.
[37:48.430 --> 38:03.450]  It's not actually a terrorist threat anymore than I imagine threats we get every single day, but that serves them to, to point to the fear and say, our freedom is under attack and it's the North Koreans, it's the hackers, and we have to do something about that.
[38:03.570 --> 38:04.530]  And a nice try.
[38:04.670 --> 38:05.410]  I don't buy it.
[38:05.410 --> 38:06.130]  Yeah.
[38:06.350 --> 38:13.710]  And another thing with the, uh, going back to this, uh, recent announcement on, on CNN that North Korea is actually behind this.
[38:13.950 --> 38:27.670]  One thing that a lot of people aren't talking about because insurance isn't a particularly sexy topic, but cyber liability insurance, which I'm sure, I'm sure Sony has, uh, which generally would, would cover your costs for forensic analysis, you know,
[38:27.750 --> 38:31.650]  data breach recovery, you know, re rejigging your network, things like that.
[38:32.450 --> 38:41.810]  Almost all of those policies have an exception or rather an exclusion for coverage if the person who hacked you or the party that hacked you is a state actor.
[38:42.250 --> 38:50.890]  So if it is in fact North Korea, Sony is going to be losing even more money because they're not going to recoup, uh, anything on their cyber liability policies.
[38:51.030 --> 38:51.550]  A state actor being?
[38:51.810 --> 38:52.410]  North Korea.
[38:52.870 --> 38:57.970]  A state actor being a government or an agent of a, of a foreign government who hacks into your city.
[38:57.990 --> 38:59.470]  So insurance doesn't cover that for some reason.
[38:59.470 --> 39:03.650]  Insurance doesn't cover because of the level of sophistication implied in those particular attacks.
[39:03.890 --> 39:04.150]  Interesting.
[39:04.430 --> 39:04.530]  Okay.
[39:04.650 --> 39:13.030]  So while my house might be covered by a nor'easter, if, uh, if say, you know, a Norway comes and destroys my house, that's not covered.
[39:13.250 --> 39:13.810]  That's right.
[39:13.850 --> 39:14.030]  All right.
[39:14.110 --> 39:14.790]  It's good to know this.
[39:14.810 --> 39:16.010]  Not likely, but not, not covered.
[39:16.170 --> 39:16.450]  All right.
[39:16.590 --> 39:17.490]  Hey, we just got this bullet.
[39:17.530 --> 39:18.690]  Why has everything happened during our show?
[39:19.010 --> 39:19.990]  Uh, this just came in.
[39:20.150 --> 39:23.230]  Sony Pictures has no further release plans for the interview.
[39:23.590 --> 39:25.050]  So that's according to a spokeswoman.
[39:25.210 --> 39:27.650]  And worst possible decision, I think really.
[39:27.810 --> 39:29.730]  And, and, and what about our offer to show it?
[39:29.810 --> 39:30.830]  What about our offer to distribute it?
[39:30.930 --> 39:31.690]  Are you just going to ignore us?
[39:31.770 --> 39:32.110]  Come on.
[39:32.170 --> 39:32.830]  We have a website.
[39:32.970 --> 39:34.170]  We can put it up there.
[39:34.570 --> 39:35.350]  I don't, I don't know.
[39:35.430 --> 39:37.070]  There, there are good points to bad movies.
[39:37.190 --> 39:38.450]  I like Mystery Science Theater 3000.
[39:38.610 --> 39:43.550]  And if this now becomes international news, every time someone puts out a bad movie, it's going to completely change the media landscape.
[39:43.810 --> 39:44.110]  Absolutely.
[39:44.330 --> 39:45.110]  Bernie, did you have something?
[39:45.630 --> 39:47.330]  I just said, wow, they're going to stop.
[39:47.470 --> 39:50.170]  I wonder if the actors in this film are going to get paid residuals.
[39:50.250 --> 39:52.850]  Not that I really care, because the whole thing was canceled.
[39:53.050 --> 39:54.510]  They're kind of out of the money.
[39:54.750 --> 39:55.670]  Well, I can tell you this.
[39:55.850 --> 39:58.450]  The sequel is not going to happen.
[39:58.870 --> 40:01.570]  This is the movie that you can bet there will be no sequel to.
[40:03.350 --> 40:09.990]  By the way, speaking of North Korea, the, the hackers are part of some elite group known as Bureau 121.
[40:10.790 --> 40:13.230]  That's according to defectors from North Korea.
[40:14.210 --> 40:20.290]  Basically, defectors from the North said Bureau 121 is staffed by some of the most talented computer experts in the insular state.
[40:20.490 --> 40:25.750]  It's part of the General Bureau of Reconnaissance, which is an elite spy agency run by the military.
[40:26.130 --> 40:32.510]  They've said it's been involved in state-sponsored hacking used by the Pyongyang government to spy on or sabotage its enemies.
[40:33.330 --> 40:35.570]  Pyongyang has active cyber warfare capabilities.
[40:35.730 --> 40:42.450]  Military and software security experts have said much of it is targeted at South Korea, which is technically still in a state of war with North Korea.
[40:42.450 --> 40:49.810]  Military hackers are among the most talented and rewarded people in North Korea, handpicked and trained from as young as 17.
[40:50.310 --> 40:51.010]  As young as 17?
[40:51.010 --> 40:52.950]  That's kind of old, actually, for hackers.
[40:53.770 --> 40:54.330]  Wow.
[40:54.550 --> 40:54.710]  Okay.
[40:54.910 --> 41:01.110]  So they are basically treated as some of the highest valued citizens.
[41:01.250 --> 41:08.410]  And I'm afraid that's how we're going to look on hackers here as a culture, as cannon fodder, digital cannon fodder.
[41:08.410 --> 41:18.050]  I'm just thinking, what an interesting perspective these people must have on the internet, not knowing it as the source for cat pictures that the rest of the world does, but as the location of the enemy.
[41:18.370 --> 41:21.810]  Yeah, it's just like a pipeline to whatever it is that we're doing.
[41:22.130 --> 41:32.810]  Personally, I would have trouble believing that there's a first world country in the world right now that doesn't have some kind of department like that full of people throwing quote-unquote cyber attacks at each other.
[41:33.070 --> 41:36.490]  So it's interesting that the one about North Korea comes out like this.
[41:37.110 --> 41:37.210]  All right.
[41:37.350 --> 41:43.570]  And of course, lost in all this story is another film that has been a victim of all this.
[41:43.750 --> 41:47.650]  Do you know that there was a movie called The Throwaways?
[41:47.650 --> 41:48.890]  It's about hackers.
[41:49.670 --> 41:49.830]  Yeah.
[41:50.050 --> 42:01.030]  Sony Pictures' digital arm, Crackle, has postponed the premiere of its James Caan, Kevin Dillon hacker movie, The Throwaways, due to the parent company's own messy and sensitive hack situation.
[42:01.910 --> 42:06.330]  Crackle also appears to have removed the trailers, press screener, and other materials from the web.
[42:06.330 --> 42:07.450]  It never existed.
[42:07.690 --> 42:10.930]  It was set to premiere on Friday, December 19th.
[42:10.990 --> 42:16.170]  It follows notorious hacker Drew Reynolds, who was captured by the CIA and given a proposition.
[42:17.010 --> 42:17.630]  Wait, ready?
[42:17.830 --> 42:20.550]  Work for them or spend the rest of his life in prison.
[42:21.570 --> 42:22.890]  I've never heard that one before.
[42:22.970 --> 42:23.130]  Wow.
[42:23.470 --> 42:26.610]  Reynolds agrees to join... I guess I can give it away.
[42:26.770 --> 42:33.190]  He agrees to join on the condition that he gets to choose his own team instead of picking from the top agents the CIA recommends.
[42:33.390 --> 42:35.230]  Again, another plot twist I've never seen before.
[42:35.790 --> 42:41.370]  Reynolds goes with a group of throwaways, misfits, blown gunmen, whatever you want to call them.
[42:42.370 --> 42:46.090]  Those deemed expendable and seemingly the worst in the organization.
[42:47.150 --> 42:48.490]  And now we're not going to see it.
[42:48.590 --> 42:49.350]  Thank you, North Korea.
[42:49.690 --> 42:50.450]  Thank you, hackers.
[42:50.670 --> 42:51.310]  Look what you did.
[42:51.990 --> 42:52.430]  Entertainment.
[42:52.730 --> 42:52.930]  Wow.
[42:53.090 --> 42:54.070]  It's all disappearing.
[42:54.350 --> 43:05.090]  So now that having the subject of hacking involved gets your movie thrown down the memory hole at Sony, I'm wondering who's going to make the movie about these events that are happening at Sony now and what they're going to call it.
[43:05.190 --> 43:06.810]  Hey, maybe that's the movie we should make.
[43:07.190 --> 43:13.850]  Maybe it is because, yeah, I mean, no one else is going to make it because they're afraid that even mentioning what happened here might upset somebody.
[43:13.850 --> 43:15.550]  And they, as we said, they have no spine.
[43:15.890 --> 43:17.830]  We have many spines, so maybe.
[43:18.670 --> 43:19.870]  And let's take some phone calls.
[43:19.870 --> 43:21.590]  It's 212-209-2900.
[43:21.930 --> 43:28.050]  But the reaction, Seth Rogen, who is one of the stars of the interview, I believe, and he actually... did he make the film?
[43:28.390 --> 43:30.850]  He has some real connection to it, I believe.
[43:30.870 --> 43:32.330]  Sony is getting such good publicity.
[43:32.590 --> 43:32.910]  They really are.
[43:33.050 --> 43:34.790]  If they released the film, they'd make billions.
[43:35.010 --> 43:40.050]  And he was on Howard Stern show, and they basically said this attack is no different than a 9-11 type attack.
[43:40.350 --> 43:49.850]  Now, if you are affected personally by 9-11, we all were to a degree, but if you had somebody who was a victim of that, that would be about the most insensitive thing to say.
[43:50.090 --> 43:51.610]  Your damn film got hacked?
[43:51.770 --> 43:53.910]  Your corporation got taken down?
[43:53.910 --> 43:55.710]  It's nothing like that at all.
[43:55.790 --> 43:56.590]  It never will be.
[43:57.990 --> 44:00.070]  That just annoys me, statements like that.
[44:00.850 --> 44:03.470]  Okay, 212-209-2900.
[44:03.490 --> 44:06.210]  Let's see if anybody else is out there, has some thoughts on this.
[44:06.270 --> 44:06.550]  Good evening.
[44:06.670 --> 44:07.270]  You're on Off the Hook.
[44:08.230 --> 44:09.190]  Good evening, Emmanuel.
[44:09.490 --> 44:10.830]  Hey, it's Bobson from Bulgaria.
[44:12.030 --> 44:17.010]  I was listening about this movie that was going to be not released or whatever.
[44:17.870 --> 44:20.110]  And it may have been shown in LA.
[44:20.290 --> 44:33.230]  And I was thinking, okay, so here's a, let's see, eight-digit budget movie where the money is worth spent somehow for something.
[44:33.450 --> 44:35.690]  And what if the movie doesn't exist?
[44:37.030 --> 44:39.090]  You think the whole movie might be a fabrication?
[44:40.170 --> 44:45.690]  No, but what if someone spent all this money and there's no movie to show for it?
[44:45.690 --> 44:54.270]  And they're trying to cover up the fact that the money was spent and there's no product to be...
[44:54.270 --> 44:58.810]  Well, you know, I would say there's a good chance of that except for the fact that there was that LA premiere.
[44:58.970 --> 45:01.010]  There are people out there who have seen this film.
[45:01.010 --> 45:02.150]  And I want to hear from them.
[45:02.250 --> 45:05.110]  I want them to tell us, was there actually a film?
[45:05.250 --> 45:06.250]  And how bad was it?
[45:06.410 --> 45:07.630]  But maybe that was the plan all along.
[45:07.690 --> 45:09.170]  Maybe this is Sony's springtime for Hitler.
[45:10.750 --> 45:14.670]  It's a story that I just could not have written in my wildest fantasies.
[45:15.270 --> 45:18.510]  Bobson, will you be at the Chaos Communication Congress this December?
[45:20.510 --> 45:22.050]  Next week, yes.
[45:22.330 --> 45:22.810]  Okay, great.
[45:22.810 --> 45:24.490]  So I'll see you there then in Hamburg.
[45:24.750 --> 45:28.090]  And of course, anyone else, I'm not sure if tickets are still available online.
[45:28.190 --> 45:35.210]  CCC.de would have the information, but it takes place on the 27th, 28th, 29th, and 30th of December in Hamburg, Germany.
[45:36.730 --> 45:37.450]  So, Bobson, any?
[45:37.930 --> 45:38.410]  Go ahead.
[45:39.290 --> 45:45.030]  I think the online sale of tickets ended on the 12th, but they may be tickets on site.
[45:45.590 --> 45:47.010]  Well, it's a huge space.
[45:47.430 --> 45:50.750]  Somehow the space is bigger than Hamburg itself.
[45:51.330 --> 45:54.470]  It's in Hamburg and somehow it's bigger than... I don't know how they did that.
[45:54.510 --> 45:55.190]  Not at all of this.
[45:55.390 --> 45:56.310]  Well, they're German.
[45:56.430 --> 45:58.030]  They can do all kinds of magical things.
[45:58.610 --> 46:00.150]  But in any event, you have your ticket.
[46:00.450 --> 46:00.970]  I have my ticket.
[46:01.130 --> 46:01.890]  We'll see each other there.
[46:02.930 --> 46:03.650]  Yes, sir.
[46:03.930 --> 46:04.550]  Thanks for your call.
[46:04.690 --> 46:05.210]  Have a great evening.
[46:05.530 --> 46:05.730]  All right.
[46:05.830 --> 46:06.350]  We'll talk to you later.
[46:07.330 --> 46:08.070]  Good evening.
[46:08.130 --> 46:09.230]  You're on Off the Hook.
[46:10.250 --> 46:10.610]  Yes.
[46:11.070 --> 46:11.590]  Go ahead.
[46:13.170 --> 46:16.690]  Well, I'm thinking about what this movie is going to be about personally.
[46:16.710 --> 46:20.550]  I'm not even going to waste my time watching it in the first place, besides the threat or not.
[46:21.950 --> 46:26.090]  Well, you'd need to really expend some effort to see it because apparently they're not showing it.
[46:26.670 --> 46:31.970]  Yeah, but, you know, I'm not... I mean, I don't really... You know, to me is... You've done this once.
[46:32.170 --> 46:36.710]  Now anybody who has a beef computer line and say, well, you do this and I'll destroy something.
[46:36.810 --> 46:41.030]  And next thing you know, every movie is going to be closing down like that, you know?
[46:41.290 --> 46:41.570]  Yeah.
[46:41.930 --> 46:43.430]  Isis the Musical, that's done.
[46:43.610 --> 46:44.090]  That's off.
[46:44.290 --> 46:46.070]  They're not going to be... They're not even going to be making that.
[46:46.470 --> 46:47.230]  It's a real shame.
[46:47.610 --> 46:49.390]  They could do this with a Broadway play next.
[46:49.510 --> 46:50.490]  You know, what's next?
[46:50.850 --> 46:51.150]  Yeah.
[46:51.350 --> 46:51.470]  Yeah.
[46:51.610 --> 46:53.190]  Actually, that was a Broadway play, Isis the Musical.
[46:54.270 --> 46:54.630]  Yeah.
[46:54.790 --> 46:58.850]  So, what do you advise that we as consumers do?
[46:59.890 --> 47:07.170]  Well, like I said, the ideal is, you know, I mean, if it goes to a movie like, say, The Lord of the Rings, most people are just going to say, to hell with this.
[47:07.330 --> 47:08.850]  We're going to see it anyway, you know?
[47:09.390 --> 47:12.830]  It all depends on what kind of film that's being presented.
[47:13.590 --> 47:16.550]  Or what's the ones who are having the biggest beef with it?
[47:16.550 --> 47:19.610]  Well, you bring up an interesting point, I think.
[47:19.750 --> 47:30.630]  And this was something I think it was in the letter that was published in the New York Times by Aaron Sorkin, who was railing against the media covering this kind of thing.
[47:30.810 --> 47:43.850]  But one interesting point that he made, I didn't think he was correct in most of his arguments that this stuff wasn't newsworthy and that the media was colluding with these hacker terrorists in disseminating this information.
[47:43.850 --> 47:52.190]  But one thing that he did say is these other media outlets, all the other motion picture studios have been really silent about this.
[47:52.290 --> 47:54.770]  And, you know, why aren't they all joining forces?
[47:54.950 --> 47:59.710]  Why isn't there some kind of NATO pact that says, we're not going to negotiate with terrorists.
[47:59.710 --> 48:01.010]  We're not going to stand for this stuff.
[48:01.110 --> 48:03.690]  We're going to make whatever the hell we want to make.
[48:03.710 --> 48:05.250]  And we're going to put it out there.
[48:05.250 --> 48:07.090]  And this is our First Amendment right to do this.
[48:07.190 --> 48:07.950]  We're not going to be threatened.
[48:08.170 --> 48:10.550]  All the other studios are apparently terrified.
[48:10.550 --> 48:14.190]  Maybe they're also spineless, as Emmanuel would say.
[48:14.390 --> 48:15.910]  Any final words, caller?
[48:16.410 --> 48:16.830]  Go ahead.
[48:18.190 --> 48:19.030]  Any final words?
[48:19.930 --> 48:20.830]  No, that's about it.
[48:20.930 --> 48:26.110]  I just said, if this was a blockbuster, then I would really be interested what whom will say.
[48:26.250 --> 48:27.950]  Well, it's got to come out for it to be a blockbuster.
[48:28.070 --> 48:28.510]  So who knows?
[48:29.110 --> 48:31.070]  We'll see what happens in the future, I guess.
[48:31.390 --> 48:33.710]  It'd be a long time before we actually get to see it, I guess.
[48:34.470 --> 48:35.330]  Let's go ahead.
[48:35.670 --> 48:38.270]  Alex, did you just call for a NATO of the motion picture industry?
[48:38.410 --> 48:40.410]  Because that is not going to end well.
[48:40.910 --> 48:41.630]  I didn't call for that.
[48:41.770 --> 48:42.890]  Aaron Shorkin called for that.
[48:42.930 --> 48:43.030]  All right.
[48:43.970 --> 48:44.910]  Let's take another phone call.
[48:44.970 --> 48:45.310]  Good evening.
[48:45.490 --> 48:46.370]  You're on Off the Hook.
[48:48.130 --> 48:48.650]  Speak up.
[48:48.770 --> 48:49.870]  Hey, I'm calling about the movie.
[48:50.010 --> 48:50.270]  Go ahead.
[48:50.330 --> 48:50.730]  You're on the air.
[48:51.530 --> 48:51.990]  Hey, how are you?
[48:52.090 --> 49:12.990]  Yeah, I'm just... You know, I think anything on this scale, this large, it's not... I think it's... You know, the way that they're covering it in the media, like he had said earlier, how, you know, on the news, we're talking about 130 kids getting blown up by grenades and then how much time they're given to this movie.
[49:13.170 --> 49:17.850]  I think they're trying to stuff this down our throats so that we're getting this in our head.
[49:18.110 --> 49:27.130]  They're kind of making this, you know, something that we're highly aware of for the next, you know, justifiable reason why we're going to go to war with somebody.
[49:27.390 --> 49:30.550]  It's the entertainment and industrial complex at our throats again.
[49:30.770 --> 49:34.870]  You know, we're about to open an embassy in Cuba, for God's sake, for the first time in 50 years.
[49:35.010 --> 49:36.310]  And that's not even on the news.
[49:36.510 --> 49:41.350]  They're talking about this stupid film and, and, and imagine terroristic threats.
[49:41.830 --> 49:44.270]  It's, it's, that in itself is laughable.
[49:44.610 --> 49:45.130]  Yeah.
[49:45.690 --> 49:51.870]  Anything on this scale, I don't think something gets to this level without somebody knowing about it somewhere along the way.
[49:52.730 --> 49:53.570]  Right, right.
[49:53.830 --> 49:54.630]  Hey, thanks for your call.
[49:55.530 --> 49:56.110]  All right.
[49:56.190 --> 49:57.530]  212-209-2900.
[49:57.610 --> 49:57.870]  Good evening.
[49:57.990 --> 49:58.670]  You're on off the hook.
[49:59.690 --> 50:00.050]  Hello?
[50:00.310 --> 50:00.610]  Go ahead.
[50:01.750 --> 50:02.050]  Awesome.
[50:02.530 --> 50:08.490]  Uh, wanted to change topics from Sony a bit because I'm sure you guys are going to talk about this next episode, but screw it.
[50:08.630 --> 50:09.630]  I want to talk about it now.
[50:09.970 --> 50:10.450]  Make it quick.
[50:10.610 --> 50:14.770]  The news that, uh, that the Cuba sanctions are starting to become less.
[50:15.490 --> 50:16.890]  That's what we were talking about as well.
[50:16.970 --> 50:17.210]  Yes.
[50:17.470 --> 50:17.770]  Yes.
[50:18.090 --> 50:33.230]  Uh, one of the, uh, key factors of that is that, uh, that unfortunately a lot of these agencies aren't reporting on is that, um, they're, they're going to put direct telco in as part of their plan is to actually establish telco, United States telco and update services to Cuba.
[50:33.430 --> 50:36.990]  And I was just curious of, uh, what your guys, uh, base thoughts are on that.
[50:37.610 --> 50:40.810]  Well, I mean, having been to Cuba, Mike and I actually went there a bunch of years ago.
[50:41.050 --> 50:57.890]  Uh, it would be great to have better communications between our country and that country to have all kinds of back and forth, whether it's auto parts or, uh, or the latest technology or just travel, you know, there's nothing to be gained from not talking to people and from,
[50:57.990 --> 51:01.430]  from just giving them the silent treatment, which is what we've been doing for 50 years.
[51:01.650 --> 51:02.070]  Yeah.
[51:02.110 --> 51:09.790]  I mean, I disagree with the, the embargo policy as a whole, but the, the part of it that really doesn't make any sense is the restriction on communications links.
[51:09.850 --> 51:22.490]  If the U S government's official position had been, you know, greater communication will lead to a natural end to the regime than to make phone calls cost, uh, you know, $2 a minute because there's such little capacity.
[51:22.990 --> 51:25.590]  It doesn't seem to help that goal.
[51:25.970 --> 51:33.850]  So I, I certainly welcome any new, uh, you know, trans Caribbean cables that get built.
[51:34.050 --> 51:34.210]  Yeah.
[51:34.430 --> 51:47.010]  And you know, this is, yeah, it is in the news a bit, but if you're watching television right now, well, you wouldn't be listening to us, but all they're talking about is this damn film and they're not focusing on what is actually a very historical occurrence that happened today.
[51:47.210 --> 51:50.890]  And that really is what should be taking attention, I think, on the cycle.
[51:51.750 --> 51:53.290]  Uh, see if we can squeeze in a couple more calls.
[51:53.350 --> 51:54.650]  212-209-2900.
[51:54.770 --> 51:55.030]  Good evening.
[51:55.130 --> 51:55.670]  You're on off the hook.
[51:56.190 --> 51:56.410]  Oh yeah.
[51:56.470 --> 51:56.810]  Good evening.
[51:56.970 --> 52:00.290]  I was just turning to the show just a few moments ago.
[52:00.510 --> 52:06.590]  Uh, the, uh, conferences coming up in Hamburg, that's, um, which, which one is that?
[52:06.650 --> 52:07.530]  That's the chaos conference.
[52:07.670 --> 52:09.290]  The chaos communication Congress, CCC.
[52:09.290 --> 52:10.050]  CCC.
[52:10.050 --> 52:12.310]  Will that also be, uh, on the internet?
[52:12.510 --> 52:12.910]  Oh yeah.
[52:13.150 --> 52:13.290]  Yeah.
[52:13.350 --> 52:16.150]  If you go to ccc.de, last year I did this.
[52:16.270 --> 52:16.850]  It was amazing.
[52:17.150 --> 52:18.510]  Well, actually we did it this year too.
[52:18.590 --> 52:27.130]  We were kind of inspired by what they did last year, but every single room that had a talk was being broadcast on the internet and, uh, in HD and everything.
[52:27.130 --> 52:28.210]  It was like being there.
[52:28.330 --> 52:34.330]  And in fact, in Germany, they actually encourage you to stay someplace else so that there's no overcrowding.
[52:34.410 --> 52:35.330]  So I think that's kind of cool.
[52:35.430 --> 52:39.270]  So you can, you can experience it if you don't actually go, but you should go to.
[52:39.770 --> 52:40.090]  Okay.
[52:40.210 --> 52:40.330]  Yeah.
[52:40.490 --> 52:41.770]  Well, that would, that'd be nice.
[52:42.050 --> 52:51.990]  The, uh, the, uh, the one thing I did listen to, uh, President Obama's, uh, talk at noontime today and the other thing that bothered me, how, how they emphasized how they were promoting American interest.
[52:52.350 --> 52:58.590]  Uh, and I'm wondering just what, what all that's going to mean in the very end, you know, what they, what they, what they're really looking to grow out of me.
[52:58.650 --> 53:02.250]  I'm wondering if like, uh, you know, if Al, if Al Pacino was consulted in all of this.
[53:02.370 --> 53:16.670]  And if, if, if you look at the reaction so far, uh, you know, Obama's getting being lambasted for this and basically being accused of, of being a, uh, you know, a red terrorist, a communist that's selling out our country, he needs to say things like that,
[53:16.670 --> 53:19.130]  or it's, uh, it's really going to be curtains for him.
[53:19.330 --> 53:19.870]  Not at all.
[53:19.990 --> 53:27.510]  I mean, the poor country, I mean, the people there, I've met people from Cuba and, and frankly, you know, they're, they're, they're a very savvy.
[53:27.650 --> 53:33.750]  I mean, I guess when you take things away from people, like when you take things away like that, people find a way how to get it.
[53:33.930 --> 53:40.630]  But once the door is open, you know, I, I, I, they'll be right, right there.
[53:40.830 --> 53:48.770]  You know, it's, it's going to be, it's going to be amazing for everybody if we actually start communicating and exchanging and visiting and things like that.
[53:48.870 --> 53:50.370]  So I'm looking forward to that.
[53:50.910 --> 53:52.010]  Um, you guys have something?
[53:52.470 --> 53:52.570]  Yeah.
[53:52.670 --> 53:59.250]  I mean, uh, there, there are interests that are going to be, uh, shared on both sides, like, um, with the telecom situation that our previous caller was talking about.
[53:59.630 --> 54:05.330]  I'm sure the government officials from both sides will be giddy at the chance to top, to tap, uh, into what's going on on that, on that system.
[54:05.470 --> 54:07.230]  I just hope they still have the old cars.
[54:07.470 --> 54:18.690]  I don't want to sound selfish, but that was one of the coolest things going to Cuba and riding in cars from the 1940s that they were because of the embargo, they can't get parts, but they really keep these things running.
[54:18.930 --> 54:24.930]  And they're very ingenious with, with, uh, converting them to diesel and just, just, uh, uh, maintaining them with no parts whatsoever.
[54:25.410 --> 54:28.890]  Uh, so it's a unique kind of a charm, but it's not a very pleasant one for them.
[54:29.430 --> 54:30.730]  All right, let's see if we can squeeze it.
[54:30.770 --> 54:31.610]  I just have one correction.
[54:31.890 --> 54:39.430]  Uh, ccc.de will get you the main website for the, uh, chaos computer club, but if you want, but it will be in German and hard to navigate.
[54:39.430 --> 54:43.670]  If you go to events.ccc.de, you'll be a little bit closer to where you want to end up.
[54:43.670 --> 54:45.710]  Is there a button that says English on ccc.de?
[54:45.770 --> 54:47.010]  Yeah, but it's a little tiny button.
[54:47.030 --> 54:47.350]  All right, all right.
[54:48.050 --> 54:49.610]  All right, uh, let's take another phone call.
[54:49.710 --> 54:49.950]  Good evening.
[54:50.070 --> 54:50.970]  You're on off the hook.
[54:51.310 --> 54:51.930]  Go ahead.
[54:52.670 --> 54:53.770]  Yeah, how are you?
[54:54.150 --> 54:55.190]  Okay, what's on your mind?
[54:55.650 --> 54:56.410]  My name is Saul.
[54:56.590 --> 54:57.850]  I'm from Newark, New Jersey.
[54:58.410 --> 54:58.630]  Okay.
[54:59.090 --> 55:02.810]  Uh, I was involved in Cuban crisis in 1960.
[55:03.890 --> 55:06.730]  But did you start it, or, uh, what, how were you involved?
[55:07.110 --> 55:07.570]  1960.
[55:07.970 --> 55:08.670]  It was 1960.
[55:09.090 --> 55:10.070]  I was 24 years old.
[55:10.430 --> 55:10.710]  Okay.
[55:10.970 --> 55:13.510]  Castro was the best thing to happen in Latin America.
[55:14.270 --> 55:16.290]  What Obama did was excellent.
[55:16.850 --> 55:18.510]  Something they should have done.
[55:18.790 --> 55:21.190]  Five presidents should have done a long time ago.
[55:22.290 --> 55:22.470]  Okay.
[55:22.990 --> 55:25.570]  Castro came to America and asked him for help.
[55:26.370 --> 55:28.410]  And the Americans helped him.
[55:28.950 --> 55:32.650]  And they went in winding a revolution for the Cuban people.
[55:33.110 --> 55:33.610]  Okay.
[55:33.670 --> 55:36.230]  I hear what you're saying, but it's really not the topic for this show.
[55:36.290 --> 55:41.730]  We just were mentioning it as a major news event that I'm sure we'll be hearing a lot more about here on WBAI.
[55:41.810 --> 55:48.030]  So please keep listening to 99.5 and, uh, let's take one more final call, hopefully, on this whole Sony craziness.
[55:48.130 --> 55:48.370]  Good evening.
[55:48.510 --> 55:49.030]  You're on Off The Hook.
[55:49.550 --> 55:50.270]  Hey, howdy.
[55:50.550 --> 55:56.930]  Um, I always thought it was interesting that it seems like any topic covered in mainstream media relating to hack events.
[55:58.010 --> 56:06.030]  Also, it seems to name a state actor right around the time whenever respective other disagreements, I guess, between nations are occurring.
[56:07.050 --> 56:18.910]  And it's particularly odd to me, considering how common it is for anybody doing it that type of thing, at least from what I've seen around, that it's going to be based from our location.
[56:19.150 --> 56:23.490]  So it's very simplistic to just say, hey, route all this stuff from there.
[56:23.770 --> 56:25.550]  We can say it's from China.
[56:25.630 --> 56:30.870]  And then it just falls into like the black hole paradox of everything else that goes into the bucket.
[56:31.370 --> 56:31.590]  Yes.
[56:31.690 --> 56:35.070]  And we just have to believe whatever we're told because we have actually no actual evidence.
[56:35.330 --> 56:36.050]  Hey, we're out of time.
[56:36.330 --> 56:36.930]  Uh, write to us.
[56:37.070 --> 56:38.730]  OTH at 2600.com.
[56:39.250 --> 56:42.650]  Couldn't really find many songs about Sony, but here's one from 1985.
[56:43.230 --> 56:44.110]  I could be with
[56:49.610 --> 56:50.950]  my wife.
[56:52.010 --> 56:54.730]  She's smoking at the signal bar.
[56:56.330 --> 56:58.630]  Washed into a subway car.
[57:00.290 --> 57:02.790]  Heat up some more rice wine.
[57:04.310 --> 57:06.910]  Somebody just jumped on the line.
[57:08.890 --> 57:12.270]  Robots have run them off on the factory floor.
[57:12.570 --> 57:16.130]  Been 20 years at Sony and I can't see 20 more.
[57:16.630 --> 57:19.750]  High-tech, sex, wilder, sex, samurai.
[57:20.770 --> 57:24.450]  Western ways, baseball games, apple pie.
[57:28.120 --> 57:30.760]  Though some will say we imitate.
[57:32.620 --> 57:35.280]  Produce the goods of cheaper rain.
[57:36.860 --> 57:39.640]  Faster to reduced in size.
[57:39.640 --> 57:42.900]  Our ingenuity's realized.
[57:43.780 --> 57:44.040]  Our ingenuity's realized.
[58:14.450 --> 58:17.370]  I had to grab a massage can.
[58:18.230 --> 58:21.490]  I left my briefcase at the last.
[58:23.010 --> 58:25.510]  God's ill-a-rate the bullet train.
[58:26.850 --> 58:29.490]  Won't see Kyoto ever again.
[58:31.030 --> 58:34.350]  Power jump the gun back in 41.
[58:35.110 --> 58:37.850]  Following the flag of the rock.
[58:43.620 --> 58:45.140]  US destroyer.
[58:45.640 --> 58:46.880]  Kamikaze plane.
[58:47.700 --> 58:50.000]  Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah.
[58:51.000 --> 58:53.220]  The worst I learned from history.
[58:55.120 --> 58:57.140]  Dune to repeat it endlessly.
[58:59.280 --> 59:01.360]  We've put the past on to Fuji.
[59:02.780 --> 59:05.360]  And we erase it totally.
[59:07.100 --> 59:07.960]  Yeah.
[59:12.900 --> 59:15.500]  Soon we'll be known as Great Japan.
[59:17.040 --> 59:19.520]  Just like they throw in Great Britain.
[59:21.400 --> 59:23.700]  Spelt microchip and solid-state.
[59:25.220 --> 59:27.880]  The things that made this country great.
[59:32.380 --> 59:33.020]  Sony.
[01:00:24.800 --> 01:00:25.440]  Sony.
[01:00:26.820 --> 01:00:41.140]  Hey, okay, so Obama said we're going to bring Cuba on board, and some politician said, well, they don't have the same human rights that we have here in the U.S.
[01:00:41.240 --> 01:00:45.160]  So, yes, they should have either better or the same.
[01:00:45.160 --> 01:00:45.440]  Well, could hear from the position that we have heard from goenne pornography.
[01:00:45.440 --> 01:00:45.960]  We'll also say a little bit, And, like, Okay now,