[00:03.400 --> 00:15.780]  And while he's thanking those folks, let me take this opportunity to thank all of you, our listeners and support staff, our contributors, our interns, the volunteers, producers, and the entire crew that works countless hours to bring WBAI into your lives.
[00:25.440 --> 00:33.680]  Hi, this is Donovan, and you're tuned to WBAI, listener-supported, non-commercial radio in New York.
[00:35.200 --> 00:41.280]  And you are listening to radio station WBAI in New York, as the man said.
[00:41.540 --> 00:49.540]  The time is just about 7 o'clock on a Wednesday, and that means it's time for Off the Hook.
[02:23.880 --> 02:25.400]  And the very good evening to everybody.
[02:25.490 --> 02:26.990]  The program is Off the Hook.
[02:27.020 --> 02:29.820]  Emmanuel Goldstein here with you on this Wednesday night.
[02:30.290 --> 02:31.710]  Joined tonight by Mike.
[02:31.940 --> 02:32.400]  Good evening.
[02:32.560 --> 02:33.050]  Rob T.
[02:33.180 --> 02:33.610]  Firefly.
[02:33.820 --> 02:34.180]  Good evening.
[02:34.460 --> 02:34.710]  Kyle.
[02:35.170 --> 02:35.620]  Present.
[02:36.150 --> 02:37.400]  And Bernie S.
[02:37.710 --> 02:38.760]  Greetings from Pennsylvania.
[02:39.440 --> 02:42.790]  Well, it's been another action-packed week, technology-wise.
[02:42.990 --> 02:44.320]  I have all kinds of fun things to talk about.
[02:44.320 --> 02:46.790]  But first, though, as promised, an update on the premium situation.
[02:47.900 --> 02:48.940]  We've made no progress.
[02:49.060 --> 02:51.600]  I'm sorry to say we've made absolutely no progress.
[02:52.170 --> 02:55.600]  Once again, we've reached out to management to try and get just the numbers.
[02:55.600 --> 02:58.200]  How many premiums do we have to deliver to the radio station?
[02:58.380 --> 03:04.740]  And that information has not been given to us, making it impossible for us to know how many premiums to deliver.
[03:05.060 --> 03:06.300]  It's a simple thing, you know?
[03:06.440 --> 03:08.790]  Give us a number, and we'll make that number and bring it to the station.
[03:09.020 --> 03:11.180]  For some reason, I don't know what the reason is.
[03:11.200 --> 03:12.800]  Maybe someone's tied up in a dungeon someplace.
[03:12.800 --> 03:14.580]  We can't get that information.
[03:14.820 --> 03:26.520]  So here tonight, I am pledging, no pun intended, promising, vowing, swearing that we will deal with this situation one way or another.
[03:26.520 --> 03:31.420]  And what that means is that we will use whatever resources are at our disposal.
[03:32.560 --> 03:35.420]  And our being the hacker community.
[03:35.600 --> 03:39.820]  The hacker community will step in and get this information one way or another.
[03:39.820 --> 03:44.620]  If we have to use microwave beams outside an office building to get the data, we will get it.
[03:44.820 --> 03:45.800]  How would that work?
[03:45.850 --> 03:48.480]  I don't know how it would work, Mike, but we're going to learn it and we're going to do it, okay?
[03:48.480 --> 03:49.480]  We're going to get the information.
[03:49.910 --> 03:53.740]  By next week at this time, the situation will be dramatically improved.
[03:53.740 --> 03:54.980]  None of us will sleep.
[03:55.240 --> 03:59.600]  None of us will rest or eat or do anything until we get the situation resolved.
[03:59.740 --> 04:00.920]  I'm not exaggerating.
[04:01.530 --> 04:02.790]  This is not a laughing matter.
[04:03.170 --> 04:07.940]  Our listeners pledged and they're going to get what's coming to them in a positive way.
[04:08.920 --> 04:15.100]  And we pledged to our listeners that we will make sure that you get what you pledged for last autumn.
[04:16.170 --> 04:18.040]  Specifically, the HopeX flash drives.
[04:19.100 --> 04:23.700]  So don't write in and tell us that you're missing anything because we're busy fixing this.
[04:23.860 --> 04:24.530]  No, no.
[04:24.680 --> 04:25.060]  Tell us.
[04:25.230 --> 04:25.470]  Tell us.
[04:25.560 --> 04:29.140]  Yeah, but, Barney, you know, we know everybody's missing the flash drives from autumn.
[04:29.360 --> 04:30.000]  We know that.
[04:30.200 --> 04:32.380]  But if you're missing something else, let us know.
[04:32.380 --> 04:41.030]  So we're going to work on all the other things from the autumn fundraiser because we haven't delivered a single one because we haven't been told how many to deliver in the first place.
[04:41.530 --> 04:48.360]  So, again, we hereby vow that we are going to move mountains and get this taken care of because it's intolerable.
[04:48.410 --> 04:50.200]  And we don't like intolerable things.
[04:50.850 --> 04:52.410]  We don't even tolerate them.
[04:52.410 --> 04:53.600]  We do not tolerate it.
[04:53.620 --> 04:54.530]  No, absolutely not.
[04:54.920 --> 04:55.360]  Okay.
[04:55.480 --> 04:56.860]  And we don't want to dwell on this.
[04:57.100 --> 04:59.680]  We want to thank our listeners for their continued support and understanding.
[04:59.680 --> 05:02.170]  Know that we are on your side doing everything we can.
[05:02.290 --> 05:04.030]  And please do not punish the radio station for this.
[05:04.100 --> 05:10.820]  This is just a temporary problem that we will fix and make sure it does not happen again one way or another.
[05:11.790 --> 05:15.560]  We have all kinds of other things I ought to talk about tonight, things that have happened in the news.
[05:15.850 --> 05:18.040]  Why don't we just start right off with the big story?
[05:18.140 --> 05:19.240]  And then, of course, is Barbie.
[05:20.180 --> 05:25.670]  Yeah, Barbie dolls apparently will be spying on people in the very near future.
[05:25.670 --> 05:32.640]  You know, actually, I think that this is tremendous public relations for the company because the doll's not even out yet.
[05:33.080 --> 05:34.580]  And everyone's talking about it.
[05:34.980 --> 05:37.220]  Hello Barbie is the name of the new model.
[05:37.520 --> 05:44.460]  Underscores the challenge toy companies face as they embrace new technology to innovate and remain current with a digital generation.
[05:44.830 --> 05:49.390]  And simultaneously navigating those privacy and safety issues with parents.
[05:50.130 --> 05:51.480]  Yeah, okay, great.
[05:51.480 --> 05:59.160]  But this Barbie doll is really kind of creepy because it eavesdrops on what kids are saying to it.
[05:59.750 --> 06:09.580]  And apparently what it does, it sends whatever somebody says to the doll into the cloud and processes it.
[06:09.660 --> 06:25.520]  In many, many ways, like if you speak to your phone and ask it a question and it comes back with an answer, or it's accessing something someplace, in this particular case, your kids will be talking to dolls and something will be happening in the cloud and it will respond back to you.
[06:25.960 --> 06:26.300]  Do I have that?
[06:26.390 --> 06:27.770]  I don't have a Barbie doll, so I don't know for sure.
[06:27.770 --> 06:29.330]  How does it connect to the internet?
[06:29.440 --> 06:30.040]  That's a good question.
[06:30.080 --> 06:33.420]  Which is what I'm going to say the internet instead of the cloud, if you don't mind.
[06:33.460 --> 06:40.710]  I would imagine that Barbie is a wireless device now and is communicating with a hotspot someplace and kind of like a cell phone.
[06:40.920 --> 06:41.710]  It's a Wi-Fi.
[06:42.360 --> 06:42.720]  Okay.
[06:42.940 --> 06:43.960]  Goes over Wi-Fi, okay.
[06:43.960 --> 06:44.680]  Yeah, it makes sense.
[06:44.830 --> 06:50.390]  You do have to press a spot, use your finger to press a spot below her belly button before she starts listening.
[06:50.460 --> 06:53.830]  Okay, and again, what kind of message is that sending to our children?
[06:54.080 --> 06:54.150]  I don't know.
[06:54.270 --> 06:55.540]  I don't know, but that's the rule.
[06:55.620 --> 06:56.180]  That's how it works.
[06:56.340 --> 06:57.890]  Press a button under her belt.
[06:57.960 --> 06:58.210]  Really?
[06:58.480 --> 06:58.770]  Yes.
[06:59.080 --> 07:00.150]  Just like a real person.
[07:00.280 --> 07:01.340]  Like a belt buckle.
[07:01.650 --> 07:01.860]  Exactly.
[07:02.100 --> 07:06.650]  Can you imagine, though, when toddlers start doing that to real people, thinking that they're going to get answers that way?
[07:07.930 --> 07:10.240]  I mean, some toddlers already do, so.
[07:10.800 --> 07:11.660]  Well, maybe so.
[07:12.040 --> 07:12.860]  Does she have a belly button?
[07:12.860 --> 07:14.360]  I don't even know if she's anatomically correct.
[07:14.420 --> 07:16.270]  Yeah, I guess we have some Barbie research to do.
[07:16.560 --> 07:20.120]  Thing is, this is getting all kinds of talk all over the place.
[07:20.220 --> 07:22.460]  I think they're going to have to scale it back a bit.
[07:23.320 --> 07:28.210]  But there, I guess the corporate response is that there's nothing to worry about.
[07:28.400 --> 07:29.420]  Am I correct on that, Bernie?
[07:30.540 --> 07:46.150]  Well, that's certainly Mattel's response, that this is a wonderful thing, and that they can interact, children can interact with a Barbie doll in new and exciting ways, and share their most intimate thoughts and feelings with Barbie in a private setting,
[07:46.150 --> 07:48.860]  as children have done for many years.
[07:49.750 --> 07:51.840]  But I guess it's not so private anymore, huh?
[07:52.120 --> 07:53.160]  Well, here's their defense.
[07:53.330 --> 07:59.960]  Kids using Hello Barbie aren't only talking to a doll, they're talking directly to a toy conglomerate whose only interest in them is financial.
[08:00.220 --> 08:03.710]  It's creepy and creates a host of dangers for children and families.
[08:03.830 --> 08:04.980]  Oh, wait, that's not their statement.
[08:05.300 --> 08:07.000]  I'm sorry, that's the opposition there.
[08:07.000 --> 08:19.300]  Their statement is, Mattel is committed to safety and security, and Hello Barbie conforms to applicable government standards, including the Children's Online Privacy Protection Act, COPPA.
[08:19.560 --> 08:27.520]  Additionally, Hello Barbie's technology features a number of safeguards to ensure that stored data is secure and can't be accessed by unauthorized users.
[08:28.020 --> 08:31.080]  And I have a feeling that's not going to be true much longer.
[08:31.080 --> 08:38.080]  If they had just stopped before the last sentence and said, you know, we comply with COPPA, like COPPA has actually got some teeth to it.
[08:38.120 --> 08:41.860]  It's why you can't use Facebook if you're under 13 and not willing to lie about it.
[08:42.720 --> 08:45.020]  If they had just stopped there, maybe I would believe them.
[08:45.120 --> 08:50.860]  But then they go on to say, talk about the security of the stored data, and, you know, we just know that it can't be true.
[08:50.860 --> 08:53.520]  But most kids who use Barbie dolls are under 13, right?
[08:53.680 --> 08:56.920]  So that rule, that Facebook rule won't apply to them.
[08:57.000 --> 08:58.760]  You'll have kids five years old communicating.
[08:58.760 --> 09:10.520]  The reason that you can't use Facebook if you're under 13 is not because there's a rule against, you know, a law against providing internet services to under 13-year-olds.
[09:10.720 --> 09:14.340]  It's just that you can't, like, collect data on them and use that to market to them.
[09:14.680 --> 09:19.800]  And Facebook is like, well, if we can't collect data on you and market to you, we don't want you as a user of our service.
[09:19.880 --> 09:21.560]  So they say you can't come in.
[09:21.560 --> 09:37.900]  I would love to be able to say, given my interactions with children in my own family and elsewhere, and my feelings about parenting, I would love to say that there's sort of a hard limit that society in general would say, I don't want my child connecting to the internet unless I have control over that,
[09:38.020 --> 09:42.160]  unless I can monitor that, unless I can, you know, administrate that somehow.
[09:42.160 --> 09:51.020]  But I also know how many children's parents just hand them a telephone or a tablet whenever they're bored to just get their attention.
[09:51.260 --> 09:57.480]  So I would like to think better things than this are possible, but I know that it will very probably succeed as a toy.
[09:57.580 --> 10:04.520]  You can install a Wi-Fi blocker or a cell phone blocker on your child to prevent any device from working near them.
[10:04.640 --> 10:06.680]  I think that's the solution that the companies are coming up with.
[10:06.680 --> 10:13.560]  Or you could just give them a damn plastic doll like all the other past generations have had that you actually have to use your imagination a bit to hear back from.
[10:13.740 --> 10:14.220]  Go ahead, Barney.
[10:14.400 --> 10:20.060]  Emmanuel, I wonder if after all this outcry, Mattel will offer a service.
[10:20.180 --> 10:37.320]  It will probably be a paid subscription service if they do that, whereby the parents can eavesdrop on what their child is saying to the Mattel corporate cloud computer and what the corporate cloud computer is telling their children through the Barbie doll,
[10:37.480 --> 10:38.760]  through a text-to-speech thing.
[10:39.220 --> 10:41.420]  Or that would maybe just be creepy, too.
[10:41.680 --> 10:42.320]  I don't know.
[10:42.420 --> 10:43.080]  It's just another...
[10:43.080 --> 10:46.320]  They're always looking for ways to generate revenue, and that's...
[10:46.320 --> 10:49.700]  The recurring revenue thing is always a big thing in corporate America.
[10:49.980 --> 10:52.940]  Yeah, they could market that maybe as Mata Hari Barbie or something.
[10:53.740 --> 10:56.040]  I'll tell you, this whole conversation is kind of creepy to me.
[10:56.040 --> 11:00.920]  Right, and even just talking about Barbie dolls and off the hook is a real mind trip.
[11:01.680 --> 11:15.340]  But I wonder, you know, they say people who use Gmail and people who use these cloud-based services, they say that only machines are accessing and reading and things like that, and humans don't actually eavesdrop.
[11:15.560 --> 11:16.680]  Is that a fair assessment?
[11:16.680 --> 11:17.360]  That's what they say?
[11:17.480 --> 11:18.040]  That's their defense?
[11:18.740 --> 11:19.620]  I don't buy it.
[11:19.740 --> 11:21.240]  Wasn't a Barbie doll hacked like a year ago?
[11:21.240 --> 11:26.560]  Well, okay, what I'm saying is use your Barbie doll and threaten the life of the president or something.
[11:26.680 --> 11:31.120]  Tell your Barbie doll that you plan on bombing the White House and see if anybody responds.
[11:31.300 --> 11:37.020]  Of course, you'll be getting your five-year-old in trouble and he'll be marked for life, but you'll be learning.
[11:37.200 --> 11:40.540]  And hopefully, you'll share that with us and we can tell people just what the situation is.
[11:40.540 --> 11:41.140]  Same thing with Gmail.
[11:41.380 --> 11:43.560]  Go ahead and say all kinds of crazy things in Gmail and see what happens.
[11:43.740 --> 11:48.640]  If a five-year-old is listening and does that because they heard that on this program, would we be liable?
[11:49.320 --> 11:53.400]  No, I'm not speaking directly to five-year-olds because we don't cater to five-year-olds in this program.
[11:55.280 --> 11:57.380]  The parents will have to tell the five-year-old to do that.
[11:57.860 --> 11:58.120]  All right.
[11:58.520 --> 11:59.720]  If you're over 13, it's pretty good.
[11:59.840 --> 12:00.220]  Yeah, go ahead.
[12:00.720 --> 12:06.120]  I seem to recall a story, I don't know, it was 10 or 15 years ago, where there was a talking Barbie doll model.
[12:07.000 --> 12:09.940]  And there was also, Patel also made the talking G.I.
[12:10.040 --> 12:10.720]  Joe model.
[12:10.720 --> 12:22.680]  And a bunch of hackers, hacktivists, were going into toy stores and buying up quantities of both models and then swapping the modules between the G.I.
[12:22.700 --> 12:24.380]  Joe and the Barbie dolls.
[12:24.560 --> 12:25.620]  So they were like gender hacking.
[12:26.060 --> 12:30.680]  So the Barbie doll was like, go shoot the enemy, kill them dead.
[12:31.260 --> 12:32.420]  And then G.I.
[12:32.460 --> 12:35.580]  Joe was like, I want to go shopping and all that stuff.
[12:35.800 --> 12:41.500]  So will this new Barbie doll be hacked in a similar way so that it will connect to a different cloud?
[12:41.900 --> 12:45.120]  Who knows what will happen with that?
[12:45.340 --> 12:51.220]  Yeah, I believe the project you're thinking of is a Yes Men thing.
[12:51.380 --> 12:51.660]  Yeah.
[12:51.660 --> 12:53.380]  I think that was in one of their films.
[12:53.720 --> 12:59.520]  And it really speaks to how inexpensive components are and sensors.
[12:59.780 --> 13:10.840]  And I mean, I don't know how much a Barbie doll costs, but these kinds of things that can hear and see and measure are all around us and in many products.
[13:11.120 --> 13:21.580]  And we have to be a bit more thoughtful about what you do and what you say and just realize that there's all kinds of functionalities and features in products like this.
[13:21.660 --> 13:26.880]  And maybe a word to the companies thinking about amazing gizmos along these lines.
[13:26.880 --> 13:28.840]  If you make them, we're going to hack them.
[13:29.020 --> 13:32.060]  And they're going to have all kinds of unintended consequences.
[13:33.020 --> 13:35.440]  And hopefully corporate America is ready for that.
[13:36.100 --> 13:38.460]  What does this Barbie say to you?
[13:38.740 --> 13:39.420]  I'm curious.
[13:39.780 --> 13:41.500]  You'll have to get your own Barbie and find out.
[13:41.660 --> 13:44.320]  I was hoping that the mass media could tell me, but I guess not.
[13:44.380 --> 13:45.500]  This one is not out yet.
[13:45.680 --> 13:47.400]  You'll have to wait, I think, until later in the year.
[13:47.400 --> 13:48.580]  So we'll do a follow-up.
[13:48.680 --> 13:53.020]  When this does come out, if the toy company wants to send us one and we can interview it and see what happens.
[13:53.540 --> 14:01.980]  I really think that the kinds of things people are going to be doing with products like these are going to be really amazing to see.
[14:02.100 --> 14:04.140]  Because you could play with this.
[14:04.300 --> 14:05.220]  I mean, imagine...
[14:05.220 --> 14:21.500]  I was imagining maybe running audio into a device like this so that it's not just using a microphone, but you could maybe run line level or some kind of regular line voltage in and maybe have a three-hour-long recording get processed by Mattel.
[14:21.880 --> 14:25.320]  Maybe of, I don't know, a famous speech or something.
[14:25.560 --> 14:29.980]  A denial-of-service attack on Mattel using Barbie as the instrument of delivery.
[14:30.120 --> 14:31.140]  Wow, I like that a lot.
[14:31.220 --> 14:31.660]  Yeah, yeah.
[14:31.740 --> 14:32.720]  Exactly like that.
[14:32.880 --> 14:47.240]  I mean, everybody can pick a different famous speech from history and make really long speeches and then get it hooked up in place of the microphone and, well, connect Barbie and have her just, you know, spout off all kinds of stuff.
[14:47.440 --> 14:54.900]  Famous orators from who knows when or just maybe, like, all of NWA's albums or something.
[14:54.920 --> 14:55.420]  I don't know.
[14:55.780 --> 14:57.760]  Well, then you're facing copyright issues.
[14:57.860 --> 15:02.120]  But, yeah, it's definitely a worthwhile endeavor and we look forward to playing with it.
[15:02.220 --> 15:03.720]  And I think they're going to cancel the project now.
[15:03.720 --> 15:11.620]  So, okay, on to misbehavior by government officials and employees and things like that.
[15:11.980 --> 15:20.000]  Well, first of all, the State Department said on Friday it was implementing improvements, those are their words, to its unclassified email systems.
[15:20.120 --> 15:27.040]  In fact, it shut down the unclassified email system months, months after a breach in its networks.
[15:27.780 --> 15:28.780]  This is what they say.
[15:28.860 --> 15:43.800]  As part of the Department of State's ongoing effort to ensure the integrity of our unclassified networks against cyber attacks, the Department is implementing improvements to the security of its main unclassified network during a short planned outage of some internet-linked systems.
[15:44.400 --> 15:48.740]  The Department continues to monitor and respond to activity of concern on our classified network.
[15:48.820 --> 15:50.500]  Such activity is something we take very seriously.
[15:50.620 --> 15:55.020]  However, it took them literally months to do this after they had malware.
[15:55.020 --> 16:07.280]  The Department of State is responsible for communicating clearly the position of the United States on various, like, very important issues where miscommunication would be, you know, cost lives in a lot of cases.
[16:07.800 --> 16:10.240]  So that statement did not make any sense.
[16:10.740 --> 16:11.500]  Yeah, yeah.
[16:11.500 --> 16:14.020]  So they're either really good at what they do or really bad at what they do.
[16:14.760 --> 16:16.180]  But, you know, this...
[16:16.180 --> 16:17.540]  How does this make Hillary Clinton look?
[16:17.540 --> 16:21.620]  Because she bypassed the State Department to send her email messages.
[16:21.620 --> 16:25.080]  And I'm not hearing of any malware on Hillary Clinton's computers.
[16:25.720 --> 16:26.600]  Well, who would know?
[16:26.800 --> 16:27.340]  Yeah, who would know?
[16:27.360 --> 16:27.920]  No way of knowing.
[16:28.080 --> 16:28.480]  Exactly.
[16:44.020 --> 16:48.380]  That official emails are not actually auto-archived.
[16:48.500 --> 16:51.580]  In fact, they weren't auto-archived until last month, in February.
[16:52.910 --> 17:06.880]  And what that means is that whether or not an email was archived for public viewing later on, that decision was left to the person or the department involved in the email itself.
[17:07.120 --> 17:20.880]  So with all that knowledge, I'm just wondering why all the furor about Hillary Clinton doing this when pretty much everybody had the exact same ability to just erase what they didn't want the public to see.
[17:21.730 --> 17:22.900]  Why the uproar?
[17:23.030 --> 17:24.640]  Because Hillary Clinton's running for president.
[17:24.960 --> 17:25.360]  Okay.
[17:25.700 --> 17:26.460]  That's the only reason.
[17:26.490 --> 17:28.030]  And her political opponents...
[17:28.030 --> 17:30.340]  You know, I mean, what she did is probably...
[17:30.340 --> 17:33.770]  It's clearly illegal and quite possibly, you know, wrong.
[17:33.880 --> 17:38.880]  But the reason it's in the news is because her political opponents are making a point of it.
[17:39.690 --> 17:40.250]  Illegal?
[17:40.510 --> 17:41.510]  Is it really illegal?
[17:41.960 --> 17:42.880]  It's against law.
[17:42.880 --> 17:47.770]  I don't know if it's criminal or civil or the details.
[17:48.380 --> 17:50.220]  It was a White House policy that she was invited.
[17:50.220 --> 17:50.920]  Well, here's the thing.
[17:50.990 --> 17:51.660]  Here's my question.
[17:51.860 --> 18:04.120]  If you knew, you worked for the State Department, and you knew that their computers were filled with malware, as many of us did, and that they weren't really doing anything about it because they didn't, would you feel compelled, even though it was the law,
[18:04.420 --> 18:09.820]  to keep using an insecure system, to communicate issues of national security?
[18:10.560 --> 18:13.030]  I mean, you know, look at it in that view.
[18:13.220 --> 18:15.820]  I don't think anyone except Hillary had the choice.
[18:16.140 --> 18:20.290]  The rest of the State Department was presumably forced to use this thing.
[18:20.530 --> 18:21.800]  No one's forced to use anything.
[18:22.010 --> 18:25.580]  Everybody could just hop onto whatever they want to hop onto and communicate that way.
[18:25.580 --> 18:26.700]  What would you suggest?
[18:26.900 --> 18:28.900]  Well, and also, people can make phone calls.
[18:29.000 --> 18:29.820]  They can meet in person.
[18:29.880 --> 18:30.920]  Not everything is documented.
[18:30.940 --> 18:38.380]  So to say that somebody has to always use a particular email account, it just seems overly simplistic and unenforceable.
[18:40.060 --> 18:41.560]  Well, this is the enforcement.
[18:41.860 --> 18:42.420]  We're watching it.
[18:43.200 --> 18:44.660]  Yeah, courtesy of Fox News.
[18:44.840 --> 18:45.260]  I don't know.
[18:45.420 --> 18:46.530]  It just doesn't seem...
[18:46.980 --> 18:48.720]  If she used Snapchat, it'd be even harder.
[18:49.960 --> 18:50.980]  Yeah, I suppose so.
[18:50.980 --> 18:58.240]  So maybe, well, we've talked on this program before about Snapchat being not quite as private as people claim.
[18:58.480 --> 19:04.200]  But, you know, maybe she and Putin can be Snapchatting each other all the time.
[19:04.480 --> 19:08.340]  Well, I'm just saying that people communicate in all different manners.
[19:08.460 --> 19:18.040]  And especially in this day and age where there's so many choices, it just seems really unrealistic to expect somebody to just follow one particular way of communicating.
[19:18.040 --> 19:20.720]  And, I don't know.
[19:20.780 --> 19:24.920]  I'm open to finding out all the different ways that people choose to use.
[19:25.480 --> 19:26.640]  But this just seems...
[19:27.140 --> 19:28.480]  It just seems unrealistic to me.
[19:29.080 --> 19:36.800]  Here's another example, though, of misuse of computers or authority figures or what have you.
[19:37.940 --> 19:39.540]  Closer to home, the New York Police Department.
[19:39.640 --> 19:51.920]  They have identified two veteran police officers who allegedly use department computers to change Wikipedia pages on several high-profile police abuse cases, including the death of Eric Garner.
[19:53.510 --> 19:57.160]  And the two officers, their names were not released.
[19:57.280 --> 19:59.200]  That's my big gripe that they don't release names.
[19:59.560 --> 20:01.060]  Don't work in police headquarters.
[20:01.060 --> 20:05.360]  They're assigned to two different units separate from one another.
[20:05.360 --> 20:09.420]  And they're expected to be spoken to by the Internal Affairs Bureau.
[20:09.700 --> 20:13.500]  Now, Wikipedia is a publicly accessed and edited web encyclopedia.
[20:14.950 --> 20:19.020]  And according to a law enforcement source, this is their first amendment right.
[20:19.020 --> 20:25.100]  But they are likely to only face a minor reprimand for using department computers for personal activity.
[20:25.660 --> 20:30.380]  They basically found 85 IP addresses registered to one police plaza.
[20:30.560 --> 20:32.620]  And they logged hundreds of edits to Wikipedia.
[20:33.910 --> 20:40.560]  And basically, they changed pages having to do with alleged police brutality, some dating back as many as 10 years.
[20:40.700 --> 20:45.480]  They include pages for the death of Eric Garner, Stop and Frisk, Sean Bell, Amador Diallo.
[20:46.180 --> 20:57.880]  The Garner entry, as one example, was edited on December 3rd, shortly after a Staten Island grand jury decided not to indict NYPD officer Daniel Pantaleo for his death.
[20:58.510 --> 21:04.900]  Garner raised both his arms in the air, was replaced by Garner, flailed his arms about as he spoke.
[21:05.260 --> 21:12.840]  While the sentence, Garner, who was considerably larger than any of the officers, continued to struggle with them, was added to the entry.
[21:12.840 --> 21:22.660]  Two edits were also made to the word chokehold, which was replaced by respiratory distress and chokehold headlock in separate mentions.
[21:23.120 --> 21:26.300]  Other Wikipedia users later removed some of those changes.
[21:26.920 --> 21:30.060]  Police officials directed none of the changes.
[21:30.060 --> 21:31.560]  That's according to a department spokesman.
[21:31.700 --> 21:34.320]  These were individuals acting on their own.
[21:34.440 --> 21:38.140]  But this has generated a bit of outrage, has it not, Bernie?
[21:38.140 --> 21:39.400]  I think so.
[21:39.580 --> 21:54.580]  And while it might be the police officers' protected First Amendment constitutional rights to express themselves on Wikipedia or any other public forum, they're using NYPD computers to do that.
[21:54.580 --> 22:01.760]  It's not only a violation of NYPD policy, which they should be disciplined for, but they were doing that on the taxpayer dime.
[22:01.760 --> 22:08.560]  You know, while they were doing this on NYPD computers, they were being paid with public tax dollars.
[22:08.820 --> 22:16.540]  I think that should be criminally prosecuted as theft, but we know that won't happen because cops typically aren't held responsible for committing crimes like the rest of us are.
[22:17.240 --> 22:20.820]  Bernie, I mean, I don't know about you, but I'm willing to admit on the air...
[22:20.820 --> 22:32.180]  I don't work for a government agency, but I'm willing to admit on the air that I have, at some point in my life, like, used social media for non-work purposes, using my employer's computer on work time.
[22:32.420 --> 22:36.400]  And, like, I don't care about that.
[22:36.640 --> 22:42.080]  It's much better that they're doing this than, like, shooting innocent people, as so many of their colleagues do.
[22:42.080 --> 22:49.320]  I'm glad you brought that up, Mike, because I have in front of me an email from Bernie discussing this, making some very good points.
[22:49.360 --> 22:56.880]  For instance, why does NYPD only maintain records that can trace computer use for one year, how long they keep evidence of crimes, some things that really made me think.
[22:57.240 --> 23:00.080]  But I couldn't help but look at the date stamp on this.
[23:00.160 --> 23:02.520]  It was Monday at about 3 o'clock in the afternoon.
[23:02.700 --> 23:04.880]  Now, Bernie, weren't you at work at that time?
[23:06.300 --> 23:09.280]  I was, but I wasn't on the taxpayer's dime either.
[23:09.420 --> 23:11.720]  I wasn't working and being paid with taxpayer dollars.
[23:11.840 --> 23:12.260]  I agree.
[23:12.260 --> 23:28.420]  You probably weren't, but do we really want to live in a society where every single minor transgression has the full authority of whatever violation has occurred, whether it be your boss or whether it be the taxpayers?
[23:29.080 --> 23:30.360]  People are going to do things.
[23:30.460 --> 23:31.880]  People are going to edit Wikipedia pages.
[23:32.020 --> 23:44.640]  I think the better thing to do is to attack what they said and to, if they say something ridiculous, ridicule that, instead of having a society where everything must be punished, every violation must be punished.
[23:44.760 --> 23:50.280]  Yeah, they did this using taxpayer moments, however long it took them to write this.
[23:50.580 --> 23:52.860]  But is that really such a major issue?
[23:53.820 --> 23:55.960]  Well, I guess the taxpayer should decide that.
[23:56.180 --> 24:07.300]  I mean, the other thing about this thing is, like, the NYPD has made it known, like, public policy, their new internal policy, possibly their old internal policy, is like, don't ever do this because it causes embarrassment.
[24:08.020 --> 24:18.620]  But, so what the police officers will do is, either they'll sign in with an account so the IP address isn't revealed, which is so easy to do that I'm amazed more people don't do it.
[24:20.140 --> 24:32.060]  Or they'll just edit Wikipedia from home, and we won't know that edits like these come from the members of the New York Police Department who we pay to, you know, not shoot innocent people is a big part of their job.
[24:32.180 --> 24:35.460]  To not put innocent people into chokeholds is a big part of their job.
[24:35.600 --> 24:45.320]  And we will no longer know that the rank and file of the New York Police Department, at least some of them, think that these sorts of tactics are so acceptable that they edit Wikipedia to defend them.
[24:45.820 --> 24:56.520]  We're going to lose public debate as a result of this policy, which is being framed as some, like, weird workplace rules issue that is completely irrelevant, in my view.
[24:56.740 --> 25:14.320]  Also, for Wikipedia users in general, you know, I'm willing to say on the air on the station that I think what they were doing was probably by management would be seen as being very good police officers, you know, in the course of their duties, being dishonest about the terrible misdeeds of their department.
[25:14.540 --> 25:22.720]  But it's actually against Wikipedia policy to make contentious edits to an article about a subject with which you personally are connected.
[25:23.280 --> 25:29.180]  So, you know, they if if they wanted to raise these changes, they could have brought it up on the talk page and let the community come to a consensus.
[25:29.580 --> 25:39.340]  And also, they they should have, they should have found citations for their edits, which would have brought it out of brought it out of the realm of debatability and controversy.
[25:39.440 --> 25:42.640]  So they're not very good Wikipedians, even if they're being very, very good cops.
[25:42.820 --> 25:49.840]  Rob, do you think those police officers gave a flying anything about about about Wikipedia's terms of service?
[25:50.060 --> 25:51.000]  They may not, but I do.
[25:51.100 --> 25:51.680]  I like Wikipedia.
[25:51.980 --> 25:51.980]  I agree.
[25:52.020 --> 25:52.500]  I agree with you.
[25:52.700 --> 25:54.620]  I'm impressed that they know how to use computers.
[25:54.980 --> 26:01.780]  And furthermore, that they were able to express themselves on Wikipedia.
[26:01.780 --> 26:08.960]  But as Rob said, they didn't do it properly because their comments were showing bias because of their inherent connection to it.
[26:09.080 --> 26:17.880]  And there's other attributes of the way Wikipedia works, which they're, I'm sure, right now researching to get better and practice their newfound skill.
[26:18.440 --> 26:24.760]  But things like bias and noteworthiness and those come into play when you're using forums like this.
[26:25.960 --> 26:31.320]  Well, it definitely raises some interesting questions and shows where different sides are coming from.
[26:31.460 --> 26:39.560]  And I welcome the debate because that's the only way you reach any kind of conclusion or change things is by talking about these issues.
[26:40.000 --> 27:02.280]  And along those lines, or the lines of people abusing their positions, we have the punishment that was faced by General Petraeus, who seems to have, according to his New York Times editorial, it's astonishing how quickly David Petraeus seems to have bounced back from the sordid aftermath of his extramarital affair,
[27:02.280 --> 27:10.080]  which cost him his job running the Central Intelligence Agency, and added a rap sheet to the carefully managed legacy of the most famous American general of his generation.
[27:11.020 --> 27:18.780]  But he basically wound up getting virtually no punishment at all for the leaks that he was responsible for.
[27:18.920 --> 27:21.040]  Bernie, do you think this might be just a tad hypocritical?
[27:21.200 --> 27:25.500]  I think it's, as some folks have called it, a profound double standard.
[27:25.900 --> 27:37.600]  General Petraeus gave eight bound black books full of classified info with the highest classification levels, like including the names of covert agents, which is a serious felony of itself.
[27:37.820 --> 27:45.500]  He gave these eight books to his mistress, who was writing a hagiography, like a glowing biography about him.
[27:45.700 --> 27:49.940]  And he also lied to the FBI about doing that, which is another felony.
[27:50.420 --> 27:53.780]  It's probably a whole long laundry list of felonies he's committed in this thing.
[27:53.940 --> 27:58.260]  Yet he's getting a sweet plea deal for a single misdemeanor charge, but probably no jail time.
[27:58.500 --> 28:02.920]  And he's still currently advising the White House on classified Iraq stuff.
[28:03.440 --> 28:15.860]  Now, Thomas Drake, one of our Hope X speakers, he said this is a blatant double standard, because Ed Snowden surely isn't being offered any plea deals to avoid prison time and felony convictions.
[28:16.080 --> 28:22.520]  But despite all the accolades Ed Snowden is getting from civic minded attorneys around the world.
[28:22.700 --> 28:25.720]  But this is really a joke, this, this plea.
[28:25.960 --> 28:33.820]  Well, now, my question then, sort of similar to the last story, do we want to see him prosecuted to the fullest extent of the law?
[28:33.980 --> 28:40.360]  Or do we want to see those other cases prosecuted along the lines that he was prosecuted, i.e.
[28:40.360 --> 28:41.300]  not seriously?
[28:41.840 --> 28:44.860]  I think that the law applies to anyone, it should apply equally.
[28:46.340 --> 28:58.880]  I don't think it's hypocritical to say that what he did for his own benefit should be dealt with more harshly than what people like Snowden and Manning have done for the public's benefit.
[29:01.340 --> 29:02.840]  But what about less harshly?
[29:03.980 --> 29:04.540]  Yes.
[29:04.880 --> 29:06.300]  I think that's what you meant to say.
[29:06.980 --> 29:14.400]  Okay, well... I don't remember who was... I don't think it's hypocritical to say that Petraeus should be the one to get more punishment.
[29:14.620 --> 29:16.100]  Of course, I mean, I'm not surprised.
[29:16.300 --> 29:17.280]  This is how power works.
[29:17.320 --> 29:18.720]  Well, you have to look at motive, too.
[29:18.880 --> 29:20.060]  What was his motivation?
[29:20.960 --> 29:22.940]  To make himself look good, as far as I know.
[29:23.200 --> 29:26.260]  Oh, maybe he hoped to get something from the woman, from his mistress.
[29:26.380 --> 29:26.740]  I don't know.
[29:26.940 --> 29:27.400]  Well, okay.
[29:27.600 --> 29:31.460]  And then you have to look at someone like Edward Stone, what his motivation was.
[29:32.140 --> 29:34.540]  And, of course, you know, it's in the eye of the beholder.
[29:34.920 --> 29:40.580]  Some people will say he was looking out for the protection of the entire country.
[29:40.580 --> 29:43.200]  Others will say that he was seeking to undermine authority.
[29:43.200 --> 29:48.600]  But in the end, you have to look at the entire big picture and come to a conclusion.
[29:48.840 --> 29:52.900]  Are we better off knowing this information than not knowing this information?
[29:53.160 --> 29:55.200]  And judge it based upon that.
[29:55.460 --> 30:02.460]  The thing is, Ed Snowden is not going to be permitted by law to speak about his motives in a court of law.
[30:02.460 --> 30:04.920]  That's why he can't get a fair trial in this country.
[30:05.040 --> 30:05.940]  And what law is that?
[30:06.780 --> 30:07.660]  What law?
[30:08.040 --> 30:08.520]  Espionage.
[30:08.520 --> 30:15.260]  Okay, so because he was charged under the Espionage Act, he is not allowed to even...
[30:15.260 --> 30:22.900]  Legally, motive is not a defense in espionage cases.
[30:23.000 --> 30:26.800]  There's a lot written about this in his and previous espionage cases.
[30:26.980 --> 30:32.260]  You can't even introduce as a defense that you were doing it for good moral reasons.
[30:32.260 --> 30:34.560]  That's not relevant in the court of law.
[30:34.680 --> 30:35.400]  It's not even admissible.
[30:36.080 --> 30:38.760]  Now, General Petraeus was not charged under that, was he?
[30:39.040 --> 30:40.660]  No, he wasn't charged with espionage.
[30:40.900 --> 30:46.080]  And he looks like he's only going to get a misdemeanor charge out of this thing.
[30:46.120 --> 30:47.900]  So it's not going to be an issue for him.
[30:48.000 --> 30:50.600]  And who determines if you get charged?
[30:50.820 --> 30:52.040]  The federal prosecutor.
[30:52.320 --> 30:53.080]  Okay, so...
[30:53.080 --> 30:53.860]  Which is the White House.
[30:54.520 --> 30:57.200]  The White House basically has direct control over this.
[30:57.280 --> 30:57.440]  Right.
[30:58.080 --> 31:04.160]  The Department of Justice is part of the executive branch of government, which is headed by the president at the White House.
[31:04.200 --> 31:07.560]  Well, it doesn't mean that Obama's there deciding who gets charged and who does not get charged, right?
[31:07.560 --> 31:13.700]  You can bet that Obama was involved somehow with the decision on what's going to happen to Petraeus over this.
[31:15.220 --> 31:18.580]  Because Petraeus is advising Obama right now about Iraq stuff.
[31:18.920 --> 31:22.260]  Bernie, I don't even think it requires that level of direct involvement.
[31:23.360 --> 31:24.540]  Like, this is the thing.
[31:24.660 --> 31:28.260]  I don't think there needs to be a conspiracy for the powerful to get protected.
[31:28.920 --> 31:37.380]  Because they're so... Like, everyone below... You know, everyone in the Justice Department, like, knows what the powerful people want, even without being directly told.
[31:37.600 --> 31:41.120]  So I don't think it's obvious that Obama had a direct hand in this case.
[31:41.520 --> 31:45.000]  But I also don't think it's a coincidence that he probably got what he wanted.
[31:46.180 --> 31:53.540]  Maybe he was just borrowing the documents, whereas Snowden was reselling... No.
[31:53.820 --> 31:54.600]  That doesn't work.
[31:54.780 --> 31:55.280]  No, it doesn't work.
[31:56.680 --> 31:57.260]  All right.
[31:57.360 --> 32:00.160]  Well, that's something to think about.
[32:00.280 --> 32:02.060]  Something in the news this week.
[32:02.820 --> 32:04.900]  Something else in the news this week.
[32:05.080 --> 32:06.100]  A new bit of technology.
[32:06.940 --> 32:08.140]  What's this all about?
[32:08.720 --> 32:09.840]  USB-C?
[32:10.080 --> 32:10.920]  Have you heard about this, Kyle?
[32:11.320 --> 32:12.320]  Yeah, Type-C.
[32:12.560 --> 32:12.780]  Type-C?
[32:12.780 --> 32:16.200]  If you have Type-C, you could be at risk.
[32:16.780 --> 32:23.480]  I've heard that before, but never... as applied to MacBooks and Chromebooks and things like that.
[32:23.620 --> 32:25.700]  But apparently, yeah, USB-C has arrived.
[32:26.000 --> 32:31.520]  That's a single flavor of cable for all your charging and connectivity needs, according to Gizmodo.
[32:31.700 --> 32:32.740]  Well, that sounds good.
[32:32.820 --> 32:34.120]  That sounds really handy.
[32:34.600 --> 32:37.640]  But apparently, that convenience does not come without a cost.
[32:39.280 --> 32:46.240]  Computers will be more vulnerable than ever to malware attacks from hackers and surveillance agencies alike.
[32:46.240 --> 32:52.420]  Now, the trouble with USB-C stems from the fact that the USB standard isn't very secure.
[32:52.900 --> 33:05.160]  And last year, researchers wrote a piece of malware called Bad USB, which attaches to your computer using USB devices like phone chargers, thumb drives, that kind of thing.
[33:05.300 --> 33:10.680]  And once connected, the malware basically takes over a computer imperceptibly.
[33:10.960 --> 33:19.300]  The scariest part is that the malware is written directly to the USB controller chip's firmware, which means it's virtually undetectable and so far, unfixable.
[33:19.780 --> 33:23.360]  Now, before USB-C, there was a way to keep yourself somewhat safe.
[33:23.360 --> 33:31.160]  As long as you kept tabs on your cables and never stuck random USB sticks into your computer, you could theoretically keep it clean.
[33:31.540 --> 33:37.060]  But the bad USB vulnerability still has not been fixed in USB-C.
[33:37.220 --> 33:42.840]  And now, the insecure port is the slot where you connect your power supply.
[33:42.940 --> 33:46.580]  You have no choice but to use it every day.
[33:47.080 --> 33:54.960]  If everyone is using the same power charger, it's not just renegade hackers posing as creative professionals in coffee shops that you need to worry about.
[33:55.020 --> 34:03.120]  With USB-C, the surveillance establishment suddenly has a huge incentive to figure out how to sneak a compromised cable into your power hole.
[34:03.120 --> 34:04.040]  Yeah.
[34:04.340 --> 34:06.100]  This is what we're looking at right now.
[34:06.380 --> 34:09.540]  The convenience of one cable into your computer.
[34:09.830 --> 34:10.560]  Power hole?
[34:10.740 --> 34:11.600]  Is that a term we use?
[34:11.640 --> 34:12.760]  Well, on Gizmodo, it is, apparently.
[34:13.020 --> 34:23.660]  Now, it might seem alarmist and paranoid to suggest that the NSA would try to sneak a backdoor into charging cables through manufacturers, except that the agency has been busted trying exactly this kind of scheme.
[34:24.160 --> 34:31.960]  Last year, it was revealed that the NSA paid security firm RSA $10 million to leave a backdoor in their encryption unpatched.
[34:32.120 --> 34:41.480]  There's no telling if or when or how the NSA might try to accomplish something similar with USB-C cables, but it stands to reason they would try.
[34:42.100 --> 34:45.450]  So, wow, you're going to have one cable going to your computer now.
[34:45.620 --> 34:47.410]  One input.
[34:47.740 --> 34:49.850]  And you don't have any choice but to use that.
[34:51.060 --> 34:52.960]  This is really...
[34:52.960 --> 35:04.100]  What I understand in this is that when you're... people typically charge their mobile devices, their laptops, and things every day, if you're using them on a regular basis.
[35:04.600 --> 35:14.100]  But just plugging in a... just a basic... just a real... just a plain power port is not a risk for data correcting your... or malware infecting your computer.
[35:14.160 --> 35:27.620]  But now that you have to use an insecure USB-C port, to power your computer, it becomes a vulnerability almost every day that you have to be cognizant of, instead of only when you're plugging something into your USB port.
[35:28.540 --> 35:31.140]  It does actually look like that.
[35:31.520 --> 35:51.300]  And I did a little bit of research about this, and I've often wondered... and just the behavior alone with the older type of USB cable, we are very free about the kinds of power supplies we plug a device in over USB to get some juice for it because it's sort of disassociated,
[35:51.430 --> 35:55.840]  at least in our minds, from the data portions of our devices.
[35:55.950 --> 36:09.360]  But if you think about it, it's actually kind of already pretty vulnerable because people do often swap around USB micro or mini USB, more micro, this day and age, very freely.
[36:09.500 --> 36:12.380]  We don't think about, well, where was that power supply made?
[36:12.380 --> 36:19.540]  And is there any kind of microelectronics involved with that that could be compromised?
[36:19.540 --> 36:23.000]  And so we don't even think about it because in our minds, it's not possible.
[36:23.260 --> 36:32.950]  I actually don't believe that it's impossible to have added things to it if you had something like a compromised wall wart.
[36:32.950 --> 36:39.640]  It's just not that common and it would be very difficult or just prohibitively expensive to design and then deploy.
[36:40.380 --> 36:56.880]  But this is even more, I guess, intrinsically tied as far as power and data because as you guys were pointing out from the article, it's required to use this port whenever you charge.
[36:57.000 --> 37:15.930]  And I read a little bit about Type-C and apparently the cables themselves, I don't know what part of the standard or if this applies on all cases, but the cables themselves will actually be signed and have encryption and other forms of countermeasures as a part of them.
[37:16.000 --> 37:32.700]  I don't know if that's very wide yet, but from my cursory glance at the standard, it seems that's something they're considering or something that was a part of that because it does affect power and data and they're very, very high speed data at that.
[37:32.900 --> 37:53.200]  So, it'll be very interesting to watch this and we'll have to be very mindful of our cables and you perhaps might have a cable that you only use for work and a cable that can only transfer or power a device for your own personal use and you don't share it or you don't trust other people's cables.
[37:53.700 --> 37:55.300]  Really a crazy leap.
[37:55.800 --> 38:02.460]  Back in the day, you wouldn't like be skeptical of someone's parallel port or their SCSI Terminator and so on.
[38:02.460 --> 38:03.020]  Speak for yourself.
[38:03.020 --> 38:05.450]  I always was very suspicious of such things.
[38:05.600 --> 38:10.220]  I mean, as you should have been because a lot of those connectors also have direct memory access.
[38:11.300 --> 38:17.480]  There was the thing on Firewire that came out fairly recently, but I'm sure SCSI would be a risk as well.
[38:17.480 --> 38:26.950]  But, people already charge their most personal computers, that is to say their smartphones, over USB.
[38:27.320 --> 38:32.660]  So, this is not a new risk in that sense, but I guess it now applies to more devices.
[38:32.880 --> 38:40.780]  Mike, there are cables, there are USB cables that only provide power, like only have the two power wires connected.
[38:40.780 --> 38:42.240]  I'm aware, but I don't own one.
[38:42.240 --> 38:42.260]  Do you?
[38:42.260 --> 38:44.620]  They're not capable, but most people don't know that, which is unfortunate.
[38:44.620 --> 38:52.320]  Because if you use one of those cables, it's kind of like a firewall against any data going into your computer from a power device.
[38:53.520 --> 39:02.140]  I mean, and some of those cables also will cause your device to be charged more slowly because they do some, like, I can handle more current handshaking over the other wires.
[39:02.320 --> 39:04.930]  But as a practical matter, like, I don't have one.
[39:05.020 --> 39:06.000]  I don't know if you have one.
[39:06.120 --> 39:06.360]  I do.
[39:06.500 --> 39:07.760]  But normal people don't.
[39:07.900 --> 39:08.500]  I'm not normal.
[39:08.500 --> 39:08.820]  Yeah.
[39:09.280 --> 39:13.580]  Neither am I, but this is a particular abnormality that I don't happen to have.
[39:13.840 --> 39:14.080]  Yeah.
[39:14.160 --> 39:23.140]  I think it's that when the data pins are jumped together, you get a faster charge or it runs at a higher current rating than when the data pins are not jumped.
[39:23.300 --> 39:24.840]  And I think that's on the connector side.
[39:25.000 --> 39:28.800]  So very often, it's a bit more rare to have cables that prevent that.
[39:29.140 --> 39:31.950]  I hope this doesn't become the standard.
[39:32.220 --> 39:34.020]  I mean, MacBooks and Chromebooks, fine.
[39:34.020 --> 39:39.930]  But I hope there's always a way that we can avoid having this vulnerability forced on us.
[39:40.200 --> 39:54.980]  Is this a market opportunity for somebody to make like a USB-C condom that like a little adapter that you plug into your computer first and then you plug whatever kind of power, you know, device into it and not worry about data getting into your computer malware?
[39:54.980 --> 40:03.900]  I mean, bugging that intermediary device sounds like a great opportunity because only, you know, people with particular security needs are going to buy them.
[40:04.780 --> 40:05.140]  Okay.
[40:05.140 --> 40:06.360]  Well, I would buy one.
[40:06.540 --> 40:06.740]  All right.
[40:06.780 --> 40:09.040]  I would make one, you know, so I was sure that it was good.
[40:09.200 --> 40:10.060]  You have your assignments.
[40:10.060 --> 40:13.600]  Go design something and we'll report back in future weeks.
[40:13.700 --> 40:13.960]  But wow.
[40:14.380 --> 40:14.740]  Interesting.
[40:14.930 --> 40:15.620]  Interesting stuff there.
[40:15.820 --> 40:18.140]  Our phone number, by the way, 212-209-2900.
[40:18.140 --> 40:21.800]  We'd like to hear from our listeners and get some feedback and input.
[40:22.040 --> 40:26.840]  And of course, you can always write to us here at OffTheHook, OTH at 2600.com.
[40:26.960 --> 40:29.880]  OffTheHook comes your way every Wednesday night from 7 to 8 p.m.
[40:29.950 --> 40:32.040]  here on WBAI in New York.
[40:32.620 --> 40:36.450]  And we have a brand new top level domain.
[40:36.640 --> 40:38.480]  There are hundreds of them now.
[40:38.740 --> 40:43.400]  Do you remember when it just used to be .com, .net, .org, .gov and a couple of others?
[40:43.400 --> 40:46.460]  And now it's gotten kind of crazy and ridiculous.
[40:46.620 --> 40:51.320]  But they finally come up with one that I think a lot of us would like to have.
[40:51.520 --> 40:55.740]  But they've made it so unpleasant that I don't think any of us are going to get one.
[40:57.020 --> 40:57.500]  .sucks.
[40:58.120 --> 40:59.860]  Yeah, I am not kidding.
[41:00.040 --> 41:04.100]  There is now going to be a .sucks top level domain.
[41:04.100 --> 41:13.040]  So you could get, oh, I don't know, Microsoft .sucks or 2600 .sucks or anything .sucks.
[41:13.700 --> 41:24.380]  However, however, they are controlling this in a rather bizarre way by charging $2,499 to register a .sucks domain.
[41:24.380 --> 41:26.640]  I cannot believe this.
[41:26.840 --> 41:38.100]  And I guess what that does, that keeps a lot of people from trying to register a particular company's domain followed by .sucks.
[41:38.680 --> 41:51.120]  But it also kind of holds those companies hostage saying, if you want to prevent criticism, you have to register your own company name .sucks and pay a huge amount to do that.
[41:51.120 --> 41:54.700]  And that just seems really, really sleazy.
[41:54.820 --> 41:59.860]  I'm trying to figure out who's behind that so I can at least register them .sucks because they really deserve it.
[42:00.180 --> 42:03.100]  I don't care if anybody gets 2600 .sucks.
[42:03.200 --> 42:10.320]  I do care that you're wasting 2500 bucks that you could pledge to WBAI or do anything else with.
[42:10.900 --> 42:17.460]  I hope the community reacts against this type of exploitation with the fervor it deserves.
[42:18.020 --> 42:28.340]  I had noticed that the top-level domains, when they come out, it was basically network solutions or whoever is in charge of these things just coming up with new licenses to print money.
[42:28.400 --> 42:35.900]  Because you start .anything and there will be certain interests, Microsoft, Google, so on and so on, who will automatically buy their own name .anything.
[42:35.900 --> 42:43.200]  And we also know from way back that entities like Verizon really like owning domain names critical of themselves.
[42:47.390 --> 42:54.780]  And it's just funny because it will still only cost you around $9 to come up with a domain that creatively insults anyone you like.
[42:55.420 --> 42:59.140]  On one of the old standard .com.net or whatever.
[43:01.160 --> 43:05.900]  And you'll be saving $2,490 whatever dollars.
[43:06.640 --> 43:09.060]  And getting your point across in a more effective way.
[43:09.220 --> 43:17.320]  Because the big effect that all these ridiculous top-level domains that have been coming out over the last year or two have had is that there really isn't much value in them anymore.
[43:17.320 --> 43:18.560]  The market is basically flooded.
[43:20.500 --> 43:24.640]  There's .kitchens, .bike, .whatever, .what have you.
[43:24.800 --> 43:31.520]  And it really doesn't... there isn't the cache in having that anymore, I don't think.
[43:31.700 --> 43:37.100]  I think domain speculators have been hit really hard, which is fun.
[43:37.620 --> 43:42.660]  But it's basically changed the whole landscape of how these things are worked and how they're perceived.
[43:43.580 --> 43:47.280]  Well, the name of the company is Vox Populi.
[43:47.500 --> 43:48.800]  Am I saying that right, Kyle?
[43:51.040 --> 43:51.880]  Vox Populi.
[43:52.220 --> 43:53.940]  Yeah, that's... I don't know what...
[43:53.940 --> 43:54.620]  P-O...
[43:54.620 --> 43:56.380]  P-O-P-U-L-I, right?
[43:56.600 --> 43:56.860]  Yes.
[43:57.100 --> 43:58.580]  That's Latin for voice of the people.
[43:58.780 --> 43:59.180]  Vox Populi.
[43:59.200 --> 43:59.840]  Oh, thank you, Bernie.
[43:59.960 --> 44:05.820]  Alright, well, then I guess that's the site to register your .sucks domain and pay them $2,500 for the privilege.
[44:06.040 --> 44:07.300]  Somebody should do iTunes sucks.
[44:07.300 --> 44:16.040]  And so, this is like the initial price, I guess it's going to come down in a bit, but still to a very... a still large, but less large number.
[44:16.260 --> 44:25.620]  But I'm just wondering if anyone has yet bought .sucksucks.com, which would be, you know, the standard domain registration price.
[44:25.780 --> 44:29.760]  Well, I would hurry up and register that now because odds are one of our listeners will if you don't.
[44:29.760 --> 44:30.780]  I hope they do.
[44:30.920 --> 44:31.680]  They'll save me the $10.
[44:32.080 --> 44:34.480]  So, the article does say it's for trademark names.
[44:34.480 --> 44:41.380]  They have to pay $2,500 or so, but you could, as an individual, register it for a lot less.
[44:41.620 --> 44:41.880]  Later.
[44:42.080 --> 44:42.220]  Later.
[44:42.460 --> 44:43.160]  Oh, is that...
[44:43.160 --> 44:43.600]  Oh, you're right.
[44:43.660 --> 44:43.840]  Yes.
[44:44.000 --> 44:45.000]  I didn't see that.
[44:45.020 --> 44:47.000]  But why would you register your own name .sucks?
[44:47.120 --> 44:52.740]  You know, it has to be something that you really believe sucks, which is probably a corporate name or a government or a celebrity.
[44:52.920 --> 44:53.740]  Uh, Bloomberg did that.
[44:54.360 --> 44:54.720]  Yeah.
[44:54.920 --> 45:07.140]  And it takes away, um, that's another thing that's been happening when, um, each time one of these new domains, uh, has been unveiled is that there will be a grace period where, um, large entities like Microsoft or whoever can, um, buy their own name,
[45:07.260 --> 45:10.380]  reserve their own name ahead of, uh, anyone else's chance to go and buy any names.
[45:10.380 --> 45:10.860]  Okay, but you know what?
[45:10.960 --> 45:17.180]  For .sucks, they should be the only ones who aren't allowed to register it because, obviously, they don't think they suck or they wouldn't be in business.
[45:17.320 --> 45:19.760]  That should be left to somebody else who does believe they suck.
[45:19.760 --> 45:24.240]  If the provider was worried about the intended use, uh, then yeah, that would be the way it would go, but it's not the way it's going to go.
[45:24.340 --> 45:25.720]  Is FCC trademarked?
[45:27.160 --> 45:28.780]  Actually, I think we can probably get that.
[45:29.000 --> 45:39.120]  Um, I mean, we've talked before on this program about the huge, well into the six figures cost of obtaining one of these top level domains and, and clearly they want to, uh, make their money back.
[45:40.020 --> 45:41.200]  Yeah, well, there's that too.
[45:41.340 --> 45:49.860]  There's the whole, um, um, corruption involved in, in getting it in the first place, but, uh, uh, freedom of speech should not be the one suffering and it always is.
[45:50.040 --> 45:50.180]  All right.
[45:50.240 --> 45:52.660]  212-209-2900 is our telephone number.
[45:52.780 --> 45:54.100]  We have a full switchboard here.
[45:54.200 --> 45:56.060]  Let's take a phone call or two.
[45:56.260 --> 45:56.880]  Good evening.
[45:57.060 --> 45:57.960]  You're on off the hook.
[45:58.840 --> 45:59.240]  Hello.
[45:59.580 --> 46:00.280]  Hi, what's on your mind?
[46:01.020 --> 46:01.420]  Okay.
[46:01.920 --> 46:06.180]  Um, I've called last week about Hillary servant and have some updates on it.
[46:06.240 --> 46:07.500]  Got some updates for us.
[46:07.500 --> 46:07.780]  Okay.
[46:07.820 --> 46:10.140]  You were the one going out and researching all of this.
[46:10.240 --> 46:10.760]  What'd you find out?
[46:10.840 --> 46:11.720]  That's okay.
[46:12.100 --> 46:14.060]  Uh, the server gave you in Florida.
[46:14.380 --> 46:15.120]  That's correct.
[46:15.120 --> 46:25.100]  It, it exists there in Palmetto Bay, but that routes, uh, the, some info or the, or the data to a server in White Plains.
[46:25.520 --> 46:33.000]  And that's on, it's called inbound 10 dot, um, oh, damn, I forgot.
[46:33.920 --> 46:46.320]  Anyway, the, uh, the, the, uh, what do you call it is owned by, um, uh, the domain is owned by John McAfee from McAfee Antivirus.
[46:47.040 --> 46:47.840]  Is that MX domains?
[46:48.480 --> 46:49.280]  And that's it.
[46:49.480 --> 46:49.980]  That's it.
[46:50.300 --> 46:52.540]  Uh, MX, uh, what was it?
[46:52.600 --> 46:53.860]  MX, Bernie, what was it?
[46:53.900 --> 46:54.400]  I sent it to you.
[46:54.400 --> 46:55.700]  I thought it was MX, MX something.
[46:55.860 --> 46:56.400]  I thought it was MX domains.
[46:56.400 --> 46:57.900]  MX something dot net.
[46:58.420 --> 47:01.900]  And that's owned by, um, John, uh, McAfee.
[47:01.900 --> 47:02.260]  John McAfee.
[47:02.820 --> 47:03.300]  Yeah.
[47:03.300 --> 47:11.640]  McAfee or however he's, anyway, um, and that's, that's, uh, it's, it seems like a pretty secure server.
[47:11.820 --> 47:13.620]  Only a couple of ports opened on it.
[47:13.880 --> 47:29.260]  And, um, that's where, that's, that, that, that, that's where they, they, um, I think she, uh, routes her emails all through there, although there could be another, other service since the first server does load balancing.
[47:29.780 --> 47:34.380]  So, as the other, um, uh, listener indicated to you in his email.
[47:35.500 --> 47:53.200]  So, anyway, they, they, if he, if Mac, McAfee set up the, the, uh, the service, uh, Hillary, he, job, because there are only a couple of ports opened, and, um, it's, uh, it's well done, very well done.
[47:53.840 --> 47:58.300]  So, basically, that's what, that's what I, uh, that's what I found out since.
[47:58.900 --> 48:00.960]  Since, uh, I spoke to you last.
[48:01.220 --> 48:03.100]  And are you going to be continuing the investigation?
[48:04.160 --> 48:08.560]  Well, that service is so secure, I can't find out what it's running.
[48:09.100 --> 48:20.560]  I don't, uh, for example, I had told you that the first server was running, uh, some F5 hardware and software from, uh, uh, uh, called Big IP from F5 networks.
[48:21.120 --> 48:34.540]  And, uh, when I go to try to find out what software, uh, inbound 10, uh, mxlogic, that's the name, mxlogic.net, when I try to find out what that's running, I can't get it.
[48:35.920 --> 48:41.400]  So, it's very secure, there are only two ports opened on it, that's 25 and 554.
[48:41.640 --> 48:43.880]  And you had to do a port scan to determine that, didn't you?
[48:44.340 --> 48:45.100]  Yes, I did.
[48:45.480 --> 48:45.720]  I did.
[48:45.780 --> 48:47.040]  Yeah, how else would you determine that?
[48:47.060 --> 48:54.860]  Yeah, so I'm, I'm just mentioning that for our listeners, it's like, I'm sure, I'm sure there's probably a million people that are port scanning this IP.
[48:54.860 --> 48:56.180]  Yeah, I hope.
[48:56.340 --> 48:57.240]  Let's put it that way.
[48:58.360 --> 49:05.180]  This would all just, this would all just be so much less complicated if Hillary would have just gone ahead and used yahoo.com like Sarah Palin.
[49:05.580 --> 49:06.380]  Yeah, exactly.
[49:06.620 --> 49:10.180]  And, you know, a lot of people don't know that Sarah Palin did that.
[49:10.500 --> 49:16.940]  And a lot of people don't know that, I believe Colin Powell admitted to using his private email as well.
[49:17.420 --> 49:24.020]  Um, but apparently they want to hang Hillary because she's the front runner for the Democratic Party.
[49:24.280 --> 49:26.740]  Uh, not, I'm not even interested in that.
[49:26.940 --> 49:35.440]  I'm only interested in the fact that the, the, the Republicans claimed that her server's not secure and the government servers are.
[49:35.700 --> 49:44.380]  And I don't believe that because, uh, from what I could see, the government servers use the, they use Akamai and that's basically a cloud server.
[49:44.640 --> 49:48.720]  Now I called, uh, put the personal computer show after I spoke.
[49:49.440 --> 49:55.640]  Hank, he told me that the server side of a cloud is identical to the server side of everything else.
[49:55.780 --> 49:57.680]  And it doesn't seem that that's true.
[49:58.180 --> 50:11.900]  Uh, uh, it seems that from what I could see, Hillary's servers are just as secure, if not more secure than anything the government has, even if it's true that she's not encrypting her emails.
[50:13.160 --> 50:21.280]  So other than that, I think her, her service are just as secure and just as good as anything the government is running.
[50:21.460 --> 50:21.900]  All right.
[50:21.960 --> 50:28.840]  Well that's the, um, determination reached by our special investigator into the Hillary Clinton email scandal.
[50:29.080 --> 50:35.400]  Hopefully, sir, you will continue your investigations and report back to us in weeks ahead and we can blow this case wide open.
[50:35.400 --> 50:37.880]  Um, in the meantime, we're going to take some more phone calls.
[50:37.980 --> 50:39.560]  Thanks again for, uh, for that information.
[50:40.980 --> 50:43.340]  212-209-2900 is our telephone number.
[50:43.400 --> 50:43.680]  Good evening.
[50:43.820 --> 50:44.700]  You're on off the hook.
[50:45.600 --> 50:45.960]  Yeah.
[50:46.040 --> 50:48.120]  Hi, uh, Bob from Islip calling in.
[50:48.320 --> 50:48.740]  Hi, Bob.
[50:48.800 --> 50:49.340]  What's on your mind?
[50:50.360 --> 50:57.400]  Oh, I was, um, just listening to the show and, uh, I'd like to also comment about the Hillary Clinton email server.
[50:58.280 --> 50:58.780]  Go ahead.
[50:58.900 --> 51:00.540]  You guys are like breaking news.
[51:00.720 --> 51:04.360]  I mean, CNN, everybody thinks it's down in Chappaqua, this server, but...
[51:04.360 --> 51:07.560]  Well, eventually they'll, they'll catch up to where we are.
[51:08.540 --> 51:14.340]  And the other thing is, um, yes, uh, uh, USB-C, that does stand for condom.
[51:16.720 --> 51:17.580]  Well, okay.
[51:17.840 --> 51:22.620]  You need a condom on that type of, uh, and, and there's just a lot of people talking about that.
[51:22.780 --> 51:27.180]  We've actually found out it's, it's a whole different world these days.
[51:27.360 --> 51:29.160]  You can manage the symptoms type C.
[51:29.900 --> 51:30.320]  Yes.
[51:31.280 --> 51:45.600]  In fact, that would, once you guys get squared away with the, um, you know, the, uh, the fundraiser for the WBAI, I mean, you know, providing those kind of USB-C, you know, USB condoms would be, that'd be a great...
[51:45.600 --> 51:51.460]  Well, let me just, uh, reassure people that the flash drives that we are trying to give to our listeners are completely safe.
[51:51.460 --> 51:52.480]  We've made them ourselves.
[51:52.480 --> 51:57.780]  Maybe that's not an endorsement, but, uh, we, uh, they're not infected with, with anything.
[51:58.080 --> 52:00.460]  Well, before we put them in the mail, that's true.
[52:01.300 --> 52:10.000]  If, if, if the NSA comes and, and opens up the envelope and insert something, yeah, I suppose that's possible if BAI listeners are really that much of a target, but I don't really think so.
[52:10.080 --> 52:11.540]  I doubt it, but you never know.
[52:12.120 --> 52:12.360]  All right.
[52:12.360 --> 52:13.260]  Uh, anything else, caller?
[52:14.160 --> 52:22.600]  Oh, no, no, just about how you guys, you know, CNN, um, Fox News, everyone's talking about Hillary's email server.
[52:22.840 --> 52:24.280]  You guys are like the only ones.
[52:24.480 --> 52:31.160]  So, you know, 2,600 are the only ones who are actually doing any investigation into this to, to track it down.
[52:31.380 --> 52:35.300]  And, and you just, you, you, that caller who was just on, you know?
[52:36.060 --> 52:45.160]  Well, that's why, that's why you should always keep your dial set to 99.5 FM because you will hear all kinds of investigations and all kinds of, uh, theories and conclusions.
[52:45.320 --> 52:48.740]  And it's up to you to decide what makes sense, what does not make sense.
[52:49.240 --> 52:50.700]  Uh, thanks again for that call.
[52:50.880 --> 52:53.680]  212-209-2900 is our telephone number.
[52:53.800 --> 52:54.720]  Let's see who else is out there.
[52:54.800 --> 52:55.140]  Good evening.
[52:55.280 --> 52:56.120]  You're on off the hook.
[52:57.440 --> 52:57.840]  Hello.
[52:58.120 --> 53:03.360]  Um, uh, I was listening to the show and I listen to the station all the time.
[53:03.360 --> 53:06.720]  I heard, uh, you guys talking about that, uh, the Barbie doll.
[53:07.260 --> 53:08.760]  Yes, we were talking about the Barbie doll.
[53:08.760 --> 53:18.040]  Yeah, I was interested to know because you guys have had other programs and a lot of other different programs I've had as well too, where people were talking about the radiation from the cell phones.
[53:18.700 --> 53:22.160]  And, you know, especially for kids, how dangerous it is.
[53:22.580 --> 53:29.580]  And then when you guys were talking about the Barbie, I was trying to understand, you know, how the signal was actually going out.
[53:29.580 --> 53:31.900]  It sounded like it was a, a Wi-Fi kind of signal.
[53:32.120 --> 53:33.960]  And somebody said something about similar to the cell phones.
[53:34.460 --> 53:37.460]  Isn't that, like, even more dangerous then?
[53:37.660 --> 53:43.420]  Because from what I understand, especially with the cell phones for kids, that's really where the danger is, no?
[53:43.420 --> 53:46.420]  Yeah, it's, um, it's, it is definitely a concern.
[53:46.420 --> 53:54.600]  Uh, I guess you can get into, uh, the radio, technical aspects of the radio band it uses, but we believe it's an access point.
[53:54.920 --> 54:02.020]  Um, and so it otherwise associates just like anything else, you might, uh, log on to your, to your wireless network.
[54:02.020 --> 54:10.480]  But, um, what I bet, uh, is the case with these is that, um, it's a very low power, um, uh, a transceiver.
[54:10.680 --> 54:21.380]  So, uh, that, that isn't, uh, going to be nearly as strong as perhaps like a router would broadcast and, and control mitt and, and allow many devices to connect to it.
[54:21.500 --> 54:28.520]  This is just a very small device that's only looking for a perhaps more powerful access point that's managing the rest of your home network.
[54:28.520 --> 54:34.420]  But it is, it is valid that there is some, uh, radio transmission there and it's, uh, measurable.
[54:34.680 --> 54:36.200]  I'm sure Bernie has some insight too.
[54:36.380 --> 54:42.540]  It's worth pointing out that it is, they, Wi-Fi does use 2.4 gigahertz, which is the same frequency band that microwave ovens use.
[54:43.120 --> 54:51.780]  Um, but the power level is, we're talking about milliwatts in the single digits probably for Wi-Fi devices to connect with a home router.
[54:51.780 --> 54:58.640]  So, uh, it's, the amount of power is not going to cook any cells, uh, in your brain.
[54:58.840 --> 54:59.260]  Yeah.
[54:59.440 --> 55:09.760]  And, and by comparison, um, I know you, you were talking about some other shows and, and the, the content of that is, I think, uh, up also for debate in, in one regard or another.
[55:09.980 --> 55:25.260]  But I think when you're talking about, um, toxicity and stuff from radio transmissions, it gets into a totally different scale because really at issue there is where are antennas being placed and how, uh, how many actual watts, not milliwatts as Bernie,
[55:25.600 --> 55:30.380]  uh, made the distinction, but, uh, these transmission sites, how much are they radiating?
[55:30.460 --> 55:31.600]  It's a totally different scale.
[55:31.720 --> 55:39.980]  You see, my, my concern is that, uh, yeah, it might be milliwatts, might be an inconsequential number, but you got kids sleeping, uh, with their Barbie dolls next to their heads.
[55:40.340 --> 55:44.760]  And that's, you know, that's never happened before that, that we know of to have that kind of exposure.
[55:44.760 --> 55:49.220]  So even though it might be a tiny number, still could be something that causes health effects down the road.
[55:49.360 --> 55:54.040]  We don't know because these devices are fairly new and, uh, it takes generations to learn these things.
[55:54.260 --> 55:55.760]  I mean, or not, just to be clear.
[55:55.820 --> 55:56.440]  Or not what?
[55:56.800 --> 55:57.520]  It might be safe.
[55:57.640 --> 55:57.960]  We don't know.
[55:58.000 --> 55:58.640]  Well, that's what I'm saying.
[55:58.660 --> 56:00.920]  It takes generations to determine these things one way or another.
[56:01.160 --> 56:03.000]  Uh, we can't say for sure one way or another.
[56:03.120 --> 56:06.960]  We're going to try and fit in one more phone call, uh, and, uh, this is it.
[56:07.020 --> 56:07.320]  Good evening.
[56:07.460 --> 56:08.220]  You're on off the hook.
[56:08.980 --> 56:09.340]  Hey.
[56:09.720 --> 56:10.640]  Hi, what's on your mind?
[56:11.180 --> 56:17.740]  Uh, well, uh, actually, speaking of the Barbie doll, uh, there was even something else that was quite extraordinary in the news.
[56:17.940 --> 56:25.800]  Uh, in New York City, they're going to be starting this, this, uh, this listening device.
[56:25.880 --> 56:36.500]  So, so if there are any gunshots in the street, the, uh, this, this, uh, uh, microphone device will, will notify the police.
[56:36.700 --> 56:40.060]  They'll triangulate where this noise that came from.
[56:40.060 --> 56:42.380]  Um, and they're going to be, you know, rushing to the scene to see what happens.
[56:42.680 --> 56:44.240]  Yeah, it's, uh, shot location technology.
[56:44.500 --> 56:46.040]  Shot spotter, I think, is a brand name.
[56:46.220 --> 56:46.240]  Yeah.
[56:46.400 --> 56:47.780]  They, they have that in other cities, don't they?
[56:47.840 --> 56:49.320]  Yeah, they have been using it for like over a decade.
[56:49.540 --> 56:50.480]  It's been around a long time.
[56:50.480 --> 56:50.900]  Oh, really?
[56:51.100 --> 56:51.220]  Yeah.
[56:51.360 --> 56:52.680]  This is the first time I've ever heard of that.
[56:53.380 --> 56:56.480]  How does it work with a backfire or with, or the firecracker?
[56:56.700 --> 56:58.860]  They're actually a different sound signatures.
[56:59.500 --> 57:02.200]  Uh, uh, uh, car backfiring or firecracker actually sound different.
[57:02.400 --> 57:04.880]  Uh, and you can analyze that with digital signal processing.
[57:04.880 --> 57:06.300]  It sounds different than a gunshot.
[57:06.560 --> 57:11.720]  These systems are actually fairly effective in showing a general area where a gunshot happened.
[57:11.720 --> 57:13.960]  If you have a good array of microphones around a city.
[57:14.120 --> 57:19.480]  So I, I don't see this as a privacy issue at all, unless you consider your gunshots a private issue.
[57:19.480 --> 57:20.740]  But they need to silence it.
[57:20.940 --> 57:25.180]  Let's not give people the idea that gunshots are private, uh, data.
[57:25.480 --> 57:36.480]  Uh, but one thing is for sure in, uh, in, in cities in the United States, it's, it doesn't take long to test the software to make sure it's working perfectly and that they are detecting gunshots and not backfires.
[57:37.160 --> 57:38.360]  Um, hey, we're out of time.
[57:38.600 --> 57:40.200]  Uh, personal computer show is up next.
[57:40.420 --> 57:44.500]  Uh, we will be back next week, uh, here at WBAL.
[57:44.640 --> 57:48.490]  You can write to us, OTH at 2600.com.
[57:48.480 --> 57:49.490]  All right.
[57:51.740 --> 57:52.940]  And Bernie has us turned up.
[57:53.360 --> 57:55.180]  Um, we, uh, we'll be back next week, as I said.
[57:55.420 --> 58:00.880]  And, uh, until then, let's go out with something a little bit belated Irish, uh, here on Off the Hook.
[58:01.100 --> 58:01.700]  Have a good night.
[58:11.250 --> 58:14.330]  Oh, my girlfriend has a mobile phone.
[58:14.450 --> 58:16.650]  Now we can never have a minute alone.
[58:16.730 --> 58:19.290]  The other night I asked her for a kiss.
[58:19.390 --> 58:22.010]  She said, hang on now till I answer this.
[58:24.390 --> 58:31.270]  Oh, this mobile phone, it is a curse and it makes an awful hole in her purse with her mobile phone.
[58:31.430 --> 58:35.230]  She gets such a thrill, but her smile disappears when she gets the bill.
[58:37.630 --> 58:42.970]  Oh, my girlfriend has a mobile phone, now we can never have a minute alone.
[58:43.010 --> 58:45.590]  The other night I asked her for a kiss.
[58:45.610 --> 58:48.410]  She said, hang on now till I answer this.
[58:50.970 --> 58:53.370]  Last week I was courting her.
[58:53.370 --> 58:58.850]  The other night I asked her for a kiss.
[58:59.010 --> 59:01.270]  She said, hang on now till I answer this.
[59:01.270 --> 59:08.690]  Oh, my girlfriend has a mobile phone, now we can never have a minute alone.
[59:08.850 --> 59:11.270]  The other night I asked her for a kiss.
[59:11.450 --> 59:14.150]  She said, hang on now till I answer this.
[59:16.590 --> 59:19.350]  Last week I was courting her in me car.
[59:19.370 --> 59:21.850]  And she was letting me go too far.
[59:21.950 --> 59:24.510]  The next thing her mobile phone did ring.
[59:24.670 --> 59:26.970]  Just as I was about to put me hand on her.
[59:41.500 --> 59:44.280]  If you're looking for a girlfriend, now you see.
[59:44.280 --> 59:46.920]  My advice to you would be.
[59:47.040 --> 59:49.820]  If the girl that you fancy has a mobile phone.
[59:50.120 --> 59:52.880]  Don't bother about her, just leave her alone.
[59:54.720 --> 01:00:00.000]  Oh, my girlfriend has a mobile phone, now we can never have a minute alone.
[01:00:00.160 --> 01:00:02.700]  The other night I asked her for a kiss.
[01:00:02.700 --> 01:00:05.400]  She said, hang on now till I answer this.
[01:00:05.540 --> 01:00:10.520]  Oh, my girlfriend has a mobile phone, now we can never have a minute alone.
[01:00:10.620 --> 01:00:13.140]  The other night I asked her for a kiss.
[01:00:13.220 --> 01:00:15.900]  She said, hang on now till I answer this.
[01:00:20.090 --> 01:00:23.150]  Hello, is that Finna 22222?
[01:00:23.270 --> 01:00:27.190]  No, this is Finna 22222.
[01:00:27.370 --> 01:00:29.530]  I'm sorry for getting out of the bed.
[01:00:30.070 --> 01:00:32.690]  I'm sure I had to come down and answer the phone anyway.
[01:00:40.020 --> 01:00:40.660]  Oh, my.
[01:00:40.660 --> 01:00:41.760]  Had to answer the phone anyway.
[01:00:42.820 --> 01:00:43.860]  Oh, my.
[01:00:44.380 --> 01:00:44.440]  Had to answer the phone anyway.