[00:00.000 --> 00:08.800]  Help end the heartbreak of psoriasis cures and other lotions, potions, and nostrums sold on the radio by sending us money to make radio.
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[00:18.260 --> 00:19.900]  This is Phil Donahue.
[00:22.100 --> 00:26.120]  And you're listening to WBAI New York.
[00:26.660 --> 00:28.120]  99.5.
[00:35.100 --> 00:37.660]  And you are indeed listening to WBAI New York.
[00:37.800 --> 00:39.320]  The time is 7 o'clock.
[00:39.700 --> 00:41.900]  Time once again for Off the Hook.
[02:06.450 --> 02:09.230]  And the very good evening to her by the program is Off the Hook.
[02:09.230 --> 02:12.310]  Emanuel Goldstein here with you on this Wednesday evening.
[02:12.550 --> 02:14.210]  Joined tonight by Mike.
[02:14.570 --> 02:15.090]  Good evening.
[02:15.270 --> 02:15.690]  Happy spring.
[02:16.570 --> 02:17.090]  Is it spring?
[02:17.230 --> 02:17.950]  Yes, I guess it is.
[02:18.450 --> 02:18.790]  Rob T.
[02:18.890 --> 02:19.250]  Firefly.
[02:19.490 --> 02:19.950]  Good evening.
[02:20.270 --> 02:20.470]  Kyle.
[02:20.970 --> 02:21.470]  Present.
[02:22.050 --> 02:22.950]  And Bernie S.
[02:24.430 --> 02:25.570]  Bernie S., are you there?
[02:26.210 --> 02:26.930]  Bernie S.
[02:27.010 --> 02:27.450]  hung up.
[02:27.910 --> 02:28.850]  Oh, how sad.
[02:29.270 --> 02:30.970]  You know, we just connected.
[02:31.110 --> 02:31.470]  There he is again.
[02:31.690 --> 02:31.730]  Okay.
[02:32.910 --> 02:33.770]  Bernie, are you there?
[02:35.090 --> 02:36.110]  Greetings from Philadelphia.
[02:36.410 --> 02:37.210]  You got a good connection?
[02:37.350 --> 02:38.170]  You going to stay with us?
[02:38.390 --> 02:41.070]  I think I walked into a bad area, but I'm okay now.
[02:41.230 --> 02:41.490]  All right.
[02:41.550 --> 02:47.490]  Well, you walked into Off the Hook, so I don't know how much bad area you can get into when you're listening to this radio station.
[02:47.650 --> 02:49.150]  But we'll see.
[02:49.230 --> 02:49.530]  We'll see.
[02:49.650 --> 02:50.710]  Hey, good news, everybody.
[02:50.890 --> 02:51.450]  Good news.
[02:51.450 --> 02:54.150]  All the premiums have been sent out.
[02:54.510 --> 02:54.810]  Woo!
[02:55.090 --> 02:55.450]  Yay!
[02:56.730 --> 02:57.890]  Okay, wait, let me just clarify.
[02:58.130 --> 02:59.450]  I believe they've all been sent out.
[02:59.570 --> 03:08.470]  We sent out the ones we said we were going to send out, the Hopex flash drives, and we delivered everything else to the radio station last week, and they were on the verge of being sent out.
[03:08.550 --> 03:09.550]  So, you should have them.
[03:09.730 --> 03:18.730]  Everybody who pledged for the fall 2014 fundraiser back in October and November should have everything that you pledged for.
[03:18.730 --> 03:25.050]  If you did not, email us, OTH at 2600.com, and hopefully that brings this saga to an end.
[03:25.390 --> 03:33.570]  Of course, giving us enough time for things that have been mailed around now to get to you, but if in a reasonable amount of time you have not gotten your stuff, let us know.
[03:33.710 --> 03:35.030]  OTH at 2600.com.
[03:35.170 --> 03:35.970]  We will keep track.
[03:35.970 --> 03:39.390]  We will collect this information, and we will do what needs to be done with that.
[03:39.450 --> 03:43.170]  We are relentless, and we don't give up until we get what we want.
[03:43.690 --> 03:47.750]  And we're getting emails from listeners who are saying, hey, I finally got my premium.
[03:47.750 --> 03:48.350]  Thank you.
[03:48.570 --> 03:50.070]  Yes, they're very thrilled and surprised.
[03:50.430 --> 03:51.470]  But yeah, we did it.
[03:51.570 --> 03:52.290]  Don't be surprised.
[03:52.530 --> 03:54.150]  We always come through in the end.
[03:54.250 --> 03:56.350]  It just takes a while sometimes to get to the end.
[03:57.090 --> 04:02.850]  Okay, but let's dive right into hysteria, because that's a good part of what we cover.
[04:03.470 --> 04:09.330]  And this week's hysterical, well, hysterical in two different ways, news story, is that U.S.
[04:09.330 --> 04:18.670]  commercial airlines could be hacked in flight by passengers using a plane's, get this, wireless entertainment system to access its flight controls.
[04:19.050 --> 04:21.770]  That's according to a federal watchdog agency.
[04:21.770 --> 04:23.590]  They warned about this yesterday.
[04:23.590 --> 04:25.290]  The U.S.
[04:25.810 --> 04:42.270]  Government Accountability Office, I don't know who holds them accountable for the things they say, they identified the danger as one of several emerging cybersecurity weaknesses that the FAA must address as the air traffic control systems move towards next generation technology.
[04:42.670 --> 04:51.870]  Internet connectivity in the cabin should be considered a direct link between the aircraft and the outside world, which includes potential malicious actors.
[04:53.230 --> 05:02.490]  So if the plane is connected to the Internet, that means it's not just the people inside the cabinet, it's the entire Internet, including ISIS, that now has access to that airplane.
[05:02.610 --> 05:04.170]  That's how, that's what they want us to believe.
[05:04.670 --> 05:06.170]  You guys don't look scared enough.
[05:06.410 --> 05:11.310]  I mean, I don't know anything at all about designing aircraft, but...
[05:11.310 --> 05:13.830]  You should work for these guys then, because I don't think they do either.
[05:13.830 --> 05:32.830]  Yeah, I mean, my understanding is that these manufacturers put a pretty rigorous separation between the flight control systems and the entertainment systems, and I would not be willing to say there are no vulnerabilities in anything, but this is the kind of thing that they actually do know how to do.
[05:33.510 --> 05:35.230]  Well, okay, it's...
[05:35.230 --> 05:39.970]  I mean, we're talking about literal, like, not necessarily rocket scientists, but like aerospace engineers.
[05:40.710 --> 05:42.710]  Many of them are reasonably smart.
[05:42.710 --> 05:46.950]  They are, and you wouldn't connect these systems together.
[05:47.030 --> 05:52.770]  Of course, we both know, we all know, that just because something makes sense does not mean that's the way they're going to do it.
[05:53.370 --> 06:06.470]  One expert is saying that all it takes is some malware, perhaps a virus, on a website that a passenger visits while in their seat that then gets loaded onto the airliner's system.
[06:06.630 --> 06:07.590]  Who is this expert?
[06:07.770 --> 06:09.530]  You know, that's funny, they don't name them.
[06:09.730 --> 06:10.370]  I mean...
[06:10.370 --> 06:13.230]  How do you get to be an expert?
[06:13.930 --> 06:17.370]  By being quoted in the Reuters story like this, and remembered.
[06:18.330 --> 06:31.630]  I mean, so, I'm not going to say outright that that's false, but I'm going to say if it's true, a number of otherwise smart people really, really failed to do their jobs, and it requires more than some unnamed expert to make that happen.
[06:31.630 --> 06:45.150]  Yeah, I mean, there's a lot of idiotic decisions made, people don't think things through, like what happens if someone gets locked out of a door, things like that, that sometimes you just need to run through some unfortunate situations to realize that,
[06:45.210 --> 06:46.790]  hey, that's not the right way to design things.
[06:47.530 --> 06:54.150]  In this particular case, though, it just seems that this would have happened already if it was that much of a vulnerability.
[06:54.150 --> 06:58.890]  And if it's a remote vulnerability, it obviously should be addressed.
[06:59.230 --> 07:00.130]  Bernie, what do you think?
[07:01.050 --> 07:06.150]  I think I'd like to see more information, but I don't think they want to show it to us.
[07:06.330 --> 07:18.590]  But I do agree with Mike on this, that the field of avionics, which is aviation electronics, its mantra 24-7 is safety, safety, safety, they spare no expense.
[07:18.750 --> 07:26.450]  Avionics equipment is extremely expensive and over-engineered for safety from every conceivable angle.
[07:26.770 --> 07:41.970]  So, like Mike, I find it really hard to believe that the entertainment systems on a plane, like you watch movies and that kind of stuff, and you maybe have your own internet access, are part of the same network that the cockpit control systems are.
[07:42.090 --> 07:44.150]  I mean, you could just have VPNs for different...
[07:44.150 --> 07:46.230]  It's implausible to me, frankly.
[07:47.030 --> 08:03.870]  Yeah, I'm kind of bewildered because on the first reading when I was listening to it, it sounded like they were cautioning people not to... or they're cautioning that an attack on the control systems could be launched from the plane, maybe it almost sounded like from the ground,
[08:04.490 --> 08:12.870]  affecting the plane's navigation or something, using the access from the plane to do things from outside.
[08:13.170 --> 08:21.890]  But I know it sounds, as we went through it here, it sounds a little bit more like, yeah, it's actually, will your traffic cross over into critical systems on the plane?
[08:22.010 --> 08:31.010]  And I'm with you guys because I think, like, definitely, as it stands, the preponderance of aircraft really do segment this stuff.
[08:31.150 --> 08:39.430]  And in a lot of cases, these Wi-Fi systems are aftermarket and they've been added on to the avionics systems that the plane originally came with.
[08:39.570 --> 08:44.870]  And probably it's the most substantial upgrade beyond, like, GPS stuff that they've done in a while.
[08:44.870 --> 08:49.810]  So it's grafted on or runs in parallel to the other systems.
[08:49.810 --> 08:56.430]  However, certain planes are really heavily integrated.
[08:56.610 --> 09:00.110]  And the trend is going further towards electronic systems.
[09:01.170 --> 09:06.670]  They are running ever more computer systems, much in the same way that cars do.
[09:06.870 --> 09:10.010]  They've got all kinds of computer systems on cars these days.
[09:10.150 --> 09:14.430]  And the trend is probably, in short, it's going more towards this.
[09:14.910 --> 09:21.630]  Just an example, I believe Airbus, like 320-era vintage planes run Linux.
[09:21.890 --> 09:24.170]  They run a version of Solaris, I think.
[09:24.290 --> 09:25.490]  I'm not exactly sure.
[09:25.650 --> 09:28.290]  I've heard people talk about that in articles, though, anecdotally.
[09:28.530 --> 09:29.310]  So it is coming.
[09:29.390 --> 09:37.910]  And I know the 787, some of the new Boeing stuff is all very much like fly-by-wire as opposed to a lot more of the, well, actual wire and hydraulic systems, et cetera.
[09:38.050 --> 09:40.510]  It doesn't matter if they're running an Amiga operating system.
[09:40.710 --> 09:47.110]  The point is, it shouldn't be connected to something that is attached to the net or to the net itself.
[09:47.110 --> 09:50.630]  We went through this with nuclear power plants.
[09:50.810 --> 09:56.090]  Like, there was the fear that hackers were going to melt down a site someplace.
[09:56.210 --> 09:58.950]  And we're seeing the same thing now with cars and now with airplanes.
[09:59.610 --> 10:02.810]  You simply isolate critical systems.
[10:02.810 --> 10:09.770]  There's no reason to have something be accessible by the world or to be connected to an insecure system.
[10:09.870 --> 10:11.410]  It's common sense, right?
[10:11.410 --> 10:11.450]  Rob?
[10:11.830 --> 10:20.230]  Yeah, this is pretty akin to designing a car so that if someone tunes into a certain thing on their radio station, it takes over their car's systems and drives them somewhere they don't want to go.
[10:20.570 --> 10:31.890]  And being that we do probably have some listeners listening to us in their car right now, I assure you that if we said code 934 Texas enable section alpha, the car would not immediately lock all the doors and drive you to the nearest children's petting zoo.
[10:32.330 --> 10:33.130]  Not today.
[10:33.130 --> 10:33.670]  Not today.
[10:34.630 --> 10:35.990]  It's not 934.
[10:36.750 --> 10:37.270]  All right.
[10:37.350 --> 10:38.590]  Well, we'll get the code down.
[10:38.710 --> 10:40.690]  But, you know, people want this kind of thing.
[10:40.790 --> 10:49.870]  They want that kind of ease and ability to override human control and just have a car go someplace because of a command.
[10:50.190 --> 10:51.370]  Yeah, computers know best.
[10:51.930 --> 10:55.230]  Well, sometimes they do, but not when humans are behind them.
[10:55.790 --> 11:03.350]  I mean, I'll say that if any of our listeners know that there's something more to this story than unnamed expert hysteria, then we'd love to hear about it.
[11:03.470 --> 11:03.610]  Right.
[11:03.770 --> 11:05.710]  But there doesn't seem to be anything there.
[11:06.310 --> 11:07.090]  Well, okay.
[11:07.170 --> 11:15.530]  On the subject of things being connected to the net that really shouldn't be, a Minnesota family has learned a hard lesson in wireless security.
[11:15.810 --> 11:28.390]  That's after discovering that hackers, because hackers are guilty of everything, had not only hijacked control of the nanny cam in their baby's room, but had used it to take surreptitious photos and post them on a foreign website.
[11:28.390 --> 11:28.410]  Right.
[11:29.390 --> 11:29.670]  Yeah.
[11:29.890 --> 11:38.610]  You know, I love how the final nail in the coffin here is that it was posted to a foreign website.
[11:38.610 --> 11:44.570]  If it was posted to a domestic website, not such a big deal, but wow, my God, the baby's been posted to a foreign website someplace.
[11:44.850 --> 11:48.710]  The nanny cam is now being read by people in Egypt.
[11:50.210 --> 11:53.190]  The things that we get concerned about mystify me.
[11:53.290 --> 11:59.650]  But why, in God's name, is a nanny cam able to be accessed on the internet in the first place?
[11:59.690 --> 12:01.110]  It's a simple concept.
[12:01.170 --> 12:02.350]  It's a very simple concept.
[12:02.370 --> 12:03.050]  You have a baby.
[12:03.290 --> 12:04.290]  Baby's in the other room.
[12:04.410 --> 12:05.270]  You want to hear the baby.
[12:05.350 --> 12:06.110]  Maybe you want to see the baby.
[12:06.230 --> 12:08.290]  It's a connection to wherever you are.
[12:08.430 --> 12:11.550]  You shouldn't be in a different country or down the block or whatever.
[12:11.710 --> 12:12.490]  There's no reason.
[12:13.050 --> 12:16.430]  Mike, you have a reason to connect a baby cam to the internet?
[12:16.590 --> 12:17.170]  Tell me what it is.
[12:17.170 --> 12:22.010]  Yeah, people want to go to work and check up on their nannies who are at home with the kid.
[12:23.190 --> 12:25.910]  And that's the only way they can do it by having...
[12:25.910 --> 12:27.590]  How would you do it without an internet?
[12:27.650 --> 12:30.950]  I wouldn't be so suspicious having to spy on people all the time.
[12:30.990 --> 12:31.110]  Okay, okay, okay.
[12:31.150 --> 12:32.830]  This is part of the surveillance society.
[12:33.070 --> 12:36.270]  Not wanting this product entirely is an entirely reasonable argument.
[12:36.270 --> 12:40.550]  But if you do want it and you want it cheaply, then the internet is how I would do it.
[12:40.570 --> 12:48.170]  Well, then don't be surprised when the baby and the nanny show up on an iZill website someplace for I don't know what kind of purpose.
[12:48.370 --> 13:01.790]  But like every other consumer good that you can buy that connects to the internet, these nanny cams that are internet-based, they have their default passwords, they have their default configurations, and they often are purchased by people who don't know how to correctly set them up in a secure manner,
[13:01.970 --> 13:05.570]  or at least a more secure manner than just putting it open to the entire damn net.
[13:05.990 --> 13:11.490]  So things like this are going to happen until people become sort of more educated about the things they're plugging into their walls.
[13:11.490 --> 13:13.490]  It's not likely to happen anytime soon.
[13:13.490 --> 13:25.470]  We just see more and more of this every single week, more instances of technology being used in stupid ways, and people wanting to spy on everything and basically exposing themselves to the entire world as a result.
[13:25.870 --> 13:26.250]  Emmanuel?
[13:26.510 --> 13:26.910]  Yes, Bernie?
[13:27.570 --> 13:33.710]  I remember, I mean, this has been going on for decades, frankly, not with the nanny cams on the internet, but with baby monitors.
[13:33.930 --> 13:42.030]  You probably remember the audio baby monitors that just use regular narrowband FM over like the 46 megahertz or 900 megahertz band.
[13:42.910 --> 13:55.290]  People would just put the microphones near their baby, typically in their bedroom, and broadcast all the audio in that room to their neighborhood unknowingly, thinking that only they could hear it in the next room or whatever.
[13:55.290 --> 13:55.890]  Yeah, to their neighborhood.
[13:55.910 --> 14:01.170]  You'd have to sit outside the house and listen, but you wouldn't be able to just tap in from the comfort of your own home.
[14:01.690 --> 14:06.090]  Yes, you could, with just a radio scanner tuned to, you know, the 46 megahertz band.
[14:06.250 --> 14:07.570]  How powerful were these things?
[14:07.950 --> 14:10.510]  They were good enough to go about a block or two.
[14:10.650 --> 14:15.370]  Okay, a block or two, but we're talking about the entire world now can see your baby and your nanny.
[14:15.490 --> 14:16.150]  It's ridiculous.
[14:16.510 --> 14:16.670]  That's true.
[14:16.850 --> 14:28.230]  This is a global thing now, but it was, this is not unprecedented where people were broadcasting their baby noises or their bedroom noises around their neighborhood for, and this has been going on for decades.
[14:28.230 --> 14:35.690]  So I just find it an amusing new evolution of the same lack of knowledge about privacy with technology they use.
[14:35.850 --> 14:41.730]  This has been a pretty explosive area of product development, too.
[14:41.850 --> 14:44.090]  There's a lot of different types of these cameras.
[14:44.190 --> 14:57.430]  I was recently looking into different types of these time-lapse devices, and there's whole time-lapse baby camera video things, and they're all connected online.
[14:57.430 --> 15:12.630]  I mean, there's just a huge array of products just for this specific thing, and they're all really pretty, pretty, a lot further along, a lot more sophisticated than the baby monitor that you mentioned.
[15:13.310 --> 15:13.770]  Manuel.
[15:14.090 --> 15:14.670]  Yes, Bernie.
[15:14.890 --> 15:17.510]  This raises an interesting legal question.
[15:17.850 --> 15:23.810]  If someone has their baby with a camera pointed at it, and the baby is naked or somewhat unclothed...
[15:24.430 --> 15:24.810]  Oh, boy.
[15:25.050 --> 15:32.550]  Is that person guilty of the felony of transmitting child pornography?
[15:32.850 --> 15:37.610]  I mean, I know it sounds ludicrous, but a lot of these laws are ludicrous.
[15:37.750 --> 15:41.790]  Well, only if in the eyes of the lawmakers every picture of a naked kid is child pornography.
[15:41.970 --> 15:42.730]  Well, you know...
[15:42.730 --> 15:44.410]  In this country, that's likely, I guess.
[15:44.530 --> 15:45.730]  In this country, it is likely.
[15:45.910 --> 15:49.830]  So I just think there's a legal issue that people should be aware of.
[15:49.830 --> 15:59.470]  If their baby is naked, and they're broadcasting its images across the internet, they could have a legal issue, as well as a privacy issue.
[15:59.610 --> 16:04.330]  Well, you're telling me that there's a legal issue for people transmitting naked images of their own baby?
[16:05.110 --> 16:06.410]  With the whole world seeing it?
[16:06.490 --> 16:06.830]  Absolutely.
[16:07.050 --> 16:09.030]  Because if you read the... what is it?
[16:09.230 --> 16:10.010]  Section U.S.
[16:10.410 --> 16:12.770]  Title 18, Section 2252...
[16:12.770 --> 16:16.950]  Okay, no, I'm going to stop you right there, because you can cite all the laws and numbers you want.
[16:17.070 --> 16:19.810]  At some point, you've just got to call BS on the whole thing, because...
[16:19.810 --> 16:21.550]  It doesn't make any sense anymore.
[16:21.830 --> 16:29.710]  You know, you have kids being arrested for walking back from a park to their home in Maryland, because you're not supposed to let kids do anything anymore by themselves.
[16:29.910 --> 16:34.610]  And you have this craziness where you can get charged with child pornography for having a picture of your own kid.
[16:35.210 --> 16:38.310]  It's... we're starting to lose our minds in this country, really.
[16:38.510 --> 16:39.110]  I agree with you.
[16:39.190 --> 16:39.690]  I agree with you.
[16:40.310 --> 16:40.790]  All right.
[16:40.830 --> 16:45.290]  Well, let's just keep noting that fact as we slide further and further into insanity.
[16:45.790 --> 16:55.770]  But on a somewhat related note, related technologically, we've seen a lot of police abuse lately.
[16:56.190 --> 16:59.170]  I believe, Bernie, you wrote in with a list, actually, which is very helpful.
[16:59.590 --> 17:11.290]  Just to give you an example, all the things that have happened since we were last on the air, NYPD counterterrorism detective was caught on a cell phone video berating an Uber driver and a xenophobic three-minute rant.
[17:11.490 --> 17:13.570]  I think we've all taken a look at that.
[17:13.770 --> 17:20.490]  South Carolina driver stopped by a cop, shot in the back, caught on camera from a passerby with a cell phone.
[17:20.750 --> 17:22.570]  Cops in Vineland, New Jersey.
[17:22.730 --> 17:23.710]  I hope I'm pronouncing that right.
[17:23.750 --> 17:30.370]  I caught on a cell phone video beating a face-down, unconscious, handcuffed man, allowing a police dog to repeatedly bite him.
[17:31.030 --> 17:38.330]  San Bernardino, California sheriff's deputies caught on a TV news helicopter video beating an alleged horse thief more than 50 times.
[17:38.490 --> 17:39.030]  Horse thieves?
[17:39.170 --> 17:40.030]  They still have horse thieves?
[17:40.250 --> 17:41.230]  In the 21st century?
[17:41.510 --> 17:42.390]  Yeah, something, isn't it?
[17:42.590 --> 17:45.930]  Well, beatings are a timeless, but I didn't know horse thieves were still around.
[17:45.970 --> 17:48.570]  Yeah, I want footage of the horse thievery more than the beating.
[17:48.570 --> 17:57.770]  Well, anyway, Virginia Beach cop was caught on a cell phone video, repeatedly using a taser on a minor who was allegedly driving a car with a broken brake light.
[17:58.630 --> 18:03.650]  That cell phone was confiscated by police and later returned to its owner with the video deleted, but it was recovered.
[18:05.370 --> 18:10.330]  All of this, and there's more, too, but that's really just as much as we have time for.
[18:11.070 --> 18:19.710]  All of this has led to more demands for mandatory police body cams, more eyes, more video, more watching.
[18:20.150 --> 18:24.690]  And Bernie, you raised the issue of no debate over privacy implications.
[18:24.970 --> 18:27.290]  Well, first of all, what do you mean by privacy implications?
[18:27.290 --> 18:38.350]  Well, I'm concerned that there's a rush to everyone, people now saying, we must have police cams, you know, police, all the police must be wearing body cams to capture what they do on camera.
[18:38.670 --> 18:49.050]  But that means that basically, you know, we've, we've talked on the show many times about the plethora of video surveillance cameras in our, in our neighborhoods and where else we travel.
[18:49.290 --> 19:04.930]  But what if every police officer walking around with a walking camera and microphone, and they could be walking, you know, by you or standing near you, recording your, your, your face and who you're associating with, and maybe any audio, anything you're saying?
[19:05.750 --> 19:07.730]  I have some concerns about this.
[19:07.770 --> 19:17.830]  I don't think we should be leaping headlong into the, into the demand that all cops should be wearing body cams, possibly with microphones, without thinking twice about what that means to our society.
[19:18.010 --> 19:27.970]  We have basically roving, roving, technically, it's called wiretapping when you're monitoring people without their knowledge, especially with audio.
[19:28.610 --> 19:32.350]  I'm just concerned about this rush into police body cams everywhere.
[19:32.350 --> 19:33.250]  What do you think?
[19:33.470 --> 19:34.870]  Well, it's not going to solve anything.
[19:34.870 --> 19:36.330]  It's not going to solve the beatings.
[19:36.430 --> 19:43.390]  It'll allow people to see from the cop's perspective, what it was like to beat somebody and probably help prosecute some of them.
[19:43.910 --> 19:46.630]  But we'll actually change the behavior.
[19:46.930 --> 19:48.190]  I doubt that.
[19:48.190 --> 19:52.010]  Yeah, I'm, I'm really concerned that we're not actually fixing the cops.
[19:52.210 --> 19:55.610]  We're, we're trying to fix cameras, but there's no evidence that they're not working.
[19:55.750 --> 19:59.490]  In fact, that's exactly why we're able to see all this stuff, because there's so many and they all work great.
[20:00.410 --> 20:05.030]  I'm extremely skeptical, Emmanuel, that we will even go as far as you claim.
[20:05.190 --> 20:21.290]  I think if we create a technology that is maintained by the police department, to expect this technology to, you know, result in a massive, uh, surge of, of rights for the victimized people is naive.
[20:21.750 --> 20:34.930]  Uh, I think these cameras will suddenly have all kinds of malfunctions when the police do something wrong and will be used as evidence to lock up people, uh, who might've not been locked up before.
[20:35.010 --> 20:44.470]  I think we have to tread very carefully, even in assuming that they will work with, before we even get to the question of whether it's the society we want to build or not.
[20:44.630 --> 20:50.190]  But this, this, um, it parallels something that we see quite a bit when there's, uh, crime in a neighborhood.
[20:50.390 --> 20:54.650]  The, the, the neighborhood demands cameras to, to, to watch the streets, to prevent the crime.
[20:54.710 --> 20:55.330]  And it doesn't work.
[20:55.470 --> 20:56.470]  It doesn't work in London.
[20:56.630 --> 20:59.330]  It doesn't work anywhere that this is, uh, uh, implemented.
[20:59.670 --> 21:05.350]  Uh, it, it might make it easier to figure out who did something at some point, but usually it just moves the crime away from the cameras.
[21:05.730 --> 21:11.710]  Same thing with, uh, with police wearing cameras and they know they're wearing cameras, they're not going to do things that incriminate them.
[21:11.770 --> 21:18.650]  They'll, as you said, either arrange for a breakdown, turn them off, face another way, figure out something, cover-ups of all sorts.
[21:19.190 --> 21:20.670]  This is one thing they're good at.
[21:20.810 --> 21:30.630]  And, um, I'm always a bit leery of, um, of assuming that something like surveillance is going to solve a problem because it almost never does.
[21:31.150 --> 21:32.410]  And we're stuck with it.
[21:32.570 --> 21:33.450]  It never goes away.
[21:33.790 --> 21:38.090]  I think there's potential for, uh, body cams on cops to not be a bad idea.
[21:38.170 --> 21:40.030]  I think there's potential for it to actually do some good.
[21:40.710 --> 21:45.210]  Um, but, um, as Mike said, it has to be under the control of an agency that's not the police department.
[21:45.410 --> 21:53.090]  We've seen time and again, especially in this city and in other large cities that, uh, the police being their own oversight does not work well for, for the public.
[21:53.290 --> 21:57.770]  Um, uh, citizen oversight of the police around here is a sad joke.
[21:58.070 --> 22:11.170]  Um, and, and, uh, I'm sure that holds true in other places, but, uh, in, if it, if we could, if we could somehow enact this where it was under the control of somebody whose job it actually was to protect the public trust rather than serve the police department themselves.
[22:11.670 --> 22:14.010]  Um, I think, I think there might be some good in it.
[22:14.110 --> 22:22.270]  But right now we have something sort of in that direction in the form of citizens recording the police whenever they're around and catching them in the act.
[22:22.690 --> 22:32.170]  That's somebody that's not the police in control of the actual footage and turning that over to the people to, uh, to judge what the, what the actions are.
[22:32.330 --> 22:36.130]  That, that is the biggest thing we have going for us, uh, on, on the non-police side right now.
[22:36.250 --> 22:48.510]  And of course, uh, people are still left and right being arrested, harassed by the police for the simple act of recording something, uh, because they're, the police basically don't like recordings happening of things that they're doing wrong.
[22:48.750 --> 22:50.190]  But, uh... You noticed that, didn't you?
[22:50.270 --> 22:50.370]  Yeah.
[22:50.450 --> 22:51.810]  They don't like it when you take their picture.
[22:51.810 --> 22:53.190]  They don't like it when you record what they do.
[22:53.190 --> 22:59.990]  It's really funny that, but, uh, but yeah, but photography is not a crime and you are allowed to record the police if you're not getting in the way of them doing their job.
[23:00.150 --> 23:01.190]  They will tell you otherwise.
[23:01.430 --> 23:02.030]  They will tell you otherwise.
[23:02.250 --> 23:06.670]  You're breaking the law, but it's an imaginative law, imaginary law, and it's, it's, it's, it does not exist.
[23:06.950 --> 23:07.250]  Right.
[23:07.430 --> 23:10.990]  And, uh, you can, you can, uh, easily find the relevant statutes in your area.
[23:11.190 --> 23:17.610]  And actually, um, there have been people carrying those statutes around on their phone to show the police when, uh, when they start raising the issue.
[23:17.750 --> 23:22.330]  And of course, you know, police don't like being reminded that, uh, the people they're trying to harass are smarter than them either.
[23:22.450 --> 23:22.650]  But...
[23:22.650 --> 23:24.030]  Yeah, okay.
[23:24.210 --> 23:30.830]  Well, as long as we're on this little kick on police, we have more material on that.
[23:30.830 --> 23:31.670]  How about this?
[23:31.750 --> 23:36.910]  The Baltimore Police Department, they have been using this device known as Stingray.
[23:37.030 --> 23:46.550]  They've been using it thousands of times in recent years, and following instructions from our friends at the FBI to withhold information about it from prosecutors and judges.
[23:47.030 --> 23:52.330]  No, not just the public, prosecutors and judges, so that nobody knows when they're doing this.
[23:52.330 --> 24:00.330]  Now, this testimony shows for the first time how frequently city police are using Stingray, which is a cell site simulator.
[24:01.230 --> 24:06.590]  It's technology that authorities have gone to great lengths to avoid disclosing, but we know that it exists.
[24:06.590 --> 24:08.690]  We've seen fake cell towers.
[24:08.690 --> 24:11.830]  We're aware of this, and we're learning more about it every single day.
[24:12.170 --> 24:17.250]  Basically, the device mimics a cell phone tower to force phones within its range to connect.
[24:17.530 --> 24:19.470]  You could be using one right now, Bernie?
[24:20.710 --> 24:24.730]  I could be talking to you through one of these Stingrays and not knowing it.
[24:25.370 --> 24:27.010]  It's a man-in-the-middle attack.
[24:27.150 --> 24:27.450]  That's right.
[24:27.530 --> 24:42.410]  And police use it to track down stolen phones or find people, you know, sometimes for good things, but many, many times to basically watch people who have not committed any kind of a crime or just ensnare them into this wide net.
[24:42.410 --> 24:46.010]  Now, Bernie, maybe you could tell us something about how the technology actually works.
[24:46.150 --> 24:51.530]  Now, if there is a Stingray near you, your phone call is routed through that.
[24:51.630 --> 24:58.930]  Now, I imagine all the metadata is able to be captured, but is the audio from a cell phone conversation able to be?
[24:58.930 --> 25:01.050]  There are some of these types of devices.
[25:01.450 --> 25:03.410]  Some of them are called Stingrays.
[25:03.590 --> 25:04.810]  Some of them are other brand names.
[25:05.030 --> 25:09.830]  But Harris Corporation is one of the biggest manufacturers and sellers of them in the United States.
[25:10.410 --> 25:15.370]  They have one model that will also monitor the audio.
[25:15.610 --> 25:16.850]  But they say they don't sell it.
[25:17.090 --> 25:19.510]  It's not really for use in this country is what they say.
[25:19.510 --> 25:21.630]  But frankly, I don't believe that.
[25:22.150 --> 25:25.290]  We have even found hackers.
[25:25.430 --> 25:39.010]  I think there's a guy named Chris Taggett who has demonstrated a homebrew Stingray for a cost of about $1,500 using a software-defined radio and a laptop computer.
[25:39.010 --> 25:49.890]  Basically, any... the strongest cell site signal to your... that can be picked up by your cell phone is the one your cell phone will latch onto and send its signal through to the network.
[25:50.090 --> 25:50.790]  Hey, Bernie?
[25:51.210 --> 25:51.670]  Yes?
[25:51.910 --> 25:54.730]  Is that only if you're automatically selecting networks?
[25:56.470 --> 26:01.210]  Well, what these things do is they impersonate the network that you are using.
[26:03.210 --> 26:09.170]  What the cops will do in these cases, or the FBI's, they'll find out what your cell phone number is, typically.
[26:10.430 --> 26:15.870]  Typically, they'll know what your cell phone number is, and they'll know from that cell phone number who your mobile carrier is.
[26:16.010 --> 26:16.230]  Okay.
[26:16.250 --> 26:24.610]  And then they will... then they will make... they will program the Stingray or whatever product they're calling to simulate that it's that network.
[26:25.750 --> 26:44.990]  If you know you're going to be in an area where this might be in use and you switch to like a manual network selection mode, you wouldn't be able to avoid this anyway because it might replicate all of the carriers available or your carrier, which then would be the only carrier you could select anyway.
[26:45.330 --> 26:49.210]  Some of these devices can emulate multiple networks simultaneously.
[26:49.210 --> 27:07.510]  I think there's a potential here for hackers to write applications for mobile apps for phones if the phone's API, if the phone's operating system's API allows it to actually detect if your phone is suspiciously switching to another cell site signal.
[27:08.710 --> 27:21.310]  There's some work on this now, and I would be really fascinated to see more work in this area for hackers to develop mobile apps that would detect whether your phone is connecting to a suspicious cell site as opposed to the one it's supposed to be connecting to.
[27:21.410 --> 27:22.330]  I have a question for you, Bernie.
[27:22.530 --> 27:26.110]  Now, is this something that requires the assistance of the phone companies?
[27:26.650 --> 27:27.410]  Absolutely not.
[27:27.510 --> 27:29.250]  They can be completely unaware of this.
[27:29.730 --> 27:30.490]  That's interesting.
[27:31.050 --> 27:42.170]  Does the signal, if they're actually connecting you, they're just in the middle, do they have some kind of government wholesale account that they're then getting back onto the network?
[27:42.230 --> 27:44.350]  How do they end up back onto the network?
[27:44.670 --> 27:52.230]  They are simulating both a cell site for your phone, and they are simulating to the network your phone.
[27:53.890 --> 28:02.210]  So, the mobile network, say it's... and most of these are for the GSM technology, but I think there's some CDMA as well, an LTE.
[28:03.050 --> 28:06.490]  Suppose you're an AT&T wireless subscriber.
[28:07.390 --> 28:20.430]  The Stingray would be programmed to emulate the AT&T network so that your phone would latch into it, and then it would, simultaneously, would emulate your phone to AT&T's wireless's actual network.
[28:20.430 --> 28:20.870]  I see.
[28:20.990 --> 28:23.570]  So, it's like a bridged Wi-Fi...
[28:23.970 --> 28:24.810]  It's like a tap.
[28:25.090 --> 28:28.850]  It's a man-in-the-middle attack, and it's transparent to the user.
[28:29.350 --> 28:34.650]  Otherwise, you know, they've given up their secrecy on this.
[28:34.670 --> 28:37.490]  You don't want your target to know that they're being eavesdropped on.
[28:37.650 --> 28:42.710]  I mean, the crazy thing to me, besides the fact that the whole thing is crazy, is the amount of secrecy here.
[28:43.430 --> 28:51.730]  It's vaguely possible that there is some legitimate law enforcement need, where they actually need this thing, and they're actually going to catch someone who's actually a threat to somebody else.
[28:51.890 --> 28:52.470]  I don't know.
[28:52.610 --> 28:57.230]  Yeah, like on an episode of Homeland, when they had to track down the guy that was making a phone call, and they didn't know who he was calling.
[28:57.710 --> 28:58.930]  Yeah, but in real life.
[28:59.910 --> 29:12.310]  But the level of secrecy around this technology, where they won't admit in court that they use it, they will, you know, like, lose cases rather than admit where the evidence came from, is just amazing.
[29:12.310 --> 29:15.830]  And it's all due to contracts with the vendors of this equipment.
[29:15.830 --> 29:17.210]  It's all crazy.
[29:17.550 --> 29:34.590]  My favorite bit from this article, there's a quote from the sheriff of Erie County, upstate New York, where he told the county lawmakers that specific use of the device should be left to the monitoring of the courts and not to the legislature or to the media.
[29:34.690 --> 29:35.710]  So that's what he said in May.
[29:35.850 --> 29:39.370]  But then when the courts try and look into it, they won't answer the courts either.
[29:39.370 --> 29:45.350]  It's just this amazing Orwellian secrecy in the law enforcement methods.
[29:45.370 --> 29:52.910]  The whole thing of not answering the courts, that's somewhat new as far as being just accepted without question.
[29:52.910 --> 29:57.330]  Yeah, I don't understand how these... I mean, I do understand because I know how power works.
[29:57.430 --> 30:03.930]  But if I were slightly one step more naive, I wouldn't know how it happens that they haven't been thrown in jail for contempt yet.
[30:04.610 --> 30:05.350]  It's amazing.
[30:05.570 --> 30:05.750]  Yeah.
[30:05.950 --> 30:14.690]  And something that we are definitely keen on finding out more about, so any information on Stingray technology, is this our name for it or is it their name for it?
[30:14.830 --> 30:15.630]  Since it's so secret.
[30:15.910 --> 30:18.690]  It's a brand name, but these are like highly secret brand names that got leaked.
[30:18.970 --> 30:21.170]  Okay, so there's a brand name called Stingray.
[30:21.170 --> 30:25.370]  Well, Harris Corporation is the make and the model is Stingray.
[30:25.490 --> 30:29.990]  Earlier models were called the trigger fish, and there's newer models, I forget what they're called.
[30:30.150 --> 30:38.070]  But they all seem... they're made... Harris Corporation is based in Florida near the coast, and they like to name their products based on aquatic animals.
[30:39.650 --> 30:41.710]  Okay, well, we have that to go on, folks.
[30:41.870 --> 30:45.290]  So let's pool our resources and find out more about this.
[30:45.370 --> 30:49.510]  And Harris is a really, really old and established American company, right?
[30:49.510 --> 30:51.510]  They do a lot of... Is this the Broadcasting Harris Company?
[30:51.810 --> 30:52.390]  Harris Radio, right?
[30:52.610 --> 30:55.250]  Yeah, it's another division, but they have a whole...
[30:55.250 --> 30:57.010]  We're using Harris equipment right now, I'll bet.
[30:57.690 --> 30:57.970]  Probably.
[30:57.970 --> 30:58.270]  My goodness.
[30:59.550 --> 31:00.450]  All right, well, that's sobering.
[31:00.590 --> 31:00.790]  Rob?
[31:01.470 --> 31:04.850]  It's actually funny how much secrecy is around this, even on the official side of things.
[31:05.350 --> 31:13.870]  There is a story on Motherboard, on Vice.com, about the legal agreement that the FBI makes a police department sign in order to be able to use the Stingray technology.
[31:14.330 --> 31:22.430]  And the NYCLU, New York Civil Liberties Union, got a hold of some of this documentation, and it's got a total fight club list of rules.
[31:22.610 --> 31:23.330]  Here are some of them.
[31:24.070 --> 31:31.410]  Police are not allowed to talk about the technology, quote, in press releases, in court documents, during judicial hearings, or during other public forums or proceedings.
[31:31.470 --> 31:32.610]  Hold on, hold on, hold on, hold on.
[31:33.830 --> 31:35.890]  Now, they don't answer to courts.
[31:35.890 --> 31:38.010]  They won't admit this in court.
[31:38.450 --> 31:40.650]  And you're telling me that they have these conditions.
[31:40.810 --> 31:42.230]  What happens if they violate the conditions?
[31:42.330 --> 31:45.510]  They can't go to court because court doesn't know anything about this, right?
[31:45.610 --> 31:45.890]  Absolutely.
[31:46.150 --> 31:46.650]  How does that work?
[31:46.730 --> 31:48.650]  It's sort of a self-sustaining non-disclosure.
[31:48.870 --> 31:50.070]  The FBI takes their toys away.
[31:50.150 --> 31:50.630]  That's what happens.
[31:51.070 --> 31:51.950]  Okay, all right.
[31:52.110 --> 31:54.390]  And the local police do not want that.
[31:54.970 --> 32:09.510]  Yeah, and another rule, if a district prosecutor intends to use details about how the Stingray works during a court case, police must alert the FBI in order to allow sufficient time for the FBI to intervene to protect the equipment, technology, and information from disclosure and potential compromise.
[32:10.210 --> 32:15.670]  So if you're going to use this in court, you have to give them time to stop you from using this in court.
[32:15.830 --> 32:18.770]  Okay, now we have to build one and make one that's better.
[32:19.450 --> 32:19.850]  Right?
[32:19.990 --> 32:21.790]  I don't doubt we can, but...
[32:21.790 --> 32:26.710]  And also, you know, as other countries have these things too, they will necessarily abide by the same rules.
[32:26.890 --> 32:27.550]  Here's a good one.
[32:27.610 --> 32:28.430]  This one's one of my favorites.
[32:28.630 --> 32:34.150]  The police must be willing to drop cases in order to protect the technology if the FBI orders them to.
[32:34.150 --> 32:43.290]  In addition, the Erie County Sheriff's Office will, at the request of the FBI, seek dismissal of the case in lieu of using or providing or allowing others to use or provide any information concerning Stingrays.
[32:43.610 --> 32:47.510]  So basically, protect the damn toys, and even at the expense of legal process.
[32:47.850 --> 32:49.250]  Now, what are you reading from?
[32:49.670 --> 32:54.550]  I'm reading from documents obtained by the NYCLU that were republished by Vice.com.
[32:54.650 --> 32:58.110]  So that is actually from Erie County, New York, from their police department.
[32:58.130 --> 32:58.910]  From their police department.
[32:58.910 --> 33:01.970]  You can get hold of the full PDF of this whole thing.
[33:01.970 --> 33:04.410]  And, yeah, it's interesting reading.
[33:04.590 --> 33:09.130]  And while we're talking about Baltimore and Erie County, New York, this is happening throughout the country.
[33:09.650 --> 33:11.050]  The Stingrays are everywhere.
[33:11.910 --> 33:14.390]  And I imagine you can even, you can spot them.
[33:14.450 --> 33:19.010]  In fact, we've gotten many emails from people saying, hey, this is a cell phone tower that shouldn't be here.
[33:19.070 --> 33:20.370]  But are they all that big?
[33:20.510 --> 33:21.850]  Are they all detectable?
[33:22.050 --> 33:25.250]  I mean, one can presume they're being used all across the country.
[33:25.250 --> 33:26.630]  And I think that's a correct presumption.
[33:26.750 --> 33:29.370]  But we don't know because of the secrecy around this thing.
[33:29.510 --> 33:29.970]  Oh, absolutely.
[33:30.110 --> 33:30.270]  Yes.
[33:30.550 --> 33:30.910]  Go ahead, Bernie.
[33:31.350 --> 33:40.850]  A version of this technology has leaked recently from actually several years old marketing material from Paris, a wearable model.
[33:40.990 --> 33:43.490]  It's a straps to your body and you can wear a suit over it.
[33:43.590 --> 33:45.630]  So you don't, you would never see this thing.
[33:45.710 --> 33:46.570]  They can be very covert.
[33:46.810 --> 33:48.690]  They can, there's one version that's mounted in a briefcase.
[33:48.690 --> 33:50.870]  There's one version that's mounted in a vehicle.
[33:51.390 --> 33:54.710]  There's one that you've worn on your body under a suit.
[33:55.290 --> 34:15.330]  What concerns me, as we were reading this, not only is it the expense of, if the FBI steps in to talk to the prosecutors and say, listen, if the only way you're going to get a prosecution on this case is to talk about how you use this technology, then we're going to tell the prosecutor to drop the case at the expense of public safety,
[34:15.330 --> 34:19.170]  not just due process, but at the expense of public safety.
[34:19.250 --> 34:26.410]  This could be a dangerous criminal being prosecuted and the FBI is going to step in and let them walk because they want to protect their secrets.
[34:26.690 --> 34:27.890]  I'm concerned about that.
[34:28.030 --> 34:30.490]  I'm waiting for the Maxwell smart version built into a shoe.
[34:30.710 --> 34:32.930]  Can I just say one word at this point?
[34:33.930 --> 34:34.370]  Landlines.
[34:34.650 --> 34:37.250]  Go back to landlines, for God's sake, people.
[34:37.470 --> 34:38.150]  I'm sorry.
[34:38.370 --> 34:39.390]  Where's the payphones?
[34:41.430 --> 34:46.750]  I mean, I know, I know that the show has something of a love for landlines, but...
[34:46.750 --> 34:48.030]  You can hear people on them.
[34:48.150 --> 34:49.770]  You don't get this kind of mass surveillance.
[34:50.090 --> 34:52.150]  If you think that...
[34:52.150 --> 34:59.630]  And I know you're paying more attention than to think this, which is why I'm a little puzzled, but if you think that your landline is immune from surveillance, think again.
[34:59.630 --> 35:01.870]  It's not immune from surveillance, but it's immune from stingrays.
[35:02.410 --> 35:04.050]  Yeah, but so they use a wiretap.
[35:04.410 --> 35:05.030]  Yeah, but...
[35:05.030 --> 35:05.690]  How do you benefit?
[35:06.030 --> 35:07.850]  It's very, very different.
[35:08.030 --> 35:13.610]  It's not as all-encompassing as these stingrays, and it's not as surreptitious.
[35:13.610 --> 35:16.470]  You know, they have to go through courts with wiretaps and things like that.
[35:17.230 --> 35:18.590]  You have been paying attention.
[35:18.730 --> 35:20.730]  That's why I'm so puzzled by when you say this.
[35:20.870 --> 35:22.310]  There's roving wiretaps.
[35:22.390 --> 35:23.150]  They have roving wiretaps.
[35:23.170 --> 35:26.570]  I'm just saying it's not as all-encompassing as this.
[35:26.750 --> 35:31.770]  We could be using this all the time and never get a clue as to the fact that we're using it.
[35:31.890 --> 35:40.590]  But we know for a fact, we have read the documents on the air on this very radio program, that the government has all of everyone's calls in the United States.
[35:40.590 --> 35:44.190]  Yeah, but Stingray is capable of more than just that, right?
[35:44.250 --> 35:45.830]  Yeah, I mean, yeah, it's got some technology.
[35:46.590 --> 35:49.070]  They're using it because it gives them new powers.
[35:49.230 --> 35:54.230]  But to say that you should use a landline and they won't be able to spy on you is very silly.
[35:54.470 --> 35:56.070]  Well, I was half jesting, Mike.
[35:56.250 --> 36:00.830]  But the fact is that landlines do sound better, and I prefer them.
[36:01.150 --> 36:02.250]  I'm just going to leave it at that.
[36:02.330 --> 36:03.550]  We'll have to agree to disagree.
[36:04.410 --> 36:05.270]  We have to move on.
[36:05.430 --> 36:06.370]  We have other stories.
[36:07.010 --> 36:11.270]  Because Edward Snowden had a statue built and installed in Brooklyn.
[36:11.430 --> 36:15.790]  It lasted about five minutes before the cops moved in and took it down.
[36:15.790 --> 36:19.870]  It was put in Fort Greene Park back on April 6th.
[36:19.930 --> 36:24.910]  If you want to get the NYPD to do something quickly, put up a statue of Edward Snowden, and you'll see how fast they move.
[36:25.310 --> 36:31.030]  But now the artists behind the Edward Snowden statue are demanding that the NYPD return it.
[36:31.030 --> 36:40.930]  But the unidentified artist's lawyer, Ron Cooby, revealed yesterday that he's fired off a letter to Commissioner Bill Bratton demanding the NYPD release the statue.
[36:41.290 --> 36:48.950]  Whatever the right of the Parks Department to remove an unauthorized sculpture, that does not translate into the right of the police to indefinitely detain a work of art.
[36:48.950 --> 36:50.910]  The statue itself is not contraband.
[36:51.150 --> 37:01.470]  The artists are planning to submit an application to exhibit the sculpture through the Parks Department's Art in the Parks Initiative, which is a program that displays artwork in city parks throughout the city.
[37:01.570 --> 37:03.570]  It was really well done, and it fit in very nicely.
[37:03.770 --> 37:07.610]  I mean, the thing that really gets me about this story is, like, of course they took down the statue.
[37:07.930 --> 37:09.530]  It's an unauthorized statue.
[37:09.830 --> 37:11.970]  I don't know why they made such a hurry of taking it down.
[37:12.070 --> 37:26.330]  But before they were able to take it down, because I guess you need equipment for that, they covered it up with a tarp so that no one would be exposed to the bust of Edward Snowden for the hour that it took for them to drive there with the screwdriver or whatever they needed to take it away.
[37:26.330 --> 37:28.530]  Well, my children walk through that park, and dogs are walking through that park.
[37:28.530 --> 37:30.570]  It's protecting people and dogs.
[37:30.830 --> 37:31.090]  Yeah.
[37:31.590 --> 37:32.190]  All right.
[37:32.270 --> 37:39.870]  So there's that, and hopefully we'll see that statue someplace else, because it's really well done and worthy, too.
[37:40.690 --> 37:43.990]  We have another crazy story.
[37:44.050 --> 37:48.510]  Speaking of technology in the hands of law enforcement, this is coming out of India.
[37:48.510 --> 37:56.210]  A police in a place, a city called Lucknow, which is about the most inappropriate name I could think of for this city, Lucknow.
[37:56.950 --> 37:59.670]  They have bought themselves a set of drones.
[38:00.170 --> 38:09.230]  And what they intend to do is, according to the Indian Express, we are planning to use these drones to control unruly mobs by showering them with pepper spray.
[38:09.570 --> 38:11.210]  I'm not making this up.
[38:11.370 --> 38:14.730]  That's according to Senior Superintendent Yashavi Yadov.
[38:14.730 --> 38:20.970]  He said the method will be less harsh than a baton charge, and police are hoping it will also be more effective.
[38:21.410 --> 38:27.830]  Drones are already used elsewhere in the state for aerial surveillance, but they haven't been used for crowd control before.
[38:28.330 --> 38:35.050]  Well, this day we all knew it was coming, and it's something that I fear that we're going to get used to.
[38:35.230 --> 38:44.250]  Drones in the sky every time there's a demonstration and dispersing pepper spray when crowds are being dispersed.
[38:45.790 --> 38:49.790]  How do you think people are going to react to this once it actually starts happening?
[38:49.930 --> 38:50.950]  Do you think we'll just accept it?
[38:51.010 --> 38:53.590]  Or do you think maybe we'll do the right thing and start shooting these things down?
[38:53.770 --> 38:56.210]  I think, you know, I'm not a gun-carrying person.
[38:56.750 --> 38:58.430]  I'll use a stone or something.
[38:58.430 --> 39:01.950]  But if a drone attacks me, I think I've got the right to knock it out of the sky.
[39:02.350 --> 39:02.750]  Right?
[39:02.750 --> 39:03.230]  Absolutely.
[39:03.490 --> 39:12.770]  I mean, this is a case in which authorities have decided not to direct their weaponry at specific people they feel are a danger, but just to direct them to the general population of a place.
[39:12.970 --> 39:14.470]  And this is a very dangerous thing.
[39:15.010 --> 39:19.930]  Pepper spray, you know, it's made out of a vegetable, but it's still very dangerous to certain individuals, more so than others.
[39:20.050 --> 39:20.770]  People can have allergies.
[39:20.930 --> 39:21.930]  People can have breathing conditions.
[39:22.290 --> 39:26.930]  And there have been cases where people have been very seriously damaged by pepper spray.
[39:27.310 --> 39:35.610]  But at the end of the day, do you want the authorities to have that kind of power to just direct things at a crowd, at anyone walking past?
[39:35.710 --> 39:45.050]  I mean, most of us in this room have more or less direct experience of what happens when you just get in the wrong place at the wrong time when the police decide that they would like to throw their weight around.
[39:45.570 --> 39:57.710]  And I think this is a very dangerous way for things to go, where it's not only under the control of the authorities themselves to do something so sweeping as this, but it's under the control of technology, a toy that's flying in the air.
[39:57.710 --> 40:07.310]  Yeah, but even with today's system where you have cops with their shields and helmets and you can't even see them, they are still human beings there.
[40:07.430 --> 40:09.170]  And now they won't be human beings.
[40:09.170 --> 40:11.650]  They'll just be machines in the sky attacking you.
[40:12.310 --> 40:13.110]  It's RoboCop.
[40:13.190 --> 40:15.410]  It just scares me that this is where we're going.
[40:15.670 --> 40:17.390]  It doesn't surprise me, but it does scare me.
[40:17.510 --> 40:22.010]  I mean, I'd still rather be pepper sprayed by a drone than, you know, shot by a missile from a drone.
[40:22.190 --> 40:22.970]  So there is that.
[40:23.750 --> 40:24.550]  But Bernie...
[40:24.550 --> 40:26.110]  I don't think that's the choice you're being given, but...
[40:26.110 --> 40:26.390]  Yeah.
[40:27.230 --> 40:30.330]  I think the people on the ground aren't getting any choices at all, precisely.
[40:30.730 --> 40:33.570]  But, Bernie, do you know the name of the manufacturer?
[40:33.710 --> 40:36.910]  There's like one manufacturer for pepper spray, and of course it's in the United States.
[40:37.010 --> 40:41.850]  It's something that unites, you know, repressive regimes all around the world, is that they buy their pepper spray.
[40:42.070 --> 40:43.510]  Do you recall the name of the place?
[40:43.550 --> 40:45.050]  I actually don't, but I know you're...
[40:45.050 --> 40:52.730]  I actually think there's more than one manufacturer of pepper spray, but there's one that specializes in selling it to law enforcement and military agencies.
[40:53.250 --> 41:02.790]  I don't recall, but I just find it particularly revolting, the whole concept of drones flying over a crowd to people, spraying them with pepper spray, which can...
[41:02.790 --> 41:05.830]  You know, people can die from inhaling that stuff.
[41:05.830 --> 41:08.770]  If they have respiratory problems, people have been...
[41:08.770 --> 41:13.690]  Police have killed people with pepper spray just by people inhaling too much of it.
[41:13.690 --> 41:20.990]  Their lungs or their nasal passages or esophagus become inflamed, and they'll suffocate.
[41:21.150 --> 41:22.430]  This is dangerous stuff.
[41:22.570 --> 41:28.710]  It's a form of chemical weapon, Bernie, and it's actually banned in warfare, I think, or at least tear gas, definitely.
[41:29.150 --> 41:42.110]  But these chemical dispersants and the flashbangs and all these things being put onto these vehicles, I mean, what's...
[41:42.710 --> 41:45.210]  The next logical extent is nobody's controlling them.
[41:45.350 --> 41:47.050]  They're just automated or something.
[41:47.350 --> 41:50.110]  I mean, it is rather frightening.
[41:50.350 --> 41:51.310]  I have a question, though.
[41:51.370 --> 41:55.670]  Would people be interested in disrupting the communications, then?
[41:55.750 --> 42:00.530]  Would it be possible to, like, jam the frequencies and have them drop from the sky?
[42:00.690 --> 42:01.610]  I mean, people will find...
[42:01.610 --> 42:03.250]  I'm sorry, that was me raising my hand.
[42:03.250 --> 42:04.530]  Yes, I'd be interested in that.
[42:05.010 --> 42:06.990]  People will find a way around, right?
[42:07.210 --> 42:08.050]  And definitely...
[42:08.050 --> 42:19.170]  To say nothing of, like, rogue swarms of drones coming from the forests and co-opting government drones into joining their clan.
[42:19.550 --> 42:20.930]  Oh, like drone dog sites.
[42:21.190 --> 42:21.530]  Yeah.
[42:22.050 --> 42:27.890]  Yeah, no, I'm imagining this and then turning good drones bad or bad drones good.
[42:27.890 --> 42:28.350]  I don't know.
[42:28.430 --> 42:30.330]  I just see this whole new landscape.
[42:30.650 --> 42:31.310]  Curse you, Red Baron.
[42:31.330 --> 42:32.870]  I don't crash on my head.
[42:33.550 --> 42:37.230]  Well, you know, we're talking about pepper spray, but it's going to be tear gas, too.
[42:37.330 --> 42:38.390]  It'll be bullets someday.
[42:38.770 --> 42:39.750]  What do you mean, someday?
[42:40.230 --> 42:42.670]  I'm talking about in this country, Mike.
[42:42.930 --> 42:45.690]  Obviously, we know what drones are doing in Pakistan.
[42:46.030 --> 42:53.690]  But we're talking about demonstrations on the Brooklyn Bridge in New York being broken up by flying drones, spraying things at crowds.
[42:53.850 --> 42:55.570]  That is a big deal, right?
[42:56.590 --> 42:58.550]  So, yeah, we have to do something about that.
[42:58.650 --> 43:01.610]  We have to be educated and maybe get our own drone army together.
[43:02.570 --> 43:05.470]  All right, we have this other story and we're going to move on to something else.
[43:05.830 --> 43:24.250]  This is something that I think you might have heard about in various places because it's such an insane story about this kid in Florida who hacked his middle school teacher's computer and is being charged with a third-degree felony.
[43:24.250 --> 43:27.870]  He used a teacher's password to log into the network.
[43:28.110 --> 43:33.770]  This is in Pasco County, a place called Newport Ritchie, I believe.
[43:34.430 --> 43:39.710]  He obtained the password simply by watching the teacher type it in.
[43:39.850 --> 43:41.190]  It was easy to remember, too.
[43:41.270 --> 43:42.130]  It was a six-letter name.
[43:42.130 --> 43:44.970]  In fact, it was the name of a teacher in the very same school.
[43:45.330 --> 43:53.090]  Once inside the network, this 14-year-old kid remotely accessed his friend's computer screens and played with the onboard cameras.
[43:53.090 --> 43:57.170]  Now, he got himself in trouble when he tried to place a pornographic image onto a teacher's desktop.
[43:57.490 --> 44:05.710]  Then, after being blocked by the school's firewall, he settled on one depicting two men kissing because he knows what really gets Florida authorities in a tizzy.
[44:06.230 --> 44:16.710]  The teacher told school administrators and then they actually charged him with a felony and that's something that's going to follow him around for the rest of his life.
[44:17.210 --> 44:27.390]  It's just simply incredible to me that, again, we're living in a society where we don't understand what it means to be a kid, to have fun, to play a prank.
[44:27.850 --> 44:32.950]  And we're treating this like an act of terrorism, like an actual crime.
[44:33.310 --> 44:42.050]  And his name is being dragged through the mud and he's going through all this just because he took advantage of bad security and used it to play a prank.
[44:42.270 --> 44:50.370]  I mean, and the newspaper stories are noting that with the access that he had, he could have changed grades or actually caused harm and he didn't.
[44:50.550 --> 44:53.770]  He put a photograph of two men kissing on a teacher's desktop.
[44:54.430 --> 44:57.250]  I mean, yeah, maybe he should be told not to do that again.
[44:57.570 --> 45:06.350]  But to make this, to drag the courts into this seems so out of proportion that I don't have, I don't know what more to say.
[45:06.910 --> 45:12.870]  He was a teen who was locked up in a child delinquent place.
[45:12.870 --> 45:14.270]  He just got out today, apparently.
[45:16.870 --> 45:18.270]  Yeah, it's just...
[45:18.270 --> 45:19.830]  I mean, it's absolutely nuts.
[45:20.350 --> 45:20.930]  I don't...
[45:20.930 --> 45:25.190]  I wish I had more to say beyond it's absolutely nuts, but there's not much more to that.
[45:25.370 --> 45:41.430]  And this case happened last week when we weren't on the air, but since then, it sort of took off online and gained a life of its own because bloggers, journalists, and people all over the place were all collaboratively saying how ridiculous this was and making fun of it and stuff.
[45:41.430 --> 45:50.130]  But the sheriff of Pasco County is basically sticking to his guns on the story, insisting that, no, he did the right thing and, you know, this kid has to be held up as an example.
[45:50.430 --> 45:51.570]  And I think that's...
[45:51.570 --> 45:52.190]  It's scary.
[45:52.270 --> 45:53.990]  He changed a desktop on someone's computer.
[45:54.250 --> 45:54.410]  Yeah.
[45:55.130 --> 46:08.270]  I'm glad that this kid is basically not backing down himself and is talking to the media and saying, this is what I did, not lying about what I did, and just basically being honest about it, honest about his mischief.
[46:08.450 --> 46:09.430]  That's not a bad thing.
[46:10.030 --> 46:12.550]  It's just ridiculous that this kind of thing happens.
[46:12.550 --> 46:23.310]  And I just wonder how many times it happens where we don't get a news story about it, where somebody is actually intimidated for the rest of their lives, has their future ruined, is castigated by their friends and family.
[46:24.110 --> 46:26.770]  We really have to look at situations like this.
[46:26.870 --> 46:28.190]  Kids will be kids.
[46:28.790 --> 46:30.370]  And this is not a crime.
[46:30.770 --> 46:30.890]  Yeah.
[46:31.010 --> 46:39.450]  And for doing something that had no victim, that did not hurt anyone in the end, it's this kid is risking getting a felony on his record at age 14.
[46:39.710 --> 46:40.550]  And that's not cool.
[46:40.670 --> 46:41.450]  No, definitely not.
[46:42.490 --> 46:44.390]  Hey, we have a guest on the phone.
[46:44.550 --> 46:46.370]  Evan Koblenz is joining us.
[46:46.530 --> 46:47.010]  Evan, are you there?
[46:47.570 --> 46:48.010]  I'm here.
[46:48.150 --> 46:48.370]  Hello.
[46:48.590 --> 46:49.410]  I pronounced your name right?
[46:49.890 --> 46:50.510]  Yes, you did.
[46:50.590 --> 46:50.750]  Good.
[46:50.850 --> 46:51.010]  Okay.
[46:51.310 --> 46:51.550]  Awesome.
[46:52.010 --> 46:55.010]  Hey, the Vintage Computer Festival is coming up this weekend.
[46:55.010 --> 46:55.410]  Is it not?
[46:56.250 --> 46:58.190]  Yes, it's the Vintage Computer Festival East.
[46:58.410 --> 47:00.630]  There are other VCS, but we're the largest one.
[47:00.990 --> 47:01.210]  Okay.
[47:01.570 --> 47:04.070]  Tell us where, when, and how people can get there.
[47:04.630 --> 47:04.990]  Sure.
[47:05.150 --> 47:05.730]  Okay, let's see.
[47:05.730 --> 47:16.610]  The show, it's the VCF East 10, and it's April 17, 18, 19, so Friday, Saturday, and Sunday at the InfoAge Science Center in Wall, New Jersey.
[47:17.470 --> 47:24.890]  And mostly, it's a highway and car kind of place, but with enough transfers, you could get there from the city on New Jersey Transit.
[47:26.270 --> 47:26.910]  Enough transfers?
[47:26.930 --> 47:28.590]  How many transfers do you think it would take?
[47:29.150 --> 47:34.150]  It takes about two or three transfers, and you can get a train station to within about two miles in here.
[47:34.550 --> 47:35.210]  Okay, all right.
[47:35.410 --> 47:38.230]  Tell us something about what actually happens at these festivals.
[47:38.710 --> 47:39.190]  Sure.
[47:39.350 --> 47:40.650]  Well, there's multiple things that happen.
[47:40.890 --> 47:43.070]  The first day of Friday is technical classes.
[47:43.730 --> 47:45.630]  So, last year, we had eight classes.
[47:45.730 --> 47:47.170]  This year, we had 16 classes.
[47:47.930 --> 48:04.590]  Everything from how to use prom burners to program and assembly to, you know, doing computer music and all sorts of hardware and software restoration from vintage computers of the 60s, 70s, and 80s.
[48:06.410 --> 48:09.790]  Saturday and Sunday, there's a keynote each morning from a VIP.
[48:10.150 --> 48:11.370]  I guess we'll get to that.
[48:11.590 --> 48:19.470]  And then the rest of the day is mostly an exhibition, sort of like an antique car show, except there's a car show where you can't drive anything, and that's no fun.
[48:20.270 --> 48:24.810]  We also have consignment sales and vendors and tours of our computer museum here and that sort of thing.
[48:25.430 --> 48:31.870]  And then the keynotes this year, on Sunday morning, the keynote is Bob Frankston who invented VisiCalc.
[48:32.410 --> 48:37.210]  And Saturday morning, the keynote is K, as in K&R.
[48:37.710 --> 48:40.330]  I don't think I have to explain to your audience who that is.
[48:40.650 --> 48:41.270]  Maybe you should.
[48:42.010 --> 48:42.570]  Maybe I should?
[48:42.810 --> 48:43.030]  Okay.
[48:43.450 --> 48:51.450]  Brian Kernighan, the co-inventor of the Unix, who also was right there with Dennis Richie and Ken Thompson at Bell Labs when they invented C.
[48:52.210 --> 48:52.690]  Wow.
[48:53.490 --> 48:55.010]  Okay, I got a couple of questions for them.
[48:55.110 --> 48:55.490]  Good, okay.
[48:55.710 --> 48:56.570]  I'm glad they'll be there.
[48:57.470 --> 48:58.370]  Or he'll be there.
[49:00.290 --> 49:02.830]  Yeah, I mean, I think it's no exaggeration to say this is...
[49:02.830 --> 49:03.090]  I'm sorry.
[49:03.730 --> 49:14.630]  I think it's no exaggeration to say for people who aren't familiar with him that computers and the internet, if they existed without him, would not be the same, would not...
[49:14.630 --> 49:18.910]  would have taken, you know, years later for these concepts to be invented by someone else.
[49:18.910 --> 49:21.730]  it's really important to early work.
[49:22.990 --> 49:36.330]  And I gotta say, I've been attending the VCF East for on and off for quite a few years and Evan and his team put together a really amazing festival, Finnish computer festival.
[49:36.490 --> 49:41.990]  There's an amazing exhibit that calling it like the computer equivalent of a car show doesn't do its justice.
[49:42.410 --> 49:47.710]  You can walk around and spend hours seeing these elaborate exhibits that people just...
[49:48.450 --> 49:49.330]  It's their...
[49:49.330 --> 49:50.930]  It's labors of love.
[49:51.090 --> 50:04.890]  People come and set up these amazing homages to this one particular old computer or obscure computer that you might have had when you were a kid or even heard about but never even got to touch.
[50:05.050 --> 50:07.030]  And you can actually sit down and use these things.
[50:07.570 --> 50:15.810]  And it's really an amazing experience getting your hands on a lot of vintage computers and doing things with them and learning about them.
[50:16.030 --> 50:17.110]  It's quite an experience.
[50:17.650 --> 50:21.690]  Now, Evan, you mentioned that there are going to be computers from the 1960s there.
[50:21.790 --> 50:22.890]  What kind of computer would that be?
[50:23.510 --> 50:25.710]  Well, there's even going to be computers from the 50s there.
[50:26.710 --> 50:27.850]  So let me explain.
[50:29.010 --> 50:38.190]  Most of us who are collectors focus on the mid-60s to mid-80s before which, you know, it's hard to get a computer much older than that.
[50:38.750 --> 50:40.030]  And after which, they're boring.
[50:42.110 --> 50:50.610]  One of the highlights of this year's show, one of the new things we're doing, is we're having something called the PDP, the PDP Pavilion.
[50:51.670 --> 50:59.610]  For those who don't know, the Digital Equipment Corp deck, PDP, eight mini-computer series came out in 1965.
[50:59.790 --> 51:01.970]  So this is its 50th anniversary of this year.
[51:01.970 --> 51:12.870]  And there's going to be, you know, some original, maybe seven or eight PDP computers at the show and including at least one original 1965 model all up and running.
[51:14.250 --> 51:22.750]  And then there's always an assortment of mini-computers from HP, IBM, Burroughs, Zwang, Prime, you know, those kind of companies.
[51:23.690 --> 51:26.710]  There's always a whole contingent of homebrew era systems.
[51:26.990 --> 51:33.210]  So out there, MSI, Apple One, OSI, Kim, Sim, that's, you know, Sol, that kind of thing.
[51:33.510 --> 51:41.590]  And then there's always a smorgasbord of 8-bit microcomputers, Atari, Commodore, Apple II, TRS-80, TI, you know, et cetera.
[51:44.050 --> 51:49.690]  However, our computer museum is right down the hall from where the event is located.
[51:51.110 --> 51:55.630]  And when I say our, I'm talking about our user group, March, the Midlandic retrocompeting hobbyist.
[51:55.890 --> 51:57.970]  Anyone who's been the hope knows us by now.
[51:59.490 --> 52:01.950]  And, actually, tomorrow,
[52:05.140 --> 52:05.580]  Thursday?
[52:10.080 --> 52:10.520]  Hello?
[52:11.160 --> 52:13.560]  I think that's your cell phone technology there, Mike.
[52:14.180 --> 52:15.660]  Too bad he's not on the landline.
[52:16.480 --> 52:17.480]  Evan, can you hear us?
[52:18.060 --> 52:20.700]  Yeah, why don't you interpret what he's saying there in the distance?
[52:20.780 --> 52:24.720]  There's a computer history museum there at this location.
[52:25.820 --> 52:32.720]  And it has an amazing collection of, from like IBM mini computers, which are actually great big things.
[52:33.020 --> 52:36.980]  They even have an Apollo, a computer from one of the Apollo missions there.
[52:37.740 --> 52:40.300]  And you can actually look at this thing.
[52:40.300 --> 52:41.200]  It's right in front of you.
[52:41.320 --> 52:52.940]  One of these computers that was used in one of the Apollo missions that, you know, your cell phone is probably a thousand times more powerful than this great big thing that was sat on a, that was in an Apollo
[52:56.080 --> 52:56.960]  lunar mission.
[52:57.240 --> 52:59.520]  So it's really amazing stuff there.
[52:59.560 --> 53:01.040]  I hope Evan calls back in.
[53:01.120 --> 53:07.140]  But if he doesn't, I can provide some information about where this thing is.
[53:07.260 --> 53:08.560]  Yeah, we are working on getting Evan back.
[53:08.560 --> 53:09.800]  but until then, why don't you go on?
[53:10.340 --> 53:16.360]  The Vintage Computer Festival East is held at the InfoAge Science Center in Wall Township, New Jersey.
[53:17.140 --> 53:20.440]  It's on 2201 Marconi Road in Wall, New Jersey.
[53:20.640 --> 53:25.780]  You can go to the website vintage.org to get some information about where this is.
[53:25.960 --> 53:27.040]  There's maps and diagrams.
[53:27.320 --> 53:28.300]  It's really worth going to.
[53:28.360 --> 53:29.220]  I've been going several years.
[53:29.220 --> 53:30.120]  I'm going to be going on Saturday.
[53:30.840 --> 53:32.140]  It's a lot of fun.
[53:32.280 --> 53:33.480]  Wait, Bernie, you're going to be there Saturday?
[53:34.200 --> 53:35.320]  We're going to be there Saturday.
[53:35.580 --> 53:38.440]  The 2600 van, Kyle and I are going to drive down.
[53:38.580 --> 53:39.800]  Wow, I didn't know you were going to be there.
[53:39.980 --> 53:40.780]  This is exciting.
[53:41.620 --> 53:42.840]  Wow, we should all go.
[53:43.240 --> 53:44.360]  Bernie's one of our regulars.
[53:44.480 --> 53:45.240]  Evan's back.
[53:45.740 --> 53:46.580]  I'm back.
[53:46.680 --> 53:47.320]  Sorry about that.
[53:47.540 --> 53:49.800]  I just want to add one really cool new thing.
[53:50.760 --> 53:56.220]  So tomorrow, Thursday, our museum here is getting a really, really incredible new donation.
[53:57.740 --> 53:59.920]  There was a company called George A.
[54:00.080 --> 54:00.960]  Philbrick Associates.
[54:01.120 --> 54:07.280]  They basically invented the op-amp and they were a leader in the 50s and 60s of analog computers.
[54:08.720 --> 54:16.400]  They made an analog computer custom-built for the MIT Mechanical Engineering Lab in 1958.
[54:16.900 --> 54:20.300]  It was used at MIT from 58 to 1970.
[54:20.300 --> 54:22.620]  It's six racks and seven feet tall.
[54:23.300 --> 54:38.560]  And when it was decommissioned in 1970, a student, I guess an alumni, acquired it, kept it with them over the years, moved to Ohio, kept it with them in Ohio, and a few months ago decided, you know what, he's an old man now, it's tiny, you're with this computer.
[54:39.060 --> 54:41.980]  So he called the MIT Museum and said, do you want this?
[54:42.100 --> 54:44.600]  And they said, well, try those guys in New Jersey.
[54:45.020 --> 54:46.600]  And it's being delivered tomorrow.
[54:47.140 --> 54:47.560]  Wow.
[54:47.560 --> 54:48.440]  Wow, that's awesome.
[54:48.680 --> 54:49.500]  It's ours now.
[54:50.660 --> 54:51.080]  Awesome.
[54:51.080 --> 54:57.560]  And it's going to be the second oldest computer we have after our 1956 Bendix vacuum tube computer.
[54:59.440 --> 55:00.040]  Fascinating.
[55:00.340 --> 55:03.360]  Evan, let me just ask you a philosophical question here.
[55:03.460 --> 55:07.700]  Now, obviously, computers have gotten a lot faster, a lot cheaper, a lot smaller.
[55:08.060 --> 55:15.380]  What do you think it is that over the decades we've lost since the days of these ancient computers?
[55:17.780 --> 55:19.800]  Well, we're getting some of it back now.
[55:20.080 --> 55:23.560]  I'd say, you know, control and character.
[55:24.680 --> 55:28.200]  And by control, I'm sure, you know, hackers understand what I mean by that, right?
[55:29.400 --> 55:32.980]  You know, computer, you know, young people today are taught, don't open the box.
[55:33.140 --> 55:33.540]  It's dangerous.
[55:33.700 --> 55:34.400]  Leave it to a pro.
[55:35.160 --> 55:40.360]  And, you know, I grew up on an Apple II and, you know, you got the schematics with it.
[55:40.860 --> 55:43.280]  You know, and that was Apple of all companies.
[55:43.560 --> 55:44.480]  Look at them now, right?
[55:46.260 --> 55:58.460]  In terms of character, I mean, you know, when I was a kid in the 80s and my dad collected cars of the 50s as his hobby and he taught me that those cars had chrome and fins and white walls and, you know, they had a character.
[55:59.220 --> 56:05.660]  And cars, when I grew up in the 80s and 90s, pretty much all looked and worked the same and they got boring.
[56:06.860 --> 56:08.740]  So I'd say control and character.
[56:08.960 --> 56:12.060]  You know, the reasons why we collect basically there's three reasons.
[56:12.500 --> 56:18.740]  Some of us just do it for nostalgia to get what we had in our youth or, you know, whether our youth was our childhood or in college.
[56:19.380 --> 56:24.560]  Some of us do it because we couldn't get back then what we wanted and now as adults we can.
[56:25.160 --> 56:29.160]  And some of us are just accumulators who just never got ready to stop in the first place.
[56:29.540 --> 56:30.320]  I'm familiar with them.
[56:31.180 --> 56:32.560]  Well, that's really awesome.
[56:32.660 --> 56:35.120]  Evan, tell us what kind of people come to these things?
[56:36.440 --> 56:39.800]  Everybody from hardcore hackers to families and children.
[56:40.020 --> 56:43.320]  You know, we try to be open to all and have a little something for everybody.
[56:44.880 --> 57:00.520]  And, you know, we're stoked that you guys are going to be there and maybe we're still working on the Z100 that you asked us to work on and I hope but maybe we'll take one of our Z100s that's in the working state and let you borrow it for the weekend.
[57:00.800 --> 57:02.240]  Yeah, we have some work we have to do.
[57:03.120 --> 57:08.560]  to get to it since the 1980s but it's nice of you to offer and we look forward to seeing that one.
[57:09.060 --> 57:19.480]  Evan, I want to mention too that our listeners who've been to one of the Hope conferences that your group, the Mid-Atlantic Retrocomputing Hobbyists, sets up an amazing exhibit at each Hope conference with retrocomputers.
[57:19.580 --> 57:28.140]  So if you come to Hope and have seen this amazing setup of retrocomputers, you haven't seen anything until you come to the Finnish Computer Festival and get a computer history museum there.
[57:28.300 --> 57:33.420]  There's also a radio and TV museum that's part of the whole Infant Wage Science Center which is really worth checking out.
[57:33.580 --> 57:35.240]  Like a lot of vintage radios and TVs.
[57:35.680 --> 57:37.000]  It's really amazing stuff.
[57:37.280 --> 57:47.940]  Yeah, we have a hackerspace here, a shipwreck museum, the radio and TV museum, a lot of Martoni era exhibits, electronic warfare, World War II military communications exhibits.
[57:48.560 --> 57:51.460]  And I don't know their hours for this coming weekend but now we also
[58:01.940 --> 58:03.080]  models of these machines.
[58:03.260 --> 58:11.680]  I think it's going to completely just be a really exciting event but really open our eyes to a whole new world.
[58:12.020 --> 58:16.160]  Every kind of computer stuff I never dreamed I'd ever see.
[58:16.300 --> 58:17.100]  So I'm really excited.
[58:17.180 --> 58:18.380]  We're looking forward to seeing that.
[58:18.500 --> 58:21.080]  Evan, we're out of time but just give us the website really quickly.
[58:22.300 --> 58:25.360]  Vintage.org slash 2015 slash East.
[58:25.540 --> 58:25.980]  Okay.
[58:26.140 --> 58:27.180]  And hashtag DCF East.
[58:27.300 --> 58:30.600]  And all the information for this weekend's Vintage Computer Festival is there.
[58:30.880 --> 58:31.640]  You got it.
[58:31.800 --> 58:32.480]  Alright, thanks Evan.
[58:32.620 --> 58:33.420]  We'll see you this weekend.
[58:33.760 --> 58:35.980]  Thanks everybody else for taking part.
[58:36.220 --> 58:43.660]  And you can write to us O-T-H at 2600.com Hey, it was 14 years ago today that we lost Joey Ramone.
[58:43.820 --> 58:48.900]  Here's a song as tribute that actually has the address of where we have our meetings now.
[58:49.720 --> 58:50.640]  53rd and 3rd.
[59:04.890 --> 59:29.670]  No more of your fairy stories Cause I got my horse with walrus 15, 7, 3rd Standing on the street 15, 7, 3rd I'm trying to turn and kick 15, 7, 3rd You're the one they never pick 15, 7, 3rd Try to make a fail Say If you think you can Well Come on man Oh,
[59:29.750 --> 01:00:08.970]  what's the green parade Me and me They think No more of your Fairy stories Cause I got my O-T-H War 15, 7, 3rd Standing on the street 15, 7, 3rd I'm trying to turn and kick 15, 7, 3rd You're the one they never pick 15, 7, 3rd Try to make a fail Say Then you took out my razor blade Then I'll see the stars The base Now the cops are obsolete But I've proved that I'm no disease 15,
[01:00:09.150 --> 01:00:22.070]  9, 9 Standing on the street 15, 9, 9 I'm trying to turn and kick 15, 9, 9 You're the one they never pick 15, 9, 9 Try to make a fail Say
[01:00:38.250 --> 01:00:43.630]  15, 9, 9 15, 9, 9
[01:01:01.870 --> 01:01:15.730]  This is Phil Donahue And you're listening to WBAI New York 99.5