[00:00.000 --> 00:03.320]  Hi, this is Cyndi Lauper, and you're listening to WBAI.
[00:03.460 --> 00:08.180]  Really got a hold on me.
[00:08.640 --> 00:09.920]  Public radio.
[00:10.300 --> 00:11.460]  Gotta love it.
[00:16.200 --> 00:18.300]  Yes, loving it is mandatory here.
[00:18.540 --> 00:20.120]  We require that of our listeners.
[00:20.120 --> 00:22.140]  This is WBAI New York.
[00:22.340 --> 00:25.440]  It's 7 o'clock time for Off the Hook.
[00:30.700 --> 00:35.180]  The telephone keeps ringing, so I ripped it off the wall.
[00:36.200 --> 00:38.120]  I cut myself while shaving.
[00:38.660 --> 00:40.680]  Now I can't make a call.
[00:46.330 --> 00:48.930]  One diddly bump, but the best is back from worst.
[00:49.610 --> 00:51.410]  I hope that's understood.
[00:51.650 --> 00:52.450]  One diddly bump!
[01:42.700 --> 01:44.180]  And a very good evening to everybody.
[01:44.300 --> 01:45.300]  Welcome to Off the Hook.
[01:45.400 --> 01:48.180]  Emmanuel Goldstein here with you, joined tonight by Mike.
[01:48.440 --> 01:48.720]  Hi.
[01:48.980 --> 01:49.360]  Kyle.
[01:49.940 --> 01:50.380]  Present.
[01:50.700 --> 01:51.440]  Bernie S.
[01:51.900 --> 01:53.100]  Greetings from Philadelphia.
[01:53.540 --> 01:54.980]  And special guest Red Hack.
[01:55.260 --> 01:55.520]  Hello.
[01:55.780 --> 01:56.360]  Welcome back.
[01:56.580 --> 01:56.860]  Thank you.
[01:57.900 --> 01:59.060]  From the West Coast.
[01:59.260 --> 01:59.460]  Yep.
[01:59.580 --> 02:00.120]  From California.
[02:00.220 --> 02:00.880]  Sunny California.
[02:02.180 --> 02:02.820]  I'm sorry.
[02:03.080 --> 02:04.460]  I wasn't even thinking.
[02:04.920 --> 02:05.460]  Here we are.
[02:05.540 --> 02:07.000]  We all have glasses of water here.
[02:07.160 --> 02:08.860]  And that's a sore topic for you guys, isn't it?
[02:09.500 --> 02:10.400]  Let's put the water...
[02:10.400 --> 02:12.540]  We're not trying to rub it in your face or anything like that.
[02:12.820 --> 02:15.640]  I mean, people are selling their children for water over there.
[02:15.720 --> 02:16.720]  It's an awful situation.
[02:16.980 --> 02:20.860]  Well, you know, if you want to help, you could buy less produce and less bottled water.
[02:21.480 --> 02:23.080]  We won't buy anything from now on.
[02:23.100 --> 02:23.480]  How's that?
[02:23.600 --> 02:23.940]  All right.
[02:23.940 --> 02:24.580]  That works fine.
[02:24.740 --> 02:28.940]  I hear the Reverend Billy, the Church of Stop Shopping, was in here earlier, so you'd appreciate that.
[02:28.940 --> 02:29.920]  Yeah, they cleaned out the place.
[02:30.100 --> 02:30.880]  There's nothing left here.
[02:30.940 --> 02:31.720]  They ransacked it.
[02:32.800 --> 02:33.640]  That's how it works.
[02:34.240 --> 02:38.360]  Okay, so we were... or some of us, anyway.
[02:38.760 --> 02:42.300]  We're at the Vintage Computer Festival this past weekend.
[02:43.300 --> 02:43.980]  I was there.
[02:44.040 --> 02:44.460]  Kyle was there.
[02:44.520 --> 02:45.100]  Bernie was there.
[02:45.340 --> 02:46.040]  What did you guys think?
[02:46.060 --> 02:46.980]  Yeah, we had a great time.
[02:47.120 --> 02:48.880]  It was quite the festival.
[02:48.880 --> 02:50.320]  First for me.
[02:50.480 --> 02:51.280]  First for you, Kyle, right?
[02:51.580 --> 02:56.320]  Yeah, all the way down in Wall, New Jersey at the InfoAge Science Center.
[02:56.500 --> 02:56.820]  Yes.
[02:56.980 --> 03:19.940]  And, you know, it's incredible because they have a facility there all the time with this exhibit of just amazing stuff, like old computers from many decades ago, some of which are up and running, but it's just incredible to walk through these large rooms and see it all being given the respect that it deserves.
[03:19.940 --> 03:24.720]  And I just... I thought the whole place was really pretty impressive.
[03:24.780 --> 03:26.040]  We met so many cool people, too.
[03:26.860 --> 03:29.660]  Yeah, all the computers are working, and that's the amazing part.
[03:29.880 --> 03:37.500]  And they continue to get contributions from different, like, research institutions and schools and really interesting places.
[03:38.160 --> 03:57.060]  They're actually referred to because they do such a fantastic job storing stuff, and they've got such an incredible space to actually keep the stuff away from the elements and hang on to it, so it's actually becoming an installation instead of falling into further disrepair.
[03:57.240 --> 03:59.760]  So it's a great resource to be able to collect this stuff.
[03:59.960 --> 04:00.640]  I have a question.
[04:01.300 --> 04:05.360]  You said that the computers there were working, you know, at the beginning of the day.
[04:05.540 --> 04:08.920]  They let all these people in come play with them, including a bunch of hackers.
[04:09.100 --> 04:09.920]  Are they still working?
[04:10.660 --> 04:11.920]  They're probably working better.
[04:11.920 --> 04:14.760]  If it wasn't for the hackers, these machines wouldn't be working in the first place.
[04:15.020 --> 04:16.640]  They probably wouldn't have been built in the first place.
[04:16.660 --> 04:17.500]  But it goes both ways.
[04:18.920 --> 04:22.100]  Oh, well, there may have been some mishaps along the way, but it...
[04:23.240 --> 04:24.120]  To my...
[04:24.120 --> 04:30.740]  To what I saw, I think definitely they were doing much more improving of the equipment than dismantling.
[04:31.500 --> 04:34.960]  But they have a really interesting co-op space there.
[04:35.040 --> 04:40.760]  There's a radio museum, and it used to be a research place for communication, military communications.
[04:40.760 --> 04:45.380]  It's had various different purposes over the years.
[04:45.700 --> 04:53.040]  And they do a really fantastic job of taking this, what once was a military barrack, I believe, or an installation.
[04:53.040 --> 04:56.360]  And they've divided it up into these different museums and shared it.
[04:56.480 --> 04:58.500]  And there's even a small hackerspace there.
[04:58.660 --> 05:03.780]  There's all kinds of interesting relics.
[05:03.780 --> 05:06.000]  And, boy, we enjoyed it.
[05:06.140 --> 05:07.840]  And they have a massive satellite dish, too.
[05:07.940 --> 05:08.880]  Bernie, did you happen to see that?
[05:09.320 --> 05:11.500]  Yes, that's the Diana dish.
[05:11.500 --> 05:12.400]  It was the first...
[05:12.400 --> 05:18.520]  It was a dish that was first used to bounce a signal off the moon, which is pretty amazing.
[05:18.700 --> 05:20.880]  I have radio operators do this routinely now.
[05:20.980 --> 05:24.000]  There's the whole EME community, Earth and Earth, that do this.
[05:24.100 --> 05:26.400]  But that was the first dish used to bounce a signal off the moon.
[05:26.400 --> 05:35.600]  If anybody's else interested in what else is at the InfoAge Science Center at the former Camp Evans, you can get to that through the vintage computer website, vintage.org.
[05:35.740 --> 05:39.780]  And the group that puts that together is the Mid-Atlantic Retro Computing Hobbyists.
[05:40.180 --> 05:44.100]  And there's a link to them to March on that website.
[05:44.100 --> 05:47.620]  They're also the folks that set up that awesome vintage computer exhibit at each Hope Conference.
[05:47.900 --> 05:55.200]  So I want to thank Evan Koblenz and all his fellow Martians, as he calls them, for doing all that for us.
[05:55.720 --> 06:00.600]  Yeah, they put on a fantastic show at Hope, and it was about time.
[06:00.600 --> 06:10.700]  I think we were due to pay them a visit and see how they do it, and check out their space and celebrate old electronics and equipment.
[06:10.880 --> 06:16.300]  We actually met a couple of people there that we hadn't seen, I hadn't seen in 25 years, if you can believe that.
[06:16.880 --> 06:20.240]  It's just, this is where the common interest is.
[06:20.380 --> 06:22.460]  Vintage computers, old machines.
[06:22.460 --> 06:26.560]  Now, Redhack, before the show, you were telling us about a similar type of exhibit out in California.
[06:26.840 --> 06:29.260]  Yeah, there's a computer history museum in Mountain View.
[06:30.160 --> 06:31.960]  It's actually pretty extensive.
[06:32.240 --> 06:35.640]  It extends all the way back to, you know, the analog computer.
[06:35.740 --> 06:38.880]  Actually, before it, the exhibit starts with abacuses.
[06:39.920 --> 06:50.940]  And it really goes through, you know, you walk through it, and it covers all the history from all the way back then through analog computers, all the kind of the military computers, different kinds of memory and storage.
[06:50.940 --> 06:52.400]  It's, it's really incredible.
[06:52.720 --> 06:56.980]  So, if anyone's out in California, in the Bay Area, it's, I definitely highly recommend it.
[06:57.060 --> 07:01.540]  You could spend hours there and still be finding new interesting things.
[07:02.100 --> 07:02.860]  That's amazing.
[07:03.020 --> 07:03.160]  Yeah.
[07:03.380 --> 07:05.460]  Real manual counting machines.
[07:05.660 --> 07:06.180]  Imagine that.
[07:06.260 --> 07:06.940]  Imagine that.
[07:07.080 --> 07:11.260]  And they have a, they have a Babbage differential engine, I believe.
[07:11.440 --> 07:13.740]  So, a mechanical computer that actually works.
[07:13.740 --> 07:15.940]  It has even a printer attached to it.
[07:16.060 --> 07:18.780]  And amazing to think that that was designed in the 1800s.
[07:19.480 --> 07:23.640]  And finally, you know, a century later, somebody built one.
[07:24.400 --> 07:26.280]  And, you know, you can see it in action there.
[07:26.400 --> 07:28.480]  So, yeah, it's a really cool, cool place also.
[07:29.160 --> 07:29.520]  Okay.
[07:29.660 --> 07:32.460]  Well, that's, that's our list of cool places for the week.
[07:33.080 --> 07:35.660]  Every week, we'll try to get out and find, find more cool places.
[07:35.840 --> 07:36.980]  Because there are so many things out there.
[07:36.980 --> 07:44.200]  And, of course, if you have any interesting locations or exhibits you'd like us to check out, OTH at 2600.com is our email address.
[07:44.460 --> 07:49.360]  Hey, we've gotten this particular bit of what some may call disturbing news.
[07:49.500 --> 07:52.140]  We've gotten it about 25 times now, I think, at our email address.
[07:52.740 --> 07:55.600]  Apparently, in Norway, they're turning off FM radio.
[07:56.140 --> 08:01.160]  Yeah, the Ministry of Culture has announced a national FM switch-off.
[08:01.340 --> 08:02.860]  Sounds like a protest, doesn't it?
[08:02.860 --> 08:07.980]  But, no, they're really, they're going ahead with this, to complete their transition to digital radio.
[08:08.320 --> 08:17.440]  Now, Norway is making this historical move into a new radio era, being the first country in the world to decide upon an analog switch-off for all major radio channels.
[08:17.520 --> 08:19.060]  Now, that's an important distinction there.
[08:19.220 --> 08:22.040]  It's not, they're not turning off all of FM.
[08:22.460 --> 08:26.260]  Major radio channels, national broadcasters, government broadcasters are doing this.
[08:26.600 --> 08:30.100]  But private broadcasters will still be on FM if they choose to do so.
[08:30.100 --> 08:41.340]  But it's an unusual situation because Norway has something like over 99% penetration with what's known as DAB, a form of digital radio.
[08:41.760 --> 08:46.220]  Now, listeners will be provided with more radio channels through that, greater diversity in content.
[08:46.520 --> 08:48.200]  It's not the death of radio.
[08:48.200 --> 08:52.680]  It's basically a change to a different type of standard.
[08:52.980 --> 08:57.280]  The DAB coverage in Norway now exceeds FM coverage.
[08:57.580 --> 08:58.460]  And again, that's unusual.
[08:58.460 --> 09:00.560]  It's not the case in most countries.
[09:01.340 --> 09:07.460]  DAB provides Norway with 22 national channels, as opposed to the five channels now transmitting on FM.
[09:08.260 --> 09:11.920]  Now, this is going to be happening January 11th, 2017.
[09:12.220 --> 09:16.000]  That's when the switch-off actually begins to happen.
[09:16.160 --> 09:25.780]  And it's important to define terms here because we're talking about DAB, which is their digital FM or digital radio standard.
[09:26.360 --> 09:29.060]  It's not the same standard that we have here.
[09:29.060 --> 09:30.880]  Of course, we have to do things differently.
[09:30.880 --> 09:34.420]  And I think in this particular case, we have to do things wrong.
[09:34.860 --> 09:39.660]  Bernie, I believe you would agree with this, that what we use in this country just isn't the same, right?
[09:39.660 --> 09:47.880]  Yeah, we have digital FM radio here, but it's some proprietary thing from a company called Ibiquity Corporation.
[09:48.220 --> 09:51.280]  The technical name for it is IBAC, in-band, on-channel.
[09:51.540 --> 09:54.720]  But they market it as something called HD radio.
[09:54.720 --> 09:57.320]  But it's not high definition in any way, shape, or form.
[09:57.320 --> 10:03.580]  It's actually lower fidelity than analog FM radio, believe it or not, because they have split it up into several different channels.
[10:03.580 --> 10:15.860]  And the bottom line is radio stations have to pay a fortune in licensing fees every year to Ibiquity Corporation just to broadcast using their so-called HD radio.
[10:15.940 --> 10:18.940]  And the transmitter manufacturers in the U.S.
[10:18.980 --> 10:21.620]  have to pay all these fat licensing fees.
[10:21.620 --> 10:23.960]  And the adoption rate is really pathetic.
[10:26.140 --> 10:31.760]  Ibiquity is trying to push these radios, this special chip, into a lot of new cars being manufactured.
[10:31.960 --> 10:33.440]  But I know very...
[10:33.440 --> 10:38.940]  I have a lot of radio friends, and very few of them have HD radio receivers in their homes.
[10:39.160 --> 10:45.200]  And the adoption rate is probably about, I don't know, 10 to 20% of radios in the U.S.
[10:45.300 --> 10:46.060]  are capable of that.
[10:46.240 --> 10:46.560]  It's that.
[10:46.700 --> 10:47.120]  How about you?
[10:47.180 --> 10:47.980]  Do you have an HD radio?
[10:48.260 --> 10:49.660]  I actually have one in my car.
[10:49.660 --> 10:50.840]  I have a relatively new car.
[10:50.960 --> 10:54.160]  And I've noticed that occasionally, if I'm listening to FM, it switches.
[10:54.460 --> 10:55.180]  It'll say HD.
[10:55.300 --> 10:56.900]  And it does sound better to me.
[10:56.980 --> 10:58.520]  I mean, maybe it's just my perception.
[10:58.880 --> 11:00.900]  Sounds better than FM or sounds better than AM?
[11:01.920 --> 11:03.180]  So here's the thing, right?
[11:03.260 --> 11:07.260]  So what I tend to see is it'll kind of cut in and out this HD radio.
[11:07.540 --> 11:09.940]  And so when it cuts in, it does sound better.
[11:10.880 --> 11:14.860]  But obviously, if it's cutting in and out, it's not working very well.
[11:14.880 --> 11:15.340]  So you don't get it all the time.
[11:15.400 --> 11:18.000]  But when you do get it, it's better than the other servers that you get all.
[11:18.000 --> 11:19.240]  Which doesn't mean it's actually better.
[11:19.680 --> 11:20.180]  Right, right.
[11:20.380 --> 11:26.480]  Well, I mean, digital television, I consider it to be a disaster because, you know, if you live in a city, you can no longer pick it up.
[11:26.660 --> 11:26.780]  Right.
[11:27.400 --> 11:28.960]  It just comes in bits and pieces.
[11:29.100 --> 11:32.560]  We've also seen this disconnect between what happens in Europe and here before.
[11:32.720 --> 11:34.680]  I mean, the same thing happened with digital TV, right?
[11:34.680 --> 11:38.080]  They have DVB in Europe and we have a totally different standard in the U.S.
[11:38.080 --> 11:44.860]  And I don't know if either is better, you know, which is better, but it's not surprising that we are doing something different.
[11:45.020 --> 11:47.380]  From what I've read, the DAB is an open standard.
[11:47.580 --> 11:47.720]  Right.
[11:47.900 --> 11:49.580]  And the HD is proprietary.
[11:49.580 --> 11:51.480]  So right away, that tells me which one is better.
[11:51.780 --> 11:52.140]  Right.
[11:52.940 --> 11:55.780]  But, you know, I don't see this as the death of radio.
[11:55.940 --> 12:03.820]  I see this as an expansion of radio because it's going into other formats and expanding, making more content available.
[12:04.000 --> 12:05.680]  I think they're doing it the right way over there.
[12:06.860 --> 12:10.800]  But it's obviously different than the standard FM broadcasting.
[12:11.020 --> 12:12.300]  I agree with you.
[12:12.700 --> 12:24.040]  Contingent upon us getting the full story, if they're actually going to open it up to more voices and to more diverse voices instead of just like a bunch of big companies, then that sounds good for the medium.
[12:24.400 --> 12:28.860]  If this is a smokescreen and we're just going to get more of the same, then, well, obviously.
[12:29.060 --> 12:31.380]  Well, in this country, perhaps we would get more of the same.
[12:31.540 --> 12:35.320]  I don't know what Norway is planning, how that's going to work out.
[12:35.320 --> 12:47.580]  But just seeing the difference in number of stations of the government and national broadcasters, I imagine that same proportion is going to hold true for community stations as well.
[12:47.720 --> 12:48.940]  So I guess we'll see.
[12:49.080 --> 12:52.420]  But I don't think anyone's here saying that digital is necessarily worse.
[12:52.760 --> 12:54.240]  I mean, it kind of depends how you do it.
[12:54.300 --> 13:01.760]  There are definitely advantages to digital in that it can be, you know, you can have less loss and all that, as long as you're actually getting the signal properly.
[13:02.000 --> 13:03.860]  Implemented properly, it can be good.
[13:03.860 --> 13:13.800]  Because you can fit more data into the same spectrum, because rather than having, you know, one frequency being held captive for one station, you can, you know, merge things as you do.
[13:13.940 --> 13:22.160]  But when you can do that, companies tend to try and cram as much in as possible, resulting in degradation of service, whether it's broadcasting or phone calls or whatnot.
[13:23.120 --> 13:25.860]  So yeah, implemented correctly, this could be a good thing.
[13:26.120 --> 13:31.000]  And of course, there's a big, a big but attached to that, especially the way things are here.
[13:31.140 --> 13:33.420]  And I don't know if we're ever going to get it right.
[13:33.540 --> 13:39.860]  If we're going to use this, this HD nonsense, instead of DAB, I doubt we'll ever have the same capabilities.
[13:40.080 --> 13:45.140]  And here in this country, also, we have XM, which is a satellite broadcasting, which is not broadcasting.
[13:45.140 --> 13:51.040]  It's, I mean, it's a satellite signal, but people think of XM as, oh yeah, AM, FM, XM.
[13:51.120 --> 13:53.600]  No, it's not a bandwidth thing, it's a company.
[13:53.940 --> 13:59.880]  And every single channel that you listen to on that particular service identifies itself as SiriusXM.
[14:00.000 --> 14:02.140]  It kind of doesn't sound like radio.
[14:02.320 --> 14:05.160]  There are some good services on there, but it's not the same thing.
[14:05.240 --> 14:06.300]  People need to realize that.
[14:06.660 --> 14:07.540]  And you have to pay for it.
[14:07.620 --> 14:08.140]  Right, you pay for it.
[14:08.180 --> 14:08.980]  And you have to pay for it.
[14:09.040 --> 14:09.760]  But there are no ads.
[14:10.060 --> 14:11.320]  Oh, that's not true at all.
[14:11.440 --> 14:12.340]  There's plenty of ads.
[14:12.960 --> 14:17.660]  Some channels don't have ads, but, you know, the only channel that's worthwhile in there is CBC, I think.
[14:17.780 --> 14:19.260]  But that's my opinion.
[14:19.500 --> 14:23.540]  Well, they advertise for other channels, and they advertise for the service itself.
[14:23.660 --> 14:23.860]  Sure.
[14:23.960 --> 14:24.500]  A lot.
[14:24.700 --> 14:25.620]  Yes, constantly.
[14:25.780 --> 14:30.780]  No matter what language you're listening to as well, you just hear constantly, SiriusXM, you know, this particular channel.
[14:31.040 --> 14:33.460]  And that's not, it's a company.
[14:33.700 --> 14:34.760]  Just remember, it's a company.
[14:35.540 --> 14:46.140]  Okay, we got a piece of mail that I think some of us might have some passioned feelings about encouraging us to contact our cell phone companies.
[14:46.240 --> 14:49.920]  Now, this actually comes from a PBS station known as KQED.
[14:50.060 --> 14:51.920]  Actually, I think that's one of yours, isn't it, Fred Hackett?
[14:52.020 --> 14:52.640]  KQED, is it?
[14:52.840 --> 14:53.120]  Bay Area?
[14:53.300 --> 14:53.500]  Okay.
[14:53.900 --> 14:58.080]  Well, they're going around telling people that your cell phone has an FM receiver.
[14:58.320 --> 14:58.740]  Now, listen to this.
[14:58.780 --> 15:01.120]  Did you know that your smartphone is also an FM radio?
[15:01.520 --> 15:02.040]  That's right.
[15:02.160 --> 15:08.280]  Today's smartphones have a built-in FM chip that gives them the ability to receive radio signals in your area.
[15:08.280 --> 15:16.480]  This means you should have easy access to the entertainment you love and information you need from music to local news to sports and more.
[15:16.880 --> 15:18.760]  The concept is similar to your car radio.
[15:18.880 --> 15:22.480]  If you can tune to a station in your car, you can tune to it on your smartphone.
[15:22.880 --> 15:30.740]  The reason you can't currently access the smartphone feature is because wireless carriers are opting not to turn on the FM chip for U.S.
[15:30.860 --> 15:31.120]  customers.
[15:31.320 --> 15:33.920]  This isn't something you can activate on your individual phone.
[15:34.240 --> 15:37.420]  It's a decision that needs to be made by your wireless carrier.
[15:37.420 --> 15:42.440]  Public broadcasting stations are asking wireless carriers to activate the already installed FM chip.
[15:42.600 --> 15:44.340]  And this is where we need your help.
[15:44.420 --> 15:55.640]  And they basically go on to ask people to call various phone companies, AT&T, Verizon, T-Mobile, Sprint, and say words to the effect of, Hi, I'm a current blank customer.
[15:55.880 --> 16:05.260]  Please unlock the FM chip in all smartphones you sell so I can get important emergency information when data networks are unavailable and reduce the amount of data I use each month.
[16:05.260 --> 16:06.000]  Thank you.
[16:06.540 --> 16:09.080]  They are encouraging people to make these phone calls.
[16:09.260 --> 16:11.300]  Now, Bernie, I believe you had a response to this.
[16:11.720 --> 16:19.280]  Yeah, I wrote back to Barry, the listener who emailed us this, and I sadly informed him that that message you just read is nonsense.
[16:19.520 --> 16:22.980]  So whoever wrote it apparently is some reporter for...
[16:23.540 --> 16:24.140]  Who was that with?
[16:24.800 --> 16:27.080]  With a PBS station called KQED.
[16:27.080 --> 16:31.160]  I don't know if it's a report or a campaign on their part.
[16:31.160 --> 16:36.120]  But whoever wrote it is really sadly ignorant of the relevant facts.
[16:36.260 --> 16:39.700]  The vast majority of mobile phones sold here in the U.S.
[16:39.960 --> 16:45.480]  do not have the necessary hardware to receive FM radio broadcasts.
[16:45.580 --> 16:48.060]  I mean, a few do, like my Blackberry Z30.
[16:48.060 --> 16:53.180]  It's one of very few phones that have an FM receiver built into them, which is one of the reasons I got it.
[16:53.260 --> 17:12.020]  But for the past couple, three years, the NAB, the National Association of Broadcasters, which is like a big lobbying arm for commercial broadcasters and non-commercial, if you want to, you know, like PBS or NPR, they've been lobbying Congress so far unsuccessfully to require the FCC to mandate that all mobile phones sold in the U.S.
[17:12.280 --> 17:14.840]  be able to receive analog FM broadcasts.
[17:15.280 --> 17:26.500]  And their stated rationale is that these FM-capable phones could then be used to receive an EAS, emergency alert system, like the former emergency broadcast system broadcasts.
[17:26.500 --> 17:34.400]  Even after mobile phone networks go down, you know, like when there's a serious disaster or maybe the government decides to shut off the phones, they'll be able to at least listen to FM radio.
[17:34.960 --> 17:48.340]  But I really think that the NAB's efforts in this are pretty self-serving, trying to get their members' advertising into mobile phone listeners.
[17:48.960 --> 17:51.200]  And therefore, they can increase their revenues.
[17:51.200 --> 17:56.140]  So I suspect this false message that we received was forwarded to us.
[17:56.280 --> 17:59.960]  It has its roots in some sort of NAB guerrilla propaganda campaign.
[18:00.240 --> 18:01.460]  Well, Marty, I'd like to talk about that a little bit.
[18:01.540 --> 18:05.260]  But first, I'd like to draw attention to the sound that some of our listeners might be hearing right now.
[18:05.680 --> 18:10.500]  And that's the sound of my phone I discovered while we were talking.
[18:11.620 --> 18:12.280]  Hear that?
[18:12.600 --> 18:16.940]  That is the radio on my phone, which is an HTC One.
[18:18.860 --> 18:20.580]  And there's a radio on it.
[18:20.680 --> 18:21.120]  I just found it.
[18:21.220 --> 18:22.600]  FM radio is what it's called.
[18:22.960 --> 18:29.580]  In fact, there's a list that I was able to find online of various phone models.
[18:29.740 --> 18:34.620]  Samsung Galaxy, Ace, Ace 4, Note 1, Note 2, S1, S2, all the way up to S5.
[18:34.620 --> 18:41.020]  You have HTC Desire C, HTC One, Sony Xperia, LG Optimus, the list goes on and on.
[18:41.400 --> 18:45.200]  There seem to be a lot of phones out there that do have, indeed, this particular feature.
[18:45.440 --> 18:46.840]  And you have one, I have one.
[18:47.020 --> 18:48.640]  Kyle, I believe you have one as well.
[18:48.720 --> 18:50.080]  You have a BlackBerry?
[18:50.180 --> 18:53.940]  Yeah, I think I'm in the camp with Bernie there with the BlackBerry.
[18:54.160 --> 18:57.260]  You guys in the far side of the studio, do you have this particular feature?
[18:57.440 --> 18:58.480]  I haven't had time to check.
[18:58.580 --> 18:59.500]  You haven't had time.
[18:59.620 --> 18:59.820]  Okay.
[18:59.960 --> 19:01.520]  I'm not on the mailing list anymore.
[19:01.980 --> 19:03.420]  Oh, sorry to hear that.
[19:03.420 --> 19:04.500]  I do have this feature.
[19:04.680 --> 19:05.960]  I have a Sony phone.
[19:06.140 --> 19:10.120]  So, Bernie, the vast majority of people, at least part of this show, seem to already have this.
[19:10.340 --> 19:10.700]  I don't...
[19:11.260 --> 19:15.840]  Kyle's BlackBerry Z10 does not have the FM radio hardware necessary.
[19:15.840 --> 19:17.780]  It would be nice if it did, but it does not.
[19:17.960 --> 19:26.860]  You know, I would say that probably 90% of the phones in the market, maybe not by market share, but by, you know, just percentage of the models out there, do not have an FM radio chip in them.
[19:27.000 --> 19:29.740]  I wish they did, but I'm not sure it should be required by the FCC.
[19:29.980 --> 19:30.400]  What do you think?
[19:30.600 --> 19:33.120]  Bernie, that's the most useless metric you could possibly use.
[19:33.120 --> 19:33.360]  Okay.
[19:33.640 --> 19:33.800]  All right.
[19:33.880 --> 19:34.740]  Well, look, iPhones.
[19:35.360 --> 19:35.720]  iPhones.
[19:35.900 --> 19:36.960]  iPhones do not have it.
[19:37.040 --> 19:37.820]  That much I do know.
[19:38.120 --> 19:39.620]  iPhones don't have it, but they're not really phones.
[19:39.860 --> 19:40.280]  I'm sorry.
[19:40.620 --> 19:42.620]  I just want to get Mac people angry at me.
[19:42.760 --> 19:48.780]  And a lot of people should not confuse what we're talking about with being able to receive radio stations on their phone through the internet.
[19:49.180 --> 19:52.220]  You know, there's different apps like, you know, TuneIn Radio.
[19:52.480 --> 19:53.280]  Yeah, TuneIn is great.
[19:53.300 --> 19:58.880]  I was listening to Queens County Community Radio in Nova Scotia before, and that's, you know, that's a lot of fun to be able to do that.
[19:59.320 --> 20:04.660]  But the thing, the advantage about this, if you do have this feature, is that you're not using any data.
[20:04.800 --> 20:07.540]  It's not dependent on you having a cell phone service.
[20:07.680 --> 20:12.180]  You actually have a radio in your pocket or in your car that you can tune into.
[20:12.540 --> 20:14.060]  It's a good service.
[20:14.180 --> 20:19.360]  It seems like it's something they, if they don't install on all phones, it seems like something they can install on all phones.
[20:19.360 --> 20:27.540]  I mean, I would guess that, you know, obviously I can't get into the mind of the carriers, but a lot of these carriers have music services that they sell to their customers.
[20:27.540 --> 20:36.460]  So one might think that FM radio would be in direct competition with that, and hence there's a reason to perhaps not enable it from their perspective.
[20:36.700 --> 20:54.720]  I mean, I would agree with the call to action to a point, to the point that carriers are selling hardware with FM chips and disabling that in software, which is probably something greater than zero and considerably less than the 100% that they claim, like,
[20:54.860 --> 20:56.900]  yeah, they shouldn't do that if they want my opinion.
[20:57.260 --> 21:00.380]  But it would be cool to get some, like, actual numbers here.
[21:00.700 --> 21:01.160]  Yeah.
[21:01.260 --> 21:05.160]  And listeners, please see if your phone has this particular feature.
[21:05.300 --> 21:10.160]  And again, as stated, there are companies can turn off that particular app.
[21:10.160 --> 21:15.400]  It is an app, but it's an app that leads to a piece of hardware attached to your phone, namely a tuner.
[21:16.180 --> 21:19.680]  And it's wrong that a company can just elect to turn that off.
[21:19.820 --> 21:22.720]  I don't know what the percentage is of phones that actually have this feature.
[21:22.920 --> 21:27.480]  I know the phone I had before this had an FM radio as well, but that wasn't a very smart phone.
[21:27.620 --> 21:32.220]  So maybe the smarter phones are not being shipped with this particular feature.
[21:32.400 --> 21:33.000]  But it would be cool.
[21:33.220 --> 21:35.620]  Bernie, you said this is something nefarious by the NAB.
[21:35.780 --> 21:36.540]  You want to elaborate?
[21:36.540 --> 21:51.920]  Well, like I said, the NAB for a couple, three years now has been really pushing, maybe even more than three years, has been pushing Congress, lobbying Congress, to force the FCC, to compel the FCC to make this a requirement for all U.S.
[21:51.960 --> 21:55.660]  cell phone manufacturers that like to get FCC approved.
[21:56.560 --> 22:02.380]  You know, the new phone manufacturers have to get FCC approval to release the phone on the market.
[22:03.280 --> 22:14.260]  And again, the National Association of Broadcasters' rationale was that then people could receive the emergency action, emergency alert system, EAS broadcasts, in the event the cell phone network goes down.
[22:14.380 --> 22:16.200]  That's fine, and that's a good goal.
[22:16.360 --> 22:18.020]  But I think they don't really care about that.
[22:18.040 --> 22:25.740]  I think what NAB really cares about is getting its commercial broadcasters' advertisement into the ears of cell phone owners.
[22:26.000 --> 22:28.800]  That's what they really care about, to increase advertising revenue.
[22:28.800 --> 22:34.880]  Who are increasingly using services that are streamed and provided over their data, right?
[22:35.400 --> 22:37.020]  Well, NAB doesn't care about that.
[22:37.260 --> 22:41.860]  NAB is not a mobile phone company.
[22:41.860 --> 22:47.680]  They care insofar as it's taking ears away from their possible medium, which is FM.
[22:47.680 --> 22:47.840]  Well, right, yeah.
[22:47.840 --> 22:48.680]  They don't want the competition.
[22:49.000 --> 22:52.040]  But, you know, so this is a competitive action on NAB's part.
[22:52.180 --> 22:54.240]  I would love everybody to have an FM radio in their pocket.
[22:54.240 --> 23:08.600]  I think that'd be a great thing, and especially since they could even tune community, you know, non-profit, listener-supported FM radio stations, not just the one you're listening to right now, but community stations.
[23:09.200 --> 23:13.060]  But, you know, until all phones have that, it's not going to happen.
[23:13.820 --> 23:14.220]  Okay.
[23:14.340 --> 23:14.920]  Well, interesting.
[23:15.060 --> 23:17.260]  I'm sure our listeners have more to say about that.
[23:17.260 --> 23:20.380]  Please write to us, OTH at 2600.com.
[23:20.560 --> 23:27.960]  We had a lot of feedback to a few of our stories last week, one of which was the ominous stingray.
[23:28.180 --> 23:37.160]  That's the fake cell phone towers that are being operated by various entities, governments, police departments, you name it.
[23:37.160 --> 23:46.700]  But there's supposedly a machine out there that is able to detect these fake cellular transmitters.
[23:47.420 --> 23:48.380]  There's a...
[23:48.380 --> 23:52.420]  Actually, it was presented at the RSA conference fairly recently.
[23:52.960 --> 23:58.400]  Network Penetration Testing and Monitoring Tool, company Pony Express.
[23:58.400 --> 23:59.400]  That's really clever.
[23:59.660 --> 24:00.760]  P-W-N-I-E Express.
[24:02.680 --> 24:16.520]  Demonstrated its newest creation, a sensor that detects rogue cellular network transceivers, including stingray devices, and other hardware used by law enforcement to surreptitiously monitor and track cell phones and users.
[24:17.340 --> 24:23.120]  I don't know, Bernie, you think this represents hope that we can actually point the finger, at least, if we can't stop these things?
[24:23.120 --> 24:38.620]  I would love for there to be a product on the market that people could purchase or build themselves, if it's an open-source hardware software project, to detect these surveillance devices used by FBI and other law enforcement agencies, so-called stingrays,
[24:38.820 --> 24:42.760]  or MC catchers is really what their more technical name is.
[24:43.200 --> 24:51.680]  But, you know, the price point really is probably going to be over $1,000 to build your own at this point, let alone buy one off the market.
[24:51.680 --> 25:14.360]  But it would be nice to see another opportunity to have an app that, if your phone's API, phone's operating system's API supports it, an app could be written for certain smartphones that might be able to detect suspicious activity that could indicate you're being attacked through a man in the middle attack through one of these MC catchers operated by the FBI or police.
[25:14.360 --> 25:24.820]  But I would imagine the FBI would take a dim view of such apps and might even force Apple or Google to not allow these apps to run on their phones.
[25:25.060 --> 25:26.860]  Well, you know, they can try that sort of thing.
[25:27.040 --> 25:27.860]  They can try that sort of tactic.
[25:28.040 --> 25:33.500]  But, you know, freedom of inquiry and the hacker spirit is always going to prevail in the end.
[25:33.720 --> 25:37.420]  In fact, there is one case, actually, that I have a lot of hope in.
[25:38.100 --> 25:42.520]  In St. Louis, in fact, there was, these suspects were part of a violent robbery spree.
[25:43.160 --> 25:47.640]  And, and part of their defense, they were caught through one of these stingray devices.
[25:47.820 --> 25:53.620]  And part of their defense is to ask the government how exactly they were caught, how this works.
[25:53.780 --> 25:55.460]  So they're going to have to...
[25:55.460 --> 25:58.180]  Wait a minute, I didn't read the story carefully enough.
[25:58.440 --> 26:00.240]  They, they dropped all the charges?
[26:00.440 --> 26:04.280]  They dropped all the charges so now they don't have to answer any questions about the stingray.
[26:05.100 --> 26:06.000]  Is this true?
[26:06.240 --> 26:07.560]  Oh my God, look at that.
[26:07.680 --> 26:12.560]  Prosecutors insist the charges dismissal was unrelated to the impending inquiry.
[26:13.180 --> 26:16.560]  But a public defender who intended to ask some of the questions believes otherwise.
[26:17.600 --> 26:20.260]  So, okay, a violent robbery spree.
[26:20.420 --> 26:25.160]  They're dropping the charges rather than give out information on how the stingray worked.
[26:25.860 --> 26:32.140]  Well, folks, we're just going to have to do more robberies and more violence to get a case that sticks so that we can ask questions.
[26:32.140 --> 26:33.100]  No, don't do that.
[26:33.400 --> 26:35.520]  But eventually, the truth will come out.
[26:36.120 --> 26:43.060]  So there's no easy way to differentiate these devices from a normal carrier's transceiver?
[26:43.160 --> 26:46.480]  Well, definitely not for the average member of the public.
[26:46.760 --> 26:46.940]  Right.
[26:47.040 --> 26:51.420]  For people with some technical expertise, it's possible.
[26:51.500 --> 26:57.640]  But so then, I mean, I assume that there's some authentication that happens out there must be with the cellular network.
[26:57.640 --> 27:02.400]  So then, is this done in cooperation or is it just exploiting a weakness in my question?
[27:02.520 --> 27:13.720]  I asked a similar question last week in the way I think Bernie described it or we could maybe say once more is that it both spoofs the phone as though it is a base station.
[27:13.980 --> 27:16.780]  And then it spoofs the tower as though it's your phone.
[27:16.780 --> 27:17.380]  I see.
[27:17.500 --> 27:18.480]  So it's a man in the middle.
[27:18.760 --> 27:19.200]  Exactly.
[27:19.920 --> 27:20.340]  Yeah.
[27:20.340 --> 27:25.640]  But every time there's a man in the middle attack or potential attack, I get warned about it online.
[27:25.640 --> 27:29.780]  So we could certainly have the same technology at work for something like this.
[27:29.960 --> 27:31.680]  Well, it depends on the level of cooperation.
[27:31.900 --> 27:45.240]  I mean, even online, if you have a certificate authority that's been compromised, we've seen cases where, you know, rogue certificates that are generated by a compromised authority can be used to perform a man in the middle attack without anybody being wiser.
[27:45.420 --> 27:45.920]  Go ahead, Bernie.
[27:46.420 --> 28:04.940]  Emmanuel, there's one thing people could be alert to, and that is if you're in a good signal area where you have a good 4G signal, whether it's LTE or whatever, if it mysteriously drops to 3G and you know you should have a good 4G signal, that could be a tip-off,
[28:04.940 --> 28:10.780]  an indicator that an MC catcher or stingray is being used against you in a man in the middle attack.
[28:11.200 --> 28:18.320]  Because as far as I know these things, that's one of their hallmarks, is they're so far only operating in 3G mode or 2G mode.
[28:18.500 --> 28:27.160]  So if you fall back to 3G mode inexplicably in an area where you shouldn't be in 3G, it might be a red flag that it could be happening to you.
[28:27.160 --> 28:30.020]  Well, for now, but you know they're going to upgrade to 4G at some point.
[28:30.020 --> 28:30.880]  Everybody does.
[28:31.160 --> 28:31.620]  Sure they will.
[28:32.560 --> 28:38.140]  I mean, also, Bernie, it could just be an indication of a poor network, which every carrier I've ever used has.
[28:38.860 --> 28:39.720]  Absolutely, absolutely.
[28:40.020 --> 28:41.960]  So just, you know, don't...
[28:41.960 --> 28:42.760]  Don't freak out.
[28:43.040 --> 28:43.180]  Yeah.
[28:43.340 --> 28:46.200]  But it could, I'm saying it possibly could be a red flag.
[28:46.280 --> 28:49.980]  And there's just no way for the normal person to distinguish between those two cases.
[28:50.260 --> 28:51.880]  So that's a concern.
[28:52.000 --> 29:06.520]  I mean, the reason why this is possible is that cell phone networks are designed, that the phone has to, like, prove its identity to the network so that you can't clone phones and they can verify that you've paid your bill and all this stuff.
[29:06.820 --> 29:12.700]  But the protocols were not designed such that the networks have to prove their identity to the phones.
[29:12.740 --> 29:14.980]  The phones are just trusting of any data they receive.
[29:15.620 --> 29:18.140]  And that is why this sort of thing is possible.
[29:18.280 --> 29:22.160]  It's just a threat that was, unfortunately, not thought of at the time.
[29:23.360 --> 29:23.940]  All right.
[29:23.940 --> 29:32.960]  Well, again, we'll keep an eye on this and hopefully somebody at the next Hope Conference will have a Stingray device that we can play with and figure out ways to...
[29:32.960 --> 29:33.860]  Wait, no, hopefully not.
[29:34.120 --> 29:35.520]  No, our own would be cool.
[29:35.780 --> 29:35.840]  Oh, okay.
[29:35.840 --> 29:40.520]  Imagine everybody at the conference has to go through our Stingray and can see for themselves exactly how it works.
[29:40.520 --> 29:43.120]  I can't imagine that the FCC is going to let us do that.
[29:43.280 --> 29:44.160]  Well, that's the thing.
[29:44.640 --> 29:48.540]  Barney, you raised this question, actually, that how do they get around the FCC?
[29:48.780 --> 29:49.960]  And I think you answered your own question.
[29:50.040 --> 29:50.300]  Did you not?
[29:50.980 --> 29:52.500]  Yeah, I've been wondering this for a while.
[29:52.500 --> 29:59.920]  How does Harris Corporation get away with making such a device that is a radio transmitter?
[30:00.080 --> 30:07.600]  All radio transmitters sold in the United States must have an FCC-type acceptance to sell the device.
[30:07.800 --> 30:21.060]  And operators of radio transmitters, such as these NC catchers or Stingrays, namely FBI and local police and other law enforcement agencies, they would have to have a license, too, or some of authority from the FCC to do this.
[30:21.260 --> 30:39.300]  So, apparently, what we learned recently from this article that we read, and someone actually asked us about this at the Avengers Computer Festival last weekend, too, and I've been thinking the same thing, is what the FCC did is they required the FBI to be the overseeing agency over the,
[30:39.940 --> 30:44.720]  you know, to prevent interference from these devices to innocent cell phone users.
[30:45.020 --> 30:52.360]  So, here we have the FBI doing the FCC's job in enforcing the rules of the radio spectrum.
[30:52.360 --> 30:54.580]  And I think that's a really disturbing trend.
[30:54.740 --> 31:10.220]  I think the FCC has unclean hands in this, and I would love to see the licensing authority that the FCC has granted to the FBI and giving them the authority to be the enforcers of how the radio spectrum is used.
[31:10.300 --> 31:14.860]  So, I'm hoping these documents come to light, because it's going to make the FCC look pretty bad.
[31:15.120 --> 31:20.620]  Yeah, maybe they can impose some retroactive fines for the poor handling of the spectrum.
[31:20.620 --> 31:21.880]  Wait, who are they going to find, themselves?
[31:22.440 --> 31:23.200]  The FBI.
[31:23.360 --> 31:23.740]  The FBI.
[31:23.920 --> 31:25.060]  This will get interesting.
[31:25.320 --> 31:25.620]  Good luck.
[31:26.140 --> 31:26.480]  Wow.
[31:26.820 --> 31:27.040]  Go ahead.
[31:27.320 --> 31:32.200]  Bernie, under this regime, the FBI is monitoring itself.
[31:32.660 --> 31:33.040]  Yeah.
[31:33.540 --> 31:36.960]  I mean, we don't have to tell our listeners about how well that works.
[31:39.360 --> 31:39.980]  All right.
[31:40.060 --> 31:42.820]  Well, moving on now to something a little less ridiculous.
[31:43.340 --> 31:45.420]  Or no, actually, it's about as ridiculous.
[31:46.020 --> 31:46.420]  The U.S.
[31:46.520 --> 31:53.480]  government is loosening its lips about a secret database that prevents tens of thousands of people from boarding airplanes to and from the United States.
[31:53.860 --> 32:05.180]  Under pressure from the courts, the government this week has announced new processes that will allow those of you individuals who have been placed on the so-called no-fly list to inquire about their status.
[32:05.340 --> 32:08.180]  I'm not really sure what to get out of inquiring, but okay.
[32:08.380 --> 32:11.220]  You'll find out that you are indeed on a no-fly list, I suppose.
[32:11.740 --> 32:14.380]  Under the newly revised procedures, a U.S.
[32:14.500 --> 32:16.160]  person, a U.S.
[32:16.300 --> 32:29.560]  person, not anyone else, who purchases a ticket, is denied boarding at the airport, subsequently applies for redress through DHS, DHS TRIP, which is the Department of Homeland Security Traveler Redress Inquiry Program.
[32:29.660 --> 32:30.140]  See what they did there?
[32:30.200 --> 32:31.300]  They spelled out TRIP with that.
[32:31.380 --> 32:31.920]  That's pretty clever.
[32:33.120 --> 32:47.540]  You ask them about the denial of boarding, and they tell you if you're on the no-fly list after a redress review, you'll receive a letter basically telling you your status, your status as to whether or not you're on the no-fly list.
[32:48.240 --> 32:54.860]  Prior inquiries made by people who suspect that they were on the list were met with secrecy as the government refused to deny or confirm inclusion.
[32:55.500 --> 33:01.740]  That issue has become more pressing since President Obama took office with the database ballooning to 50,000 entries.
[33:02.720 --> 33:05.560]  So is this good news or is this bad news?
[33:05.560 --> 33:07.860]  It's a smokescreen.
[33:08.800 --> 33:24.460]  This is the result of a lawsuit that the department is facing, and they have modified their procedures in an attempt to get the lawsuit dismissed, but without ever actually making it really, like, possible to meaningfully contest your placement on this list.
[33:24.520 --> 33:38.720]  They still won't provide the evidence that in most cases is flawed, or in many cases is flawed, that put people on the list, you can just sort of, like, be like, well, maybe this is why you think I should be on the list, and that's not true.
[33:38.800 --> 33:42.280]  But if it's genuinely untrue, you probably don't know why you're on there in the first place.
[33:42.400 --> 33:45.560]  If I understand correctly, though, you can only do this if you have been denied boarding.
[33:45.940 --> 33:46.800]  That's true as well.
[33:46.960 --> 33:59.480]  And you already could know you were... the government would never say you're on the no-fly list, but you could already have a very reasonable guess that you're on the no-fly list because you showed up to the airport and they wouldn't let you on the plane for no other good reason.
[34:00.020 --> 34:00.380]  It's...
[34:00.380 --> 34:03.980]  I don't understand why you need to get confirmation from them that that's the reason why.
[34:03.980 --> 34:06.360]  If they do that, yeah, you can pretty much assume something's up.
[34:06.360 --> 34:06.540]  Right.
[34:06.620 --> 34:18.440]  So now they will officially tell you that this is the reason why your very reasonable guess is correct, they'll tell you, but they still won't give you the meaningful redress that you need in this case, and that is a shame.
[34:18.440 --> 34:21.420]  So I can't just go and ask, hey, am I on the no-fly list?
[34:21.440 --> 34:31.040]  I have to actually go down to the airport, be denied entry, you know, embarrassed in front of all these people, and then send them a letter, and hopefully they'll tell me, yes, indeed, you are in fact banned.
[34:31.220 --> 34:33.220]  But you already know you're not banned because you've flown recently.
[34:33.220 --> 34:34.260]  Well, I don't know that now.
[34:34.460 --> 34:35.920]  Maybe it changed today, you know?
[34:36.080 --> 34:36.380]  All right.
[34:36.580 --> 34:41.840]  There's a guy who has found himself banned in the last week because he said this on Twitter.
[34:59.380 --> 35:11.740]  That was a Twitter message sent by Chris Roberts, a cybersecurity expert, founder of a security intelligence company that identifies security breaches before hackers can exploit them.
[35:11.900 --> 35:20.280]  He was detained for four hours, deprived of his IT equipment, after he sent that particular tweet on United Airlines Boeing 737-800.
[35:20.760 --> 35:28.260]  The tweet, which was supposed to be a funny, harmless joke, did not amuse the guys from the Federal Bureau of Investigation, nor the United Airlines staff.
[35:28.340 --> 35:32.780]  In fact, since then, he has been denied boarding on all United Airlines flights.
[35:32.900 --> 35:39.500]  And it's interesting, too, because at the same time, United is saying that there is no security issue with their system.
[35:39.620 --> 35:43.140]  You cannot hack into the control of the airplane.
[35:43.280 --> 35:44.340]  We talked about this last week.
[35:45.000 --> 35:52.040]  But at the same time, they are banning this guy from flying on their planes because, well, I guess he makes them uneasy.
[35:52.220 --> 35:53.800]  Does this seem logical?
[35:55.300 --> 35:57.700]  Is it just United or is it all airlines?
[35:58.500 --> 36:00.660]  It's just... well, United is the one that banned it from there.
[36:00.960 --> 36:01.880]  I don't know if anybody else...
[36:01.880 --> 36:03.480]  He flew Southwest, if that's what you're asking.
[36:03.600 --> 36:05.260]  He flew Southwest to get where he needed to go.
[36:05.440 --> 36:07.320]  So he's not... probably not on the no-fly list.
[36:07.340 --> 36:12.980]  He's not on the no-fly... he's on their no-fly list, but... and he might very well graduate to a no-fly list of the United States.
[36:13.020 --> 36:13.480]  I don't know.
[36:14.100 --> 36:19.860]  It reminds me of a system administrator saying, my system is airtight.
[36:20.160 --> 36:21.840]  You know, you can't do anything.
[36:21.960 --> 36:41.480]  But the nearest hint that some kid is able to do something that undermines his authority a little bit will result in severe action and and basically very insecure type of... insecure feelings from the admin, who apparently is not as in control as he thinks he is.
[36:41.780 --> 36:42.280]  I don't know.
[36:42.660 --> 36:43.760]  Bernie, what do you make of this?
[36:44.240 --> 36:48.400]  I think this is a really mean-spirited move by what airline... if it was United Airlines, I don't know.
[36:49.580 --> 36:50.900]  He posted a joke.
[36:51.300 --> 36:53.620]  He didn't... he didn't... he didn't... I don't know.
[36:53.740 --> 36:54.860]  He didn't do anything dangerous.
[36:55.200 --> 36:56.420]  And he doesn't pose a danger.
[36:57.220 --> 36:58.100]  This was a joke.
[36:58.300 --> 37:00.700]  It wasn't a threat of any kind to anybody.
[37:01.300 --> 37:03.720]  Maybe somebody could have misinterpreted it as a threat, but it wasn't a threat.
[37:03.720 --> 37:07.020]  Well, he did give very specific identifiers there.
[37:07.260 --> 37:08.640]  E-I-C-A-S.
[37:08.740 --> 37:09.500]  I don't even know what that is.
[37:09.660 --> 37:11.580]  He threw around some acronyms.
[37:11.580 --> 37:12.800]  He says, he's on a flight.
[37:12.860 --> 37:14.240]  He sees this, this, and this, and this.
[37:14.320 --> 37:14.920]  That's what he said.
[37:15.380 --> 37:22.320]  He didn't say, you are all... he didn't... he didn't say he was... he was doing anything to interfere with such systems.
[37:22.380 --> 37:25.600]  And in fact, he hadn't done anything to even access those systems.
[37:26.200 --> 37:29.600]  But they're still banning him because he made the airline look bad.
[37:29.880 --> 37:31.720]  Well, he made the airline nervous.
[37:31.880 --> 37:36.540]  I mean, he said things like, pass oxygen on, which I guess means passenger oxygen is on.
[37:37.040 --> 37:38.100]  Why wouldn't it be on?
[37:39.120 --> 37:40.240]  The things that fall down.
[37:40.400 --> 37:40.840]  Okay, got it.
[37:41.340 --> 37:43.920]  And ICE-SATCOM.
[37:44.200 --> 37:52.000]  You know, I'm playing somewhat devil's advocate here, but I can sort of understand how they can say, yeah, we have a secure system.
[37:52.000 --> 37:57.940]  But if someone's going to start passing around these acronyms and saying very specific type things, it's going to make us uneasy.
[37:58.120 --> 38:01.940]  And if we're uneasy, we have the right to say, we don't want you flying with us.
[38:02.040 --> 38:03.200]  I can sort of see that.
[38:03.420 --> 38:05.160]  Does anybody else disagree?
[38:05.480 --> 38:12.380]  I mean, so the question is, yeah, I mean, first of all, the airlines are insanely paranoid about everything.
[38:12.640 --> 38:15.480]  And they'll certainly ban people for much less than this.
[38:15.660 --> 38:23.980]  But is there, you know, are these supposed to be companies that can do whatever they want?
[38:24.080 --> 38:30.340]  Or are they supposed to be common carriers that have the responsibility to take people where they want to go in exchange for money?
[38:30.640 --> 38:34.180]  And, you know, government, huge government subsidies flow into the airline industry.
[38:34.400 --> 38:37.500]  Should we let the airlines then do whatever they want as a result?
[38:37.560 --> 38:39.820]  Or should there be some semblance of sense?
[38:40.300 --> 38:41.800]  That, to me, is the question.
[38:44.140 --> 38:45.960]  And no one else has an opinion on this?
[38:48.140 --> 38:48.540]  Kyle?
[38:49.300 --> 38:58.840]  I think he, yeah, I think on a certain level, he was sort of definitely bragging and sort of a doofus for saying this.
[38:58.980 --> 39:02.920]  And I kind of am with Bernie in that I think there was a bit of an overreaction.
[39:02.920 --> 39:04.460]  And he should be able to say certain things.
[39:04.580 --> 39:05.740]  But a threat?
[39:05.920 --> 39:12.980]  I mean, he did post at a certain time, he was in a certain place, and he was talking about specific systems.
[39:13.180 --> 39:20.920]  So as far as whether it is or is not a threat, I think that's debatable, depending on how you see it.
[39:21.000 --> 39:22.920]  I mean, I think that you could argue both ways.
[39:23.080 --> 39:33.100]  But he didn't really say in the text of this tweet, he was planning to do some imminent thing on this flight.
[39:33.100 --> 39:36.060]  He was just merely bragging at his skills.
[39:36.060 --> 39:41.860]  And I think it's a really doofus-y thing to say, like, just because you're some expert to start bragging.
[39:41.940 --> 39:49.620]  Because then, really, what you're starting to do is you're publicly, you're making this a target more so than it has to be.
[39:49.680 --> 39:58.420]  And I think you kind of start this escalation of like, well, let's see what nerd can out-talk the next guy who's on a flight on this system.
[39:58.560 --> 40:00.920]  And then you start making this a little game.
[40:01.020 --> 40:04.420]  And I think gamifying this when you have hundreds of other people on a plane.
[40:04.540 --> 40:05.400]  Is this kind of stupid?
[40:05.520 --> 40:08.220]  That's exactly as far as other people on the plane.
[40:08.340 --> 40:12.840]  How would they have reacted to seeing this particular tweet, knowing it was coming from the airplane that they were on?
[40:13.080 --> 40:17.720]  I think they might have agreed with the airline, the way they took action in this particular case.
[40:17.760 --> 40:23.320]  Just like when you're online at security, if you make a joke about explosives or something like that, they're going to treat it differently.
[40:23.540 --> 40:29.380]  Even if you don't have any evidence of something, they're going to treat you very suspiciously.
[40:30.080 --> 40:31.380]  It's not a very funny joke.
[40:31.740 --> 40:32.680]  I mean, I don't get it.
[40:32.920 --> 40:35.720]  Well, yeah, maybe if I knew the acronyms better, it would be hilarious.
[40:35.840 --> 40:37.280]  But no, it wasn't that funny.
[40:37.360 --> 40:40.860]  It seemed to be more, you know, an attempt to show off that I know this stuff.
[40:40.980 --> 40:41.660]  And it worked.
[40:42.020 --> 40:44.120]  They believed him that he does know a lot.
[40:44.280 --> 40:44.420]  Yeah.
[40:45.480 --> 40:47.120]  So I guess it was a success?
[40:47.880 --> 40:48.600]  I don't know.
[40:48.700 --> 40:50.100]  That's a good question to ask him.
[40:50.180 --> 40:52.300]  Was this a good exercise for you?
[40:52.300 --> 40:53.860]  So certainly got him a lot of attention.
[40:54.880 --> 40:59.540]  So now the FBI is warning.
[40:59.740 --> 41:09.700]  The FBI and the TSA have gotten together and they're both issuing alerts to airlines, advising them to be on the lookout for evidence of tampering on networks or any kind of intrusion.
[41:10.180 --> 41:20.860]  FBI and the TSA both say they have no information to support claims that an attacker could commandeer a plane's navigation system through either the passenger Wi-Fi or in-flight entertainment networks.
[41:21.040 --> 41:22.520]  But they're taking the claim seriously.
[41:22.720 --> 41:29.040]  They're currently evaluating the evidence to determine if there is a credible threat posed by intrusions into the networks of passenger planes.
[41:29.160 --> 41:30.360]  I can't say I really disagree with that.
[41:30.480 --> 41:31.820]  I mean, they should look into it, obviously.
[41:32.340 --> 41:39.080]  I would hope that there's an air gap between anything that someone on the airline has and what the pilots have access to.
[41:39.240 --> 41:40.000]  It's a good idea.
[41:40.240 --> 41:41.600]  I'll pass that along to them.
[41:41.680 --> 41:44.180]  I really think they should consider that if they haven't already.
[41:44.380 --> 41:45.800]  But here's what the alert says.
[41:45.920 --> 41:50.620]  They basically describe a bunch of signs that flight crews should be looking for.
[41:50.740 --> 42:01.780]  And this is going to affect each and every one of us who flies in the future because I think we might have... we might basically qualify for one, at least one of these particular points.
[42:01.880 --> 42:12.700]  Report any suspicious activity involving travelers connecting unknown cables or wires to the IFE system, in-flight entertainment system, or unusual parts of the airplane seat.
[42:12.840 --> 42:15.820]  Well, I've connected my headphones to airplanes.
[42:15.960 --> 42:20.340]  Yeah, there are also USB chargers and all kinds of other ways to connect.
[42:20.520 --> 42:21.980]  That's a pretty broad...
[42:21.980 --> 42:22.780]  All right.
[42:22.860 --> 42:24.180]  Well, that's only number one.
[42:24.280 --> 42:34.720]  Number two, report any evidence of suspicious behavior following a flight, such as in-flight entertainment systems that show evidence of tampering or the forced removal of covers to network connection ports.
[42:34.920 --> 42:37.360]  I've never seen a network connection port on an airplane.
[42:37.700 --> 42:37.980]  Yeah.
[42:38.100 --> 42:45.080]  I mean, a lot of these articles seem to be claiming that there's like a port under your seat that if you're nefarious enough, you can plug into.
[42:45.540 --> 42:48.860]  And am I just not observant enough to have ever seen such a thing?
[42:48.860 --> 42:49.080]  Apparently not.
[42:49.200 --> 42:50.360]  I'm going to look next time.
[42:50.940 --> 42:51.860]  I wouldn't say that.
[42:51.920 --> 42:52.940]  Maybe you shouldn't say that.
[42:53.460 --> 42:54.600]  I'm not tweeting it.
[42:54.640 --> 42:57.320]  It seems like really stupid design, if that's the case.
[42:57.540 --> 43:11.200]  I think the old airphone systems used to have modular connected ports, so you could maybe connect your old modem to the pay credit card or phone that was on there.
[43:11.580 --> 43:12.380]  I'm with Mark.
[43:12.600 --> 43:13.780]  Have you ever seen anybody do that?
[43:14.060 --> 43:14.500]  Right.
[43:14.640 --> 43:19.080]  I've never, ever seen anyone do that, let alone use one of the in-flight phones.
[43:19.220 --> 43:19.940]  But I'm with Mark.
[43:20.100 --> 43:26.420]  I think things like USB would be the closest bus or network, quote, network interface.
[43:26.640 --> 43:37.380]  Other than that, it's just a Wi-Fi access point that's, in a lot of scenarios, just slapped onto and certified by the FAA as a completely separate system.
[43:37.620 --> 43:42.960]  But again, there's no reason for any of that to be connected to the plane control systems, right?
[43:43.040 --> 43:44.300]  And it would be really poor.
[43:44.340 --> 43:51.000]  I would be surprised if a bunch of engineers who were smart enough to put together a plane would have made that oversight.
[43:51.020 --> 43:51.820]  But who knows?
[43:52.060 --> 43:52.980]  I'm curious, though.
[43:53.280 --> 43:55.540]  What was the reaction time to the tweet?
[43:55.680 --> 43:58.460]  Was it like he tweeted it and then they pulled him off the plane?
[43:58.500 --> 43:59.520]  Or did something happen later?
[43:59.680 --> 44:01.040]  I think they were waiting for him when he landed.
[44:01.340 --> 44:02.440]  I think that's what happened.
[44:02.440 --> 44:03.960]  And I'm not sure how much time passed by.
[44:03.960 --> 44:06.400]  But they were just monitoring Twitter for...
[44:06.400 --> 44:08.800]  Well, yeah, you know, that's what Twitter is.
[44:09.060 --> 44:12.580]  People, they see all kinds of things or they report all kinds of things.
[44:12.580 --> 44:16.040]  It's a great dragnet to get people who say the wrong thing.
[44:16.640 --> 44:25.840]  But, you know, to pursue what you were saying just now, I would not be surprised to see engineers who design amazing systems forget one simple thing.
[44:26.180 --> 44:29.280]  Like, you know, having a password or something ridiculous like that.
[44:29.440 --> 44:30.600]  I've seen it happen before.
[44:30.600 --> 44:30.880]  Sure.
[44:31.060 --> 44:31.880]  People make mistakes.
[44:32.020 --> 44:38.100]  I'm just saying that, I mean, there's no reason why a in-flight entertainment... Okay.
[44:38.540 --> 44:41.620]  There's a reason, which was pointed out to me after last week's show.
[44:41.700 --> 44:48.320]  The reason is for the cool map thing, which is my favorite feature of the in-flight entertainment system, but it has to know where the plane is.
[44:48.520 --> 44:49.340]  Yeah, but does...
[44:49.340 --> 44:50.520]  But that could be independent, right?
[44:50.780 --> 44:51.940]  I don't know how it works.
[44:52.360 --> 44:57.680]  I can imagine implementing it with a separate GPS transceiver that's not connected to anything else.
[44:57.820 --> 45:01.920]  But I can also imagine a lazy engineer not thinking of that and implementing it.
[45:01.940 --> 45:02.940]  You don't have to talk to the map.
[45:03.060 --> 45:04.540]  You're not contributing to it.
[45:04.760 --> 45:09.300]  Yeah, but if the networks are connected, then there's no such thing as a one-way network connection.
[45:09.420 --> 45:09.560]  Right.
[45:10.000 --> 45:10.200]  Okay.
[45:10.320 --> 45:16.940]  Well, it could be a third-party network connection where it transmits to someplace else and you're reading it not directly from the airplane's controls.
[45:16.940 --> 45:21.400]  There are safe ways to implement this, but it is not certain that they have done that.
[45:21.400 --> 45:35.760]  Actually, another thing, now that you say that, that I'm thinking about, when I was on a flight recently, one of the channels that you could tune into during, I think, takeoff and landing, was a camera under the plane, as well as all of the audio coming from the cockpit.
[45:35.900 --> 45:37.020]  So you could listen to them talking to the tower.
[45:37.020 --> 45:39.280]  Until something goes wrong, then they turn that off.
[45:39.520 --> 45:39.700]  Right.
[45:39.800 --> 45:43.020]  I don't know why, because at that point, it doesn't really matter anyway.
[45:43.020 --> 45:43.060]  Okay.
[45:43.600 --> 45:50.720]  But all of these things could be implemented without any actual connection to the plane systems, and I don't think we should assume that such a connection exists.
[45:50.880 --> 45:51.540]  Bernie, did you have something?
[45:52.000 --> 45:55.200]  I was just going to say, I agree with what RedHack just said there.
[45:55.400 --> 46:09.120]  There could be a separate GPS receiver just for the in-flight entertainment system, just like the one in your car, and to hear the air-to-ground communications and other stuff.
[46:09.320 --> 46:15.720]  It wouldn't have to have any connection with the actual flight control systems.
[46:15.720 --> 46:20.340]  It could just be an audio channel, one-way audio channel running into the in-flight entertainment system.
[46:20.940 --> 46:21.380]  Yeah.
[46:22.080 --> 46:25.980]  The cockpit voice is pretty standard on United Flights, which I think this was.
[46:26.180 --> 46:30.140]  All of the United Flights tend to have that channel, but it's not as common on other carriers.
[46:30.940 --> 46:31.660]  Well, okay.
[46:31.660 --> 46:34.260]  I just wonder if you can maybe... I'm just thinking out loud now.
[46:34.380 --> 46:46.180]  If you can tap into other airplanes that are going the same route as you and hear their in-flight entertainment system, if maybe somebody got a booster and made a signal a little stronger, and then you could see someone else's map.
[46:46.380 --> 46:48.820]  Or maybe you could see them as they pass over your house.
[46:49.500 --> 46:50.340]  Things like that.
[46:50.860 --> 46:51.800]  Just thinking out loud.
[46:51.940 --> 46:53.080]  There are more effective ways.
[46:53.240 --> 46:53.480]  I know.
[46:53.880 --> 46:54.960]  Okay, so item number three.
[46:55.040 --> 46:55.980]  We only got through two of the items.
[46:56.300 --> 47:13.580]  Report any evidence of suspicious behavior concerning aviation wireless signals, including social media messages with threatening references to onboard network systems, ADS-B, ACARS, A-C-A-R-S, and air traffic control networks.
[47:13.760 --> 47:15.760]  Now, again, threatening references.
[47:16.900 --> 47:19.680]  I guess that's open to interpretation as to what is a threat, what is not.
[47:19.880 --> 47:23.940]  The tweet that we read certainly didn't seem like a threat, just kind of, you know, a goofy joke.
[47:24.320 --> 47:26.420]  But people treat things differently.
[47:27.140 --> 47:27.740]  And...
[47:27.740 --> 47:28.340]  Emanuel?
[47:28.560 --> 47:28.740]  Yes.
[47:28.980 --> 47:32.700]  I have been monitoring ACARS messages, A-C-A-R-S.
[47:32.800 --> 47:33.240]  It's an acronym.
[47:34.040 --> 47:45.320]  Basically, airplanes transmit their elevation and their flight number and other information about flight maintenance requests, that sort of thing.
[47:45.780 --> 47:53.600]  This is broadcast over the air that anybody can pick up with a VHF radio receiver and the right software or hardware.
[47:54.020 --> 47:56.760]  And there's hobbyist equipment you can buy to do this.
[47:56.900 --> 47:59.380]  It's been around for literally 20-some years.
[48:00.000 --> 48:10.040]  So, you know, if anybody's talking about, oh, I monitored this on ACARS, they could, you know, the FBI might erroneously consider such a report as a threat.
[48:10.480 --> 48:14.260]  Yeah, you can make all kinds of things that are easy to do seem like a threat.
[48:14.360 --> 48:16.660]  Like, oh my God, you can listen to the police on the radio.
[48:16.820 --> 48:17.700]  You can hear where they're going.
[48:18.060 --> 48:21.280]  You can make that sound like something you're not supposed to be able to do.
[48:21.420 --> 48:26.360]  And if they pull the wool over Congress's eyes, they can make it so it's illegal for you to do that.
[48:26.700 --> 48:29.160]  So yeah, this is something that is definitely of concern.
[48:29.280 --> 48:32.300]  Well, and that data is widely available on the internet, too.
[48:32.400 --> 48:36.800]  I assume that these flight tracking websites are just using that, right, as their input, Bernie?
[48:37.260 --> 48:38.980]  That's one of the inputs they're using, yes.
[48:39.240 --> 48:45.280]  You know, one app that I have on my phone that works just great overseas allows me to point my phone at an airplane.
[48:45.400 --> 48:47.980]  It tells me exactly where that airplane is coming from and where it's going.
[48:48.260 --> 48:49.480]  It doesn't work in this country.
[48:49.480 --> 48:55.240]  They use a different system over here, but also, and it's kind of ridiculous, they delay the information 15 minutes.
[48:55.640 --> 49:01.120]  I mean, what good is it pointing your phone at a plane and waiting 15 minutes to figure out what plane that was?
[49:01.460 --> 49:06.560]  But apparently, we believe that if we had that information, we'd say, oh, that's the 557 to Tampa.
[49:06.640 --> 49:08.100]  That's the one I want to shoot down.
[49:08.480 --> 49:10.420]  And we can't have that information.
[49:10.480 --> 49:11.680]  But in Europe, it works great.
[49:11.880 --> 49:16.660]  It's really amazing to wonder where is that plane going and to find out, hey, that's going to Scandinavia.
[49:16.820 --> 49:17.400]  Isn't that nice?
[49:17.780 --> 49:19.060]  And then you get on with your day.
[49:19.780 --> 49:19.980]  All right.
[49:20.180 --> 49:20.780]  Item number four.
[49:20.900 --> 49:22.120]  And this is the final one.
[49:22.480 --> 49:31.380]  Review network logs from aircraft to ensure any suspicious activity, such as network scanning or intrusion attempts, is captured for further analysis.
[49:32.100 --> 49:34.100]  Obviously, we can't, or maybe we can do that.
[49:34.320 --> 49:36.560]  But I don't think we can review the network logs.
[49:36.680 --> 49:45.960]  But if you are scanning an aircraft on their system, someone's going to capture that for further analysis and probably ask you a whole bunch of questions.
[49:46.100 --> 49:48.580]  So these are the things that people are looking out for.
[49:48.700 --> 49:57.080]  And I imagine anyone who is categorized as a hacker, wearing a hacker shirt, perhaps, you might be targeted for further investigation as well.
[49:58.220 --> 50:03.480]  That assumes a lot of knowledge of hacker shirts amongst airlines to have.
[50:03.880 --> 50:04.080]  Yeah.
[50:04.200 --> 50:10.520]  Well, probably passing around, just like those books that tell you what driver's licenses look like for bartenders.
[50:10.740 --> 50:15.640]  They're going to have something like that, all the hacker shirts for TSA employees so that they can identify suspicious people.
[50:15.640 --> 50:16.180]  Okay.
[50:16.260 --> 50:18.880]  We're going to try and take some phone calls in the limited time we have left.
[50:19.000 --> 50:20.860]  212-209-2900.
[50:21.060 --> 50:29.700]  If you have anything that you'd like to contribute to the conversation, been talking about airline security and stingrays and all sorts of other things.
[50:30.160 --> 50:38.380]  Hey, Junts, our own Junts wrote in with what I thought was some interesting dialogue from a program called CSI Cyber.
[50:38.580 --> 50:41.420]  I'd like to make this a regular feature, if at all possible.
[50:41.540 --> 50:44.140]  Maybe our listeners can participate in this as well.
[50:44.140 --> 50:44.600]  Gibberish.
[50:44.760 --> 50:52.620]  Gibberish from various over-the-air or just broadcast on cable or whatever television shows that don't get it.
[50:53.560 --> 50:58.580]  IRC, Internet Relay Chat, on CSI Cyber was described this way.
[50:58.680 --> 51:03.540]  IRC is an application layer protocol that facilitates data transfer in the form of text.
[51:04.360 --> 51:07.600]  Junts goes on to say, I believe that is said in the video.
[51:07.820 --> 51:14.980]  Somewhere was directly lifted from the first line of the IRC Wikipedia article, but it's a terrible one-line explanation of IRC.
[51:15.260 --> 51:15.700]  Absolutely.
[51:16.160 --> 51:27.980]  Another gem from an earlier episode, where one character known as M3TA, I guess you say Meta, claims he doesn't remember specifically talking to a suspect.
[51:28.460 --> 51:30.860]  He says, names blend together.
[51:31.060 --> 51:33.520]  You know how many hackers are using LeetSpeak now.
[51:34.720 --> 51:36.200]  I don't even know what that means.
[51:36.400 --> 51:37.300]  I mean, I know what it means.
[51:37.360 --> 51:38.080]  I just don't...
[51:38.760 --> 51:41.520]  Oh, it's just... it's incredible.
[51:41.640 --> 51:47.300]  But there are so many more, so many more bits of dialogue out there that are gems that I think we should appreciate a little more.
[51:47.400 --> 51:55.020]  So if you see something like that, if you happen to find yourself watching these awful programs, then please send us an email, OTH at 2600.com.
[51:55.340 --> 51:56.440]  We have some phone calls.
[51:56.880 --> 51:58.040]  Let us see who is out there.
[51:58.140 --> 51:58.440]  Good evening.
[51:58.580 --> 51:59.260]  You're on off the hook.
[52:00.820 --> 52:01.760]  That's a strange tone.
[52:01.920 --> 52:10.020]  Let's disconnect that tone from our switchboard and hope that the switchboard resets itself in time for us to take more calls.
[52:10.080 --> 52:12.020]  212-209-2900.
[52:12.120 --> 52:12.940]  Bernie, did I lose you?
[52:13.980 --> 52:14.740]  No, I'm still here.
[52:14.760 --> 52:15.620]  Okay, good, good.
[52:15.760 --> 52:15.920]  Okay.
[52:16.820 --> 52:23.440]  Yeah, for some reason, all the lines went out when I did that, and I don't know why, but our phone number remains 212-209-2900.
[52:24.040 --> 52:34.100]  I would just say if you're watching these shows anyway and you see something amusing, let us know, but please don't waste your time watching these shows just for us to do something else.
[52:34.320 --> 52:36.340]  Yeah, I wouldn't do that.
[52:36.840 --> 52:41.860]  But there is a lot in there that could be used for our entertainment, I think.
[52:42.120 --> 52:43.480]  Let's try to take this phone call.
[52:43.540 --> 52:43.780]  Good evening.
[52:43.920 --> 52:44.580]  You're on off the hook.
[52:45.020 --> 52:45.400]  Hi.
[52:45.700 --> 52:53.060]  Yeah, a couple of additional advantages to using the FM receiver in your phone is, one is low power consumption.
[52:53.720 --> 52:54.540]  Absolutely, yes.
[52:54.620 --> 52:59.520]  Your phone will not drain if you're just listening to it as a radio, and you can walk around and listen to us.
[52:59.820 --> 53:00.300]  Yes.
[53:00.520 --> 53:12.920]  Also, this is similar to what Verizon did with GPS, where they wanted you to pay an extra fee for getting the free satellite information that's available to anybody with a GPS receiver.
[53:12.920 --> 53:16.200]  So I dropped Verizon for that reason.
[53:18.080 --> 53:26.500]  And I got a Motorola DeFi, which has an FM receiver and is unlocked, so I could use the GPS.
[53:26.780 --> 53:29.360]  And I don't think T-Mobile charges for that anyway.
[53:29.700 --> 53:30.780]  No, T-Mobile does not.
[53:31.480 --> 53:35.560]  The app, the FM radio app on my phone works just fine.
[53:36.260 --> 53:42.120]  I'd like to know if other phone companies are the same with that particular phone, the HTC One, if it's blocked on that phone.
[53:42.680 --> 53:54.260]  One more thing is that I thought that remote control was how the CIA flew the buildings on... flew the airplanes into buildings on 9-11.
[53:54.480 --> 53:54.900]  Okay.
[53:55.000 --> 53:58.380]  We don't have time for that right now, but we promise we'll get into it in the future.
[53:58.520 --> 53:59.140]  Thanks for that call.
[53:59.180 --> 54:07.460]  I can tell you something about GPS on cell phones, which is that some cell phones, the GPS can in fact not work without a network signal.
[54:07.460 --> 54:13.300]  It's because they don't have the ability to pull down all the data that is necessary from the satellite.
[54:13.440 --> 54:17.660]  So they have to pull it down from the internet or from otherwise from the carrier network.
[54:18.500 --> 54:21.980]  And that is, you know, it makes the chips smaller and cheaper.
[54:22.200 --> 54:26.440]  And so some phones, they're not ripping you off when they say that.
[54:27.040 --> 54:27.520]  Okay.
[54:27.520 --> 54:28.660]  Let's take another phone call.
[54:28.660 --> 54:29.440]  Good evening.
[54:29.620 --> 54:30.260]  You're on Off The Hook.
[54:30.760 --> 54:31.200]  Hi.
[54:31.300 --> 54:36.580]  When I was at the HOPE conference, I asked Steve Rambam a question that he thought was somewhat brilliant.
[54:36.860 --> 54:42.980]  And although I was very pleased to be flattered by him, I actually didn't think the question was that brilliant.
[54:42.980 --> 55:03.200]  I thought it was pretty obvious and logical, which is, what is the corresponding data between the surveillance state and the number of people who are being either detained, arrested, or the missing persons who are being found as a result of all of this surveillance?
[55:03.580 --> 55:17.080]  Because, you know, obviously it's like all this data is being collected, but then, for example, and this isn't something domestic to the United States, but nevertheless, you have, you know, 200 girls go missing in Nigeria.
[55:17.980 --> 55:29.680]  And now it's been, what, a year or two years since that kidnapping, and no one knows in the whole wide world where criminals might have taken 200 kidnapped human beings.
[55:31.060 --> 55:32.300]  Well, that's a good question.
[55:32.380 --> 55:33.160]  Did you get an answer?
[55:34.680 --> 55:35.480]  Actually, yeah.
[55:35.540 --> 55:37.820]  What Rambam said was, no.
[55:38.560 --> 55:40.780]  The amazing thing is, no.
[55:41.040 --> 55:48.000]  More missing people have not been brought home as a result of all this massive surveillance that we're all being subjected to.
[55:48.220 --> 55:54.320]  So, you know, I think the state needs to start getting called to the carpet in terms of, well, where are the results of all of this?
[55:54.440 --> 55:57.660]  Yeah, if you granted yourself tons of power, what are the results?
[55:57.960 --> 56:02.980]  You look at a state like England, which has surveillance everywhere, does the crime go down?
[56:03.280 --> 56:04.060]  No, it doesn't.
[56:04.060 --> 56:06.220]  It just moves to a place that does not have cameras.
[56:06.400 --> 56:09.820]  Well, you know, they'd love to tell you the results, but that's sealed, so... That too.
[56:10.300 --> 56:11.860]  All right, see if we can squeeze in one more.
[56:11.960 --> 56:13.000]  Good evening, you're on Off The Hook.
[56:14.400 --> 56:15.180]  Speak up, please.
[56:17.720 --> 56:18.820]  I'll give you one more second.
[56:19.940 --> 56:21.280]  Okay, well, moving on.
[56:21.400 --> 56:21.700]  Good evening.
[56:21.820 --> 56:22.440]  You're on Off The Hook.
[56:23.160 --> 56:23.900]  Yeah, hi.
[56:24.100 --> 56:24.760]  Hi, what's on your mind?
[56:25.080 --> 56:26.940]  I just want to make two comments.
[56:27.380 --> 56:34.600]  It's rather scary that the STASI would be envious of the amount of surveillance that we have compared to what they did.
[56:35.140 --> 56:40.360]  They were pikers as compared to what the current state of affairs is.
[56:40.520 --> 56:48.680]  I mean, there was literally almost nothing, except maybe if you're whispering to somebody in the middle of a late that has not picked up and surveilled today.
[56:48.880 --> 56:58.620]  The second thing is the real danger of this whole surveillance state apparatus, which we've seen in, like, J.
[56:58.740 --> 56:59.240]  Edgar Hoover.
[56:59.520 --> 57:03.540]  The head of the NSA finally admitted that they were spying on Congress.
[57:03.880 --> 57:05.320]  Now, what does that tell you?
[57:05.380 --> 57:10.400]  If you have dirt on every politician, which they do, because they're all corrupt, as we know.
[57:10.600 --> 57:12.160]  They're all doing something dirty.
[57:12.400 --> 57:17.560]  You have total control, just like Putin became the head of Russia because he was the head of the KGB.
[57:17.920 --> 57:19.460]  He had dirt on everybody.
[57:19.720 --> 57:22.080]  And nobody messes with you like whoever had.
[57:22.200 --> 57:24.740]  He had files on every politician.
[57:25.080 --> 57:28.820]  That's why he was allowed to go past the mandatory retirement age.
[57:28.820 --> 57:30.280]  He, I think, was 70.
[57:30.280 --> 57:31.440]  He was the mandatory age.
[57:31.580 --> 57:33.480]  He worked until he dropped dead.
[57:33.660 --> 57:35.460]  He was a total homophobic.
[57:35.460 --> 57:36.620]  And meanwhile, he was gay.
[57:36.640 --> 57:37.440]  That's been proven.
[57:37.780 --> 57:40.060]  So this is the kind of world we're living in.
[57:40.300 --> 57:40.480]  Absolutely.
[57:40.700 --> 57:47.440]  George Orwell would have turned over in his grave to see he wouldn't believe the level of surveillance today.
[57:47.620 --> 57:49.540]  There's nothing practically that you can do.
[57:49.720 --> 57:52.660]  And you have to assume that someone is surveilling it.
[57:53.000 --> 57:53.180]  Okay.
[57:53.340 --> 57:53.920]  Well, you're out of time.
[57:53.920 --> 57:55.820]  I'm sorry, but that's some great points there.
[57:55.820 --> 57:56.800]  Thanks for raising those.
[57:57.440 --> 57:59.680]  And we're kind of out of time.
[57:59.800 --> 58:00.820]  In fact, we're definitely out of time.
[58:01.400 --> 58:04.280]  But please write to us, OTH at 2600.com.
[58:04.440 --> 58:09.260]  Tune in again next week when we have another hour to talk about these issues and take more phone calls.
[58:09.500 --> 58:10.460]  Today is Earth Day.
[58:10.540 --> 58:18.700]  I'd like to go out with a song that maybe you didn't know was an environmental song from none other than Marvin Gaye.
[58:19.660 --> 58:21.060]  And we'll see you next week.
[58:21.440 --> 58:22.780]  OTH at 2600.com.
[58:22.880 --> 58:23.260]  Have a good night.
[58:27.580 --> 58:28.940]  OTH at 2600.com.
[58:28.940 --> 58:31.340]  Oh, mercy, mercy, me.
[58:33.660 --> 58:37.020]  Oh, things ain't what they used to be.
[58:37.240 --> 58:38.300]  No, no.
[58:38.880 --> 58:42.200]  Where did all the blue skies go?
[58:43.180 --> 58:45.500]  Poison is the wind that blows.
[58:45.820 --> 58:48.040]  From the Lord did something see?
[58:49.320 --> 58:51.980]  Oh, mercy, mercy, me.
[58:51.980 --> 58:52.400]  Oh, mercy...
[58:54.160 --> 58:57.620]  Oh, things ain't what they used to be.
[58:57.820 --> 58:59.660]  Oh, my heart...
[58:59.660 --> 59:06.140]  Oil wasted on the oceans, And upon high seas, Fish full of mercury.
[59:06.980 --> 59:11.160]  Oh, it's full of mercy...
[59:11.160 --> 59:11.980]  Oh, mercy, mercy...
[59:12.820 --> 59:18.020]  Oh, things ain't what they used to be.
[59:18.020 --> 59:29.060]  You lost my radiation underground, And in the sky, Animals and birds who live near by the night.
[59:29.960 --> 59:32.920]  Oh, mercy, mercy...
[59:32.920 --> 59:34.020]  Oh, mercy, mercy...
[59:34.960 --> 59:40.720]  Oh, things ain't what they used to be.
[59:40.980 --> 59:44.480]  I heard about this overcrowded land.
[59:44.480 --> 59:46.860]  How much more be used from me?
[59:46.860 --> 59:48.840]  I can't just stand out.
[59:49.120 --> 59:50.700]  Ooh, oh,
[01:00:04.480 --> 01:00:06.140]  my heart...
[01:00:06.980 --> 01:00:07.040]  Oh!
[01:00:32.040 --> 01:00:33.900]  And it is 8 p.m.
[01:00:34.240 --> 01:00:39.120]  Earth Day, April 22nd, 2015.
[01:00:39.120 --> 01:00:40.580]  Wow, we got it right.
[01:00:40.580 --> 01:00:40.660]  Geez...
[01:00:40.660 --> 01:00:40.800]  And this is the second one.