[00:00.110 --> 00:05.730]  And you are listening to radio station WBAI in New York.
[00:05.950 --> 00:08.850]  The time is just about 7 o'clock, I guess.
[00:09.150 --> 00:12.950]  And that means... That means don't push that button.
[00:13.370 --> 00:14.210]  Oh, boy.
[00:15.670 --> 00:18.950]  Okay, let's push this button instead, and hopefully we'll hear our theme.
[00:42.390 --> 00:44.710]  Yes, it's the new Mellow Edition of Off the Hook.
[00:45.530 --> 00:48.330]  I'm Emmanuel Goldstein, joined tonight by Mike.
[00:48.750 --> 00:49.050]  Hi.
[00:49.670 --> 00:50.090]  Rob T.
[00:50.210 --> 00:50.690]  Firefly.
[00:50.890 --> 00:51.270]  Good evening.
[00:51.270 --> 00:51.870]  Kyle.
[00:52.890 --> 00:53.250]  Wee!
[00:53.550 --> 00:55.290]  And we forgot to call Bernie.
[00:55.830 --> 00:59.010]  We only had 30 seconds to set up in here, so we couldn't call Bernie.
[00:59.210 --> 01:04.510]  Someone needs to call Bernie because I'm talking on the microphone and trying to cover up the fact that I played the wrong card.
[01:04.690 --> 01:05.390]  And that's not our theme.
[01:05.630 --> 01:06.570]  That's not our new theme.
[01:07.010 --> 01:07.650]  You want the theme?
[01:08.230 --> 01:08.830]  Okay, yeah.
[01:08.950 --> 01:09.430]  Thank you, Reggie.
[01:09.590 --> 01:10.630]  Yeah, that's why I'm here.
[01:10.770 --> 01:12.510]  Play the theme from the other source.
[01:12.750 --> 01:14.150]  Because apparently I don't know what I'm doing.
[01:16.590 --> 01:19.250]  Apparently you don't need it because that's on the count, not off the hook.
[01:19.630 --> 01:20.730]  Okay, no, no, no, no.
[01:20.730 --> 01:22.550]  Why do we have shows that sound so similar?
[01:22.850 --> 01:23.270]  I know.
[01:23.430 --> 01:24.870]  I got it, I got it, I got it.
[01:25.110 --> 01:25.470]  Okay.
[01:26.110 --> 01:27.150]  OTH theme, that's it?
[01:27.270 --> 01:27.930]  Yeah, that's it.
[01:27.950 --> 01:28.450]  Open there.
[01:29.010 --> 01:30.130]  Okay, a little thing of spinning.
[01:31.610 --> 01:32.790]  Just hit the play button, right?
[01:32.990 --> 01:33.550]  Won't that work?
[01:33.730 --> 01:34.350]  Why wouldn't that work?
[01:34.410 --> 01:34.950]  There we go!
[01:38.560 --> 01:41.840]  And now we've brought ourselves some time to call Bernie.
[01:42.000 --> 01:42.900]  So we'll be back in a moment.
[02:11.820 --> 02:12.880]  And we're back.
[02:13.040 --> 02:15.040]  And of course, it didn't take any effort whatsoever.
[02:15.440 --> 02:16.400]  Emmanuel Goldstein here.
[02:16.840 --> 02:18.120]  Again, with Mike, Rob T.
[02:18.240 --> 02:21.940]  Firefly, Kyle, and Bernie S.
[02:23.760 --> 02:25.680]  Wait, why did the mellow theme come back?
[02:25.840 --> 02:26.600]  We don't want that.
[02:26.700 --> 02:27.240]  We want Bernie.
[02:27.340 --> 02:28.100]  Bernie, where are you?
[02:28.840 --> 02:29.720]  I'm in Philadelphia.
[02:29.720 --> 02:30.900]  Can you hear me down here?
[02:30.900 --> 02:32.040]  Yes, we can hear you.
[02:32.340 --> 02:33.040]  It's just...
[02:33.040 --> 02:36.020]  This microboard that we have here is very confusing.
[02:36.300 --> 02:39.380]  And if you're not careful, it can easily take over the show.
[02:40.000 --> 02:41.440]  You know, I've got this issue.
[02:41.900 --> 02:44.300]  You notice my voice now sounds like it's on the phone.
[02:44.500 --> 02:46.740]  This is because of this technology we have now.
[02:46.800 --> 02:49.740]  If I bring Bernie up, I sound like I'm on the phone.
[02:49.860 --> 02:51.560]  If I bring him down, I don't.
[02:52.080 --> 02:53.240]  I don't know why that is.
[02:53.300 --> 02:54.140]  I don't know why that would be.
[02:54.260 --> 03:00.780]  But the other thing I noticed, the other thing I noticed is that I sound okay to myself right now, but when I listen back later, my voice sounds muddy.
[03:01.940 --> 03:03.600]  Or muffled, I guess is the right word.
[03:03.880 --> 03:04.800]  You agree, Kyle, right?
[03:04.880 --> 03:06.440]  You even said that the other day.
[03:06.920 --> 03:09.780]  Yeah, it is different than some of the other mics.
[03:10.020 --> 03:11.420]  You said my, Emmanuel.
[03:11.680 --> 03:13.740]  Your voice sounds particularly muddy on that recording.
[03:14.480 --> 03:18.060]  And so I'm wondering if perhaps it's the microphone.
[03:18.820 --> 03:19.920]  And I'd like to test it.
[03:20.020 --> 03:22.140]  I'm going to grab Mike's microphone here.
[03:22.260 --> 03:23.240]  I don't know why we're hearing it dialed to.
[03:25.000 --> 03:26.100]  Apparently Bernie hung up.
[03:26.760 --> 03:27.960]  This is the other microphone.
[03:27.960 --> 03:35.660]  So when I play it back later and listen to myself, I'm going to ask if I'm equally muddy in this microphone or if it's just my voice.
[03:37.180 --> 03:39.120]  Thanks, Mike, for indulging me.
[03:39.460 --> 03:39.820]  Anytime.
[03:40.160 --> 03:43.700]  I don't know why we lost Bernie, but we can't play the theme again and call him.
[03:43.700 --> 03:44.440]  This is ridiculous.
[03:45.280 --> 03:46.100]  I'm sure I didn't...
[03:46.760 --> 03:49.240]  Would moving the microphone somehow hang up the phone?
[03:49.360 --> 03:50.040]  Is that possible?
[03:50.280 --> 03:52.200]  Can we get the piano music back instead of Bernie?
[03:52.280 --> 03:52.980]  Because that was kind of fun.
[03:53.140 --> 03:54.480]  Oh, if only we could fit a piano in here.
[03:54.480 --> 03:55.100]  That would be nice.
[04:00.540 --> 04:03.120]  That are rumored to be on the way.
[04:03.180 --> 04:03.600]  Where are they?
[04:03.920 --> 04:04.800]  They're on the way.
[04:05.240 --> 04:06.160]  I didn't see them.
[04:06.600 --> 04:07.680]  It's a telephone, Mike.
[04:07.680 --> 04:08.480]  It's not hard to work.
[04:08.640 --> 04:11.060]  But you have to press something to put it on the telephone, not the board.
[04:11.060 --> 04:14.220]  You press the off button, and then you press the on button.
[04:14.880 --> 04:15.880]  Just like any telephone.
[04:16.920 --> 04:17.980]  Actually, it's not like any...
[04:17.980 --> 04:19.060]  You dial the number.
[04:19.140 --> 04:19.860]  Are you familiar with that?
[04:20.300 --> 04:20.620]  Numbers?
[04:20.960 --> 04:22.920]  Yeah, but usually you get a dial tone first.
[04:23.080 --> 04:23.760]  You don't have a dial tone?
[04:23.860 --> 04:23.960]  No.
[04:24.040 --> 04:25.200]  Well, is Bernie still there, maybe?
[04:25.680 --> 04:26.440]  Bernie, are you kidding?
[04:26.660 --> 04:26.880]  No.
[04:27.600 --> 04:28.440]  You don't have a dial tone?
[04:28.480 --> 04:29.620]  Well, why don't you hit the off button?
[04:29.680 --> 04:30.540]  I can't believe we're doing this on the air.
[04:30.740 --> 04:31.680]  Why don't you hit the off button?
[04:32.400 --> 04:32.720]  Okay.
[04:33.120 --> 04:34.020]  Oh, that's our theme.
[04:34.340 --> 04:34.660]  You know what?
[04:34.660 --> 04:35.540]  Hold that up to the microphone.
[04:36.180 --> 04:37.640]  This is the real thing, folks.
[04:38.360 --> 04:39.600]  Yeah, this is the real thing.
[04:39.720 --> 04:40.520]  And that sort of is...
[04:40.940 --> 04:42.920]  It never symbolized our show better than today.
[04:43.140 --> 04:47.520]  So if you can figure out how to get rid of that, how to hang that up and dial a number, we'll be in business.
[04:48.160 --> 04:56.500]  I have to try and collect notes for the show tonight because I only had about 30 seconds to get in here after the last show was here.
[04:58.140 --> 05:00.300]  And, yeah, and collect my thoughts.
[05:00.500 --> 05:01.720]  Does anyone have any thoughts?
[05:01.880 --> 05:03.300]  I could buy us some time with that.
[05:03.640 --> 05:06.440]  Well, Kyle, you were saying about the studio that's on the way.
[05:06.820 --> 05:07.440]  Yes, Kyle.
[05:07.580 --> 05:08.680]  Where is that damn studio?
[05:08.680 --> 05:09.240]  Well, it's funny.
[05:09.360 --> 05:13.260]  Everyone, when we walk in, they ask us if we brought it.
[05:13.380 --> 05:15.600]  And, in fact, we didn't bring it.
[05:15.680 --> 05:18.960]  We're not the delivery mechanism for that.
[05:18.960 --> 05:23.680]  But it is an exciting thing that is on the horizon.
[05:24.000 --> 05:34.300]  And there's evidence here at the station that all kinds of movement and boxes and things to get around and shuffling from here to there.
[05:34.420 --> 05:41.160]  And it definitely signs that the planning and the implementation of that studio is going to occur.
[05:41.160 --> 05:49.220]  And it really does make a huge difference at a place like a radio station to have all the things in the right places and all the connectors connected.
[05:49.240 --> 05:52.420]  And you don't have to relive it every time you start your show up.
[05:52.580 --> 05:57.480]  So, anyway, apart from that delay and so on, I guess we're ready.
[05:57.600 --> 05:58.420]  We have everybody.
[05:58.660 --> 06:02.540]  And we can get excited about the new studios in the background.
[06:02.620 --> 06:03.560]  Do we have Bernie back?
[06:04.620 --> 06:05.960]  I'm back from the twilight zone.
[06:06.120 --> 06:06.380]  Thank you.
[06:06.500 --> 06:06.720]  Okay.
[06:06.940 --> 06:08.380]  And you're not going to hang up this time, right?
[06:09.560 --> 06:10.580]  I don't think I hung up.
[06:10.680 --> 06:12.920]  I heard a lot of click, but I was still connected for several seconds.
[06:13.060 --> 06:13.740]  And then I disappeared.
[06:14.660 --> 06:16.700]  Bernie, if you're not good, we'll send you back into the cornfield.
[06:17.580 --> 06:18.060]  That's right.
[06:18.560 --> 06:18.980]  All right.
[06:19.180 --> 06:19.440]  All right.
[06:19.500 --> 06:20.180]  I think we're all together.
[06:20.360 --> 06:22.680]  Hey, folks, on top of everything else, today is a fundraising edition.
[06:22.700 --> 06:25.320]  So that's going to be extra fun.
[06:25.700 --> 06:27.340]  We need your funds, as you can tell.
[06:27.500 --> 06:27.640]  Yep.
[06:27.740 --> 06:29.340]  I don't even know what phone number we're supposed to give out.
[06:29.460 --> 06:30.960]  There's no sign here or anything.
[06:31.100 --> 06:37.180]  I assume it's the old number, but I don't want to give out the wrong number and have someone else get all the funds because that can happen if you're not careful.
[06:38.000 --> 06:40.480]  But what does work is give2wbai.org.
[06:40.500 --> 06:41.480]  That definitely works.
[06:41.640 --> 06:45.340]  Either the number two or the word two, but not spelled wrong.
[06:45.800 --> 06:46.640]  T-O.
[06:47.140 --> 06:48.760]  Not T-O-O, not T-W-O.
[06:49.080 --> 06:49.940]  Yeah, if you use...
[06:49.940 --> 06:51.960]  I'm just going to confuse people if I keep talking.
[06:52.120 --> 06:53.960]  Yeah, that's how I feel sometimes, too.
[06:53.960 --> 06:54.580]  That's what we do here.
[06:55.020 --> 06:55.420]  All right.
[06:56.800 --> 07:00.380]  Basically, we're just going to lay it out because this is the only week we'll be doing this.
[07:00.500 --> 07:01.480]  We're only on this week.
[07:02.720 --> 07:05.940]  And the summer fundraiser is the shortest of the year, thank God.
[07:06.920 --> 07:09.600]  212-209-2950 is the number to call.
[07:09.760 --> 07:18.620]  If you pledge $50, $50, you'll get an autographed copy of the brand new, not even published yet, 2016 Hacker Calendar.
[07:18.620 --> 07:27.880]  All of us will sign it and you'll receive it probably before most other people get the calendar in the first place, seeing as how 2016 isn't until January.
[07:28.120 --> 07:34.120]  Filled with full-color, spectacular reader submissions.
[07:34.560 --> 07:35.060]  All right.
[07:35.140 --> 07:38.300]  So this is like the hacker community, as it were.
[07:39.880 --> 07:42.720]  And it's just tons of photos of payphones.
[07:43.000 --> 07:43.360]  Yeah.
[07:43.360 --> 07:44.780]  Full-color payphones.
[07:45.080 --> 07:47.140]  I believe the measurements are, what, 16 by 16?
[07:47.240 --> 07:48.460]  Is that correct?
[07:48.660 --> 07:49.180]  They're glossy?
[07:49.900 --> 07:50.880]  Yeah, I think so.
[07:51.040 --> 07:56.360]  It's the standard calendar size, but they're huge full-color photos and there's a lot of information as well.
[07:56.360 --> 08:01.660]  Every single day, almost, has something that happened in the hacker world and in the technology world.
[08:01.900 --> 08:07.340]  And, you know, if I had one with me, but they haven't been published yet, so I don't, we'd be able to say what happened today.
[08:07.500 --> 08:08.360]  And it's a lot of fun.
[08:08.440 --> 08:17.120]  We've actually made a game we really want to fill every single day with a plethora of hacker milestones and historical dates and so on and so forth.
[08:17.220 --> 08:25.240]  That's still ongoing, but we're back with this fantastic item and we're donating several as soon as they get delivered to the station.
[08:25.800 --> 08:26.080]  Okay.
[08:27.480 --> 08:32.960]  212-209-2950 is our phone number for those pledges.
[08:33.040 --> 08:35.860]  $50, again, a limited number of those, too.
[08:36.100 --> 08:40.160]  $50 will get you an autographed copy of the 2016 Hacker Calendar.
[08:40.920 --> 08:43.700]  Always a big hit when that comes out.
[08:43.700 --> 08:49.240]  Always something that people like to put on their walls and give as gifts at various times also.
[08:49.960 --> 08:52.180]  Bernie, anything to get people to call in?
[08:54.080 --> 08:59.060]  I would just encourage our listeners, if they're listening now, this show must have some value to them.
[09:00.260 --> 09:16.060]  They're not going to hear material like this anywhere else, and the only way to keep it on the air and keep it on the Internet, we're not going to go Internet only, is to pledge your support for a station that would have a chutzpah to keep us on the air for so many decades.
[09:16.280 --> 09:17.600]  The phone number is...
[09:17.600 --> 09:19.980]  Is it still the 212 number, or have they changed that?
[09:20.080 --> 09:22.760]  Well, unless they changed in the last minute, I don't think they...
[09:22.760 --> 09:27.100]  It's a 212-209-2950 is the number I've been told to give out.
[09:27.240 --> 09:28.200]  Okay, that's good to know.
[09:28.420 --> 09:28.640]  Yes.
[09:28.960 --> 09:30.860]  You know, we don't get any of this money.
[09:30.960 --> 09:47.380]  We do this all volunteer, and the whole station is full of a lot of volunteers, but there's a lot of expenses, like paying a $50,000 a month transmitter, rental bill, rental space bill, electricity, rent, and a lot of things like that add up.
[09:47.640 --> 09:49.880]  And, you know, that's what you have to do.
[09:50.000 --> 09:50.840]  It's a community project.
[09:51.180 --> 09:52.980]  212-209-2950.
[09:53.380 --> 09:56.120]  Yeah, and it definitely goes a long way to...
[09:56.120 --> 09:59.380]  I mean, what we're trying to do here is we are building a studio from scratch.
[09:59.580 --> 10:08.260]  I mean, it's frankly a wonder that we've been able to get what we need together to keep broadcasting since we lost access to our previous space.
[10:08.700 --> 10:16.440]  Because, you know, as much as we laugh at the situation here with the equipment and everything else, it is chutzpah that's kept us going.
[10:17.240 --> 10:29.340]  Things are just wired together sort of out of sheer gall and just stubbornness and the unwillingness to go off the air because it's important to us to keep doing what we do.
[10:29.480 --> 10:47.280]  And if you call 212-209-2950 or go to give2wbai.org, you can be part of getting us back to where we were with a full-fledged pro-grade studio with all sorts of more interesting buttons to push than the ones we have now and just enable us to keep doing what we do here.
[10:47.760 --> 10:50.300]  And, yeah, that's something that's excited to be a part of.
[10:51.660 --> 10:52.060]  Absolutely.
[10:52.240 --> 10:54.680]  Again, 212-209-2950 is the phone number.
[10:54.900 --> 10:55.820]  You know what we're offering today.
[10:55.880 --> 11:00.320]  And also, if you just want to get something else, feel free to do that as well.
[11:00.980 --> 11:03.060]  WBAI has all kinds of amazing premiums.
[11:03.160 --> 11:07.340]  But do say, please, do say that Off the Hook is the program you're pledging for.
[11:07.500 --> 11:08.180]  That counts.
[11:08.380 --> 11:12.820]  That makes a big difference for us and keeps us around here for even longer.
[11:12.920 --> 11:17.960]  But if you want the 2016 autographed hacker calendar, be sure to ask for that and pledge $50.
[11:18.240 --> 11:19.620]  212-209-2950.
[11:19.880 --> 11:23.060]  Can we, like, crowdsource the remaining days to see what happened on them?
[11:23.400 --> 11:24.420]  Well, uh...
[11:24.420 --> 11:24.900]  Put out a list.
[11:24.960 --> 11:25.660]  How would that work?
[11:25.840 --> 11:26.820]  I mean, maybe nothing's happened.
[11:26.940 --> 11:29.340]  Like, we don't know anything that happened on such and such a date.
[11:29.660 --> 11:31.460]  Someone in the hacker community must know.
[11:32.160 --> 11:34.080]  Or something needs to happen.
[11:34.260 --> 11:35.160]  Or they could make something up.
[11:35.260 --> 11:35.360]  Yeah.
[11:35.360 --> 11:35.900]  Or they could do something.
[11:36.020 --> 11:36.340]  That's right.
[11:37.820 --> 11:40.180]  Because maybe it's too late to publish it for this year's calendar.
[11:40.200 --> 11:46.300]  But if you see a blank square, you can do something amazing that day and then we can put it on next year's hacker calendar.
[11:46.420 --> 11:52.740]  I always tell the kids that if you see a blank date, that's the day to hack something and we get it on the calendar next year.
[11:52.860 --> 11:53.620]  Is that what you tell the kids?
[11:53.620 --> 11:54.460]  That's what I tell the kids.
[11:54.600 --> 11:55.920]  That's why I can't talk to the kids anymore.
[11:56.280 --> 11:56.480]  All right.
[11:56.740 --> 11:58.740]  212-209-2950.
[11:58.740 --> 12:03.660]  Hey, we have some news because we are going to actually provide content today as well.
[12:03.660 --> 12:06.260]  This just actually happened today.
[12:06.720 --> 12:07.120]  Canada.
[12:07.340 --> 12:08.400]  Good news from Canada.
[12:08.540 --> 12:17.420]  Canada's big telecom companies will be required to open their highest speed internet cables to smaller competitors who want to offer broadband services to consumers.
[12:17.420 --> 12:21.740]  That's according to a CRTC ruling that was released today.
[12:21.860 --> 12:24.980]  CRTC, of course, being Canada's equivalent of the FCC.
[12:25.460 --> 12:37.220]  Now, what that means is big telecom and cable providers, the people already required to share their copper and coaxial cables with smaller competitions such as Primus, Distributel or TechSavvy.
[12:37.740 --> 12:39.420]  Those are the smaller ones, I believe.
[12:39.760 --> 12:40.280]  TechSavvy.
[12:40.580 --> 12:43.820]  Will now have to do the same with their fiber optic cables.
[12:44.040 --> 12:57.080]  The smaller competitor companies currently own about 10% of the Canadian home internet market with the other 90% controlled by big phone and cable companies, companies such as Bell and Rogers, those big companies there.
[12:57.280 --> 12:58.720]  So, I don't know, Bernie, what do you think?
[12:58.780 --> 12:59.160]  Good news?
[12:59.960 --> 13:07.720]  Oh, that's good news for Canadians, but we used to have such a requirement here in this country up until, I think it was sometime in the George W.
[13:07.840 --> 13:21.580]  Bush administration, possibly shortly prior, where our internet service providers and cable, primarily internet service providers, had to wholesale their services to competitors.
[13:22.080 --> 13:26.840]  And that's no longer legally required in this country as it is now in Canada.
[13:26.840 --> 13:30.660]  So, one step forward for Canada and one step back for the United States.
[13:30.840 --> 13:35.700]  Well, in all fairness, we already took the step back and we're just remaining back.
[13:35.700 --> 13:37.220]  We haven't taken a step forward.
[13:37.440 --> 13:38.740]  Maybe this will inspire us to.
[13:38.960 --> 13:49.140]  I mean, the reason why this is important for Canadians is because, you know, they already have this competitive access on many lines, but the large providers are...
[13:50.080 --> 14:04.280]  I rarely use the word collude because a lot of bad things can happen without collusion, but I think in this case it's very intentional that they're denying access to these high-speed lines to their competitors because they know that people are going to want the high-speed lines and they're not going to be able to go to the competitors to get it.
[14:04.400 --> 14:09.140]  So, the CRTC, I think, is very right to say you have to give access to all your lines.
[14:09.340 --> 14:10.200]  Like, stop it already.
[14:10.760 --> 14:12.620]  Stop trying to put your competitors out of business.
[14:12.980 --> 14:20.360]  We grant the monopoly on the physical wires for a reason, but it doesn't mean there has to be a monopoly on the provision of the actual internet service.
[14:22.080 --> 14:26.980]  Okay, well, well done, Canada, and hopefully we will learn from your example once again.
[14:27.280 --> 14:28.280]  Unlikely, but it would be nice.
[14:28.280 --> 14:30.640]  Unlikely, but we can at least fret about it.
[14:31.400 --> 14:35.460]  Okay, this whole Ashley Madison thing, we've heard about it in the news.
[14:35.840 --> 14:41.280]  You know, I didn't know there was a website for people to cheat on their spouses.
[14:41.280 --> 14:43.500]  Why do you need a website to cheat on your spouse?
[14:43.620 --> 14:48.340]  You must really be stupid if you can't figure out how to cheat without the help of a website.
[14:48.740 --> 14:51.000]  Cheating is like one of the easiest things in the world to do.
[14:51.900 --> 15:04.760]  But, okay, so the Ashley Madison website allows married users to find a partner to cheat with and in so doing, of course, you're putting that information someplace that obviously is not secure because of what we're about to tell you.
[15:05.260 --> 15:06.340]  Yes, they were hacked.
[15:06.640 --> 15:10.880]  The security blog known as Krebs on Security first reported this.
[15:11.040 --> 15:15.080]  They say it was claimed by a hacker or a group of hackers called the Impact Team.
[15:15.440 --> 15:29.680]  They claim to have infiltrated the private databases of Avid Life Media, ALM, the company that owns Ashley Madison, and other dating sites including such highly ranked sites as Cougar Life and Established Men.
[15:30.620 --> 15:31.120]  Oh, boy.
[15:31.200 --> 15:40.140]  It is understood the hackers have accessed user profiles, financial records, and even salary information for employees of Avid Life Media.
[15:40.360 --> 15:40.880]  How exciting.
[15:41.480 --> 15:45.700]  Ashley Madison currently has more than 33 million global users.
[15:45.700 --> 15:49.720]  It's attracted one million Australian users because I'm reading an Australian story.
[15:50.240 --> 15:59.540]  But just to give you an idea of how it ranks, the reports say that ALM chief executive Noel Bitterman confirmed the hack.
[16:00.300 --> 16:02.140]  What do you think it's like to be married to him?
[16:02.660 --> 16:03.760]  Do you trust him?
[16:05.120 --> 16:09.100]  Somebody who runs a site like this could not really have much in the way of scruples, right?
[16:09.100 --> 16:09.760]  Is he married?
[16:09.980 --> 16:10.600]  I don't know.
[16:10.740 --> 16:12.800]  I'm just wondering, I'm speculating what it must be like.
[16:13.880 --> 16:19.620]  Anyway, he said the company was quote-unquote working diligently and feverishly.
[16:19.800 --> 16:25.220]  For the first time ever, they've been working diligently on something other than cheating.
[16:25.420 --> 16:25.600]  Wow.
[16:26.420 --> 16:30.980]  They're working on taking down ALM's intellectual property.
[16:31.160 --> 16:39.600]  So they consider this intellectual property and their way of dealing with it is to go out with cease and desist orders somehow and try and forget this ever happened.
[16:40.220 --> 16:47.020]  Even though he says we're not denying this happened, like it or not, like us or not, this is still a criminal act.
[16:47.760 --> 16:52.560]  Bitterman also said they were close to confirming who the culprit behind the hacking is in their internal investigation.
[16:53.500 --> 17:03.960]  But, you know, wouldn't it by their own standards be perfectly okay because this person is doing something dishonest and a bit reprehensible and well, you know what, there's a website for that too, I'll bet.
[17:04.820 --> 17:08.120]  He said we're on the doorstep of confirming who we believe is the culprit.
[17:08.240 --> 17:10.360]  Unfortunately, that may have triggered this mass publication.
[17:10.360 --> 17:12.940]  I've got their profile right in front of me, all their work credentials.
[17:13.240 --> 17:16.820]  It was definitely a person here that was not an employee.
[17:17.480 --> 17:22.840]  A person here who was not an employee, but certainly had touched our technical services.
[17:23.520 --> 17:24.080]  Right.
[17:24.180 --> 17:28.340]  The Impact Team hackers have posted some internal data online.
[17:28.340 --> 17:31.780]  They've alleged that Ashley Madison's full delete feature does not work.
[17:31.900 --> 17:39.160]  That's a feature that promises, get this, promises to entirely remove member profiles emails at a cost of only $19.
[17:39.520 --> 17:43.100]  So for $19, you pay them, they delete the information they have on you.
[17:43.320 --> 17:45.700]  It's like voluntary blackmail, really.
[17:45.820 --> 17:54.180]  You give them information and they say, okay, this is really sensitive, you've admitted to wrongdoing, and we're going to charge you if you want to get rid of that information.
[17:54.300 --> 17:55.980]  And you have to trust us that we'll do that.
[17:56.380 --> 18:07.100]  In their online manifesto, the Impact Team hackers wrote full delete netted, and that's what the service is called, full delete netted ALM $1.7 million in revenue in 2014.
[18:07.120 --> 18:09.520]  It's also a complete lie.
[18:10.180 --> 18:14.800]  Users almost always pay with credit cards, their purchase details are not removed as promised.
[18:14.940 --> 18:16.700]  And I guess they went and they proved that.
[18:17.000 --> 18:17.740]  What a story.
[18:17.900 --> 18:20.260]  What an interesting chain of events.
[18:20.460 --> 18:28.020]  I had no idea such a site existed, but any website that keeps this information online is subject to this kind of thing.
[18:28.100 --> 18:28.240]  Rob?
[18:28.360 --> 18:32.500]  I love the fact that the regret aspect of this has made so much money.
[18:32.560 --> 18:37.720]  They made a million bucks and change on people regretting that they were using their service and wanting to just disappear from it.
[18:38.720 --> 18:46.560]  It's things like that that are interesting when a hack like this happens because you get to see all the shady things that are going on behind the scenes in an organization like this.
[18:46.640 --> 18:50.640]  Stuff came out with Sony, things people were saying to one another that they wouldn't want known publicly.
[18:50.900 --> 18:52.400]  It happens with other things.
[18:52.680 --> 18:58.140]  And now Ashley Madison has no one heard of an open marriage anymore.
[18:58.740 --> 19:12.330]  If you regret listening to this radio show or 289.5 or hearing our voices for only $100, we'll forget that you ever listen to us and you can 212-209-2950.
[19:12.350 --> 19:13.190]  Maybe it works.
[19:13.310 --> 19:13.970]  Maybe it works.
[19:14.050 --> 19:15.470]  We should at least try it.
[19:15.790 --> 19:21.050]  If you want a hacker calendar that will be autographed by all of us, $50 will get you that.
[19:21.150 --> 19:22.610]  212-209-2950.
[19:22.770 --> 19:24.390]  Bernie, any thoughts on this story?
[19:25.010 --> 19:48.590]  Yeah, if I was the owner of this Ashley Madison or I would have it Life Media, I'd be pretty worried knowing that there's almost certainly lawyers lining up for a good class action lawsuit by all the customers who paid $19 to have all their information removed and whose information wasn't removed and now they can prove they've been damaged because now this stuff has been leaked.
[19:48.810 --> 19:49.910]  Yeah, but would they want to?
[19:49.990 --> 19:57.150]  Would they want to line up in a class action lawsuit being cheaters and liars would they want to add their name to that list?
[19:57.770 --> 20:20.510]  Maybe not all of them but I'm sure a lot of them would be that maybe they're no longer married maybe they got caught cheating and that's why they don't buy the service anymore because they don't have to cheat because they're now divorced but anyway there are probably people lining up to sue this company and maybe rightly so for defrauding them on this $19 fee and also putting their information at
[20:20.510 --> 20:22.170]  risk twice.
[20:22.770 --> 20:42.210]  I mean I don't think it's reasonable to assume a priority that like every single user of this site is in fact being dishonest in some way maybe they're not married maybe their spouse knows about it there's all kinds of possibilities here the tagline to the site is life is short have an affair yeah I mean how do you I mean they're getting this site's getting a lot of great marketing out of this
[20:42.210 --> 21:05.470]  that's true but I mean I think that like the dishonest people here are the people who run the site who are promising features they don't deliver who are not taking care of their users data you know before they pay this fee to have it removed and I think that's the dishonesty that is worth focusing on it's also interesting too I'm proceeding I'm reading on this website as we talk.
[21:05.810 --> 21:11.250]  After you read their tagline, they urge you to get started by telling us your relationship status.
[21:11.470 --> 21:12.650]  And there are six of those.
[21:12.830 --> 21:15.450]  You can be an attached male seeking females.
[21:15.710 --> 21:16.710]  And note the plural.
[21:17.110 --> 21:18.910]  Attached females seeking males.
[21:19.410 --> 21:21.570]  A single male seeking females.
[21:21.590 --> 21:23.290]  A single female seeking males.
[21:23.510 --> 21:25.050]  A male seeking males.
[21:25.170 --> 21:26.350]  A female seeking females.
[21:26.590 --> 21:30.830]  They don't, for whatever reason, have attached males seeking males or attached females seeking males.
[21:30.830 --> 21:31.890]  I don't know why that is.
[21:32.030 --> 21:33.610]  Just males seeking males and females seeking males.
[21:33.630 --> 21:36.210]  But that's interesting right there.
[21:36.450 --> 21:37.390]  So I don't know.
[21:37.570 --> 21:38.730]  How should I proceed?
[21:38.950 --> 21:40.750]  I could be an attached female-seeking mouse.
[21:40.790 --> 21:41.230]  How's that?
[21:41.470 --> 21:43.430]  Are we really going to, like, give them...
[21:43.430 --> 21:45.050]  See my matches?
[21:45.510 --> 21:46.370]  Wow, right away.
[21:46.510 --> 21:47.010]  How do you...
[21:47.010 --> 21:48.270]  It says you're almost done.
[21:48.410 --> 21:51.070]  Please take 30 seconds to complete your profile and start searching.
[21:51.470 --> 21:54.250]  Username, password, postal code, greeting, date of birth.
[21:54.630 --> 21:55.670]  What are limits?
[21:56.290 --> 21:57.350]  Limits are...
[21:57.350 --> 22:03.510]  Oh, something short-term, something long-term, cyber-affair slash erotic chat, whatever excites me, anything goes.
[22:03.630 --> 22:04.510]  Or undecided.
[22:05.190 --> 22:06.810]  Undecided would definitely be a limit for me.
[22:07.250 --> 22:09.350]  As soon as someone's undecided, that's just a real turn-off.
[22:11.030 --> 22:13.290]  Bernie, any more thoughts before we move on to something else?
[22:15.650 --> 22:18.590]  Categories either, but it's kind of bizarre, frankly.
[22:19.470 --> 22:22.830]  I'm sorry, the first part of that statement was replaced with a high-pitched whine.
[22:22.910 --> 22:23.910]  Could you just repeat that?
[22:24.570 --> 22:26.590]  No, that was actually me whining.
[22:26.830 --> 22:30.590]  But no, I said I don't know which of those categories I'd fit into either, frankly.
[22:30.590 --> 22:43.230]  The site seems pretty bizarre, and I'm hoping the publicity this company gets out of all this doesn't net them more business, but actually harms them, because they clearly are not honest dealers to the public.
[22:44.010 --> 23:00.790]  I think, unfortunately, Bernie, that what we said the other week about Hacking Team Applies in this case, is also that even if they do somehow manage to get the bad publicity from this, put them out of business, I'm sure the same people will start a new site with a new name with the same business model and just make more money.
[23:00.930 --> 23:02.110]  Well, they could merge, you know?
[23:02.230 --> 23:08.650]  How about a bunch of people cheating on their spouses and spreading wares around, too, at the same time?
[23:08.650 --> 23:09.310]  That could be fun.
[23:10.250 --> 23:10.650]  No?
[23:11.470 --> 23:13.090]  There's nowhere good for that conversation to go.
[23:13.090 --> 23:21.590]  Well, I'd like to know, okay, I never heard of this site before, and it seems kind of weird and bizarre to me, but obviously there are all kinds of websites out there.
[23:21.730 --> 23:22.710]  I'd like to know some more.
[23:22.810 --> 23:26.830]  I'd like to know some more websites that I would not think exist that actually do.
[23:26.950 --> 23:34.790]  So if people have ideas on sites that would surprise Emanuel, OTH at 2600.com, I could use a little excitement.
[23:34.930 --> 23:36.710]  And may all our inboxes rest in peace.
[23:37.070 --> 23:38.990]  I feel like that could be a very long list.
[23:39.130 --> 23:40.370]  Do you want to give some...
[23:40.370 --> 23:41.170]  Do you have one, Mike?
[23:41.330 --> 23:41.610]  Go ahead.
[23:41.690 --> 23:42.270]  Go right ahead.
[23:42.350 --> 23:42.970]  I'm here.
[23:42.970 --> 23:43.550]  I'm waiting.
[23:43.810 --> 23:46.530]  How are the people supposed to know what your expectations are?
[23:46.710 --> 23:51.890]  Oh, because I'm pretty conservative and traditional, and I'm surprised by a lot of things.
[23:52.010 --> 23:52.390]  All right.
[23:52.430 --> 23:52.610]  There.
[23:52.810 --> 23:53.170]  All right.
[23:53.310 --> 24:02.170]  I'm sure our listeners will be conservative or liberal or anything and untraditional and send us more websites than we can shake sticks at.
[24:02.630 --> 24:03.150]  All right.
[24:03.250 --> 24:23.430]  Well, speaking of websites and the hacker world and all kinds of things like that, notorious Chinese, the notorious Chinese hacker army, properly known as Dark Angels in the cyber world, have decided not to hack an IRCTC website after a failed hacking attempt yesterday.
[24:23.610 --> 24:25.450]  This story actually came out on July 17th.
[24:26.090 --> 24:42.410]  According to underground tech blogs, the Dark Angels launched a massive attack on Indian websites, specifically targeting IRCTC, the Indian Railway's website, used all possible techniques in the Black Hat book to crack the IRCTC website.
[24:42.570 --> 24:54.230]  However, after three hours of continuous hacking attempts, the Dark and Hacker Army, that's what they're known as, Dark Angels, they fell back because they were apparently unable to load any pages within five minutes.
[24:55.370 --> 25:00.490]  So, the incident has been seen as a major cyber victory by the Indian hacker community.
[25:00.650 --> 25:08.230]  An anonymous Indian hacker basically said, Dark and is notorious.
[25:08.430 --> 25:09.550]  They have no rules, no ethics.
[25:09.690 --> 25:10.530]  They hack for anyone.
[25:10.730 --> 25:14.810]  If paid properly, they can even hack their own systems.
[25:15.290 --> 25:16.610]  Plus, they are uber cool.
[25:16.790 --> 25:20.230]  They claim to have hacked some of the most secure systems around the world within seconds.
[25:20.230 --> 25:26.770]  But to see them kneel down before IRCTC was not only shocking, but was serendipitous.
[25:26.970 --> 25:31.490]  It answers so many questions on how we can effectively stop the Dark Hackers.
[25:31.630 --> 25:36.150]  He continued, Dark Hand Hackers can create all kinds of cyber tunnels and proxy-laden pathways.
[25:36.150 --> 25:44.410]  They can crack all kinds of databases, but they just can't increase the page load speeds of a website if the background server does not support that kind of a speed.
[25:44.530 --> 25:48.910]  And we hackers are habitual at working at lightning-fast speeds.
[25:48.910 --> 25:51.650]  We come in, we hack, and we are gone in 15 seconds.
[25:51.710 --> 25:57.550]  But if the page we're trying to hack takes five minutes to load, that's too much of a test of nerves for a hacker.
[25:58.190 --> 25:58.470]  Wow.
[25:58.670 --> 25:59.790]  I mean, that's fascinating.
[26:00.070 --> 26:09.290]  So the only word in that whole story that I actually understood, and it's not going to be the one you suspect, is the IRCTC, which is, it's true, the Indian train company's website for selling tickets.
[26:09.290 --> 26:10.730]  It does take a long time for them to load those pages.
[26:11.230 --> 26:15.990]  Their website is one of the few that really, I believe, deserves to be taken off the internet.
[26:15.990 --> 26:20.050]  It is almost unusable for its stated purpose of purchasing train tickets.
[26:20.210 --> 26:21.310]  You went to India, so you know this.
[26:21.410 --> 26:23.170]  Yeah, I went to India, and I could not use their website.
[26:23.350 --> 26:29.950]  I had to use a third party that somehow connects to their website and, like, makes it usable.
[26:30.870 --> 26:37.250]  It's... they need some technical skills in doing things other than changing page of the trilogy times.
[26:37.390 --> 26:38.850]  They need pages worth loading, in my view.
[26:38.850 --> 26:41.370]  Well, apart from that, have you been in touch with the Dark Angels about these?
[26:41.370 --> 26:43.430]  I didn't understand that part of the story at all.
[26:43.430 --> 26:44.450]  Well, that was the story.
[26:44.590 --> 26:45.230]  That was the whole story.
[26:45.270 --> 26:47.030]  Yeah, I'm telling you, I didn't understand the story.
[26:47.150 --> 26:50.430]  It was full of gobbledygook, as they say.
[26:50.530 --> 26:52.910]  Well, yeah, many stories that we read are full of gobbledygook.
[26:52.990 --> 26:53.290]  Right, Rob?
[26:53.490 --> 26:54.130]  Any further?
[26:54.330 --> 27:04.110]  I would just like to proudly announce that I have a jar of olives in my apartment, some nice Greek Kalamata olives, and the Dark Ant hackers have completely failed to steal any of my olives.
[27:04.250 --> 27:07.390]  So I think this is a victory for my pantry and a victory for olives everywhere.
[27:07.550 --> 27:09.190]  Well, how long does it take to load an olive?
[27:09.950 --> 27:11.250]  That depends on how you prepare it.
[27:11.430 --> 27:12.730]  It's a slow olive that I could see that.
[27:13.430 --> 27:16.950]  So anyway, this comes from the website, and I'm just starting to realize this now.
[27:17.090 --> 27:20.170]  It's called, I thought it was Faking News.
[27:20.310 --> 27:26.110]  So faking, I guess, could be interpreted to mean that the story is also faking, a fake story.
[27:26.550 --> 27:28.170]  I thought faking was a city.
[27:28.510 --> 27:29.210]  I'm sorry.
[27:29.210 --> 27:32.690]  I thought it was like a city in China or something, like Peking.
[27:33.110 --> 27:34.290]  Anyone can make this mistake.
[27:34.290 --> 27:42.870]  Point is, this story is as outrageous as stories that are not fake, just in the way that hackers are talked about.
[27:43.270 --> 27:45.970]  Yes, you can pay them a huge fee, and they'll be able to do this.
[27:46.070 --> 27:50.010]  They can do all kinds of magic to any site, anywhere.
[27:50.390 --> 27:56.890]  And just basically painting this picture that the media and mainstream movies have been trying to paint for decades.
[27:57.450 --> 28:08.170]  And there are lots of people out there that don't know the first thing about hacking, but they do know the first thing about ripping people off, and about taking down websites, and various other things that really have nothing to do with hacking.
[28:08.870 --> 28:19.790]  And they are the ones that these very same media sites and movie producers are pointing to and saying, aha, you guys are the real hackers, and we're going to make more movies and write more stories about you.
[28:20.590 --> 28:23.130]  In this case, though, the whole thing was made up.
[28:23.270 --> 28:24.530]  So I feel better about that.
[28:24.610 --> 28:26.190]  Bernie, any thoughts from your end?
[28:27.230 --> 28:29.930]  You mean another made-up story in the media?
[28:30.470 --> 28:32.650]  Yeah, except this one is proud of the fact that it's fake.
[28:36.070 --> 28:38.950]  Well, I'd say we need to check our sources, that's all.
[28:40.130 --> 28:42.790]  Yes, that's always good to be able to do that.
[28:43.790 --> 28:46.150]  All right, so other things that have been going on.
[28:46.590 --> 28:49.570]  The other big story, I guess, is the one about the cars.
[28:50.250 --> 28:51.450]  You heard about this?
[28:51.450 --> 29:01.130]  This is a big Wired story about these hackers that, basically, the headline reads, Hackers remotely kill a Jeep on the highway with me in it.
[29:01.450 --> 29:05.810]  I'll just read a little bit of this, because it's very long, very detailed.
[29:05.830 --> 29:06.570]  Interesting story.
[29:06.570 --> 29:12.490]  I was driving 70 miles per hour on the edge of downtown St. Louis when the exploit began to take hold.
[29:12.950 --> 29:23.410]  Though I hadn't touched the dashboard, the vents in the Jeep Cherokee started blasting cold air at the maximum setting, chilling the sweat on my back through the in-seat climate control system.
[29:23.410 --> 29:28.270]  Next, the radio switched to the local hip-hop station and began blaring Ski-Lo at full volume.
[29:28.730 --> 29:32.290]  I spun the control knob left and hit the power button to no avail.
[29:32.470 --> 29:33.690]  Seemed awfully quick to do that.
[29:33.930 --> 29:37.650]  Then the windshield wipers turned on and wiper fluid blurred the glass.
[29:38.090 --> 29:44.390]  As I tried to cope with all this, a picture of the two hackers performing these stunts appeared on the car's digital display.
[29:45.010 --> 29:48.790]  Charlie Miller and Chris Valasek wearing their trademark track suits.
[29:48.950 --> 29:49.950]  A nice touch, I thought.
[29:50.790 --> 30:04.590]  But basically, this guy, Andy Greenberg, the writer of the piece, said he'd come to St. Louis to be a digital crash test dummy, a willing subject on whom these guys could test their car hacking research that they've been performing over the past year.
[30:05.130 --> 30:16.570]  The result of their work was a hacking technique, what the security industry calls a zero-day exploit, that can target Jeep Cherokees and give the attacker wireless control via the internet to any of thousands of vehicles.
[30:16.570 --> 30:29.170]  Their code is an automaker's nightmare, software that lets hackers send commands through the Jeep's entertainment system to its dashboard function, steering, brakes, transmission, all from a laptop that may be on the other side of the country.
[30:30.410 --> 30:45.090]  Now, to better simulate the experience of driving a vehicle while it's being hijacked by an invisible virtual force, these two guys, Miller and Valasek, refused to tell me ahead of time what kinds of attacks they planned to launch from Miller's laptop in his house,
[30:45.210 --> 30:46.350]  which was 10 miles west.
[30:47.250 --> 30:51.010]  Instead, they merely assured me they wouldn't do anything life-threatening.
[30:51.770 --> 30:54.070]  Then they told me to drive the Jeep onto the highway.
[30:54.250 --> 31:02.430]  Remember, Andy, Miller had said through my iPhone speaker just before I pulled onto the i40 on-ramp, no matter what happens, don't panic.
[31:02.790 --> 31:11.570]  And as the two hackers remotely toyed with the air-conditioning radio and windshield wipers, I mentally congratulated myself on my courage under pressure, and that's when they cut the transmission.
[31:12.570 --> 31:14.530]  My accelerator immediately stopped working.
[31:14.530 --> 31:17.110]  I frantically pressed the pedal, watched the RPMs climb.
[31:17.110 --> 31:19.550]  The Jeep lost half its speed, then slowed through a crawl.
[31:20.010 --> 31:23.730]  And this occurred just as I reached a long overpass with no shoulder to offer an escape.
[31:23.890 --> 31:26.210]  The experiment had ceased to be fun, et cetera, et cetera.
[31:26.270 --> 31:42.990]  This goes on for many, many pages about the various risks and dangers this person was exposed to, and how many cars, many automobiles, many motor vehicles in general, trucks included, are being subjected to this.
[31:43.250 --> 31:47.430]  Well, let's start with thoughts as to what all this means, guys.
[31:48.770 --> 31:50.890]  I really liked Stephen King's book, Christine.
[31:52.010 --> 31:52.270]  Okay.
[31:53.130 --> 31:54.550]  I mean, yeah, don't...
[31:54.750 --> 31:58.050]  Don't connect cars to the internet seems like a fairly reasonable...
[31:58.050 --> 31:58.690]  Yeah, I don't get that.
[31:58.990 --> 32:03.350]  Why would anyone want to connect their car in this manner?
[32:03.350 --> 32:06.010]  Why would auto manufacturers be doing this in the first place?
[32:06.050 --> 32:11.210]  Of course somebody's going to come along and figure out a way to hack a vehicle.
[32:11.330 --> 32:23.970]  Just like if an airplane we talked about weeks ago is able to be controlled by somebody connecting on Wi-Fi, either on the plane or on the ground, someone is eventually going to do it.
[32:24.010 --> 32:25.730]  And we deserve to know that, too.
[32:26.050 --> 32:36.550]  I mean, yeah, we claimed, I think, still, that what the airplane claimed was not possible because they separate the avionics from anything that passengers can access.
[32:37.030 --> 32:39.290]  The car people should do the same thing.
[32:39.510 --> 32:40.230]  It seems...
[32:40.230 --> 32:42.810]  I wish I had more to say on the topic.
[32:42.850 --> 32:51.990]  Yeah, I wish I understood the mentality of people designing these things that don't perform these common-sense tasks and separate various networks.
[32:52.210 --> 32:53.130]  Bernie, any thoughts from you?
[32:54.070 --> 33:03.690]  Yeah, well, obviously, you're both right on this, but the motivating factor for having cars connected to the Internet all the time is greed.
[33:04.430 --> 33:22.570]  The auto manufacturers want to be able to sell services to third parties, to both the car owners and the third parties, that basically require constant connection, like services that serve you based on your location or what you're listening to in real time on the Internet.
[33:23.450 --> 33:27.970]  They want to turn your car into a cell phone, basically, is what these auto manufacturers want to do.
[33:28.270 --> 33:39.430]  Yeah, but Bernie, do they have to make it so that people can control the accelerator or the air conditioning, just so people can browse the net?
[33:40.050 --> 33:41.710]  No, but once you connect...
[33:41.710 --> 33:46.030]  I agree with Mike that there should be two separate networks on the car.
[33:46.150 --> 33:57.630]  There's probably a lot of networks in the car, but the network that controls how the car operates, the driving and all that, that should not at all be connected with any of the Internet stuff, but apparently it is.
[33:57.690 --> 34:04.130]  Maybe it's for remote maintenance, so the auto manufacturers can perform remote diagnostics and stuff.
[34:04.330 --> 34:08.050]  But it's obviously a dangerous idea, and now we're seeing it happen.
[34:08.050 --> 34:23.750]  I think it's the first time, I think Jen's pointed out, this is the first time we've seen where this is getting sophisticated enough for fully remote access to cars' control systems via the Internet as possible, like controlling the driving, the braking,
[34:24.250 --> 34:24.930]  all that.
[34:26.250 --> 34:29.890]  So I think this is a new plateau in this.
[34:30.210 --> 34:32.210]  Yeah, it's exactly that.
[34:32.610 --> 34:44.970]  The distinction, I think, for this stuff is that those switches and buttons used to be electrical, so that you'd physically connect a circuit, and you couldn't reassign them in any way.
[34:45.430 --> 34:53.110]  And what these systems, what these hacks are about is basically activating a switch without actually pressing the switch.
[34:53.270 --> 35:00.370]  You're, like, reassigning control, and they're given that assignment based on a network within the car.
[35:00.510 --> 35:03.790]  And there could be, as you said, multiple networks within the car.
[35:03.970 --> 35:07.070]  I think it's CAN bus is the protocol that's used.
[35:07.310 --> 35:15.070]  But there's a lot of that stuff going on, and so you can activate something by accessing that loop.
[35:15.090 --> 35:22.310]  It's sort of like a loop of information that's constantly cycling, like a processor would cycle.
[35:23.130 --> 35:35.890]  And if you could get something to switch in that data that's going around, kind of checking different sensors constantly at a very high frequency, you could slip something in that actually activates something.
[35:36.210 --> 35:40.170]  Yeah, I mean, and this is all fine until you hook it up to the Internet, and then you get problems like this.
[35:40.490 --> 35:40.770]  Yeah, yeah.
[35:40.930 --> 35:48.510]  And I think that's the crux of it, is having these entertainment systems and, like, not building in some separation.
[35:48.650 --> 35:50.390]  And that's the real problem.
[35:50.510 --> 35:56.050]  And it's touted, and we're going to see more of this, and I think that's the big mental thing.
[35:56.330 --> 36:01.150]  The letting go of, like, having an autonomous vehicle drive you someplace.
[36:01.250 --> 36:05.650]  I think for a lot of people, that's going to be difficult, because not only could some...
[36:05.650 --> 36:21.090]  You know, already with semi-autonomous vehicles, couldn't you have this kind of interruption and malicious stuff going on to say nothing of, like, bugs and things in the future in automated, like, fully automatic cars, and the kinds of malicious things that could go on as well with that.
[36:21.090 --> 36:35.830]  If you've just completely stopped monitoring the car and given yourself entirely to this system, you're going to be a lot less able to intervene and jump in, because you're basically entrusting this thing to never fail.
[36:35.830 --> 36:37.890]  Well, you know, we drove in today.
[36:38.170 --> 36:44.790]  We drove in a car, and we used a GPS system to navigate to tell us the best way to go.
[36:45.630 --> 36:55.750]  That GPS system was not tied into the actual car, so that didn't actually connect in any way remotely.
[36:56.070 --> 37:01.150]  It was through a cellular phone, as was connectivity to the internet.
[37:01.330 --> 37:05.350]  Right, so that's what Bernie was saying about how these systems and services are sold to you.
[37:05.530 --> 37:09.990]  Like, the car makers are already putting a lot of the basics in, right?
[37:10.090 --> 37:11.870]  They've got power through the alternator.
[37:12.070 --> 37:17.190]  They've got all these, like, sound systems and infotainment, as it's called.
[37:17.350 --> 37:22.990]  They are already a lot of the way there as far as computing power in the vehicle's systems.
[37:23.310 --> 37:29.150]  And then they know that we're bringing our own communication devices in, and so they want you to have connectivity.
[37:29.350 --> 37:31.670]  They're offering access points now in a lot of cars.
[37:31.670 --> 37:47.070]  So it's like these additional packages they can sell you so that you have this seamless thing in your life where everything is just a joy, and you go from here to there with your phone, and it just follows you, and everything connects, and it works great.
[37:47.290 --> 37:49.590]  It sounds awesome, right?
[37:49.730 --> 38:02.370]  But it is building this sort of control into the design, and, like, building it in without a thought to people maybe not wanting that.
[38:02.370 --> 38:04.450]  I don't know if that speaks to...
[38:04.450 --> 38:15.410]  Yeah, I mean, anyone in IT will tell you that if you hook anything up to the Internet, you know, a brand-new computer or a car or a phone or a toaster or what have you, you hook anything up to the Internet and leave it connected long enough just doing nothing,
[38:15.910 --> 38:19.470]  and because it's on an IP range somewhere, it will find itself the target of attacks.
[38:19.890 --> 38:24.050]  So it behooves us to maybe consider before we hook something up into the...
[38:24.430 --> 38:27.230]  something up to the Internet, like, what's going to happen when this gets attacked?
[38:27.230 --> 38:28.550]  What's going to happen when this gets broken?
[38:28.830 --> 38:34.850]  Is it going to actually put somebody in physical danger, such as if it's, for some reason, hooked to the control systems of a car?
[38:34.970 --> 38:40.590]  We hooked a free BSD machine up the other day and, you know, on an IP that had not been used before.
[38:40.770 --> 38:47.230]  Inside of 10 minutes, there was a connection, some kind of an attempt being made by an IP in China.
[38:47.550 --> 38:48.550]  It does happen.
[38:48.910 --> 38:54.430]  And, you know, this particular case was controlled, but imagine an uncontrolled scenario.
[38:54.690 --> 39:07.170]  And I also find it interesting, too, that this is part of the story, that Senators Ed Markey and Richard Blumenthal plan to introduce an automotive security bill to set new digital security standards for cars and trucks.
[39:07.290 --> 39:23.130]  Now, I'll bet, especially since Ed Markey is involved, that what this is going to be in actuality is just a way of criminalizing attempts to show the security fallibilities of vehicles like this and won't do a damn thing to actually make them safer.
[39:23.370 --> 39:24.750]  Bernie, am I being a bit too harsh?
[39:24.750 --> 39:24.830]  Josh?
[39:27.810 --> 39:28.130]  Bernie?
[39:30.870 --> 39:31.690]  Can you hear me now?
[39:31.690 --> 39:32.230]  I hear you now.
[39:32.230 --> 39:33.270]  What's going on with your phone this time?
[39:33.310 --> 39:34.510]  I had my cough button on.
[39:34.610 --> 39:34.950]  I was coughing.
[39:35.290 --> 39:35.410]  Oh.
[39:35.630 --> 39:40.770]  Yeah, you and I know you and Senator Markey go way back decades.
[39:41.030 --> 39:41.830]  We have a history, yes.
[39:41.830 --> 39:56.790]  I would not be surprised that part of his agenda is to provide extremely harsh sentences for anyone who would expose the security of an automobile connected to the internet.
[39:57.010 --> 40:03.230]  By the way, we should note that this vehicle in the story was not connected directly to the internet.
[40:03.230 --> 40:11.310]  The vulnerability came through Sprint's wireless network, not directly over the internet.
[40:11.510 --> 40:12.230]  It was just...
[40:12.230 --> 40:13.010]  It was only...
[40:13.010 --> 40:20.750]  These only cars that were vulnerable for this particular hack had to be on Sprint's wireless intranet.
[40:21.010 --> 40:23.130]  But, you know, it's a very similar story.
[40:23.130 --> 40:27.110]  So, what, the car was connected to Sprint?
[40:28.210 --> 40:30.150]  Yes, and the hacker had to be...
[40:30.150 --> 40:37.650]  had to actually be using a Sprint cell phone to get the internet connectivity through which they could access the vehicle's control systems.
[40:37.690 --> 40:39.890]  They could not have done it directly through the internet.
[40:40.070 --> 40:41.030]  They had to be on...
[40:41.030 --> 40:43.130]  The attacker had to be on a...
[40:43.130 --> 40:45.430]  get the internet connectivity through a Sprint phone.
[40:45.610 --> 40:46.710]  That's what the story said.
[40:46.770 --> 40:51.230]  Yeah, but isn't the point of entry the car and not Sprint?
[40:52.570 --> 41:04.770]  The point of entry was the Sprint cellular connection to the car, through which Sprint is the gateway to the Internet, but apparently the vulnerability was only possible.
[41:05.010 --> 41:12.130]  And the hackers said this, that the only way they could get to this car was through Sprint's mobile network.
[41:12.130 --> 41:16.230]  But, you know, there's a lot of cars on Sprint's mobile network.
[41:16.430 --> 41:20.650]  There's the cell phone in the car that controls the...
[41:20.650 --> 41:25.690]  Bernie, this seems to me a distinction without a difference, as far as I can tell.
[41:25.990 --> 41:27.350]  It came over IP.
[41:28.090 --> 41:36.210]  Whether Sprint does something to make it harder from non-Sprint networks or not today doesn't tell us anything about the lessons for tomorrow.
[41:37.730 --> 41:47.610]  I said, it's a matter of semantics, but it wasn't... the car was not immediately available to everybody over the Internet, only through people that access the Internet through Sprint's network.
[41:47.770 --> 41:49.810]  But I agree, it's still bad.
[41:50.450 --> 41:55.590]  I mean, people with Sprint's network, as anyone with, I don't know what they charge, 30 bucks or something, it's... who cares?
[41:56.030 --> 42:00.030]  Yeah, I just wanted to point out, too, that this was a demonstration for a journalist.
[42:00.370 --> 42:04.830]  This was not that they had done someone as a prank or anything.
[42:06.430 --> 42:08.370]  Or... and so on and so forth.
[42:08.490 --> 42:12.250]  Like, that's the preamble in the article that we were reading.
[42:12.970 --> 42:18.630]  But you can only imagine what the impact would be elsewhere.
[42:18.910 --> 42:25.830]  But just, you know, next time you see a car commercial, or if you, you know, if you really think about it, the implications are pretty profound.
[42:25.830 --> 42:34.590]  And, um, the, the, the clamoring, you know, I had someone try to demonstrate a, a car that parks itself for me the other day.
[42:34.610 --> 42:42.150]  Like, it was, uh, really funny, because they were, like, hot-shotting around in their new car, and they're like, oh, yeah, all right, check this out.
[42:42.230 --> 42:43.010]  And I knew it was coming.
[42:43.130 --> 42:45.270]  I was like, oh, this is, this is when it's gonna park itself.
[42:45.430 --> 42:46.330]  And it didn't do anything.
[42:46.470 --> 42:47.110]  It totally...
[42:47.110 --> 42:47.610]  It didn't even work.
[42:47.610 --> 42:48.190]  It broke.
[42:48.390 --> 42:49.310]  It was really embarrassing.
[42:49.650 --> 42:51.210]  And you wind up with people who don't know how to park.
[42:51.350 --> 42:51.710]  Yeah.
[42:51.710 --> 42:53.490]  You know, and, and they rely on this kind of thing.
[42:53.570 --> 42:54.430]  And then they need this.
[42:54.530 --> 42:56.190]  They need this to get, uh, to get by.
[42:56.310 --> 42:58.010]  But the thing is, yeah, you're talking about implications.
[42:58.270 --> 43:01.190]  And one of the biggest implications in a story like this...
[43:01.190 --> 43:02.750]  Okay, we're talking about pranksters.
[43:02.870 --> 43:04.690]  We're talking about people demonstrating for journalists.
[43:05.170 --> 43:17.150]  How about when this becomes the norm a few years from now, uh, or it becomes implemented in other places around the world, you have authorities that are able to pretty much control your car whenever they want to.
[43:17.610 --> 43:22.530]  Uh, run you off the road if necessary, or at least slow you down quite a bit so they can catch up to you.
[43:22.630 --> 43:24.010]  They don't need to even arrest you.
[43:24.190 --> 43:29.150]  They'll just drive you to the police station and drop you off at processing and have you, you know, checked in and everything.
[43:29.270 --> 43:29.650]  You're fine.
[43:29.970 --> 43:31.810]  We laugh, but this kind of thing is what they're thinking about.
[43:31.890 --> 43:37.810]  A car then parks itself over at Impound and then, uh, goes through a car wash and then gets resold and auctioned.
[43:37.890 --> 43:39.970]  And the people are lapping it up, you know?
[43:40.170 --> 43:44.510]  It's, that's what really pisses me off so much is that people don't see the risks here.
[43:45.010 --> 43:46.570]  And, uh, that's what hackers do.
[43:46.650 --> 43:47.510]  They point out the risks.
[43:47.610 --> 43:49.190]  And, and these guys did a very good job.
[43:49.310 --> 43:52.370]  These guys did exactly the right thing by demonstrating it.
[43:52.490 --> 43:54.090]  They've been in touch with the manufacturers.
[43:54.550 --> 43:59.690]  Uh, but, um, the design of this, wow, you know, who, who thinks of these things?
[44:00.430 --> 44:01.250]  Indeed, indeed.
[44:01.530 --> 44:18.870]  And, uh, the, the design, I think, and this, to speak to some of the, the other things, I think that, that we would like to see and that we've talked about on the show with regard to this is, um, the licensing attribute and the lack of access to actually go in and work with some of these systems.
[44:18.990 --> 44:35.750]  So the very systems that are giving you a bunch of features and a bunch of, um, sort of new territory of functionality with your vehicle and also, oh, by the way, could make you vulnerable in, in, in these sort of, um, um, uh, hacking, uh, exploit type of ways.
[44:36.190 --> 44:49.990]  Um, these are the same computer systems that you don't get any information about if you'd like to say, uh, uh, upgrade the software or, uh, optimize it for a fuel economy or, or any of those things, uh, you're locked out of these systems.
[44:49.990 --> 44:57.350]  So here it goes, it's ongoing, it's dead, it's developing, it's getting richer and more connected and bigger, badder beast.
[44:57.610 --> 45:13.330]  And you can't actually, um, go through and just maybe take your older model and, and have it maintained and, and continue to function because they, they want to cycle more customers through new vehicles and, and other, uh, with that are then, you know,
[45:14.050 --> 45:25.930]  embracing all this other technology and you still can't fun, you still can't, um, functionally mess with it to, to, uh, get past, you know, to, to legally modify things.
[45:26.070 --> 45:27.870]  And, and it's, it's, it's crazy.
[45:28.250 --> 45:34.530]  That's the ultimate irony is that all of this is wide open and, and, and the, the rightful owners of the cars can't get the access they need to fix this.
[45:34.590 --> 45:51.510]  So I think it's criminal that whoever that politician is saying is like that if they, if it was like some kind of thing where you're preventing people from responsibly disclosing these kinds of vulnerabilities, that just makes me so, uh, sort of enraged as a possibility because for years,
[45:51.650 --> 46:00.530]  even on very simple systems that do have vehicle computers, we have not as independent mechanics been able to modify these software systems legally.
[46:00.530 --> 46:02.250]  And it's, it's a big problem.
[46:02.390 --> 46:11.790]  And, uh, so here we are, they're getting even more crazy and well, I guess we're going to continue to keep owners and hacker owners from, from making things work right.
[46:11.790 --> 46:22.690]  In fairness, though, the, the politicians have not said, at least as far as I know, that, uh, that they're going to attack the messenger rather than the, uh, the vulnerabilities, but history has taught us that that's the way it goes.
[46:22.770 --> 46:38.610]  Remember the ECPA of, uh, was it 1986, Bernie, when, when, uh, the, the reaction to people being able to listen in on cellular phone calls on their UHF TV channels and scanners, uh, was not to make it more secure, was not to encrypt it, was to simply make it illegal to listen.
[46:39.850 --> 46:51.670]  And to make, and to give, and to give, uh, consumers a false sense of security so that, uh, corporations could, uh, reassure them that everything's safe because it's illegal to do this, you know?
[46:51.830 --> 46:54.970]  Just remember, too, the stuff, it just, it comes at a cost.
[46:55.090 --> 46:56.130]  There's a cost somewhere.
[46:56.490 --> 47:03.750]  And, uh, and, uh, you know, it's, it's, uh, it may sound nice, but remember, these people are in the business of selling cars.
[47:03.750 --> 47:11.010]  I mean, uh, let's not criticize the bill till we know what's in it, um, but you're, you're right that these people are in the business of selling cars.
[47:11.150 --> 47:18.870]  And I think, uh, you're reminding me that is, that is precisely the reason why it is so important that we do not have advertisements on this program.
[47:19.410 --> 47:27.690]  Um, it is not a stretch to say that a car company might want to sponsor us and we would possibly be in a position where it'd be hard to say no.
[47:28.110 --> 47:31.250]  And then we would not be able to continue to do this type of reporting.
[47:31.250 --> 47:37.550]  So if you want us to continue to be able to provide this type of analysis, 212-209-2950 is the number to call.
[47:37.730 --> 47:42.210]  You pledge $50, you'll get the calendar with lots of stuff on it.
[47:42.390 --> 47:47.110]  Maybe we'll put next year's calendar, the, uh, the day that the, this vulnerability was revealed.
[47:47.230 --> 47:54.730]  I don't know, but, uh, this is the kind of thing that we can bring to you thanks to your direct support that we couldn't do with corporate support.
[47:54.890 --> 47:58.290]  And by calling that number, you're supporting this kind of conversation.
[47:58.290 --> 48:12.490]  You're supporting, uh, the, um, uh, the, the, the basic philosophy we have of exposing vulnerabilities, reporting them, sharing them, not doing what this alleged hacking team bunch of jerks were, were doing over the last, uh, few years.
[48:12.650 --> 48:14.270]  They sound like a motorcycle gang.
[48:14.410 --> 48:16.010]  They, they have nothing to do with hacking.
[48:16.190 --> 48:21.990]  They basically would, would sell exploits, keep them to themselves and, and, and basically intimidate other people.
[48:22.370 --> 48:25.170]  Can you imagine what they would do if they were the first ones to get this vulnerability?
[48:25.170 --> 48:25.630]  Exactly.
[48:25.770 --> 48:25.870]  Yeah.
[48:25.970 --> 48:31.570]  They would sell this vulnerability to governments and, uh, maybe corporations and control people that way.
[48:31.670 --> 48:34.170]  And, and, and people will be the last to ever find out about this.
[48:34.250 --> 48:46.630]  What hackers do, they tell the people through, through our magazine, through this radio show, through countless conferences that go on throughout the world, hackers are always exposing things and usually getting in trouble for it because the people in,
[48:46.670 --> 48:52.610]  in power are really afraid of losing control by having somebody tell them, Hey, this isn't working.
[48:52.770 --> 48:54.330]  It's not working the way you think it works.
[48:54.470 --> 48:56.110]  You're wasting a lot of money on this.
[48:56.330 --> 48:58.110]  Uh, what you're saying makes no sense.
[48:58.190 --> 48:59.830]  People don't like to hear that if they're in control.
[49:00.190 --> 49:03.330]  Uh, and that's pretty much what hackers are constantly saying.
[49:03.450 --> 49:09.010]  You know, the kid that said the emperor has no clothes, that was one of the first hackers, whoever that was, whatever fairy tale that was.
[49:09.390 --> 49:12.330]  Um, just to finish up this story here.
[49:12.670 --> 49:23.670]  Um, this is all possible because Chrysler, like practically all car makers is doing its best to turn the modern automobile into a smartphone.
[49:24.790 --> 49:32.930]  You connect, the letter you connect, uh, an internet connected computer feature in hundreds of thousands of Fiat Chrysler cars.
[49:33.090 --> 49:34.310]  What Fiat is part of Chrysler?
[49:34.510 --> 49:35.190]  Is that true, Kyle?
[49:35.450 --> 49:35.650]  Yeah.
[49:35.810 --> 49:36.070]  Oh yeah.
[49:36.150 --> 49:36.270]  Yeah.
[49:36.370 --> 49:42.170]  That was like a big, um, part of the bailing out of the auto companies that, uh, yeah, Chrysler was sold to Fiat.
[49:42.330 --> 49:42.910]  Oh boy.
[49:43.210 --> 49:43.370]  Okay.
[49:43.450 --> 49:55.690]  Well hundreds of thousands of Fiat Chrysler cars, SUVs and trucks, uh, controls the, uh, you connect that is controls the vehicle's entertainment and navigation, enables phone calls, even offers a wifi hotspot.
[49:55.930 --> 50:12.950]  And thanks to one vulnerable element, which, uh, Miller and Valisek will identify at the Black Hat conference later on this summer in Vegas, uh, you connects cellular connection also lets anyone who knows the car's IP address gain access from anywhere in the country.
[50:13.010 --> 50:15.190]  How hard do you think it is to find out a car's IP address?
[50:15.430 --> 50:18.790]  Uh, from an attacker's perspective, it's a super nice vulnerability.
[50:19.070 --> 50:20.410]  Well, this vulnerability will be history.
[50:20.590 --> 50:22.410]  They'll fix it, but there will be more.
[50:22.650 --> 50:28.290]  And every time we agree that, yeah, you know, we should have this connectivity.
[50:28.290 --> 50:30.410]  We should attach this network to that network.
[50:31.030 --> 50:34.050]  You're opening yourself up to, to more of this kind of thing.
[50:34.210 --> 50:43.630]  And, and, and the more critical and, and, and important something is like an airline, like a car, um, like even your, your environmental controls in your home.
[50:43.950 --> 50:51.370]  If you open this up so that it is vulnerable to outsiders or, or to, uh, any kind of an exploit, at some point you'll pay the price.
[50:51.870 --> 50:52.310]  Yeah.
[50:52.370 --> 50:59.390]  I mean, they're going to fix this vulnerability, but the proposed fix is to like send you a USB stick or, or make you download something to your own USB stick.
[50:59.470 --> 51:07.270]  It's absolutely nuts to pretend that any sizable percentage of normal people are actually going to bother to upgrade the computer security of their automobiles.
[51:07.650 --> 51:09.730]  So they'll, yeah, you're right.
[51:09.810 --> 51:15.310]  A fix is out, but this cars with this vulnerability will be on the road for many years to come.
[51:15.470 --> 51:19.310]  Of course, a simple fix for the vulnerability would be to unplug the damn thing from the outside world.
[51:20.130 --> 51:21.530]  Well, isn't that what they said in war games?
[51:21.650 --> 51:22.450]  Can't you just unplug it?
[51:22.550 --> 51:23.750]  And they couldn't, of course.
[51:25.030 --> 51:26.770]  I think that's going to be the quote for the next decade.
[51:26.870 --> 51:27.770]  Can't you just unplug it?
[51:27.910 --> 51:29.810]  Sometimes the only way to win is not to play at all.
[51:30.010 --> 51:31.430]  So that too, that too.
[51:31.630 --> 51:32.750]  That applies here as well.
[51:32.890 --> 51:34.150]  Hey, we're almost out of time.
[51:34.750 --> 51:37.750]  Uh, 212-209-2950 is our pledge line.
[51:37.910 --> 51:38.870]  We're not here next week.
[51:39.530 --> 51:46.230]  And, um, uh, this is our summer drive, a very short drive, but an important one because all drives are important at WBAI.
[51:46.470 --> 51:48.890]  Um, we, uh, just dropped off a bunch of premiums.
[51:48.950 --> 51:52.510]  Those of you who, uh, pledged for the hacker, um, uh, what'd we call that, Kyle?
[51:52.630 --> 51:56.510]  It was the hacker, uh, um, uh, that bag or something.
[51:56.810 --> 51:59.030]  That was the, uh, informal name.
[51:59.190 --> 51:59.590]  Yes.
[51:59.830 --> 52:04.670]  Uh, it was called the, uh, random pack of hacker stuff.
[52:04.670 --> 52:06.510]  I believe it was something like that.
[52:06.550 --> 52:09.130]  It was a collection of hacker items.
[52:09.310 --> 52:10.790]  It was something of that nature.
[52:10.850 --> 52:10.990]  Yeah.
[52:11.070 --> 52:13.330]  We just dropped those off here is what we're trying to say.
[52:13.490 --> 52:14.790]  So those will be going out soon.
[52:14.970 --> 52:18.270]  And again, uh, we can't say for sure what people will get.
[52:18.390 --> 52:19.930]  You'll, you'll definitely get some things.
[52:19.990 --> 52:21.010]  You might get other things.
[52:21.490 --> 52:27.230]  Uh, it's basically, um, stuff that was available from other, uh, fun drives and it proved to be very popular.
[52:27.230 --> 52:28.950]  Went in about 10 minutes, I think.
[52:29.470 --> 52:34.330]  Uh, so if you pledge for that last, um, last spring, this spring, uh, you'll be getting that soon.
[52:34.450 --> 52:35.610]  Other premiums on the way as well.
[52:35.810 --> 52:35.910]  Yeah.
[52:35.990 --> 52:38.670]  Every single one is definitely worth what you pledge for it.
[52:38.710 --> 52:42.750]  We, we put a lot of stuff in there, crammed them, uh, full of, of good stuff.
[52:42.870 --> 52:45.410]  So hopefully everybody gets those soon and, uh, is happy.
[52:45.550 --> 52:48.650]  And just to, just to, um, to show folks things do change.
[52:49.070 --> 52:51.090]  Um, a year ago we were very frustrated.
[52:51.290 --> 52:56.050]  We, we didn't have the right kind of, uh, response, uh, to get the premiums out to people.
[52:56.190 --> 52:57.170]  And now we're on top of it.
[52:57.710 --> 52:58.590]  The station's on top of it.
[52:58.650 --> 52:59.370]  Things are improving.
[52:59.670 --> 53:02.690]  We're here in Brooklyn and, uh, it's just going to keep getting better.
[53:02.950 --> 53:11.250]  Hey, last, last week was really cool because last week the, uh, the cafe downstairs was open and we actually had a post show beer.
[53:11.430 --> 53:12.350]  Yeah, we can do that.
[53:12.450 --> 53:15.370]  A tradition that I hope becomes a weekly tradition.
[53:15.850 --> 53:16.630]  Yeah, it's cool.
[53:16.770 --> 53:22.150]  It's a tremendous, uh, sense of community to have, uh, concessions and stuff, uh, on site.
[53:22.310 --> 53:24.550]  And this is a really, really cool space.
[53:24.750 --> 53:28.510]  Uh, I can't wait for the, um, fish fry and, uh, barbecue.
[53:29.230 --> 53:29.590]  Okay.
[53:30.190 --> 53:32.870]  I'm sure that, uh, that will be on the way too.
[53:33.050 --> 53:36.290]  Hey, um, let's, uh, read a couple of letters where we're pretty much out of time.
[53:36.550 --> 53:39.190]  Our email address, OTH at 2600.com.
[53:39.310 --> 53:39.990]  Here's a letter from Phil.
[53:40.490 --> 53:43.110]  Uh, great show guys throughout the CWBAI continuing on.
[53:43.270 --> 53:48.470]  I definitely will be giving again this drive and Phil, you know, we can check, we can see if you, uh, we make good on that promise.
[53:49.050 --> 53:52.270]  Um, anyway, I love to hear about the healthcare hack.
[53:52.910 --> 53:57.050]  Um, I, I love Emmanuel's definition of hacking, hack everything.
[53:57.370 --> 53:58.010]  Is that my definition?
[53:58.330 --> 53:59.770]  Well, it, it, it works for me.
[53:59.930 --> 54:01.150]  That's a short version.
[54:01.290 --> 54:01.490]  Okay.
[54:01.750 --> 54:06.630]  Uh, I want to hear the continued details of Kyle's hand and if Canada's healthcare is really any better.
[54:06.870 --> 54:07.930]  Kyle, how is your hand?
[54:08.030 --> 54:09.230]  You're still cast up there.
[54:09.790 --> 54:18.630]  It's, uh, it's, uh, still attached and, uh, um, uh, it's, it's progressing and I think it will heal soon.
[54:18.710 --> 54:21.490]  We're going to sneak across the border and try and get the cast looked at.
[54:21.550 --> 54:24.230]  Yeah, we'll, we'll try to take some more pictures of it down here.
[54:24.350 --> 54:27.650]  We got to find a, an x-ray machine we can borrow some time on.
[54:27.810 --> 54:28.690]  Your nail turned blue.
[54:28.770 --> 54:29.250]  Is that healthy?
[54:30.070 --> 54:30.630]  Oh yeah.
[54:30.890 --> 54:31.970]  No, that one's symbolic.
[54:32.310 --> 54:36.950]  It's just because there's so much graffiti on, on my hand, I extended it to one of my fingernails.
[54:37.030 --> 54:37.610]  That's decorative.
[54:37.890 --> 54:39.050]  Yeah, there's a lot of writing on that cast.
[54:39.050 --> 54:42.490]  It's a good tradition, good tradition to, uh, to sign, uh, people's casts like that.
[54:43.130 --> 54:43.910]  Um, okay.
[54:44.050 --> 54:44.710]  We're out of time.
[54:44.810 --> 54:45.730]  Bernie, any last words from you?
[54:46.710 --> 54:59.210]  I just want to thank our listeners for listening and, uh, if they want to keep listening to this show, um, please express your support by calling, uh, WBII support line 212-209-2950.
[54:59.210 --> 55:00.290]  We appreciate it.
[55:00.730 --> 55:03.470]  And thanks to everybody who has called in so far.
[55:03.590 --> 55:08.570]  And thanks to those of you who are, uh, stumbling over yourselves to get to the phone to make that phone call.
[55:08.970 --> 55:15.170]  Uh, or if you're driving, you can maybe use your smartphone slash car to, uh, call us as well, but do it safely.
[55:15.350 --> 55:19.890]  Again, 212-209-2950 is our phone number for off the hook.
[55:20.270 --> 55:21.150]  This is Emmanuel.
[55:21.350 --> 55:22.630]  We will see you in two weeks.
[55:22.770 --> 55:26.950]  Again, write to us, OTH at 2600.com.
[55:27.070 --> 55:27.550]  Have a good night.