[00:00.000 --> 00:03.640]  I think it's meaning to fight back, and I think that's exactly what we're seeing.
[00:03.840 --> 00:07.100]  Tune in to The Morning Show, Monday through Friday, from 6 to 8 a.m.
[00:07.140 --> 00:19.840]  What we're seeing is that there is wide-scale concern about the impact that both the revelations of surveillance that we know about, but also just the threat more generally, is having on journalists and on their sources.
[00:20.080 --> 00:26.160]  Only on WBAI 99.5 FM and online at WBAI.org.
[00:27.260 --> 00:29.700]  WBAI, your true community alternative.
[00:31.860 --> 00:37.340]  And this is your true community alternative, WBAI New York, where the time is just about 7 o'clock.
[00:37.900 --> 00:39.020]  Hey, look, it's Wednesday.
[00:39.220 --> 00:41.320]  That means it's time for Off the Hook.
[02:21.100 --> 02:22.900]  And a very good evening to everybody.
[02:22.900 --> 02:24.680]  The program is Off the Hook.
[02:24.820 --> 02:28.080]  Emmanuel Goldstein here with you on this Wednesday evening.
[02:28.620 --> 02:29.720]  Joined tonight by Rob T.
[02:29.860 --> 02:30.260]  Firefly.
[02:30.500 --> 02:30.880]  Good evening.
[02:31.140 --> 02:31.380]  Kyle.
[02:31.760 --> 02:32.160]  Hi there.
[02:32.520 --> 02:33.020]  Wait a minute.
[02:33.080 --> 02:33.960]  Why aren't you working?
[02:34.220 --> 02:35.360]  I'm not sure.
[02:35.960 --> 02:36.680]  Ah, this week.
[02:36.720 --> 02:37.960]  What's the issue this week?
[02:38.500 --> 02:40.340]  Okay, I hear you when you tap your mic.
[02:40.500 --> 02:41.160]  I don't hear you when you...
[02:41.160 --> 02:42.740]  But you can't hear me when I raise my voice.
[02:42.740 --> 02:45.960]  Not well enough to actually...
[02:46.420 --> 02:47.220]  This is...
[02:47.220 --> 02:50.100]  Of course, what I hear is not necessarily what's going on over the air, so...
[02:50.100 --> 02:51.240]  I'll try a different mic.
[02:51.260 --> 02:51.760]  How about that?
[02:52.000 --> 02:52.860]  Is that mic working?
[02:53.180 --> 02:53.440]  Yeah, true.
[02:53.440 --> 02:54.680]  It doesn't sound like it's working.
[02:55.080 --> 02:56.480]  No, because it's not on.
[02:56.700 --> 02:57.340]  It's not on.
[02:58.140 --> 02:58.880]  Now it's on.
[02:58.980 --> 02:59.420]  Check, check.
[03:00.100 --> 03:00.700]  No, it's not.
[03:01.220 --> 03:01.900]  It's on.
[03:02.440 --> 03:02.880]  Hello?
[03:03.740 --> 03:04.840]  Not on my headphones, it's not.
[03:05.340 --> 03:05.660]  And...
[03:06.040 --> 03:07.420]  Oh, ow, that's loud.
[03:07.680 --> 03:08.200]  That's loud.
[03:09.160 --> 03:09.700]  Bernie S.
[03:09.820 --> 03:10.360]  is on the phone.
[03:10.440 --> 03:11.660]  Wait, if I can figure out where the phone is.
[03:11.860 --> 03:12.320]  The phone's over there.
[03:12.400 --> 03:13.180]  Bernie, are you there?
[03:13.940 --> 03:15.380]  We're trying to figure out our microphones.
[03:15.760 --> 03:16.780]  I'm sorry about this.
[03:17.320 --> 03:17.720]  That's okay.
[03:17.840 --> 03:18.720]  Kyle, you want to try again?
[03:18.820 --> 03:21.400]  By the way, I could not hear Kyle either on that one.
[03:21.400 --> 03:23.320]  Okay, Bernie confirms that he could not hear Kyle.
[03:24.840 --> 03:26.140]  So, there is something...
[03:26.140 --> 03:28.780]  It's funny, because that microphone just worked in the previous program.
[03:28.780 --> 03:29.740]  We have a different microphone.
[03:29.980 --> 03:31.620]  We have a different microphone?
[03:31.760 --> 03:32.280]  We have a spare.
[03:32.280 --> 03:32.960]  Wow, okay.
[03:33.340 --> 03:36.220]  Well, try putting in a different microphone then.
[03:37.780 --> 03:38.580]  It's unreal.
[03:39.260 --> 03:41.400]  Okay, while we're doing that...
[03:41.880 --> 03:42.980]  Rob, how are you today?
[03:43.540 --> 03:44.320]  I'm doing all right.
[03:44.380 --> 03:45.480]  My microphone works just fine.
[03:45.480 --> 03:46.000]  That's wonderful.
[03:46.200 --> 03:47.480]  And Bernie, you sound good on the phone.
[03:48.100 --> 03:49.020]  Try it now, Kyle.
[03:49.140 --> 03:49.520]  Hello?
[03:49.900 --> 03:50.860]  No, it's not working.
[03:51.140 --> 03:51.460]  No, no.
[03:52.280 --> 03:52.980]  Try it now.
[03:53.200 --> 03:53.720]  Check, check.
[03:54.080 --> 03:55.940]  That's his channel over here, not there.
[03:55.980 --> 03:56.520]  No, no, no.
[03:56.800 --> 03:58.440]  Okay, well, either one doesn't work.
[03:59.560 --> 04:07.540]  Listeners, we really appreciate you going on this journey with us as we continue to rebuild technologically and systematically here at WBAI.
[04:09.340 --> 04:12.340]  Reggie, you can have my headphones and hear him not coming over the microphone if you want.
[04:12.580 --> 04:13.480]  Nobody believes me.
[04:13.620 --> 04:17.060]  But the listeners will back me up here that you're not hearing him.
[04:17.060 --> 04:18.120]  You can even see.
[04:18.240 --> 04:18.620]  It's there.
[04:18.920 --> 04:19.480]  I don't know.
[04:19.760 --> 04:20.160]  All right.
[04:20.900 --> 04:27.240]  Kyle, why don't you use that microphone while that one is troubleshot, and we can talk about other things.
[04:28.220 --> 04:30.640]  Well, anything going on in the world of hackers?
[04:30.880 --> 04:32.680]  How was Chaos Camp?
[04:32.860 --> 04:33.840]  I understand it just ended.
[04:34.500 --> 04:36.000]  I wish I knew I wasn't there.
[04:36.020 --> 04:36.760]  I wasn't there either.
[04:37.100 --> 04:37.900]  Bernie, were you there?
[04:38.520 --> 04:39.900]  I wish I'd been there, too.
[04:39.960 --> 04:41.640]  I just had so much going on here in the States.
[04:41.640 --> 04:42.720]  Did anybody go?
[04:43.400 --> 04:44.660]  Everybody just wishes they went.
[04:44.720 --> 04:45.380]  Lots of people went.
[04:46.840 --> 04:47.140]  Okay.
[04:47.980 --> 04:48.680]  Didn't Mike go?
[04:48.780 --> 04:49.380]  Mike was abroad.
[04:49.420 --> 04:52.740]  Yes, but he's not here, so we have no idea.
[04:52.820 --> 04:53.980]  He's still over there, I believe.
[04:54.160 --> 04:54.300]  Right.
[04:55.520 --> 04:57.620]  Oh, we're still trying to make the studio work.
[04:57.840 --> 04:59.640]  This is kind of ridiculous here, but...
[05:02.180 --> 05:02.880]  Well, okay.
[05:02.980 --> 05:05.100]  Why don't we talk about the Chelsea Manning case?
[05:05.260 --> 05:09.060]  Since we have nothing else we can do right now.
[05:09.060 --> 05:13.220]  So, Robbie, I believe you just got some email about the latest.
[05:14.200 --> 05:16.320]  I do, but I don't have it in front of me.
[05:16.980 --> 05:18.660]  Okay, you're as prepared as the microphone.
[05:18.820 --> 05:19.280]  That's great.
[05:20.480 --> 05:21.540]  I have to make...
[05:21.540 --> 05:23.220]  Bernie, please tell us what's going on.
[05:23.900 --> 05:29.680]  Yeah, well, Chelsea Manning has received some punitive confinement.
[05:29.800 --> 05:35.620]  That is punishment, meaning you can't come out of your cell except for like one hour a day.
[05:35.620 --> 05:39.820]  For a very serious series of offenses.
[05:44.010 --> 05:45.730]  You're waiting for the other shoe to drop?
[05:47.190 --> 05:47.570]  No.
[05:48.090 --> 05:48.490]  So, yeah.
[05:48.690 --> 05:51.910]  So, Chelsea was accused of several things.
[05:52.050 --> 05:55.910]  Having certain books, having toothpaste that was expired.
[05:56.470 --> 05:58.350]  Was that it, or was there something else?
[05:59.030 --> 06:03.230]  Possessing magazines, books, and expired toothpaste.
[06:03.590 --> 06:03.810]  Yes.
[06:04.450 --> 06:06.950]  It expired about late April.
[06:07.150 --> 06:07.550]  Yes.
[06:08.290 --> 06:08.770]  Toothpaste.
[06:08.910 --> 06:09.850]  Yeah, microphone is working.
[06:10.770 --> 06:11.090]  Excellent.
[06:11.510 --> 06:12.350]  Wow, thank you, Reggie.
[06:12.450 --> 06:12.990]  Thank you very much.
[06:13.290 --> 06:16.570]  But yes, so toothpaste that had been past its expiration date.
[06:17.010 --> 06:22.190]  A couple of magazines, I believe it was Vanity Fair and Vogue, things like that.
[06:22.510 --> 06:22.710]  Yeah.
[06:22.710 --> 06:34.150]  And a number of books, one of which we'd actually discussed on this program, which was Biela Coleman's book about hacking and whistleblowing and anonymous.
[06:34.450 --> 06:34.710]  Yes.
[06:34.930 --> 06:39.010]  It sounds like it's something that got personal, like with a particular guard.
[06:39.010 --> 06:56.730]  And, I don't know, Bernie, you seem to have a little bit of insight that this kind of thing can go on when you are in regular contact with people in a facility like that, that sometimes there is a little bit of retribution kind of stuff and a little culture that evolves in and of that.
[06:57.250 --> 06:58.930]  I think there's some resentment.
[06:59.290 --> 07:01.930]  I've noticed that in two of the different institutions.
[07:02.210 --> 07:06.710]  I was on a tour of five different prisons during my 1995 ordeal with the feds.
[07:06.990 --> 07:07.250]  Five?
[07:07.450 --> 07:07.930]  I had two of those.
[07:08.070 --> 07:08.390]  Wow.
[07:08.470 --> 07:08.870]  Yeah, five.
[07:09.110 --> 07:09.370]  Wow.
[07:09.530 --> 07:09.990]  Five of them.
[07:10.890 --> 07:24.670]  But the two of them, the staff, the guards, or correctional officers, as they like to be called, had a lot of problems with people that had a lot of books and magazines and things.
[07:24.670 --> 07:30.530]  They just felt like you were thinking too much or something, dangerous or whatever.
[07:30.830 --> 07:31.270]  Yeah, yeah, yeah.
[07:32.470 --> 07:35.750]  And then they go after you.
[07:35.850 --> 07:38.190]  They toss your cell.
[07:38.530 --> 07:39.290]  You're a target.
[07:39.430 --> 07:40.090]  Yeah, you're a target.
[07:40.630 --> 07:42.970]  They confiscate books, magazines.
[07:43.410 --> 07:45.330]  I even had the same thing happen with the toothpaste.
[07:45.630 --> 07:50.310]  I had my toothpaste seized and all the toothpaste squeezed out.
[07:50.490 --> 07:50.950]  Wow.
[07:50.950 --> 07:54.710]  To make sure that there was no contraband inside the tube of the toothpaste.
[07:55.090 --> 07:57.490]  They seem to have a thing for toothpaste, don't they?
[07:58.230 --> 07:58.710]  Apparently.
[07:58.710 --> 07:59.410]  It's funny.
[08:00.450 --> 08:04.390]  It's like a go-to gotcha that they can then pin to you.
[08:04.390 --> 08:09.150]  But it's ironic because these things actually are important.
[08:09.150 --> 08:22.610]  If you're a prisoner, maybe a little radio or a little magazine, a little bit of literature, that's really important for your sanity to maintain and keep yourself occupied while you're incarcerated.
[08:22.610 --> 08:23.150]  Absolutely.
[08:23.430 --> 08:32.310]  And then this, sticking out a bit, doing something that makes you feel a little bit better or at least makes the time pass, then marks you.
[08:32.470 --> 08:39.870]  And so then you stick out more than you would had you not tried to do anything to make your time less ordinary.
[08:39.870 --> 08:44.910]  So being plain and a good prisoner, I guess, is what they want out of you.
[08:45.590 --> 08:45.890]  All right.
[08:46.010 --> 08:46.750]  You have something else, Rob?
[08:47.110 --> 08:47.370]  Yeah.
[08:47.890 --> 08:59.170]  I have a note from Fight for the Future, the activist organization, which someone there talked to Chelsea on the phone last night and got the news that even though she was convicted of all four of the ridiculous charges the military brought against her,
[08:59.170 --> 09:04.790]  she was not sentenced to any solitary confinement, which is good because that was a definite possibility.
[09:05.010 --> 09:09.690]  Well, I think a lot of that was because of the outrage that spread throughout the net when that word of that got out.
[09:09.890 --> 09:09.990]  Yeah.
[09:09.990 --> 09:11.730]  And it's good that word of that gets out.
[09:11.810 --> 09:12.310]  That's important.
[09:12.550 --> 09:17.490]  Fight for the Future, in particular, ran an online petition that got something like over 100,000 signatures.
[09:19.290 --> 09:20.710]  What's their website, Fight for the Future?
[09:20.850 --> 09:22.390]  That's fightforthefuture.org.
[09:22.510 --> 09:22.790]  Okay.
[09:23.110 --> 09:23.450]  All right.
[09:23.450 --> 09:31.490]  And, yeah, so, but she is being punished with 21 days of restrictions that will prevent her from using the prison library and from going outside.
[09:32.590 --> 09:33.250]  I see.
[09:33.410 --> 09:33.630]  Okay.
[09:34.110 --> 09:34.510]  Interesting.
[09:34.750 --> 09:36.930]  Which I guess that'll teach her to read books and have toothpaste.
[09:38.990 --> 09:39.390]  Amazing.
[09:39.650 --> 09:39.850]  All right.
[09:39.870 --> 09:44.530]  Really, I don't even know what to say, but it's thankful that it's shorter.
[09:44.690 --> 09:47.390]  I was getting the impression that it was going to be some sort of serious...
[09:47.390 --> 09:51.310]  I think there was some wording about it taking years, but that seems to have been a bit of a change.
[09:51.310 --> 09:54.030]  Um, but sad news, all the same.
[09:54.270 --> 09:54.790]  All right.
[09:54.930 --> 09:56.090]  Uh, we have a story here.
[09:56.210 --> 10:00.750]  I think this might rub people the wrong way, but, uh, it's, it's gotta be talked about because it is an issue.
[10:00.910 --> 10:03.270]  In, in, in my eyes, it's a, it's an important issue.
[10:03.610 --> 10:08.430]  Um, this is a story that, um, um, went out about a week ago or so.
[10:08.530 --> 10:12.210]  Uh, police say a Long Island man has been arrested on child pornography charges.
[10:12.270 --> 10:12.990]  Oh, yes.
[10:21.310 --> 10:24.710]  Uh, police say a Long Island man has been arrested on child pornography, including four illicit videos of toddlers and young girls.
[10:25.090 --> 10:26.290]  We don't have to get specifics here.
[10:26.590 --> 10:31.230]  Google reported that, um, he uploaded some images as well.
[10:31.410 --> 10:43.450]  Now, okay, you know, this is a hard topic to discuss because if you say anything to, uh, to question this, you're, you're supporting child pornography and you can't ever get away with that.
[10:43.450 --> 10:48.650]  And I think that's one of the reasons why that's always front and center, uh, whenever stories like this come out.
[10:48.790 --> 10:50.490]  You, you have to protect the children.
[10:50.630 --> 10:53.550]  You have to, um, um, uh, lock these people up, et cetera, et cetera.
[10:53.970 --> 10:55.570]  But look at what we're talking about here.
[10:55.690 --> 11:00.830]  First of all, we're not talking about somebody who necessarily abused anyone, whether or not he would abuse somebody in the future.
[11:00.990 --> 11:01.830]  That's a whole other issue.
[11:02.070 --> 11:11.790]  What we're talking about here, and this is why it's important, Dropbox was able to tell what he uploaded and was able to tell the authorities.
[11:12.430 --> 11:16.210]  Gmail was able to tell that he, they say he uploaded.
[11:16.390 --> 11:18.530]  I'm not sure what that means, how you upload something to Gmail.
[11:18.790 --> 11:23.810]  I guess upload in order to email, but this is, this is solid evidence.
[11:23.970 --> 11:33.370]  Not that we should be surprised that the email and, and what you put on Dropbox is analyzed, whether it's analyzed by a computer, whether they have people looking at it, whatnot.
[11:33.790 --> 11:35.690]  And that's something that should bug us.
[11:35.830 --> 11:37.510]  Forget the child pornography part of this.
[11:37.730 --> 11:44.770]  Just look at the part of, of, uh, suspicious data being analyzed because I guarantee you it's going to be used for other things as well.
[11:44.870 --> 11:47.830]  Political speech, controversial subject matter of any sort.
[11:48.070 --> 11:51.150]  And if not in this country, then definitely in other countries.
[11:52.070 --> 11:52.470]  Yeah.
[11:52.590 --> 12:03.070]  And I think, uh, the caveat there is the, um, upload in the context of Google, these, um, free storage you get with them as they've been sort of transferred into the Google drive storage.
[12:03.070 --> 12:04.410]  So it's sort of one in the same.
[12:04.410 --> 12:13.830]  So when you upload to like a Gmail, you're uploading it to sort of a cloud storage service akin to like a Dropbox, but, uh, it would be on Google's, uh, uh, system.
[12:14.030 --> 12:16.050]  So anyway, that, that's a distinction to make there.
[12:16.150 --> 12:25.650]  But I, this issue, just talking about this in general, you really do have to get specific, specific and not be afraid to actually open it up and talk about it because it's so taboo that people don't talk about these issues.
[12:25.790 --> 12:26.530]  They just don't.
[12:26.710 --> 12:28.830]  And, and, uh, and it gets very polarized.
[12:29.270 --> 12:31.590]  Well, we do because we're here on BAI and on off the hook.
[12:31.590 --> 12:31.770]  That's right.
[12:31.770 --> 12:32.910]  And we're going to confront this head on.
[12:33.030 --> 12:33.830]  We'll dive right into this.
[12:34.030 --> 12:34.170]  Yeah.
[12:34.290 --> 12:42.570]  And the thing about something like Dropbox, I mean, the services sold to people, uh, with the idea that, okay, here's something that will just sync files between multiple computers of yours and that's it.
[12:42.950 --> 12:46.970]  So it's easy to sort of psychologically think, okay, this is just my stuff on this Dropbox.
[12:47.090 --> 12:51.610]  But when it comes down to it, you're uploading data to a computer that's not yours to something that you don't control.
[12:51.810 --> 12:54.210]  And you have nothing to say about what happens to the data after that.
[12:54.350 --> 12:54.430]  Yeah.
[12:54.530 --> 13:00.350]  And inherently the system has your data in a lot of different places, perhaps even across multiple state lines and so on.
[13:00.610 --> 13:00.830]  Right.
[13:00.830 --> 13:08.050]  And, uh, so when, so when you upload to something like Dropbox, you, you are basically surrendering the ability to say what happens to that information.
[13:08.050 --> 13:17.210]  You're inviting it to, you're inviting, you're inviting scrutiny from anyone, not just for things like child pornography, which is very useful as something to point to and say, you know, think of the children.
[13:17.430 --> 13:26.050]  We have to protect the children, but because, but, uh, you know, when regarding any other kind of data that might not, uh, be illegal, but might be troubling to certain people.
[13:26.050 --> 13:26.770]  Yeah.
[13:26.910 --> 13:41.350]  But the real issue is that we need to know, and I think we already know this, but the general public needs to know that when you use these services, you are giving up your privacy and it will be looked at either by a computer or by a human or by a government or something.
[13:41.630 --> 13:44.470]  So if that's okay with you, go ahead, upload everything you got.
[13:44.470 --> 13:51.950]  But, um, let's not enter into these things, thinking, deceiving ourselves that privacy is a part of the package.
[13:52.110 --> 13:52.810]  Bernie, any thoughts?
[13:53.650 --> 13:56.390]  Yeah, this was, uh, this was decided by the U.S.
[13:56.470 --> 14:12.930]  Supreme Court, uh, I think a couple of decades ago that, uh, when you entrust your information to a third party business, they are, it's business records and you no longer have fourth amendment protections for your information.
[14:12.930 --> 14:25.010]  So bear that in mind, when you entrust your information to Google or Dropbox or, or Microsoft or any other company on in the cloud, you have no reasonable expectation of privacy.
[14:25.190 --> 14:33.490]  It's, and, and police, law enforcement, Google, anybody can access it without a warrant and you have no recourse.
[14:34.590 --> 14:35.150]  Absolutely.
[14:35.450 --> 14:36.470]  Very, very true there.
[14:37.210 --> 14:48.490]  Um, that said, you know, the, the services are pretty handy as far as, uh, being able to transfer things between people and store large amounts of data, but nothing is free.
[14:48.690 --> 14:49.870]  That's what people have to remember.
[14:49.990 --> 14:53.810]  There's always a price of one sort or another in this particular case, it's your privacy.
[14:53.990 --> 14:57.890]  Now, you know, there are people out there saying, oh yes, but manual, but in this case it did good.
[14:57.970 --> 15:01.790]  It caught a dangerous person before it was, uh, uh, too late, you know, whatever.
[15:01.790 --> 15:03.550]  I'm not going to get into that aspect of the story.
[15:03.650 --> 15:12.210]  The point is, uh, that the information is looked at and it's looked at very quickly and it is shared with authorities if, uh, if they deem it necessary to do so.
[15:12.650 --> 15:14.270]  Hey, we have a special guest here today.
[15:14.650 --> 15:15.790]  Just walked in the door.
[15:15.930 --> 15:16.890]  What, what a surprise.
[15:17.490 --> 15:18.510]  Hey, great to be here.
[15:18.650 --> 15:19.490]  Kevin Mitnick.
[15:19.670 --> 15:20.390]  Long time.
[15:20.610 --> 15:21.790]  We're just talking about child pornography.
[15:21.930 --> 15:22.390]  Don't mind us.
[15:23.330 --> 15:25.810]  Wait, that was some guy that was as busted with it that, uh...
[15:25.810 --> 15:28.770]  Well, uh, we were just mentioning that he uploaded it to Gmail.
[15:29.270 --> 15:31.410]  Uh, there's nothing here that says he actually sent it.
[15:31.410 --> 15:41.130]  He probably did email it to somebody, but Dropbox and Gmail and immediately authorities found out about it because when you use those services, your privacy does not, it does not exist anymore.
[15:41.230 --> 15:41.430]  Oh, yeah.
[15:41.490 --> 15:49.470]  They actually, uh, I'm actually working on a book now called The Art of Invisibility, which is all about how consumers could protect their privacy.
[15:49.630 --> 15:56.090]  Anyone from, like, a consumer up to somebody that's, like, a little bit below a privacy activist because, you know, that's what they focus on.
[15:56.790 --> 16:09.070]  And, um, I know this, like, when you send images through these services, especially Google and, uh, Microsoft and stuff, they're actually doing analysis on those images looking for stuff like child pornography, right?
[16:09.510 --> 16:21.910]  Which is good if they bust those people, but at the same time, I'm not, you know, I'm not thinking that I'm giving them the right to do it, but probably when you click on that EULA that says, you know, I'll give you my firstborn, just give me free email,
[16:22.130 --> 16:24.490]  probably to give some full permission to do that.
[16:25.210 --> 16:25.590]  Well...
[16:25.590 --> 16:26.410]  People just don't know.
[16:26.530 --> 16:27.330]  They don't think about it.
[16:28.430 --> 16:42.530]  Yeah, you know, they tell you that, um, uh, when it's a child pornography case, they tell you, but all the other times when they don't tell you and they're analyzing things and, uh, we need an Edward Snowden to come around in the future and tell us what they actually did with that information.
[16:42.990 --> 16:43.790]  That's what's different.
[16:44.450 --> 16:46.070]  So, um, uh, Bernie, thoughts?
[16:47.190 --> 16:55.370]  Uh, well, like Kevin said, hi, Kevin, um, I think that, as I said before, that this is not a matter of what's right or wrong.
[16:55.530 --> 17:01.030]  The Supreme Court has ruled that these are third-party business records and you have no reasonable expectation of privacy.
[17:01.350 --> 17:09.350]  And you just have to know that, uh, when you upload this stuff to, uh, to the cloud, it's just, it's not, it's not your call anymore.
[17:09.350 --> 17:10.930]  It's no longer your privacy.
[17:11.370 --> 17:15.150]  Well, um, we run our own mail server at 2600.
[17:15.450 --> 17:22.650]  Um, but we know, we notice that other than Hillary Clinton, I don't think very many people do that anymore, right?
[17:23.410 --> 17:26.110]  And look what, look what's happening to her because she dared to do that.
[17:26.850 --> 17:28.370]  What did Scott McNeely say?
[17:28.370 --> 17:30.070]  You have no privacy, get over it.
[17:30.190 --> 17:32.030]  What, what was that in the 1980s?
[17:32.510 --> 17:34.630]  Uh, well, Steve Rambam said that, yes.
[17:34.870 --> 17:37.110]  Um, well, I think he took that from Scott McNeely.
[17:37.190 --> 17:37.570]  Did he?
[17:37.710 --> 17:37.870]  Yeah.
[17:38.110 --> 17:42.550]  He was a founder of Sun Microsystems and he said this back in the seventies or eighties.
[17:42.670 --> 17:46.450]  And I kind of laughed and chuckled, but he was absolutely right, right?
[17:46.450 --> 17:47.550]  So, yes, yes.
[17:47.770 --> 17:50.650]  And it's just getting, uh, uh, less and less privacy that you have.
[17:51.130 --> 17:57.490]  Um, well, Kevin, tell us, uh, some, something that I've always seen you on television, always, uh, uh, on, on speaking engagements around the world.
[17:57.590 --> 17:58.750]  Have you been anywhere interesting lately?
[17:58.970 --> 17:59.690]  Been everywhere.
[17:59.850 --> 18:04.090]  Been in Dubai, been in Singapore, uh, recently in London.
[18:04.450 --> 18:07.750]  So I've been, this year has been like a really heavy, heavy travel schedule.
[18:07.870 --> 18:11.530]  In fact, why I'm here in New York is to do a gig tomorrow in Manhattan.
[18:12.370 --> 18:26.750]  And, uh, you know, things have been, it's kind of cool because apparently people, people are definitely more interested in security and privacy with every day, something new is being hacked and every, you know, and then we're hearing all about the Snowden revelations.
[18:26.910 --> 18:29.770]  So right now it's like a super red hot, hot topic.
[18:29.930 --> 18:36.090]  So of course I do, I talk about this stuff and when I'm doing my speaking gigs, I don't just blah, blah, blah, talk.
[18:36.310 --> 18:39.050]  I actually show hacking demos and that's what people love.
[18:39.170 --> 18:41.230]  And why I do that, it's kind of like a magic show.
[18:41.230 --> 18:52.250]  And I started in this phone freaking was really based on magic because someone showed me how they could, uh, have your phone number read back with what we call the A&I, how they could dial the number and ring back your phone.
[18:52.470 --> 18:54.410]  And to me as a 10 year old was magic.
[18:54.610 --> 18:57.030]  So I like to do hacking magic.
[18:57.230 --> 18:59.890]  If you say, if you know, hacking magic, that's what I love doing.
[19:00.150 --> 19:04.530]  The old 800 numbers that gave you A&I, the ANAC local numbers, 958 or whatever.
[19:05.030 --> 19:08.990]  Uh, all these magical things that nobody knew about that hackers figured out.
[19:08.990 --> 19:09.930]  Remember the loop arounds?
[19:10.090 --> 19:10.870]  Uh, the loop.
[19:10.970 --> 19:14.170]  So you call one end and somebody else would call another and you'd be speaking to some guy from England.
[19:14.590 --> 19:14.910]  Exactly.
[19:14.970 --> 19:16.850]  But I, but I used them a little bit differently.
[19:16.850 --> 19:20.510]  What I used them for was callback numbers when I'd social engineer the phone company.
[19:20.650 --> 19:21.970]  So you'd be waiting on the other end.
[19:22.170 --> 19:22.290]  Right.
[19:22.390 --> 19:23.410]  But they wouldn't hear a ring.
[19:23.550 --> 19:25.470]  So what I do is I'd three way in a ringing signal.
[19:25.670 --> 19:30.630]  And as soon as I'd call on one side, which you'd get the thousand cycle tone and the other side would be the silent side.
[19:30.750 --> 19:33.830]  I'd give them the silent side number, call on, on the tone number.
[19:33.970 --> 19:36.130]  And then I just three way in like a payphone.
[19:36.270 --> 19:36.490]  Right.
[19:36.610 --> 19:38.010]  That one answer in the middle of nowhere.
[19:38.010 --> 19:43.390]  And then when they called under the loop, they'd hear the ringing that I three way off the ring, Pacific bell, may I help you?
[19:43.470 --> 19:45.890]  And you would know they were calling in because the tone would disappear.
[19:46.110 --> 19:46.210]  Yeah.
[19:46.310 --> 19:46.390]  Yeah.
[19:46.670 --> 19:50.190]  And they would check the number and they wouldn't find anything on it.
[19:50.290 --> 19:51.370]  So it had to be intercompany.
[19:51.470 --> 19:51.570]  Right.
[19:51.830 --> 19:51.890]  Right.
[19:51.890 --> 19:54.810]  Because I said, well, if you try to look it up, it's intercompany, you're not going to see anything.
[19:55.090 --> 20:00.270]  And it was, it was a great way to convince phone company people that, Hey, I was with the phone company.
[20:00.350 --> 20:00.790]  It was awesome.
[20:00.890 --> 20:03.950]  And the other thing that's amazing about that is that you could call a payphone.
[20:04.070 --> 20:05.110]  First of all, you could call a payphone.
[20:05.250 --> 20:07.010]  They don't take incoming calls, at least not around here.
[20:07.010 --> 20:09.030]  And it would ring forever.
[20:09.250 --> 20:14.750]  It wouldn't time out because the phone company wasn't making enough money so that they'd cut it off after 20 rings.
[20:15.030 --> 20:20.830]  So these little throwbacks to the old days when things worked right.
[20:21.130 --> 20:21.590]  Yeah.
[20:21.710 --> 20:24.050]  And exactly.
[20:24.550 --> 20:36.450]  And I miss those days kind of because, you know, the telephone system was there to explore and it was always learning new tricks, especially reading like 2600 magazine.
[20:37.150 --> 20:40.290]  And, uh, this is kind of where I started in computer hacking.
[20:40.450 --> 20:41.770]  I mean, I...
[20:41.770 --> 20:41.910]  Wait, wait, wait.
[20:41.910 --> 20:42.710]  Are you saying it's our fault?
[20:43.190 --> 20:43.850]  It's your fault.
[20:43.930 --> 20:44.570]  Oh my God.
[20:44.730 --> 20:46.630]  And tap, and tap, and tap.
[20:47.010 --> 20:51.230]  And, and I think there was blacklisted 411 and I wanted to become better.
[20:51.790 --> 20:52.570]  I'm going to say this.
[20:52.570 --> 20:53.310]  That's what started.
[20:53.410 --> 20:54.890]  I'm going to say this publicly for the first time.
[20:55.010 --> 20:57.370]  That other magazine you just mentioned, his name, I will not speak.
[20:57.370 --> 20:58.690]  They ripped us off.
[20:58.790 --> 20:59.610]  They took our articles.
[20:59.870 --> 21:00.550]  They took our style.
[21:00.790 --> 21:03.010]  And they tried to pretend that they were, uh, they were hackers.
[21:03.010 --> 21:04.050]  Yeah, it looked, it looked like a 2600.
[21:04.050 --> 21:04.630]  It looked exactly.
[21:04.750 --> 21:07.650]  And all, the thing that annoyed me was that people would always buy both of them together.
[21:07.930 --> 21:14.070]  And, and they just didn't earn the right in the hacker community, uh, to, to, you know, you build a publication.
[21:14.390 --> 21:15.190]  Tap earned the right.
[21:15.490 --> 21:16.670]  And there are other publications too.
[21:16.790 --> 21:18.870]  Fracas certainly earned the right as an electronic publication.
[21:19.490 --> 21:21.630]  But, uh, you don't just go and take other articles.
[21:21.790 --> 21:29.970]  You don't just go and literally, literally take word for word, um, or advertising or, uh, It looked like 2600 magazine and they sold it on the newsstand.
[21:30.130 --> 21:30.330]  Yeah.
[21:30.490 --> 21:31.690]  And right next to each other.
[21:31.810 --> 21:32.970]  Except their covers sucked.
[21:33.270 --> 21:33.710]  That's true.
[21:33.830 --> 21:33.970]  Yeah.
[21:34.190 --> 21:35.750]  Anyway, but they're still collector's items.
[21:36.070 --> 21:37.470]  I think I, I think I like, what was that cover you did?
[21:37.630 --> 21:38.610]  The Free Kevin cover.
[21:38.850 --> 21:39.450]  Remember that one?
[21:39.510 --> 21:41.110]  We did a bunch of Free Kevin covers.
[21:41.530 --> 21:42.110]  Quite a few.
[21:42.430 --> 21:47.810]  Oh, by the way, um, I don't know if you watch, uh, much of, um, um, uh, hacker television.
[21:47.810 --> 21:50.570]  But every show has, has hackers in it now.
[21:50.770 --> 21:51.290]  What show?
[21:51.450 --> 21:53.150]  CSI, cyber, scorpion.
[21:53.370 --> 21:53.970]  They're crap.
[21:54.110 --> 21:54.950]  They're, they're utter garbage.
[21:54.990 --> 21:57.730]  But there's one good program out there called Mr. Robot.
[21:57.910 --> 21:58.170]  Yeah.
[21:58.290 --> 21:58.710]  Have you seen it?
[21:58.710 --> 21:59.190]  I've seen it.
[21:59.270 --> 21:59.390]  Yeah.
[21:59.410 --> 22:00.350]  And I was actually surprised.
[22:00.350 --> 22:00.970]  You're in it.
[22:01.110 --> 22:01.450]  You're in it.
[22:01.450 --> 22:01.570]  Yeah.
[22:01.590 --> 22:06.010]  They have a 2600, uh, uh, uh, 20, uh, something on a screen.
[22:06.050 --> 22:07.070]  Somebody put it on Twitter.
[22:07.410 --> 22:07.530]  Yeah.
[22:07.650 --> 22:08.050]  We're in it too.
[22:08.130 --> 22:13.970]  So that, that's, that's awesome because we were talking about it a couple of weeks ago and that very night an episode aired that we were in, we had no idea.
[22:14.210 --> 22:15.250]  So that was kind of cool.
[22:15.250 --> 22:17.410]  And it's good to know people out there are doing their research.
[22:17.410 --> 22:23.650]  Um, we were watching an episode, uh, the other night where someone got kick banned on IRC on TV and it was dramatic.
[22:23.850 --> 22:25.030]  This is what I've always been saying.
[22:25.130 --> 22:29.010]  You can make ASCII texts dramatic if you do it right.
[22:29.010 --> 22:29.590]  That's awesome.
[22:29.750 --> 22:30.450]  And they did it right.
[22:30.590 --> 22:33.850]  The person was banned from an IRC channel, was not allowed to communicate.
[22:34.010 --> 22:36.290]  Actually, she got a private message.
[22:36.630 --> 22:37.470]  Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah.
[22:37.790 --> 22:39.670]  What's her name and the character in the show?
[22:39.710 --> 22:40.350]  I'm bad with the names.
[22:40.430 --> 22:40.990]  I'm bad with the names.
[22:41.070 --> 22:42.150]  She's the one on Coney Island.
[22:42.290 --> 22:43.210]  That's all I know.
[22:43.830 --> 22:45.790]  The funny thing is actually film it here in New York.
[22:45.950 --> 22:46.410]  Did you know that?
[22:46.410 --> 22:47.890]  Yeah, Lower East Side, absolutely.
[22:48.150 --> 22:49.290]  Yeah, those aren't fake subway cars.
[22:49.910 --> 22:53.130]  And, and, uh, Coney Island and, and, and throughout various other parts.
[22:53.170 --> 22:53.890]  So it's good.
[22:53.970 --> 22:54.750]  You know, it can be done.
[22:55.110 --> 22:59.330]  Also, uh, another bit of information you might not know about, Hackers, uh, the movie.
[22:59.470 --> 22:59.590]  Yeah.
[22:59.590 --> 23:00.270]  20th anniversary.
[23:00.630 --> 23:01.170]  Oh, wow.
[23:01.350 --> 23:03.030]  And I just came out on Blu-ray, apparently.
[23:03.350 --> 23:03.730]  Man, I'm old.
[23:03.930 --> 23:10.950]  Yeah, I did an interview for the 20th anniversary and, um, and it's somewhere, I have the DVD or the, the Blu-ray and, um, and I have not seen it yet.
[23:11.050 --> 23:13.310]  But people are telling me that I'm on, I've never been on Blu-ray before.
[23:13.310 --> 23:15.370]  So I don't know if that's too traumatic to people.
[23:15.490 --> 23:15.950]  Thank you very much.
[23:16.090 --> 23:17.930]  But, uh, I don't, I have not seen it yet myself.
[23:18.130 --> 23:20.130]  So, uh, uh, yeah, that just came out.
[23:20.250 --> 23:28.630]  So, uh, the, the hackers are always in the news and always on TV in one way or another, but getting it right, getting the story right is the challenge.
[23:28.810 --> 23:30.890]  And certainly the media does not get the story right.
[23:31.150 --> 23:32.010]  You'd agree with that.
[23:32.190 --> 23:32.430]  Oh, yeah.
[23:32.510 --> 23:33.210]  For years and years.
[23:33.570 --> 23:42.990]  Well, the media just wants a sensational story, you know, because then the journalist wants to work up the ranks to, you know, obviously make more money later and they don't care much about the facts, right?
[23:42.990 --> 23:44.310]  Are you thinking about somebody in particular?
[23:45.010 --> 23:46.070]  I think you are.
[23:46.350 --> 23:47.510]  I don't know anybody.
[23:47.930 --> 23:49.250]  No, but, uh, yeah.
[23:49.490 --> 23:55.030]  So, uh, I think today the, uh, the populace is getting much smarter when it comes to technology.
[23:55.530 --> 24:00.870]  Everyone you look at, I mean, you see a five-year-old in a store, you know, they're on their iPad or on the cell phone.
[24:00.970 --> 24:02.190]  Does that make them smarter though?
[24:02.570 --> 24:03.450]  Or just more detached?
[24:03.710 --> 24:08.930]  Well, I, I have this shirt that I bought in Italy that I love to wear to, uh, conferences like hacker cons.
[24:08.930 --> 24:09.210]  Uh-huh.
[24:09.390 --> 24:12.110]  Are you, are you allowed to say bad words on, on, on, are we on radio?
[24:12.250 --> 24:12.970]  We're on radio.
[24:13.350 --> 24:14.910]  So the FCC is watching us.
[24:15.150 --> 24:17.970]  Yeah, so, yeah, so, so it would say F Google asked me.
[24:18.650 --> 24:20.470]  You can't say Google, can you say Google?
[24:20.850 --> 24:22.130]  You gotta, okay, yeah.
[24:22.250 --> 24:25.390]  Yeah, say F, the shirt, but it would actually spell out the word.
[24:25.650 --> 24:25.870]  Wow.
[24:25.970 --> 24:26.790]  F Google asked me.
[24:26.910 --> 24:28.210]  It's the funniest shirt I've ever seen.
[24:28.430 --> 24:28.710]  Uh-huh.
[24:29.490 --> 24:30.590]  That's, that's interesting.
[24:30.750 --> 24:31.210]  Okay, well.
[24:31.230 --> 24:37.550]  So you have to think about that because, I mean, when we're going to school, right, did we, you know, we're lucky if we had a calculator in class, right?
[24:37.550 --> 24:43.270]  That was like, uh, you know, but now you, you basically have the world at your fingertips, you know?
[24:43.810 --> 24:43.970]  True.
[24:44.110 --> 24:47.770]  Of course you don't know if the information, you know, a lot of information is inaccurate out there, right?
[24:47.890 --> 24:49.830]  But, I mean, it's just, just an amazing tool.
[24:49.950 --> 24:55.430]  I wish I had this when I was, imagine what I could have done if I had this back in the 80s and 90s.
[24:55.430 --> 25:10.410]  But it also, it also becomes a bit of a crutch because kids don't do certain things that we would do, like use, you know, uh, use arithmetic skills, for instance, uh, that they, they have calculators or they've had calculators for decades now, obviously,
[25:10.550 --> 25:20.110]  um, looking things up, not, um, doing research as far as going to a library and looking up encyclopedias or whatever, or just actually reading an entire book.
[25:20.110 --> 25:21.930]  Now you can get answers extremely quickly.
[25:22.150 --> 25:23.070]  Try playing a game of trivia.
[25:23.210 --> 25:24.230]  It's almost impossible now.
[25:24.250 --> 25:26.430]  Or ask the kid, what's, what's the Dewey decimal system?
[25:26.650 --> 25:27.650]  That'd probably stump him.
[25:27.850 --> 25:28.110]  Yeah.
[25:28.250 --> 25:30.490]  Until he goes to, to Wikipedia and looks it up.
[25:30.730 --> 25:33.670]  It's, it's, you know, just being able to look things up is not really knowledge.
[25:34.070 --> 25:39.190]  And that's what I worry about is that everyone's getting quick answers without really diving into the subject matter.
[25:39.330 --> 25:41.550]  Actually, I think, um, it is knowledge.
[25:41.770 --> 25:45.330]  What you're, the distinction you're looking for is the difference, the distinction between knowledge and wisdom.
[25:45.910 --> 25:46.270]  Yes.
[25:46.410 --> 25:47.770]  So you can look up knowledge.
[25:47.910 --> 25:48.950]  Knowledge is like facts.
[25:49.370 --> 25:49.430]  Yeah, information.
[25:50.110 --> 25:58.830]  But in a book, wisdom is like the wisdom you would get of experience and like storytelling and what, what hackers have really done.
[25:59.150 --> 26:04.510]  And like the kinds of stories you've told in your books, uh, our deception and, and on and on and on out of intrusion.
[26:04.830 --> 26:08.990]  All of those stories are wisdom because it's applying the knowledge.
[26:09.190 --> 26:12.510]  This system works like this, this phone works like this.
[26:12.630 --> 26:12.770]  Right.
[26:13.030 --> 26:18.870]  And then applying it through wisdom, through something that will affect your goal, your ends and so on.
[26:18.870 --> 26:19.750]  Telling a story.
[26:20.030 --> 26:20.170]  Yeah.
[26:20.190 --> 26:21.150]  That's the important thing.
[26:21.390 --> 26:31.630]  The, the, the technology becoming a crush is, uh, is a funny thing because, um, nobody remembers, when's the last time you memorized anyone's phone number on purpose or, um, even email addresses like my own...
[26:31.630 --> 26:32.130]  I memorized Eric's.
[26:32.130 --> 26:32.550]  Yes.
[26:33.910 --> 26:36.570]  But my, my own email address is like my name at my name dot net.
[26:36.690 --> 26:40.270]  And I still have people who know me for years, uh, asking me what it is when they need to send me something.
[26:40.670 --> 26:50.970]  Um, like, but, uh, on the other hand, like I think of, as you said, you know, what if I had today's, uh, today's technology, 24 seven connectivity in my pocket, um, you know, super processing power in my pocket.
[26:51.090 --> 26:53.430]  What if I had this in my formative years?
[26:53.430 --> 26:54.410]  Uh, that would have been awesome.
[26:54.550 --> 26:56.950]  But then I think, you know, I came out socially weird enough as it is.
[26:56.950 --> 26:58.950]  I don't need any more crutches then.
[26:59.150 --> 27:02.110]  You know, I always dreamed of, of having such technology.
[27:02.110 --> 27:04.670]  I just never expected everyone else to have it too.
[27:05.770 --> 27:06.210]  Yeah.
[27:06.270 --> 27:06.750]  That's the thing.
[27:06.870 --> 27:12.430]  As, as phone freaks of the past, our big thing was, was making free connections, right?
[27:12.510 --> 27:17.810]  Kevin, we were able to, uh, connect to people all over the world and it was cool because nobody else could do that.
[27:18.150 --> 27:22.930]  We couldn't even call from, from Long Island to New York city without incurring toll charges per minute.
[27:23.210 --> 27:24.090]  Oh, I remember those days.
[27:24.310 --> 27:24.450]  Yeah.
[27:24.450 --> 27:35.310]  Uh, but when we were able to bypass that and talk to people anywhere, whether it was information operators or people in foreign countries that we just call it random, literally calling people at random, uh, that was magic.
[27:35.390 --> 27:39.130]  But now everybody can talk to anybody all the time.
[27:39.130 --> 27:40.010]  I suppose it's victory.
[27:40.190 --> 27:47.550]  We got what we wanted, you know, free communications everywhere, but somehow the magic is lost because it's, it's mass acceptance.
[27:47.990 --> 27:49.910]  You know, we need to find something else.
[27:50.110 --> 27:51.030]  It's not as special.
[27:51.030 --> 28:02.270]  With, with, um, conspicuous consumption and, and, uh, and, uh, uh, commodification of, of services and things along on top of all of that.
[28:02.710 --> 28:11.770]  So, I mean, we've lost some of that, but, and, and also we have things being repackaged that aren't like a universal computing machine, right?
[28:11.870 --> 28:22.590]  Like with these wall gardens and, and, and, uh, user interfaces that limit and basically only give you so much of, of, of what, uh, a retailer or advertiser wants you to have.
[28:23.330 --> 28:29.490]  Um, and it, it's, uh, it's, it's accepted very, very widely now.
[28:29.550 --> 28:32.210]  I mean, it's not even, uh, a question in a lot of ways.
[28:33.030 --> 28:33.430]  Yes.
[28:33.650 --> 28:47.450]  Well, you know, the thing is, um, I, and Kevin, you must be very familiar with this as, as you, um, uh, travel around the world, uh, talking to various, um, audiences, uh, that the word hacker, uh, it's always been demonized, always been misrepresented,
[28:47.450 --> 28:50.350]  but I, I think more so now than ever before.
[28:50.450 --> 28:53.510]  I mean, I am just looking at a pile of stories here.
[28:53.590 --> 28:54.750]  Let's read you some, some headlines.
[28:55.030 --> 29:07.010]  Uh, she watched Netflix with her boyfriend and she got a creepy message from a hacker about it because somebody was, was hacking her, um, her, um, uh, camera on her computer and was able to actually see her, uh, from the Daily Mail.
[29:07.130 --> 29:09.450]  Hackers can access every call and message you send.
[29:09.450 --> 29:14.870]  Um, nine charged in $30 million press release hacking scheme.
[29:15.150 --> 29:27.630]  And, and, and today, uh, how long before hackers take down an entire city, you know, hackers are, are the demons here, but it seems to me that hackers are the ones that are able to figure this stuff out and tell people about it.
[29:27.690 --> 29:32.390]  Like you say, you demonstrate things in front of audiences and they learn because of that.
[29:32.510 --> 29:35.330]  How do you feel about, about the word hacker though being demon?
[29:35.450 --> 29:44.810]  I mean, there were people in our, in our group that give up, that have given up, that say, you know what, the word is a lost cause and hacker is going to be analogous to criminal.
[29:45.030 --> 29:46.110]  Should we give up on this?
[29:46.230 --> 29:46.850]  It still is.
[29:46.970 --> 29:55.990]  I mean, now they put these terms, uh, is kind of widely accepted to the community of non, you know, technically astute people of where they call white hat and black hat.
[29:56.230 --> 29:57.930]  Yeah, there was good hacker, bad hacker.
[29:58.090 --> 29:59.410]  I hate that phrase so much.
[29:59.410 --> 30:00.770]  I can't even begin to express it.
[30:00.970 --> 30:12.590]  It's, there, there was a, an article that someone sent in, uh, about, uh, gentrification of hacking and basically the concept of the, the sanitizing of the word being, coming around full circle.
[30:12.750 --> 30:12.870]  Right.
[30:12.870 --> 30:21.650]  So now you have, uh, this sense, this, like these white hat groups and, and this, uh, sort of industrializing of it to where it's acceptable.
[30:21.650 --> 30:24.790]  It's, it's clean enough that, that it serves industry.
[30:24.910 --> 30:31.430]  So you have tons and tons of people and, and like, uh, corporate entities hosting things.
[30:31.590 --> 30:33.630]  And the article goes on, actually a listener sent it in.
[30:33.690 --> 30:34.370]  I'm really, I apologize.
[30:34.510 --> 30:47.550]  I should have had it in front of me because I, I did enjoy the article, but there, you know, major multinationals hosting hackathons to basically harvest more ideas and more, more services and, and skills from young people.
[30:48.550 --> 31:02.050]  And basically in, in, in a constructed sort of nice, nice, safe environment, a little sandbox of that, you know, that is nice and, and, and, uh, protected, but it's not, but it's, it's taking the grit out of it, right?
[31:02.170 --> 31:08.850]  Like the, the, the, um, sort of the individualism and spirit, it takes the teeth out of it, I think a little bit.
[31:09.030 --> 31:09.170]  Right.
[31:09.230 --> 31:11.050]  Well, what, what, what about now bug bounties?
[31:11.210 --> 31:17.830]  So now companies that don't want to spend money on getting security testing, just basically say, Hey, we're going to start a bug bounty.
[31:18.050 --> 31:18.270]  Yeah.
[31:18.430 --> 31:25.970]  And if you hack us, we'll pay you, you know, we'll send you a t-shirt, we'll give you a gold star, you know, Google now will pay you money.
[31:26.150 --> 31:26.510]  Right.
[31:26.530 --> 31:33.990]  So now you got these companies that are saying, Hey, if you find a security hole, let us know and we'll pay you, which is now.
[31:34.270 --> 31:46.230]  So, you know, these big, bad hackers over here, but now corporate America is leveraging their information or, or the information they're able to obtain through the research to help the company.
[31:46.490 --> 31:46.550]  Right.
[31:46.870 --> 31:55.450]  So as long as it's kid friendly and, and not so not as long as it doesn't encourage people to step outside of what, what maybe the corporation would want or expect of them.
[31:55.550 --> 31:57.410]  Is that a bad thing when they do that?
[31:57.730 --> 32:14.290]  No, it's interesting because I'm wondering if, um, you know, could you have the bad guys that are truly the crux that want to break into, you know, AT&T, for example, and they're sitting there trying to exploit a web application bug, you know, maybe they,
[32:14.430 --> 32:16.170]  you know, get access to customer credit cards.
[32:16.290 --> 32:21.910]  They're hoping, uh, and, and they get caught and they say, Oh no, no, no, I'm just doing this for the part of the bug bounty.
[32:22.090 --> 32:22.850]  Oh, right.
[32:23.010 --> 32:23.250]  Okay.
[32:23.550 --> 32:23.910]  So, yeah.
[32:24.010 --> 32:24.330]  Right.
[32:24.470 --> 32:35.330]  So it's, you know, it's a great excuse, I think, or, uh, you know, is how does the legal team of these companies, how do they know the intent of the person doing the bug bounty research?
[32:35.510 --> 32:36.010]  That's a good point.
[32:36.050 --> 32:44.690]  Also, when a company offers a bug bounty, uh, okay, they'll give you some money if you find a bug, but what they're giving you is not market value to actually employ a security professional to find that on their behalf.
[32:44.850 --> 32:51.810]  But also what happens when the quote unquote bad guys then offer more money than the company to, uh, to get their exclusive rights to the bug.
[32:51.930 --> 32:55.230]  Well, and it pales in comparison to what they, uh, levy against you.
[32:55.410 --> 33:02.530]  If you get in trouble and then they want to take action against you, it's always a much more valuable thing when, when they've been damaged.
[33:03.010 --> 33:03.990]  Bernie, you had something?
[33:04.790 --> 33:08.130]  Oh yeah, I was going to say there's a, there's, it comes down to the highest bidder.
[33:08.130 --> 33:18.050]  There's, uh, really unethical, uh, security companies out there like the one called Hacking Team, which apparently isn't that, isn't competent to keep their own, own information under wraps.
[33:18.270 --> 33:32.850]  They were buying, uh, you know, zero day, zero day exploits and, and other bugs, um, uh, for a lot of money and presumably a lot more than, uh, the companies who were affected were paying, uh, uh, uh, bounty, uh, bounty seekers.
[33:32.850 --> 33:45.470]  So, um, and, you know, and there's, and they're in turn selling those or offering those as services to, uh, to world governments to, uh, to go after, uh, you know, political dissidents and all things like that.
[33:45.470 --> 33:55.290]  So, uh, I think just offering a bounty is not a good solution because you don't know who else is going to offer a bounty that's higher than yours for nefarious purposes.
[33:55.550 --> 34:06.950]  To me, it's just as soon as money is introduced, whether it's in a criminal conspiracy or whether it's in a corporate offer, you're, you're leaving the hacker world.
[34:07.050 --> 34:17.110]  Am I naive for, for thinking that, that the hacker world is still, uh, somewhat magical and doesn't involve, uh, doing things for profit or for corporate secrets or, or does that world still exist?
[34:17.230 --> 34:18.030]  That's old school.
[34:18.330 --> 34:32.130]  Uh, you know, I think everything has changed where now, because the internet and commercial transactions are being, you know, pretty much done, you know, a gazillion times a day that now that's attracted an element of organized crime, right?
[34:32.230 --> 34:42.550]  So, um, I think the old school hackers like myself, I mean, we, uh, you know, I never, uh, hacked for money, you know, I, I, I, I was doing it for the trophies, right?
[34:42.670 --> 34:47.550]  And a lot of people in my time of, were the same, you know, of the same motivation, right?
[34:47.730 --> 34:49.250]  But now I think a lot of it's changed.
[34:49.370 --> 34:57.930]  I don't know if there's any people that are actually active doing stuff, you know, doing hacks that are just, um, for, for fun.
[34:58.370 --> 34:58.930]  Oh, of course there are.
[34:59.190 --> 34:59.550]  Absolutely.
[34:59.970 --> 35:00.270]  Yeah.
[35:00.350 --> 35:01.370]  Come to a 2600 meeting.
[35:01.530 --> 35:02.690]  Well, I mean, that's different.
[35:02.990 --> 35:03.170]  Yeah.
[35:03.430 --> 35:04.350]  That's a little bit different.
[35:04.390 --> 35:09.630]  What I'm saying is like, Oh, like breaking into companies illegally for fun.
[35:09.710 --> 35:10.650]  Like what I used to do.
[35:10.910 --> 35:13.770]  I don't think if I go to your meeting, there's going to be many people doing that publicly.
[35:13.950 --> 35:15.950]  Well, I mean, you didn't do it publicly.
[35:15.950 --> 35:17.330]  You didn't do it in front of an audience.
[35:17.330 --> 35:19.430]  Um, no, but you know what I'm, yeah, yeah.
[35:19.510 --> 35:20.270]  But you know what I mean?
[35:20.310 --> 35:22.990]  Usually when you do this type of stuff and it's a crime, right?
[35:23.070 --> 35:23.990]  You try to keep it secret.
[35:24.650 --> 35:33.810]  My point is though, as soon as organized crime gets involved or as soon as a corporation, uh, comes knocking at your door and hiring you, that's when you're not really hacking anymore.
[35:33.890 --> 35:36.110]  You're working and you're using your hacking abilities.
[35:36.250 --> 35:36.390]  True.
[35:36.390 --> 35:40.370]  But the kind of the joy, the innocence is gone from that.
[35:40.550 --> 35:48.130]  And I maintain that people still have that until they get approached by, yeah, these hordes of people out there that are looking to profit one way or another from your skills.
[35:48.310 --> 35:48.490]  Right.
[35:48.590 --> 35:55.210]  But it's interesting because I, you know, I'm friends with a lot of security experts and we end up a, like at, you know, hope, uh, Defcon, Blackhead or whatever.
[35:55.670 --> 35:57.690]  And these guys, you know, are corporate by day.
[35:57.890 --> 36:05.470]  And then when they get into the hotel room, like, you know, I'll go to the, you know, their suite, they're sitting there trying to hack the hotel system to get like free wifi.
[36:05.470 --> 36:05.770]  Exactly.
[36:05.930 --> 36:06.830]  And they're still hackers.
[36:07.210 --> 36:10.110]  And I'm going like, I'd say, they'd be telling me what they're doing.
[36:10.170 --> 36:11.330]  I said, please don't tell me anything.
[36:11.430 --> 36:11.990]  I don't want to know.
[36:12.230 --> 36:15.150]  You know, in fact, after you, I'll come back after you're done.
[36:15.290 --> 36:21.510]  I don't want to know anything, but these guys are, you know, making, you know, good money as pen testers can help themselves.
[36:21.510 --> 36:28.550]  And when they get into like a hotel room or somewhere, you know, they go back because it's, it's, it's curiosity and challenge and fun.
[36:28.670 --> 36:31.290]  And that is a hacker spirit that has lived within them.
[36:31.410 --> 36:31.530]  Yes.
[36:31.650 --> 36:38.670]  By day they, they are beholden to some other entity, but at night or at fun occasions like that, they're able to do something else.
[36:38.910 --> 36:39.190]  So, right.
[36:39.270 --> 36:45.070]  And they're not malicious, by the way, it's not like they're going to go, you know, DOS the, you know, or, you know, damage the hotel network.
[36:45.210 --> 36:48.670]  They just want to see if they could find a web app bug or something to get to it.
[36:48.750 --> 36:51.730]  As a rule, I found that hackers are not malicious by default.
[36:51.950 --> 36:56.210]  And of course there are exceptions to that, but that's what the media can't seem to ever get.
[36:56.370 --> 37:02.290]  Although we have to consider that it's maybe not so ingenuous to think that, okay, when organized crime and stuff gets involved, like that's something new.
[37:02.550 --> 37:11.670]  Um, if you go back to the seventies and, uh, two guys named Steve, uh, starting Apple computer back on the back of the money that, uh, they made selling blue boxes to like organized crime figures so they could run bookmaking operations.
[37:12.330 --> 37:14.850]  Um, they sold it to anybody who came to the garage.
[37:14.970 --> 37:16.310]  I don't think it was Berkeley, right?
[37:16.390 --> 37:17.550]  They sold a lot on the campus.
[37:17.710 --> 37:18.390]  It was more for students.
[37:18.550 --> 37:21.810]  I don't think, uh, you know, they, they actually sold the organized crime.
[37:21.950 --> 37:23.930]  That's on that, that doesn't sound like Steve.
[37:24.130 --> 37:30.190]  I know that might've come to their, their door and they didn't have a business card to say organized crime, but it might've, but the point is, yeah.
[37:30.330 --> 37:30.450]  Yeah.
[37:30.630 --> 37:33.530]  Organized crime is out there and they can buy whatever is being sold.
[37:33.690 --> 37:42.610]  It's a, it's a thing that exists and you know, whether you use your hacker skills for, for quote unquote good or evil or whatever, it's, you know, it's gotta be something separate from the criminal element.
[37:42.770 --> 37:45.630]  It's gotta be something separate from, uh, you know, the, the money making element.
[37:45.630 --> 37:48.530]  It's gotta be just its own thing and you know, you'll direct it how you will.
[37:49.010 --> 37:59.370]  I think also, I mean, you, you, you, to be, uh, swayed ethically or morally like with just as soon as money is floated, all of a sudden your actions are validated.
[38:00.130 --> 38:14.770]  Whether it's done under the auspices of some corporation or individuals or any kind of action like that, it's like coming up with a reason and then validating it doesn't necessarily change what it is and how you look at it.
[38:14.870 --> 38:23.090]  Maybe you have more of a legal team behind you or a bunch of contracts that you can maybe hold up and say, well, this is okay.
[38:23.090 --> 38:29.490]  Or like you said, oh, I'm just looking at this for the bug that you're going to pay me for.
[38:29.650 --> 38:34.130]  Lots of excuses and things can be taken to reinterpret that.
[38:34.270 --> 38:44.290]  And I think we need to really focus on our own intuition more so than just who is footing the bill and then make your moral or ethical decisions.
[38:44.290 --> 38:52.510]  I think that you should question what you're doing or question what's being asked of you and what you're participating in before money even enters into it.
[38:52.510 --> 38:57.790]  I'd like to just look at a couple of these stories that I alluded to just to give a little bit more detail.
[38:58.390 --> 39:04.210]  Toronto woman Chelsea Clark recently got a creepy surprise from a stranger on Facebook after watching Netflix with her boyfriend.
[39:04.330 --> 39:05.330]  It's according to Good Housekeeping.
[39:05.530 --> 39:07.810]  I don't know when Good Housekeeping started reporting on stories like this.
[39:08.150 --> 39:11.770]  The message contained pictures from her boyfriend's laptop webcam.
[39:11.770 --> 39:13.150]  I'm sorry, I said it was her laptop.
[39:13.150 --> 39:14.290]  It was his laptop.
[39:14.790 --> 39:17.590]  Of the pair in bed watching the streaming service together.
[39:17.590 --> 39:22.170]  There was only a short message from the hacker using the name Mahmoud Abdo.
[39:23.110 --> 39:29.490]  And I guess, you know, a name that sounds like that probably scared them more than anything else because that's the world we live in now.
[39:29.990 --> 39:32.950]  The pair had no idea at the time they were being watched.
[39:33.270 --> 39:36.050]  They said we obviously had no idea it was taking place in the moment.
[39:36.170 --> 39:39.250]  But retroactively, it was like a really, really deeply creepy feeling.
[39:39.810 --> 39:41.030]  It was very unnerving.
[39:41.130 --> 39:44.590]  I mean, it does feel like there's someone just in your home with you.
[39:45.050 --> 39:50.130]  The Facebook message was even more creepy for Clark because her Facebook settings didn't allow contact from strangers.
[39:50.130 --> 39:54.770]  The images in the message showed how intimately the couple's privacy was invaded.
[39:54.910 --> 40:04.790]  But I maintain that the hacker who did this, assuming there was a hacker behind it, did a service by showing that, yeah, this is something that can be exploited.
[40:04.790 --> 40:08.170]  And that you don't have the privacy you think you have.
[40:08.370 --> 40:11.010]  Your own laptop can reveal images.
[40:11.230 --> 40:12.490]  Could have just kept this to himself.
[40:12.490 --> 40:14.270]  Could have kept watching him to this day.
[40:14.690 --> 40:16.170]  But instead revealed it.
[40:16.270 --> 40:19.230]  And of course, they called the cops.
[40:19.430 --> 40:23.550]  The cops came in, seized the computer, seized the laptop of the...
[40:23.550 --> 40:24.990]  I don't understand the logic.
[40:25.170 --> 40:28.410]  And they're analyzing it for clues, probably shaking it up and down.
[40:29.810 --> 40:32.170]  The hacker's Facebook account has been deleted.
[40:32.390 --> 40:33.490]  It's believed to have been fake.
[40:33.970 --> 40:34.810]  Yeah, you think?
[40:35.010 --> 40:35.590]  All right, maybe.
[40:36.150 --> 40:43.250]  It's also thought that the hacker knows the couple because of the connection between her Facebook account and the images taken with her boyfriend's hacked laptop.
[40:43.450 --> 40:48.170]  My point here is that it's a good thing when you figure something out and you share it.
[40:48.170 --> 40:56.050]  It's not a good thing when you just allude to it or you save it for special occasions or sell it to the highest bidder.
[40:56.230 --> 40:59.230]  What a hacker does is show off what it is they...
[40:59.230 --> 41:01.690]  Yeah, it's some ego involved, but they're showing it off.
[41:02.110 --> 41:03.850]  But in doing so, look at this.
[41:03.850 --> 41:05.130]  They've got the cops after them.
[41:05.230 --> 41:09.690]  They've got probably an ISIS connection because, you know, an Islamic-sounding name.
[41:09.850 --> 41:14.410]  There's all kinds of things that we're going to panic about that we don't have to panic about.
[41:14.430 --> 41:16.350]  I think this was fairly innocuous.
[41:16.350 --> 41:18.190]  This is a really fun situation.
[41:18.370 --> 41:24.010]  I mean, like you were saying before, doing your hacking demos on stage and making the connection to, like, stage magic.
[41:24.510 --> 41:31.690]  And when a stage illusionist gets up on stage, he's in the business of showing people things that they know to be impossible.
[41:32.130 --> 41:36.870]  When you do a hacking demo on stage, you're showing people things that they thought were impossible, but, oh, my God, that's possible.
[41:37.250 --> 41:37.550]  Exactly.
[41:37.730 --> 41:43.830]  So it's opening people's eyes to, like, when they put their trust in all these services and, you know, what we were saying about Dropbox and everything else.
[41:43.830 --> 41:50.110]  Just all these services that they are comfortable with until they figure out that what's going on behind the scenes is maybe not in their best interests.
[41:50.550 --> 41:50.790]  Oh, yeah.
[41:50.930 --> 41:55.190]  Like, when I do my presentations, it's like the audience afterwards is like, oh, my God.
[41:55.530 --> 41:55.750]  Right?
[41:56.190 --> 42:05.350]  Because, you know, you're not dealing with people in our space, you know, that know not to plug in a USB stick, don't know not to open up a PDF file or click that Java applet.
[42:05.350 --> 42:05.850]  Right?
[42:05.970 --> 42:07.130]  And they just don't know.
[42:07.270 --> 42:13.350]  And when you show it to them and show them how easy it is for a bad guy across the world to take over their system, they freak out.
[42:13.830 --> 42:19.490]  And what they freak out about most is I set up the situation where to trick the target into doing so.
[42:19.670 --> 42:22.430]  And it's something that the audience member would easily fall for.
[42:22.590 --> 42:25.110]  So then it's like, oh, my God, I would have fell for that myself.
[42:25.450 --> 42:27.010]  So it actually scares them.
[42:27.230 --> 42:32.110]  I wonder if they lose any productivity at work because they're not going to open up anything anymore.
[42:32.110 --> 42:34.130]  They're not going to, you know, use any external media.
[42:34.430 --> 42:37.270]  Well, until something more secure comes along, maybe they shouldn't.
[42:37.350 --> 42:43.910]  But do you think it's fair, though, that after a demonstration like that, the way the media spins it, they say a hacker could do this.
[42:44.050 --> 42:45.150]  It's not a hacker can do this.
[42:45.210 --> 42:46.210]  Anybody can do this.
[42:46.330 --> 42:50.210]  A hacker just showed you how to prevent this from happening.
[42:50.570 --> 42:51.830]  Give them some credit for that.
[42:51.970 --> 42:56.490]  But anybody with malicious intent can compromise your security.
[42:56.630 --> 42:57.470]  Oh, I'll tell you a story.
[42:57.470 --> 43:06.830]  So I recently did a panel, and it was myself, it was General Alexander, XNSA, and XMI6, John Sawyers.
[43:06.990 --> 43:09.550]  And we did it in Chicago for a telecom conference.
[43:09.970 --> 43:14.790]  And one of my demos is to bring somebody up on stage and ask them permission.
[43:14.790 --> 43:19.350]  I'm going to say, I'm going to get some super private information about you, and I'm going to display it on the screen.
[43:19.470 --> 43:20.870]  And I'm just going to use the Internet.
[43:21.170 --> 43:23.130]  You know, I'm not going to do anything really special.
[43:23.690 --> 43:24.930]  And do I have your permission?
[43:24.930 --> 43:27.030]  And then once they give me their consent, you know, I go forward.
[43:27.550 --> 43:31.910]  And so I brought this guy up on stage, and, you know, he went through the consent thing.
[43:32.030 --> 43:35.090]  And then within, you know, a minute, I have a social security number.
[43:35.290 --> 43:36.670]  I have his mother's maiden name.
[43:36.790 --> 43:37.610]  I have his date of birth.
[43:37.730 --> 43:39.010]  I have his driver's license number.
[43:39.170 --> 43:42.510]  I have all the cities, all his past addresses for the last 10 years.
[43:42.610 --> 43:43.730]  Do you have his lawyer calling you?
[43:44.450 --> 43:44.770]  No.
[43:44.770 --> 43:53.690]  So this guy actually contacted, like, my agent and goes, I had no idea it was going to be that type of information.
[43:54.130 --> 43:56.470]  And, yeah, I bought the guy some identity.
[43:56.690 --> 43:58.610]  I bought the guy a year of lifelock, right?
[43:58.670 --> 44:00.670]  Because he was so paranoid, right?
[44:00.850 --> 44:02.110]  And had no clue.
[44:02.330 --> 44:07.050]  Even though I said it's going to be extremely personal information that you wouldn't want anyone to see.
[44:07.050 --> 44:08.370]  I tell them that ahead of time.
[44:08.550 --> 44:12.030]  And I basically, you know, get consent, right?
[44:12.150 --> 44:14.350]  And this guy just freaked out.
[44:14.450 --> 44:17.970]  It was the first one that ever happened like this in, you know, in the 10 years of doing this.
[44:18.070 --> 44:27.070]  Because people just don't realize how easy it is, you know, if you have a credit card and access to the Internet, that you can pretty much find out anything about anyone that lives in America.
[44:27.070 --> 44:29.490]  Because our privacy, it sucks.
[44:30.170 --> 44:30.430]  Yes.
[44:30.710 --> 44:32.730]  It's very, very true there.
[44:32.890 --> 44:35.950]  And we've heard stories like that many times.
[44:36.630 --> 44:49.010]  Bernie, continuing along the list of stories that we had here, I know you had some thoughts on this one about these nine people who were charged in a $30 million press release hacking scheme.
[44:49.170 --> 44:50.710]  I'll read you the first paragraph.
[44:51.270 --> 44:59.210]  Nine people have been charged in a massive international hacking scheme designed to steal unpublished press releases from business news wires.
[44:59.450 --> 45:00.810]  That's a thing in itself.
[45:01.110 --> 45:04.590]  And use the information to make profitable insider trades.
[45:04.590 --> 45:06.530]  Now, is this hacking?
[45:09.550 --> 45:11.350]  I wouldn't call it hacking.
[45:11.530 --> 45:15.970]  I would just say it's breaking into the computers of these newswire companies.
[45:16.130 --> 45:32.130]  But what I can't understand in that whole story is, why would these big corporations that have so much to lose entrust their unpublished press releases that they don't want published until some future date with these third parties and say, oh, you just sit on this.
[45:32.250 --> 45:35.530]  We'll trust you with it until we tell you to release this press release.
[45:35.710 --> 45:39.670]  Why not just say, you know, wait and we'll send it to you when it's ready to go out?
[45:39.770 --> 45:42.930]  I don't understand this story at all.
[45:43.070 --> 45:45.470]  Well, that's the corporate world versus reality.
[45:45.470 --> 45:49.310]  And we've long studied that and there's no correlation whatsoever.
[45:49.710 --> 45:56.850]  But the thing that bugged me about that story was that these are people stealing money.
[45:57.050 --> 46:04.370]  They're basically benefiting from manipulating the news and inside information.
[46:04.990 --> 46:10.570]  Just because they were able to hack into a system does not make them hackers.
[46:10.910 --> 46:18.210]  They were able to figure out a password that somebody either gave them or just a default password or something like that.
[46:18.290 --> 46:23.230]  But it's just this tendency of the media every time something like this happens to simply use that word.
[46:23.350 --> 46:24.070]  That's what bugs me.
[46:24.990 --> 46:27.090]  Can't these news media organizations...
[46:27.090 --> 46:44.610]  I'm not talking about the outfit that releases the press releases for corporations, but news media outlets, why can't they just use the word people or malicious people or unethical people did this and that as opposed to hackers?
[46:44.850 --> 46:46.230]  Because that's what it is.
[46:46.250 --> 46:48.110]  You could also use the word criminals if they're doing this.
[46:48.270 --> 46:50.570]  Because, I mean, why not?
[46:50.670 --> 46:54.550]  Why do they just have to use this in the same term instead of...
[46:55.090 --> 47:01.850]  You know, for all other crimes, they don't have a term they use to describe...
[47:01.850 --> 47:07.610]  Well, I can answer that, Bernie, because there are four basic words in the tabloid vocabulary.
[47:08.210 --> 47:11.230]  Pedophile, Trump, ISIS, and hackers.
[47:11.750 --> 47:13.870]  I think that's what it boils down to.
[47:14.250 --> 47:23.690]  Now, Kevin, you have another hacker story that is hitting the news today or has been hitting the news actually for a couple of weeks, but it's really hitting the news today.
[47:23.950 --> 47:25.430]  Yeah, the Ashley Madison hack.
[47:25.610 --> 47:27.810]  I mean, I'm actually going through their dump now.
[47:27.810 --> 47:29.050]  And it's quite interesting.
[47:29.290 --> 47:34.250]  And I even searched on my own name, and there was like 30 people using the name Kevin Mitnick.
[47:36.170 --> 47:38.830]  Now, honestly, you're amongst friends here.
[47:38.930 --> 47:43.310]  Is this just your way of getting out of whatever trouble you're in?
[47:43.350 --> 47:44.650]  I had like 30 accounts, right?
[47:44.750 --> 47:46.950]  But it's like, you know, so I'm searching.
[47:47.150 --> 47:51.770]  And it was funny because I saw someone I think I actually know.
[47:51.910 --> 47:54.710]  But yeah, so I've been searching through the...
[47:54.710 --> 47:55.490]  It's too big.
[47:55.490 --> 47:57.550]  It's like gigabytes of data.
[47:57.770 --> 47:58.710]  I think it's like 30.
[47:59.130 --> 47:59.850]  No, it's like...
[47:59.850 --> 48:01.710]  Well, it's 10 GZIPed.
[48:02.630 --> 48:03.490]  I'll give you...
[48:03.490 --> 48:04.430]  I have a copy here.
[48:04.630 --> 48:05.270]  I'm told there's more coming.
[48:05.670 --> 48:10.050]  But it's funny because, you know, and then I go, oh, I'll just search on my own name for fun.
[48:10.090 --> 48:13.150]  And I go, what are these people using my name?
[48:14.190 --> 48:17.150]  Because they think they'll be safe if they use a fake name.
[48:17.490 --> 48:19.410]  Yeah, it's funny.
[48:19.610 --> 48:20.850]  It's actually pretty damn funny.
[48:20.950 --> 48:23.090]  And maybe you'll get blamed for it, you know, if they do get caught.
[48:23.210 --> 48:23.550]  I don't care.
[48:25.490 --> 48:27.230]  Michael's email addresses on this list.
[48:27.370 --> 48:28.630]  How is that even possible?
[48:28.970 --> 48:31.270]  That's like all these people in the U.S.
[48:31.390 --> 48:33.430]  government are cheating on their spouses, apparently.
[48:33.530 --> 48:37.890]  Yeah, and it's funny because I'm sure a lot of these are like real people's addresses, right?
[48:38.270 --> 48:40.710]  Like here's one, Kevin Mitnick, 25 at yawg.com.
[48:41.130 --> 48:42.050]  But it's a...
[48:42.050 --> 48:45.170]  You're violating that Kevin Mitnick's privacy by giving out the email address.
[48:45.350 --> 48:46.790]  There could be another Kevin Mitnick.
[48:47.590 --> 48:48.690]  Oh, that's true.
[48:48.690 --> 48:50.630]  I think there's actually one other one in the United States.
[48:50.810 --> 48:52.070]  I met a Mitnick once somewhere.
[48:52.370 --> 48:53.870]  No, I think there's actually another Kevin Mitnick.
[48:54.010 --> 48:55.230]  I wonder if he gets hassled.
[48:55.450 --> 48:56.570]  Oh, you better believe it.
[48:56.790 --> 48:57.850]  You better believe it.
[48:57.850 --> 49:02.350]  And I think the guy lives in Pennsylvania because I searched on my own name and there was actually one other guy here.
[49:02.690 --> 49:10.810]  But it's, you know, because I wasn't really sure if the hackers were actually telling the truth and actually had the full dumps.
[49:10.870 --> 49:13.130]  I was like, hmm, why didn't they release it?
[49:13.130 --> 49:14.690]  Or it could just be a big bluff.
[49:14.890 --> 49:24.850]  But apparently, if this data is to be believed, and it looks quite real, that they just actually dumped all, you know, all the email addresses of these individuals.
[49:25.130 --> 49:26.470]  It's not a nice thing to do.
[49:26.630 --> 49:29.310]  I will definitely agree that it's not nice.
[49:29.610 --> 49:34.690]  But I also maintain that this is a lesson that people can benefit from.
[49:35.150 --> 49:39.290]  Do not put your private information on some website.
[49:39.930 --> 49:42.050]  Don't put certain pictures on your phone.
[49:42.050 --> 49:43.030]  Yeah, it's...
[49:43.030 --> 49:43.750]  And sync it with your computer.
[49:43.910 --> 49:47.730]  It doesn't take much to realize that this information is not secure.
[49:47.870 --> 49:48.210]  Or iCloud.
[49:48.270 --> 49:54.350]  If you run your own computer and you encrypt things and you're responsible, then you're the one that can control it.
[49:54.430 --> 49:57.330]  But when you give it to somebody else, you lose control.
[49:57.550 --> 50:05.090]  And this is the perfect story for my book because it goes to show that people sign up for something that they definitely want to protect their privacy or else they're going to get a divorce.
[50:05.090 --> 50:17.650]  And they actually think that they can go online and maybe use a computer somewhere else or at work, sign up for this, and that nothing bad would ever come of it.
[50:17.790 --> 50:28.710]  And here's a primary example of what 40 million users that were now, if they have real identifying information, could cause them to end up with divorce attorneys later.
[50:28.710 --> 50:34.250]  I love the fact that people with .gov email addresses used their work email to sign into this thing.
[50:34.270 --> 50:35.190]  Oh, I got to search for that now.
[50:35.310 --> 50:39.630]  But the real lesson here is, I mean, it's easy to point at this and go, okay, this is Ashley Madison.
[50:39.630 --> 50:43.330]  This is a business that had a business model profiting from people's innate dishonesty.
[50:44.030 --> 50:46.790]  Okay, people who are signing up to this maybe deserve it on some level.
[50:46.930 --> 50:50.550]  But beyond all that, Ashley Madison is just a company at the end of it.
[50:50.690 --> 51:01.870]  And anything that you sign into, your Twitter, your Facebook, your right down to the website that you buy, you know, whatever random junk from, anything that you develop a login and a password for, anything that you put your credit info in, your address,
[51:02.070 --> 51:05.410]  anything could be hit just as easily as Ashley Madison was.
[51:05.810 --> 51:07.190]  And what about Google, man?
[51:07.250 --> 51:08.310]  They know everything that you buy.
[51:08.430 --> 51:11.730]  Google and Amazon, they know everything you buy, when you bought it, where you bought it.
[51:11.950 --> 51:17.230]  I mean, it's like, it would be interesting just to see the dossiers these companies have on you.
[51:17.590 --> 51:27.330]  I mean, it would be probably incredible knowing, I mean, by correlating what you search on, where you shop, where you drive, if you're using Waze, or, you know, Google acquired Waze, right?
[51:27.390 --> 51:28.250]  I use Waze.
[51:28.390 --> 51:28.530]  Right.
[51:28.690 --> 51:29.150]  It's awesome.
[51:29.230 --> 51:30.290]  I used it to get here, by the way.
[51:30.350 --> 51:31.370]  Oh my God, so did I.
[51:32.570 --> 51:34.110]  Wow, we are so nailed.
[51:34.550 --> 51:35.670]  Everybody's going to know where we are.
[51:35.730 --> 51:36.810]  So they know where we are.
[51:36.990 --> 51:38.710]  They know what hotel I'm at.
[51:39.170 --> 51:55.350]  I mean, but it would be actually incredible to actually see what parties have, you know, besides looking at an X-key score, but actually being able to put a complete picture of somebody based on this information, I'm sure that once that complete picture is there,
[51:55.690 --> 51:56.730]  people would be freaked out.
[51:56.830 --> 52:02.650]  Well, because, you know, they're not concerned about the discrete pieces of information, but when you put it all together, it's probably really scary.
[52:02.910 --> 52:03.350]  Go ahead, Bernie.
[52:04.230 --> 52:05.390]  In Europe, you can do that.
[52:05.530 --> 52:05.850]  You can...
[52:05.850 --> 52:10.330]  There are privacy laws in Europe that are much better than our own, depending on the country over there.
[52:10.450 --> 52:14.790]  But you can request, for instance, all the information that Google has about you.
[52:14.950 --> 52:15.950]  You can do that here, too.
[52:16.050 --> 52:18.030]  You can go to any Gmail account and request that.
[52:18.610 --> 52:19.070]  Oh, yeah?
[52:19.070 --> 52:19.410]  Okay.
[52:19.810 --> 52:21.090]  Have you done that for yourself?
[52:21.490 --> 52:23.110]  I did it for one of my...
[52:23.110 --> 52:30.950]  See, one of my protections against this sort of thing is to have multiple accounts and have all kinds of different data floating around, some of it real, some of it false.
[52:31.630 --> 52:35.930]  So the accounts that I've requested information about had surprisingly little.
[52:37.070 --> 52:38.130]  Or so they say.
[52:38.470 --> 52:39.270]  Well, yeah, that's true.
[52:39.290 --> 52:41.630]  You have to believe that they're actually telling the truth.
[52:42.490 --> 52:44.410]  But I always shy...
[52:44.410 --> 52:52.150]  You know, people call me old-fashioned for not diving into all these social media, media, you know, festivals and things like that.
[52:52.970 --> 52:56.670]  And I think this is the flip side of that, in that you have more privacy.
[52:57.030 --> 52:58.250]  All this information isn't out there.
[52:58.550 --> 52:59.590]  What, do I have things to hide?
[53:00.030 --> 53:00.710]  Maybe I do.
[53:00.830 --> 53:01.290]  Maybe I don't.
[53:01.370 --> 53:02.130]  That's for me to decide.
[53:02.130 --> 53:07.710]  I just don't believe in everything being out there for anybody to analyze at any time.
[53:07.850 --> 53:09.710]  You see it, you know, bite you in the ass.
[53:12.050 --> 53:12.650]  All right.
[53:13.110 --> 53:15.870]  We have only a couple minutes left.
[53:16.450 --> 53:20.330]  I did want to focus a little bit on this other story.
[53:20.510 --> 53:23.230]  How long before hackers take down an entire city?
[53:24.150 --> 53:25.550]  It hasn't happened yet.
[53:25.550 --> 53:26.690]  It will eventually.
[53:26.930 --> 53:28.610]  Cybersecurity experts are warning.
[53:28.950 --> 53:31.530]  Maybe, Kevin, you're one of the cybersecurity experts warning people about this.
[53:31.730 --> 53:33.030]  First, the power goes out.
[53:33.150 --> 53:34.590]  It's not clear what's gone wrong.
[53:34.710 --> 53:36.750]  But cars are starting to jam the streets.
[53:36.750 --> 53:41.390]  The traffic lights are down and something seems to be going haywire with the subways, too.
[53:41.590 --> 53:42.630]  No one can get to work.
[53:42.730 --> 53:47.810]  And even if they could, or they do, a cyber attack has driven the city to a halt.
[53:48.250 --> 53:49.910]  Of course, that has not happened yet.
[53:50.030 --> 53:56.850]  And to a lot of people, the idea of malicious hackers taking down a city still sounds like a bad movie plot, but it may not be as crazy as it sounds.
[53:57.030 --> 54:07.710]  According to security experts who say cities increasing dependence on technology and the haphazard ways those systems sometimes connect could leave them vulnerable to someone looking to cause chaos.
[54:08.050 --> 54:09.530]  Someone looking to cause chaos.
[54:09.770 --> 54:12.210]  Hey, that's the sentence that makes sense.
[54:12.370 --> 54:16.450]  Because, yeah, someone looking to cause chaos can cause chaos, can cause all these problems.
[54:16.650 --> 54:20.070]  The headline, though, says how long before hackers take down an entire city?
[54:20.190 --> 54:21.570]  Probably a pretty long time.
[54:21.750 --> 54:24.030]  How long before someone looking to cause chaos will do it?
[54:24.430 --> 54:25.550]  Probably not that long.
[54:25.710 --> 54:32.550]  And it's because of the boneheaded ways that people set things up where they're all interconnected And there's no security whatsoever.
[54:33.670 --> 54:37.030]  That is why this is what I consider to be a threat.
[54:37.310 --> 54:38.030]  Bernie, any thoughts?
[54:39.090 --> 54:40.270]  I agree with you.
[54:40.370 --> 54:43.970]  There should be... they should just say how long before somebody takes down an entire city.
[54:44.110 --> 54:44.870]  You don't have to say hackers.
[54:44.870 --> 54:45.590]  It could be anybody.
[54:47.150 --> 54:47.510]  Yes.
[54:47.610 --> 54:50.730]  Yeah, but a lot of things would have to, you know, to actually take down a city.
[54:50.870 --> 54:52.550]  You want to hit telecom... you want to hit energy.
[54:52.710 --> 54:54.310]  You want to hit critical infrastructure.
[54:56.150 --> 55:02.830]  So... so the attackers would have to be, you know, very meticulous in organized attacks.
[55:03.110 --> 55:07.330]  First of all, compromise the systems, number one, without getting caught or, you know, obviously detected.
[55:07.630 --> 55:15.110]  And then actually doing something simultaneously, which would take a lot of effort and time to do, but it's definitely plausible.
[55:15.270 --> 55:16.910]  Well, the systems have already been compromised.
[55:17.230 --> 55:19.550]  We can assume that much.
[55:19.670 --> 55:23.150]  They've been compromised and the information has not gotten out.
[55:23.150 --> 55:27.670]  And one day, when somebody wants to do something, that will happen.
[55:28.050 --> 55:31.830]  I just think the antidote is to be prepared, you know.
[55:31.910 --> 55:35.630]  Disaster preparedness is important for a lot of reasons.
[55:35.630 --> 55:43.370]  And being ready to be on or off and being able to take your systems apart and know what's there.
[55:43.370 --> 55:48.910]  I mean, it's an argument for not being reliant on services that could just be shut down for other reasons.
[55:48.910 --> 55:53.610]  So, definitely, you know, take care of yourself and these things won't affect you as much.
[55:53.710 --> 55:55.750]  Well, how would you suggest doing that?
[55:55.910 --> 55:59.610]  How can somebody protect themselves or how can a company protect themselves?
[56:00.170 --> 56:09.050]  Well, I mean, it's things that we always talk about and it's probably it's in the realm of personal computing where you maybe you have uninterruptible power supplies.
[56:09.050 --> 56:18.830]  You keep good backups of things you you you maybe have some spare computers or other equipment and and other forms of media.
[56:18.830 --> 56:24.690]  Maybe not everything in one type of media or another so that and some old gear like old equipment.
[56:25.050 --> 56:27.190]  Boy, that stuff that really works in a pinch.
[56:27.530 --> 56:31.530]  Well, let me I'll ask you if I'm being secure when I make a backup of my system.
[56:31.670 --> 56:34.970]  I copy it to another drive on my computer and leave it there.
[56:35.750 --> 56:36.410]  Good bad?
[56:37.090 --> 56:38.390]  Yeah, because it's a different drive.
[56:38.610 --> 56:43.630]  So, I mean, that's like a basic on the same computer on the same computer and probably not the best.
[56:43.690 --> 56:50.150]  I mean, you probably want to like have a drive that's like in a physically yeah, maybe external drive.
[56:50.310 --> 56:52.410]  I copy to an external drive and I put it on top of that computer.
[56:52.630 --> 56:56.470]  Yeah, or maybe send it to your aunt and yeah, exactly.
[56:56.650 --> 56:57.950]  Don't keep it in the same place.
[56:58.150 --> 57:00.710]  These are elementary things encrypted encrypted.
[57:00.910 --> 57:01.830]  Yeah, Kevin Mitnick.
[57:01.930 --> 57:03.310]  We're we only have a couple of minutes.
[57:03.310 --> 57:06.530]  Uh, so any final words or no, it's just great to be here.
[57:06.630 --> 57:10.590]  I mean, it's, uh, uh, I haven't been on your show for I think years.
[57:10.650 --> 57:15.550]  I mean, since I came out with ghost in the wires back in 2011, you missed, you missed Harlem.
[57:15.690 --> 57:18.390]  You missed our stop over there for a couple of years.
[57:18.550 --> 57:18.650]  Yeah.
[57:18.790 --> 57:24.190]  So I'm just really awesome to be back on your show and, uh, just everyone just, you know, stay safe, be smart.
[57:24.350 --> 57:25.190]  Well, you're welcome anytime.
[57:25.330 --> 57:27.210]  And, uh, we hope to see you again really soon.
[57:27.310 --> 57:32.970]  Uh, folks, you can write to us at off the hook OTH at 2600.com with your comments.
[57:33.450 --> 57:34.150]  Please write.
[57:34.410 --> 57:35.150]  Not enough people write.
[57:35.490 --> 57:38.750]  Uh, I know it's, uh, you know, people tweet and they, they, they send SMSs.
[57:38.870 --> 57:40.630]  That's, that's great, but write us a letter.
[57:40.810 --> 57:41.650]  We'd love reading letters.
[57:42.210 --> 57:46.730]  OTH at 2600.com personal computer show is up next.
[57:46.970 --> 57:47.730]  We'll see you next week.
[57:47.810 --> 57:47.950]  Good night.