[00:00.700 --> 00:03.200] And you're listening to Radio Station WBAI New York. [00:03.600 --> 00:08.610] It's 7 o'clock, and that means only one thing, that it's time, once again, for Off the Hook. [00:13.800 --> 00:18.300] The telephone keeps ringing, so I ripped it off the wall. [00:19.240 --> 00:23.780] I cut myself while shaving, now I can't make a call. [00:24.420 --> 00:26.620] We couldn't get much worse. [00:28.800 --> 00:32.080] Would a middly bump, but the best is paid for worst. [00:32.640 --> 00:34.580] I hope that's understood. [00:34.780 --> 00:35.540] One middly bump! [01:42.250 --> 01:44.110] And a very good evening to everybody. [01:44.110 --> 01:46.110] The program is Off the Hook. [01:46.590 --> 01:47.930] Emmanuel Goldstein here with you. [01:47.930 --> 01:50.970] on this Wednesday evening. [01:51.730 --> 01:54.070] Joined tonight by Mike. [01:54.390 --> 01:55.150] Good evening. [01:55.310 --> 01:55.770] Happy Wednesday. [01:56.390 --> 01:57.470] Happy Wednesday to you as well. [01:57.910 --> 01:58.890] Rob T. Firefly. [01:59.810 --> 02:00.350] Good evening. [02:00.770 --> 02:01.110] Kyle. [02:01.890 --> 02:02.390] Hi. [02:02.550 --> 02:03.110] Hey, everybody. [02:03.110 --> 02:03.510] I'm here. [02:03.830 --> 02:04.530] And Bernie S. [02:05.530 --> 02:06.690] Greetings from Philadelphia. [02:07.990 --> 02:08.510] Greetings. [02:09.430 --> 02:10.710] Yeah, that's interesting. [02:12.050 --> 02:13.850] Everything is a little bit low. [02:14.050 --> 02:17.070] I'm sorry I have to do this every week, but it's like we have to rebuild the station every week. [02:18.410 --> 02:19.870] Is that as loud as I can get? [02:20.050 --> 02:20.210] Okay. [02:20.610 --> 02:22.190] I'd like to be commanding. [02:22.350 --> 02:23.450] Somebody turn that down? [02:23.690 --> 02:25.730] I mean, that's your monitor right there. [02:25.830 --> 02:26.170] All right. [02:26.610 --> 02:27.270] No, I'm fine. [02:27.350 --> 02:27.570] You know what? [02:27.570 --> 02:28.230] I can live with this. [02:28.430 --> 02:28.750] You sound great. [02:28.750 --> 02:30.250] If the audience can live with this, I can live with this. [02:30.330 --> 02:30.830] You sound great. [02:31.050 --> 02:31.410] Thank you. [02:31.510 --> 02:31.950] Thank you for that. [02:31.990 --> 02:32.170] That's true. [02:32.810 --> 02:33.810] Well, here we are. [02:34.490 --> 02:39.230] It's September now, and we still don't have phone lines, but we're going to get them. [02:39.350 --> 02:40.230] We keep getting promised. [02:40.390 --> 02:50.010] Every week, I'm going to say the same thing, that, yes, they say the phone lines are coming, and we'll be able to take phone calls like normal radio stations are able to, but not tonight. [02:51.250 --> 02:55.650] Maybe if we hold the cell phone up to the speaker again or to the microphone, but that's kind of ridiculous. [02:55.910 --> 02:58.730] You would be disappointed if this was a normal radio station, though. [02:58.730 --> 03:04.490] You know, I'd like to try it once just to see, and maybe it wouldn't be such a traumatic experience. [03:04.570 --> 03:10.950] I mean, there are things that normal radio stations get right, but on balance, if this was a normal radio station, well, we wouldn't be here. [03:11.030 --> 03:15.530] It would be the first thing they would do, but it wouldn't be fun. [03:15.590 --> 03:19.090] Yeah, none of you have commented on the big smile on my face. [03:19.590 --> 03:22.310] Does anybody want to know why I seem so happy today? [03:22.490 --> 03:24.730] Yeah, it was kind of creeping me out, but I didn't want to raise the subject. [03:24.730 --> 03:28.990] I'm sorry about that, and people on the street also commented that it was a little weird. [03:30.010 --> 03:32.670] I'm happy, and I'm not ashamed to admit it. [03:32.770 --> 03:37.870] I'm happy because after our request of last week, boy, did we receive a lot of emails. [03:38.250 --> 03:38.890] Oh, my goodness. [03:39.810 --> 03:42.470] Too many emails to even read on the air, but you know what? [03:42.510 --> 03:43.070] I'm going to try. [03:43.250 --> 03:44.250] I'm going to read a bunch. [03:45.130 --> 03:52.610] And it's great to know that readers are out... readers... well, they are readers because they know how to read, but listeners are out there, and they're writing. [03:52.770 --> 03:57.430] And that's something that at least I was complaining about last week is that not enough people write anymore. [03:57.630 --> 03:59.610] What they do write is 140 characters. [03:59.950 --> 04:01.990] And, you know, we want more. [04:02.170 --> 04:03.150] We want more from our listeners. [04:03.310 --> 04:03.830] We want to hear more. [04:03.970 --> 04:04.830] We want to hear words, right? [04:05.510 --> 04:06.950] Am I alone in this? [04:07.310 --> 04:07.590] LOL. [04:07.970 --> 04:08.070] Yeah. [04:08.450 --> 04:09.170] Well, thank you, Mike. [04:09.610 --> 04:09.770] Yeah. [04:09.870 --> 04:10.010] Okay. [04:10.070 --> 04:10.590] Well, you know what? [04:10.930 --> 04:15.370] If your attention span wanders away, we'll try and get you back. [04:15.990 --> 04:18.590] But here's a letter from Robert. [04:18.690 --> 04:20.570] I just heard you talking about the few emails you're getting. [04:20.750 --> 04:29.810] So, for what it's worth, I'll mention I tried to write you a few weeks ago and couldn't find your email address after a quick look at your website and Googling for it. [04:30.030 --> 04:32.450] I only learned it after hearing you say it on the radio. [04:32.450 --> 04:34.010] So, it might be worth advertising it more. [04:34.110 --> 04:35.410] You see, Robert, thank you for that. [04:35.690 --> 04:39.950] That's the kind of thing that can be conveyed in an email that we didn't know about. [04:40.290 --> 04:44.830] I guess if you look at our website, maybe we forgot to do that. [04:44.990 --> 04:48.110] We forgot to put our own email address. [04:48.250 --> 04:48.850] People are bad. [04:48.950 --> 04:51.670] You know, in the hacker world, people are very bad at self-promotion. [04:52.010 --> 05:03.290] And many times, when we put together the issue, which we just finished, thank God, the autumn issue, people write in to give us updates on the 2600 meetings that take place once a month. [05:03.330 --> 05:05.050] In fact, I believe there's one coming up this Friday. [05:05.270 --> 05:05.650] Yes, indeed. [05:05.850 --> 05:11.210] One in New York City, a whole lot around the world, all on the first Friday, except in Israel, where it's on the first Thursday. [05:12.130 --> 05:21.590] But what a lot of people do is they write in and they update us on their meeting and say, well, you know, all these people showed up and we did this, we did that, and they don't tell us which meeting it is. [05:21.850 --> 05:25.350] We're supposed to somehow figure it out from, I don't know, their name or something. [05:25.510 --> 05:27.890] But yeah, sometimes we forget the most important details. [05:28.010 --> 05:32.650] So it's quite possible on our own website, we forgot to tell people how to contact us. [05:32.750 --> 05:37.430] But for those listening on the radio, OTH at 2600.com is our email address. [05:38.090 --> 05:42.950] And we'll get a committee together to fix the website so that we can put the email address there. [05:44.090 --> 05:45.670] Here's another letter from Don. [05:46.030 --> 05:48.130] Email is an outstanding... is... [05:48.130 --> 05:49.010] Actually, you know what, Don? [05:49.070 --> 05:51.790] I don't mean to embarrass you, but I'm going to say it like you said. [05:51.890 --> 05:53.770] Email is a outstanding way to communicate. [05:54.090 --> 05:56.030] Let's utilize this great form of communication. [05:57.030 --> 05:59.850] Don, I couldn't agree with you more, except what you sent us was a tweet. [05:59.990 --> 06:00.230] Come on. [06:00.310 --> 06:01.770] You tweeted that, didn't you? [06:01.850 --> 06:03.450] Or you SMSed it or something. [06:03.590 --> 06:04.430] That is not an email. [06:04.630 --> 06:10.230] It's two sentences, and it's not even two sentences, and there's grammatical issues, and there's no closing period. [06:10.410 --> 06:11.310] And it's impersonal. [06:11.450 --> 06:12.470] It's kind of impersonal. [06:12.570 --> 06:16.450] I mean, I appreciate that Don took the time to write this, but this is kind of what I'm talking about. [06:16.730 --> 06:19.970] You know, what Robert did, Robert wrote, it was a brief letter. [06:20.250 --> 06:21.250] We got some long letters. [06:21.910 --> 06:26.050] But, you know, sentences and structure and all that kind of thing, I'm not a stickler for it. [06:26.110 --> 06:27.150] Well, yeah, I guess I am, actually. [06:27.790 --> 06:29.030] But I appreciate that. [06:29.110 --> 06:36.190] I appreciate being able to read things and communicate with people in that old-fashioned way, which I didn't think was that old-fashioned. [06:36.730 --> 06:37.530] You're so mean. [06:37.930 --> 06:39.410] People take the time to write to us. [06:39.490 --> 06:42.610] How much time do you think it took to write those, what, 12 words? [06:42.770 --> 06:44.590] More time than it would have taken to not write. [06:44.970 --> 06:47.990] Well, less time than it's taken me to complain about it, I'll say that. [06:48.070 --> 06:48.830] Well, that's true, too. [06:49.030 --> 06:49.330] All right. [06:49.690 --> 06:51.650] Here's another letter from Nick26. [06:52.130 --> 06:55.990] I wonder if Nick named himself after 2600, or he's just a 26th Nick. [06:56.110 --> 06:56.470] Who knows? [06:57.070 --> 06:57.730] Hi, guys. [06:57.730 --> 07:01.470] If President Kennedy had Twitter, he might have deleted Ich bin ein Berliner. [07:01.730 --> 07:02.850] The German is so tricky. [07:03.010 --> 07:04.990] Yeah, he would have because he's actually saying that he's a jelly donut. [07:05.050 --> 07:05.990] Is that the truth? [07:06.190 --> 07:06.510] It's a myth. [07:06.830 --> 07:07.430] It's a myth. [07:07.550 --> 07:08.210] He's not saying that. [07:08.310 --> 07:09.110] What is he saying he is? [07:09.330 --> 07:11.050] He's saying what he intended to say. [07:11.050 --> 07:12.330] So President Kennedy was right? [07:12.570 --> 07:15.610] Well, I don't want to go that far, but his German... He was handed some German. [07:15.610 --> 07:17.730] Wait, you can't even admit that President Kennedy was right? [07:17.850 --> 07:18.690] I mean, I'm sure he was wrong. [07:18.690 --> 07:21.010] You hate all presidents, but I didn't think it went back even to Kennedy. [07:21.010 --> 07:21.850] He was right on this. [07:21.970 --> 07:22.390] How's that? [07:23.190 --> 07:23.510] Okay. [07:23.510 --> 07:27.490] I'm not going to say he's generally right on everything, because I wasn't alive at the time. [07:27.490 --> 07:28.670] I'm sure he got a lot of things wrong. [07:28.830 --> 07:30.470] But this was fine. [07:30.470 --> 07:31.110] Okay. [07:31.790 --> 07:37.990] About ways of keeping in touch, people like me will keep every account in every format I've used as I slowly progress, just in case. [07:38.590 --> 07:40.750] Millennials will just move on and delete the old. [07:40.970 --> 07:43.090] If you've been keeping in touch, you'll know about it. [07:43.950 --> 07:47.070] Also, what was that bit of music at the end of the show? [07:47.270 --> 07:48.810] The bit of music at the end of the show? [07:48.930 --> 07:52.890] I guess you're referring to this bit of music. [07:54.210 --> 07:55.310] Oh, I'm sorry. [07:55.350 --> 07:58.530] I had this all planned out, and the CD player failed. [07:58.970 --> 07:59.530] You know what? [07:59.590 --> 08:00.270] We'll get back to that. [08:00.590 --> 08:00.990] Oh, there it is. [08:01.510 --> 08:01.830] Okay. [08:02.210 --> 08:03.250] This piece of music? [08:03.250 --> 08:04.250] This is what you're talking about? [08:08.120 --> 08:08.980] No, that's not it. [08:12.950 --> 08:15.790] These are those kids we hired to do the new Google name. [08:17.950 --> 08:19.330] You know, they're called Alphabet now? [08:19.730 --> 08:21.110] And we never use this. [08:22.630 --> 08:26.030] But it's on the same CD that, um, that the outro is on. [08:26.150 --> 08:43.650] So we have to sit through this to get a CD. [08:43.650 --> 08:44.450] Oh, hell no. [08:44.650 --> 08:45.670] No, no, no, no, no, no. [08:45.910 --> 08:46.490] Fade that down. [08:46.690 --> 08:46.810] I'm sorry. [08:46.870 --> 08:47.710] We're not going through all that. [08:48.050 --> 08:51.070] Uh, I'm gonna skip on, uh, you guys fill some time while I skip on the CD. [08:51.650 --> 08:52.710] Yeah, that's a tough. [08:53.030 --> 08:55.290] I, I, I'm sure that's not the original version of that song. [08:55.330 --> 08:56.330] I've heard it done by someone else. [08:56.390 --> 08:57.030] I think that's a cover. [08:57.070 --> 09:02.770] Well, I don't know who has the copyright for, for the, you know, it's going to be so crazy having all these Google companies, uh, called Alphabet. [09:03.330 --> 09:03.850] Alphabet, I mean, what? [09:04.010 --> 09:07.290] That's the thing that every kid knows or every kid's supposed to know. [09:07.410 --> 09:08.330] It's the first thing. [09:08.490 --> 09:09.470] It's the first thing they learn. [09:09.670 --> 09:12.350] And, and, and they're going to know a company associated with that. [09:12.790 --> 09:16.950] You know, it's, it's like, it's like calling a company mom or something like that. [09:17.070 --> 09:21.370] You know, in what reality would there be a, a big company known as mom? [09:21.790 --> 09:24.230] And, uh, and that's what you grow up. [09:24.450 --> 09:26.070] I mean, it would be a nightmare, wouldn't it? [09:26.150 --> 09:27.870] And now we're going to have, we're going to have Alphabet. [09:28.750 --> 09:29.650] Mildly dystopian. [09:29.850 --> 09:30.470] Yeah, yeah. [09:30.630 --> 09:34.210] I may not approve of the move, but, uh, I kind of respect their audacity in doing so. [09:34.810 --> 09:36.450] Well, we have to because we live in fear. [09:36.890 --> 09:41.470] We've, uh, we've registered everything numeral, so don't even try it. [09:41.590 --> 09:41.970] That's true. [09:42.150 --> 09:43.730] It's the exact opposite of 2600, isn't it? [09:43.770 --> 09:44.930] Because it's just Alphabet. [09:45.170 --> 09:45.630] That's right. [09:45.790 --> 09:46.050] No numbers. [09:46.610 --> 09:47.890] Um, oh, there's the piece. [09:48.050 --> 09:48.190] Okay. [09:48.310 --> 09:48.590] Finally. [09:49.110 --> 09:52.750] Um, so this, this, uh, is a piece called Program Me. [09:52.850 --> 09:54.550] It's by a guy named Bruce Hack. [09:55.110 --> 09:55.410] Yeah. [09:55.590 --> 09:57.070] I found the name by accident. [09:57.350 --> 10:00.090] Uh, it's spelled with two A's, H double A C K. [10:00.470 --> 10:07.830] Uh, he was a Canadian electronic, um, artist in the seventies, I believe, and, um, has some really good material. [10:07.830 --> 10:10.470] And I've been, I've been captivated by it and playing it nonstop. [10:10.910 --> 10:11.790] So check it out. [10:11.910 --> 10:13.090] Bruce Hack or Hawk. [10:13.250 --> 10:14.590] I'm not exactly sure how you pronounce it. [10:14.890 --> 10:15.530] I like it. [10:15.810 --> 10:16.710] I dig this. [10:18.630 --> 10:19.310] Actually, you know what? [10:19.350 --> 10:19.810] This isn't it. [10:19.890 --> 10:20.210] I'm sorry. [10:20.310 --> 10:21.870] That's a, that's, I got the wrong. [10:23.510 --> 10:25.110] That was two weeks ago. [10:25.350 --> 10:26.690] That's a two, I don't know who that is. [10:27.510 --> 10:28.290] I like it. [10:28.930 --> 10:29.490] I did. [10:29.610 --> 10:30.130] I dig that. [10:30.330 --> 10:32.310] I am so scatterbrained in this, in this studio. [10:33.390 --> 10:33.750] Yeah. [10:33.750 --> 10:35.150] But I don't remember who that was. [10:35.410 --> 10:38.090] So we didn't have to play the kids with the alphabet at all. [10:38.230 --> 10:40.630] I was wondering, cause we definitely didn't play it last week. [10:40.810 --> 10:45.010] No, we didn't play that last week or the week before that, because we didn't, uh, ever get to it. [10:45.050 --> 10:46.170] We had so many other things to talk about. [10:46.370 --> 10:47.110] It's so confusing. [10:47.110 --> 10:50.490] We pile all these bands into the studio and have them play their music live for us. [10:50.610 --> 10:53.490] And, uh, you know, it gets confusing to remember which one was which. [10:53.610 --> 11:01.690] Well, do you see how a short letter can result in a long conversation because it, it, it spurs discussion on various things, especially if I press the wrong buttons. [11:02.150 --> 11:02.690] Ah, here we go. [11:02.830 --> 11:04.370] This is, this is more like it. [11:04.450 --> 11:04.910] This is Bruce. [11:05.030 --> 11:07.410] All the Bruce Hack fans out there must've been tearing their hair out. [11:08.310 --> 11:13.590] This is Bruce Hack from Canada, 1970s, uh, a song called Program Me. [11:25.420 --> 11:30.680] And we're not going to hear the whole thing because we heard it last week, but just to answer the question, that's, um, that's what it was. [11:31.200 --> 11:34.160] Uh, let's, um, let's read another letter. [11:34.920 --> 11:39.540] Um, I've been listening to your show for over 15 years. [11:39.880 --> 11:41.920] Boy, you need to get outside. [11:42.240 --> 11:42.520] Seriously. [11:43.100 --> 11:44.580] Um, nothing's worth that amount of time. [11:44.800 --> 11:46.160] It's okay to stop every now and then. [11:46.160 --> 11:49.020] Stop, you know, take bathroom breaks or whatever else you need to do. [11:49.600 --> 11:52.760] Um, I've listened to virtually all of the episodes in your archive. [11:53.600 --> 12:03.040] So you've probably found us contradicting ourselves constantly, um, because, well, you know, as, as things change, we, we have to change with it. [12:03.160 --> 12:07.280] So we might say we believe in something and then our overlords tell us to believe in something else. [12:07.400 --> 12:08.940] And, you know, it's like changing the country music. [12:08.940 --> 12:09.560] We have to do it. [12:09.620 --> 12:09.940] I'm sorry. [12:10.000 --> 12:10.860] I've just got an update. [12:10.980 --> 12:11.760] That's actually not true. [12:12.260 --> 12:13.860] You see, you see how it works. [12:14.580 --> 12:15.520] Corporate overlords. [12:15.720 --> 12:16.360] Uh, okay. [12:16.460 --> 12:26.660] So, um, the, the one constant I've noticed during all this time is the never ending debate over the true definition of the word hacker cracker nonsense. [12:26.920 --> 12:27.320] Remember that? [12:27.380 --> 12:28.280] Is anybody around for that? [12:28.420 --> 12:28.740] Oh, yes. [12:28.900 --> 12:34.540] They tried to rename us crackers because there were all these older hackers, mostly on the West coast. [12:34.640 --> 12:41.600] I'm sorry to say, uh, who resented all the young punks coming up and, um, and, and degrading their name by, uh, disobeying the rules. [12:41.820 --> 12:47.000] Well, hacking is about disobeying the rules, whether it's big rules, little rules, rules inside your head, whatever. [12:47.620 --> 12:53.880] Uh, there are plenty of, um, of, of, um, designations for people that break the huge rules and, uh, wind up going to prison for that. [12:54.560 --> 13:01.800] Um, credit card thief, uh, murderers, whatever you want to say, people are, whatever crime they commit, but hacking is not a crime. [13:01.840 --> 13:03.540] And that's, that's always been my point. [13:03.700 --> 13:08.100] Anyway, uh, the hacker cracker nonsense to the media's fascination with hacker being synonymous with criminal. [13:08.260 --> 13:11.840] It seems anyone anywhere can use the term to mean almost whatever, whenever. [13:12.200 --> 13:12.680] Exactly. [13:13.580 --> 13:21.820] Personally, I say hacker when I mean a curious person who bends, breaks, or rewrites the rules to show people what's really possible. [13:22.020 --> 13:27.800] A hacker is an explorer, a creator, and a questioner, especially when those questions go against the norm. [13:28.200 --> 13:30.860] To be clear, not all computer criminals are hackers. [13:31.080 --> 13:35.800] There are plenty of morons out there capable of copying files and screwing things up with a few keystrokes. [13:35.920 --> 13:40.040] It doesn't mean they've dedicated their life to learning all they can about computers. [13:40.200 --> 13:42.780] And it definitely doesn't mean they have a genuine love for technology. [13:43.020 --> 13:49.560] The hackers I've celebrated and revered, such as Kevin Mitnick, fiber optic, and yes, the one and only Bernie S. [13:52.440 --> 13:55.000] I expected a better, better sound than that. [13:55.140 --> 13:57.700] Uh, we're all in it for the love of the technology. [13:57.860 --> 13:59.660] That's the difference between a hacker and a criminal. [13:59.860 --> 14:01.740] I think, I think they nailed it here. [14:01.920 --> 14:04.940] That is definitely the difference because criminals don't love the technology. [14:05.520 --> 14:06.680] They really don't. [14:06.880 --> 14:13.420] Um, a hacker may break the law, but the odds are good they're doing it because they just want to play with the technology. [14:13.420 --> 14:15.940] They couldn't care less about anything like personal data. [14:16.100 --> 14:21.880] Credit cards, Facebook accounts, social security numbers are not only private, they're downright boring and not what real hackers are interested in. [14:22.060 --> 14:34.660] The people who leaked the Ashley Madison data or the, uh, mighty North Korean hackers, AKA the insiders at Sony from last year, in no way represent people who dedicate their lives to exploring technology. [14:34.660 --> 14:37.840] They're just plain old criminals using computers instead of crowbars. [14:38.060 --> 14:39.460] As always, love your show. [14:39.640 --> 14:46.440] I can't wait to see you at the next HOPE con, which my wife insists you name HOPE Prime, signed Screamer Chaotix. [14:46.640 --> 14:55.720] Well, that's, that's one idea, I suppose, but it wouldn't be the first prime number that, um, that, I mean, hope number, uh, well, the fifth hope would be, that's a prime number. [14:56.000 --> 14:58.260] You know, I'm not a mathematician, but I do know that much. [14:58.780 --> 15:02.600] Um, there's other prime numbers that we've already been through, but yeah, well, we'll, we'll, we'll consider it. [15:02.700 --> 15:09.120] But thank you, Screamer Chaotix for that amazing letter and an example of, um, of, of how keyed in our, our listeners are. [15:09.120 --> 15:09.140] Right. [15:09.600 --> 15:13.840] You can't, you have to do what random listeners' lives say. [15:14.060 --> 15:15.640] I think that's, isn't that how we operate? [15:16.100 --> 15:17.220] That is one of the rules, I think. [15:17.320 --> 15:17.440] Yeah. [15:17.760 --> 15:18.260] Random listeners, was it? [15:18.340 --> 15:24.480] If someone writes us an email and their spouse, you know, tells us to do something, don't, don't we have to do it by the terms of our contract? [15:24.480 --> 15:26.260] Is that, is that something that we have to do? [15:26.400 --> 15:27.320] Uh, I, I don't know. [15:27.720 --> 15:29.320] Um, it's something to consider. [15:29.560 --> 15:30.440] I like his letter though. [15:30.560 --> 15:31.800] I mean, I consider him an authority. [15:31.960 --> 15:42.900] If he's listened to this much of the show, he definitely, um, can draw some conclusions and maybe have some insight into, um, our opinions and, and think, and how things have evolved over time. [15:42.980 --> 15:43.900] That's, that's a great insight. [15:44.060 --> 15:44.260] It's cool. [15:44.320 --> 15:44.540] Yes, absolutely. [15:44.600 --> 15:45.560] And Bruce Haack, everybody. [15:45.840 --> 15:47.400] Uh, what, that was the piece we just heard. [15:47.540 --> 15:47.660] Yeah. [15:47.720 --> 15:48.160] Nicely done. [15:48.340 --> 15:52.220] And, uh, good luck hearing that on any other radio station, uh, as Haack with two A's. [15:52.360 --> 15:53.120] So, uh, look that up. [15:53.500 --> 15:55.200] Um, here's a letter from Molly. [15:55.360 --> 16:00.060] I seldom miss a show, but I've, uh, listened time shifted via the iTunes podcast. [16:00.600 --> 16:03.460] Yes, I guess we are a podcast as well as a radio show. [16:03.920 --> 16:04.740] You can be both. [16:05.000 --> 16:08.260] It can be a floor cleaner and, uh, uh, a what now? [16:08.480 --> 16:09.600] And the dessert topping. [16:09.820 --> 16:09.960] Yeah. [16:10.600 --> 16:11.560] And that is true now. [16:11.780 --> 16:13.600] Uh, I'm in Cloverdale, California. [16:13.600 --> 16:15.040] I've been a regular listener for years. [16:15.040 --> 16:17.460] I'm a 50 year old club mate drinking mom and housewife. [16:17.660 --> 16:24.960] I've never been to a HOPE conference, but I always download and listen to as many talks as I can from HOPE as well as from DEFCON, Black Hat, B-Sides, wherever I can find. [16:25.100 --> 16:30.220] I'm a Mitch Altman fan and taught my kids to solder by making trip glasses and TV-B-Gones. [16:30.380 --> 16:34.080] I discovered 2600 in the late 90s and have let my subscription lapse. [16:35.160 --> 16:35.840] All right, Molly. [16:36.040 --> 16:39.000] Well, it's good to get it off your chest and confess to these things. [16:39.400 --> 16:41.460] Um, and now maybe we can, we can fix that. [16:41.980 --> 16:46.280] Um, Molly also sent us a picture of a pay phone at a monastery in Bulgaria. [16:46.540 --> 16:46.860] Wow. [16:47.060 --> 16:48.340] Well, that sounds really amazing. [16:48.620 --> 16:51.620] Um, people get all over the world and send us so many pay phone photos. [16:52.500 --> 16:55.660] Far and away, more than anything else, people send us pay phone photos. [16:55.820 --> 16:57.300] I'm always amazed by that. [16:57.760 --> 16:58.480] Anyway, cheers to you. [16:58.560 --> 17:00.260] Great to hear, uh, hear from you guys. [17:00.400 --> 17:00.880] Signed, Molly. [17:00.880 --> 17:03.560] Molly and, uh, and thanks very much for that, that great letter, Molly. [17:03.740 --> 17:05.300] And, uh, what an amazing mom. [17:05.420 --> 17:09.800] She must've been to, uh, these kids that grew up soldering and making trip glasses and TV begons. [17:10.260 --> 17:18.000] So the size of the 2600 collection of pay phone photos continues to grow and the number of pay phones remaining in the world continues to shrink. [17:18.100 --> 17:20.780] Will there be a point at which point, you know, they meet? [17:21.160 --> 17:22.260] I think we're going to have them all. [17:22.260 --> 17:23.840] We'll have all the existing pay phones. [17:24.100 --> 17:28.640] Cause you can have a photo of a pay phone for long after that pay phone itself ceases to exist. [17:28.980 --> 17:28.980] Yeah. [17:28.980 --> 17:29.560] So absolutely. [17:29.800 --> 17:29.960] Yes. [17:30.300 --> 17:33.440] We, we might have more pay phones now than, than pay phones exist. [17:33.680 --> 17:34.140] That's possible. [17:34.300 --> 17:35.260] I mean, it's bound to happen. [17:35.540 --> 17:37.160] Whether it's happened or not, I don't know. [17:37.280 --> 17:39.040] At some point it has to. [17:39.180 --> 17:40.440] You raise a really good point, Mike. [17:40.580 --> 17:46.480] I mean, that's absolutely possible, but it's a point we're not going to dwell upon, uh, because we have a more, uh, Bernie, do you have something to say? [17:47.140 --> 17:53.600] I just wanted to say, uh, Molly says she listened to it through, listens to, uh, off the hook via the, uh, iTunes, uh, podcast. [17:53.980 --> 18:03.400] There was a time, do you recall when off the hook was like the ninth or 11th most downloaded Apple, uh, podcast. [18:03.660 --> 18:04.580] Do you recall that iTunes? [18:04.860 --> 18:05.060] Yeah. [18:05.200 --> 18:07.500] Those days, but now we're number one, right? [18:07.980 --> 18:08.140] Yeah. [18:08.260 --> 18:13.460] And well, we've gone down a little bit, but we were like way up there in the top 10 or 11. [18:13.560 --> 18:19.420] I just assumed we just stayed up there and that, you know, we even rose higher, but, uh, well, now it's a sad news. [18:19.700 --> 18:21.360] We're not even number nine anymore. [18:22.620 --> 18:23.640] A little competition. [18:24.080 --> 18:36.140] I think we could, I think we could be described actually as podcasting since before people called it a podcast because the show was being, um, converted to, uh, other compressed formats and put online back before people were calling it a podcast. [18:36.300 --> 18:38.880] Wasn't it us that came up with the phrase or the name podcast? [18:39.200 --> 18:41.860] Um, I think when's our, when's our next royalty check coming in? [18:41.860 --> 18:42.020] Yeah. [18:42.100 --> 18:44.280] I think, I think we should claim that because nobody else can. [18:44.400 --> 18:45.340] And we had one of the first ones. [18:45.480 --> 18:46.560] So, uh, yeah. [18:46.720 --> 18:46.880] Okay. [18:46.960 --> 18:48.060] Well, we'll, we'll sort that out later. [18:48.300 --> 18:53.360] Uh, here's another letter from a listener and, and listeners who did not write us yet. [18:53.480 --> 18:56.300] Our email address is OTH at 2600.com. [18:56.700 --> 18:57.880] We would love to hear from you. [18:58.020 --> 19:07.700] Um, and, and, um, as you can see, we do read letters on the air and, uh, especially when we don't have phones to take listener phone calls at, um, hi, I'm writing to you exclamation point. [19:07.720 --> 19:09.880] And I'm thrilled to be getting letters like this. [19:10.240 --> 19:13.100] Uh, listening to your talk about email was interesting to me. [19:13.200 --> 19:21.640] I use email as much as I can, but I also use other quote unquote instant communications in a social sense, Skype, IRC, Facebook chat, Google Hangouts, et cetera. [19:22.240 --> 19:24.520] Um, you know, I've never used Google Hangouts. [19:24.600 --> 19:28.080] I've never, I've, I've, I've sent little text messages on Facebook chat. [19:28.600 --> 19:30.880] Have I, have I used, Oh, you're right with Snowden. [19:30.940 --> 19:31.680] That was a Google Hangout. [19:31.820 --> 19:32.100] Wasn't it? [19:32.260 --> 19:32.880] I forgot. [19:32.880 --> 19:35.040] Well, I've never, I've never used it by choice. [19:35.040 --> 19:35.380] Okay. [19:35.980 --> 19:38.420] He told us we had to use that and we, we obeyed. [19:38.520 --> 19:38.920] That's right. [19:39.000 --> 19:39.260] All right. [19:39.380 --> 19:44.620] Uh, but, uh, IRC certainly and Skype, uh, on occasion, but you know, uh, I'm not really a big fan. [19:45.140 --> 19:48.860] Um, but I, I, I like what this listener is saying that, um, they use both. [19:49.060 --> 19:50.320] They use pretty much everything. [19:50.500 --> 19:56.520] And I think that's, that's something that everybody could learn from, uh, for business and where there needs to be, um, uh, a record. [19:56.700 --> 19:59.640] I always use email encrypted if it needs to be. [19:59.820 --> 20:04.160] And that's something that we definitely need to focus upon is getting email to be encrypted. [20:04.380 --> 20:13.920] Now you would never guess this by watching, uh, the tabloid news on, on television or reading the tabloid press and newspapers, uh, because hackers want to steal all your information. [20:13.920 --> 20:22.540] They want to get into your, uh, identity, uh, identification and steal everything that you own and, and, and, and, uh, scare your baby with a baby monitor and everything you could possibly imagine. [20:22.680 --> 20:27.720] It's a nightmare taking over your car and driving it off into, into the ditch someplace, crashing airplanes. [20:28.000 --> 20:29.340] That's what hackers are all about, right? [20:29.760 --> 20:36.300] Well, in actuality, hackers want to protect people's privacy by making everything encrypted by default, which is not the case now. [20:36.580 --> 20:45.660] If you, uh, send email most times, most by, by a great majority, most times it is not encrypted in clear, clear text. [20:45.800 --> 20:50.520] And it can be intercepted in between, uh, where you send it and where it's received. [20:50.800 --> 20:52.540] And you would never know. [20:53.720 --> 21:02.000] It'll hop through so many machines on the way that any one of which, uh, can happen, uh, basically, um, capture it or just simply watch it in real time. [21:02.160 --> 21:04.340] There's many ways to do this and we need to change that. [21:04.580 --> 21:07.100] Anyway, let me continue with this, um, this letter. [21:07.340 --> 21:11.700] The privacy issues with email in that it can be sniffed by external parties can be a worry. [21:12.160 --> 21:14.820] Um, my work runs its own mail server. [21:14.940 --> 21:20.120] So nothing is, uh, in, in the clown, like this Gmail account I'm using to send this. [21:20.120 --> 21:20.660] Is that a thing? [21:20.800 --> 21:21.320] I can clarify. [21:21.520 --> 21:24.380] A lot of people are starting to call things that are cloud-based the clown. [21:24.540 --> 21:25.420] Oh, I get it. [21:25.700 --> 21:26.320] I store things in the clown. [21:26.540 --> 21:26.780] In the clown. [21:26.800 --> 21:27.440] That's clever. [21:27.540 --> 21:29.140] Yeah, because it's funny and it's like silly. [21:29.360 --> 21:30.220] It is funny and silly. [21:30.220 --> 21:32.560] It's not going to be very useful for your privacy. [21:32.680 --> 21:32.980] Right, right. [21:33.340 --> 21:37.600] Um, and, and, and, uh, this person said LOL, Mike, after that. [21:37.860 --> 21:38.980] Yeah, which we all did. [21:39.260 --> 21:39.480] Yeah. [21:39.860 --> 21:48.380] Uh, there are email replacements inside closed networks like, uh, 12P, which are 100% clear of sniffing, but are no use outside the I2P network. [21:49.060 --> 21:51.880] Anybody want to translate that for listeners that might not know what that means? [21:52.940 --> 21:53.340] No. [21:53.560 --> 21:53.740] Okay. [21:53.900 --> 21:55.080] I guess we don't know what it means either. [21:55.260 --> 21:59.740] I mean, it's a, it's an encrypted thing, but it's got very little usage is the point. [21:59.740 --> 21:59.740] Right. [21:59.960 --> 22:05.660] And that's, that's one of the big problems with encryption is that, um, it's not something that is spread out to the masses. [22:05.880 --> 22:15.580] Um, small groups of people are able to use it effectively, but then, you know, what that does is it kind of labels the small groups of people that know enough to do this as people of interest and kind of defeats the whole purpose. [22:16.060 --> 22:22.200] It's also not uniform across, uh, devices in, in quite the ways that it could be. [22:22.380 --> 22:38.460] And, um, that people idealize it to be, I mean, there are certain things that are standardized and used across them, but of all those things you use that, uh, that you named, that you named in the letter, uh, they're not so interoperable, um, not quite in the way that like email would be, [22:38.460 --> 22:42.120] uh, as, and that adds to ease of use issues. [22:42.360 --> 22:49.120] This, uh, this listener continues that, um, one thing, uh, that, um, they think is really interesting is something called bit message. [22:49.600 --> 22:56.800] Bit message is still really alpha, but it is a candidate for an email replacement and even now can be used by email clients instead of a mail server. [22:56.940 --> 23:04.200] It works using a distributed blockchain type of concept and a proof of work is required to, um, uh, to put more data onto the chain. [23:04.580 --> 23:08.440] So it deters spammers by default as all data goes to everyone. [23:08.620 --> 23:13.220] No one can ever know who gets what or what was in it unless they have the encryption keys. [23:13.880 --> 23:14.840] Sounds kind of interesting. [23:14.980 --> 23:21.460] And that's the, that's the way of thinking that we need to, um, uh, to adopt in order to, um, uh, move beyond all of this and secure things. [23:21.920 --> 23:27.620] Um, there are, uh, public channels too, which attract exactly who you would imagine they attract, but you can ignore, ignore them. [23:27.920 --> 23:31.800] Uh, on another matter, read this rubbish from the Australian Broadcasting Corporation. [23:31.800 --> 23:33.540] It's from a news article about child porn. [23:33.620 --> 23:40.120] So I'm not forwarding the whole article as talking about encryption and, uh, um, actually we don't have that attached. [23:40.200 --> 23:44.720] It's a URL about, uh, a dismantled child porn network that could be just the tip of the iceberg. [23:44.800 --> 23:46.800] I think I, I know pretty much what it says. [23:46.940 --> 23:47.700] There are some clips here. [23:47.860 --> 23:53.500] Law enforcement agencies warn that the anonymity and security of the dark net provides a perfect haven for child abusers. [23:53.740 --> 23:55.340] This was one encrypted website. [23:55.340 --> 23:57.840] So we are concerned that this is the tip of the iceberg. [23:57.960 --> 24:02.320] There are potentially many vulnerable children who are being exploited through other protected websites. [24:02.540 --> 24:03.360] So protect a website. [24:03.540 --> 24:10.620] You're exploiting a child and that way encryption is the demon here and must be stopped or controlled in one way or another. [24:10.860 --> 24:14.640] Anyway, thanks Neil for, um, for writing to us with, uh, these interesting thoughts. [24:14.940 --> 24:19.520] And, uh, so many of the listeners wrote in as well, and it's just great to, uh, to hear from you. [24:19.760 --> 24:21.780] OTH at 2600.com. [24:21.980 --> 24:25.500] I mean, it's important to know you have a, you have a story under your, uh, your elbow right now. [24:25.720 --> 24:30.120] This, this notion that people are going to be persecuted for using encryption is not theoretical. [24:30.120 --> 24:32.100] It's actually happening in the world today. [24:32.280 --> 24:33.460] When did you learn to read upside down? [24:33.560 --> 24:34.660] Yeah, I do have this story. [24:34.800 --> 24:45.240] This is about the, uh, the vice reporter, uh, or vice reporters, uh, that were, um, uh, basically, um, I guess arrested by Turkish, uh, authorities. [24:45.440 --> 24:47.380] Now, weren't they live streaming or something? [24:47.660 --> 24:48.400] I'm not exactly sure. [24:48.580 --> 24:50.840] I'll read what the story, uh, from Al Jazeera says. [24:51.080 --> 24:52.020] They weren't storing it locally. [24:52.060 --> 24:53.000] We can analyze it then. [24:53.160 --> 25:07.640] Uh, three staff members from vice news were charged with engaging in terrorist activity because one of the men was using an encryption system on his personal computer, which is often used by the Islamic state of Iraq and the, how do you say? [25:07.720 --> 25:08.200] Levant? [25:08.360 --> 25:08.700] Levant? [25:09.200 --> 25:12.180] We should know this because it, it, it spells out ISIL. [25:12.340 --> 25:12.920] That's ISIL. [25:13.100 --> 25:14.900] Islamic state of Iraq and the Levant. [25:15.080 --> 25:16.800] I'm going to say Levant until somebody corrects me. [25:17.060 --> 25:17.560] Dash. [25:18.160 --> 25:32.020] We, uh, a senior, uh, press official in the Turkish, uh, government has, uh, told Al Jazeera this, uh, two UK journalists, Jake Hanrahan and Philip Pendleberry, along with their Turkey based Iraqi fixer and a driver. [25:32.300 --> 25:42.600] So actually four people, uh, were arrested on Thursday while filming clashes between security forces and youth members of the outlawed and armed Kurdistan workers party. [25:43.000 --> 25:44.460] You notice who wasn't there. [25:44.900 --> 25:46.040] ISIL wasn't there. [25:46.160 --> 25:49.840] So that's kind of weird, um, that this is all supposedly about ISIL. [25:50.160 --> 25:56.400] On, on, uh, Monday, the three men were charged by a Turkish judge with engaging in terrorist activity on behalf of ISIL. [25:57.040 --> 26:00.580] Uh, the driver was released without charge because he was only driving apparently. [26:00.800 --> 26:07.400] Uh, the Turkish official though, uh, and, and he spoke on condition of anonymity and used encryption when he said this, I'm sure. [26:07.580 --> 26:17.900] The main issue seems to be that the fixer uses a complex encryption system on his personal computer that a lot of ISIL militants also utilize for strategic communications. [26:18.600 --> 26:20.080] All right, hold on a second here. [26:21.000 --> 26:34.520] These people, or this, the, the, the, the fixer that is, that, that one person in particular is being held and accused of being a terrorist because he had an encryption system on his computer that ISIL also used. [26:34.640 --> 26:35.880] They use YouTube as well. [26:36.160 --> 26:37.620] I mean, do people get prosecuted for that? [26:37.900 --> 26:39.580] What encryption system are we talking about? [26:39.840 --> 26:42.760] I mean, we don't know, but we'll, I'm, we'll probably find out at some point. [26:43.100 --> 26:43.620] I hope so. [26:43.680 --> 26:48.340] I mean, we don't know if these people were communicating with ISIL at all. [26:48.420 --> 26:50.900] Uh, but if they were, it's their job. [26:51.000 --> 26:51.580] They're journalists. [26:51.760 --> 26:53.880] They, they talk to unpleasant people sometimes. [26:53.880 --> 26:54.760] They talk to U.S. [26:54.860 --> 26:56.000] government officials sometimes. [26:56.000 --> 26:58.260] Uh, and maybe some of those emails are encrypted too. [26:58.980 --> 27:12.680] Um, it's, it's really worrying that simply possessing the ability to communicate with bad people or even actually communicating with bad people is, is a crime in places like Turkey. [27:12.900 --> 27:19.300] Well, nothing here says, A, that they were in touch with anybody in particular that was part of ISIL. [27:19.480 --> 27:26.360] Uh, and certainly nothing says that, uh, they were saying or conspiring, uh, with ISIL people or anybody else. [27:26.560 --> 27:32.060] All they are accused of, all this one person is accused of, is having the encryption software on their computer. [27:32.260 --> 27:44.440] I mean, there's a weird side issue, which is that Turkey is using the, the bad press that ISIL is deservedly getting to sort of fight their ongoing battle with the, the Kurds, which, uh, and I think it's pretty deliberate that they're conflating the issue, [27:44.520 --> 27:46.780] but I don't know enough about it to say more than that. [27:47.100 --> 27:52.380] But, uh, regardless, like even assuming they did everything that they're accused of doing, I don't see the crime. [27:52.720 --> 27:52.900] Yeah. [27:53.120 --> 27:55.220] Uh, well, uh, communication is not a crime for sure. [27:55.660 --> 28:10.400] Uh, and, um, and this sort of thing is really troubling because it's the same basic mentality that we see domestically where encryption is seen as the threat and people are suspected of all kinds of horrible things just because they either use encryption or have an encryption program. [28:10.880 --> 28:15.640] And yeah, these people are journalists and it is a journalist job to be able to communicate with whoever they need to. [28:15.900 --> 28:23.080] So to have all that stuff, uh, set up, I've helped journalist, uh, friends myself set up, um, encryption for their email and things like that. [28:23.180 --> 28:26.740] So they could protect their sources so they could communicate with people that require encryption. [28:27.200 --> 28:32.740] Um, and that's something that's important if you do that for a living or, or if you just do that for whatever reason. [28:32.960 --> 28:34.180] Brian, I know you have some thoughts on this. [28:34.740 --> 28:50.160] Yeah, I just, uh, um, think that it's very possible that these, uh, these reporters from Vice and their fixer, um, uh, at least the fixer had to use this particular piece of, uh, certain type of encryption software that the, uh, that these PKK members, [28:50.300 --> 28:55.140] it's a, it's a group time. [28:55.360 --> 28:56.280] They're, they're not ISIL. [28:56.420 --> 28:56.980] It's a different group. [28:57.660 --> 28:59.280] Um, they're fighting ISIL. [28:59.480 --> 29:00.900] In fact, uh, exactly. [29:01.040 --> 29:04.920] They're not friends of ISIL, but they're fighting them more than almost anyone else, I believe. [29:05.620 --> 29:08.860] Probably more effectively too than, uh, than the U S in fact. [29:08.960 --> 29:26.120] But, um, it seems likely that the only way this, uh, this fixer for Al Jazeera was able to communicate with their, uh, with, and do, uh, do interviews with these, uh, PPK, PKK members is that the PKK probably didn't trust any other encryption program other than the one they said, [29:26.260 --> 29:28.800] if you want to talk to us, use this program. [29:29.020 --> 29:30.800] That's, that's my guess is what was going on. [29:30.860 --> 29:42.500] And I think this case is really more about the Turkish government not wanting any kind of independent, uh, reporting coming from this war zone at all, uh, than anything about encryption. [29:42.800 --> 29:44.500] They're just using that as an excuse, I think. [29:45.280 --> 29:46.640] Yeah, I agree with you, Bernie. [29:47.360 --> 29:51.840] What, what I don't understand is, is how they think this is going to actually work. [29:51.840 --> 30:04.860] I mean, if they've ever watched a vice report, I think they know that they're not going to back down and that they're going to get tremendous support, uh, for, for, uh, basically reporting on what's actually going on in the world. [30:05.060 --> 30:10.840] Um, this kind of thing is just going to have a, a really, um, opposite effect to what they, what they want. [30:11.080 --> 30:16.640] I think it's really interesting also to look at this through the point of view of the export bandwidth encryption. [30:17.040 --> 30:31.620] I'm curious if Kurdistan or the PKK or any of those, uh, like, a lot of those countries involved in these conflicts are in areas where we've had an export treaty or ban on encryption, uh, in general. [30:31.860 --> 30:46.120] And it's sort of funny that, uh, ISIL or whatever you want to call them have got all these, like, um, vehicles and equipment that uses a lot of this encryption technology, even military encryption technology. [30:46.460 --> 30:56.460] And here we are going after the encryption, not the things that, not the mistakes that were made, not the, um, the actual roots of some of these problems. [30:57.700 --> 31:03.560] Also the, the encryption ability itself is not a thing that, uh, that is, it's, it's just a tool. [31:03.700 --> 31:13.400] It's like, you know, saying that somebody has the equipment, uh, the encryption technology similar to, or the same as what ISIL is using is like saying somebody is wearing a shirt and ISIL members have been known to wear shirts. [31:13.640 --> 31:15.520] So, uh, they must be a terrorist as well. [31:15.720 --> 31:17.540] I mean, I think we want to be careful. [31:17.840 --> 31:31.640] Uh, what could happen, uh, what I'm afraid will happen is that the Turkish government will bow to pressure and release the, the British direct employees of, uh, vice and leave this, uh, Turkish Iraqi. [31:32.160 --> 31:42.400] I'm not clear if he himself is Kurdish, uh, fixer who's doing this important work of enabling the, the communication, uh, in the lurch. [31:42.780 --> 31:47.780] So that's something to watch out for and something that is definitely happened in the past in similar situations. [31:48.700 --> 32:01.200] Uh, you can bet that, um, this guy who's in custody now is being pressured to give out keys, uh, so that they can read whatever has been, uh, sent or recorded or whatnot and who they're talking to. [32:01.400 --> 32:12.380] It frustrates the authorities no end when they don't have this information and they always try to convince the populace that they absolutely must need to know who we're talking to and what we say and, uh, what we think. [32:12.540 --> 32:15.120] And it'll just keep going if we let that happen. [32:15.260 --> 32:17.120] So this is a great battle right here. [32:17.220 --> 32:27.120] This, this battle actually parallels the battle they were covering, uh, as far as, uh, um, basically something that is going to change history of the world. [32:27.300 --> 32:33.600] Uh, how we deal with, um, with challenges to encryption is going to affect the way we communicate in the future. [32:34.000 --> 32:40.440] Encryption will either be something that we have by default or it'll be something that is illegal, that only criminals use. [32:40.840 --> 32:43.220] That's unfortunate considering that it's speech. [32:44.540 --> 32:44.940] Yes. [32:45.240 --> 32:47.120] Well, speech is the most dangerous thing in the world. [32:47.180 --> 32:48.000] I think we all know that. [32:48.840 --> 32:49.700] Um, yes, Bernie. [32:50.620 --> 32:54.100] Um, well, Turkey does not have a first amendment or a freedom of speech. [32:54.260 --> 33:08.480] Uh, so that may not count in this case, but, uh, I did a little bit of research and found, look up the name of this, uh, fixer who was working for these Al Jazeera journalists, whether he's a journalist or not, I'm not sure, but his name is Muhammad Ismail Rasool, [33:08.620 --> 33:10.140] R-A-S-O-O-L. [33:10.560 --> 33:12.220] And I think that's, I, I agree with Mike. [33:12.220 --> 33:27.880] We should really pay attention to what happens to him because, uh, uh, I don't want Al Jazeera or any other news organization that uses, uh, fixers or anyone else really as consultants to communicate with, uh, third parties, uh, on their behalf to, uh, [33:28.040 --> 33:31.240] to be targeted for prosecution and be left, as Mike says, in the lurch. [33:31.760 --> 33:37.500] Um, so I think we should follow this case and see what happens to Muhammad Ismail Rasool, because, uh, it's important. [33:37.680 --> 33:41.140] All he was doing was, uh, he had an encryption program on his computer, apparently. [33:41.500 --> 33:44.320] And, uh, that's something that should concern all of us. [33:44.620 --> 33:46.420] Uh, I agree with your, your analysis. [33:46.560 --> 33:50.420] I just want to clarify, uh, the journalists in question were not working for Al Jazeera. [33:50.500 --> 33:55.600] Al Jazeera is reporting on the story, uh, of something that happened to, to some folks working for Vice. [33:55.820 --> 33:59.700] Uh, but of course it could be happened to any, uh, news organization. [33:59.700 --> 34:03.580] And the Al Jazeera reporters were sentenced to jail in Egypt earlier this week, too. [34:03.580 --> 34:03.580] Yeah, yeah, yeah. [34:03.580 --> 34:03.700] I mean... [34:03.700 --> 34:05.800] So it's, everyone's under threat someplace. [34:06.340 --> 34:07.600] That's ongoing as well. [34:07.900 --> 34:08.120] Uh-huh. [34:08.720 --> 34:16.980] Uh, okay, but, you know, one place you wouldn't think that, um, you'd be running much of a risk of prosecution, at least I wouldn't have thought it, is Twitter. [34:17.860 --> 34:26.920] Well, a 17-year-old American teenager has been sentenced to 11 years in prison for providing material support to terrorism. [34:27.200 --> 34:33.380] But Ali Shukri Amin, who is just 17 years old, never committed violence in the name of radical Islam terrorism. [34:33.540 --> 34:39.860] His crime was running a Twitter account that celebrated the terrorist group and taught others how to send money through Bitcoin. [34:40.720 --> 34:46.300] Yeah, I mean, ran a Twitter account with roughly 4,000 followers before it was shut down. [34:46.440 --> 34:52.420] The account regularly posted positive tweets about ISIS and included tutorials on how to send money to them by using Bitcoin. [34:53.360 --> 35:01.940] The, uh, Virginia teenager also helped instruct one teenage ISIS recruit on how to get Syria to fight for the terrorist organization. [35:02.500 --> 35:10.020] I doubt that one teenage ISIS recruit managed to convince Syria on, uh, to fight for the terrorist organization. [35:10.120 --> 35:23.740] But the point here is this is way, way, way overboard as far as, uh, punishment for something that really is speech might not be the kind of speech you like, but, um, somebody who praises, I, I've praised ISIS. [35:24.340 --> 35:30.840] I even went online early this week and started a hashtag called praise ISIS, which didn't go anywhere, but I'll say what I said there. [35:30.980 --> 35:31.560] I'll say it here. [35:31.640 --> 35:33.760] I say, I think their flag is pretty cool there. [35:33.780 --> 35:35.120] I have praised ISIS. [35:35.340 --> 35:40.420] Any of you guys have anything you got the guts to praise ISIS and, and, and take the, uh, take the heat. [35:40.900 --> 35:44.180] I admire their grasp of, uh, modern social media techniques. [35:44.440 --> 35:44.780] Okay. [35:44.960 --> 35:45.360] That's good. [35:45.500 --> 35:45.880] That's good. [35:46.000 --> 35:46.960] Rob Bernie. [35:48.080 --> 35:49.300] Uh, I, I agree with Rob. [35:49.560 --> 35:52.900] The, the, the, you got your own, your own phrase, my own, my own thing. [35:53.020 --> 35:56.160] Well, when you say social media techniques, that covers a lot of things. [35:56.180 --> 36:03.260] So I was going to say some things related to that, but they are, are the U S government is investing millions and millions of about hundreds of millions. [36:03.420 --> 36:07.200] I've just been reading today to try to, to fight ISIS in cyberspace. [36:07.620 --> 36:12.760] Uh, and this is, you know, they're, they're apparently one upping the U S government in cyberspace. [36:12.960 --> 36:17.620] So they're, they're better than the United States government in cyberspace is what you're saying, Bernie. [36:18.280 --> 36:28.500] Uh, no, I'm saying the U S government is freaking out about it and spending hundreds of millions of dollars to fight ISIS in cyberspace because apparently they feel that ISIS is better than them in cyberspace. [36:28.660 --> 36:31.660] ISIS is better than the United States government in cyberspace. [36:31.840 --> 36:34.060] You heard it here from Bernie S authorities. [36:34.480 --> 36:35.680] Now you have more targets. [36:36.180 --> 36:37.980] Uh, anyone else want to praise ISIS while we're here? [36:38.540 --> 36:40.160] Um, they're They're mediocre butchers. [36:41.140 --> 36:42.920] That's not praise, that's criticism. [36:43.400 --> 36:44.760] Well, they're all right. [36:44.900 --> 36:46.860] Wow, okay, you know how to hedge your bets. [36:47.120 --> 36:47.700] Mike, anything? [36:48.380 --> 37:09.720] I don't know that I have anything, but this is the sort of inevitable consequences of these super broad material support for terrorism laws that are so vague that you can charge people for violating them for almost anything, and you have these giant prosecutorial apparatus that has nothing... [37:10.400 --> 37:23.100] There's really not very many ISIS supporters in the United States to find and threaten with things, so when they find one like this kid, and they can really train all their resources on him, it's worrying. [37:23.320 --> 37:40.540] If I may, though, critique ISIS just a little bit, in relation to getting the word out, publicity, you gotta do a better job, because this news story I'm reading now from Gizmodo, half of it says ISIS, half of it says ISIL, they can't even get it right, [37:40.600 --> 37:57.060] and you guys, you need to basically, and of course you're called Islamic State, IS, which nobody uses, you need to issue some kind of decree and say this is the name, nothing else, and we're not even gonna talk to anybody or acknowledge anybody who uses the wrong name. [37:57.060 --> 38:11.380] I mean, I think there's some parallels here to other topics we've discussed on the show, like, it's very hard for a central entity to dictate how language should be used, especially in the case like this, where they don't even speak the language that we're speaking in general, [38:11.620 --> 38:27.660] but it, you know, they could come up with a policy statement, we wish to be called such and such, and no one else can use this word or that word or the other word, and it's very hard to enforce that kind of thing, at least outside of the territory where they're able to execute people, [38:27.860 --> 38:28.240] so... [38:28.240 --> 38:30.240] Would the DMCA be able to help them with this? [38:31.000 --> 38:33.320] To enforce the proper use of it? [38:33.420 --> 38:40.100] I think, you know, the DMCA is super broad and we rightly criticize it, but I think it can't really do this. [38:40.200 --> 38:42.800] I think they're a perfect match, to be honest, but that's just my opinion. [38:43.060 --> 38:43.460] Go ahead, Rob. [38:43.980 --> 39:04.400] Well, there are people on Twitter who use the service to say the most terrible things, you know, things about people's, people of certain races or genders or what have you, and that is, it may be terrible speech, it may be reprehensible speech, but it is speech and freedom of speech ceases to have any meaning at all if you decide it doesn't apply to speech you don't like. [39:05.480 --> 39:05.880] Exactly. [39:05.880 --> 39:09.700] And also, you have to wonder, how effective is this speech then? [39:09.800 --> 39:21.480] You're making it a lot more effective by drawing all this attention to it, but if you have one kid out there praising ISIS or ISIL or whatever they're called this week, is that really a threat to United States policy? [39:21.480 --> 39:26.460] I mean, listen to this quote from the Assistant Attorney General for National Security, John Carlin. [39:26.780 --> 39:35.020] ISIL continues to use social media to send their violent and hateful message around the world in an attempt to radicalize, recruit, and incite youth and others to support their cause. [39:35.180 --> 39:40.640] More and more, their propaganda is seeping into our communities and reaching those who are most vulnerable. [39:40.640 --> 39:42.220] Yeah, but you know what, John? [39:42.780 --> 39:52.880] If people are smart and educated and actually listening to reasoned approaches rather than this kind of thing, I don't think they're gonna buy any of that propaganda. [39:53.220 --> 40:01.180] And sometimes it's good, in fact, most times it's good, to let your enemy speak and let them define why they're your enemy. [40:01.180 --> 40:08.980] I mean, like, I would like to believe the same thing about, you know, pro-US war mongering, but there seems to be some evidence that it does work, so... [40:08.980 --> 40:13.880] Well, that's true, but maybe there just isn't enough countering of it. [40:14.960 --> 40:17.080] And 11 years for tweeting. [40:17.680 --> 40:18.000] Yeah. [40:18.000 --> 40:19.420] This kid is 17 years old. [40:19.640 --> 40:21.560] You know, go back 11 years and he was a toddler. [40:21.720 --> 40:26.000] That's how much of his... that's the chunk of his life that's gonna go missing if he gets 11 years for this. [40:26.140 --> 40:26.320] No. [40:26.420 --> 40:27.020] And that is ridiculous. [40:27.180 --> 40:35.580] That's the kind of thing you hear about... you hear being said about, you know, quote-unquote, the bad guys, the sorts of things they do to their citizens for speaking against the powers that be. [40:35.680 --> 40:35.920] Exactly. [40:35.920 --> 40:38.480] And what kind of mood do you think he's gonna be in in 11 years? [40:38.700 --> 40:41.720] You know, when he's in his late 20s getting out serving 11 years for tweeting. [40:41.720 --> 40:43.940] It's... it's utterly insane. [40:44.360 --> 40:48.780] Here's another statement from the assistant director in charge of the FBI's Washington field office. [40:48.920 --> 40:50.060] Everybody got together on this one. [40:50.380 --> 40:55.800] Amin's case serves as a reminder of how persistent and pervasive online radicalization has become. [40:56.200 --> 41:04.540] The FBI, through our joint terrorism task forces, remains dedicated to protecting the United States against the ongoing violent threat posed by Eisel and their supporters. [41:05.860 --> 41:06.420] Yeah. [41:06.640 --> 41:10.060] Well, you know, you can... you can make it into this huge threat. [41:10.060 --> 41:19.760] People tweeting various messages and... and... and... and having so little faith in your citizens that you think everybody's just gonna go along and believe this garbage. [41:20.880 --> 41:25.740] Or you can actually try to educate people and... and not do things like this. [41:25.800 --> 41:28.180] I think this is gonna have the opposite effect. [41:28.380 --> 41:28.980] Emmanuel? [41:29.200 --> 41:29.560] Yes, Bernie. [41:30.160 --> 41:37.100] I... I just want to reiterate that this was a 17-year-old kid yakking about ISIS on Twitter. [41:37.100 --> 41:38.380] That's what this was. [41:38.500 --> 41:48.320] He got a lot... he's gonna be locked up in a high-security metal cage for the next 11 years of his life for yakking on Twitter about ISIS. [41:48.820 --> 41:57.040] These... these federal... this federal statute for material support of terrorist activity is, as Mike said, way too broad. [41:57.040 --> 42:07.380] We covered a case, I think, more than a decade ago where some guy in the New York metropolitan area was helping people set up satellite issues so they could watch Al-Manar, which is the... [42:07.380 --> 42:09.760] the TV channel for Hezbollah, which the U.S. [42:09.860 --> 42:12.380] government had classified as a terrorist organization. [42:12.380 --> 42:15.920] And he went to jail for a bunch of federal prison for a bunch of years, too. [42:16.160 --> 42:25.860] This is all about speech, and I think we're losing our First Amendment to these overreaches with material... with these statutes. [42:26.000 --> 42:27.360] It's really dangerous, I think. [42:27.360 --> 42:29.860] Yeah, overreach, and it's... it's misplaced. [42:30.040 --> 42:43.580] Like, they're... they're applying it to cases, and all it really is is... is... is adding... that... that... each case itself, as it's... if it's misplaced, is, like, broadening the scope of how it's interpreted and normalizing that. [42:43.740 --> 42:45.640] And that's so incredibly damaging. [42:46.020 --> 42:46.560] Absolutely. [42:46.780 --> 42:54.880] And, Bernie, you just mentioned the case of Al-Manar a number of years ago, which is a satellite channel, I believe, out of Lebanon. [42:56.040 --> 43:03.740] What people missed in that story, and what I think we haven't focused on enough, is the fact that that channel is banned in the United States. [43:03.900 --> 43:18.180] So, we talk about all these third-world countries, and there are dictatorships that ban various networks from the United States or from the Western world or whatnot, but we don't ban things in this country. [43:18.180 --> 43:20.040] We're... we're free and open society. [43:20.220 --> 43:21.140] You can say what you want. [43:21.260 --> 43:23.460] You can... you can... you can have opposing views. [43:23.600 --> 43:25.240] You can be obnoxious and insulting. [43:25.740 --> 43:28.080] It's part of what our forefathers set up. [43:28.160 --> 43:30.780] It's what we fight for in all the wars that we participate in. [43:31.800 --> 43:33.920] But we ban TV networks. [43:34.040 --> 43:37.020] We send people to prison for receiving TV networks. [43:37.200 --> 43:38.420] That is the story here. [43:38.520 --> 43:42.000] And that's something that I don't think people focused on enough, that that kind of thing can happen. [43:42.100 --> 43:57.840] And now, we send people away to prison for tweeting the wrong things, for... and not... not for threatening somebody's life, or... or posting information that is going to actually wind up hurting somebody, or giving out credit card numbers, or whatever. [43:58.100 --> 44:07.080] Things that could be a crime for simply stating opinions, saying, I think ISIS is cool, and here's how Syria can... can do this or that. [44:07.680 --> 44:11.560] You know, this is just so... so stupid. [44:11.760 --> 44:12.220] It really is. [44:12.220 --> 44:13.280] There's just no other word for it. [44:13.540 --> 44:21.560] And I... I hope that somebody appeals this, and that they don't send the kid away for 11 years, just for having an opinion that... that the government doesn't like. [44:22.500 --> 44:24.340] All right, we're going to switch gears here. [44:24.400 --> 44:29.160] We have a statement that we were... we were given a couple of days ago. [44:29.840 --> 44:37.700] This is a statement from the president and chief executive officer of T-Mobile. [44:38.880 --> 44:43.600] And it's titled, Stopping Network Abusers and Open Letter to T-Mobile Customers. [44:43.620 --> 44:44.840] And there are a couple of them in this room. [44:45.000 --> 44:46.580] So, listen up, guys. [44:46.760 --> 44:47.060] Listen up. [44:47.280 --> 44:49.700] Some of you may have seen my Periscope this afternoon. [44:49.920 --> 44:51.320] Anybody want to say what Periscope is? [44:51.340 --> 44:52.420] For those who don't know, it's a... [44:52.420 --> 44:53.920] It's a live video streaming thing. [44:54.060 --> 44:55.060] Yeah, it's like live stream. [44:55.120 --> 44:56.060] Only call something else. [44:57.040 --> 44:58.500] You might see my Periscope this afternoon. [44:58.540 --> 44:59.700] Why would we see his Periscope? [44:59.780 --> 45:00.860] Why would we be watching his Periscope? [45:00.880 --> 45:01.580] I don't understand that. [45:02.280 --> 45:05.100] Okay, where I shared a preview of this blog. [45:05.560 --> 45:07.080] I'm not even sure why I'm seeing the blog. [45:07.920 --> 45:11.620] To those of you already supporting my position in social media, I appreciate it. [45:11.700 --> 45:13.320] However, I am following up now. [45:13.500 --> 45:20.160] Because I want to make sure I am being really clear and transparent on this issue as we take action tomorrow morning. [45:20.340 --> 45:23.320] And by the way, this was posted, I believe, on Monday. [45:23.820 --> 45:26.080] So, the action that is promised was... [45:27.180 --> 45:29.160] Well, actually, I didn't... over the weekend. [45:29.380 --> 45:30.880] That action supposedly has already happened. [45:30.920 --> 45:31.220] We'll see. [45:31.220 --> 45:38.340] This week, I am taking aim at a select group of individuals who have actually been stealing data from T-Mobile. [45:38.680 --> 45:45.580] If their activities are left unchecked, their actions could eventually have a negative effect on the experience of honest T-Mobile customers. [45:45.980 --> 45:47.280] Not on my watch. [45:47.280 --> 45:54.320] We've built the T-Mobile network to reach 290 million Americans with the fastest 4G LTE speeds around. [45:54.660 --> 46:03.720] We drive hard every day for our network to reach more people and to keep giving customers the fastest data speeds in the USA. [46:03.720 --> 46:06.920] I won't let anyone jeopardize that. [46:07.220 --> 46:13.260] So, we are going after a small group of users who are stealing data so blatantly and extremely that it is ridiculous. [46:13.560 --> 46:14.400] Who's with me? [46:14.500 --> 46:14.740] You? [46:15.120 --> 46:15.540] You? [46:16.300 --> 46:17.020] Oh, wait. [46:17.060 --> 46:17.340] I'm sorry. [46:17.440 --> 46:18.560] I got into character there. [46:19.600 --> 46:20.240] Calm down. [46:20.880 --> 46:22.140] Here's what's happening. [46:22.140 --> 46:36.020] When customers buy our unlimited 4G LTE plan for their smartphones, we include a fixed amount of LTE to be used for tethering using the quote-unquote smartphone mobile hotspot feature at no extra cost. [46:36.020 --> 46:44.400] For the occasions when broadband may not be convenient or available, if customers hit that high-speed tethering limit, those tethering speeds slow down. [46:44.520 --> 46:47.760] If a customer needs more LTE tethering, they can add on more. [46:48.020 --> 46:48.620] Simple. [46:48.620 --> 46:55.660] However, these violators are going out of their way with all kinds of workarounds to steal more LTE tethered data. [46:55.980 --> 47:03.180] They're downloading apps that hide their tether usage, rooting their phones, writing code to mask their activity, etc. [47:03.500 --> 47:07.740] They are hacking the system to swipe high-speed tethered data. [47:08.000 --> 47:09.720] These aren't naive amateurs. [47:09.980 --> 47:13.740] They are clever hackers who are willfully stealing for their own selfish gain. [47:13.740 --> 47:23.160] It's a small group, one one-hundredth of a percent of our 59 million customers, but some of them are using as much as two terabytes of data in a month. [47:23.380 --> 47:24.860] That's 2,000 gigabytes. [47:25.520 --> 47:36.640] I'm not sure what they are doing with it, stealing wireless access for their entire business, powering a small cloud service, providing broadband in a small city, mining for Bitcoin. [47:36.640 --> 47:37.760] I really don't care. [47:38.320 --> 47:45.480] These abusers will probably try to distract everyone by waving their arms around about throttling data. [47:45.680 --> 47:47.520] Make no mistake about it. [47:47.620 --> 47:48.880] This is not the same issue. [47:49.060 --> 47:51.020] Don't be duped by their sideshow. [47:51.020 --> 47:56.280] We are going after every thief, and I am starting with the 3,000 users who know exactly what they are doing. [47:56.580 --> 48:01.760] The offenders start hearing from us tomorrow or Monday or Tuesday, whatever day it was. [48:01.920 --> 48:06.060] No more abuse and no risk to the rest of our customers' experience. [48:06.060 --> 48:06.720] It's over. [48:07.040 --> 48:10.240] If you are interested, you can find more info in our support forum. [48:10.420 --> 48:17.460] I'm not in the business to play data cop, but we started this wireless revolution to change the industry for good and to fight for consumers. [48:18.060 --> 48:20.840] I won't let a few thieves ruin things for everyone else. [48:21.060 --> 48:24.580] We're going to lead from the front on this, just like we always do. [48:25.020 --> 48:25.680] Count on it. [48:26.560 --> 48:30.480] Signed, John Lagiere, president and CEO of T-Mobile USA. [48:30.480 --> 48:34.340] He was surrounded by people and carried out of the room with loud applause and all that kind of thing. [48:35.360 --> 48:35.840] Wow. [48:36.200 --> 48:40.640] I can't recall a statement like that from a president and CEO of a phone company before. [48:41.340 --> 48:46.420] And I'm ashamed to admit this, and maybe, Bernie, you can explain what's going on in my head. [48:47.380 --> 48:48.580] I like this guy. [48:49.400 --> 48:52.560] I disagree with everything he's saying, but I like the way he's saying it. [48:53.340 --> 48:54.640] He's a compelling speaker. [48:55.220 --> 48:56.080] That must be it. [48:56.120 --> 48:57.120] I must be a sucker for that. [48:58.000 --> 49:02.380] I guess I could say that I admire T-Mobile's grasp of modern social media techniques. [49:02.380 --> 49:03.000] Yeah. [49:03.200 --> 49:04.800] I mean, it's really, it's passionate. [49:04.840 --> 49:05.320] I'll say that. [49:05.540 --> 49:05.660] Okay. [49:05.720 --> 49:06.720] But what are you actually talking about? [49:07.020 --> 49:15.040] I mean, I'm a little bit uncomfortable with how emphatic you are channeling the words of a telecom industry executive, but... [49:15.040 --> 49:18.320] Well, it's written like the end of an action movie where everyone's going into battle. [49:18.320 --> 49:18.600] Right. [49:18.800 --> 49:32.340] I mean, so, T-Mobile sells a thing called unlimited internet to some of their customers, and apparently, he doesn't like it when you actually push the limits of unlimited, and he's threatening to cut off the service. [49:32.580 --> 49:34.880] Well, I mean, who needs two terabytes of data a month on their phone? [49:35.100 --> 49:36.120] Apparently, a few people. [49:36.300 --> 49:36.780] I don't know. [49:36.940 --> 49:38.540] I mean, I just, it just seems kind of crazy. [49:38.540 --> 49:40.580] Okay, so, maybe the word... [49:40.580 --> 49:41.320] I mean, I mean, yeah, it seems a lot. [49:41.440 --> 49:46.220] But the thing is, they sell these services as unlimited, and they're not unlimited. [49:46.560 --> 49:54.280] And in fact, you can't do things with these limited services that you can do with unlimited, actually unlimited connections. [49:54.340 --> 50:05.140] I was traveling, as many of our listeners know, not that long ago, and I took a whole bunch of photos, and I wanted to upload them, and the place I was staying had no Wi-Fi, so I had some internet in my pocket. [50:05.140 --> 50:08.380] But I couldn't afford to use that internet to upload my photos. [50:08.680 --> 50:14.220] I had to actually travel to another country with a friend who had Wi-Fi, so... [50:14.220 --> 50:16.380] Wait, you traveled to another country just to upload some pictures? [50:16.380 --> 50:18.740] Well, I was traveling there anyway, but I had to wait till I got there. [50:21.060 --> 50:29.720] And, you know, the things you can do with truly unlimited internet are very different than the kinds of things you can do with the limited internet that the cell phone carriers sell. [50:30.600 --> 50:33.180] And these people who are pushing that limit... [50:33.180 --> 50:35.720] Uh, this guy's very angry to have them... [50:36.220 --> 50:38.960] Well, I mean, I think the problem is the word unlimited. [50:39.200 --> 50:39.980] Nothing is unlimited! [50:40.400 --> 50:42.160] You can't name a single thing that is unlimited. [50:42.400 --> 50:43.420] I mean, I don't get... [50:43.420 --> 50:53.080] There's no amount of data I can use on my cable modem, and I do not like my cable company, but there's no amount of data I can use on my cable modem that will cause my service to be ended. [50:53.420 --> 51:00.240] Okay, but it's capable of handling a lot more as a wire going into your place that can carry more than something that's going through the air. [51:00.980 --> 51:01.380] Um... [51:01.380 --> 51:02.120] Why is that? [51:02.140 --> 51:02.760] I don't understand. [51:02.760 --> 51:06.360] I don't understand it either, but you can get higher speeds than you can with your phone. [51:06.520 --> 51:07.300] Usually, right? [51:07.940 --> 51:08.340] Uh... [51:08.340 --> 51:08.380] It's... [51:09.100 --> 51:10.540] It's kind of complicated now. [51:10.680 --> 51:13.200] I mean, phones are doing really, really, uh, fantastic. [51:13.820 --> 51:15.360] Wireless is kicking, but... [51:15.360 --> 51:16.700] But that's a limited amount of spectrum. [51:17.220 --> 51:17.620] Doesn't it? [51:17.620 --> 51:18.580] Is that what it boils down to? [51:18.680 --> 51:24.620] Yeah, but your average cable modem is going to be around 30 megabit, and you can do 30 megabit with 4G all day long. [51:24.620 --> 51:26.220] So they're comparable these days. [51:26.480 --> 51:27.780] I mean, the thing... [51:27.780 --> 51:32.920] The reason this worries me is that in, you know, whatever, I can afford a cable modem and a 4G cell phone plan. [51:33.080 --> 51:35.860] But there's a lot of places in the world where you can't get a cable modem. [51:35.940 --> 51:36.020] Yeah. [51:36.020 --> 51:42.960] There's a lot of people in the world who cannot afford to pay for two internet connections, and these people are cut off from many corners of the internet. [51:43.180 --> 51:51.240] They cannot upload high-definition photos from their travels because they cannot afford to, and that worries me. [51:51.240 --> 51:52.920] Okay, but that's not what he's talking about. [51:53.040 --> 51:55.660] He's not talking about people that are trying to upload things where a service isn't available. [51:55.860 --> 52:00.880] He's talking about people that are constantly using data and using a humongous amount of it. [52:00.980 --> 52:04.940] And you're talking about people that are in parts of the world that can't get access at all, right? [52:05.040 --> 52:17.480] No, no, I'm saying there's a lot of parts of the world where the only internet access is mobile internet access, and where the mobile internet access is restricted by bytes used or by which sites you can visit. [52:17.480 --> 52:19.640] And again, these concerns are not merely theoretical. [52:19.640 --> 52:21.340] We talk about them on this program all the time. [52:21.340 --> 52:23.340] Well, is the unlimited package offered in those areas? [52:23.360 --> 52:24.300] That's what I'm curious about. [52:24.380 --> 52:28.460] I'm sure there are places where they offer fake unlimited packages like T-Mobile does. [52:28.940 --> 52:29.600] Go ahead, Rob. [52:29.720 --> 52:43.480] We should mention that on a technological level, from the point of view of the company, the only difference between using data on your phone and using data via tethering onto another device is the fact that you're looking at the internet on your little screen or on a bigger screen. [52:43.480 --> 52:46.400] Like, using the data through your phone, okay, you're using your phone. [52:46.520 --> 52:47.800] You can surf the websites. [52:47.800 --> 52:50.960] You can use the little keyboard or swipey screen or whatever you have on your phone. [52:51.100 --> 52:56.360] If you tether, you're just putting the phone down and using instead a screen and a keyboard on a computer. [52:56.560 --> 52:57.920] But you're using the same data. [52:58.060 --> 52:59.040] You're looking at the same things. [52:59.040 --> 53:01.540] You're accessing the same sorts of stuff. [53:01.720 --> 53:10.220] And what's the big deal with making this divide between tethered use and use on your phone? [53:10.220 --> 53:20.080] It's because it's something else that's sort of... it's this artificial classification that they can use to more effectively squeeze money out of their customers. [53:20.260 --> 53:22.340] And then they attach this fake morality to it. [53:22.420 --> 53:23.240] It's really kind of weird. [53:23.380 --> 53:23.620] Absolutely. [53:23.760 --> 53:24.140] Go ahead, Bernie. [53:24.900 --> 53:33.040] Manuel, I have a... I mean, I'm not a big supporter of cell phone companies, but I do think the CEO of T-Mobile has a point in saying... [53:33.040 --> 53:48.460] and I haven't read T-Mobile's Terms of Service, but I'll take the guys' word at it that there's only a limited amount of tethering data that users are allowed under their Terms of Service to download or upload. [53:49.300 --> 53:57.600] But what I have a problem with what this guy's saying, John McGuire, the CEO of T-Mobile, is calling this illegal and calling it theft. [53:57.600 --> 54:04.720] He's upping a Terms of Service violation to the level of a criminal violation. [54:04.820 --> 54:17.740] So I'm going to be really... I'm going to be following this case to see if T-Mobile actually files criminal charges against some of these people who were downloading a lot of data just by using some app to sort of hide the fact that they're tethering this data as opposed to just, [54:17.960 --> 54:21.240] as Rob said, just downloading it record to their phone. [54:21.960 --> 54:28.180] This is really dangerous when you start conflating Terms of Service violations with criminal activity. [54:28.180 --> 54:32.560] We've seen this before, and I think we should pay attention to it because it's a really slippery slope. [54:32.980 --> 54:36.580] Yeah, and he's even admitting... admittedly using the word about data... [54:36.580 --> 54:41.620] I don't want to be data cop, which, yeah, he says, but in action, I don't know if that's actually the case. [54:41.620 --> 54:44.500] He kind of is, as to your point. [54:45.440 --> 54:58.560] And also, to elaborate on something that Rob said that's very, very true, is that even higher-rate packages, unlimited versus people who are not unlimited, it really doesn't amount to a heck of a lot of work on the telephone company's end. [54:58.640 --> 55:07.820] I mean, sure, it's their network, and they can run it the way they'd like and charge you what they see fit and so on and so forth, but it is still really... there's not a huge difference. [55:07.820 --> 55:14.080] It just is that with the tethering, you perhaps could, I don't know, maybe do more with... [55:14.080 --> 55:23.060] the user interface would allow you to do more at a time, productivity-wise, or maybe it can run more universal software. [55:23.400 --> 55:23.980] Who knows? [55:24.040 --> 55:26.160] There's a lot of attributes to this, but it's definitely something to watch. [55:26.360 --> 55:28.360] Okay, and we will be watching that for sure. [55:28.640 --> 55:33.880] My advice, just stop calling it unlimited for starters and work it out after that. [55:34.440 --> 55:36.880] Updates to the whole Ashley Madison business. [55:37.680 --> 55:38.720] Yes, it's true. [55:39.360 --> 55:45.100] OutEast Entertainment is producing the tentatively titled Thank You, Ashley Madison, for TV consideration. [55:45.640 --> 55:49.540] Anytime 30 million people are doing anything, it becomes worthy of discussion. [55:50.160 --> 55:53.880] Yeah, you're going to see a TV movie or maybe even a series based on all this. [55:54.040 --> 55:57.180] But here's what I thought was really kind of funny and interesting. [55:57.380 --> 56:11.080] In a new development, after Ashley Madison was hacked by the Impact team last month, the CPU of every employee of the cheating website was reportedly set up to play the ACDC song Thunderstruck. [56:12.640 --> 56:13.900] Oh yeah, there it is, in fact. [56:14.200 --> 56:21.320] So if you worked for Ashley Madison and this was coming out of your computer and everybody's computer around you, it's because you got hacked. [56:21.680 --> 56:34.080] Computer security reporter Brian Krebs, who seems to know everything about this story and no doubt will be writing a book and probably producing a major motion picture, he broke the news back in July after receiving a link to the hack's source code. [56:34.080 --> 56:38.120] Then hours later, a Twitter user tweeted a link to that programming data. [56:39.070 --> 56:46.000] And then, of course, Ashley Madison CEO Noel Bitterman resigned on August the 28th. [56:46.100 --> 56:49.440] The mysterious Twitter account that posted the code was ThaddeusZoo. [56:49.920 --> 57:06.860] And during the press conference last week by the Toronto Police Department, they included details about the song Thunderstruck, which was put onto everybody's computer at the Ashley Madison organization. [57:07.680 --> 57:08.100] Yeah. [57:08.340 --> 57:13.760] Okay, well, this story just keeps on growing and getting more and more interesting and less and less interesting at the same time. [57:14.300 --> 57:19.560] That's going to do it for us tonight as we go out with this amazing piece of work here. [57:19.560 --> 57:23.640] You can write to us, O-T-H at 2600.com. [57:23.920 --> 57:28.300] Don't forget, 2600 meetings taking place all around the world this Friday. [57:30.020 --> 57:33.460] Check www.2600.com slash meetings for more information. [57:33.760 --> 57:34.380] It's Manu for Off The Hook. [57:34.580 --> 57:35.700] Stay tuned for The Personal Computer Show. [57:35.760 --> 57:35.940] Good night. [57:38.970 --> 57:42.410] There was no help, no help from you. [57:43.630 --> 57:44.190] Thunder! [57:44.530 --> 57:46.110] Turn up the drums. [57:47.790 --> 57:49.630] We can get my heart. [57:51.090 --> 57:53.270] The thunder of guns. [57:55.150 --> 57:56.970] Turn me up hands. [58:00.530 --> 58:04.130] You've been Thunderstruck. [58:09.390 --> 58:11.030] Walked down the highway. [58:11.850 --> 58:13.010] Broke the limits. [58:13.430 --> 58:14.670] We hit the top. [58:16.940 --> 58:18.300] Went through to Texas. [58:19.100 --> 58:20.040] Yeah, Texas. [58:20.360 --> 58:22.000] And we had some fun. [58:23.500 --> 58:25.620] We met some gangs. [58:25.620 --> 58:29.820] Some dancers who gave a good time. [58:36.970 --> 58:39.430] They blew our mind. [58:40.350 --> 58:42.990] And I was shaking at the knees. [58:43.790 --> 58:46.190] Could I come again, please? [58:47.790 --> 58:49.970] Yeah, the ladies want your kind. [58:51.310 --> 58:54.470] You've been Thunderstruck. [58:57.330 --> 58:58.230] Thunderstruck. [58:58.230 --> 58:59.610] Thunderstruck. [58:59.610 --> 59:00.490] Yeah, yeah, yeah. [59:00.610 --> 59:01.810] Thunderstruck. [59:04.250 --> 59:05.450] Thunderstruck. [59:16.550 --> 59:19.170] I was shaking on the knees. [59:19.990 --> 59:22.190] Could I come again, please? [59:58.000 --> 59:59.200] Thunderstruck. [59:59.840 --> 01:00:00.880] Yeah, yeah. [01:00:01.440 --> 01:00:02.640] Thunderstruck. [01:00:04.780 --> 01:00:05.980] Thunderstruck. [01:00:06.880 --> 01:00:07.640] I'm not feeling it. [01:00:08.180 --> 01:00:09.100] I'm not feeling it. [01:00:09.180 --> 01:00:11.060] Yeah, it's a harm! [01:00:12.300 --> 01:00:13.060] Yeah, [01:00:17.220 --> 01:00:18.200] it's a harm! [01:00:19.520 --> 01:00:21.340] We are doing it. [01:00:23.080 --> 01:00:23.840] Thunderstruck. [01:00:26.160 --> 01:00:27.560] Thunderstruck. [01:00:28.200 --> 01:00:29.600] Thunderstruck. [01:00:29.700 --> 01:00:30.740] Thunderstruck. [01:00:33.320 --> 01:00:34.720] Thunderstruck. [01:00:35.400 --> 01:00:37.960] You mean Thunderstruck. [01:00:46.680 --> 01:00:48.080] Thunderstruck. [01:00:49.080 --> 01:00:52.120] You mean Thunderstruck.