[00:00.000 --> 00:01.920] Coffee over in my keyboard. [00:01.940 --> 00:03.120] Do you think that's a problem? [00:04.000 --> 00:05.220] No, not for me. [00:06.340 --> 00:08.140] What does this mean we're working right, Jimmy? [00:08.980 --> 00:11.680] I'd buy a new one, you know what I mean? [00:12.000 --> 00:14.020] Okay, but you've really got to be there. [00:14.220 --> 00:15.020] It's like the best. [00:15.040 --> 00:16.620] It's the personal computer show. [00:21.930 --> 00:29.870] And you're listening to radio station WBAI New York, where the time is just about 7 o'clock, maybe a little bit before 7 o'clock. [00:30.390 --> 00:31.190] But that's okay. [00:31.370 --> 00:32.690] It's time for Off the Hook. [00:38.150 --> 00:42.510] The telephone keeps ringing, so I ripped it off the wall. [00:43.590 --> 00:48.010] I cut myself while shaving, now I can't make a call. [00:48.750 --> 00:50.830] We couldn't get much worse. [00:53.640 --> 00:56.280] Bum-diddly-bum for the best, expect the worst. [00:56.980 --> 00:58.800] I hope that's understood. [00:59.060 --> 00:59.800] Bum-diddly-bum! [02:24.710 --> 02:26.050] And a very good evening to everybody. [02:26.150 --> 02:26.970] The program is Off the Hook. [02:27.010 --> 02:29.150] Emmanuel Goldstein here with you, joined tonight by Mike. [02:29.890 --> 02:30.870] Hang on, hang on. [02:30.950 --> 02:32.490] The theme wants to play a second time. [02:32.670 --> 02:33.070] No. [02:33.570 --> 02:33.930] No. [02:34.190 --> 02:34.370] Okay. [02:34.610 --> 02:34.950] I'm sorry. [02:35.110 --> 02:36.350] Joined tonight by Mike. [02:36.610 --> 02:36.950] Good evening. [02:37.130 --> 02:37.550] Happy Thanksgiving. [02:38.150 --> 02:39.270] Happy Thanksgiving to you as well. [02:39.990 --> 02:41.010] And Rob T. [02:41.150 --> 02:42.010] Now you got me all... [02:42.530 --> 02:43.670] You went off script, Mike. [02:43.890 --> 02:44.290] I'm sorry. [02:44.430 --> 02:44.750] Rob T. [02:44.890 --> 02:45.250] Firefly. [02:45.390 --> 02:46.390] Please just say hello. [02:46.530 --> 02:46.970] Yeah, thank you. [02:47.370 --> 02:47.730] Kyle. [02:48.110 --> 02:48.390] Present. [02:48.870 --> 02:49.230] Thank you. [02:49.690 --> 02:50.750] And Bernie S. [02:51.570 --> 02:52.770] Greetings from Philadelphia. [02:54.090 --> 02:54.450] Wow. [02:54.790 --> 02:55.250] Did you hear that? [02:55.390 --> 02:56.770] Could you say that one more time, Bernie? [02:57.670 --> 02:59.070] Greetings from Philadelphia. [03:00.670 --> 03:01.210] I'm sorry. [03:01.430 --> 03:02.250] Just once more. [03:02.330 --> 03:02.650] Once more. [03:03.690 --> 03:05.350] Greetings from Philadelphia. [03:06.470 --> 03:06.670] Wow. [03:07.110 --> 03:07.890] Doesn't he sound good? [03:08.290 --> 03:08.630] Yes. [03:08.830 --> 03:10.050] Doesn't he sound... Don't I sound good? [03:10.130 --> 03:11.590] Listen, I'm talking to Bernie now. [03:11.830 --> 03:12.730] The phone is up. [03:13.210 --> 03:13.630] Prove it, Bernie. [03:13.710 --> 03:14.330] Say something else. [03:15.430 --> 03:17.490] I love that we now have phone lines. [03:17.490 --> 03:20.130] And I can talk at the same time, and I don't sound like I'm on the phone anymore. [03:20.350 --> 03:21.010] This is great. [03:21.190 --> 03:22.130] We have phone lines. [03:22.230 --> 03:23.310] We have phone lines, folks. [03:23.310 --> 03:24.550] We promise we get phone lines. [03:24.830 --> 03:28.510] Yes, we promised it when most of you are children, but we have them now. [03:28.750 --> 03:29.970] And the phone number... [03:29.970 --> 03:30.750] I'm going to give out the phone number. [03:30.830 --> 03:32.150] I want to see all the phone lines light up. [03:32.230 --> 03:40.410] We're not going to take calls immediately, but I'll tell you, a lot of this show is going to be phone calls from you, our listeners, who we have not heard from, but we've heard from you in various ways. [03:41.170 --> 03:45.250] We've heard from you in email, when we hold our cell phone up to the microphone. [03:45.870 --> 03:47.270] Some of you wait for us on the street. [03:48.210 --> 03:50.910] We've heard from a bunch of you, but we haven't heard from all of you. [03:50.910 --> 03:53.390] And now we can again by taking your phone calls. [03:53.530 --> 03:54.510] So this is the number. [03:54.630 --> 03:55.130] All right. [03:55.250 --> 03:56.510] This is the number 718. [03:56.930 --> 03:58.110] The 718 area code. [03:58.250 --> 03:58.990] Yes, we're in there. [03:59.930 --> 04:04.670] 718-780-888. [04:05.710 --> 04:06.590] What's that last number? [04:08.250 --> 04:08.690] Eight. [04:09.370 --> 04:09.970] Okay, I'm sorry. [04:10.090 --> 04:10.850] I couldn't make it out. [04:11.450 --> 04:13.910] 718-780-8888. [04:14.270 --> 04:19.230] And that's a lot of fun when you're dialing on a touchtone pad to hit those last four eights really quickly. [04:19.850 --> 04:21.670] It's hell if you have a rotary phone. [04:21.670 --> 04:25.390] I know that because only the one is a quick dial. [04:25.510 --> 04:26.790] Everything else takes a long time. [04:27.550 --> 04:31.790] But I would like to see if our phone lines actually are... I see one call coming in now. [04:31.930 --> 04:33.630] 718-780-8888. [04:34.670 --> 04:36.470] I think I'll say 8888. [04:36.730 --> 04:37.190] I don't know. [04:37.510 --> 04:38.130] No, don't do that. [04:38.250 --> 04:42.250] Well, saying 8888 is hard and it makes me sound like an idiot. [04:42.430 --> 04:44.610] It's not as hard as saying 8,888. [04:44.990 --> 04:46.010] Bernie, how would you say it? [04:46.670 --> 04:51.610] I was just going to say the same thing that Rob said, that it's worse to say 8,888. [04:51.710 --> 04:53.150] But 8888 is okay. [04:53.150 --> 04:54.910] I think that rolls off the tongue better. [04:55.730 --> 04:58.770] Yeah, I couldn't make out which one you said just now, so maybe it doesn't. [04:59.910 --> 05:00.750] 8888 rolls off the tongue. [05:00.750 --> 05:01.010] 8888 rolls off the tongue. [05:01.170 --> 05:03.670] Or 8888 plus 8, maybe, or... [05:03.670 --> 05:06.830] Yeah, you could say 8888 plus 8, or 8888. [05:07.110 --> 05:09.110] Leave off the last 8 for... [05:09.110 --> 05:10.970] I don't know why for... [05:10.970 --> 05:11.290] 8888. [05:16.310 --> 05:17.210] Oh, that's going to be fun. [05:17.290 --> 05:19.230] Okay, we don't have a ton of calls. [05:19.310 --> 05:19.910] Can we have a bunch? [05:19.910 --> 05:20.550] Not a ton. [05:20.690 --> 05:21.150] I want a ton. [05:22.150 --> 05:24.790] 718-780-8888. [05:25.830 --> 05:26.310] That's good. [05:26.430 --> 05:26.850] I like that. [05:27.050 --> 05:29.090] We just got this put in and already you want to blow it up. [05:29.290 --> 05:29.990] Well, yes. [05:30.170 --> 05:33.070] That's just the nature of the way I do things. [05:33.510 --> 05:35.850] And now this phone over here started ringing out loud. [05:36.770 --> 05:37.570] Why is that? [05:38.110 --> 05:39.150] We have so many phones. [05:39.150 --> 05:41.430] I don't even know what that phone could possibly be for. [05:41.930 --> 05:44.530] Wow, it has a 516 area code on it for some reason. [05:44.530 --> 05:46.430] Oh, this one's calling from the 516 area. [05:46.590 --> 05:48.070] Wow, it's got caller ID on that phone. [05:48.170 --> 05:49.030] So don't call that phone. [05:49.450 --> 05:50.590] I don't even know the phone number. [05:51.850 --> 05:53.450] This mystery line is ringing, Richie. [05:55.290 --> 05:56.570] I won't read the phone number out. [05:56.690 --> 05:58.330] I won't read the entire phone number. [05:58.450 --> 06:00.450] And now it's 848 number calling. [06:00.690 --> 06:01.530] Okay, whatever. [06:01.650 --> 06:02.250] Enough about phones. [06:02.370 --> 06:04.230] Thank you, people, for testing out our phone lines. [06:04.330 --> 06:04.950] We have phone lines. [06:05.050 --> 06:06.950] We'll be taking phone calls later on, so spread the word. [06:07.150 --> 06:14.230] And we want to hear what listeners have been up to over the past however many months it's been since we were able to take normal phone calls. [06:14.230 --> 06:18.170] It's also nice to have Bernie on the phone and have him sound like he's actually on a real phone. [06:19.070 --> 06:19.470] Wow. [06:20.010 --> 06:21.550] Yeah, and we sound good to you, I hope. [06:22.190 --> 06:22.590] Wonderful. [06:22.910 --> 06:23.690] It's great. [06:23.910 --> 06:24.430] I'm thrilled. [06:24.710 --> 06:31.570] And I want to thank our operations director and all the other folks that made this happen. [06:32.010 --> 06:34.310] Because otherwise, it wouldn't have happened. [06:34.310 --> 06:35.610] Yeah, it's a real team effort. [06:35.770 --> 06:39.230] And we're happy to say that we got it done. [06:39.350 --> 06:41.590] Now we're on to the next challenge. [06:42.790 --> 06:43.230] Yeah. [06:43.750 --> 06:46.170] So, anyway, following up on something. [06:46.270 --> 06:47.430] We haven't been on for two weeks. [06:47.650 --> 06:55.190] Following up on something that we were talking about two weeks ago is the magic link that Google has. [06:55.590 --> 06:57.130] Mike, we were talking about this. [06:57.490 --> 07:03.430] You found a magic link that played back all of your voice commands to, what's it called? [07:03.530 --> 07:04.010] OK Google? [07:04.150 --> 07:04.890] Is that what they call it? [07:05.290 --> 07:06.310] I don't know what it's called. [07:06.450 --> 07:06.910] It's called something. [07:06.910 --> 07:10.330] You say OK Google and it just starts listening to you and doing things. [07:10.510 --> 07:11.390] Wait, you say that to your phone? [07:11.470 --> 07:13.590] You say OK Google and your phone will perk up? [07:13.730 --> 07:16.110] Yeah, I've disabled it so you can't activate my phone. [07:16.310 --> 07:18.670] But generally, that's how it works. [07:18.670 --> 07:24.170] OK, I hit a little button and then something pops up and I say something and I get into an argument with it. [07:24.310 --> 07:26.790] I think it's called like voice search or something really boring. [07:26.910 --> 07:34.330] Well, I went to this, on the advice of a few of our listeners, I went to google.com slash settings slash dashboard. [07:36.650 --> 07:41.790] And according to a bunch of people, you have to click around a whole lot to find things and to disable them. [07:42.250 --> 07:47.630] But I found that most of my settings were already disabled and nothing was being kept. [07:47.630 --> 07:52.290] No history was being kept and I couldn't find any list of voice recordings. [07:52.670 --> 07:59.930] I was kind of disappointed, actually, but also kind of happy that at some point I must have set things so that information about me was not saved. [08:00.710 --> 08:02.970] But there is an awful lot in there. [08:03.090 --> 08:08.370] There's a lot of settings and you do have to either pause some things or disable them completely. [08:08.630 --> 08:17.370] Just today I was going through there and I found a whole bunch of little check marks for getting spam, getting mail about promotions and things like that that I never asked for. [08:17.630 --> 08:20.130] But it was in a hidden part and I had to turn all those off. [08:20.870 --> 08:31.090] But the thing is, and this is the point that I really think we should stress, you may think that turning all of these things off and disabling them makes you safe and private. [08:31.090 --> 08:34.470] And it does to a degree, but it doesn't completely. [08:35.350 --> 08:52.030] And the reason I know this, I mean, I knew it before, but the reason I was able to confirm this was because there was a particular link there, a particular button, a selection, that basically allowed you to click and locate your device, your Android device. [08:52.130 --> 08:55.150] And within a second, it said exactly where I was. [08:55.250 --> 08:58.590] And this is with me having all the settings turned off to do that. [08:58.590 --> 09:01.230] If you click that particular button, guess what? [09:01.350 --> 09:01.990] You do it immediately. [09:02.230 --> 09:12.370] So we would have to be fools to think that within Google, someone doesn't have the ability to bypass your authentication and do that to anyone they want. [09:12.410 --> 09:23.470] And if they have the ability to do that, they have the potential to be told to do that by a higher power, namely the government, to basically click a button and find out where you are. [09:23.730 --> 09:26.010] So yeah, we can disable all the things we want. [09:26.010 --> 09:27.850] We can turn all these settings off. [09:28.050 --> 09:33.350] But the technology is there with a single keystroke to find you. [09:33.570 --> 09:37.070] And it's just something that people need to be aware of. [09:37.270 --> 09:38.490] You can still play with the toys. [09:38.690 --> 09:39.550] You know, they're fun. [09:39.990 --> 09:40.790] They're useful. [09:41.630 --> 09:44.790] But everything comes with a price, especially things that are free. [09:45.830 --> 09:49.190] So, I think that's our lesson for this. [09:49.490 --> 09:51.250] Bernie, anything I say surprise you? [09:51.650 --> 09:53.610] It doesn't surprise me at all, Emmanuel. [09:53.870 --> 09:58.110] I don't think we're a lot safer by knowing how to disable these things. [09:58.350 --> 10:00.750] Because there's so many other vulnerabilities about the information. [10:00.930 --> 10:04.130] I don't use this service, by the way, where you say, okay, Google. [10:04.950 --> 10:11.170] I use a BlackBerry, and I don't talk to the phone and give it commands to do online lookups. [10:11.950 --> 10:16.770] But that doesn't make me entirely safe, but it probably makes me safe for the people that use that service. [10:17.510 --> 10:20.670] Well, do you think you're more secure because you use BlackBerry? [10:21.650 --> 10:22.910] I do in some ways. [10:23.630 --> 10:24.070] Okay. [10:24.170 --> 10:24.970] Can you tell us how? [10:25.350 --> 10:44.130] Well, for instance, there is far less malware written for the BlackBerry 10 operating system, which is based on QNX, which is a pretty secure kernel compared to what Android and iOS are built upon. [10:44.530 --> 10:57.690] And I encourage our listeners to research the BlackBerry 10 operating system and QNX, which it's built on, because it has some advantages over the other mobile operating systems. [10:57.690 --> 11:04.350] However, there aren't really as many apps written for it, but all the apps I need are available, and it's impressive. [11:04.790 --> 11:07.250] It just only has like 1% of the market share, unfortunately. [11:07.750 --> 11:13.150] They've actually got an Android emulator now, which might be a good or a bad thing, depending on how you're looking at it. [11:13.510 --> 11:15.370] I'm not sure if it's a vulnerability necessarily. [11:15.510 --> 11:17.270] Kyle has a BlackBerry 10 phone also, don't you? [11:17.270 --> 11:24.870] I've used a couple for a while, but it is distinct in that it's not in everybody's pocket. [11:25.210 --> 11:27.390] Like, there are the two big phones, right? [11:27.530 --> 11:30.310] And I think that's kind of my rationale. [11:30.430 --> 11:36.070] Without getting into it, I like the idea that it's not the thing that everybody's got. [11:36.170 --> 11:46.030] And there was, I think, some numbers on that ability, the amount of access Google had on particular phones. [11:46.030 --> 11:50.110] And I think Apple's the same way, well, in different ways, maybe. [11:50.310 --> 11:55.230] But as far as accessing locked phones and things like that, maybe it's a little harder with Apple. [11:55.350 --> 12:02.710] But some of those issues cross my mind, and just basically not being on the systems everyone's using. [12:02.810 --> 12:06.190] The thing is, I think you nailed it, the systems everyone is using. [12:06.390 --> 12:07.770] People want these things. [12:07.870 --> 12:11.610] They want to be able to use various services. [12:12.450 --> 12:14.210] And I have fun with them as well. [12:14.210 --> 12:20.250] I think everybody can enjoy these inventions and services. [12:20.910 --> 12:22.530] But again, there's a price. [12:22.770 --> 12:31.790] And if you're trying to stay off the grid, if you're trying to not be trackable constantly, 24 hours a day, you have to work hard at it. [12:31.850 --> 12:35.590] You have to really try and stay one step ahead. [12:35.630 --> 12:38.850] And you're never completely secure from this. [12:39.450 --> 12:42.050] I mean, I know of people in Google that can do this. [12:42.050 --> 12:47.290] They can simply log in to somebody's account and see their mail. [12:48.490 --> 12:49.870] There'll be a record, of course. [12:50.050 --> 12:52.290] They have security measures and safeguards. [12:52.510 --> 12:55.470] But the capability is there to do that. [12:55.550 --> 12:59.210] And the capability is there to find your phone and to do all sorts of other things. [12:59.310 --> 13:00.670] So let's not be fooled. [13:00.670 --> 13:15.210] I might add there, though, it is getting a little bit popular to run software on phones, either on top of the operating system or entire phones that have their own sort of secure, and I put that in really huge quotations, operating system. [13:15.350 --> 13:17.090] There's a small market for that now. [13:17.930 --> 13:21.290] Black phone, all these different products are coming out. [13:21.290 --> 13:33.570] Because there's, I think, sort of a recognition of the maturity of smartphones in general and what they can and cannot sort of protect you from in default states. [13:34.310 --> 13:34.910] All right. [13:34.990 --> 13:39.350] Well, that's one topic that we're going to focus on today. [13:39.350 --> 13:43.470] Since we've been on the air, things have been happening in the world, as we know. [13:43.830 --> 13:47.530] All kinds of horrible things in various places. [13:48.250 --> 13:55.210] And I'm not sure what scares me more, are the horrible things or the reaction to the horrible things. [13:55.390 --> 13:57.670] Actually, I think I am more scared by the reaction. [13:57.670 --> 14:04.810] Because we've seen an awful lot of pig-headed reactions in this country alone to the events of overseas. [14:04.870 --> 14:08.050] And it's not getting any better. [14:09.650 --> 14:11.030] It's devolving by the day. [14:11.370 --> 14:20.670] We have basically a whole pile here of idiots who have spoken out in the news in one way or another. [14:20.810 --> 14:22.150] We keep our idiots in a pile. [14:22.430 --> 14:23.970] Well, we're going to need more than that. [14:24.050 --> 14:26.270] We're going to need a bin of some sort. [14:26.450 --> 14:27.630] They're definitely piling up. [14:27.790 --> 14:27.930] Yeah. [14:28.030 --> 14:29.150] That's what we do know. [14:30.350 --> 14:31.590] Who shall we start with? [14:32.030 --> 14:34.270] We're not going to go through all of them, obviously, because we don't have time. [14:34.270 --> 14:35.010] We're only on for an hour. [14:35.210 --> 14:36.690] And we want to take listener phone calls. [14:38.310 --> 14:39.990] Well, all right. [14:40.050 --> 14:48.290] How about we start with the ex-CIA head, Mr. Woolsey. [14:48.430 --> 14:48.990] What's his first name? [14:49.430 --> 14:49.890] James. [14:50.130 --> 14:50.730] James Woolsey. [14:50.890 --> 14:51.050] Yes. [14:51.610 --> 14:52.370] For some reason... [14:52.370 --> 14:54.330] Do you want a pile of non-idiots for counterbalance? [14:54.410 --> 14:58.030] Because I'm really feeling intimidated by the size of the papers on your desk. [14:58.210 --> 14:58.850] Slim pickings. [15:00.050 --> 15:13.390] Ex-CIA director James Woolsey, during an appearance on CNN on the 19th of November, was talking about Edward Snowden because he decided that the terrorist attacks in Paris were Edward Snowden's fault. [15:14.390 --> 15:14.750] Yeah. [15:14.750 --> 15:17.550] How he got there, I'm not really sure. [15:17.630 --> 15:18.810] Maybe we can try and figure that out. [15:19.490 --> 15:27.230] There's every indication these guys communicated through SMS and traditional ways. [15:27.930 --> 15:30.390] If encryption was used, it was used sparingly. [15:30.390 --> 15:36.210] But even if it was used completely, contription is a good thing that everybody should have. [15:36.490 --> 15:49.090] And to blame somebody for revealing that the NSA is spying on all of us, to blame them for everything bad that happens in the future is about as dumb as I can imagine. [15:49.370 --> 15:51.170] But he makes it even better. [15:51.290 --> 15:57.390] He makes it even better by going into graphic detail of what he thinks should happen to Edward Snowden. [15:57.390 --> 16:00.370] He says, it's still a capital crime, I would give him the death sentence. [16:00.490 --> 16:05.830] And I would prefer to see him hanged by the neck until he's dead, rather than merely electrocuted. [16:07.530 --> 16:18.690] Now, you know, when you have the former head of the CIA expressing his great desire that you be hanged by the neck until dead, I imagine that might make you a little bit nervous. [16:18.950 --> 16:21.670] But Edward Snowden has many, many people on his side. [16:21.670 --> 16:28.350] And I think that when somebody says something like that, it reveals more about them than anything else. [16:28.470 --> 16:35.870] It reveals more about their just utter contempt for humanity and their devaluation of life. [16:36.330 --> 16:43.890] I mean, if we were to say, and this is just a theoretical, if we were to say, how would we like James Woolsey to be tortured to death? [16:43.890 --> 16:55.770] Would we prefer, oh, I don't know, waterboarding, of course, being traditional and sort of a throwback to old days, or maybe being drawn and quartered, or I don't know, thrown in front of a train? [16:56.090 --> 16:58.770] You know, saying things like this, it ruffles feathers. [16:59.050 --> 17:00.830] And people will be like, how could you say that? [17:01.010 --> 17:05.770] How can you say that about somebody respected from the CIA that you want him to be... [17:05.770 --> 17:06.650] And we don't. [17:06.710 --> 17:11.670] We don't say things like that, because we speak at a higher level than what this guy is speaking at. [17:11.830 --> 17:13.030] To say things like that. [17:13.090 --> 17:16.290] People didn't talk like this in public a few years ago. [17:16.350 --> 17:17.050] I don't think they did. [17:17.050 --> 17:25.250] I don't think you had officials from our government saying that, yes, this person should be killed in this particular way. [17:25.550 --> 17:27.550] Especially people who are U.S. [17:28.030 --> 17:28.030] citizens. [17:28.630 --> 17:30.550] I mean, I don't really believe that U.S. [17:30.850 --> 17:32.790] citizens are more deserving of rights than anyone else. [17:32.870 --> 17:39.190] But we certainly had all kinds of government officials of this nature saying things like this about Assange and other whistleblowers. [17:39.190 --> 17:40.210] I'm talking about in the past. [17:40.430 --> 17:41.850] Yeah, you're talking about the current day. [17:42.010 --> 17:43.970] I'm talking about, say, 20, 30 years ago. [17:44.090 --> 17:46.070] Did government officials talk like this? [17:46.070 --> 17:48.970] Did they say that this person who we know their name? [17:49.130 --> 17:52.730] Not just random enemies that we can paint with a broad brush. [17:53.210 --> 17:54.090] Specific people. [17:54.350 --> 17:55.550] And American citizens. [17:56.150 --> 17:58.090] Have we known people to do this? [17:58.490 --> 17:58.970] Officials. [17:59.070 --> 17:59.590] I don't. [17:59.750 --> 18:00.390] I don't. [18:00.470 --> 18:02.390] I wasn't really following the news 30 years ago. [18:02.690 --> 18:05.530] But, you know... [18:05.530 --> 18:06.130] And these... [18:06.130 --> 18:07.250] You know, Snowden is lucky. [18:07.390 --> 18:08.430] He gets mentioned by name. [18:08.430 --> 18:13.090] Most of the people the CIA actually kills, their names are never made public. [18:13.570 --> 18:14.010] So... [18:14.010 --> 18:18.070] Well, I'm not sure he feels very lucky being targeted by the ex-CIA chief. [18:18.510 --> 18:18.930] It just... [18:18.930 --> 18:20.570] You know, luck is relative, but... [18:20.570 --> 18:22.090] It just seems incredibly immature. [18:23.050 --> 18:26.590] And kind of like what the Republicans do with their debates. [18:27.250 --> 18:30.390] Point fingers and throw tantrums and things like that. [18:30.510 --> 18:35.730] And it just goes to show that they don't have control of the situation and they know it and they're very frustrated by it. [18:35.730 --> 18:41.350] To say something like, I think the blood of a lot of these French young people is on his hands, referring to Snowden. [18:41.890 --> 18:46.730] It's the epitome of inaccuracy and offensiveness. [18:47.290 --> 18:48.870] And he needs to be called on it. [18:48.950 --> 18:50.710] He needs to be called on it for saying these things. [18:50.790 --> 18:55.330] There is absolutely no evidence in the world that Snowden is responsible for anything like this. [18:55.330 --> 19:01.250] In fact, how many lives might he have saved by revealing the evils that our government has been up to? [19:01.670 --> 19:02.070] Emmanuel. [19:02.310 --> 19:02.810] Go ahead, Bernie. [19:02.810 --> 19:13.210] I just want to say, just to expand on what you just said, I don't think there have been any statements by the CIA or NSA or any other U.S. [19:13.270 --> 19:24.190] government agency stating that encryption was used by any of these terrorists who committed terrible acts in Paris and elsewhere recently. [19:25.310 --> 19:34.310] So this is a wholly unfounded accusation because there's no public information out there unless Wolsey has it. [19:34.410 --> 19:39.010] And he's been out of... he hasn't been to DCI for, what, 15 years? [19:39.110 --> 19:39.670] I don't know. [19:39.730 --> 19:41.270] He's been out of the CIA for many years. [19:41.450 --> 19:42.690] Yeah, well, he's frustrated, I think. [19:42.750 --> 19:43.370] He has nothing to do. [19:43.450 --> 19:52.070] He doesn't have access to this classified information if there is any information that even says that encryption was used by any terrorists. [19:52.970 --> 20:03.450] And all these... I think we should also be talking tonight about all these public officials now who are clamoring to basically outlaw encryption again. [20:03.450 --> 20:08.610] This is just back like the crypto wars, back in the 90s, all over again, back to the clipper chip. [20:09.010 --> 20:13.190] Well, Bernie, you're getting ahead of... we have more idiots to come, so we will be touching upon that. [20:13.490 --> 20:13.770] Okay, good. [20:13.930 --> 20:14.110] Rob? [20:14.890 --> 20:17.230] You can't stop... encryption is out there. [20:17.350 --> 20:20.430] It's been invented, it's out there, and anybody can use it. [20:20.670 --> 20:27.830] And there's no amount of laws or regulations that can prevent anybody from securing their privacy using encryption. [20:27.830 --> 20:37.830] So, this whole argument about we shouldn't have encryption is just... it's inane, it's stupid, it shows gross ignorance by whoever says that. [20:38.350 --> 20:42.970] And it just... I feel... I feel very frustrated. [20:42.970 --> 20:44.090] I hear the frustration. [20:44.290 --> 20:44.910] I hear the frustration. [20:45.110 --> 20:48.430] Our public officials seem to be grossly ignorant of the facts. [20:48.430 --> 20:58.490] If they could say, you know, we shouldn't have private conversations, because that's when things are plotted and schemed, they would say that if they didn't realize how ridiculous that was. [20:58.750 --> 21:00.150] And we're one step away from them saying that. [21:00.230 --> 21:00.350] Rob? [21:00.530 --> 21:12.050] Yeah, but I think this teaches us a lot, not only about the personality of Woolsey here, but the personality, the organizational personality of the CIA, you know, judging by the sort of person that ends up in charge of them. [21:12.770 --> 21:19.410] It sort of reminds me of, like, when I end up talking with police officers and realizing, wait, these are the people that used to kick the crap out of me in high school. [21:19.990 --> 21:24.230] They just found a job where they could use their bullying tendencies constructively. [21:24.250 --> 21:26.130] What, police officers used to kick the crap out of you in high school? [21:26.450 --> 21:26.950] No, but... [21:26.950 --> 21:28.030] Oh, they were in your high school. [21:28.150 --> 21:29.290] They were kids in your... Okay, got it. [21:29.610 --> 21:31.150] So, yeah, it's... [21:31.150 --> 21:33.810] Yeah, because these days, cops do come and kick your ass in school. [21:33.970 --> 21:34.450] Right, right. [21:34.870 --> 21:41.050] But, yeah, it's really indicative of the mindset that is behind all this. [21:41.050 --> 21:50.690] I mean, the Central Intelligence Agency, ostensibly, it's their job to investigate what's going on, gather, you know, quote-unquote intelligence, and find out the truth behind what's going on. [21:50.790 --> 21:59.150] But rather than that, they're saying things which are patently false, like this, about people who are living and in this situation, like Snowden. [21:59.490 --> 22:00.170] What do we do? [22:00.430 --> 22:00.670] Okay. [22:00.670 --> 22:05.150] I mean, the other thing to remember is that, like, ordinary CIA workers who may or may... [22:05.150 --> 22:07.970] Like, we don't know what they think, but they may or may not think this is stupid. [22:07.970 --> 22:10.510] But they are forbidden from speaking out. [22:10.810 --> 22:17.190] It's only the uppermost political appointees who will say things like this who are even allowed to speak in public. [22:17.550 --> 22:21.570] So, you know, I don't really want to defend the individual CIA agents. [22:21.670 --> 22:24.470] They should quit their jobs and do something productive with their lives. [22:24.470 --> 22:27.570] But we don't really know what they think. [22:28.830 --> 22:37.630] Well, I think this is a good indication of a mindset that's out there, whether it's in ex-CIA people or current CIA people, and it needs to be confronted. [22:38.090 --> 22:39.910] And we have more idiots to get to. [22:39.970 --> 22:42.010] You know, I know we're not going to get to all of them. [22:42.310 --> 22:48.790] Yesterday on the other radio show, we focused on all the Republican candidates and tried to find something stupid. [22:48.890 --> 22:51.370] They said it just about the refugee issue, and we ran out of time. [22:51.730 --> 22:52.870] An hour wasn't enough to cover. [22:53.050 --> 22:54.250] There's a lot of Republicans. [22:54.250 --> 22:57.530] I know, there's so many of them, but they're all talking, and oh boy. [22:57.830 --> 22:59.770] But okay, let's move on to the next one. [22:59.890 --> 23:10.730] FCC chairman, the nation's top telecom regulator, recommended broadening America's wiretapping laws in response to the recent attacks in Paris by Daesh. [23:11.050 --> 23:12.310] And I don't know if you guys know this. [23:12.330 --> 23:22.710] I'm calling it Daesh from now on because they're not Islamic, and they're not a state, and nobody here knows what Daesh means, and nobody here understands what they're about anyway. [23:22.710 --> 23:24.530] So I think that's a better name. [23:24.650 --> 23:27.930] And that's what they're called in that part of the world anyway. [23:28.970 --> 23:29.490] Daesh. [23:29.770 --> 23:36.330] But I'll say Islamic State, or ISIL, so people get used to it for now. [23:36.790 --> 23:40.890] Anyway, that was in response to the recent attacks in Paris. [23:40.890 --> 23:47.970] This nation's top telecom regulator, expressing will for this. [23:48.090 --> 24:03.270] Chairman Tom Wheeler said the FCC cannot take direct action against Daesh, such as shutting down its websites or social media accounts, but Congress could do specific things, allowing the FCC to assist law enforcement more effectively. [24:03.270 --> 24:06.050] And that includes revisiting the wiretap legislation. [24:06.370 --> 24:14.530] Now, this 1994 law, known as the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act, and what does that spell out, Bernie? [24:15.090 --> 24:15.490] CALEA. [24:15.690 --> 24:32.190] And I'm fond of telling people that I am probably CALEA's first casualty, because when that passed in late 1994, it had an obscure provision of it that was used to prosecute me in a federal case back in 1995. [24:33.270 --> 24:43.430] But it scares me that Tom Wheeler, our FCC chairman, is calling for an expansion of CALEA, which it was so controversial. [24:43.630 --> 25:04.990] Remember you and I and others in fiber optic at the CFP2 conference back in, this was like, 93, 94, where there was this big debate about, should there be a law requiring all telephone companies to provide direct access to their central office, which is by the FBI and other law enforcement agencies, [25:05.170 --> 25:10.010] just like the telephone systems of Eastern Europe provided access to the Stasi. [25:11.130 --> 25:13.730] And we thought that was extremely evil at the time. [25:13.750 --> 25:18.670] Bernie, Bernie, Bernie, you know, we have, like I said, we're trying to focus on today's idiots. [25:18.870 --> 25:24.490] If we go back into history and look at the idiocy of the past that led to today's idiots, we're going to need all night. [25:25.430 --> 25:28.810] You're right, but the idiocy is compounding this idiocy. [25:29.030 --> 25:31.430] So they want, Tom Wheeler wants CALEA to be expanded. [25:31.670 --> 25:35.850] But how would you feel if we couldn't cover all the idiots tonight and give them the time they deserve? [25:36.170 --> 25:41.230] So anyway, Tom Wheeler is pushing for expansion of this. [25:42.230 --> 25:48.350] Now CALEA, as you mentioned, provides for the quote-unquote lawful intercept of a suspect's telephone, online communications. [25:48.630 --> 25:57.750] It requires telecom companies and internet providers, not to mention online voice services, to build their networks in ways that grant authorities easier access to these communications. [25:58.010 --> 26:09.650] Now, his new suggestion underscores the FCC's growing interest in online privacy and security, just as intelligence officials are rekindling a debate over government surveillance and encrypted communications. [26:09.790 --> 26:15.290] One of the issues here, he says, is the question of what is a lawful intercept? [26:16.350 --> 26:28.790] Except, you read in the press that the attackers were using PlayStation 4 games to communicate on, which is outside the scope of anything considered in CALEA, so there's probably opportunities to update the lawful intercept concept. [26:29.150 --> 26:30.070] Mike, you have something to say? [26:30.130 --> 26:37.850] I mean, just to be clear, this is a thing we did, in fact, read in the press, but there's no evidence that it's actually true, the PlayStation thing. [26:37.990 --> 26:38.790] But what if it were? [26:38.930 --> 26:40.410] What if they were communicating via PlayStation game? [26:40.410 --> 26:48.910] Look, here's the thing, like, and I'm sure I'll say the same thing to someone else in your pile of idiots, but, like, the U.S. [26:49.110 --> 26:51.610] government has plenty of mass surveillance. [26:51.610 --> 26:54.770] The French state has plenty of mass surveillance. [26:55.930 --> 27:11.790] The attackers in this particular case were from all available information using their real names on Facebook and sending unencrypted SMSs, and we're not caught by this mass surveillance on which we are spending billions of dollars. [27:11.790 --> 27:13.790] It doesn't work. [27:15.410 --> 27:23.130] We should take this billions of dollars and spend it on, like, cancer research or something that actually saves lives. [27:23.310 --> 27:23.990] Space travel. [27:24.130 --> 27:25.550] Space travel, sure, why not? [27:25.690 --> 27:26.370] High-speed rail. [27:26.370 --> 27:29.750] I don't know if any of these things save lives, but at least they do something. [27:30.650 --> 27:31.090] Rob? [27:31.130 --> 27:36.430] Yeah, I'm wondering if this guy, if Tom Wheeler, really counts as an idiot in this case, though. [27:36.790 --> 27:49.890] Because what he's doing is, could be seen as just something tactically intelligent, which is taking something terrible that happens and that everyone's talking about and trying to wedge it in to justify some ulterior motive and goal of your own. [27:50.710 --> 27:55.570] And as this guy is in charge of the FCC, he's also deep into the cable and telecom industry. [27:55.570 --> 27:57.770] He used to be a lobbyist for the cable industry. [27:58.230 --> 28:05.730] And he, I imagine, is in favor of things which involve that industry getting paid more money by the government to do shady things. [28:06.190 --> 28:15.410] So I'm wondering if he's really being an idiot right now or if he's just trying to intelligently, evilly twist something around. [28:15.590 --> 28:19.450] So you think there's more nefarious purposes to what he's saying? [28:19.450 --> 28:20.350] Yes, Bernie. [28:21.010 --> 28:25.890] I just want to say that Tom Wheeler was appointed the chairman of the FCC by President Obama. [28:26.070 --> 28:29.070] He serves at the pleasure of the president. [28:29.390 --> 28:42.830] I don't think Tom Wheeler would go out on a limb on making such a statement that he thinks CALEA should be expanded without first checking with the White House to see if that was going to be the party line. [28:42.910 --> 28:44.470] So I think this is an omen. [28:44.470 --> 28:50.610] I think this is a clue we have to where the White House or current administration is headed. [28:50.890 --> 29:05.610] I mean, it seems perfectly logical to me that this current administration, the Obama administration, wants to do what Tom Wheeler is saying, because he would not be saying this otherwise, because he was appointed by the president and serves at his pleasure. [29:05.610 --> 29:07.530] So that's my theory. [29:08.090 --> 29:09.250] The plot thickens. [29:09.430 --> 29:09.750] All right. [29:09.970 --> 29:12.670] Moving on, let's get a little more local. [29:13.270 --> 29:16.450] Cyrus Vance, Jr. Yeah. [29:16.650 --> 29:20.470] Some of you might remember Cyrus Vance, Sr. was our Secretary of State under Carter. [29:20.670 --> 29:27.170] But this is his son, and he's the Manhattan District Attorney and an outspoken critic of encryption. [29:27.170 --> 29:37.250] He is calling on Congress to adopt legislation mandating that mobile phone makers like Apple and Google put backdoors into their smartphones. [29:37.750 --> 29:50.910] Vance says it is government's principal responsibility to keep its residents safe and that a government cannot fulfill that responsibility if huge amounts of vital information directly related to public safety are inaccessible to the government. [29:51.130 --> 29:53.430] In other words, we need to hear everything. [29:53.430 --> 29:56.970] Let us decide what privacy is. [29:57.170 --> 29:58.930] And just give us all the data. [29:59.330 --> 30:00.410] I think that's about right. [30:00.870 --> 30:02.950] I mean, look, it's no secret that the U.S. [30:03.030 --> 30:05.110] government is really good at locking people up. [30:07.510 --> 30:10.070] And we're pretty safe here in America. [30:10.290 --> 30:12.150] Like, there's not a lot of murders anymore. [30:12.730 --> 30:14.030] There's still, you know, too many. [30:14.190 --> 30:16.810] But by historical levels, there's really not very many. [30:19.390 --> 30:23.930] And, you know, they were able to fight crime before everything was digitally recorded. [30:24.770 --> 30:26.730] They can still do it. [30:26.730 --> 30:29.010] But it just doesn't make any sense. [30:29.010 --> 30:33.110] I really wish I could understand the line of thinking so I could rebut it intentionally. [30:33.270 --> 30:34.350] Well, I understand the line of thinking. [30:34.550 --> 30:37.910] It's just they can't say this publicly, but they just want complete control. [30:38.110 --> 30:44.670] They want to have as much private information on everybody as possible for whatever purposes they choose to use. [30:44.770 --> 30:46.990] But what do they even want to do that they're not already doing? [30:47.590 --> 30:48.490] I don't know. [30:48.590 --> 30:51.730] I guess they want insurance for new forms of technology that might... [30:51.730 --> 30:53.790] I mean, look at it from their point of view. [30:53.930 --> 31:00.810] We are smart enough where we can devise means of communication that they cannot crack ways of going back. [31:00.970 --> 31:06.410] And fortunately, terrorists aren't right enough to make use of that in effective ways. [31:06.410 --> 31:07.850] That has not yet happened. [31:07.970 --> 31:09.070] It may happen in the future. [31:09.170 --> 31:12.430] But as you say, there's always a way of investigating. [31:12.430 --> 31:17.950] There's always a way of using your crime-fighting talents to find criminals. [31:17.950 --> 31:20.490] You don't need to be able to hear every word, every thought. [31:21.830 --> 31:36.190] And to say that having people discuss things either privately or via encryption is going to make everybody more unsafe is just... it's a way to scare people to get what you want. [31:36.330 --> 31:36.970] That's what we're seeing. [31:37.110 --> 31:38.130] That's exactly what it is. [31:38.230 --> 31:45.010] I mean, the reason all these people are making these statements out in news articles or in interviews or whatever is because this isn't really about... [31:45.010 --> 31:49.470] Like, as you said, Mike, they're probably already doing the things that they're saying they want to be able to do. [31:49.650 --> 31:59.410] But what they're doing here is trying to shape public opinion of these things, trying to get the public on their side so far as, like, encryption. [31:59.750 --> 32:08.110] You know, sure, technically inclined people like you or I in this room could put, say, another ROM on our phone and not be subject to a commonly accepted backdoor. [32:08.370 --> 32:14.030] But at the same time, will the general public then think we're doing something nefarious by doing so? [32:14.970 --> 32:19.810] You know, or can we just go around and keep being reasonable about these things? [32:19.950 --> 32:20.190] I don't know. [32:20.790 --> 32:21.710] Yes, go ahead, Bernie. [32:22.430 --> 32:34.850] I want to call out Cyrus Vance Jr. and every other politician and law enforcement agent who keeps repeating this lie, this canard, that, quote, it's government's principal responsibility to keep its residents safe. [32:35.070 --> 32:36.010] No, it's not. [32:36.010 --> 32:40.690] Their primary responsibility is to follow the Constitution. [32:41.210 --> 32:47.050] If you look at the presidential oath, their oath is to uphold the Constitution. [32:47.050 --> 32:52.970] There's nothing in the presidential oath that says the oath is to keep people safe. [32:54.070 --> 32:57.470] And Cyrus Vance Jr. is the Manhattan district attorney. [32:57.470 --> 32:59.490] He should know what the law is. [32:59.590 --> 33:02.830] The highest law in the land is the United States Constitution. [33:04.170 --> 33:12.410] And he, of all people, should know, and I'm sure does know, but he's lying, that when he says the government's principal responsibility is to keep its residents safe. [33:12.550 --> 33:13.090] No, it's not. [33:13.230 --> 33:16.290] It's to follow the Constitution, which is the highest law of the land. [33:18.290 --> 33:18.970] Well said. [33:19.110 --> 33:19.510] Well said. [33:21.210 --> 33:21.650] Yes? [33:21.830 --> 33:31.990] I, for one, look forward to Mr. Vance's campaign against falling furniture, which is a thing that kills more people in the United States than terrorism. [33:31.990 --> 33:32.650] You don't say. [33:34.410 --> 33:35.630] Well, no, we should talk about this. [33:35.630 --> 33:36.530] I mean, I wish to be... [33:36.530 --> 33:36.990] I like a... [33:36.990 --> 33:40.870] If a couch fell on my head, like, that would be remarkably unsafe. [33:40.870 --> 33:44.310] We should spend as much time talking about things like that as we do on everything else. [33:44.310 --> 33:50.590] And we could probably, for a lot less money than we're spending on the NSA, like, come up with some way to make furniture safer. [33:50.790 --> 33:51.830] I mean, you know... [33:51.830 --> 33:52.330] Outlaw couches. [33:52.490 --> 33:53.590] It's got to be possible. [33:54.410 --> 33:54.990] Yeah, yeah. [33:55.910 --> 33:59.550] All right, there are a ton more, but I don't want the time to slip by. [33:59.750 --> 34:04.190] I would like to take some phone calls from our listeners as we promised we would. [34:05.270 --> 34:08.310] 718-780-8888 is our new phone number. [34:09.210 --> 34:12.010] And we're going to start taking phone calls as soon as they start coming in. [34:12.110 --> 34:23.070] But let me also say that if you've heard via Facebook or some other place that a bunch of terrorists are out buying UPS uniforms and they're going to come to your house and blow themselves up or something, that's false. [34:23.090 --> 34:24.190] That is not true. [34:24.190 --> 34:28.910] In fact, that has been spreading around on the internet since 2003. [34:29.750 --> 34:31.610] And it was not true then. [34:31.610 --> 34:32.710] It's not true now. [34:32.990 --> 34:39.830] In fact, the LAPD even reported it as true at one point and had to rescind it when they realized that they had fallen for it. [34:40.630 --> 34:42.950] Anytime you hear things like this, it gets spread around. [34:43.130 --> 34:44.670] And you're going to hear a lot of it probably on Thursday. [34:45.990 --> 34:50.330] you have to take it with a big grain of salt because most times it's not true. [34:50.690 --> 34:57.930] Yeah, snopes.com S-N-O-P-E-S dot com is the Urban Legend site that catalogs these things and explains why they're false. [34:58.090 --> 35:01.170] So always check Snopes before you forward something on that you've gotten like this. [35:01.330 --> 35:02.790] You do have to be careful of them though. [35:02.870 --> 35:04.030] They have their own agenda. [35:04.290 --> 35:04.870] What, UPS? [35:05.090 --> 35:05.730] No, Snopes. [35:05.910 --> 35:06.050] Oh, okay. [35:06.050 --> 35:09.410] I mean, UPS has an agenda I'm sure too, but I don't really know what it is. [35:10.130 --> 35:10.710] All right. [35:14.670 --> 35:15.590] Here's our new telephone number. [35:15.670 --> 35:16.670] Let's see who's out there. [35:17.610 --> 35:18.210] Good evening. [35:18.210 --> 35:19.050] You're our first caller. [35:19.170 --> 35:19.410] Go ahead. [35:21.710 --> 35:25.450] I guess our first caller not saying anything is about what I could expect. [35:25.590 --> 35:26.270] Is anyone out there? [35:27.550 --> 35:28.630] Bernie, you're still there, right? [35:28.910 --> 35:29.950] I'm still here, yes. [35:30.730 --> 35:33.010] Okay, well, the first caller is being disconnected now. [35:33.110 --> 35:33.990] I'm going to the second caller. [35:34.070 --> 35:34.330] Good evening. [35:34.490 --> 35:35.210] You're on the air. [35:35.770 --> 35:36.370] Go ahead. [35:38.290 --> 35:39.390] Does this thing work? [35:41.150 --> 35:42.370] The lights light up. [35:42.570 --> 35:44.630] The buttons work, but I don't hear any audio. [35:45.790 --> 35:46.670] We hear Bernie. [35:46.950 --> 35:47.610] We hear Bernie. [35:47.790 --> 35:48.450] And he called us. [35:48.530 --> 35:48.750] I'm still here. [35:48.910 --> 35:49.490] Why don't we... [35:49.490 --> 35:51.230] Maybe three times is a charm. [35:51.370 --> 35:51.750] Try it again. [35:52.630 --> 35:53.350] Is anyone there? [35:54.010 --> 35:54.690] No one's there. [35:54.790 --> 35:56.510] Let's try going over here now. [35:56.590 --> 35:56.850] Good evening. [35:56.970 --> 35:57.550] You're on the air. [35:58.250 --> 35:58.650] Anyone? [36:00.150 --> 36:00.550] Okay. [36:00.790 --> 36:02.070] This doesn't work, folks. [36:02.930 --> 36:04.270] It doesn't work. [36:04.570 --> 36:05.770] For God's sake. [36:05.950 --> 36:07.670] Why do you set me up like this? [36:08.490 --> 36:11.830] Add me to the list of idiots now because, wow, I really fell for this. [36:12.790 --> 36:14.470] Bernie, I'm going to put you on hold. [36:14.710 --> 36:15.110] Okay, go ahead. [36:15.110 --> 36:16.570] I'm going to test out a theory here. [36:17.050 --> 36:18.530] And now I'm going to pick up this line. [36:18.650 --> 36:19.450] Is anyone there? [36:19.870 --> 36:20.150] Hello? [36:20.370 --> 36:20.930] Oh, you see? [36:21.070 --> 36:22.530] The conferencing is what doesn't work. [36:22.530 --> 36:22.730] Can you hear me? [36:22.850 --> 36:23.830] Yes, we hear you now. [36:23.950 --> 36:24.290] Hey! [36:24.430 --> 36:25.350] Bernie was the problem. [36:25.690 --> 36:27.910] Once we got rid of Bernie, we could hear you. [36:28.050 --> 36:29.090] Well, hey, listen. [36:29.630 --> 36:29.990] Guess what? [36:30.210 --> 36:31.630] Conferencing doesn't work on the phone lines. [36:31.630 --> 36:35.250] Two weeks ago on NPR, there was a fascinating story. [36:35.490 --> 36:40.750] There's a magazine called The Atlantic that had a story called, and it's a great title. [36:40.930 --> 36:43.230] If you're not paranoid, you're crazy. [36:43.230 --> 36:45.170] I don't know if you guys know about this story. [36:46.570 --> 36:47.650] Do you know about it? [36:48.190 --> 36:49.530] I don't think I read it. [36:49.710 --> 36:50.890] Okay, here's the deal. [36:52.130 --> 36:55.570] The guy who wrote it, he was making breakfast one day. [36:55.570 --> 36:59.510] He's looking for walnuts and to put into his cereal. [36:59.510 --> 37:00.450] He can't find it. [37:00.510 --> 37:05.230] He shouts out to his wife, who's in the shower, Honey, where are the walnuts? [37:05.370 --> 37:06.610] And she didn't hear him. [37:07.010 --> 37:17.550] Later on, he gets to his office and he turns on his cell phone and he sees it says, walnuts are on sale at, you know, wherever, 79 cents a pound. [37:17.690 --> 37:18.730] Eat walnuts every day. [37:18.870 --> 37:19.650] They're healthy for you. [37:20.490 --> 37:20.970] Coincidence? [37:21.390 --> 37:21.870] No. [37:22.070 --> 37:35.090] It turns out he wears one of these wristbands that communicate with his phone via Bluetooth that count his steps, you know, they take his pulse, one of these healthy things. [37:35.410 --> 37:35.510] It did. [37:35.850 --> 37:49.410] And it turns out that in the terms of service, when he signed on for this thing, it gives microphone rights to this thing, which looks out for keywords for advertising purposes. [37:49.630 --> 37:50.850] Now, you can look up this article. [37:50.850 --> 37:55.190] Again, it's called If You're Not Paranoid, You're Crazy. [37:55.790 --> 37:57.410] Now, I'd just like to ask this. [37:57.410 --> 37:59.370] I'm not the most technical person. [37:59.890 --> 38:01.190] When you use... [38:02.430 --> 38:10.530] Like, let's say, the other day, I wanted to use Google Map, and it says, click here to accept the terms of service. [38:11.330 --> 38:13.430] I don't know what's in the terms of service. [38:13.430 --> 38:19.590] Am I able to select what I allow, or is it one fell swoop? [38:19.590 --> 38:21.450] You say yes to everything. [38:22.750 --> 38:27.770] In general, the companies that write the terms of service do not care to negotiate with you. [38:28.410 --> 38:31.650] They present their agreements as a sort of take it or leave it thing. [38:32.210 --> 38:33.590] Some companies do... [38:34.190 --> 38:37.590] You know, you have to accept the whole legal agreement in order to use the product. [38:39.110 --> 38:43.750] It's also questionable whether these legal agreements are enforceable, but that's a topic for another day. [38:46.730 --> 38:53.190] Well, have you ever heard control, in some ways, what they do with your data, but not through the legal agreement process? [38:53.290 --> 38:54.250] For me, this is very scary. [38:54.490 --> 39:02.110] I mean, is there any way to, you know, well, you can't disconnect your mic because then it's a cell phone. [39:02.310 --> 39:04.090] So, I mean, is there anything you can do? [39:05.730 --> 39:18.190] Again, like, you can turn off, on most phones at least, all the ones I've ever looked at, you can turn off the automatic wake up and listen to what I'm saying mode, and that does generally work. [39:19.190 --> 39:20.670] But, you have to know what you're doing. [39:20.830 --> 39:23.570] Can I ask our caller to help us with an experiment here? [39:23.970 --> 39:24.290] Absolutely. [39:24.550 --> 39:25.650] Does it involve chemicals? [39:25.770 --> 39:33.010] No, it involves you speaking, and we're going to hit the other button and see if we lose you at the moment that we hit the other button, and that way we'll know what's broken on this phone. [39:33.150 --> 39:33.650] Okie doke. [39:33.850 --> 39:37.030] Would you like a count of, like, one to ten? [39:37.250 --> 39:38.070] No, he's still there. [39:38.770 --> 39:39.570] Bernie, are you there now? [39:39.650 --> 39:40.290] Musical scales? [39:40.450 --> 39:41.150] What would you like? [39:41.390 --> 39:42.550] Maybe Bernie's not there now. [39:43.150 --> 39:43.830] Oh, you know what? [39:43.830 --> 39:44.850] It's the second call. [39:45.010 --> 39:45.830] That's what we lose. [39:45.950 --> 39:46.930] So, Bernie was there before. [39:47.470 --> 39:48.250] Okay, we're learning. [39:48.330 --> 39:50.450] We're learning as we move along here. [39:51.110 --> 39:52.170] Thanks for that call. [39:52.670 --> 39:54.190] Can I say one last thing? [39:54.310 --> 39:54.750] Very quickly. [39:56.170 --> 39:59.850] Bring back Uncle Sidney to WBAI, please. [39:59.850 --> 40:00.750] Yes, that would be awesome. [40:00.890 --> 40:01.750] That would be really awesome. [40:01.950 --> 40:02.370] Thank you. [40:02.470 --> 40:03.750] Thanks for your call. [40:03.850 --> 40:04.630] Bernie, are you there now? [40:06.410 --> 40:07.890] Is Bernie even on the phone? [40:08.330 --> 40:11.150] I'm going to put him on hold one more time and then go back. [40:11.350 --> 40:12.150] Maybe it'll work now. [40:12.270 --> 40:12.870] Bernie, are you there? [40:14.010 --> 40:15.030] Yeah, now I'm here. [40:15.390 --> 40:16.910] Now you can hear me, right? [40:16.910 --> 40:18.170] Okay, this phone is messed up. [40:18.730 --> 40:20.830] We can't have you on and have the callers on. [40:21.050 --> 40:21.770] I understand. [40:21.930 --> 40:22.970] I can listen to them online. [40:22.970 --> 40:28.050] I just want to comment that listener's comment that if you're not paranoid, you're crazy. [40:28.150 --> 40:37.290] Reminds me of the great Dr. Johnny Fever who once said, when everybody's out to get you, paranoia is just good thinking. [40:38.430 --> 40:39.910] Yeah, he said something to that effect. [40:40.110 --> 40:40.450] He did. [40:41.150 --> 40:43.050] Also, consider the time it takes. [40:43.190 --> 40:51.930] Like, the investment, the effort to modify a device and make it so that it doesn't do any of the number of things with sensors on it. [40:52.770 --> 41:03.630] It's a nice idea, but the time you'd spend, the amount of other sensors and devices and things that are coming into the world would just compound that effort. [41:03.630 --> 41:11.890] In other words, stuff that can track you is cropping up in all sorts of places. [41:12.150 --> 41:13.890] So it's kind of like whack-a-mole. [41:13.970 --> 41:22.330] You can try one thing with a device here, but you'll probably buy two other devices that next week that are tracking you in other ways. [41:22.570 --> 41:26.990] So it's really, whatever you can imagine is possible is possible with these things. [41:27.110 --> 41:38.350] And you really need to be deliberate about how you act and behave around this stuff and what kinds of purchases and items and services and agreements, as was pointed out, that you're agreeing to. [41:39.250 --> 41:45.770] We should also note that it is not a coincidence that the legal frameworks in this country permit these large corporations to do such things. [41:45.910 --> 41:55.350] They vigorously fight any sort of regulation upon them, which may be something we could, in another parallel universe, use to fight back. [41:56.190 --> 41:57.390] Emmanuel, we're all hackers. [41:57.490 --> 42:07.830] I would like to see a switch on cell phones that would allow you to turn off, to disconnect the power to the microphone, disconnect power to the video cameras on our phones. [42:08.050 --> 42:11.050] And I'm disturbed that we don't have those options. [42:12.330 --> 42:18.450] There are some pretty well-known hackers that have done teardowns of cheap phones to actually remove that stuff. [42:18.690 --> 42:21.610] But it would be nice if that was built in. [42:21.730 --> 42:24.750] Like, you could actually interrupt a sensor. [42:24.750 --> 42:25.250] A hardware switch. [42:25.290 --> 42:26.070] What a concept. [42:26.170 --> 42:28.690] A hardware switch to shut off power to the microphone and the camera. [42:29.090 --> 42:30.590] Or, Bernie, what if it was all sensors? [42:31.110 --> 42:32.090] Like, anything that... [42:32.090 --> 42:33.690] Audio, video, light, anything. [42:33.850 --> 42:35.070] All sensors just switch off. [42:35.230 --> 42:35.530] Bypass. [42:35.710 --> 42:35.970] Absolutely. [42:36.310 --> 42:40.050] Do you know if the XCIA chief is listening to this right now, he's probably having a heart attack. [42:40.270 --> 42:43.630] The ideas you're coming up with, the dangerous ideas that should be outlawed. [42:44.430 --> 42:46.530] What kind of heart attack would you like him to have? [42:46.610 --> 42:47.650] Oh, that's a good question. [42:49.110 --> 42:53.970] All right, Bernie, we're going to try and move on to other listeners, which means we have to say goodnight to you. [42:54.610 --> 42:59.130] All right, well, goodnight, or, I mean, I can, I want to keep me if you are not, or I'll just listen online for the rest of the show. [42:59.130 --> 43:01.430] We can put you on hold and come back to you in case... [43:01.430 --> 43:01.910] That would be great. [43:02.210 --> 43:02.930] Put me on hold. [43:03.030 --> 43:03.850] All right, we'll do that. [43:04.250 --> 43:04.550] Thank you. [43:04.690 --> 43:11.750] So, Bernie's now on hold, and our phone lines are wide open, 718-780-8888. [43:12.170 --> 43:16.610] That's our new telephone number, and now we know how to work the phone, so we'll be able to hear from people. [43:16.610 --> 43:18.750] And let's please try and keep it brief, people. [43:19.130 --> 43:19.890] Yes, good evening. [43:20.010 --> 43:20.790] You're on Off the Hook. [43:21.870 --> 43:22.430] Oh, hi. [43:22.510 --> 43:23.490] This is Joe calling. [43:23.570 --> 43:28.530] I wanted to address what you were saying about falling furniture, killing people more than terrorism. [43:28.770 --> 43:29.050] Uh-huh. [43:29.530 --> 43:31.790] Yeah, I saw it on Facebook. [43:31.790 --> 43:33.290] They didn't use the word falling. [43:33.450 --> 43:36.490] They just said furniture kills more people than terrorism. [43:36.670 --> 43:43.630] I just am glad you clarified that for me because I was forced to write, you know, I'm so happy that my furniture doesn't take up arms against me. [43:43.770 --> 43:44.690] Yeah, you have to think about it. [43:44.690 --> 43:46.510] I mean, how would furniture kill you just sitting on the ground? [43:47.270 --> 43:52.710] Yeah, I mean, unless it's being hoisted up in the air and you're walking down the street and a couch hits you. [43:52.850 --> 43:53.890] Well, yeah. [43:54.250 --> 43:59.530] I mean, a flat-screen TV can hit you and kill you, but that's falling off the wall, so that's falling as well. [44:00.110 --> 44:00.890] Air conditioning? [44:01.110 --> 44:01.970] Is air conditioning furniture? [44:03.370 --> 44:05.070] I would highly doubt it. [44:05.190 --> 44:05.990] It's an appliance. [44:06.130 --> 44:06.710] It's an appliance. [44:06.810 --> 44:08.530] All right, so that's probably another figure for that. [44:08.970 --> 44:09.970] Yeah, I mean, I'm just... [44:09.970 --> 44:17.130] The headline, and this is the Washington Post, so maybe it's reliable, says, you're more likely to be fatally crushed by furniture than killed by a terrorist. [44:17.490 --> 44:21.050] And you can Google the article, I guess, and read how they do their math. [44:21.170 --> 44:26.670] Or killed by just about any kind of wildlife there is, including squirrels and wombats or whatever. [44:27.010 --> 44:32.490] One would think with such a serious subject as terrorism, they could have come up with a better simile or something. [44:32.490 --> 44:36.070] Well, sometimes you have to point out the absurd to make the point. [44:36.310 --> 44:44.070] They do give a list of other things in the article that are also more dangerous than terrorism or at least kill more Americans annually. [44:44.270 --> 44:45.250] Just about anything else. [44:45.250 --> 44:47.550] I don't want to spoil the article for you by reading it all on the air. [44:47.630 --> 44:50.950] We have a bunch of phone calls, almost a full switchboard here, so let's move on to another one. [44:50.950 --> 44:52.390] Good evening, you're on Off the Hook. [44:53.590 --> 44:54.290] Yeah, hi. [44:55.430 --> 44:56.070] How you doing? [44:56.610 --> 44:57.270] Yeah, good. [44:57.270 --> 45:05.210] I just wanted to give an answer to an earlier question about why the government is discriminating with surveillance. [45:05.450 --> 45:07.990] Could you speak more into the microphone of your telephone, please? [45:08.470 --> 45:09.390] Yeah, could you hear me now? [45:09.470 --> 45:09.690] Yes. [45:10.290 --> 45:21.110] I just wanted to give an answer to an earlier question on the show asking why the government is extending indiscriminately its surveillance capability. [45:21.450 --> 45:22.750] Okay, go ahead and answer that question. [45:23.450 --> 45:30.650] The answer that I would give would be that the population itself That's a good point. [45:31.190 --> 45:32.930] That's a scary point, but it's a good point. [45:33.650 --> 45:44.150] Yeah, control in any form is critical, because if we're all in sort of... if we're all disconnected or decentralized... not decentralized, that's a bad one. [45:44.310 --> 45:45.130] I don't know how to say it. [45:45.290 --> 46:00.830] But if we're all sort of... we have our blinders, whatever they are, virtual and otherwise, and not cohesive, even in spite of our... especially in spite of our differences, there isn't much in the way of change from the people. [46:01.010 --> 46:06.450] And that is how change happens in our fancy little experiment here. [46:06.570 --> 46:07.650] I think that's kind of hard. [46:07.790 --> 46:14.330] Sometimes people don't understand that, that might pontificate about the U.S. [46:14.590 --> 46:24.990] That's a very good point, because like we were saying earlier about the ability to switch off the mic on your phone, if people in general wanted that, then it would be worth it for these companies that do this for a living to provide that. [46:26.450 --> 46:30.610] If it's something that people just don't think about, they're never going to just volunteer that feature. [46:30.750 --> 46:36.850] Well, maybe they don't think about it because they don't realize how useful that feature can be, and people like us can tell them this is a good thing to have. [46:37.010 --> 46:37.650] That's exactly right. [46:37.890 --> 46:39.310] The fourth estate. [46:39.630 --> 46:41.050] Journalism is key. [46:41.190 --> 46:45.070] And that's why consolidation matters, and where you get your information from matters. [46:45.390 --> 46:47.030] Thanks for that point, caller. [46:47.290 --> 46:48.030] You're very welcome. [46:48.170 --> 46:48.750] All right, take care. [46:49.830 --> 46:51.170] Bernie, we're checking in with you now. [46:51.170 --> 46:51.770] How are you doing? [46:53.130 --> 46:53.970] I'm still here. [46:53.970 --> 46:55.290] I know you're still here. [46:55.370 --> 46:56.210] That's why we're talking to you. [46:56.370 --> 47:00.370] Okay, I was listening online, and boy, I was really impressed by what Kyle just said. [47:00.610 --> 47:07.610] The fourth estate is really an extremely important thing, like this show and other shows. [47:08.410 --> 47:19.190] The report on this stuff make people aware of things like, hey, why don't we have a way to actually have a physical switch on our microphones and cameras on our mobile devices to prevent this kind of surveillance? [47:19.490 --> 47:20.570] And these are good questions. [47:20.570 --> 47:26.530] If more people knew this was a possibility, maybe the manufacturers would take notice if there was enough public demand for it. [47:26.870 --> 47:34.850] Yeah, consumer advocacy, consumer people asking for things, like the market demanding things. [47:34.850 --> 47:36.250] It's a good analogy. [47:36.470 --> 47:39.230] It's not exactly how democracy works. [47:39.230 --> 47:54.730] But as Rob said, when people speak up, even if it's for a silly product, you know, they want a different headband or, you know, bow or dress on their GI Joe or something, they have to speak up and demand it. [47:54.890 --> 47:57.010] And that's really what it's about. [47:57.010 --> 48:01.650] You speak to your representatives, and that's how democracy is ideally supposed to work. [48:01.650 --> 48:07.430] So it's a great analogy, and it does... whatever things you pick, they all matter, right? [48:07.590 --> 48:13.630] So pick something good that you would like to change and tell people about it and get a lot of people interested. [48:13.730 --> 48:16.110] And that's how stuff really does evolve. [48:16.830 --> 48:39.770] Going back to the story of terrorism and technology and hacking, I was wondering what you guys thought of one reaction from members of the Anonymous Collective who decided to go after Daesh, Islamic State, and take down their Twitter accounts, reveal them, [48:40.010 --> 48:42.010] basically disrupt their communications. [48:42.810 --> 48:45.470] Is that a good thing or a bad thing? [48:47.330 --> 48:57.910] I'm usually against censoring other people's communications, even people I don't like, because I like to see even what people I don't agree with are saying, because I like to be able to point out how full of crap they are. [48:59.230 --> 49:01.630] I kind of thought, yeah, I... [49:01.630 --> 49:07.670] You and I talked about this, I've heard other conversations, but I initially was like, yeah, they should shut them all down. [49:08.070 --> 49:10.310] Like, I don't know. [49:10.390 --> 49:11.090] I don't know why. [49:11.090 --> 49:16.030] I guess that was a really reactionary inclination to have. [49:16.170 --> 49:24.610] But when I thought about it, I think it's a good point where Rob says, and I think you feel the same way, or I've heard this, that, you know, it's important. [49:24.610 --> 49:27.950] You have to be able to know who's saying what. [49:29.330 --> 49:39.970] Because if they're there, if they've got a voice, right, at least you can kind of get a characterization of that opinion, of that perspective over the long term. [49:39.970 --> 49:50.670] If you just annihilate that perspective from visibility, it doesn't mean it's gone anywhere, and you can't have any sort of dialogue with the people that hold that. [49:51.390 --> 49:51.930] Right, right. [49:52.130 --> 49:52.270] Right. [49:52.390 --> 49:56.510] And freedom of speech is only worth anything if it also applies to speech you personally don't like. [49:57.070 --> 50:06.230] You know, if you see an unpopular opinion and think that shouldn't be expressed at all by these people, then, you know, what happens the next time you want to express an opinion that might be unpopular? [50:06.410 --> 50:11.010] Well, I'm just so thrilled that we have all these Republican debates because it lets them speak. [50:11.130 --> 50:16.070] And when they speak, they say things that they have to spend the next six weeks getting out from under. [50:16.510 --> 50:23.990] If you just shut people up because they're reprehensible or stupid or whatever, you don't get to hear that. [50:24.070 --> 50:28.210] You don't get to see what they actually think or what they are actually planning. [50:28.430 --> 50:37.050] So while I do understand the desire to do something like this, and also the desire to show how easy it is, because it really is easy. [50:37.210 --> 50:45.910] I was on the Islamic State website and seeing who was being linked to via Twitter and then who they were following. [50:46.110 --> 50:52.550] And before I knew it, I had a whole collection of people, a lot of whom look pretty much like they were really into it. [50:52.970 --> 50:57.190] And, you know, if I could only translate what they were saying, I'd have a lot of intelligence right there. [50:57.250 --> 51:01.330] And I have to wonder, there must be people out there doing precisely that. [51:01.530 --> 51:07.170] So if we take that away, if we wipe that out, like Kyle said, they're still going to be saying these things. [51:07.170 --> 51:08.430] They'll just be saying them someplace. [51:08.590 --> 51:09.610] We can't hear them. [51:09.710 --> 51:10.430] So that's something to consider. [51:10.590 --> 51:12.090] I understand the reasoning behind it. [51:12.410 --> 51:19.230] And it is, I guess, a satisfactory feeling knowing that you've taken something off the net, but they are, it's whack-a-mole. [51:19.330 --> 51:20.330] They're going to pop up someplace else. [51:20.430 --> 51:20.570] Mike. [51:20.750 --> 51:20.930] Yeah. [51:20.990 --> 51:25.370] I mean, I haven't really had the time to study this story with the attention that it deserves. [51:25.370 --> 51:32.690] And I'm wondering if you've had the chance to sort of distinct, get behind the story and figure out what's actually going on. [51:32.890 --> 51:44.950] Like one of the things that Anonymous does so well and that we love them for is this sort of like blustery proclamations of how much they've done and how artfully they've done it. [51:45.250 --> 51:51.330] And I'm curious what they actually mean when they say they've removed from the internet 20,000 accounts or something. [51:51.590 --> 51:59.410] Well, I mean, basically 20,000 Twitter accounts have been taken down, deactivated, but it doesn't mean 20,000 more haven't popped up in their place. [52:00.150 --> 52:02.130] So there's a spin to it. [52:02.130 --> 52:09.430] By the way, it's also interesting, too, that the name Isis... Actually, you know, I don't remember if it's Isis or Isil. [52:09.690 --> 52:11.090] You cannot get that on Twitter. [52:11.270 --> 52:12.690] It doesn't exist, and you can't get it. [52:12.750 --> 52:17.790] And I just wonder, what terms of service is it that prevents somebody from having that particular name? [52:18.030 --> 52:20.730] There was a story going around about a week ago. [52:20.910 --> 52:25.410] There was a woman by the name of Isis, which is, of course, a word from ancient Egyptian mythology. [52:26.190 --> 52:34.590] This was her given name, and Facebook would... canceled her account without warning and wouldn't let her log back in because she happened to be called Isis. [52:34.910 --> 52:37.710] Another reason to call him Daesh, because few people have that name. [52:38.330 --> 52:57.050] Now, the other interesting thing about this, and Bernie, I'm going to ask your opinion on this as well, but what's interesting is that Daesh actually responded to Anonymous, which is kind of weird and kind of scary, but they actually put out a set of guidelines, [52:57.810 --> 53:02.590] anti-hacking guidelines, so people won't get hacked by Anonymous. [53:02.750 --> 53:05.210] It's just so surreal and crazy. [53:05.210 --> 53:08.530] I can't believe I'm even saying these things, but this is what they said. [53:08.630 --> 53:23.770] Oh, brothers of Tahid, and forgive me if I'm mispronouncing any of these words, this message have reached to Ali Anza for the importance the Anonymous hackers threatened in new video release that they will carry out a major hack operation on the Islamic State, [53:23.970 --> 53:25.170] in parentheses, idiots. [53:25.490 --> 53:26.850] I'm not sure if they're referring to... [53:26.850 --> 53:29.390] they must be referring to Anonymous, not themselves, as idiots. [53:30.370 --> 53:37.690] What they gonna hack all... what they can do is hacking Alan Zahr, Twitter accounts, emails, etc. [53:37.990 --> 53:41.390] So you should follow the instructions below to avoid being hacked. [53:41.690 --> 53:46.510] And I guess this applies to everybody, so not just members of Daesh should be listening to this. [53:47.030 --> 53:51.830] Number one, do not open any kind of links unless you are sure from the source. [53:52.410 --> 53:57.590] Two, use VPN and change your IP constantly for security reasons, phones and computers. [53:58.190 --> 54:06.710] Three, do not talk to people you don't know on Telegram and block them if you have to, because there are many glitches in Telegram and they can hack you by it. [54:07.070 --> 54:11.790] Four, don't talk to people on Twitter DM because they can hack you too. [54:12.590 --> 54:17.670] Five, do not make your email same as your username on Twitter. [54:17.930 --> 54:23.310] This mistake cost many Anzar their accounts and the Kufar published their IP. [54:23.810 --> 54:24.490] So be careful. [54:24.630 --> 54:32.130] May Allah protect you and all Anzar of the Islamic State from those dirty Kufar spread the warning to reach all Anzar. [54:32.530 --> 54:41.770] Kind of feel like I'm being, I'm falling for a joke, but I also kind of feel like maybe this is real and wow, it's something else. [54:41.870 --> 54:43.330] Bernie, what's your opinion on all this? [54:43.470 --> 54:44.730] This is like a twilight zone. [54:44.870 --> 54:47.090] It's really a surreal thing, as you said. [54:47.610 --> 54:57.770] You've got the so-called the so-proclaimed Islamic State debating Anonymous, which could be anybody in their basement. [54:58.030 --> 55:10.490] But what intrigued me is that whoever said they were with Anonymous that revealed some 20,000 Twitter accounts to Twitter and said, hey, these are all being operated by ISIS or whatever they might call themselves. [55:11.490 --> 55:13.350] And Twitter just took them all down. [55:13.670 --> 55:18.770] I mean, without, they couldn't possibly have time to verify that they're all being used by this terrorist organization. [55:18.770 --> 55:20.810] And that's just ludicrous. [55:20.970 --> 55:23.010] So this, this is really a coup in Anonymous. [55:23.070 --> 55:29.830] And I'm wondering why Twitter thought they, I guess, it was a big liability and they just played it safe and took all these accounts down without checking everything. [55:30.070 --> 55:45.870] Well, if that's, if that is the case, Bernie, just if anyone who's involved in this is listening, if I could just ask, if you could, next time you give a list of 20,000 accounts to Twitter to take down, could you find and include XCIA director James Woolsey's account? [55:46.050 --> 55:47.430] I would like that ever so much. [55:47.650 --> 55:50.170] And it would be really, really fun to... [55:50.170 --> 56:00.230] Speaking of CIA, what also intrigues me is that I'm sure if these were actual Twitter accounts used by ISIS or whatever they are, I'm sure the CIA was monitoring them. [56:00.410 --> 56:09.130] And then if Twitter all took them down, then that's denying intelligence to organizations that are tracking this terrorist organization. [56:09.390 --> 56:11.690] So this whole thing is just bizarre. [56:13.530 --> 56:14.090] Absolutely. [56:14.290 --> 56:14.450] Definitely. [56:15.190 --> 56:15.870] All right. [56:15.970 --> 56:17.770] We are pretty much out of time. [56:18.610 --> 56:22.030] So any, any last words, please, please say them now. [56:22.770 --> 56:25.150] Those of you celebrating Thanksgiving, have a happy one. [56:25.910 --> 56:26.470] Yes. [56:26.730 --> 56:27.090] Yes, indeed. [56:27.230 --> 56:28.770] Have a happy Thanksgiving. [56:28.770 --> 56:29.330] I'm sorry. [56:29.410 --> 56:32.070] I'm a little distracted because our outro is not working. [56:32.070 --> 56:34.630] It's not coming across this, this channel here. [56:35.070 --> 56:37.030] I just wanted to report, we'll talk about it. [56:37.430 --> 56:38.450] We'll talk about it again. [56:39.170 --> 56:43.590] The exciting Librarian of Congress ruling about DMCA exceptions. [56:44.130 --> 56:54.190] They, a couple weeks ago, we didn't, we didn't get to talk about it, but a couple weeks ago, they changed some of the exceptions with automobiles and farm agricultural machinery, et cetera, et cetera, et cetera. [56:54.370 --> 56:57.390] Basically, you can hack your car's computer now. [56:58.050 --> 57:03.130] Actually, it's actually going to be implemented over the course of a year or after a year, then you'll be able to. [57:03.590 --> 57:23.430] We'll have another couple stories about that and cover it in weeks to come, I am sure, because there's some, some, some differing opinions about why it's taking so long to implement that because in the wake of all these vehicle scandals and stuff, it really is critical that people can modify and look at this stuff, [57:23.590 --> 57:29.730] especially with manufacturers putting bogus software and other wonderful things in consumer goods. [57:30.050 --> 57:34.290] So that's one, I guess, sort of win that is kind of neat. [57:34.430 --> 57:34.990] That's kind of cool. [57:35.130 --> 57:39.950] We can, um, we can look at our vehicles code now and, uh, learn. [57:41.090 --> 57:43.250] As you can hear, I've gotten the outro to work. [57:43.390 --> 57:45.510] Finally, we're out of time. [57:45.750 --> 57:48.510] Uh, write to us, OTH at 2600.com. [57:48.650 --> 57:52.210] We'd love to hear your feedback on the things we've discussed and something we can say. [57:52.330 --> 57:53.610] We have not been able to say in quite a while. [57:53.630 --> 57:57.290] We'll be back next week with another edition of Off the Hook. [57:57.450 --> 57:57.690] Good night. [57:57.690 --> 57:59.170] Make [59:09.840 --> 59:17.740] the music go blacky. [59:26.580 --> 59:28.220] I'm a dog. [59:29.300 --> 59:29.300] I'm a dog. [59:29.300 --> 59:32.020] I'm a dog. [59:32.020 --> 59:32.820] I'm a dog. [01:01:12.150 --> 01:01:15.650] I'm a dog. [01:01:15.650 --> 01:01:16.490] I'm a dog. [01:01:16.610 --> 01:01:18.950] I'm a dog.