[00:00.000 --> 00:04.080]  ...website, give2wbai.org.
[00:04.080 --> 00:09.040]  There's a great selection of plays, events, discussions, concerts, movies.
[00:09.300 --> 00:10.880]  I'll definitely find something.
[00:11.220 --> 00:14.300]  All I have to do is click on the header that says Tickets.
[00:14.880 --> 00:15.980]  I'm saved!
[00:16.480 --> 00:17.840]  Happy birthday, sweetie!
[00:22.320 --> 00:29.520]  That's give2, the numeral 2, wbai.org, and click on the header that says Tickets.
[00:37.290 --> 00:38.230]  No, he's not.
[00:38.370 --> 00:40.250]  It's 7 o'clock, 7.01.
[00:40.590 --> 00:42.490]  You're listening to WBAI New York.
[00:42.710 --> 00:44.570]  It's time for Off the Hook.
[00:49.950 --> 00:54.410]  The telephone keeps ringing, so I ripped it off the wall.
[00:55.410 --> 00:57.390]  I cut myself while shaving.
[00:58.030 --> 00:59.890]  Now I can't make a call.
[01:00.550 --> 01:02.690]  We couldn't get much worse.
[01:03.350 --> 01:05.250]  But if they could, they would.
[01:05.250 --> 01:08.170]  But the best, it's back the worst.
[01:08.830 --> 01:10.690]  I hope that's understood.
[01:11.050 --> 01:11.730]  But the little bit more!
[02:19.100 --> 02:20.500]  And a very good evening to everybody.
[02:20.620 --> 02:22.940]  The program is Off the Hook.
[02:24.080 --> 02:26.560]  Manny Goldstein here with you, joined tonight by Mike.
[02:26.760 --> 02:27.060]  Hi there.
[02:27.220 --> 02:27.620]  Rob T.
[02:27.720 --> 02:28.200]  Firefly.
[02:28.420 --> 02:28.660]  Hi there.
[02:28.980 --> 02:29.520]  Kyle.
[02:30.040 --> 02:30.600]  Hello.
[02:30.920 --> 02:31.840]  And Bernie S.
[02:32.260 --> 02:33.540]  Greetings from Philadelphia.
[02:34.100 --> 02:35.660]  Well, here we are.
[02:38.100 --> 02:46.300]  The day before the premiere of the next Star Wars film, and of course we have a story that ties into that quite nicely.
[02:47.220 --> 02:55.900]  When it's released, actually it was released yesterday technically, but it's coming out to the masses tomorrow, or the day after, depending on where you are.
[02:57.420 --> 03:06.300]  Basically, this film, The Force Awakens, is likely to become one of the most popular science fiction films of all time, and even for non-fans, the anticipation can be felt around the entire web.
[03:06.480 --> 03:17.440]  It's no surprise, then, that Disney and Lucasfilm, the two main companies behind this giant film, are gearing up for an aggressive anti-piracy campaign, should, heaven forbid, the movie leak onto the internet.
[03:17.980 --> 03:19.620]  Does anybody know if it's leaked onto the internet?
[03:20.440 --> 03:20.800]  No?
[03:20.920 --> 03:21.380]  I do not.
[03:21.540 --> 03:21.900]  No.
[03:22.100 --> 03:22.700]  No one has a copy?
[03:22.800 --> 03:22.940]  All right.
[03:24.240 --> 03:25.700]  Now, I'm sorry, Bernie, did you say something?
[03:26.360 --> 03:31.400]  I did not, but I would not be surprised if somewhere on the torrents there is a copy of that movie.
[03:31.540 --> 03:37.000]  Probably done with a camcorder in a movie theater, so it's not high quality.
[03:37.300 --> 03:41.920]  Well, basically they're going a little overboard as far as protecting their interest.
[03:42.820 --> 04:00.000]  This actually began last week when a fan site called Star Wars Action News put up an update on its Facebook page, and there was an update from an excited person named Justin who revealed that he just purchased an action figure of Ray, apparently that's a character,
[04:00.600 --> 04:03.280]  from the store.
[04:04.280 --> 04:05.660]  Have we known this figure was coming?
[04:05.700 --> 04:06.660]  I just found her at Walmart.
[04:06.660 --> 04:07.440]  No other new figures.
[04:07.540 --> 04:09.160]  He took a picture, basically, of something he bought.
[04:10.940 --> 04:24.340]  And what happened was, basically, they woke up to numerous DMCA takedown notices on their Twitter accounts, on their Facebook account, a Google Plus page, personal Twitters.
[04:25.540 --> 04:31.400]  A web host also received a takedown email from them with a threat of a lawsuit of if the image was not removed.
[04:32.100 --> 04:37.240]  And this is all for displaying a photograph of a product being sold in a store.
[04:39.640 --> 04:46.420]  Now, it's really pretty amazing, and this story on Torrent Freak points out the absurdity of it.
[04:46.740 --> 04:50.840]  Acting on behalf of Lucasfilm's anti-piracy outfit, Erdetto.
[04:51.000 --> 04:51.760]  Has anyone heard of this?
[04:51.840 --> 04:53.080]  I-R-D-E-T-O?
[04:53.080 --> 05:00.980]  Uh, they've been hitting Twitter, not only filing DMCA notices, uh, but, uh, also going after those who dared to retweet the image.
[05:01.140 --> 05:02.020]  I retweeted it yesterday.
[05:02.800 --> 05:10.580]  And, uh, although I had a difficult time getting in, I'm still, uh, I haven't actually been hit by any DMCAs, as far as I know.
[05:10.800 --> 05:12.620]  I haven't checked my email, so maybe I have.
[05:13.160 --> 05:22.320]  Um, while, uh, taking down an image they don't own the copyrights to is certainly taking things too far, uh, Lucasfilm appears to have their reasons for doing, you know, I'm familiar with this.
[05:22.320 --> 05:27.480]  Uh, when, uh, you're told to take something down by somebody who does not have any right to tell you that.
[05:27.940 --> 05:38.040]  Um, according to, uh, Torrent Freak, we're not Star Wars experts here, but from what we understand, there was an item printed on the Raid toy packaging that fans of the series will not want to see.
[05:38.640 --> 05:41.100]  And that's why we're not publishing that picture in all its glory.
[05:41.140 --> 05:42.200]  I don't know what that means.
[05:42.760 --> 05:47.260]  Um, but basically they printed a, um, um, a copy of the image as well.
[05:47.460 --> 05:48.240]  Here we go again.
[05:48.360 --> 05:56.240]  You know, it's, it's, it's all, whenever something big is coming out, uh, the, uh, the, the legal teams go insane doing all sorts of, uh, of unfair things.
[05:56.280 --> 05:56.440]  Rob?
[05:56.760 --> 06:01.800]  Well, you know, I'm glad someone finally took down the one image on the internet that people might not want to see.
[06:02.060 --> 06:03.660]  Because, you know, that's, that's a valid concern.
[06:04.100 --> 06:06.980]  But, uh, no, I, I think this is a clever advertising, uh, method.
[06:07.180 --> 06:10.420]  Because, like, I'm, I'm not the target of, uh, Disney or Lucasfilm's advertising.
[06:10.420 --> 06:13.420]  I wasn't really probably going to buy any of these action figures.
[06:13.640 --> 06:20.160]  But now, um, apparently if you buy one of these and display it, you can, you can make Disney's lawyers angry.
[06:20.180 --> 06:21.600]  And that excites me.
[06:21.780 --> 06:24.000]  Now I kind of want to buy one of these things and take a picture of it.
[06:24.280 --> 06:26.080]  Yeah, but then you're buying one of those things.
[06:26.300 --> 06:27.360]  And either way, they profit.
[06:27.780 --> 06:28.220]  You know?
[06:28.340 --> 06:29.100]  Maybe I'll save the receipt.
[06:29.800 --> 06:31.120]  Uh, yeah, okay.
[06:31.240 --> 06:31.980]  Take a picture of that.
[06:32.160 --> 06:34.020]  Maybe that'll be, uh, upsetting to some of you.
[06:34.040 --> 06:37.380]  You could just take a photograph in the store without making a transaction.
[06:37.640 --> 06:38.460]  Why don't we all do that?
[06:38.560 --> 06:40.400]  Take pictures of all the Star Wars things that we don't buy.
[06:40.420 --> 06:44.800]  So, so I think, but I, I have to give the, the Lucasfilm team credit.
[06:44.980 --> 06:46.560]  This is an amazing marketing campaign.
[06:46.740 --> 06:51.620]  They've got us talking about this Cyphilly film that I don't think we would have otherwise, you know, talked about on the radio.
[06:51.860 --> 06:52.880]  Did they really need us to do that?
[06:53.320 --> 06:56.940]  They want everyone talking about this all the time and they are getting it.
[06:57.140 --> 07:00.540]  Well, um, it's worth also pointing out that it's, it's really Disney now.
[07:00.700 --> 07:01.200]  It's Disney.
[07:01.320 --> 07:03.620]  It's not so much Lucas because he sold it.
[07:03.700 --> 07:04.700]  He made $4 billion.
[07:05.120 --> 07:10.100]  Basically, um, Disney wants to make the money that they paid him back.
[07:11.100 --> 07:12.100]  That's the aggression.
[07:12.640 --> 07:13.160]  They're mad.
[07:13.160 --> 07:18.420]  He made out with so much money on that and he doesn't have to do any work now.
[07:18.480 --> 07:20.040]  He just gets to laugh at them.
[07:20.240 --> 07:23.940]  I'm just going off the first word of the Torn Freak headline, which is Lucasfilm.
[07:24.160 --> 07:24.420]  Oh yeah.
[07:24.780 --> 07:25.740]  So, you know, I don't know.
[07:25.840 --> 07:27.560]  No, no, you can't be faulted for that.
[07:28.800 --> 07:29.380]  All right.
[07:29.540 --> 07:31.880]  Well, uh, that's what's happening.
[07:32.040 --> 07:39.540]  That's, that's, that's one of the, uh, rather silly items, but it, it, it does underline, uh, the intimidation tactics that are in play all the time.
[07:39.760 --> 07:40.740]  Thanks, Magic Kingdom.
[07:41.180 --> 07:41.400]  Yeah.
[07:41.640 --> 07:54.280]  And, um, Twitter is a great way to, um, uh, to, uh, convey intimidation in one form or another, whether it's, um, uh, saying nasty things about people, whether it's, um, uh, delivering, um, threats of one sort or another.
[07:54.280 --> 08:02.260]  But, um, here's something interesting that happened in the past week and that Twitter actually has, um, has, has taken a step to, uh, to combat.
[08:02.600 --> 08:14.220]  They've sent warnings to a small number of users saying that their accounts may have been hacked by, get this, state sponsored actors, state sponsored actors.
[08:14.460 --> 08:18.420]  Now that's not, uh, you know, your favorite actor who happens to be paid by the state.
[08:18.500 --> 08:19.180]  No, it's nothing like that.
[08:19.260 --> 08:21.400]  It's, it's basically governments.
[08:21.400 --> 08:27.960]  It's, governments are basically, uh, trying to hack certain people's Twitter accounts.
[08:28.100 --> 08:28.780]  It sounds bizarre.
[08:28.960 --> 08:29.520]  It sounds weird.
[08:29.960 --> 08:34.380]  Uh, it's also the first time the, uh, social media company has issued such a warning.
[08:34.500 --> 08:44.340]  Twitter emailed users to say that the hackers, and it's great how they, this BBC story still calls them hackers, even though they are government agents of one sort or another.
[08:44.500 --> 08:50.600]  Uh, hackers may have sought their email or IP addresses or phone numbers, which it recently began collecting.
[08:50.760 --> 08:51.480]  Yeah, I noticed that.
[08:51.620 --> 08:53.700]  Twitter wants, uh, phone numbers now.
[08:53.920 --> 08:55.560]  Well, they're not getting a real one from me.
[08:55.900 --> 09:00.800]  I mean, they used to, back in the day, operate heavily through SMS.
[09:01.200 --> 09:01.360]  Yeah.
[09:01.600 --> 09:06.120]  Well, I mean, if you wanted to, you had the option, but I think now it's, it's something that you can't really, um, avoid.
[09:06.240 --> 09:11.540]  You need to get some kind of code if you want your, uh, if you want a new account, it's got to be sent to a phone that you have control over.
[09:12.160 --> 09:18.580]  Uh, so it's, yeah, they're, they're, they're kind of clamping down on that and it's getting harder to be anonymous, but still, still possible, still necessary.
[09:18.820 --> 09:23.260]  Anyway, the, uh, number of accounts affected by this suspected hack is unclear.
[09:23.880 --> 09:39.220]  Um, and, um, according to a nonprofit organization known as ColdHack in, uh, Canada, we believe that these actors, possibly associated with the government, may have been trying to obtain information such as email addresses, IP addresses, and or phone numbers.
[09:39.220 --> 09:50.640]  At this time, we have no evidence they obtained your account information, um, but, uh, I'm quoting the, the Twitter, uh, for some reason, they're quoting the Canadian nonprofit organization quoting the Twitter warning.
[09:50.800 --> 09:52.420]  I don't know why they didn't just quote the Twitter warning.
[09:52.700 --> 09:57.180]  At this time, we have no evidence they obtained your account information, but we're actively investigating this matter.
[09:57.340 --> 10:02.440]  We wish we had more we could share, but we don't have any additional information we can provide at this time.
[10:02.980 --> 10:17.260]  The, uh, Chinese and North Korean governments are thought to be responsible for some cyber hacking Speaking of Western companies and governments, some IT experts say the hackers who breached Sony's computer network late last year and leaked huge amounts of confidential information were backed by the North Korean state.
[10:17.600 --> 10:19.800]  That really has absolutely nothing to do with this story, though.
[10:19.860 --> 10:20.940]  And I'm sorry I read that paragraph.
[10:22.860 --> 10:30.020]  If somebody were to hack into a Twitter account, we get hack attempts all the time at the 2600 Twitter account.
[10:30.900 --> 10:33.820]  Basically just email saying someone's trying to get your password.
[10:33.980 --> 10:35.200]  I don't know what the difference is.
[10:35.200 --> 10:41.080]  If they know it's a state actor behind it, what information are they getting that tells them this?
[10:41.360 --> 10:41.860]  Any theories?
[10:42.240 --> 10:48.140]  I mean, I think part of the reason the story is so fascinating is just how little information it contains.
[10:49.060 --> 10:50.580]  I would like to know that as well.
[10:51.000 --> 10:53.460]  Twitter obviously has some smart people working for them.
[10:53.640 --> 10:57.980]  They probably have some reason for this theory, but it doesn't mean they're right.
[10:59.100 --> 11:04.040]  If I were one of the people targeted by this, I would certainly want to know which state was targeting me.
[11:05.720 --> 11:09.400]  And there's just so little information, and I hope we can get more information.
[11:09.520 --> 11:10.860]  Yeah, just give us the information that you have.
[11:10.960 --> 11:13.040]  I mean, this has to do with somebody's account, right?
[11:13.480 --> 11:23.320]  Shouldn't the person or entity that controls that account be entitled to the same amount of information that you have received concerning its potentially being compromised?
[11:23.540 --> 11:24.660]  I think it's only fair.
[11:25.220 --> 11:26.300]  That would be nice.
[11:26.300 --> 11:29.220]  It's generally not the way the Silicon Valley world works, but...
[11:29.220 --> 11:31.980]  Well, we can help change that, and I think we should.
[11:32.520 --> 11:36.700]  I mean, props to Twitter for, you know, even making this very limited disclosure.
[11:36.700 --> 11:38.460]  It's more than a lot of companies would have done.
[11:38.580 --> 11:39.920]  Well, it's interesting that they did that.
[11:40.040 --> 11:40.100]  Yeah.
[11:40.200 --> 11:41.780]  Now, consider...
[11:41.780 --> 11:50.240]  Are they maybe upsetting somebody who they're supposed to be maintaining secrecy with by even revealing that something is happening without revealing their name?
[11:50.320 --> 11:53.180]  I imagine somebody is upset that they said this much.
[11:53.180 --> 11:53.880]  I'm sure.
[11:54.080 --> 11:58.260]  And maybe if they speak out, then we'll know more information about what's going on.
[11:58.400 --> 12:01.280]  Or maybe if they just say nothing, we're supposed to assume who it is.
[12:01.300 --> 12:05.580]  And it gets very, very complicated and dramatic.
[12:06.220 --> 12:07.180]  Bernie, any thoughts on this?
[12:08.240 --> 12:10.620]  Yeah, I kind of concur with Mike.
[12:10.960 --> 12:20.460]  I'm glad that Twitter is at least saying something about its suspicions or theories that state actors are trying to hack its clients' customers' accounts.
[12:20.460 --> 12:23.020]  But, you know, if my... I don't have a Twitter account.
[12:23.120 --> 12:31.140]  But if I had one, I would like Twitter to let me know that, hey, we have this information that indicates someone is trying to hack into your account.
[12:32.240 --> 12:33.100]  Is this you?
[12:33.140 --> 12:36.640]  And I would look at the information and decide that, no, it's not me.
[12:36.780 --> 12:39.860]  Maybe I could tell from the IP address or whatever it's a state actor.
[12:39.860 --> 12:44.680]  Frankly, if it's a state actor, they're probably using methods to conceal their identity.
[12:45.880 --> 12:56.060]  But because state actors probably have some of the best people working for them to conceal their mysterious deeds.
[12:56.520 --> 12:58.500]  So tell us more, Twitter.
[12:58.660 --> 12:59.220]  That's all I'm saying.
[12:59.960 --> 13:01.800]  Yeah, I think that's a fair request.
[13:01.800 --> 13:04.740]  I mean, I will say one thing.
[13:04.920 --> 13:12.460]  I don't think it's quoted in this particular news story, but another source that printed the full email from Twitter to the affected users.
[13:12.920 --> 13:18.680]  Twitter doesn't really give very good advice for what these users can do about it.
[13:18.780 --> 13:24.500]  They say to use Tor, but also, on the other hand, Twitter is making it harder and harder to use Tor with their service.
[13:24.840 --> 13:26.180]  So I hope they will...
[13:26.180 --> 13:28.060]  Well, it's significant that they said that.
[13:28.120 --> 13:29.340]  That they said use Tor.
[13:29.340 --> 13:35.080]  They're kind of encouraging people to do that because they were seen only a week or so earlier as discouraging the use of Tor.
[13:35.200 --> 13:40.800]  So maybe this is some kind of power struggle within Twitter of whether Tor is supposed to be good or bad.
[13:41.000 --> 13:47.260]  Yeah, I mean, I'm sure whoever wrote this email thought it was good advice, but they're not the people responsible for making the decision to block Tor.
[13:48.040 --> 13:54.020]  But... or make it more... Tor is not totally blocked, but they're making it more and more difficult to use the service anonymously.
[13:54.760 --> 13:56.540]  I hope they get on that.
[13:56.540 --> 14:08.320]  It also seems to me that it's possible that the actor they're talking about, but they might not know because it is indeed, like, proxied or obfuscated.
[14:09.120 --> 14:21.660]  And so that just by virtue of it being from sort of a block or an area, quote, of the internet that is used by state actors, they might not be able to tell much further than that.
[14:21.660 --> 14:24.740]  Because that's kind of where the trail goes cold or whatnot.
[14:25.020 --> 14:38.340]  And they kind of can lump it in and generally say it's likely that it's the behavior of it and maybe from other details is something you might see with a state actor, but they can't actually give much more information.
[14:38.700 --> 14:40.220]  Doubt it, but it is possible.
[14:40.280 --> 14:41.020]  See, I think...
[14:41.020 --> 14:46.000]  I think they can give all the information they have because whose privacy are they invading at that point?
[14:46.000 --> 14:53.880]  If somebody tries to get into a Twitter account, I think that people should know, hey, this IP, this address tried to do something and failed.
[14:54.100 --> 14:59.240]  Maybe you get the permission of the person who actually runs a Twitter account to say, do you want this information released to the public?
[14:59.320 --> 15:00.100]  Then the whole world knows.
[15:00.440 --> 15:02.360]  Whose privacy are you hurting by doing that?
[15:02.640 --> 15:07.420]  A lot of services will give you, if someone's trying to log into your account and failing, they'll say.
[15:07.540 --> 15:11.820]  Someone from IP such and such is attempting to log into your account so you know if it's you, it's fine.
[15:11.820 --> 15:13.580]  If it's not, then something's going on.
[15:13.820 --> 15:18.920]  Well, it's interesting, too, because this ties into another story taking place overseas in the UK.
[15:19.120 --> 15:27.500]  Hackers are claiming that a number of Islamic State supporters' social media accounts are being run from Internet addresses linked to the Department of Work and Pensions.
[15:28.220 --> 15:29.680]  Yeah, you weren't expecting that, were you?
[15:29.800 --> 15:41.700]  A group of four young computer experts who call themselves Vandeseck have unearthed evidence indicating that at least three ISIS-supporting accounts can be traced back to the DWP.
[15:41.820 --> 15:51.980]  Now, every computer, this is for people to understand where this comes from, every computer and mobile phone logs onto the Internet using an IP address, which is a type of identification number.
[15:52.180 --> 15:53.420]  We can agree on that, right?
[15:53.640 --> 16:09.460]  The Hacking Collective showed the online mirror newspaper details of the IP addresses used by a trio of separate digital jihadis to access Twitter accounts, which have been used to spread extremist propaganda.
[16:09.460 --> 16:13.120]  Now, at first glance, the IP addresses seem to be based in Saudi Arabia.
[16:13.240 --> 16:19.080]  But upon further inspection using specialist tools, they appear to link back to the DWP.
[16:19.520 --> 16:21.100]  Don't you think that's strange?
[16:21.100 --> 16:23.000]  One of the hackers asked Mirror Online.
[16:23.140 --> 16:26.800]  We trace these accounts back to London, the home of the British intelligence services.
[16:27.460 --> 16:39.860]  Vandeseck's work has sparked wild rumors, suggesting somebody inside the DWP is running ISIS-supporting accounts, or they were created by intelligence services as a honeypot to trap wannabe jihadis.
[16:40.040 --> 16:51.100]  However, when Mirror Online traced the IP addresses obtained by Vandeseck, we found they actually pointed to a series of unpublicized transactions between Britain and Saudi Arabia.
[16:51.100 --> 16:57.760]  We learned that the British government sold a large number of IP addresses to two Saudi Arabian firms.
[16:57.760 --> 16:59.360]  It's really getting pretty interesting.
[16:59.820 --> 17:05.800]  After the sale completed in October of this year, they were then used by extremists to spread their message of hate.
[17:06.800 --> 17:16.280]  Now, Jamie Turner, an expert from a firm called PCA Predict, discovered a record of the sale of IP addresses and found a large number were transferred to Saudi Arabia in October of this year.
[17:16.420 --> 17:24.100]  He told us it was likely the IP addresses could still be traced back to the DWP because records of the addresses had not yet been fully updated.
[17:24.100 --> 17:38.080]  The cabinet office has now admitted to selling the IP addresses onto Saudi Telecom and the Saudi-based mobile telecommunications company earlier this year as part of a wider drive to get rid of a large number of the DWP's IP addresses.
[17:38.340 --> 17:43.000]  It said the British government can have no control over how these addresses are used after the sale.
[17:43.220 --> 17:50.660]  A cabinet office spokesperson, in fact, said the government owns millions of unused IP addresses, which we are selling to get a good return for hardworking taxpayers.
[17:51.160 --> 17:59.000]  We have sold a number of these addresses to telecoms companies back in the UK and internationally to allow their customers to connect to the Internet.
[17:59.260 --> 18:05.820]  We think carefully about which companies we sell addresses to, but how their customers use their Internet connection is beyond our control.
[18:06.700 --> 18:11.540]  Well, do we choose to believe this story, or do we think something more nefarious is going on?
[18:12.520 --> 18:15.100]  I'm entertained by this whole selling IP addresses thing.
[18:15.100 --> 18:20.820]  I mean, we're an organization, and, you know, the holidays are either here or coming up, depending.
[18:21.100 --> 18:29.020]  So, like, if someone wanted to chip in and get us all some London IP addresses, some London governmental IP addresses, you know, that would look nice in my stocking.
[18:29.380 --> 18:30.040]  Well, yeah.
[18:30.260 --> 18:34.160]  My understanding is that if you trace route this, it appears to go to Saudi Arabia.
[18:34.260 --> 18:45.520]  What these guys did was they looked up who actually owned the IPs, and that seemed to come back to that London organization, sparking...
[18:45.520 --> 18:48.660]  I mean, it seems like a plausible story that that's what happened.
[18:48.920 --> 18:50.420]  But it is a little weird.
[18:51.120 --> 18:52.360]  Yeah, absolutely.
[18:52.360 --> 18:54.400]  I think that that could definitely...
[18:54.400 --> 19:08.020]  I mean, the propagating of new owners and transferring of domains and all of these kinds of things takes time, and it seems likely that that could explain it.
[19:08.020 --> 19:19.240]  It's rather convenient, but it could explain why it was from one place, but then, you know, you can find other information that it's actually being used in another place.
[19:19.840 --> 19:25.440]  It's interesting that they're funding, sort of indirectly funding, quote, extremists.
[19:25.540 --> 19:34.640]  The other thing I'm curious about is that these Vanasek people, who they don't, say, have any special access to anything, how do they get IP addresses of people who post to Twitter?
[19:35.280 --> 19:37.140]  That's not something you normally get, is it?
[19:38.020 --> 19:40.600]  Yeah, that's the most interesting part of the story, I suppose.
[19:40.800 --> 19:43.520]  But it's a very poorly fleshed out story.
[19:43.740 --> 19:51.120]  The government's... it's the British government explanation seems entirely credible to me that they no longer have control over these IP addresses.
[19:52.600 --> 19:56.340]  It's the kind of... transfer of IP addresses is the kind of thing that happens all the time.
[19:56.880 --> 20:02.820]  If this were some grand conspiracy, I feel like the conspirators could do a better job.
[20:02.820 --> 20:04.760]  Yeah, you know, I say that a lot, though.
[20:05.160 --> 20:07.500]  You always think that, why couldn't they have just done this?
[20:07.600 --> 20:10.160]  It would have made it so much more difficult to trace.
[20:10.820 --> 20:16.720]  And the fact of the matter is, most people in the world are not technically savvy, even to the degree that we think is just basic competence.
[20:17.580 --> 20:22.740]  And, of course, law enforcement loves that, because they are able to find people without doing very much work.
[20:23.140 --> 20:34.480]  And what they're complaining about now is that they might actually have to start doing work when people make use of technology the way it was intended, such as encryption and Tor and things like that, that we have every right to use.
[20:35.480 --> 20:41.120]  So, anyway, that's something to think about when you post something.
[20:41.260 --> 20:42.600]  Somebody might be tracing your IP.
[20:43.040 --> 20:46.380]  I'm actually very interested in the mechanics of selling IP addresses.
[20:46.580 --> 20:49.100]  Like, where does the IP address physically terminate now?
[20:49.100 --> 20:56.960]  Is this IP still connecting to a machine in London that these Saudis who have reportedly bought them bounce their connection through now, proxy stuff?
[20:57.260 --> 21:03.940]  Or are these IP addresses under the control of London somehow that are physically located in Saudi Arabia?
[21:03.960 --> 21:12.720]  If they control the IP at one point or another, it could still be going through a data center that they used to be part of and simply transferred over to...
[21:12.720 --> 21:13.740]  So everyone's shaking their heads.
[21:13.820 --> 21:14.780]  Why is that impossible?
[21:14.980 --> 21:17.700]  Especially if you're the British government wanting to spy on these people.
[21:18.300 --> 21:22.420]  I think it doesn't really move in quite that way.
[21:22.800 --> 21:31.900]  It has a lot to do with, like, the root DNS servers and it's really just pointing from one organization to another.
[21:32.820 --> 21:34.540]  Well, that's the right way to do it, yes.
[21:34.560 --> 21:35.980]  The best physical way to explain it.
[21:36.040 --> 21:38.180]  But it isn't physically doing very much.
[21:38.260 --> 21:39.600]  But isn't that the way it's supposed to work?
[21:39.780 --> 21:46.220]  What I'm saying is, isn't there another way it could work where you actually are monitoring everything that is passed on those IP...
[21:46.220 --> 21:51.360]  If I was the British government, this is what I'd be thinking about when I'm selling IPs to other countries.
[21:53.160 --> 21:58.180]  The British government has far more direct ways to monitor all internet traffic.
[21:58.180 --> 22:00.380]  They can just call up the NSA and ask for copies.
[22:00.600 --> 22:03.540]  And you don't think they'd want another way in case something goes wrong?
[22:03.680 --> 22:04.200]  I don't know.
[22:04.320 --> 22:07.180]  I don't think this story provides any evidence for that theory.
[22:07.420 --> 22:08.320]  That's what I'm going to...
[22:08.320 --> 22:10.400]  Well, they don't provide much evidence for anything, to be honest.
[22:10.640 --> 22:13.780]  I mean, look, the British government story...
[22:13.780 --> 22:15.660]  And look, why am I defending the government?
[22:15.660 --> 22:19.180]  But the British government story here is entirely reasonable.
[22:19.440 --> 22:22.700]  It makes a lot more sense than any other theory.
[22:23.660 --> 22:25.400]  Well, I guess we'll just have to wait and see.
[22:25.520 --> 22:25.880]  Yes, Bernie?
[22:26.440 --> 22:30.180]  I just want to say, I don't know why anybody...
[22:30.820 --> 22:34.500]  I don't know why anybody would have a problem with the UK or, frankly, the U.S.
[22:34.580 --> 22:46.500]  government assisting the world's largest beheader, you know, the government of Saudi Arabia, who beheads far more people.
[22:46.640 --> 22:48.100]  Did they win the title again this year?
[22:48.400 --> 22:48.840]  Yeah.
[22:48.960 --> 22:49.120]  Oh, yeah.
[22:49.120 --> 22:52.140]  Yeah, this year alone, they've beheaded the Saudi government.
[22:52.480 --> 22:53.220]  It's December already.
[22:53.340 --> 22:53.900]  Wow, time flies.
[22:54.040 --> 22:55.660]  More than 150 people.
[22:55.820 --> 22:56.140]  Uh-huh.
[22:56.340 --> 22:58.540]  So, it's way more than ISIS.
[22:58.900 --> 23:01.780]  And, you know, why would anybody have a problem with the UK or U.S.
[23:01.880 --> 23:04.020]  government supporting a regime like that?
[23:04.100 --> 23:04.800]  I don't know.
[23:04.800 --> 23:06.180]  Well, Bernie, I mean, when...
[23:06.180 --> 23:07.520]  How do I say this?
[23:07.600 --> 23:14.060]  When the Saudi government beheads people, it's very different from a group like ISIS behead...
[23:14.060 --> 23:14.880]  I can't say.
[23:14.940 --> 23:15.720]  I can't finish the sentence.
[23:16.000 --> 23:16.660]  I'm trying.
[23:16.660 --> 23:19.480]  I'm trying to just see how it is to have these theories.
[23:19.640 --> 23:22.100]  And I can't even get to the end of the sentences.
[23:22.720 --> 23:24.100]  There's something going on here.
[23:26.400 --> 23:27.200]  About beheading?
[23:27.340 --> 23:28.920]  You didn't use beheading properly?
[23:29.000 --> 23:31.520]  There are people who just, they turn a blind eye to this.
[23:31.680 --> 23:34.660]  And it's, you know, it's perfectly okay because it's justified in one way or another.
[23:34.800 --> 23:38.340]  Somebody blogged something that, you know, insulted someone over there.
[23:38.480 --> 23:39.340]  And yeah, of course, what else?
[23:40.020 --> 23:41.180]  That's what you have to do.
[23:41.480 --> 23:42.340]  Cut off their head.
[23:42.500 --> 23:42.700]  Yeah.
[23:43.660 --> 23:49.780]  But speaking of differing points of view, I have not watched the entire debate from last night.
[23:49.900 --> 23:56.400]  But does anyone know if any gems on such things as encryption or privacy were spouted by anybody?
[23:56.840 --> 23:58.940]  The election is 11 months away.
[23:59.200 --> 23:59.980]  Yeah, I'm not talking about the election.
[24:00.120 --> 24:01.140]  I'm talking about last night's debate.
[24:01.140 --> 24:04.780]  No, but I can't pay, like, I'm on top of these things.
[24:04.800 --> 24:06.140]  I can't care about this.
[24:06.140 --> 24:07.100]  Okay, this is not what I'm asking.
[24:07.120 --> 24:08.420]  I'm not asking how much you don't care.
[24:08.540 --> 24:12.420]  I'm asking if anybody saw this and has anything to contribute.
[24:12.580 --> 24:13.180]  Bernie, maybe you?
[24:13.400 --> 24:29.260]  Yeah, there was a series of good quotes from the Republican candidates about, you know, domestic electronic surveillance in the United States and encryption and that sort of thing.
[24:29.340 --> 24:30.180]  Anything comes to mind?
[24:30.580 --> 24:31.180]  Let's see.
[24:31.340 --> 24:47.000]  I think Ted Cruz defended his Senate vote earlier this year in favor of the USA Freedom Act, which restricted bulk data collections from millions of people and was hailed as a milestone by privacy activists.
[24:47.300 --> 24:51.720]  So he's, you know, frankly, I think there's a lot of problems with the USA Freedom Act.
[24:51.820 --> 24:56.160]  But he's sort of like trying to show that he's slightly in favor of privacy.
[24:56.360 --> 25:05.200]  But Marco Rubio, from Florida, he's a senator, he said that authorities lost a really important tool for keeping Americans safe.
[25:05.600 --> 25:08.100]  He said, quote, let me just be very clear.
[25:08.100 --> 25:11.780]  There, there's nothing that we're allowed to do under this bill that we could not do before.
[25:14.500 --> 25:21.280]  And Rubio said, actually, Rand Paul said that he thought Marco Rubio got it completely wrong.
[25:21.280 --> 25:24.840]  We're not even safer with the bulk collection of Americans' records.
[25:24.840 --> 25:26.960]  I think we're all less safe when that's happening.
[25:27.080 --> 25:37.420]  So far, Rand Paul seems to be the most pro-privacy Republican running for president, in my opinion, anyway.
[25:38.100 --> 25:38.600]  Absolutely.
[25:39.000 --> 25:41.640]  Yeah, and Ben Carson's comments weren't so good either.
[25:41.900 --> 25:44.660]  They're pretty much like echoing Rubio a little bit.
[25:45.100 --> 25:46.560]  But he was called to task.
[25:46.760 --> 25:55.860]  Also, Trump was asked directly about his statements about shutting off parts of the internet and went into quite a long discussion about clarifying that.
[25:56.080 --> 26:04.380]  Almost to the point of like saving, you know, kind of like almost digging himself out of those comments.
[26:04.380 --> 26:13.040]  And it was tempting to start really like shaking my head and being like, yeah, no, nice recovery.
[26:13.220 --> 26:14.180]  That's the right...
[26:14.180 --> 26:18.960]  Because he was talking about like, you know, no, of course not all the parts of the internet.
[26:19.320 --> 26:22.800]  He was kind of digging out of whatever hole he was in over that.
[26:22.800 --> 26:34.900]  Of all of them, my impression was that Rand Paul got it the most as far as privacy and not having mass surveillance against people in this country.
[26:36.200 --> 26:40.580]  But now, Bernie, you're saying that Ted Cruz might actually have exhibited a clue or two?
[26:41.720 --> 26:46.320]  Well, he's just sort of mouthing support for privacy activists.
[26:46.520 --> 26:54.960]  But my favorite quote was Donald Trump where he said, I'd certainly be open to closing areas where we were at war with somebody.
[26:54.960 --> 27:01.660]  I sure as hell don't want to let people that want to kill us and kill our nation use our internet.
[27:01.940 --> 27:02.600]  Yeah, yeah.
[27:03.040 --> 27:03.800]  Our internet.
[27:03.800 --> 27:04.660]  Our internet.
[27:04.880 --> 27:05.400]  The U.S.
[27:05.440 --> 27:05.780]  is internet.
[27:06.260 --> 27:08.140]  So now we own the internet now?
[27:08.300 --> 27:09.220]  Yes, apparently.
[27:09.460 --> 27:09.640]  Okay.
[27:10.620 --> 27:11.100]  All right.
[27:11.140 --> 27:13.360]  Now, I'm also curious about these areas of the internet.
[27:13.580 --> 27:16.660]  How do you get to certain areas of the internet that he wants to close off?
[27:16.760 --> 27:20.860]  Because, you know, our time there might be limited, so I'd like to wander over.
[27:21.260 --> 27:24.900]  I just never assume that when these people say, are, they're including me.
[27:25.660 --> 27:26.060]  Okay.
[27:26.060 --> 27:31.840]  Well, you know, I'm going to be included so that I can explore before they close it down and see where these areas are.
[27:33.120 --> 27:35.160]  And owning the internet, I think, is an advantage.
[27:35.160 --> 27:41.980]  So I think we should occupy and take it over and keep those people, other people that we don't approve of from having it.
[27:42.160 --> 27:44.480]  He also said that we invented it.
[27:45.060 --> 27:46.120]  Therefore, you know, how dare...
[27:46.120 --> 27:46.580]  Al Gore invented it.
[27:46.640 --> 27:47.660]  No, Al Gore invented it.
[27:47.720 --> 27:48.320]  It was a Democrat.
[27:48.920 --> 27:51.900]  Well, we, as in the pejorative Americans, invented it.
[27:51.900 --> 27:53.480]  Therefore, how dare they use it.
[27:53.800 --> 27:59.300]  They use our internet that we invented, you know, and on and on and on.
[27:59.300 --> 28:00.900]  Who told politicians about the internet?
[28:01.060 --> 28:02.540]  That's where the real trouble began.
[28:02.860 --> 28:04.940]  You know, we should have just kept them off it.
[28:05.600 --> 28:06.420]  It's hilarious.
[28:06.420 --> 28:09.820]  Like, they're savvy with it now, you know.
[28:10.020 --> 28:11.640]  Like, Ted Cruz is trolling Trump.
[28:11.640 --> 28:13.060]  And it's just, it's hilarious.
[28:14.540 --> 28:15.420]  But, um...
[28:16.160 --> 28:16.600]  Okay.
[28:16.720 --> 28:18.560]  Well, that's what we have to look forward to.
[28:18.700 --> 28:20.540]  That's pretty much all you needed to hear about that.
[28:21.900 --> 28:24.480]  By the way, this is a fundraising edition of the program.
[28:24.620 --> 28:25.600]  Yes, yet another one.
[28:25.700 --> 28:28.960]  I think this is the last one of this particular drive, which has no name.
[28:29.580 --> 28:32.740]  Because it's in December, and we have a winter one in January or February.
[28:33.660 --> 28:35.840]  So, what are we offering tonight, Rob?
[28:35.860 --> 28:37.460]  I know you have your paintings still.
[28:37.880 --> 28:39.540]  Yeah, we've still got some paintings available.
[28:39.940 --> 28:42.440]  We have the Luminaries of the Hacker World painting.
[28:43.420 --> 28:46.560]  5x7 canvas, portraying someone important to hacker history.
[28:46.800 --> 28:50.760]  And a little card explaining who it is and what they are known for.
[28:50.760 --> 28:59.200]  There are also the historical telephones paintings, which will be paintings of various interesting and important telephones.
[28:59.620 --> 29:07.940]  Either of those can be had for a pledge of at least $50, which you can make by going to give2wbai.org.
[29:08.400 --> 29:09.960]  Or what's the pledge phone number?
[29:09.960 --> 29:12.300]  212-209-2950.
[29:12.840 --> 29:13.200]  Exactly.
[29:13.480 --> 29:13.680]  Yes.
[29:13.920 --> 29:15.140]  And you can do that now.
[29:15.140 --> 29:16.760]  You can do that after the show.
[29:17.000 --> 29:21.260]  The paintings that we have available will remain available for as long as the supplies last.
[29:21.440 --> 29:22.440]  No, do it now.
[29:22.840 --> 29:27.480]  Yeah, do it right now, because we don't want to keep harping on it for the entire hour.
[29:27.720 --> 29:34.000]  We would prefer you do this now, but if you're listening to this in the mysterious future on an MP3, then you can do it what's now for you.
[29:34.000 --> 29:37.100]  Yeah, you can do it in your now, but you can't do it later.
[29:37.280 --> 29:42.020]  What is an historic phone, an historic telephone?
[29:42.140 --> 29:46.360]  Various interesting telephones that have their own place in history for some reason.
[29:47.040 --> 29:53.900]  Alexander Graham Bell's phone, maybe Steve Wozniak's Blue Box, things like that.
[29:54.260 --> 29:58.280]  Just phones that are themselves interesting, the Western Digital 500s, we like those.
[29:59.380 --> 30:03.440]  And just interesting pieces of telephone technology from across history.
[30:03.820 --> 30:05.860]  You could do keyed telephones.
[30:05.860 --> 30:07.120]  I could think of a lot.
[30:07.420 --> 30:08.140]  Pay phones.
[30:09.600 --> 30:10.720]  There's so many.
[30:11.200 --> 30:12.240]  Blastproof phones.
[30:12.520 --> 30:13.140]  Shoe phones.
[30:13.380 --> 30:14.100]  I mean...
[30:14.100 --> 30:15.120]  Any cell phones?
[30:16.020 --> 30:17.200]  I don't know yet.
[30:17.900 --> 30:18.720]  That's a no.
[30:18.820 --> 30:29.240]  If we can find an interesting cell phone, like maybe the one Tsutomu Shimomura pulled out of the shrink wrap and picked up calls on Capitol Hill with in front of Congress or something like that.
[30:29.560 --> 30:29.800]  Uh-huh.
[30:30.280 --> 30:36.180]  Some things age well, and I think maybe those early ones that are as big as your head, that might be something that we look at for comical relief.
[30:36.240 --> 30:43.820]  But as far as actual instruments, those sturdy ones from the 40s and 50s that are still around today, that's something we won't match anytime soon, I don't think.
[30:44.060 --> 30:44.760]  Bernie, you had something.
[30:45.060 --> 30:49.100]  Yeah, I just want to say, Rob is way too modest about his artwork.
[30:49.100 --> 30:55.740]  His paintings of the hacker luminaries, I haven't seen any of the historic telephones yet, because I think he's yet to paint them.
[30:56.380 --> 30:58.920]  His artwork is really amazing.
[30:59.260 --> 31:06.300]  I would be honored, and I probably will pledge myself as soon as I can get off the air here, for one of these things.
[31:06.480 --> 31:07.980]  They're truly amazing paintings.
[31:08.200 --> 31:09.980]  And what's the pledge level for these things?
[31:10.560 --> 31:13.500]  A pledge of $50 or more if you'd like to pledge more.
[31:13.660 --> 31:19.100]  I mean, these are original paintings of something that are of great interest to our listeners, ostensibly.
[31:19.960 --> 31:21.700]  And I just want to give a shout-out for that.
[31:21.960 --> 31:27.260]  Rob, don't you have a website where you put some of these pictures online of your paintings?
[31:27.400 --> 31:28.180]  They're really amazing.
[31:28.420 --> 31:29.060]  I do, actually.
[31:29.200 --> 31:34.500]  If you go to my website, which is robvincent.net, it's all on the front page.
[31:34.980 --> 31:38.700]  There's a link to the portfolio where you can see the hacker luminaries, because I painted all of those.
[31:39.660 --> 31:46.760]  I am in the process of painting the phones, so there are no pictures of those yet, but there are links to each one of these that you can just click and pledge directly.
[31:47.480 --> 31:55.320]  And, yeah, you can see some other stuff I've done, too, so maybe get a feel for my style and what the as-yet-to-be-painted paintings might look like.
[31:55.660 --> 31:59.500]  These are framed photographs, framed paintings, right?
[31:59.660 --> 32:00.400]  They're not framed.
[32:00.500 --> 32:04.840]  They're stretched canvases, which means if you want to put them in a frame, you can, but they also display well on their own.
[32:05.160 --> 32:08.760]  But they're stretched around a frame of some kind.
[32:08.860 --> 32:09.140]  Yes.
[32:09.460 --> 32:10.200]  Okay, got it.
[32:10.200 --> 32:17.800]  And I should also point out that the pledge level of $50 is significantly less than I would be charging for these, just, like, selling my work, so...
[32:17.800 --> 32:18.420]  Absolutely.
[32:18.760 --> 32:27.120]  And if you do go to that website, robvincent.net, do not take pictures of Rob's painting, or he will come down on you hard.
[32:27.640 --> 32:35.240]  I will come down on you as hard as the Creative Commons license allows me to, which I think today is actually the birthday of the Creative Commons license as well.
[32:35.240 --> 32:38.860]  Can't we just be unreasonable for a little bit?
[32:38.980 --> 32:42.500]  Because I'm trying to understand alternative viewpoints.
[32:43.260 --> 32:50.040]  And just these people that sue you at the drop of a hat, if you just, you know, you take a picture of a building now, you can get in trouble for that if you don't get permission.
[32:50.340 --> 32:55.820]  All sorts of things, they just come after you, and they have the legal team to back them up.
[32:55.840 --> 32:56.960]  I just wonder, what does that feel like?
[32:57.020 --> 32:57.760]  Does that feel good?
[32:57.860 --> 32:59.360]  Does that feel like you're in control?
[32:59.760 --> 33:00.260]  I don't know.
[33:00.340 --> 33:02.320]  Maybe I'll have to paint a Star Wars character and see.
[33:03.000 --> 33:04.720]  Are we allowed to talk about Star Wars?
[33:04.720 --> 33:05.860]  Can we mention Star Wars?
[33:06.000 --> 33:07.460]  Can we say Star Wars sucks?
[33:08.020 --> 33:09.740]  Oh my God, that film is so terrible.
[33:09.800 --> 33:11.060]  You should not go see that film.
[33:11.160 --> 33:11.500]  It's awful.
[33:11.600 --> 33:13.440]  I hear people are like vomiting in the aisles.
[33:13.560 --> 33:13.940]  It's so bad.
[33:14.120 --> 33:19.080]  I think we can mention like general Star Wars, but maybe not the specific Star Wars as portrayed in these films.
[33:19.980 --> 33:21.220]  What about the Reagan thing?
[33:21.500 --> 33:22.420]  Can we talk about that?
[33:22.420 --> 33:27.660]  Well, what's going to happen when we do have wars in space, and there are Star Wars, and there's a copyright issue that comes up as a result?
[33:28.040 --> 33:29.460]  That is going to happen at some point.
[33:29.620 --> 33:31.620]  We're delaying it, I know, but it will happen.
[33:32.740 --> 33:33.760]  Okay, well, you know what?
[33:33.760 --> 33:37.020]  That's not the only thing we're offering, the paintings for a pledge of $50.
[33:37.380 --> 33:58.940]  We're also offering the keynote addresses from the HOPE conferences, 10 different HOPE conferences, more than 10 keynote and featured speakers that are included here, people like Steve Wozniak and Jello Biafra and Stephen Levy and Kevin Mitnick, all kinds of people giving addresses to a crowd of hackers in New York City at one time or another,
[33:58.940 --> 34:01.680]  from 1994 through 2014.
[34:02.800 --> 34:06.460]  Those are all yours in DVD format for a pledge of $50.
[34:06.920 --> 34:13.540]  And if you want them on a thumb drive, a pledge of $75 will get you all of those talks, and you can copy them to your heart's content.
[34:13.540 --> 34:15.400]  There's no DRM or anything like that on them.
[34:15.900 --> 34:23.760]  So a pledge of $50 for the DVDs, $75 for the thumb drives, 212-209-2950 or give to WBAI.org.
[34:23.940 --> 34:27.980]  Just make sure you mention that Off the Hook is the program you're donating in the name of.
[34:28.440 --> 34:30.240]  And that will keep us going.
[34:30.240 --> 34:36.580]  That will keep us on the air and keep this radio station pumping out the megawatts for a while to come.
[34:37.580 --> 34:38.040]  All right.
[34:38.160 --> 34:39.440]  Any other thoughts on this?
[34:39.600 --> 34:40.380]  What's the number again?
[34:42.260 --> 34:44.600]  212-209-2950.
[34:45.720 --> 34:46.840]  That's the phone number to pledge.
[34:47.000 --> 34:47.560]  It's a good phone number.
[34:47.680 --> 34:48.240]  You should dial it.
[34:48.300 --> 34:58.760]  It's a great phone number, but there's another good phone number that we're going to give out as well because we like hearing from our listeners and we have not heard from them enough over the past few months because we haven't had a phone line, but now we do.
[34:58.860 --> 35:00.160]  Now we have a whole bunch of phone lines.
[35:00.260 --> 35:01.120]  There's already a call.
[35:01.440 --> 35:07.080]  There's already a call, but I don't know if that person's calling for that or maybe it's a debt collector.
[35:07.200 --> 35:07.720]  Okay, so...
[35:07.720 --> 35:08.280]  They call too.
[35:08.800 --> 35:09.520]  Finish what you're going to say.
[35:09.520 --> 35:13.360]  Yeah, the phone number is 718-780-8888.
[35:13.620 --> 35:16.820]  That's our on-air line if you want to be on the air.
[35:17.060 --> 35:19.240]  718-780-8888.
[35:20.040 --> 35:22.060]  We'll take phone calls in just a couple of minutes now.
[35:22.180 --> 35:30.220]  I understand from what I heard that if you call this number, it doesn't pick up.
[35:30.280 --> 35:33.000]  It winds up going to our general manager's voicemail.
[35:33.100 --> 35:33.380]  You know what?
[35:33.420 --> 35:34.500]  Let's test this.
[35:34.580 --> 35:35.100]  Can we do this?
[35:35.100 --> 35:36.000]  Can we test this right now?
[35:36.700 --> 35:37.140]  All right.
[35:37.240 --> 35:38.760]  That's our internal line.
[35:39.140 --> 35:40.260]  That's our external line.
[35:40.400 --> 35:45.020]  We're going to call that very same number because now you can call with the area code.
[35:45.820 --> 35:47.860]  Actually, you've been able to do this for quite some time in New York.
[35:48.500 --> 35:49.440]  Let's see what happens.
[35:51.100 --> 35:52.120]  If the phone rings.
[35:53.420 --> 35:54.880]  Okay, I see the call coming in.
[35:54.960 --> 35:55.800]  That's us right there.
[35:56.020 --> 35:57.280]  One more line just lit up.
[35:57.940 --> 35:59.020]  I'm going to count the rings.
[35:59.400 --> 36:00.340]  This is the second ring.
[36:01.060 --> 36:01.380]  Three.
[36:01.560 --> 36:01.840]  Three rings.
[36:01.920 --> 36:03.020]  No one else has done this, by the way.
[36:03.080 --> 36:04.260]  This is the kind of thing that we do on this show.
[36:04.260 --> 36:05.800]  So we have to demonstrate how things work.
[36:06.240 --> 36:06.780]  Thank you, Kyle.
[36:07.800 --> 36:10.120]  Everybody out there can count the number of rings.
[36:12.900 --> 36:13.920]  I deserve this.
[36:14.100 --> 36:14.260]  Six.
[36:14.400 --> 36:14.600]  Six.
[36:14.720 --> 36:14.880]  Okay.
[36:15.060 --> 36:16.060]  I would have lost track by now.
[36:17.060 --> 36:17.380]  Seven.
[36:17.440 --> 36:18.420]  What do you think is a fair number?
[36:18.520 --> 36:20.720]  You used to be able to make phones ring a hundred times more.
[36:21.440 --> 36:21.660]  Eight.
[36:21.820 --> 36:25.060]  I had a friend's phone ring all weekend when he was away once when I was a kid.
[36:25.360 --> 36:25.560]  Nine.
[36:25.560 --> 36:29.240]  I would have been able to come up with what I want to say and at least repeat it four times by now.
[36:29.560 --> 36:34.040]  But now they basically disconnect you after a certain number of rings because they're not making any revenue.
[36:34.200 --> 36:35.100]  There's no call on connection.
[36:35.580 --> 36:36.160]  I think it's 13.
[36:36.260 --> 36:36.400]  Okay.
[36:36.420 --> 36:37.600]  Now I've rehearsed my message.
[36:37.920 --> 36:37.980]  13.
[36:38.340 --> 36:40.300]  Now I'm changing the message I rehearsed.
[36:40.660 --> 36:41.020]  Okay.
[36:41.200 --> 36:42.380]  I really want to...
[36:42.380 --> 36:42.880]  What number are we up to?
[36:42.880 --> 36:43.960]  Get my point across.
[36:55.560 --> 36:56.440]  Maybe it'll just go forever.
[36:56.640 --> 36:57.900]  Maybe those reports are wrong.
[36:58.080 --> 36:59.200]  I think like 18 now.
[36:59.460 --> 36:59.880]  We're at 18.
[37:00.300 --> 37:00.660]  Okay.
[37:01.420 --> 37:01.780]  19.
[37:02.420 --> 37:03.100]  20 is my...
[37:03.100 --> 37:03.600]  We're no longer blinking.
[37:03.760 --> 37:04.200]  We're off the board.
[37:04.360 --> 37:04.840]  Oh, we're off the board.
[37:04.940 --> 37:05.060]  Okay.
[37:05.420 --> 37:06.560]  Everybody listen carefully now.
[37:10.260 --> 37:10.610]  21.
[37:10.980 --> 37:12.090]  It's ringing someplace else.
[37:15.410 --> 37:17.710]  If our general manager picks up, we'll interview him on the air.
[37:18.490 --> 37:20.050]  That's if he's not at the Christmas party downstairs.
[37:20.430 --> 37:20.610]  Oh.
[37:21.490 --> 37:21.850]  Okay.
[37:21.930 --> 37:22.070]  Okay.
[37:22.150 --> 37:22.270]  Yeah.
[37:22.330 --> 37:23.950]  So that's probably why that won't happen.
[37:23.950 --> 37:25.210]  You should still be counting, Kyle.
[37:25.610 --> 37:26.390]  Oh, I'm sorry.
[37:27.210 --> 37:27.570]  25.
[37:27.850 --> 37:28.150]  26.
[37:28.690 --> 37:29.050]  25.
[37:29.390 --> 37:30.010]  Yeah, what Bernie said.
[37:30.250 --> 37:38.170]  So this is interesting because people at this point will think they're calling us when in actuality, we don't know where they are and we can't answer the phone.
[37:38.330 --> 37:39.470]  It's ringing someplace.
[37:41.130 --> 37:41.490]  Somewhere.
[37:41.910 --> 37:42.270]  Wow.
[37:42.490 --> 37:43.390]  It's sort of metaphysical.
[37:43.570 --> 37:45.470]  The phone rings, but no one's there to hear it.
[37:45.650 --> 37:46.710]  This needs to be fixed.
[37:47.150 --> 37:48.870]  Could that be it over here on the secret phone?
[37:48.950 --> 37:50.410]  You see, there's a little green light over there.
[37:50.910 --> 37:52.450]  I don't know if that was flashing before, though.
[37:52.570 --> 37:57.830]  I mean, we have the phone number written down of the secret phone and we're not allowed to say it on the app, but it's a different phone number.
[37:57.830 --> 37:58.750]  We can't even say it to ourselves.
[37:59.810 --> 38:00.630]  Well, you know...
[38:00.630 --> 38:03.630]  That might just be saying an extension of that network is ringing.
[38:05.270 --> 38:06.070]  Okay, well...
[38:06.070 --> 38:06.350]  35.
[38:06.810 --> 38:07.810]  The thing is, it's almost...
[38:07.810 --> 38:08.130]  Oh, nice.
[38:08.130 --> 38:08.390]  Thanks, Brent.
[38:08.390 --> 38:11.630]  It's almost rung as many times now as it rang for us.
[38:11.890 --> 38:15.490]  And it's ringing for some other radio station someplace or some... who knows where.
[38:15.870 --> 38:17.010]  What if we get on the air?
[38:17.130 --> 38:19.210]  But if you're a listener, theoretically, you'd go through this.
[38:19.430 --> 38:20.250]  I mean, you'd be here.
[38:20.250 --> 38:24.090]  Oh, but they're wasting their time is my point because after 20 rings, it goes...
[38:24.630 --> 38:25.030]  Oh.
[38:26.130 --> 38:28.570]  That sounded like a call waiting tone of some sort.
[38:28.670 --> 38:29.210]  Call waiting...
[38:29.210 --> 38:30.250]  Call our ID on call waiting.
[38:30.250 --> 38:30.450]  That's 42.
[38:32.010 --> 38:33.790]  Okay, that's kind of strange that that happened.
[38:35.050 --> 38:36.690]  I have no idea where this is now.
[38:36.850 --> 38:39.810]  It's someplace weird and we can't get it back.
[38:39.950 --> 38:40.890]  So, folks...
[38:40.890 --> 38:41.170]  Oh.
[38:41.470 --> 38:42.370]  What are these beeps?
[38:42.370 --> 38:45.450]  I remember those beeps from when we were traveling last year.
[38:47.170 --> 38:48.990]  Very distinctive beeps, but I don't know what they mean.
[38:51.110 --> 38:51.910]  Okay, so...
[38:52.570 --> 38:56.730]  If the phone rings 20 times, hang up and call back because...
[38:57.670 --> 38:58.890]  We can't get to you.
[38:58.930 --> 38:59.950]  I don't know what the beeps mean.
[39:00.030 --> 39:00.630]  I really don't.
[39:01.550 --> 39:02.490]  That's 50 rings.
[39:02.710 --> 39:03.330]  That's 50, yeah.
[39:03.770 --> 39:04.150]  Okay.
[39:05.250 --> 39:07.930]  It's not going to the general manager's box as far as I know.
[39:07.950 --> 39:09.490]  Not as fast as we thought, no.
[39:09.490 --> 39:10.130]  No, definitely not.
[39:10.190 --> 39:11.330]  Or maybe he unplugged his phone.
[39:11.330 --> 39:14.170]  So, maybe we should just go back to taking calls.
[39:14.230 --> 39:15.230]  I'd like to know what those beeps mean.
[39:15.350 --> 39:15.770]  I really would.
[39:15.950 --> 39:16.190]  All right.
[39:17.570 --> 39:20.830]  Okay, well, before we do that, I'd like to...
[39:20.830 --> 39:23.770]  Bernie, I'm going to turn this down and leave you listening to it.
[39:23.850 --> 39:24.630]  I lost count, though.
[39:26.450 --> 39:28.170]  Because why torture the listeners?
[39:28.190 --> 39:29.250]  We can just torture one person.
[39:30.450 --> 39:33.150]  I won't read the story, but we will take phone calls right afterwards.
[39:33.830 --> 39:36.190]  And Bernie, when we come back, we're going to ask you how many rings total.
[39:36.230 --> 39:37.270]  So, hopefully, you're keeping track.
[39:37.650 --> 39:40.350]  And maybe you'll be speaking to our general manager by then, too.
[39:40.410 --> 39:40.730]  Who knows?
[39:41.330 --> 39:45.650]  Um, we talked about this story, um, uh, VTech, a couple weeks ago.
[39:46.030 --> 39:46.150]  Yes, VTech.
[39:46.150 --> 40:02.370]  About how this guy went out and hacked this company and was able to, uh, get all this information on children around the world because this company was keeping all this information on children around the world, including things like, like chat logs and pictures and all sorts of other things.
[40:02.690 --> 40:03.510]  Well, guess what?
[40:03.610 --> 40:05.210]  We're safe now because they arrested him.
[40:05.210 --> 40:12.370]  Yeah, authorities have arrested a 21-year-old man in the UK on suspicion of crimes related to unauthorized access to a computer.
[40:12.690 --> 40:14.530]  They're calling it a creepy crime.
[40:14.530 --> 40:18.170]  They're calling it something that, uh, uh, is, is very unnerving.
[40:18.170 --> 40:30.030]  But the fact of the matter is, when this guy talked to, um, uh, I believe, uh, Motherboard, uh, he basically said that he did this to expose their poor security.
[40:30.030 --> 40:32.190]  And he went public for that very reason.
[40:32.370 --> 40:35.850]  Now he's being portrayed as somebody who is up to something.
[40:35.850 --> 40:44.010]  And it's, what this does is this, uh, this discourages people from, uh, finding security holes and telling the world about them.
[40:44.210 --> 40:44.870]  That's what it does.
[40:45.010 --> 40:47.290]  It just makes people want to keep these things to themselves.
[40:47.490 --> 40:47.570]  Mike?
[40:47.730 --> 40:53.790]  I mean, keeping this kind of information about children in particular is like the only thing you can't do with information under U.S.
[40:53.890 --> 40:54.030]  law.
[40:54.270 --> 40:56.690]  I'm sure it violates all kinds of laws in other countries.
[40:56.850 --> 41:05.590]  So now that a prosecutor is looking into this whole case, I eagerly await the jailing of the VTech executives who are responsible for this system.
[41:05.850 --> 41:10.150]  Well, you'll be waiting quite a long time because I don't think, uh, they'll ever even be named.
[41:10.310 --> 41:11.870]  I couldn't wait at least 60 rings.
[41:12.030 --> 41:12.510]  I've proven it.
[41:14.330 --> 41:26.530]  Well, um, yeah, so that's, it's, it's, it's, it's disturbing because there's a lot we can learn from people who find these, uh, these security holes, but this underlines how, um, how hackers are thought of in the first place.
[41:26.610 --> 41:31.330]  They're thought of as people that, uh, can't be trusted and are only up to something nefarious.
[41:32.110 --> 41:34.110]  And, um, it's, it's just sad.
[41:34.110 --> 41:42.970]  I like how they, they, um, quickly want to run with like the pervy angle of, of, of of these transgressions.
[41:43.290 --> 41:43.630]  Uh-huh.
[41:43.750 --> 41:55.070]  And I mean, come on, if he didn't say anything, then maybe you could, you could argue there was some creep factor, you know, like he was sitting on them for like, whatever, 20, 30 years or something.
[41:55.070 --> 42:05.750]  Point is, he, he was, it was a proof of concept about lack of, of, of proper handling practices and so on of, of kitty data.
[42:05.970 --> 42:10.610]  Well, what I'm wondering is, would this have been better if maybe he had been a little bit more public?
[42:10.750 --> 42:12.350]  I mean, he went to Motherboard and told the story.
[42:12.530 --> 42:13.830]  Maybe he should have had a press conference.
[42:13.950 --> 42:17.430]  Maybe he should have revealed himself right away and said, this is what I found out.
[42:17.630 --> 42:18.810]  What's your answer, VTech?
[42:18.930 --> 42:19.890]  What are you going to do about it?
[42:19.890 --> 42:23.850]  And then if they come and arrest him after that, uh, they really look bad.
[42:23.990 --> 42:30.290]  The thing is, most people who find these security holes really aren't up to organizing a press conference and appearing on international television.
[42:31.630 --> 42:33.430]  We, we need to take this more seriously.
[42:33.450 --> 42:34.770]  We need to listen to what people say.
[42:34.870 --> 42:39.570]  We need to, uh, uh, to thank people when they find security holes and tell us about them, not punish them.
[42:40.190 --> 42:40.650]  All right.
[42:40.790 --> 42:42.310]  Um, I think we should take some phone calls.
[42:42.430 --> 42:43.150]  Let's check in on Bernie.
[42:43.270 --> 42:44.130]  Bernie, how you doing over there?
[42:44.610 --> 42:45.190]  I'm here.
[42:45.330 --> 42:49.390]  I haven't been hearing any ringing, but I'm guesstimating there's been about 130 rings by now.
[42:49.730 --> 42:50.050]  Nice.
[42:50.290 --> 42:51.290]  Wait, no rings at all now?
[42:51.510 --> 42:56.350]  I haven't heard any, but I just guesstimated because it should be like two seconds of, four seconds of ringing in two seconds.
[42:56.390 --> 42:57.470]  When did the ring stop?
[42:57.970 --> 42:59.070]  The beeps are still there.
[42:59.150 --> 43:00.650]  The beeps are still there, though, but not the ring.
[43:00.810 --> 43:02.030]  Do you think it went to voicemail somehow?
[43:02.050 --> 43:03.130]  Well, he would have heard a voicemail.
[43:03.150 --> 43:03.470]  We might have.
[43:03.810 --> 43:04.190]  We might have.
[43:04.270 --> 43:07.730]  Maybe we're leaving a voicemail message right now for these, for the, uh, general manager.
[43:07.890 --> 43:08.410]  Oh, okay.
[43:08.650 --> 43:12.130]  Well, uh, in, in that case, um, yeah, carry on.
[43:12.210 --> 43:12.770]  Everything is fine.
[43:12.930 --> 43:13.730]  Uh, we're going to hang up now.
[43:13.890 --> 43:14.030]  Goodbye.
[43:14.750 --> 43:15.990]  Uh, all right.
[43:15.990 --> 43:22.850]  Our phone number, 718-780-8888 is our telephone number, 718-780-8888.
[43:23.070 --> 43:24.390]  We have a couple of phone calls.
[43:24.510 --> 43:25.970]  Let's take one of them and see who's out there.
[43:25.990 --> 43:26.290]  Good evening.
[43:26.410 --> 43:27.270]  You're on off the hook.
[43:27.270 --> 43:29.910]  Hey, first, the technicalities.
[43:30.350 --> 43:31.390]  Oh, and we still have the beeps.
[43:31.490 --> 43:31.950]  How wonderful.
[43:32.170 --> 43:33.590]  Okay, um, continue talking.
[43:33.730 --> 43:34.710]  I'll try and find these beeps.
[43:35.090 --> 43:35.350]  Okay.
[43:36.170 --> 43:41.550]  The, uh, I was the caller whom you say was already on when you started calling the, um, the number.
[43:42.290 --> 43:43.010]  Oh, great.
[43:43.150 --> 43:51.570]  And what happened is, uh, after an under-***ing amount of rings, it went to a rapid busy signal, which is what happened other occasions I call the station.
[43:51.930 --> 43:52.290]  Interesting.
[43:52.290 --> 43:52.670]  Okay.
[43:53.170 --> 43:58.850]  Then, uh, the beeps are only on your internal phone system because I didn't hear anything on my line.
[43:59.150 --> 43:59.570]  Okay.
[43:59.650 --> 44:00.430]  Well, you know, it's interesting.
[44:00.570 --> 44:03.010]  I just, uh, did some detective work while you were speaking.
[44:03.250 --> 44:06.450]  And, uh, Bernie, I have to tell you the beeps are on your line.
[44:06.830 --> 44:07.350]  There you go.
[44:07.650 --> 44:07.810]  Yeah.
[44:07.950 --> 44:14.130]  So, more importantly, I just tried to go to ralphvincent.net and I tried www.
[44:14.930 --> 44:16.730]  Are you saying Ralph or Rob?
[44:17.130 --> 44:17.570]  Ralph.
[44:17.810 --> 44:18.090]  Ralph.
[44:18.370 --> 44:19.710]  No, it's Rob, R-O-B.
[44:19.890 --> 44:20.310]  Oh, okay.
[44:20.450 --> 44:20.670]  Yes.
[44:20.790 --> 44:21.630]  So I'll try Rob.
[44:21.830 --> 44:22.130]  Okay.
[44:22.290 --> 44:34.850]  Then, the next, next question is, um, I heard this on public radio because I didn't watch the debate, but apparently there was some kerfuffle about between Cruz and, uh, Rubio.
[44:35.650 --> 44:43.730]  One said that, um, now a hundred percent of phone calls can be, um, audited with the new system.
[44:44.310 --> 44:51.430]  And, uh, the other campaign accused him of revealing classified information because of this.
[44:51.430 --> 44:54.750]  Now you can source it and, uh, and, and, and look it up better.
[44:55.230 --> 44:59.230]  Um, but this is, this is what I heard on, uh, all things considered today.
[45:00.210 --> 45:01.190]  Yeah, you're right.
[45:01.350 --> 45:04.630]  That, that did kind of, it was very, uh, quick.
[45:04.630 --> 45:11.110]  It was just a couple seconds and basically, um, I think Rubio, I can't remember which one.
[45:11.230 --> 45:19.290]  I believe it was Rubio was coming back saying that he did not think it was the proper setting to discuss what percentages or capabilities.
[45:19.590 --> 45:29.050]  It was some detail that I believe Cruz had indicated or started to speak to and, um, didn't really reveal a whole lot.
[45:29.510 --> 45:45.470]  And then Rubio's way of responding to it was to say, oh, well, I'm going to, I'm, I'm on the, the, the road where, you know, I'm just not even going to address it, you know, feigning that it's some sort of state secret, which really, I mean, they can talk about these terms in,
[45:45.470 --> 45:50.930]  in, um, sort of large fundamental ways without revealing any kind of secrets.
[45:50.950 --> 45:52.030]  So it was very quick.
[45:52.170 --> 45:52.810]  Here's what I don't get.
[45:52.970 --> 46:00.630]  Uh, if, if, um, if they reveal that, yes, uh, we have the ability to record all the conversations all the time or, or get metadata information.
[46:01.150 --> 46:05.590]  Um, how does our knowing that affect their ability to do that?
[46:05.750 --> 46:07.690]  They are always going to be able to do that.
[46:07.710 --> 46:09.030]  And we just know about it now.
[46:09.410 --> 46:12.430]  Does that really affect their ability to, to get information?
[46:12.430 --> 46:15.790]  The fact that the, the, the populace knows what they're up to.
[46:16.210 --> 46:29.350]  The argument, which I think is pretty foolish, is that evildoers will use this knowledge to avoid making phone calls and will use some method of communication that is less trackable instead, if they can find one.
[46:29.670 --> 46:38.290]  There's all kinds of holes in this argument and I'll leave it to our listeners as an exercise to, to find them or, you know, each listener can find at least one hole.
[46:38.410 --> 46:39.350]  It's not much of an exercise.
[46:39.890 --> 46:40.050]  Yeah.
[46:40.050 --> 46:42.370]  They, they want to have some ambiguity, right?
[46:42.610 --> 46:56.170]  Like try to give people a sense of, give people and by people, I mean bad people, this little sense of comfort, perhaps to give them a little confidence where they might then, uh, make some, some mistake.
[46:56.450 --> 47:03.530]  And, and the thing is we have the right to know these things and to say we don't, I think is a lot more newsworthy than anything else.
[47:03.730 --> 47:05.830]  So that's something to, uh, to consider.
[47:05.830 --> 47:11.890]  Another detail that was, um, let that kind of slipped, I believe was the time period.
[47:12.030 --> 47:27.330]  I think Rubio or one of them said five years or seven years and that hadn't really been that much of a, I mean, it's, it's probably out in the public record anyway, but little things like that came up, um, the term for which they would retain data and so on.
[47:27.330 --> 47:42.490]  Um, but whether we know about it or not, I mean, the capability is there, at least, I mean, the technologically, uh, we don't have to really use our imaginations anymore because you know, it's, it's been, um, it's been sort of, uh, uh, proven, uh, with,
[47:42.550 --> 47:43.250]  with leaks and so on.
[47:43.410 --> 47:44.410]  Bernie, are you still there?
[47:44.890 --> 47:45.570]  I'm still here.
[47:45.650 --> 47:46.090]  Can you hear me?
[47:46.190 --> 47:46.390]  Yes.
[47:46.470 --> 47:48.070]  And the beeping has, has disappeared.
[47:48.350 --> 47:52.310]  The beeping only seems to happen when I am, uh, uh, connecting you to another caller.
[47:52.490 --> 47:55.190]  So that's another, another clue on figuring out what's going on here.
[47:55.190 --> 47:56.310]  It wasn't my line.
[47:56.410 --> 48:01.830]  No, it definitely, it's coming from your, your extension here on this phone though, because when I turned you down, the beeps went down.
[48:02.070 --> 48:11.830]  Also, another interesting fact is that I see that green light on the other private phone flashing again, as another caller goes into that mysterious region of telephony before they disappear.
[48:12.270 --> 48:13.910]  So that has something to do with it as well.
[48:13.990 --> 48:15.870]  These calls are being bounced all over the city, apparently.
[48:16.090 --> 48:18.110]  Let me try and grab this one before we lose it.
[48:18.470 --> 48:18.970]  Uh, good evening.
[48:19.150 --> 48:20.010]  You're on off the hook.
[48:20.650 --> 48:21.050]  Yes.
[48:21.050 --> 48:31.170]  I wanted to report that Michael Savage has requested that the government draft all young hackers into, uh, the war against the crusade, the crusade.
[48:31.530 --> 48:31.690]  So.
[48:31.950 --> 48:34.210]  And why should anybody take him seriously?
[48:35.470 --> 48:36.550]  But thanks for that.
[48:37.050 --> 48:38.410]  Thanks for reporting this.
[48:39.070 --> 48:39.330]  Yeah.
[48:39.470 --> 48:50.530]  This is exactly the kind of, um, of ignorant viewpoint that you can count on seeing more of as, as hackers are seen as soldiers, people who are there to, um, to fight for one side or another.
[48:51.070 --> 48:53.650]  Let me just tell you, hackers do not make very good soldiers.
[48:53.890 --> 48:55.690]  And there's many examples of that.
[48:55.830 --> 48:57.670]  So, uh, don't, don't fool yourself.
[48:57.830 --> 48:58.290]  What are you talking about?
[48:58.290 --> 49:00.050]  Some of our very best soldiers are hackers.
[49:01.210 --> 49:01.930]  Like who?
[49:02.510 --> 49:03.410]  Uh, Chelsea Manning.
[49:03.810 --> 49:04.250]  Okay.
[49:04.490 --> 49:04.970]  Yeah.
[49:05.210 --> 49:05.450]  Okay.
[49:05.590 --> 49:14.170]  Maybe Chelsea Manning would not be held up as, as the epitome of military excellence in the eyes of those in the military.
[49:14.350 --> 49:15.750]  That's who I'm addressing right now.
[49:15.750 --> 49:22.850]  The people who think they can just pull all these, uh, smart people in, uh, to that culture and it's going to work out well for them.
[49:23.070 --> 49:25.950]  It won't because they think, because they act as individuals.
[49:26.530 --> 49:28.490]  I think that's what makes her an excellent soldier.
[49:28.730 --> 49:30.890]  No, it doesn't make her, it makes her an excellent person.
[49:31.330 --> 49:35.290]  A lousy soldier because soldiers have to follow orders without question.
[49:35.590 --> 49:35.930]  All right.
[49:35.930 --> 49:37.710]  I guess I don't know very much about soldiering.
[49:37.870 --> 49:39.710]  You know, and, and that's, that's a good thing.
[49:39.890 --> 49:42.170]  I mean, Mike, you, you could be benefiting from that.
[49:42.170 --> 49:56.910]  And I think, uh, it's just worth reiterating that a lot of people might, uh, be lured into this trade, uh, thinking they're going to be, uh, doing things for some greater purpose, uh, uh, militarily.
[49:57.050 --> 49:58.390]  We've seen this with drone operators.
[49:58.630 --> 50:01.470]  We've seen this with people that were, uh, involved with leaks.
[50:01.930 --> 50:23.530]  And, um, and I could easily see, um, people being, uh, sort of courted, uh, in, you know, when they're looking for a job or, uh, so, and so on, and being approached by these organizations with sort of a, kind of a really, uh, um, shiny, real, um, uh, a clean,
[50:23.710 --> 50:27.830]  kind of glossy image of, of, uh, elite cyber warriors.
[50:28.630 --> 50:45.950]  But when it, when it comes down to it, what you actually are participating in is not something for you to question once you're in, so to speak, um, unless you're brave enough to be a whistleblower, I guess, uh, anyway, suffice to say, it, it may not be what you,
[50:46.170 --> 50:48.530]  what it seems and what you think it is.
[50:48.690 --> 51:00.190]  And I think that speaks to some of the other things I was saying is, uh, about the political pivoting, about how they make surveillance sound nice, because that's really what we're talking about now.
[51:00.190 --> 51:03.090]  The technical parts are like, you know, that's out of the bag.
[51:03.750 --> 51:06.370]  Same thing with this, like, kind of war fighting.
[51:06.750 --> 51:07.110]  Great.
[51:07.290 --> 51:19.650]  I mean, it's what we need, quote, to, to, to, to be on one side or the other of this modern crusade or World War IV, whatever you want to call it, but, um, to what end?
[51:19.770 --> 51:29.590]  And once you, once you get involved, you know, you better be researched because, uh, this stuff, you could be fighting for stuff that you really, in the end, don't want to support.
[51:29.970 --> 51:41.750]  And let me also just point out, make it clear that, uh, within the military, there are a lot of good, uh, individual people who are hackers, who think for themselves, who don't just blindly follow orders, but they don't like people like you.
[51:41.930 --> 51:42.890]  That's something to consider.
[51:43.250 --> 51:43.590]  All right.
[51:43.630 --> 51:45.010]  Let's, uh, take this, uh, phone call.
[51:45.110 --> 51:45.970]  It might be the last one we get tonight.
[51:46.050 --> 51:46.290]  Good evening.
[51:46.410 --> 51:47.150]  You're on off the hook.
[51:47.910 --> 51:48.790]  Oh, okay.
[51:49.230 --> 51:59.090]  Well, you know, while you were talking about hackers and I've been making very good soldiers, there was a movie that came out in the sixties called Tribes.
[51:59.550 --> 52:01.970]  It was a team made for TV movie.
[52:02.150 --> 52:03.630]  I don't know if you guys ever heard of it.
[52:03.910 --> 52:04.870]  No, I've never heard of it.
[52:05.030 --> 52:05.150]  Nope.
[52:05.450 --> 52:20.250]  It was about this hippie that was drafted into the Marines and he rebelled against being drafted and he organized all the guys in his barracks, you know, to be able to, uh, uh, he just organized all the guys.
[52:20.350 --> 52:20.530]  Yeah.
[52:21.210 --> 52:26.250]  The rebelled against his, uh, the, the, the sergeants and the officers.
[52:26.270 --> 52:27.570]  It's a really great movie.
[52:27.850 --> 52:29.530]  And he went in AWOL and...
[52:29.530 --> 52:29.890]  Wow.
[52:30.030 --> 52:30.230]  Okay.
[52:30.310 --> 52:31.690]  Well, it's, it's on my list then.
[52:32.150 --> 52:32.710]  Yeah.
[52:32.950 --> 52:33.310]  Oh yeah.
[52:33.450 --> 52:40.270]  Also, number two, you know, you guys got to do something about those effing begathons.
[52:41.310 --> 52:41.830]  Please.
[52:42.270 --> 52:46.410]  Well, we're doing what we can and we didn't beg too much this hour.
[52:46.410 --> 52:47.890]  So hopefully it wasn't too offensive to people.
[52:48.290 --> 52:53.690]  No, but overall, man, he's telling Emmanuel and now it's just going to be another one in next month.
[52:54.790 --> 52:55.670]  Well, possibly.
[52:55.690 --> 52:56.490]  I don't know.
[52:56.630 --> 52:57.270]  I'm not sure.
[52:57.450 --> 52:59.130]  I never find out till it's upon us.
[52:59.250 --> 53:08.250]  We definitely hear where you're coming from and, uh, we, we like to support the station in every way we can as few times a year as possible.
[53:08.570 --> 53:09.650]  Oh, definitely, man.
[53:09.770 --> 53:17.230]  But make it, you know, why don't you guys try and have a really massive fundraising that benefit.
[53:17.630 --> 53:17.750]  Uh-huh.
[53:17.850 --> 53:20.630]  I used to do that when I was a kid, a teenager.
[53:20.890 --> 53:20.970]  Yeah.
[53:21.170 --> 53:21.470]  It was great.
[53:21.750 --> 53:24.230]  Other stations have had massive success with things like that.
[53:24.470 --> 53:35.610]  Um, and there's definitely a lot of still like transition stuff going on here and hopefully ideas like that will come to the surface and, and we could have like a once a year kind of huge, uh, fundraiser.
[53:35.610 --> 53:40.270]  But, uh, for that to work, people have to be really excited and really into it.
[53:40.350 --> 53:46.810]  And that's something that I think we need to, uh, uh, to light some fires and, and get people to really, um, um, be enthusiastic about that.
[53:47.010 --> 53:47.230]  Yeah.
[53:47.290 --> 53:55.090]  I mean, when it comes down to it, uh, the pledge drives are what keep us alive because this is pretty much the only thing we do to get any income at all at the station.
[53:55.330 --> 53:58.950]  Um, you know, we don't, we don't, uh, have, you know, car washes and things like that.
[53:59.090 --> 53:59.990]  This is, this is it.
[54:00.090 --> 54:04.450]  Well, maybe we should, but right on Atlantic Avenue, if we watched every car that went by here, we'd make a fortune.
[54:04.710 --> 54:04.890]  Maybe.
[54:05.170 --> 54:10.990]  But, uh, but you know, the fact of the matter is like when, when we need to pay a bill and there isn't money for it, uh, you know, what else can we do?
[54:11.070 --> 54:15.290]  And the answer is, you know, the only thing that keeps us going is the direct support from our listeners.
[54:15.750 --> 54:18.510]  And, uh, so that is, that is what we've got.
[54:18.630 --> 54:20.630]  Uh, when, when we don't have that, we don't have anything else.
[54:20.710 --> 54:22.890]  So if you're listening, you're part of this.
[54:23.010 --> 54:32.770]  And if you're, if you actually, uh, if you pledge a minimum of, I believe it's $25, you also become a member of the station and, uh, with all the, uh, benefits that entails.
[54:32.910 --> 54:36.850]  And that also means you have a voice in what happens next and in how we start doing things.
[54:37.130 --> 54:42.830]  Um, but yeah, we're always open to ideas and we're always looking for new ways to keep things, uh, going and keep doing what we do here.
[54:43.490 --> 54:43.890]  Okay.
[54:44.110 --> 54:45.870]  Uh, unfortunately that's it for us.
[54:45.990 --> 54:46.790]  We are out of time.
[54:46.930 --> 54:49.690]  Uh, but we will be back next week from what I understand.
[54:49.890 --> 54:55.110]  I want to offer a congratulations to the 50th anniversary of the Tinker versus Des Moines process.
[54:56.350 --> 54:59.110]  Want to tell us a little bit about that for those people that don't know?
[54:59.170 --> 54:59.350]  Should look it up.
[54:59.730 --> 55:00.890]  It's a very interesting story.
[55:00.890 --> 55:02.190]  Well, that's snarky remark.
[55:02.350 --> 55:06.590]  We're going to sign off for tonight and, uh, hopefully we'll have more information on that next week.
[55:07.010 --> 55:07.410]  Write to us.
[55:07.590 --> 55:09.670]  OTH at 2600.com.
[55:10.190 --> 55:11.530]  Stay tuned for the personal computer show.
[55:11.630 --> 55:11.770]  Good night.