[00:00.000 --> 00:06.180]  Whether it's Chopin, Stravinsky, or Leggetti, how does she use the low notes to spring into a leap?
[00:06.400 --> 00:09.120]  How many spins can she fit into one measure?
[00:09.400 --> 00:13.380]  How does a slow waltz make her feel as she turns toward her partner?
[00:13.780 --> 00:22.060]  Tune in to hear former New York City ballet star Wendy Whelan talk through the music with us on Friday, February 5th, 10 a.m.
[00:22.140 --> 00:29.020]  to noon, here on WBAI New York, 99.5 FM, and WBAI.org.
[00:32.880 --> 00:36.940]  And you're listening to radio station WBAI New York.
[00:37.620 --> 00:40.020]  The time is just about 7 o'clock.
[00:40.320 --> 00:43.120]  Time once again for Off the Hook.
[01:09.450 --> 01:10.330]  That's understood.
[01:10.530 --> 01:11.350]  Monday, let's go!
[02:35.430 --> 02:37.010]  And the very good evening, Ted White.
[02:37.130 --> 02:37.930]  The program is Off the Hook.
[02:38.010 --> 02:42.210]  Emmanuel Giltz, when you're with you on this Wednesday evening, back live in the studio this week.
[02:42.370 --> 02:43.650]  Joined tonight by Mike.
[02:43.890 --> 02:44.190]  Hi there.
[02:44.770 --> 02:45.310]  Rob T.
[02:45.430 --> 02:45.830]  Firefly.
[02:46.050 --> 02:46.510]  Good evening.
[02:47.770 --> 02:48.650]  And Kyle.
[02:49.230 --> 02:49.450]  Hi.
[02:50.110 --> 02:51.090]  And Bernie S.
[02:51.650 --> 02:52.910]  Greetings from Philadelphia.
[02:53.490 --> 02:53.930]  Okay.
[02:54.870 --> 03:02.590]  Well, here we are again, the program about hacking, about technology, about privacy, leaks, you name it.
[03:02.750 --> 03:04.650]  All kinds of things that we have to cover.
[03:04.790 --> 03:12.490]  And there's a usual assortment of various things that have been attacked in the last week and various threats that we're panicking over.
[03:13.330 --> 03:14.210]  Where do we start?
[03:15.070 --> 03:15.830]  What do you say?
[03:15.930 --> 03:18.810]  Local, international, interplanetary, what?
[03:19.230 --> 03:20.250]  Don't say interplanetary.
[03:20.410 --> 03:20.790]  A local.
[03:20.990 --> 03:21.610]  Let's start with local.
[03:21.610 --> 03:21.910]  Local?
[03:22.070 --> 03:22.210]  Okay.
[03:22.410 --> 03:25.550]  Well, then there's... you can get more local than this, I guess.
[03:26.390 --> 03:27.310]  There's a...
[03:27.310 --> 03:29.290]  The story is coming from inside the building?
[03:29.450 --> 03:31.130]  Well, no, it's coming from inside the state.
[03:31.190 --> 03:31.650]  How about that?
[03:31.750 --> 03:31.950]  All right.
[03:32.310 --> 03:43.390]  New York Assemblyman has introduced a new bill that aims to essentially disable strong encryption on all smartphones sold here in the Empire State.
[03:43.610 --> 04:02.750]  Now, among other restrictions, the proposed law states, and this is a quote, get ready, Any smartphone that is manufactured on or after January 1st, 2016 and sold or leased in New York shall be capable of being decrypted and unlocked by its manufacturer or its operating system provider.
[04:02.750 --> 04:14.390]  Now, if it passes both houses of the state legislature and is signed by the governor, this bill would likely be the first state law that would impose new restrictions on mobile-based cryptography.
[04:14.390 --> 04:26.110]  Undoubtedly, if it makes it that far, the law would face certain legal challenges from such entities as Apple and Google and perhaps the people.
[04:27.210 --> 04:38.130]  Many local and federal law enforcement authorities have been pushing back against the widespread adoption of easy-to-use, strong encryption by default, something that I don't think there's enough of.
[04:38.330 --> 04:48.470]  In July 2015, for example, New York County District Attorney Cyrus Vance Jr. said the safety of all American communities is imperiled by iOS 6.
[04:48.870 --> 04:50.030]  Or is that 8?
[04:50.290 --> 04:51.390]  What are we up to, 8 or 6?
[04:51.390 --> 04:56.610]  I think they're up to 9, but I don't know what version in particular that this person's concerned about.
[04:56.710 --> 04:58.650]  Well, this says iOS 8, actually.
[04:58.770 --> 04:59.570]  It's this microscopic print.
[04:59.970 --> 05:08.610]  In September 2014, Apple took a stronger pro-encryption stance, saying that under iOS 8 and later devices, it was unable to access customer data.
[05:09.170 --> 05:16.550]  Currently, Apple is also fighting a federal government demand to help unlock a criminal suspect's iPhone in federal court in New York.
[05:16.550 --> 05:21.670]  Now, the bill's author is Assemblyman Matthew Titone, or Titone-y.
[05:21.750 --> 05:22.690]  I'm not really sure how to pronounce that.
[05:23.070 --> 05:27.410]  Perhaps he could call in because he's a Democrat from Staten Island within our listening range, and he might be listening.
[05:27.470 --> 05:30.730]  If he knows what's good for him, he'd be listening to this show because this is how you learn things.
[05:30.950 --> 05:34.850]  There's some evidence that he doesn't know what's good for, you know, well, for the people of New York State.
[05:34.950 --> 05:35.950]  Maybe he knows what's good for himself.
[05:35.950 --> 05:38.890]  Well, yeah, some evidence, but let's see if that's true.
[05:39.330 --> 05:52.890]  At a congressional hearing in April 2015, though, just to show you that there's a balance to this, Representative Ted Lieu of California, both Democrats, by the way, swatted down law enforcement's arguments.
[05:52.970 --> 06:00.130]  I like when they swat down law enforcement's arguments that they needed new expansive powers to weaken crypto.
[06:00.130 --> 06:09.850]  Now, Lou describes himself as a recovering computer science major and as a lieutenant colonel in the United States Air Force Reserves.
[06:09.930 --> 06:15.590]  This is the guy you want to have a beer with, you know, and just have a good conversation about various topics.
[06:15.850 --> 06:18.050]  He said giving the government a backdoor was ludicrous.
[06:18.170 --> 06:25.790]  It is clear to me that creating a pathway for decryption only for good guys is technologically stupid.
[06:26.450 --> 06:28.150]  You just can't do that.
[06:28.150 --> 06:29.570]  I like his approach.
[06:29.570 --> 06:30.070]  I really do.
[06:30.890 --> 06:35.230]  While concerned, at least some legal watchers don't believe the bill will advance very far.
[06:36.130 --> 06:43.510]  In fact, Andrew Kroc from Electronic Frontier Foundation said, I can't totally predict whether the bill will move, but I doubt it.
[06:43.610 --> 06:47.170]  It isn't a remotely credible approach, likely unconstitutional.
[06:47.390 --> 06:50.490]  Also, it was first introduced last June and didn't go anywhere then as well.
[06:50.650 --> 06:57.710]  So the thing is, though, this sort of thing is always popping up, and government is always trying to get this power.
[06:58.990 --> 07:01.530]  Is it forever doomed to failure?
[07:01.650 --> 07:02.270]  Bernie, what do you think?
[07:03.170 --> 07:08.330]  Well, what would prevent people from just going across the river to New Jersey and buying their phone if this was a New York thing?
[07:08.570 --> 07:14.890]  And also, I'm looking at the legislative language here about any phone sold or leased in New York.
[07:15.790 --> 07:23.930]  The Assemblyman spelled it leased L-E-A-S-T, like less than leased instead of leased as in leased.
[07:24.010 --> 07:26.390]  How do you know he spelled it that way in the person quoting him?
[07:26.390 --> 07:33.650]  Well, this is a quote in an article in Ars Technica, so I think they just copied and pasted the legislative language.
[07:33.870 --> 07:37.410]  It wouldn't surprise me, but it would be funny if that actually was passed into law.
[07:37.690 --> 07:40.630]  How would they interpret that leased L-E-A-S-T?
[07:40.630 --> 07:43.790]  You know, I'm going to bet on the journalist typo.
[07:43.850 --> 07:46.030]  Otherwise, it would say sick in brackets next to it.
[07:47.510 --> 07:48.170]  This is silly.
[07:48.270 --> 07:52.530]  How can you localize this sort of restriction on just one state?
[07:52.970 --> 07:57.570]  I mean, Apple isn't going to create a special phone for New Yorkers.
[07:57.690 --> 07:59.250]  They're just saying, hell with you folks.
[07:59.430 --> 08:14.110]  Yeah, but Bernie, the way things change in this country, I've noticed, has been on the state level at first, and then it sort of cascades, and before you know it, the entire nation is demanding something, and then, last and least, the federal government finally makes a change.
[08:14.650 --> 08:17.790]  So something like this could start at the state level and catch on.
[08:17.850 --> 08:21.030]  But it just seems fantasy.
[08:22.450 --> 08:29.750]  Even if all 50 states went with something like this, well, you could still go to another country, or you could still design something of your own.
[08:29.950 --> 08:35.070]  Encryption is here to stay, and the people in charge need to realize that and deal with it.
[08:35.070 --> 08:39.210]  You know, we're giving away more of our privacy now than ever before with our little devices.
[08:39.410 --> 08:42.890]  It's easier to find people than it was 20 years ago.
[08:43.030 --> 08:50.670]  So all this complaining is really just another poor attempt at getting yet more control over our lives.
[08:50.750 --> 08:50.890]  Rob?
[08:51.310 --> 09:03.290]  And another question this raises is, where does this leave people who like to root and or jailbreak their phone and upload an alternative OS that's maybe open source and not subject to such restrictions?
[09:03.990 --> 09:06.490]  I mean, I'm sure the congressman question...
[09:06.490 --> 09:07.750]  Would it make you a correct criminal?
[09:08.390 --> 09:10.270]  ...doesn't care in the least about that.
[09:10.430 --> 09:16.590]  I did look up the text of the bill from the official state government website, and they did spell least correctly.
[09:16.850 --> 09:18.230]  So that's on the journalist.
[09:18.490 --> 09:23.870]  But the rest of the idiot idea is on the state representative in question.
[09:23.870 --> 09:30.570]  I'm slightly optimistic here because this is New York State where the state government doesn't do anything.
[09:30.930 --> 09:33.770]  They basically never pass any bills.
[09:34.350 --> 09:39.750]  So I'm kind of optimistic that this will be in the set of bills that they never get around to looking at.
[09:39.950 --> 09:41.950]  But it is a terrible idea.
[09:41.950 --> 09:47.530]  And some state with a more competent government might try and copy it and actually pass it.
[09:47.630 --> 09:48.430]  And that would be worrying.
[09:48.430 --> 09:56.030]  Well, just don't think that this is something that's isolated to any particular state, any particular party, any particular country.
[09:56.330 --> 09:57.150]  Let's go overseas.
[09:57.390 --> 10:08.250]  France says the European Union is moving too slowly with efforts to cut off finances to extremist groups a year after the attacks in Paris on Charlie Hebdo.
[10:09.730 --> 10:19.750]  France's finance minister, Michel Sapin, I believe, said on Friday, we can no longer wait day after day for decisions to be taken.
[10:20.250 --> 10:28.790]  He demanded that the EU's executive commission lay out by next month a very precise vision of what measures must be taken to deprive extremists of funds.
[10:29.410 --> 10:41.050]  France wants the EU to boost intelligence sharing among finance experts, tighten the rules on prepaid cash cards, and introduce tougher controls over the use of virtual currencies like Bitcoin.
[10:41.430 --> 10:46.070]  So you see, this quest for control, it's everywhere.
[10:46.390 --> 10:55.710]  The technologies that they don't understand, that they don't feel they have a handle on, they want crippled in one form or another so that they can basically set the rules.
[10:56.770 --> 11:05.150]  Yeah, I mean, and they come up with these bills like so quickly after various attacks that you know they've been thinking about it for a while.
[11:05.330 --> 11:10.930]  And there's no evidence, of course, to suggest that this would prevent any sort of violent attacks.
[11:11.370 --> 11:13.990]  But, you know, they just want this level of control.
[11:14.210 --> 11:24.190]  And I hope that the good people of France, our friends at Le Quadratire d'Ernette, I'm sure are busy opposing this and other members of the civil society.
[11:24.370 --> 11:28.570]  But it's really problematic that we have to keep fighting these nonsense bills.
[11:28.750 --> 11:33.570]  Because one day when we blink and these bills pass, that's when the trouble starts.
[11:34.110 --> 11:38.550]  Well, I'm curious where this is going to be a bunch of years down the road.
[11:38.670 --> 11:42.490]  Because obviously, encryption is going to get better, stronger.
[11:43.270 --> 11:45.830]  But will it be used more by people?
[11:46.010 --> 11:51.610]  Will we step up to the plate and make it so that it's easy for people to use by default?
[11:51.870 --> 11:53.090]  Easier than it is now.
[11:53.190 --> 12:13.270]  So that all of our emails going back and forth, so that all of our private messages, whether they're direct messages in Twitter or any other platform we decide to use, that they cannot simply be read by anybody who has, quote unquote, the authority to do so or the skill to get in.
[12:13.270 --> 12:17.090]  You always see these news stories about how hackers can access this information.
[12:17.310 --> 12:21.750]  What they really should be saying is government or criminals or anybody.
[12:21.950 --> 12:23.430]  Because that's what it is.
[12:23.510 --> 12:26.710]  When something is wide open like that, anyone can get access to it.
[12:27.070 --> 12:27.570]  Emmanuel?
[12:27.810 --> 12:27.950]  Yes.
[12:29.170 --> 12:35.250]  I find it hard to believe that these legislators who come up with this stuff, they're creating all this language themselves.
[12:35.410 --> 12:44.190]  You've seen time and time again where political lobbyists, corporate lobbyists, basically draft legislation and feed it to legislators along with a big bag of money.
[12:45.990 --> 13:03.070]  I would not be surprised at all, as we've seen with CALEA back in 1994 and other communications act for law enforcement assistance and other really odious legislation that was depriving people of privacy, was being pushed heavily by law enforcement.
[13:04.330 --> 13:11.170]  I'd like to know who talked to this legislator and said, hey, this is a really good idea.
[13:11.310 --> 13:13.790]  This is what you should say in your bill.
[13:13.970 --> 13:14.570]  What do you think?
[13:14.890 --> 13:21.850]  Well, they're obviously talking to quote-unquote experts who whisper words into their ears so that they don't look like total idiots.
[13:23.210 --> 13:27.270]  But are you asking what interests do they represent?
[13:27.290 --> 13:31.950]  Because they don't represent Google and Apple, at least not in their present form.
[13:32.270 --> 13:43.490]  Which of their constituents, like consumers of using cell phones, are actually clamoring to them, to these legislators, and saying, hey, we want less privacy on our phones.
[13:44.010 --> 13:48.390]  Please make a bill that will make our phones and communications less private.
[13:48.510 --> 13:49.670]  Who's really pushing this stuff?
[13:49.730 --> 13:53.210]  I don't think it's the legislators that are coming up with this legislative language.
[13:53.230 --> 14:01.010]  I think someone is, as you say, whispering in their ears, saying, this is what you want to put in the bill, and this is why you're going to do it for us.
[14:01.510 --> 14:02.010]  Yeah.
[14:02.170 --> 14:12.210]  And the providers and people who implement it and enforce it, they're probably not going to do so justly, like across the board.
[14:12.430 --> 14:19.130]  It's going to be applied to people that prosecutors and attorneys want to go after.
[14:19.130 --> 14:39.450]  But the politicians themselves, I'm sure, you know, getting their records and applying decryption techniques to people of privilege, it just won't happen because of what we feel should be inalienable privacy.
[14:39.850 --> 14:41.570]  But we just know that's not the case.
[14:41.710 --> 14:48.850]  When power is rolled out in this way, it's applied to, it's not applied evenly and in a just way.
[14:48.850 --> 14:48.870]  Okay.
[14:49.150 --> 14:52.710]  So I'm looking at this New York state bill in a little more detail.
[14:52.710 --> 14:54.870]  And it's such a, it's very poorly written.
[14:55.150 --> 14:58.890]  They give a whole paragraph of definition of what sold in New York means.
[14:59.010 --> 15:00.590]  And it means exactly what you would think it means.
[15:00.730 --> 15:02.310]  They have to define what sold in New York means?
[15:02.310 --> 15:03.430]  Yeah, well, they bother to.
[15:04.130 --> 15:05.450]  And it goes on and on.
[15:06.050 --> 15:07.930]  I'm not going to bore you by reading it.
[15:08.030 --> 15:12.250]  But they don't ever define encrypted or locked, which is the thing...
[15:12.250 --> 15:13.350]  I'd love to hear the definition of that.
[15:13.530 --> 15:15.590]  Well, they don't provide one, which is so strange.
[15:15.910 --> 15:19.530]  It's totally unclear what this bill is actually trying to accomplish.
[15:21.290 --> 15:23.710]  It's trying to make people not feel scared, basically.
[15:23.830 --> 15:25.290]  It's like the TSA on paper.
[15:25.610 --> 15:34.310]  They just want to, want to do something that makes it seem like they're on top of the situation when in actuality, they don't have a clue what's going on and it scares them to death.
[15:34.470 --> 15:43.450]  And to answer Bernie, you know, or to ask another question of what you brought up, I wonder who comes out first and says, we need this.
[15:43.550 --> 15:52.970]  Is it the politicians that say, hey, can somebody out there in the technical community come forward and give us information that would back up our position where we want to control more?
[15:53.110 --> 15:56.370]  Can you give us as much technical rationale behind that?
[15:56.510 --> 16:06.130]  Or is it somebody in the technological community that goes to the politicians and says, hey, I've got a smoking hot story for you here.
[16:06.490 --> 16:08.930]  And this is why this is important.
[16:09.070 --> 16:10.550]  This is why you have to clamp down harder.
[16:10.550 --> 16:20.590]  I mean, I think in this particular case, it's relatively clear that like no one with any level of technical smarts was involved in the drafting of this bill at any level, because it's so vague and useless.
[16:20.810 --> 16:21.850]  I wouldn't say that.
[16:21.850 --> 16:25.570]  I think there are people with technical smarts that say really stupid things.
[16:25.710 --> 16:36.910]  No, no, I, there are plenty of people with technical smarts who could draft a better, a better written version of this bill that would actually make its aims clear in all kinds of ways that I disagree with.
[16:37.030 --> 16:47.890]  But I don't even think any of those people were involved just based on the fact As I say, they go into a full paragraph of defining sold in New York and then another full paragraph of defining leased in New York.
[16:47.990 --> 16:51.570]  And then they just use encrypted or locked, like we're all supposed to know exactly what they mean.
[16:51.590 --> 16:56.050]  It's like when you have to write a five-page paper and you only have two pages of material.
[16:56.090 --> 16:57.910]  You have to space it out as much as possible.
[16:57.930 --> 16:59.430]  So they're just filling it with definitions.
[17:00.250 --> 17:21.870]  I kind of agree with that, but is it possible also that maybe the providers themselves are coming up with these things with a little bit of pressure maybe from government and they're trying to lobby or otherwise push this stuff through so that their lives are easier in providing service and they're not challenged as much because,
[17:22.050 --> 17:33.490]  well, we've had this stuff on the books and it's sort of an industry-government combination that then kind of gets it onto the public docket, so to speak.
[17:33.770 --> 17:35.850]  I mean, I don't buy it in this particular case.
[17:35.850 --> 17:45.170]  I think you're right that that happens all the time, but this law, as written, is so broad that no cell phone provider would willingly open themselves up to the kind of...
[17:45.170 --> 17:50.510]  There's serious penalties, $2,500 per phone that you sell, which could add up.
[17:51.070 --> 17:59.710]  And there's no way that a cell phone provider would open themselves up to that kind of liability without actually enough definitions to know how to avoid that liability, and that's not here.
[17:59.890 --> 18:00.490]  That's interesting.
[18:00.630 --> 18:10.210]  I'm glad you make the distinction because it seems like they would be shooting themselves in the foot by attacking their market, their customers like this.
[18:10.430 --> 18:12.830]  How could that be a business plan?
[18:13.030 --> 18:14.190]  It just makes no sense.
[18:14.390 --> 18:14.390]  All right.
[18:14.470 --> 18:14.810]  Well, look.
[18:14.910 --> 18:15.870]  This is not a law.
[18:16.070 --> 18:17.850]  This is a proposed law.
[18:17.970 --> 18:18.970]  It's not going to go anywhere.
[18:19.310 --> 18:25.050]  It's basically dipping a toe into the pool to see what the temperature is, to see how it gets received.
[18:25.210 --> 18:31.150]  And they're going to come back with something that's better written, that spells all the words right, and has definitions that actually make sense.
[18:31.350 --> 18:51.210]  So we need to be prepared for that because the day is going to come when a bill like this has a realistic chance of passing because there'll be more attacks that scare people and hackers will be demonized even more as the threat that's basically compromising everybody's privacy,
[18:51.230 --> 18:53.910]  when actually it's probably a lot closer to the opposite.
[18:53.910 --> 19:07.650]  So what arguments do we use against this kind of thinking where people are saying, hey, we need to be able to read these terrorist emails and text messages and stop crime before it happens?
[19:07.790 --> 19:12.590]  How can you defend encrypted messages between all these evil people?
[19:12.750 --> 19:18.370]  Isn't it worth giving up a little security, a little privacy to be able to stop that kind of thing?
[19:18.470 --> 19:19.130]  What do we say to that?
[19:20.010 --> 19:21.250]  All right, Bernie, we heard that.
[19:22.070 --> 19:23.930]  But we need to say more than just no.
[19:24.910 --> 19:39.450]  I mean, I agree with Bernie's analysis so far as it goes, but I'll go a little further and say that, you know, to deny people the right to encrypt their communications is really a great enabler of criminality.
[19:39.810 --> 19:48.950]  The only reason why, you know, credit card fraud is as low as it is, is because it is, takes some work to get access to people's credit card numbers.
[19:49.090 --> 19:59.250]  If you could just sit in a cafe and go on the Wi-Fi, the unencrypted Wi-Fi, and look at everything anyone ever said, criminals would be doing that all the time.
[19:59.930 --> 20:06.570]  The online economy, as we know now, it could, as we now know it, could not exist without encryption.
[20:07.030 --> 20:10.770]  And so we would really be giving up a lot by banning encryption.
[20:11.430 --> 20:19.430]  And the cost of the occasional criminal getting away with something is really pales in comparison.
[20:19.770 --> 20:27.230]  Well, you see, I want to move towards a world where we're not talking about encryption being banned, but encryption being the default.
[20:27.490 --> 20:36.230]  And how do we defend that, where it's not just people with something sensitive to say that are encrypting their communications, but that's how everybody communicates now.
[20:36.310 --> 20:39.650]  The government can't simply listen in on our private conversations anymore.
[20:39.650 --> 20:41.170]  They have to find some other way.
[20:41.310 --> 20:43.950]  Are we crippling law enforcement by doing that?
[20:44.690 --> 20:47.890]  Because keeping things unlocked in general is never good security.
[20:48.190 --> 20:56.770]  It's, you know, if they outlawed locks and everyone had to leave their houses and cars and things open, we would quickly see how far crime rises in those circumstances.
[20:56.990 --> 21:00.870]  And we're really just talking about an electronic equivalent to that.
[21:01.090 --> 21:08.970]  And so, you know, we have to reinforce that, yes, this is something that's good, that's useful to a lot of us for a great many reasons.
[21:09.430 --> 21:15.790]  You're probably using it several times a day without even realizing it, and the loss of it would be substantial and actually dangerous.
[21:17.110 --> 21:18.430]  Bernie, any thoughts from you?
[21:20.670 --> 21:23.630]  Again, I just don't think this is going to go anywhere.
[21:23.950 --> 21:32.190]  It's kind of... I don't think we should be spending a lot of time talking about it, frankly, because they want us to be talking about this and being afraid about it.
[21:32.490 --> 21:38.850]  And I really don't... I think that if people really care about this, they should contact the legislators and say, what are you smoking?
[21:39.070 --> 21:40.330]  This is just really stupid.
[21:40.590 --> 21:42.950]  I think that will speak louder than anything we say on the air.
[21:43.190 --> 21:46.170]  Bernie, I agree with your analysis for this particular bill.
[21:46.170 --> 21:49.570]  I think it won't go anywhere, and we don't have to be super worried about it.
[21:49.890 --> 21:52.050]  But I want to echo what Emmanuel said.
[21:52.170 --> 21:54.870]  I don't think this is the end of this kind of legislation.
[21:54.870 --> 21:59.270]  I think the next one will be slightly better written, and eventually people will start taking it seriously.
[21:59.270 --> 21:59.850]  What then?
[22:01.930 --> 22:04.170]  We do have to keep letting people know about it.
[22:04.210 --> 22:04.830]  I guess you're right.
[22:05.010 --> 22:13.790]  Maybe we should be talking about it early rather than later when better versions or more craftily worded versions of this sort of legislation comes down the pike.
[22:14.570 --> 22:23.170]  But I think education is the strongest thing that we could use, not just us, but organizations like the Electronic Frontier Foundation.
[22:24.210 --> 22:30.610]  And we've even had some presidential candidates talk about this kind of stuff recently in a debate earlier this week.
[22:30.770 --> 22:37.150]  So it's surprising that the high levels this is being talked about it, but the more people know about it and discuss it, I think the better.
[22:37.710 --> 22:46.650]  Also, just choose services, choose things that you've looked into and that have the kind of security we're talking about as much as you can.
[22:46.770 --> 22:52.790]  Maybe that's something that's a little bit something you have to be a bit too proactive or vigilant on.
[22:52.910 --> 23:00.330]  But it doesn't take much when you're going through different things that you're interested in to find out a little bit more about them, built.
[23:00.830 --> 23:26.670]  And then also, just as we innovate and build things ourselves in the digital realm, like, let's embrace these things and make that a part of our calculations, whether you need more processing power for it or bandwidth or whatever it is, but make those considerations as you're developing technologies that people will think are cool.
[23:26.670 --> 23:33.150]  You know, the other reason I think that we should continue talking about this is because I don't want the status quo.
[23:33.290 --> 23:38.850]  I don't want things to stay the way they are and protect it from further encroachment.
[23:39.050 --> 23:42.450]  Obviously, I want to protect it from further encroachment, but I want to make things better.
[23:42.690 --> 23:49.970]  I want to make things so that encryption is the default and it's easy to use and it's a lot more widespread than it is now.
[23:50.090 --> 23:58.410]  We're not constantly advertising private information about ourselves that if we took a few seconds to think about, we really wouldn't want that to get out there.
[23:58.730 --> 24:05.310]  And that to me is the real threat that we have less privacy now than we did 20 years ago.
[24:05.550 --> 24:06.790]  And I see it getting worse.
[24:06.930 --> 24:13.330]  I see it getting worse as we get more sophisticated devices that don't take that into account.
[24:14.010 --> 24:20.070]  You're not told of certain features in your phone or your tablet that advertise where you are.
[24:20.210 --> 24:31.270]  You know, I had some interesting things happen myself, and I've heard this from other people, where a smartphone figures out where your house is without you telling it because of how much time you spend there.
[24:31.770 --> 24:32.590]  It's kind of invasive.
[24:32.850 --> 24:37.510]  The other day, my smartphone told me how far I was from work.
[24:37.710 --> 24:39.290]  Now, I have no idea what it...
[24:39.290 --> 24:42.690]  Unfortunately, I wasn't able to follow where it was trying to take me.
[24:42.870 --> 24:47.150]  But it had figured out that I work somewhere, and I was this amount of time away from it.
[24:47.250 --> 24:58.130]  I love giving it bad information, leaving it someplace for a few days so that it thinks that's where I live, you know, messing around with their algorithms and systems and things like that.
[24:58.210 --> 25:08.270]  But for the average person who doesn't play these games, a lot of information about you is getting out without you giving specific permission to let that information get out.
[25:08.370 --> 25:13.330]  And it's being stored in various data centers and all kinds of places.
[25:13.330 --> 25:17.030]  And it's being made accessible to people who know how to get it.
[25:17.290 --> 25:18.870]  These are serious issues.
[25:18.990 --> 25:20.250]  You may think you have nothing to hide.
[25:20.490 --> 25:24.310]  But everybody values privacy, and everybody should know how to protect that.
[25:24.810 --> 25:30.750]  Yeah, I mean, I don't think the solution, and to be clear, I don't think you're saying this is the solution, is to make our devices dumber.
[25:30.810 --> 25:34.390]  I think the solution is to let us have control over our own data.
[25:34.530 --> 25:35.370]  Like, it's super useful.
[25:35.370 --> 25:45.210]  I know some people who think it's super useful to get notified how much traffic there is going home so they can adjust what time they leave work appropriately.
[25:45.650 --> 25:45.670]  Yes.
[25:46.490 --> 25:48.670]  But who else has access to that data?
[25:48.770 --> 25:49.530]  There's no way to know.
[25:49.730 --> 25:52.610]  And we're not given the tools to make those trade-offs.
[25:52.670 --> 25:53.530]  I think that's the problem.
[25:54.230 --> 26:01.970]  I think also it's just worthy of a reminder of just how powerful the handsets we have now are.
[26:01.970 --> 26:04.390]  They are chock full of sensors.
[26:04.870 --> 26:19.170]  And just a recognition of what you're actually using and the kinds of data footprints or trails you're leaving in all kinds of ways is, I think, a healthy attitude.
[26:19.290 --> 26:20.950]  Just that awareness.
[26:20.950 --> 26:28.970]  And I think that's part of communicating and having discussion about how things work or what underlying technologies are used and so on.
[26:28.970 --> 26:29.550]  Yeah.
[26:29.670 --> 26:40.810]  And I want to echo what Mike said as far as the usability, the coolness factor of a lot of these things that we have now on our devices.
[26:41.750 --> 26:42.670]  Don't get me wrong.
[26:42.670 --> 26:43.870]  I love playing with these things.
[26:43.990 --> 26:45.110]  I love experimenting with them.
[26:45.190 --> 26:53.350]  But I also cringe when I see how information is just being given out and people aren't thinking, who else could have access to this?
[26:53.450 --> 27:00.630]  What is this saying about me as far as my habits, where I go, who my friends are, various things like that?
[27:00.950 --> 27:04.470]  And that's what I think is more available now than ever before.
[27:04.710 --> 27:09.610]  There are a few stories, actually, that came out in the past week or so that underline things like this.
[27:10.150 --> 27:12.430]  The Nest thermostat, really cool device.
[27:12.590 --> 27:25.290]  You know, it allows you to control the temperature in your house remotely and set schedules and have it know when you're around and basically figure things out that normally would be a bit of a pain.
[27:25.390 --> 27:26.950]  You'd have to adjust things yourself.
[27:27.210 --> 27:33.010]  It's kind of cool, too, because you can hook it up to any kind of home heating system.
[27:33.030 --> 27:38.210]  So it takes like maybe an older system and kind of breathes a little bit of tech into it.
[27:38.310 --> 27:53.070]  And it's kind of a retro computing kind of thing that you can have your old heater maybe run a little bit more efficiently or have these things like remote access that you never would have had when it was originally installed and so on.
[27:53.110 --> 27:54.110]  It's a really good tool.
[27:54.430 --> 28:07.770]  But you know, kind of my philosophy on these things is that you should always have the old technology still there in addition to the new technology to serve as a backup when the new technology has some kind of a bug because it's new and we're still figuring it out.
[28:08.730 --> 28:17.610]  And recently, Nest, which by the way was bought by Google, as anything that is cool eventually is, 3.2 billion dollars they bought it for in 2014.
[28:17.610 --> 28:18.330]  Can you imagine that?
[28:18.330 --> 28:21.910]  That's like two lotteries of last week.
[28:22.010 --> 28:22.790]  It was bought by Alphabet.
[28:23.650 --> 28:24.290]  Alphabet, yes.
[28:24.410 --> 28:25.510]  Are we supposed to call them Alphabet now?
[28:25.690 --> 28:27.110]  At the time it was bought, it was Google.
[28:27.150 --> 28:27.930]  Yeah, it was Google then.
[28:28.350 --> 28:28.950]  Alphabet now.
[28:29.250 --> 28:38.690]  Anyway, they sent out some kind of an update and all kinds of customers all around were affected by this.
[28:39.210 --> 28:41.710]  Their Nest systems went offline.
[28:42.250 --> 28:45.010]  One customer tweeted that mine is offline.
[28:45.150 --> 28:46.010]  Not enough battery.
[28:46.390 --> 28:47.370]  I'm traveling.
[28:47.510 --> 28:48.110]  I called Nest.
[28:48.210 --> 28:48.870]  It's a known problem.
[28:48.970 --> 28:49.610]  No resolution.
[28:50.810 --> 28:54.670]  And this basically, they call this a first world problem.
[28:54.850 --> 28:56.630]  You know, a thermostat that can't connect to the web.
[28:56.830 --> 29:06.010]  But it can be a serious thing because, well, if you have somebody who's elderly or ill or you have infants in the house, freezing house can have some dire health consequences.
[29:06.550 --> 29:14.930]  And people who installed a Nest in, say, a weekend home or who are on vacation, well, the pipes could freeze and burst while you're not there.
[29:15.070 --> 29:16.490]  You're not aware of this situation.
[29:16.870 --> 29:24.590]  So according to Matt Rogers, who is the co-founder and vice president for engineering at Nest, it was a software update from December that was at fault.
[29:24.610 --> 29:28.410]  We had a bug that was introduced in the software update that didn't show up for about two weeks.
[29:28.750 --> 29:32.710]  In January, devices went offline, and that's when things started to heat up.
[29:32.810 --> 29:35.710]  That's an unfortunate phrase that he used there because things did not heat up.
[29:36.090 --> 29:42.090]  But Nest said the issue had been fixed for 99.5, which happens to be our frequency percent of its customers.
[29:42.630 --> 29:49.070]  And to be fair, the company's tech support has been working hard to help users who are affected.
[29:49.170 --> 29:56.810]  But the fix can require customers to follow a nine-step procedure to manually restart the thermostat.
[29:56.870 --> 30:01.890]  So if you've got your grandparents this as a present or something like that, think of what they might have to go through to fix this.
[30:02.030 --> 30:11.390]  They have to detach the device from the wall, charge it with a USB cable for 15 minutes, reattach it to the wall, press a series of buttons, charge it again for at least an hour, etc., etc., etc.
[30:13.430 --> 30:17.470]  According to this piece in the New York Times, this is not just about the Nest.
[30:17.630 --> 30:21.010]  It points to a larger problem with so-called smart devices we're inviting into our lives.
[30:21.310 --> 30:23.510]  Small glitches can cause huge problems.
[30:23.630 --> 30:26.370]  We've seen it before with wireless fobs for keyless cars.
[30:26.550 --> 30:34.190]  They're supposed to make life easier by letting us do away with car keys, but they also make it easier for thieves to break in by using a simple radio amplifier.
[30:34.370 --> 30:42.590]  And thank you for writing this article and saying thieves and not hackers, because nine-tenths of the articles out there say hackers are the only ones breaking into cars, which obviously is not true.
[30:43.190 --> 30:47.030]  It also happened recently with Fitbit, the maker of wearable activity trackers.
[30:47.130 --> 30:58.310]  The company was hit with a class action lawsuit in San Francisco, asserting that the wristbands failed to, quote, consistently and accurately record wearers' heart rates, which is vital for those with certain medical conditions.
[30:58.570 --> 30:59.770]  But here's the thing.
[30:59.970 --> 31:02.390]  I know, Bernie, you're going to have a field day with this.
[31:02.810 --> 31:16.490]  Buried deep in Nest's 8,000-word service agreement, which we all read when we sign up for these things, there's a section called Disputes and Arbitration, which prohibits customers from suing the company or joining a class action suit.
[31:16.670 --> 31:17.890]  They can just throw that in there.
[31:17.890 --> 31:21.190]  Instead, disputes have to be settled through arbitration.
[31:21.570 --> 31:26.890]  And arbitration means you have to travel to where Google is in San Francisco.
[31:27.010 --> 31:34.510]  And that already puts people at a tremendous disadvantage by having to do that.
[31:34.630 --> 31:43.290]  And you have to agree to keep the terms of the arbitration confidential, meaning you can't warn other consumers about potential flaws.
[31:43.390 --> 31:45.710]  Bernie, does this seem typical to you?
[31:45.710 --> 31:54.730]  No, I think that some politicians are actually talking about outlawing these really onerous arbitration clauses in contracts.
[31:54.910 --> 32:05.130]  More and more stuff that you buy, if you look in the fine print of the license or the terms of service, you have to agree, like when you use the product at all, that you won't sue the company that offers it.
[32:05.330 --> 32:15.470]  And it has to be settled through like a binding arbitration thing, like you said, where you have to go to them and then they pick the arbiters who decides you don't get to pick your own lawyer or anything.
[32:15.630 --> 32:16.210]  It doesn't work that way.
[32:16.330 --> 32:20.930]  And you can't talk about the settlement at all, if there even is one, and you're just out of luck.
[32:21.150 --> 32:30.630]  How does that foster better... how does that foster any accountability or improving things when they can keep all their mistakes secret?
[32:30.770 --> 32:32.010]  I think it's counterproductive.
[32:32.250 --> 32:41.990]  Yeah, it's very rarely a good thing to go ahead and sign away one of the basic rights of our society, in this case, the right to take legal action against an entity that wrongs you somehow.
[32:42.370 --> 32:49.730]  And we see time and again that they slip these things into contracts and, you know, people are stuck with stuff that doesn't work.
[32:49.810 --> 32:58.850]  But yeah, I can't really think of a good context in which you should sign something and go, okay, yeah, it's worth giving up such and such a right to have this gadget or to do this thing.
[32:59.390 --> 33:01.470]  And to be clear, like arbitration can be useful.
[33:01.650 --> 33:08.490]  I had a legal dispute once where we were able to settle it more cheaply with arbitration than with the the formal court system.
[33:08.770 --> 33:20.450]  But there are cases like product disputes where it's just not at all efficient for one person who probably maybe only had a couple thousand dollars worth of damages to bring the case.
[33:20.970 --> 33:25.110]  People banding together can bring a case that affects everyone.
[33:25.350 --> 33:33.070]  And that is what large corporations like in this case, Google and basically every other large company you do business with are afraid of.
[33:33.550 --> 33:41.170]  What got me about this though, I was just looking it over and asking why can't they just revert back to their old thermostat?
[33:41.350 --> 33:45.270]  If something doesn't work, why can't you just go back and use it manually?
[33:45.470 --> 33:48.250]  And I realized you have to replace your old thermostat.
[33:48.510 --> 33:53.270]  And so it no longer, if you lose power or if the device loses power, you have no control anymore.
[33:53.590 --> 33:59.530]  You don't have that basic backup where you can just turn it on or turn it off.
[33:59.610 --> 34:03.530]  You have to disconnect everything and basically reassemble it.
[34:03.770 --> 34:16.710]  Yeah, you have to deinstall and then reinstall the manual or the chemical or however the other thermostat you originally were replacing with the Nest.
[34:16.950 --> 34:23.350]  So it puts you in a position of having to get a toolbox out and actually start messing with wires.
[34:23.550 --> 34:32.450]  And again, if someone installed this for you and you are maybe not inclined to be doing this stuff yourself anyway, you're basically at the mercy of bad software.
[34:32.630 --> 34:45.150]  And I think this is something that is huge in the realm of apps and a lot of software out there that we're depending on or that we're simply licensing.
[34:45.150 --> 34:47.410]  We don't actually own all of these kinds of things.
[34:48.530 --> 34:50.210]  It really ought not to be...
[34:50.210 --> 34:58.170]  I mean, I get that frivolous lawsuits and stuff are a thing and people are, you know, concerned and they have to guarantee their shareholders all this stuff.
[34:58.390 --> 35:04.630]  But it also ought to be that there is recourse that does something.
[35:04.850 --> 35:16.410]  And I feel like we just have so much stuff that's kind of shoddily implemented and we're sort of left to pick up the pieces or dig around and research how it ought to work.
[35:16.610 --> 35:22.130]  And in a lot of cases, this stuff is just hurried to market and not well put together.
[35:22.130 --> 35:23.830]  And then the support isn't well put together.
[35:24.010 --> 35:33.230]  You see this with older, like the early proprietary software development and stuff, but you see it even more now.
[35:33.910 --> 35:41.550]  And it used to be that an update meant something like, oh, you know, it's going to fix some things that people were worried about and this, that and the other thing.
[35:41.630 --> 35:53.630]  There's many situations where that not only isn't that great of a fix or whatever bugs it did fix, they're like lackluster, but really what it does is cripples, your ability to use the system.
[35:53.750 --> 36:06.370]  I had this in a case with some video software that then wanted RAM and my machine was physically unable to have any more RAM because of course it is a closed hardware design.
[36:06.590 --> 36:10.490]  So it wants more gigabytes than I can physically add to the machine.
[36:10.490 --> 36:18.570]  It just turns into this whole thing where now I have to get a new computer or get a totally new version of the operating system.
[36:18.830 --> 36:20.210]  And it just snowballs.
[36:20.210 --> 36:27.710]  And I think people really get, they, they get, um, disenhearted by the entire process and throw all of it out.
[36:27.930 --> 36:45.550]  So, um, anyway, power to the people for being able to, to, um, revert as you said, and, um, maybe let's like put more sort of safe modes and more, um, manual, like manual modes, uh, for if some of the automated stuff does fail and, um, um, and let's not,
[36:45.550 --> 36:53.170]  uh, uh, uh, outlaw people's ability to talk about problems they have with, with your products because that's a real thing.
[36:53.290 --> 36:55.910]  Consumers ought to have that, uh, power.
[36:55.910 --> 36:56.530]  Yeah.
[36:56.610 --> 37:10.890]  I mean, I've never in person yet seen one of the, uh, self-driving cars that everyone's, uh, uh, still going on about, but, um, it's my understanding that they do actually have a steering wheel inside that, uh, a human could grab and operate the car with if something went wrong with the software driving the thing.
[37:11.010 --> 37:12.710]  I can hardly wait to play with one of those things.
[37:12.790 --> 37:14.250]  I really, uh, I'm, I'm serious.
[37:14.770 --> 37:23.050]  Um, I, I think it's, it's, uh, it's, it's probably going to cause problems that we have not thought of yet, as well as some that we have thought of, but I can hardly wait to start.
[37:23.210 --> 37:31.750]  And, you know, if, if we're confident with the technology, people should be playing with the technology and figuring out what the limitations are, what the, what the weaknesses are.
[37:31.930 --> 37:34.710]  Otherwise we'll just be surprised when it happens unintentionally.
[37:34.930 --> 37:37.070]  Uh, here's another, uh, uh, cool device.
[37:37.170 --> 37:39.130]  Uh, we're talking about the Nest heating system.
[37:39.230 --> 37:41.730]  Well, have you heard about the ring smart doorbell?
[37:42.310 --> 37:42.550]  Yeah.
[37:43.250 --> 37:43.490]  Yeah.
[37:43.630 --> 37:46.190]  Apparently this is, um, that's something that, uh, a lot of people have.
[37:46.310 --> 37:54.970]  And these guys over at Pentest Partners, um, they assess computer systems, apps, and, and, and various other things for potential network security vulnerabilities.
[37:55.590 --> 38:00.670]  They took a look at this and found a serious flaw for hackers to exploit.
[38:00.870 --> 38:02.950]  Okay, CNET, thanks for using the word hackers there.
[38:03.230 --> 38:09.610]  Um, the team of testers says ring has already addressed the issue via a firmware update.
[38:09.890 --> 38:18.630]  Uh, but it's still, it's still interested, uh, uh, to see how hackers are trying to circumvent smart home security protocols to access wifi networks.
[38:18.730 --> 38:21.450]  First of all, the only evidence that they're doing this is in this article.
[38:21.810 --> 38:25.470]  Um, and it's, it's basically a, what if, um, uh, scenario here.
[38:25.790 --> 38:33.090]  Uh, but, uh, apparently, uh, there, um, uh, there is a button on, on these devices as an orange button.
[38:33.490 --> 38:40.070]  Uh, and they're only secured, uh, the, the ring devices are only secured to your doorframe with a couple of screws, pretty easy to access the back of the unit.
[38:40.530 --> 38:45.770]  And if a hacker were to press that orange button, they'd be able to get their hands on all sorts of wifi goodies.
[38:46.070 --> 38:55.450]  Specifically ring units are equipped with, uh, Ginespan wireless modules and pressing the orange configuration button puts it into access point mode.
[38:55.610 --> 39:03.190]  And once that access point is created, hackers can supposedly retrieve the Mac address and Ginespan's HTTP server.
[39:03.350 --> 39:04.950]  You know, there's a couple of things here that bug me.
[39:05.130 --> 39:06.490]  First of all, you have to have physical access.
[39:06.630 --> 39:10.550]  You have to walk up to somebody's house and, and, uh, unscrew the thing and press the button.
[39:11.150 --> 39:14.170]  That's not generally within the DMO of hackers.
[39:14.490 --> 39:14.610]  Okay.
[39:14.710 --> 39:19.930]  It's, it's a little, uh, after that, yeah, people can, can access all sorts of things, but you need that physical access.
[39:20.210 --> 39:23.010]  And if you've already walked up to it by then you've already been photographed by it.
[39:23.070 --> 39:30.970]  There's that too, because the whole point of the ring smart doorbell system is to, is to keep a record of the people that come up to your front door ways around that, notwithstanding.
[39:31.110 --> 39:36.770]  So if you see somebody with a paper bag over their heads coming up to your door, okay, there's, there's an indication that something might be up.
[39:36.910 --> 39:37.090]  Right.
[39:37.350 --> 39:44.350]  Uh, but you know, that's, um, this is not the same thing, but again, there should be a way to bypass that if it does become a thing.
[39:44.350 --> 39:48.170]  Well, imagine if it was hooked up to, uh, one of these motorized door locks.
[39:49.490 --> 39:49.890]  Okay.
[39:50.150 --> 39:51.310]  Does ring have that feature?
[39:51.550 --> 39:51.950]  I don't know.
[39:52.290 --> 39:53.170]  I've never used one of these.
[39:53.270 --> 39:58.050]  There's, there's, there's motorized locks and things, uh, with the use codes and so on.
[39:58.310 --> 40:02.290]  It's not a far stretch to have, um, these things start being integrated.
[40:02.290 --> 40:11.450]  And if one thing ends up being, um, vulnerable in this way you've described, then if it's connected to other things, you've got someone able to walk right in your front door.
[40:11.670 --> 40:18.350]  Well, you know, one of the, uh, stories that somebody sent us that sort of, um, um, made me feel good comes out of New Jersey.
[40:18.530 --> 40:22.010]  Doesn't happen very often, but wait, something out of New Jersey made you feel good.
[40:22.190 --> 40:23.070]  It does happen occasionally.
[40:23.310 --> 40:30.370]  This has to do with the, uh, the red and white metal boxes that you might see on utility poles or the walls of large buildings.
[40:30.670 --> 40:37.710]  Uh, they're considered relics of an earlier time pieces of street furniture that are easily overlooked in North Jersey's crowded suburban landscape.
[40:38.250 --> 40:45.110]  Fire departments almost everywhere once relied on these call boxes as their primary means of learning about fires and other emergencies.
[40:45.370 --> 40:49.670]  Now these boxes have been slowly disappearing over the past three decades, many becoming collector's items.
[40:49.810 --> 40:58.990]  In fact, um, as fewer departments see the value of maintaining a system that is prone to false alarms and in the era of the cell phone relies on century old telegraph technology.
[40:59.150 --> 41:02.510]  But some fire departments in New Jersey continue to use them.
[41:02.770 --> 41:11.470]  We kept some of these, uh, basic systems because they still work, said chief Anthony Verley of the TNEC fire department, uh, which has paid firefighters.
[41:11.670 --> 41:17.130]  Uh, Little Falls, Hawthorne, Hackensack, and Ridgewood also still use them for these departments and others.
[41:17.330 --> 41:20.790]  The appeal of the call box endures, not despite its simple nature.
[41:21.550 --> 41:32.130]  The technology after all was developed in the late 1800s, the boxes themselves and the wiring can date back to the 1930s or earlier, but because, because of, uh, it's simple nature.
[41:32.270 --> 41:39.650]  Call box systems, um, they use very little electricity, making them reliable in the event of a natural disaster that knocks out the power grid.
[41:39.850 --> 41:43.530]  A Ridgewood system, for example, runs on only 12 volts.
[41:44.090 --> 41:53.510]  Six car batteries in the attic at fire headquarters can provide enough backup power to run the entire box network for days in the event of a widespread power outage.
[41:53.630 --> 41:54.690]  We don't need power.
[41:54.890 --> 41:55.810]  We don't need anything.
[41:55.810 --> 41:58.030]  It's self-sufficient, they say.
[41:58.510 --> 42:04.610]  Uh, it's one of the rarest things you can think of when something 100 years old is more reliable than what they've come up with since.
[42:05.370 --> 42:07.050]  Now, call box systems are simple.
[42:07.250 --> 42:10.870]  The, the boxes are traditionally made of cast iron, though newer models can be made out of aluminum.
[42:11.270 --> 42:13.710]  Uh, they're attached to, to posts, poles, buildings.
[42:14.150 --> 42:15.270]  Uh, they're numbered.
[42:15.410 --> 42:18.130]  Firefighters have records of where each call box is located.
[42:18.150 --> 42:29.910]  And when someone pulls a box's lever, or if a smoke detector attached to one of them triggers it, gears inside the box begin to turn and click, tripping a signal that's transmitted to fire stations through a network of copper wires.
[42:29.910 --> 42:39.630]  Now, when the signal reaches a fire station, a bell chimes, get this, a number of times, corresponding to the number of the box, telling firefighters where to go.
[42:39.910 --> 42:41.690]  You could not get more simple than this.
[42:41.830 --> 42:47.510]  A digital signal receiver also prints out the box location, just to mix in a little new technology there.
[42:47.730 --> 42:59.990]  Now, some departments like Hackensack and Ridgewood maintain manual receivers that predate the digital ones and punch triangular-shaped holes in long strips of paper, like Morse code, indicating where the emergency is.
[43:00.070 --> 43:01.050]  We have to visit these guys.
[43:01.190 --> 43:02.270]  Wow, this is just so awesome.
[43:02.490 --> 43:18.070]  Um, but the real kicker here is that they're faster, because when this, this alarm gets sent into a fire department, you don't have to deal with a dispatcher who then contacts the fire department and, uh, and, and, you know, what can be a critical delay,
[43:18.270 --> 43:20.770]  uh, is avoided in these particular cases.
[43:21.690 --> 43:30.830]  So, um, for instance, the Hackensack department has received more than 6,500 calls this year, of which 1,200 to 1,300 came through the box system.
[43:31.050 --> 43:43.550]  Uh, nine times out of ten, the calls from the master boxes around the city, in the schools, Hackensack University Medical Center, other locations, reached the department before those from dispatchers or alarm companies.
[43:44.130 --> 43:47.570]  And that, to me, said the chief, is worth more than its weight in gold.
[43:47.730 --> 43:49.290]  So, you know, that's a perfect example.
[43:49.450 --> 43:54.550]  You can have the new technology, but this is a great backup when the new technology doesn't work.
[43:54.590 --> 44:05.650]  When cell phones die, when batteries wear out, when there's no signal, this system of, of a bell ringing the number of times or punching out some kind of code, it conveys information.
[44:05.730 --> 44:08.250]  And I think it's a, it's a really good example of that.
[44:08.250 --> 44:08.610]  Yeah.
[44:08.790 --> 44:12.230]  And I think this is also a very early example of the customizable, personalized ringtone.
[44:12.590 --> 44:17.250]  Uh, but also this, this is also delightfully steampunk gears turning and bells ringing.
[44:17.570 --> 44:19.330]  And, uh, you know, this is retro.
[44:19.490 --> 44:22.490]  I mean, the people who still play music off of vinyl records should be all about this.
[44:23.370 --> 44:23.770]  Absolutely.
[44:24.370 --> 44:26.050]  Hey, uh, let's take some phone calls.
[44:26.270 --> 44:30.230]  Uh, 718-780-8888 is our telephone number.
[44:30.350 --> 44:31.910]  718-780-8888.
[44:32.450 --> 44:39.290]  Um, this bit of news that, uh, I, I saw in a couple of different places and saves me from having to burn the place down.
[44:39.850 --> 44:44.810]  Uh, Pier 57, the place where they held people at, uh, we called it Guantanamo and Hudson.
[44:45.050 --> 44:47.650]  It was where they held people at the RNC in 2004.
[44:48.490 --> 44:50.150]  Nasty memories of that place.
[44:50.270 --> 44:52.470]  And well, hopefully the future memories will be better.
[44:52.850 --> 44:54.290]  Google is taking it over.
[44:54.550 --> 44:55.270]  That's right.
[44:55.550 --> 45:02.250]  Pier 57, which was a former freight and, uh, bus terminal on the edge of the, uh, meatpacking district.
[45:02.250 --> 45:04.150]  It stood empty since 2003.
[45:04.150 --> 45:05.350]  Well, not entirely true.
[45:05.570 --> 45:06.630]  It wasn't empty in 2004.
[45:06.630 --> 45:13.770]  I'll tell you that, uh, is, is about to be, um, to be leased, uh, 15 year lease for 250,000 square feet.
[45:14.430 --> 45:16.830]  So Google is taking over Pier 57.
[45:16.990 --> 45:17.910]  What do you guys think about that?
[45:19.410 --> 45:23.870]  I hope that they lock up people's private data and don't let it out.
[45:24.430 --> 45:26.010]  Well, yeah, the best I can do.
[45:26.150 --> 45:26.330]  Okay.
[45:26.470 --> 45:27.630]  No, it wasn't very good.
[45:27.630 --> 45:31.750]  And as someone who was locked up there, a bit offensive, but, um, yeah, yeah.
[45:31.970 --> 45:33.650]  Data should be treated differently than people.
[45:33.770 --> 45:34.770]  I think we can agree on that.
[45:35.150 --> 45:35.330]  Probably.
[45:35.390 --> 45:35.650]  Yes.
[45:35.970 --> 45:37.450]  I have a totally different question.
[45:37.550 --> 45:37.970]  It's kind of related.
[45:38.130 --> 45:44.290]  How many square feet is in Manhattan vertically and, um, horizontally?
[45:44.570 --> 45:45.730]  I want to know total.
[45:45.910 --> 45:47.110]  You were pondering that on the way in.
[45:47.190 --> 45:51.610]  You want to know, and if anybody can help Kyle with this, write to us, OTH at 2600.com.
[45:51.850 --> 45:55.950]  Uh, he wants to know how many square feet of living space there actually is in Manhattan.
[45:56.070 --> 45:58.150]  Not, not, not just the square footage of Manhattan.
[45:58.150 --> 46:02.930]  That's easy, but every single apartment building floor by floor, add all that up.
[46:03.090 --> 46:05.830]  And then maybe we can add up, uh, expansions to that.
[46:06.050 --> 46:06.230]  Total.
[46:06.410 --> 46:06.550]  Wow.
[46:06.770 --> 46:07.210]  Okay.
[46:07.310 --> 46:08.050]  That's a project.
[46:08.210 --> 46:10.010]  How do you even call that?
[46:10.290 --> 46:12.590]  Let's, uh, take a phone call and good evening.
[46:12.730 --> 46:13.650]  You're on off the hook.
[46:14.470 --> 46:17.030]  Uh, yeah, I was just first time ever calling.
[46:17.650 --> 46:21.570]  I mean, I've been hearing a bunch about privacy and whatnot.
[46:21.990 --> 46:24.710]  Why don't people just quit using smartphones?
[46:25.330 --> 46:29.010]  I mean, with convenience comes a price and the price is privacy.
[46:29.230 --> 46:31.370]  Well, you're very, you're very correct in that.
[46:31.550 --> 46:34.210]  And, um, uh, there is a price for convenience.
[46:34.430 --> 46:36.470]  I think, you know, there's a, there's a combination.
[46:36.810 --> 46:40.910]  There's, there's sort of a compromise that we can make where we're aware of, of, of what we're giving up.
[46:41.110 --> 46:45.190]  Uh, and we work on ways to, to preserve as much as possible, make decisions.
[46:45.430 --> 46:51.110]  Is this too much privacy I'm giving up, uh, in exchange for the convenience of using this really cool tool?
[46:51.750 --> 46:53.370]  Oh yeah, they try to hide all that.
[46:53.530 --> 46:53.730]  Uh huh.
[46:53.890 --> 46:54.330]  Yeah, they do.
[46:54.430 --> 46:54.990]  They absolutely do.
[46:55.270 --> 47:10.410]  Also, I mean, if there's anybody that wants to see a good talk about privacy, I mean, DEFCON 22 Zaws, I can't say the name on the radio, but, I mean, he had a really good talk.
[47:10.750 --> 47:11.190]  Okay.
[47:11.570 --> 47:12.010]  Yeah.
[47:12.170 --> 47:16.470]  Well, um, that's something that, uh, is being discussed in the hacker community quite a bit.
[47:16.470 --> 47:20.670]  And I think this is, this is where we should look for, uh, for answers to this.
[47:20.770 --> 47:20.870]  Rob.
[47:21.170 --> 47:21.430]  Yeah.
[47:21.490 --> 47:32.870]  I'm reminded of, uh, how they, when you see advertisements in this country on television for drugs and they'll tell you like what the drug is for, but then they would let, they have to rattle off all these lists of side effects and downsides to, isn't that great?
[47:33.170 --> 47:34.310]  It goes on for like two minutes.
[47:34.630 --> 47:44.410]  Now, if, if that happened when they had to advertise smartphones or Nest thermostats or anything, and they had to tell you all the terrible things that could happen if it goes wrong, um, would it have gotten as far as it has now?
[47:44.410 --> 47:44.410]  Yeah.
[47:44.550 --> 47:51.970]  And I think the metaphor is that because the drugs provide such amazing benefits for certain people that it is worth the risk of the side effects.
[47:51.970 --> 47:55.770]  And that is an informed decision that people in consultation with their doctors can make.
[47:56.070 --> 48:00.070]  But, uh, with the case of the, the cell phones, people just don't have all the information.
[48:00.290 --> 48:02.210]  They, they only know the good sides.
[48:02.350 --> 48:05.570]  And, and I think the good sides are many and, and, you know, worth considering.
[48:06.750 --> 48:07.210]  Yeah.
[48:07.370 --> 48:12.530]  I mean, and two, they gotta list every single case of where one thing went wrong.
[48:12.970 --> 48:19.970]  I hear, here, I had an idea, um, just based on your, uh, comment that perhaps there's, uh, room for innovation here.
[48:20.150 --> 48:32.630]  And maybe if there were some really cool, simple phones that, uh, were offered and people had that as an option, you still see people going after like the flip phones and so on, or people that just like them enough.
[48:32.790 --> 48:33.190]  They're simple.
[48:33.350 --> 48:35.050]  That's all they, that's all they want.
[48:35.270 --> 48:37.450]  There's so many different types of smartphones now.
[48:37.670 --> 48:45.470]  It'd be kind of cool if somebody took that and, uh, seized it as an opportunity to, uh, create another type of product that's a little bit more pared down.
[48:46.150 --> 48:47.410]  I don't know where you are now.
[48:48.070 --> 48:54.190]  Well, like with me, I mean, it's funny the look you get whenever you say, uh, I don't carry him mobile.
[48:55.330 --> 48:56.490]  Yeah, absolutely.
[48:56.950 --> 48:57.150]  Wow.
[48:57.290 --> 49:03.050]  I mean, they just, it's everybody's, they're getting overloaded on technology.
[49:03.050 --> 49:04.290]  There should be a balance.
[49:04.530 --> 49:06.410]  I mean, I don't consider myself a noob.
[49:06.890 --> 49:12.230]  I don't consider myself weak, but I mean, there should be a balance.
[49:12.490 --> 49:12.830]  Absolutely.
[49:12.890 --> 49:13.250]  Yes.
[49:13.350 --> 49:14.690]  I think you hit the nail on the head there.
[49:14.810 --> 49:15.670]  It definitely should be a balance.
[49:16.170 --> 49:20.110]  Let's, uh, continue that conversation over the, uh, weeks, months, years ahead.
[49:20.250 --> 49:20.450]  Thanks.
[49:20.610 --> 49:21.730]  Uh, thanks so much for that phone call.
[49:22.050 --> 49:25.670]  Again, our phone number is 718-780-8888.
[49:26.390 --> 49:27.490]  Let's take another phone call.
[49:27.550 --> 49:27.850]  Good evening.
[49:27.970 --> 49:28.790]  You're on off the hook.
[49:29.690 --> 49:30.210]  Hello.
[49:30.530 --> 49:30.630]  Hi.
[49:30.950 --> 49:37.630]  Um, I think it's, uh, kind of hilarious to think that there might be a black market in strong encryption, uh, smartphones.
[49:38.470 --> 49:44.250]  Um, the other thing would be, would GSM itself be outlawed since that uses some sort of encryption?
[49:44.790 --> 49:51.150]  And, uh, the third thing is, how would, uh, sales of cell phones across state lines be handled?
[49:51.350 --> 49:53.330]  Would that sale be considered in New York?
[49:56.250 --> 50:05.150]  Well, if, if you give me a moment, I can look up the very precise definition of sold in New York that the bill author provided, but the other questions I think are, are, are good questions.
[50:05.330 --> 50:14.010]  Something that I, I got out of our discussion and that you, um, reminded me of is what the crux, what I was hearing, what we were talking about is that they want it both ways.
[50:14.230 --> 50:17.830]  They want encryption when they're selling you something, right?
[50:17.990 --> 50:23.730]  When, when you are the consumer and they're profiting, uh, encryption is in their interest.
[50:23.910 --> 50:35.130]  But when, when they're not, when it's not about their bottom line, uh, they want access and they could be your, whomever, uh, government, whatever you fill in that.
[50:35.250 --> 50:37.290]  But the point is that's not possible.
[50:37.290 --> 50:52.230]  And it is what we're saying in this discussion that you cannot separate it that way and start, uh, tiering who has access to, uh, secure, secure communications and so on, uh, realistically, because people will reject that.
[50:52.530 --> 50:59.750]  I, I think it's really important, Kyle, to, to remember that there's more than one they and they have not always all the same goals.
[50:59.930 --> 51:03.930]  Uh, and there, so there are entities out there that are caring for your privacy.
[51:04.170 --> 51:07.390]  Uh, there are entities that want to destroy it in all circumstances.
[51:07.390 --> 51:09.610]  There are entities that want to destroy it in some circumstances.
[51:09.970 --> 51:13.270]  And it's important for us to, uh, distinguish among those cases.
[51:13.270 --> 51:19.470]  Well, I maintain though that everybody has their level at which point they stop caring about somebody else's privacy.
[51:19.610 --> 51:32.130]  Whether it's a sysadmin someplace, uh, a privacy advocate even, uh, there comes a point, whether it's in your personal life or just something that you get impassioned by where you will be tempted to violate somebody else's privacy.
[51:32.230 --> 51:34.170]  And technology makes that kind of thing possible.
[51:34.170 --> 51:50.210]  Whether it's looking up what somebody said on Facebook or, or using your, your admin access, uh, to, to see what somebody is doing in their account or being the government and, and simply being able to, uh, uh, to, to sign a bill or plug in a device and,
[51:50.230 --> 51:51.850]  and monitor masses of people.
[51:52.170 --> 51:54.390]  You raised some great questions though about interstate stuff.
[51:54.510 --> 51:57.750]  I mean, what if there were now, uh, encryption safe haven states?
[51:58.150 --> 52:01.770]  Um, it is kind of, uh, funny when you, when you look at it that way.
[52:02.030 --> 52:03.170]  That's, that's a, thanks for the insight.
[52:04.530 --> 52:05.070]  Well, thanks.
[52:05.170 --> 52:05.810]  Thanks for your call.
[52:06.090 --> 52:09.550]  Uh, we're going to move on to, uh, one or two more if we have time.
[52:09.550 --> 52:09.910]  Good evening.
[52:10.010 --> 52:10.770]  You're on off the hook.
[52:11.630 --> 52:11.950]  Yes.
[52:12.130 --> 52:22.230]  Um, I guess I have a fundamental question and, and is end to end encryption communication between two human beings on earth?
[52:22.310 --> 52:23.430]  Is that a human right?
[52:24.890 --> 52:26.690]  That's a, that's a, that's a good question.
[52:26.950 --> 52:27.750]  Uh, Bernie, what do you think?
[52:28.530 --> 52:29.850]  No, it's not legally.
[52:30.090 --> 52:31.010]  It's not a human right.
[52:31.170 --> 52:45.030]  It would be nice if we were all legally entitled to it, but, um, I don't think that has been, uh, made law in any country, nation state in, in the world where everyone is legally entitled to end to end encryption.
[52:45.330 --> 52:48.090]  Why didn't the founding fathers write that into the constitution?
[52:48.290 --> 52:49.090]  What, what was wrong with them?
[52:49.150 --> 52:53.850]  They, I think they would have had, had, had they knew of such technologies or thought of them back then.
[52:53.850 --> 52:56.310]  They had one shot at this and they blew it, you know?
[52:56.310 --> 52:56.930]  They would have done it.
[52:57.030 --> 52:58.170]  I think they'd have been all for it.
[52:58.270 --> 52:59.070]  Because you can't change it.
[52:59.190 --> 53:01.270]  You can't change the constitution ever for anything.
[53:01.510 --> 53:03.350]  So, ah, we're stuck with it.
[53:04.430 --> 53:06.150]  Ah, those damn ecliptic curves.
[53:07.690 --> 53:17.510]  Is there no, uh, interpretation of like search and seizure, like fourth amendment stuff that would protect you in any way or that there's no reading of that, that, that could be applied to, uh, technology?
[53:17.650 --> 53:19.270]  That would make a very interesting legal case, I think.
[53:19.490 --> 53:19.790]  I don't know.
[53:19.890 --> 53:28.710]  I mean, isn't there some bill of rights stuff about, you know, your, your property and your papers and your, you know, your religion and whatever else you like?
[53:29.090 --> 53:30.810]  Yeah, that's largely eviscerated.
[53:32.090 --> 53:33.330]  No, wrong amendment, man.
[53:33.410 --> 53:35.170]  That's the, that one with the 45s.
[53:35.710 --> 53:36.070]  Uh-huh.
[53:36.570 --> 53:38.130]  Like that's mixed up with my encryption.
[53:38.450 --> 53:38.750]  Indeed.
[53:39.130 --> 53:39.290]  Yeah.
[53:40.230 --> 53:41.850]  All right, thanks, uh, thanks for that call.
[53:41.950 --> 53:42.270]  Rob, go ahead.
[53:42.530 --> 53:47.650]  Yeah, I know we have a lot of people, uh, who listen to, who have the legal chops to tell us, uh, more about this sort of thing.
[53:47.730 --> 53:49.690]  So send us email, OTH at 2600.com.
[53:49.690 --> 53:50.150]  Yes.
[53:50.150 --> 53:50.390]  Absolutely.
[53:50.530 --> 53:50.690]  Yes.
[53:50.750 --> 53:53.570]  We want to hear from you, um, with your thoughts.
[53:56.590 --> 53:58.730]  Whether you're pirates or, or, or, or whatnot.
[53:58.970 --> 53:59.510]  You know what?
[53:59.510 --> 54:03.330]  Let's take one more phone call because there's so many ringing and I, I hate to leave it like this.
[54:03.410 --> 54:03.670]  Good evening.
[54:03.810 --> 54:04.270]  You're on the air.
[54:04.550 --> 54:04.850]  Go ahead.
[54:05.710 --> 54:06.910]  Hey, thanks for taking my call.
[54:07.110 --> 54:07.790]  Uh, my name's John.
[54:07.930 --> 54:08.750]  I'm calling from Oregon.
[54:08.750 --> 54:12.270]  I actually run the only, uh, hacker space that's here in Portland.
[54:13.950 --> 54:14.890]  There's only one?
[54:15.970 --> 54:18.270]  Uh, in, in, uh, Portland area.
[54:18.430 --> 54:18.510]  Yeah.
[54:18.510 --> 54:24.430]  There's some places that call themselves maker spaces and a few that have come and gone, but we're the only one that's operating currently.
[54:24.590 --> 54:25.690]  The only one that uses the H word.
[54:25.790 --> 54:26.190]  Okay, good.
[54:26.350 --> 54:26.730]  Good for you.
[54:26.970 --> 54:27.150]  Yeah.
[54:27.390 --> 54:28.130]  Yeah, exactly.
[54:28.350 --> 54:31.110]  We let our H flag fly, I guess you could say.
[54:31.250 --> 54:34.710]  So my question is about, uh, PDX hacker space.
[54:34.930 --> 54:38.810]  It's also known as control H AKA, uh, backspace.
[54:39.070 --> 54:39.270]  Okay.
[54:39.330 --> 54:40.310]  I've, I've heard of it actually.
[54:41.030 --> 54:42.050]  I think I've been there.
[54:42.790 --> 54:43.970]  Well, what's your, what's your question?
[54:44.550 --> 54:46.750]  Uh, so, uh, my question is about mesh nets.
[54:47.010 --> 54:49.730]  Uh, tonight we have a meetup, uh, starting in a couple hours.
[54:50.110 --> 54:56.570]  I'm wondering if there are any other groups that you're aware of that are working on, uh, the protocol for, uh, CJ DNS and pushing it forward.
[54:57.990 --> 55:02.550]  I, I know there's a lot of people working, uh, on mesh networking in the hacker community and elsewhere.
[55:02.630 --> 55:05.250]  I don't have any specific groups off the top of my head.
[55:05.410 --> 55:08.310]  It sounds like distributed, uh, infrastructure, that kind of thing.
[55:09.250 --> 55:15.110]  Also, uh, also not, uh, not related to your question, but, uh, your hacker space tweeted some wonderful paintings at me.
[55:15.210 --> 55:15.930]  Thank you very much for that.
[55:16.190 --> 55:17.470]  They tweeted paintings at you?
[55:17.650 --> 55:17.870]  Yes.
[55:18.090 --> 55:18.270]  Wow.
[55:18.430 --> 55:19.850]  That was, that was my wife.
[55:20.010 --> 55:20.090]  Yeah.
[55:20.330 --> 55:20.890]  Ah, excellent.
[55:21.470 --> 55:22.190]  Well, tell her thanks.
[55:22.590 --> 55:23.070]  All right.
[55:23.070 --> 55:26.870]  Good luck with what you're doing and, uh, and, and, uh, keep the conversation going.
[55:27.050 --> 55:28.970]  If we think of any, we'll let you know or we'll talk about it.
[55:29.170 --> 55:40.630]  Uh, this, um, this word, um, we were talking about all sorts of, um, hacker issues and, uh, and, and making new technology, improving upon things and asking a lot of difficult questions.
[55:41.070 --> 55:45.830]  This is precisely the kind of thing we'll be talking about at the Hope Conference in many, many different forums.
[55:46.050 --> 55:47.330]  You can be a part of this.
[55:47.510 --> 55:49.770]  We have opened up the call for participation.
[55:49.770 --> 56:01.930]  Just write to speakers at hope.net with your ideas of, uh, uh, a talk or, um, uh, any kind of, uh, seminar or, uh, panel that you'd like to organize.
[56:02.350 --> 56:03.350]  There's more information.
[56:03.350 --> 56:08.790]  If you go to hope.net, you'll see all kinds of guidelines for, um, uh, for how you can participate.
[56:09.210 --> 56:15.190]  And remember, um, hope is coming this July in New York City, and we hope to see you there.
[56:15.930 --> 56:17.550]  In any event, we will see you next week.
[56:17.710 --> 56:19.390]  Well, you'll hear our voices.
[56:21.190 --> 56:22.330]  This is Emmanuel for Off the Hook.
[56:22.530 --> 56:23.030]  Have a good night.