[00:00.000 --> 00:03.000]  Whether it's Chopin, Stravinsky, or Leggetti.
[00:03.260 --> 00:06.500]  How does she use the low notes to spring into a leap?
[00:06.740 --> 00:09.400]  How many spins can she fit into one measure?
[00:09.700 --> 00:13.680]  How does a slow waltz make her feel as she turns toward her partner?
[00:14.000 --> 00:22.340]  Tune in to hear former New York City Ballet star Wendy Whelan talk through the music with us on Friday, February 5th, 10 a.m.
[00:22.440 --> 00:29.340]  to noon, here on WBAI New York, 99.5 FM, and WBAI.org.
[00:32.920 --> 00:37.280]  And you're listening to radio station WBAI in New York.
[00:37.700 --> 00:39.420]  Time is just about 7 o'clock.
[00:39.620 --> 00:41.500]  Time, once again, for Off the Hook.
[00:46.740 --> 00:51.240]  The telephone keeps ringing, so I ripped it off the wall.
[00:52.180 --> 00:56.700]  I cut myself while shaving, now I can't make a call.
[00:57.340 --> 01:04.970]  We couldn't get much worse from Billy Bump, but the best, expect the worst.
[01:05.550 --> 01:08.570]  I hope that's understood from Billy Bump!
[02:17.140 --> 02:18.800]  And a very good evening to everybody.
[02:18.840 --> 02:20.600]  The program is Off the Hook.
[02:20.840 --> 02:22.720]  Emmanuel Goldstein here with you on this Wednesday evening.
[02:23.000 --> 02:24.580]  Joined tonight by Mike.
[02:24.800 --> 02:25.100]  Hi there.
[02:25.100 --> 02:25.820]  Kyle.
[02:26.260 --> 02:26.640]  Hello.
[02:27.120 --> 02:27.840]  Bernie S.
[02:28.240 --> 02:29.340]  Greetings from Philadelphia.
[02:30.160 --> 02:31.020]  And that's it.
[02:31.120 --> 02:31.600]  Nobody else.
[02:31.700 --> 02:32.180]  Wow, okay.
[02:32.400 --> 02:33.160]  Small crew tonight.
[02:33.220 --> 02:33.600]  I like it.
[02:33.660 --> 02:34.300]  I like it this way.
[02:34.440 --> 02:36.060]  Nice and cozy.
[02:37.000 --> 02:44.680]  Well, you know, every week we go into various details about things in technology, the hacker world, bits like that.
[02:44.680 --> 02:49.620]  And it seems to always divide into a couple of distinct sections.
[02:50.200 --> 02:51.240]  Today is no exception.
[02:52.040 --> 02:54.800]  It's about advances in technology.
[02:54.800 --> 03:07.140]  And I put advances in quotes because sometimes the advances are regressions, such as somebody leaving a laptop with everybody's social security number in the back of a car and it gets stolen, things like that.
[03:07.140 --> 03:23.720]  And also the other kinds of stories that we seem to get an awful lot of are stories that blame hackers for everything, everything you could conceive of, things that have happened, things that might happen sometime in the future, things that have never happened and probably never will,
[03:24.060 --> 03:26.040]  you name it, people are afraid of hackers.
[03:26.040 --> 03:27.920]  So we have those two distinct types of stories.
[03:28.560 --> 03:32.640]  And tonight we have a third category as well, and I'm just going to call that listener mail.
[03:32.880 --> 03:39.400]  So we have three different things, and I'd like to give you guys the chance to determine which one we plunge into first.
[03:39.480 --> 03:43.540]  Oh, and also the latter part of the show, we'll be taking phone calls, so that's unavoidable.
[03:43.940 --> 03:44.800]  I like our listeners.
[03:45.200 --> 03:47.020]  Yeah, well, we all like our listeners.
[03:47.220 --> 03:49.080]  Oh, I want to hear from them.
[03:49.200 --> 03:49.780]  Letters, yeah.
[03:49.860 --> 03:50.620]  You want to hear the letters first.
[03:50.800 --> 03:51.340]  How about you, Bernie?
[03:51.360 --> 03:51.780]  What do you think?
[03:53.020 --> 03:55.860]  Yeah, I think we should read some letters from our listeners.
[03:56.040 --> 03:59.580]  We can't call them tonight, unfortunately, but we could maybe read some of their letters.
[03:59.860 --> 04:02.000]  Well, wait, that would be kind of creepy if we called our listeners.
[04:02.340 --> 04:03.300]  I mean, why would we do that?
[04:03.760 --> 04:09.620]  It would be kind of fun if a listener put their phone number in a letter, and we just called them.
[04:09.740 --> 04:11.140]  It's like, hey...
[04:11.140 --> 04:12.580]  No, I don't think we should do that.
[04:12.600 --> 04:14.000]  We got your letter.
[04:14.240 --> 04:16.900]  I think that's a bad precedent, Bernie, for a couple of reasons.
[04:17.820 --> 04:23.680]  One reason, another reason is that you could put any phone number you want and have us call somebody who doesn't want to be called.
[04:23.680 --> 04:25.180]  That's because you put a number at the bottom.
[04:25.500 --> 04:25.940]  You know what?
[04:25.940 --> 04:28.200]  Let's just leave listener letters as listener letters.
[04:28.380 --> 04:30.040]  How's that for a radical idea?
[04:30.180 --> 04:32.920]  Yeah, and we'll take listener phone calls, and listeners can call us.
[04:33.100 --> 04:35.440]  Yeah, it's not like we have no opportunity to talk to our listeners.
[04:35.680 --> 04:38.060]  Yeah, we spend an inordinate amount of time talking to our listeners.
[04:38.180 --> 04:38.840]  They tell us that.
[04:38.840 --> 04:46.780]  So, we're going to go into some mail, some stories, and then we'll have more communications with our listeners.
[04:47.040 --> 04:54.540]  Oh, and this programming note, next week, if I'm not mistaken, next week we are on for two hours, and it's the beginning of the winter fundraiser.
[04:54.640 --> 04:56.140]  This is one of the big ones.
[04:56.200 --> 04:58.840]  This is one of the ones that we have always done since we've been on the air.
[04:59.300 --> 05:01.440]  So, we're looking to do quite well on that one.
[05:01.440 --> 05:06.000]  And so, I think we have a two-hour show next week filled with all kinds of surprises.
[05:06.840 --> 05:08.480]  I know because I don't know what they are yet.
[05:09.700 --> 05:16.900]  And hopefully people will be generous and keep us going, keep this radio station and this program, this unique program going.
[05:17.260 --> 05:18.040]  That's exciting.
[05:18.180 --> 05:18.760]  It is exciting.
[05:19.000 --> 05:20.380]  Nothing but exciting news tonight.
[05:21.240 --> 05:23.060]  Okay, so let's see.
[05:23.060 --> 05:27.060]  We have this mail from somebody named Dave.
[05:27.160 --> 05:31.360]  Actually, Dave had written in the week earlier, and I don't think we ever read his letter before that.
[05:31.440 --> 05:33.520]  But he was asking, whatever happened to Rebel?
[05:33.780 --> 05:35.900]  And it was that very week that Rebel called in.
[05:36.040 --> 05:43.840]  So, it was kind of funny because he followed it up by saying, I emailed you earlier, asked whatever happened with Rebel, and I guess I got my answer when he called in on Wednesday.
[05:43.840 --> 05:44.960]  It's just too funny.
[05:45.240 --> 05:50.100]  And it is, but it goes to show that we're a hive mind, and we all have communication with each other.
[05:50.220 --> 05:53.140]  And if somebody thinks of Rebel, Rebel appears.
[05:53.520 --> 05:54.600]  Maybe Dave is Rebel.
[05:55.580 --> 05:56.020]  Wow.
[05:56.760 --> 05:58.260]  I doubt it, but you never know.
[05:58.260 --> 06:03.840]  So, while my mind reconstructs, Bernie, anything you have to say?
[06:04.620 --> 06:05.540]  I haven't even thought of that.
[06:05.900 --> 06:15.440]  Well, I thought that was beyond coincidence that we hadn't heard from Rebel for years, and then somebody writes in about him, and then right during that show, he called in.
[06:15.640 --> 06:16.560]  It's like, what are the chances?
[06:17.480 --> 06:17.780]  Anyway.
[06:17.900 --> 06:18.760]  Pretty good in our crowd.
[06:18.920 --> 06:21.240]  We have all kinds of coincidences and things that happened.
[06:21.940 --> 06:29.740]  We got an interesting letter from, I wouldn't say interesting, we got a letter from Ruben, Ruben, who...
[06:29.740 --> 06:31.760]  Wait, you're hijacking my letter with your letter?
[06:32.260 --> 06:33.700]  I was reading Dave's letter.
[06:34.060 --> 06:34.560]  No, go ahead.
[06:34.660 --> 06:35.560]  I thought you were asking me to pick a letter.
[06:35.640 --> 06:39.720]  Obviously, this guy has gotten your attention, so we'll go back to Dave's letter.
[06:40.220 --> 06:41.380]  Dave, just hang on a second.
[06:41.520 --> 06:42.000]  Don't worry about it.
[06:42.040 --> 06:43.240]  I'm sorry we didn't read your first email.
[06:43.620 --> 06:48.240]  And now we're going to read your second one, but after we hear the listener that Bernie would like to...
[06:48.240 --> 06:59.080]  Oh, okay, well, Ruben wrote in, and he was asking us about our discussion about all these top officials at the NSA and CIA that had their personal emails hacked.
[06:59.320 --> 07:01.920]  And he was really curious as to how that could have happened.
[07:02.160 --> 07:14.520]  He says that he uses something called two-step verification, which I think is something you know and something you have, like a device that has some crypto thing in it.
[07:16.240 --> 07:22.240]  And he says that way he convinces himself that, short of someone stealing his phone, that he's safe and virtually unhackable.
[07:22.500 --> 07:26.140]  He says, should I just assume that these officials were not using two-step verification?
[07:26.400 --> 07:29.720]  Or is there some way to defeat the two-step verification process that I'm not aware of?
[07:29.860 --> 07:33.340]  I asked this so that I could take further steps to protect my security.
[07:33.340 --> 07:39.600]  And I think these top NSA and CIA officials were not using two-step authentication.
[07:39.620 --> 07:44.960]  I think they're doing the old two-step, as in, like, backtracking and lying about what they're doing.
[07:44.980 --> 08:01.740]  But they were using hardly any security at all, using AOL and services where you provide secret questions that anybody could figure out the answers to for security.
[08:01.740 --> 08:07.840]  It really makes you wonder about the confidence of these people in charge of NSA and CIA.
[08:08.180 --> 08:22.080]  Yeah, there is a bit of a... it seems cavalier, to a degree, that they wouldn't think themselves a potential target in this day and age where we're so socially connected and what have you.
[08:22.080 --> 08:25.120]  So, yeah, it's probably a bit of an awakening there.
[08:25.460 --> 08:42.240]  But I think the attitude goes something along the lines of their sort of administration or they're sort of in a role that isn't technical or a sensitive role that could be compromised technically.
[08:43.540 --> 08:47.380]  And they're sort of insulated, in other words, by their sort of office.
[08:47.620 --> 09:05.360]  But it's proof that, you know, anybody can be touched by these systems if they leave it sort of out there and don't consider maybe a bit more security, especially if you have a position where you might be targeted like this.
[09:05.360 --> 09:13.420]  But, Kyle, aren't these people supposed to be living and breathing OPSEC every moment of their lives if you're in charge of the NSA and CIA?
[09:13.900 --> 09:16.680]  Shouldn't, like, OPSEC be your, like, way of life?
[09:16.960 --> 09:18.960]  And clearly it's not.
[09:19.000 --> 09:21.300]  And they just screw up.
[09:21.640 --> 09:23.080]  Who knows what else they're screwing up?
[09:23.420 --> 09:24.600]  Yeah, I hear you.
[09:24.920 --> 09:26.100]  I... absolutely.
[09:26.440 --> 09:27.720]  I mean, you would think.
[09:27.840 --> 09:28.580]  You would think.
[09:28.780 --> 09:31.600]  But maybe they just get so tired of it all the time.
[09:31.600 --> 09:36.400]  Well, no, is two-step verification, is that the answer to all of our security woes?
[09:36.400 --> 09:37.820]  A lot of people seem to think it is.
[09:37.880 --> 09:38.520]  I'm not so sure.
[09:38.740 --> 09:41.380]  It depends what you're trying to protect against.
[09:41.620 --> 09:44.700]  It works pretty well for protecting against people guessing your password.
[09:45.600 --> 09:56.160]  Doesn't work so well for, you know, the provider being forced to give access to your data, which is a thing that happens a lot.
[09:57.040 --> 09:58.520]  How does it not work well for them?
[09:58.660 --> 10:01.260]  Well, because the provider doesn't need two steps, two factors.
[10:01.600 --> 10:02.420]  To get to your data.
[10:02.940 --> 10:04.380]  It's on their hard drives already.
[10:04.600 --> 10:17.640]  So if a government or a malicious employee or just a criminal goes in and gets the data directly from the provider without going through the login flow, then the complexity of the login flow doesn't matter.
[10:18.220 --> 10:18.900]  Could you...
[10:18.900 --> 10:19.280]  Go ahead, Kyle.
[10:19.420 --> 10:27.020]  Well, I was just going to add that it also is a pretty wide open market as far as security products like tokens and devices and stuff.
[10:27.160 --> 10:28.040]  There's a lot of different ones.
[10:28.140 --> 10:29.240]  There are standards, right?
[10:29.240 --> 10:36.840]  I think, but it's still sort of emerging and it's taken up and adopted sort of haphazardly.
[10:36.940 --> 10:43.180]  There's no like real sort of one technology that is it per se.
[10:43.380 --> 10:53.080]  And there are other objects that you have as that you could use in conjunction with that, but that could be compromised if you were depending on that as a way of verifying.
[10:53.080 --> 10:59.620]  I'm thinking like phones and something that could be emulated like based on something that isn't in hardware.
[10:59.960 --> 11:02.840]  I don't think anything is foolproof.
[11:03.000 --> 11:09.420]  Nothing has been deemed something that's impenetrable and perfect, right?
[11:09.520 --> 11:11.760]  We're learning and everything gets compromised.
[11:12.240 --> 11:24.980]  I mean, nothing's perfect, of course, but most of the consumer-grade stuff that is good uses either just SMSing your phone and assumes you have your phone in your possession or it uses...
[11:24.980 --> 11:26.920]  There's an OTP standard.
[11:27.220 --> 11:31.760]  The popular implementation is Google Authenticator, but you don't have to use it with Google stuff.
[11:32.540 --> 11:37.740]  But the advantage there is you can have one app that can provide the tokens for all of your accounts.
[11:37.900 --> 11:39.700]  And it works reasonably well.
[11:39.700 --> 11:49.160]  For our listeners who might not be completely familiar with the two-step, give us a very simple example of when that would be used and how.
[11:49.700 --> 11:49.920]  Right.
[11:50.060 --> 11:52.840]  So I use a service called GitHub.
[11:52.840 --> 11:54.120]  It doesn't matter what it does.
[11:55.260 --> 11:59.700]  And when I log into it, I type my login name and my password.
[11:59.980 --> 12:02.880]  And then it goes to another screen.
[12:03.780 --> 12:06.660]  And it says, enter your one-time code.
[12:06.660 --> 12:08.640]  And so I open up this app on my phone.
[12:09.100 --> 12:11.740]  And I'm going to just tell you what it says on my screen.
[12:12.160 --> 12:13.040]  Maybe I shouldn't do that.
[12:13.120 --> 12:14.140]  Maybe someone's listening live.
[12:14.240 --> 12:16.480]  Well, this is how we find out what the vulnerabilities are.
[12:16.600 --> 12:17.400]  Give us your info.
[12:17.520 --> 12:17.700]  Go ahead.
[12:17.840 --> 12:19.400]  So it gives my...
[12:19.400 --> 12:20.800]  There's a six-digit code.
[12:21.740 --> 12:22.720]  What's the six-digit code?
[12:23.200 --> 12:27.640]  I'm going to wait until the six-digit code is almost expired before I read it out loud.
[12:27.640 --> 12:29.000]  All right, listeners, you heard that challenge.
[12:30.400 --> 12:32.760]  It's 597-793 right now.
[12:33.060 --> 12:34.120]  597-793, folks.
[12:34.120 --> 12:34.720]  You know what to do.
[12:34.720 --> 12:37.940]  Yep, and now I have a new code already.
[12:38.140 --> 12:39.460]  Hopefully, our listeners are fast.
[12:39.600 --> 12:40.540]  Yep, they might be.
[12:41.180 --> 12:43.280]  And your phone, I see, is flashing red now.
[12:43.620 --> 12:44.580]  What does that...
[12:44.580 --> 12:47.420]  So the point is, it's a constantly changing code.
[12:47.560 --> 12:48.720]  It's a different six-digit code now.
[12:48.880 --> 12:53.960]  So even though you've got that code once, you don't have it again when you actually try and get into my account.
[12:54.220 --> 13:00.720]  So every time you log in, you have to enter your password, and then you have to look at your phone to get that code, and you have to enter that code before it expires.
[13:00.940 --> 13:01.200]  Right.
[13:01.280 --> 13:02.320]  What happens if you don't have your phone?
[13:02.800 --> 13:03.360]  Can't get in.
[13:04.720 --> 13:05.700]  What's your account if you don't have your phone?
[13:05.780 --> 13:07.460]  What if I take your phone right now?
[13:07.600 --> 13:08.440]  You can't get into that account.
[13:08.440 --> 13:15.760]  So I actually have backup passwords that I store on my laptop that I can use, or I think there's another backup method.
[13:15.920 --> 13:22.600]  And also, if it's a computer I've used before, it will often know it's a computer I've used before and not enter the code.
[13:22.600 --> 13:26.520]  But the general overview is that I gave.
[13:26.860 --> 13:27.080]  Okay.
[13:27.260 --> 13:28.160]  Well, it's something.
[13:28.280 --> 13:38.740]  But again, it opens up other doors, because oftentimes we borrow each other's phones, and I've seen situations where you can just go to a website and have a text sent to somebody's phone.
[13:38.860 --> 13:45.340]  And if they don't know that text got sent to their phone, the service that you're connected to will believe that you're the right person.
[13:45.340 --> 13:53.740]  But your friend, quote unquote, will never know that you're doing something to their account based on that one bit of verification, very weak verification that's done.
[13:54.060 --> 13:56.680]  Obviously, it has to be done in conjunction with other things.
[13:56.860 --> 13:58.940]  Well, they send me the message.
[13:59.220 --> 14:07.060]  So if I get an extra, if for whatever reason I got an extra SMS from a service I'm not currently trying to log into, I would just ignore it.
[14:07.140 --> 14:08.440]  But see, I'm borrowing your phone.
[14:08.600 --> 14:09.140]  That's the scenario.
[14:09.280 --> 14:09.700]  I'm borrowing your phone.
[14:09.700 --> 14:11.500]  If I would delete that SMS, you would never see it.
[14:11.800 --> 14:13.480]  But then I have access to your account.
[14:13.480 --> 14:14.320]  I mean, if you know...
[14:14.320 --> 14:15.100]  So you...
[14:15.100 --> 14:16.580]  But you have to know my password as well.
[14:17.100 --> 14:18.940]  The six-digit code comes after the password.
[14:19.180 --> 14:19.340]  Here's the thing.
[14:19.440 --> 14:25.200]  I've forgotten your password, or I never knew your password, so they send you something to reset it.
[14:25.300 --> 14:27.400]  And sometimes they can send that via SMS as well.
[14:28.060 --> 14:29.560]  See, there's all kinds of ways...
[14:29.560 --> 14:35.520]  I'm not convinced there's any circumstance in which adding the second factor is less secure than just the password.
[14:36.460 --> 14:36.860]  Yeah.
[14:37.040 --> 14:40.480]  I mean, I feel like you could break it somehow, but it would take a lot of effort.
[14:40.700 --> 14:41.360]  You can break...
[14:41.360 --> 14:42.420]  You're both right.
[14:42.420 --> 14:43.120]  You can break anything.
[14:43.120 --> 14:47.940]  But I think to this level of skepticism, it's maybe going a little bit too far.
[14:48.100 --> 14:54.800]  Like, it is clearly better to have, or at least harder to get into an account you don't control if it has both factors.
[14:55.120 --> 14:55.400]  Yeah.
[14:55.700 --> 14:58.120]  And I think that's relatively clear.
[14:58.820 --> 15:00.480]  Dave, we're getting to your email, so don't worry.
[15:00.480 --> 15:01.140]  We haven't forgotten you.
[15:01.240 --> 15:03.100]  We're going to get to it, but this is a good conversation.
[15:03.180 --> 15:03.500]  Go ahead, Kyle.
[15:03.620 --> 15:18.060]  Well, for the sake of argument, I mean, for the sake of this example, it's clear he did not use it, and it may be laziness or just not realizing that you had that feature with one of these services, whatever one was compromised and so forth.
[15:18.700 --> 15:21.480]  All I'm saying is, later tonight, you guys want to lend me your phones.
[15:21.480 --> 15:23.720]  I can show you all kinds of things that's possible.
[15:23.720 --> 15:31.780]  Just by having somebody's phone in someone else's hands, you can basically compromise all sorts of things.
[15:31.900 --> 15:33.540]  It's one example.
[15:33.540 --> 15:34.080]  There are many.
[15:34.680 --> 15:35.440]  Here's something.
[15:35.440 --> 15:37.660]  I don't know if you guys saw this story.
[15:37.960 --> 15:42.100]  It's entitled, This Amazon Customer Service Story Will Freak You Out, from Gizmodo.
[15:42.700 --> 15:58.660]  There is a story that actually appeared on Medium, and according to this article, it will make any Amazon user wince, according to customer Eric Springer, all a hacker needs, yes, is one of the stories that blames hackers for everything, again, to unlock your whole damn life is your name,
[15:59.280 --> 16:01.840]  email address, and a mailing address.
[16:01.840 --> 16:05.080]  And the mailing address doesn't even have to be correct.
[16:05.720 --> 16:06.920]  So, imagine that.
[16:07.520 --> 16:14.380]  Four months ago, this is what happened, Springer received an email from Amazon thanking him for contacting customer service.
[16:14.680 --> 16:18.800]  The only problem was, Springer hadn't actually contacted Amazon at all.
[16:18.980 --> 16:33.240]  He was troubled by the auto-reply email response he received, and I imagine he checked to make sure it was actually from Amazon, because lots of times you get email that claims to be from Princeton, Nigeria, or the IRS, or who knows what entity, but it turns out to be fake,
[16:33.300 --> 16:36.380]  or just some, some, some, uh, uh, phishing expedition.
[16:37.140 --> 16:50.960]  Um, anyway, he reached out to Amazon, managed to get a hold of the transcript, and he discovered that a social engineer, otherwise known as a hacker in this article, was pretending to be him in order to gain access to critical account information on Amazon.
[16:50.960 --> 16:55.620]  Now, we have the chat right here, uh, and here's how, um, uh, here's how it goes.
[16:55.960 --> 16:59.760]  Uh, Mahesh has accepted the chat, and that's, that's where the customer service agent is.
[17:00.040 --> 17:00.680]  Hello, Eric.
[17:00.900 --> 17:01.940]  My name is Mahesh.
[17:02.060 --> 17:03.320]  I'm here to help you today.
[17:03.840 --> 17:06.400]  Uh, may I know your issue in detail?
[17:06.700 --> 17:11.260]  Uh, Eric says, I need to know where my latest order is being shipped.
[17:11.520 --> 17:13.300]  Mahesh says, let me check that for you.
[17:13.760 --> 17:15.720]  Before that, I need to verify your account.
[17:15.720 --> 17:20.800]  Can you please confirm the name on your account, your email address, and your complete billing address?
[17:21.300 --> 17:23.800]  Name, Eric Springer, email, gave an email address.
[17:24.020 --> 17:25.240]  I imagine he gave the right one.
[17:25.700 --> 17:27.980]  Um, and address was completely fake.
[17:28.340 --> 17:31.380]  Um, and, uh, Mahesh says, thanks for the confirmation.
[17:31.580 --> 17:34.180]  So, the address wasn't his real home.
[17:34.260 --> 17:37.160]  It was a bogus address he used to register websites online.
[17:37.660 --> 17:41.680]  Yet, with that confirmation, the hacker was able to get Springer's real address.
[17:41.680 --> 17:47.880]  And, with his real residence, his email address, and his name, that person could do quite a bit of damage.
[17:48.280 --> 17:53.260]  Now, Springer informed Amazon of the colossal failure on their part, and the company promised to improve security.
[17:53.480 --> 17:57.340]  He assumed he was done with the mess until he received another email from Amazon last week.
[17:57.660 --> 17:59.340]  And, again, he asked for the transcripts.
[17:59.420 --> 18:05.280]  Again, it showed that all a hacker needed to gain access was a name, email address, and a mailing address.
[18:05.440 --> 18:10.380]  Now, his only relief was seeing that the hacker failed to get a credit card number out of the overly helpful customer service representative.
[18:10.380 --> 18:20.680]  And that's an improvement from 2012, when that particular bit of information was able to successfully be gotten from a customer service representative.
[18:21.520 --> 18:24.160]  So, yeah, this kind of thing is all too common.
[18:24.400 --> 18:31.520]  And I think we see the results of it with a lot of stories and actual things that happen to people we know.
[18:33.340 --> 18:35.300]  So, try out security stuff.
[18:35.300 --> 18:42.400]  Uh, if you can add security to your, uh, services, try stuff out, play with it, see how it works.
[18:42.420 --> 18:51.020]  And that's the way you, uh, you can, uh, add layers of security to things and, and, uh, and not find yourself in one of these situations.
[18:51.040 --> 18:52.380]  And you really do have to be vigilant.
[18:52.460 --> 19:07.380]  You have to watch these companies a bit, uh, because they have sort of, uh, very cumbersome, uh, procedures that sort of are built to apply to everybody, but there are specific circumstances where they can be kind of upended.
[19:07.520 --> 19:09.800]  Yeah, you have to, you have to be, uh, vigilant.
[19:10.100 --> 19:13.120]  You have to watch, as Kyle said, what's, uh, what's going on.
[19:13.200 --> 19:14.140]  I didn't do that last year.
[19:14.280 --> 19:16.640]  That's, that's how I wound up buying a train for some kid in Brooklyn.
[19:17.140 --> 19:19.080]  Uh, and, uh, it was Chase's fault.
[19:19.080 --> 19:28.820]  They had a security hole of some sort on their system that allowed, uh, not only, uh, my credit card number, but my correct billing address to get into the hands of somebody who did not deserve that.
[19:29.260 --> 19:39.540]  Uh, and, uh, because, uh, I let, uh, 60 or 90 days go by without catching it because I had, uh, all kinds of charges going on at the time, um, it, it, it falls on me.
[19:39.720 --> 19:44.520]  They, they, they refused to even help give any information on where the purchase went.
[19:44.520 --> 19:49.620]  The purchase that I bought, that, that was charged to me, they would not tell me anything about it.
[19:49.680 --> 19:51.920]  And you know damn well they have that information someplace.
[19:52.280 --> 19:55.400]  As merchants ourselves, we keep that information for, for years.
[19:55.400 --> 19:56.320]  We have that information.
[19:56.320 --> 19:57.180]  We can always get it.
[19:57.500 --> 20:02.960]  And, uh, it, it goes to show how companies deal with security issues when they're the ones at fault.
[20:03.160 --> 20:07.860]  But if you open it up, if they tell you that, then they have to open it up and, uh, and then it becomes an issue.
[20:08.140 --> 20:13.100]  And so by denying you access or, or saying, oh, well, we don't keep those records, they can just deny it.
[20:13.100 --> 20:17.000]  I was even willing, I was even willing to, to say, you know what, it's my fault.
[20:17.100 --> 20:18.080]  I didn't catch it in time.
[20:18.080 --> 20:19.120]  Just tell me the information.
[20:19.300 --> 20:20.440]  And they refused to even do that.
[20:20.600 --> 20:22.460]  I finally got the information from the toy company.
[20:22.600 --> 20:23.220]  They gave it to me.
[20:23.300 --> 20:25.560]  I, I made it clear to them, it's not your fault either.
[20:25.940 --> 20:27.640]  Uh, and I'm not going to pursue this.
[20:27.740 --> 20:29.360]  I just want to know who the guilty party is.
[20:29.420 --> 20:30.320]  And I have the information now.
[20:30.420 --> 20:35.260]  So I, you know, that feels good to know who the guilty party is, but there's nothing I can do legally.
[20:35.500 --> 20:35.740]  That is.
[20:35.880 --> 20:37.420]  We're still accepting suggestions for that.
[20:37.520 --> 20:38.560]  Yes, we, we really are.
[20:38.740 --> 20:39.020]  Okay.
[20:39.280 --> 20:41.180]  Uh, now, uh, to, uh, Dave's letter.
[20:41.360 --> 20:43.000]  Unless Bernie, you have another listener that you feel?
[20:43.100 --> 20:43.920]  You'd like to push in front?
[20:43.980 --> 20:45.100]  No, I won't interrupt you this time.
[20:45.320 --> 20:45.340]  All right.
[20:45.340 --> 20:45.540]  Go ahead.
[20:45.880 --> 20:46.120]  All right.
[20:46.180 --> 20:47.240]  Dave, um, Dave writes.
[20:47.380 --> 20:47.640]  I'm sorry.
[20:47.740 --> 20:49.000]  It's taking so long for us to read this.
[20:49.160 --> 20:57.580]  Um, in regards to the topic of privacy, which gets, uh, gets brought up frequently on your show, I think people have been conditioned to the point where it's become 99.9% accepted.
[20:57.700 --> 21:02.840]  Nobody seems to care any longer how much information is collected or what information and to whom they divulge it to.
[21:03.040 --> 21:06.960]  People jokingly, but acknowledge, acknowledgedly, is that a word?
[21:07.660 --> 21:08.000]  Acknowledgedly.
[21:08.440 --> 21:08.560]  Wow.
[21:09.100 --> 21:12.820]  Uh, they talk about, uh, email providers scanning our mail.
[21:13.100 --> 21:13.520]  I.e.
[21:13.700 --> 21:13.960]  Gmail.
[21:14.500 --> 21:15.960]  Uh, GPS tracking our movements.
[21:16.140 --> 21:19.520]  Huge databases being built to create profiles in everyone's tastes and habits.
[21:19.900 --> 21:25.680]  It's the new world, albeit a scary one, but one that practically everyone has accepted, unfortunately.
[21:26.120 --> 21:27.480]  And I don't see it reversing.
[21:27.640 --> 21:34.220]  But just getting to the point where not only is information collection an acceptable practice, but governments also make choices for us.
[21:34.300 --> 21:36.900]  They push new laws out to where people scream foul.
[21:37.280 --> 21:40.560]  Then they back off a little, although nowhere close to where it was originally.
[21:40.800 --> 21:42.180]  And then people accept a new level.
[21:42.740 --> 21:44.200]  That's, that's pretty much what happens.
[21:44.780 --> 21:48.260]  Uh, rinse and repeat it goes until finally it's now where the government wanted it.
[21:48.260 --> 21:55.820]  And yet, because they inched their way forward, people have accepted the new laws they once cried foul about without even realizing it.
[21:56.280 --> 21:57.340]  Gotta love the naive.
[21:57.660 --> 22:01.160]  And when you realize how many companies are in bed with the government and in the U.S.
[22:01.160 --> 22:02.840]  with the NSA, how can we avoid it?
[22:02.840 --> 22:07.980]  It seems like an impossible task for those of us who care about maintaining what little privacy we have.
[22:08.320 --> 22:16.460]  Um, I was listening to a show, I think from 2008, and it was brought up that a very large percentage of internet information is passed through a handful of companies.
[22:16.580 --> 22:27.260]  But the biggest ones, uh, the biggest ones that is at that, uh, for us few that actually care about privacy, we find our ways around, uh, those Stalins as, as he refers to them.
[22:27.380 --> 22:38.020]  But even still the path to complete privacy, uh, for us seems like it's, it's getting narrower and as more and more companies fall to greed and pressure from governments, it's only getting harder for us few hackers.
[22:38.320 --> 22:41.180]  But then we live and breathe for new challenges.
[22:41.500 --> 22:43.860]  And I, I, I couldn't agree more with that.
[22:43.860 --> 22:58.320]  And I also, I appreciate that use of the word hackers, uh, as people that are battling this kind of thing, battling information, uh, being stored by, by corporations and governments and used against us, our privacy going down the drain.
[22:58.540 --> 23:00.600]  That's the true definition of what hackers are.
[23:00.600 --> 23:04.240]  Yeah, you can use, uh, knowledge and intelligence to do bad things.
[23:04.360 --> 23:08.720]  And then you'll see people, um, the social engineering, Amazon and, and, and stealing things.
[23:08.720 --> 23:18.920]  But, you know, we have words for people like that, thieves, criminals, uh, and, and yeah, you can use technological knowledge and ability to do these things, but it doesn't make you a hacker.
[23:19.620 --> 23:19.980]  Shoplifter.
[23:20.700 --> 23:21.060]  Shoplifter.
[23:21.220 --> 23:21.760]  There's a word.
[23:21.880 --> 23:21.980]  Yeah.
[23:22.080 --> 23:23.020]  There's all kinds of words.
[23:23.600 --> 23:24.660]  Um, all right.
[23:24.800 --> 23:25.600]  Yes, go ahead, Bernie.
[23:26.240 --> 23:27.320]  Um, that was a good letter.
[23:27.320 --> 23:34.540]  Um, I did want to point out one common misconception, though, that he seems to have, and that is that GPS tracks us.
[23:35.340 --> 23:38.780]  GPS is an orbit of satellites, military, U.S.
[23:38.860 --> 23:43.400]  military satellites that don't receive any signals from us.
[23:43.700 --> 24:00.120]  They simply beam down, uh, coordinates, basically, or your, your GPS receiver in your, in your phone, your car, or wherever, um, receives several satellites at once and then figures out, um, where it is on, on, on the earth, very accurately.
[24:00.760 --> 24:18.000]  Um, but, like, if you have a GPS thing in your car, navigator in your car, um, unless it's tied to another device, like a, uh, like a cell phone or, or, or some kind of transmitter to send your GPS coordinates to someone else, nobody knows where you are.
[24:18.400 --> 24:20.400]  So, GPS does not track people.
[24:20.580 --> 24:26.380]  Okay, wait, but, Bernie, okay, you, you, you might be right technically, but something is tracking us.
[24:26.460 --> 24:27.280]  How would you say it?
[24:27.300 --> 24:29.980]  What's the right way to say it in, in, in less than a paragraph?
[24:30.660 --> 24:41.340]  Well, you could just say cell phones are tracking us, um, or, or cell phone companies are tracking us, um, or people that are, have access to cell phone companies' data are tracking us, but GPS does not track us.
[24:41.720 --> 24:42.520]  Um, Bernie?
[24:42.800 --> 24:43.200]  Yeah.
[24:43.400 --> 24:43.880]  Who cares?
[24:44.480 --> 24:47.520]  Well, I think people, I think you need to understand how this technology works.
[24:47.520 --> 24:48.620]  I agree.
[24:48.820 --> 24:49.240]  I agree.
[24:49.440 --> 24:53.740]  But people are using GPS to track us.
[24:53.740 --> 24:55.780]  It does not feel like a wrong sentence to me.
[24:55.880 --> 24:58.720]  Can I say that GPS provides the means to track us?
[25:01.260 --> 25:02.640]  It provides data.
[25:02.640 --> 25:09.760]  And if someone else gains access to what your GPS receiver says, yes.
[25:10.100 --> 25:12.460]  But GPS by itself does not track anybody.
[25:12.460 --> 25:17.720]  Like, if you have a GPS navigation device, nobody can tell you where you are from that.
[25:17.840 --> 25:18.720]  It's just a receiver.
[25:18.940 --> 25:20.680]  It doesn't transmit anything at all.
[25:21.500 --> 25:23.460]  Yeah, I kind of see what you're saying, Bernie.
[25:23.660 --> 25:33.360]  It's that the other people is like, I think, other components in the circuit, I guess, is what you're saying.
[25:33.360 --> 25:43.420]  It's that when coupled with other parts of a larger system, it can easily, I don't know, leak information.
[25:43.580 --> 25:49.180]  But it's connected physically on a circuit board, e.g.
[25:49.280 --> 25:50.280]  your phone, right?
[25:50.420 --> 25:57.460]  Is a board with a multiplicity, like many components combined in one place.
[25:57.460 --> 26:09.980]  So, when Bernie says, talks to other people or things or software in the device, what he's saying is that by being an integrated circuit, it's integrated into that.
[26:10.100 --> 26:14.980]  Therefore, it's constantly connected to all these other systems on a computer, like your phone.
[26:15.360 --> 26:15.960]  And why?
[26:16.100 --> 26:17.380]  It's because they're required by law.
[26:17.380 --> 26:30.980]  Our own federal government mandated that cell phones must report, as part of the whole E911 initiative, our federal government, through the FCC, mandated that all cell phones have to rat out your location.
[26:31.140 --> 26:32.960]  Well, Bernie, it's not really the cell phones that are doing it.
[26:33.040 --> 26:36.320]  It's the software that's on the cell phones that's reporting it.
[26:36.460 --> 26:37.340]  Well, not even that.
[26:37.460 --> 26:40.580]  Yeah, I think if we're going to say it right, we might as well say it 100% right.
[26:40.800 --> 26:45.440]  No, even without any software on your phone at all, your cell phone is still ratting out your position.
[26:45.440 --> 26:46.940]  How does it do that without any software?
[26:47.380 --> 26:49.260]  It's just true because the...
[26:49.740 --> 26:51.640]  Emmanuel, I think you mean firmware.
[26:52.280 --> 26:52.880]  Oh, boy.
[26:53.380 --> 26:54.680]  No, Mike's right.
[26:55.200 --> 26:55.560]  Yeah, yeah.
[26:55.700 --> 27:01.040]  But what I'm saying is that even if you had no software running on your phone at all, if it's like a dumb phone...
[27:01.040 --> 27:01.900]  You can't have that.
[27:02.160 --> 27:04.780]  Your cell phone still just knows where you are.
[27:04.840 --> 27:05.180]  Hang on.
[27:05.260 --> 27:11.920]  If I turn GPS off on my phone, all of a sudden I'm able to do all kinds of things that I would never be able to get away with ordinarily, right?
[27:12.420 --> 27:12.820]  No.
[27:13.080 --> 27:15.540]  Your cell phone carrier still knows where your phone is.
[27:16.300 --> 27:19.420]  Because of what towers it's connecting to.
[27:20.080 --> 27:30.400]  And, in fact, the federal government has mandated that even if your GPS is not working in your cell phone, that the cell phone companies be able to tell pretty much exactly where you are.
[27:30.600 --> 27:37.140]  It's not quite as accurate as if the GPS coordinates are taken from your GPS software in your phone and then writing you out.
[27:37.260 --> 27:39.720]  But it's like a two-step thing.
[27:39.940 --> 27:41.960]  They can get your information either way.
[27:41.960 --> 27:42.320]  Right.
[27:42.440 --> 27:47.460]  Because it falls back on triangulating where you are based on signal strength.
[27:47.580 --> 27:53.140]  But if it does have access to GPS, it's much easier to just get that data at a consistent rate and so on.
[27:53.280 --> 27:56.140]  And I think it is, as you said, tied to E911.
[27:56.640 --> 27:58.660]  I mean, legislatively, probably it was.
[27:59.260 --> 28:01.440]  Which speaks to what you said about it being mandated.
[28:02.180 --> 28:15.220]  And it's the kind of information that basically was used, would you say, as a way to optimize signal strength?
[28:15.300 --> 28:19.280]  I mean, does that help you if you're running an array of antennas?
[28:19.440 --> 28:21.080]  Or is it strictly E911?
[28:21.380 --> 28:23.920]  I mean, would it be a part of making propagation?
[28:23.920 --> 28:27.800]  Well, no, cell phones worked pretty fine before the E911 issue.
[28:28.140 --> 28:46.040]  One of the more amusing arguments that I heard law enforcement saying, that we all had to have our phones be able to track us at all times, because of the common problem of someone being kidnapped and thrown into the trunk of the car with their cell phone and not being able to tell the police where they are when they call 911.
[28:46.560 --> 28:48.360]  Because that happens all the time.
[28:48.500 --> 28:54.640]  But that was the classic rationale that law enforcement kept using over and over.
[28:54.800 --> 28:55.700]  The knee-jerk story.
[28:55.740 --> 28:56.700]  We have to track the children, yeah.
[28:57.180 --> 28:58.680]  Well, that's a little tip for kidnappers.
[28:58.740 --> 29:03.000]  If you want to kidnap people and get away with it, try the North Shore of Long Island, because you don't get any signal there.
[29:03.380 --> 29:05.380]  And I'm sure you get away with it for quite a while.
[29:05.960 --> 29:08.140]  But Bernie, okay, yeah, I can sort of see this.
[29:08.140 --> 29:09.920]  But I don't know.
[29:10.760 --> 29:15.420]  I don't know if people will be able to identify what's going on with their...
[29:15.420 --> 29:18.700]  I guess I could say these companies are tracking them.
[29:19.260 --> 29:22.900]  But I still think that GPS is adding to it.
[29:24.220 --> 29:25.720]  With the phone, obviously.
[29:25.900 --> 29:27.260]  But it's that whole GPS mentality.
[29:27.680 --> 29:29.120]  Is it right to say that?
[29:29.400 --> 29:30.680]  I wouldn't call it mentality.
[29:30.940 --> 29:31.700]  It's just...
[29:31.700 --> 29:38.000]  If you have one of those standalone GPS things, like you stick with a suction cup on your windshield, it's not ratting you out.
[29:38.000 --> 29:42.880]  It's simply a receiver that receives the GPS satellite signals and tells you where you are.
[29:43.020 --> 29:44.220]  And it doesn't tell...
[29:44.220 --> 29:48.260]  It has no means of communicating to anybody else to tell anybody where you are.
[29:48.500 --> 30:02.620]  But if you have a GPS receiver in your cell phone, which is mandated by federal law, then your GPS coordinates are, by law, reported to the mobile phone carrier, who then logs all that stuff.
[30:02.620 --> 30:08.060]  And they can probably look back at where you've been and where, when, going back very many months.
[30:08.340 --> 30:11.120]  Just like, you leave digital breadcrumbs all over the place.
[30:11.220 --> 30:15.460]  But I just wanted people to be clear, GPS in itself does not track us.
[30:15.560 --> 30:22.160]  It just provides the information to your device, and then other technology gets that data, and then is used to track us.
[30:22.240 --> 30:23.200]  Yeah, that's clear.
[30:23.200 --> 30:30.600]  I think that the rest of the circuit then interprets data that it's passively just collecting from the satellites themselves.
[30:31.380 --> 30:36.720]  And I think we might technically say, yes, you're constantly being tracked.
[30:36.820 --> 30:44.400]  But I think, more practically speaking, that it is constantly connected, and you could be tracked from...
[30:44.400 --> 30:52.800]  If someone gleaned that information and wanted to, or your phone was compromised in some way, and it was accessing it via a third-party application.
[30:52.800 --> 31:00.480]  The point is, we're living in a society where we're giving out more information about ourselves, more information that's being sucked out of our various accounts and devices than ever before.
[31:00.740 --> 31:03.740]  Less privacy than I ever thought possible.
[31:04.320 --> 31:07.280]  When you drive somewhere in your car, it's logged.
[31:07.500 --> 31:10.140]  It's kept track of in some device, some place.
[31:10.640 --> 31:12.500]  And soon it'll be the car itself.
[31:12.760 --> 31:14.260]  They'll have black boxes in all cars.
[31:14.560 --> 31:22.720]  And we've talked about all kinds of examples of people's privacy being invaded without their permission.
[31:23.020 --> 31:34.120]  Just last week, we were talking about phones that tell you how far you are from getting home, how far you are from your office, without you ever telling the phone where you live or where you work.
[31:34.240 --> 31:36.020]  It's sort of learning your habits.
[31:36.100 --> 31:39.440]  It learns your habits and says, oh, you must work here, you must live there.
[31:39.580 --> 31:41.400]  To me, that's very intrusive.
[31:41.500 --> 31:48.300]  That's something you did not give permission for them to make an assumption and then store that information someplace and share it with God knows who.
[31:48.440 --> 31:52.200]  Let's put huge quotations around learning.
[31:52.500 --> 31:52.760]  Uh-huh.
[31:53.220 --> 32:00.140]  I can hardly wait till we talk about some of these at the 11th Hope in July because we have so much to talk about.
[32:00.720 --> 32:11.360]  And folks, if you want to submit a proposal for any kind of talk, the call for speakers and participation of all sorts is wide open now.
[32:11.720 --> 32:14.200]  Go to our website, hope.net.
[32:14.200 --> 32:18.760]  or xi.hope.net if you want to go type in 11 in Roman numerals.
[32:19.360 --> 32:29.480]  And you'll see all kinds of information on how you can submit your talk proposals and get involved in other ways as well because it's going to be one amazing forum.
[32:29.980 --> 32:36.080]  Hundreds and hundreds of people presenting various things, thousands of people showing up, and so much to talk about.
[32:36.200 --> 32:42.440]  Every time we do this, the world just gets more and more fascinating with these particular topics.
[32:42.580 --> 32:49.240]  So hope.net, you can write to speakers at hope.net if you want to basically contribute something or you have an idea.
[32:49.380 --> 32:58.520]  And we don't discriminate like other conferences do where you have to have a whole resume and speaking experience and things like that.
[32:58.620 --> 33:01.080]  We've had kids as young as 12 give talks.
[33:01.580 --> 33:06.560]  We've had presidents of corporations and government officials give talks as well.
[33:07.000 --> 33:09.280]  We don't discriminate on the basis of any of that.
[33:09.400 --> 33:11.720]  Just if you have something interesting to say, hey, we want to hear it.
[33:11.800 --> 33:13.220]  And hope is taking place...
[33:13.220 --> 33:14.180]  Tell me if I have the dates wrong.
[33:14.440 --> 33:17.360]  July 22nd through 24th.
[33:17.740 --> 33:22.720]  It's Friday through Sunday of this year at the Hotel Pennsylvania up in Manhattan.
[33:23.280 --> 33:24.580]  I think that's the right date, right?
[33:24.900 --> 33:25.060]  Yep.
[33:25.320 --> 33:25.520]  Okay.
[33:25.520 --> 33:26.640]  20 seconds to the 24th.
[33:26.720 --> 33:27.580]  I really should remember that.
[33:27.760 --> 33:32.780]  I was just going to add that we're equally as open to topics as long as it's topical.
[33:34.280 --> 33:41.760]  Whatever is going on, we want to add and build on some of the stuff we've talked about in the past, some of the stuff we cover on the show and see in the news.
[33:41.960 --> 33:53.440]  But it's really about having some of the more interesting conversations, stuff you hadn't thought was prescient and relevant.
[33:54.380 --> 34:03.240]  Sometimes those can be really counterintuitive but really, really helpful in making some changes and moving the conversation.
[34:04.020 --> 34:04.360]  Absolutely.
[34:05.040 --> 34:08.080]  I want to say, even if you...
[34:08.080 --> 34:10.100]  Sorry, I was Kyle just intimated.
[34:10.300 --> 34:28.380]  Even if you don't want to be a speaker at Hope this summer, the 11th Hope, if you have an idea for a talk, something you've always wanted to know about that we're afraid to ask, or a panel discussion, and you're just dying to know about this topic, please email us anyway at speakers at Hope.net,
[34:28.500 --> 34:34.660]  and we will try to find speakers who are knowledgeable about that topic and maybe put them together in a panel or something like that.
[34:34.880 --> 34:36.680]  We've got some of our best ideas that way.
[34:37.100 --> 34:38.060]  Also, here's a little hint.
[34:38.060 --> 34:41.200]  I mentioned the Roman numerals before, xi.hope.net for the 11th Hope.
[34:41.240 --> 34:46.360]  If you type a Roman numeral before hope.net, you'll get the website for whatever Hope that was.
[34:47.080 --> 34:48.780]  So, i through x.
[34:49.160 --> 34:52.440]  If you know all those Roman numerals, if you don't study, and you'll learn them.
[34:52.520 --> 34:52.760]  It's easy.
[34:52.960 --> 34:55.400]  Does it work for future hopes?
[34:55.560 --> 34:56.060]  How could it?
[34:56.240 --> 34:56.780]  I don't know.
[34:57.420 --> 34:58.600]  We haven't done the future.
[34:58.760 --> 34:59.100]  Oh, boy.
[34:59.180 --> 34:59.740]  We have to explain.
[34:59.880 --> 35:01.060]  Mike has so much faith in the Romans.
[35:01.060 --> 35:02.520]  You said if you type a Roman numeral, and we got all excited.
[35:02.520 --> 35:04.820]  A conference we've already had, obviously.
[35:05.140 --> 35:05.420]  All right.
[35:05.540 --> 35:06.600]  You know what happened to the Romans?
[35:08.020 --> 35:09.660]  Yeah, for this kind of forward thinking.
[35:10.160 --> 35:15.680]  A couple of technological issues that I'd like to bring up, and then we'll take some phone calls.
[35:16.380 --> 35:17.720]  But did you hear about this plan?
[35:17.880 --> 35:22.480]  We were talking about Chase before, covering their asses, but they're always looking for the future as well.
[35:23.260 --> 35:27.160]  Apparently, they're developing card-free ATMs.
[35:27.380 --> 35:28.020]  You heard about this?
[35:28.320 --> 35:29.360]  Card-free ATMs.
[35:29.460 --> 35:34.200]  So soon, losing your ATM card won't be the life-stopping event it used to be.
[35:34.760 --> 35:36.760]  Just don't also lose your phone.
[35:36.960 --> 35:37.620]  So there you go.
[35:37.780 --> 35:38.760]  It's that kind of a thing again.
[35:39.180 --> 35:47.420]  Chase customers will soon be able to withdraw cash or initiate other transactions using their cell phones at Chase ATMs that are being upgraded later this year.
[35:47.740 --> 35:58.300]  Now, this move will include new cash machines that don't require a card and upgrades to existing machines that will allow customers to withdraw more money and in different denominations.
[35:58.520 --> 36:04.400]  The withdrawal limit will be substantially higher, up to $3,000 during branch hours.
[36:04.620 --> 36:06.100]  I'll have that and $1 bills, please.
[36:06.640 --> 36:07.900]  You might get your wish.
[36:08.000 --> 36:09.100]  I want to see some twos.
[36:09.320 --> 36:09.460]  Yeah.
[36:09.660 --> 36:13.100]  Well, Kyle, you always go around getting $2 bills, right?
[36:13.220 --> 36:14.320]  And it's really amazing.
[36:14.520 --> 36:15.440]  Kyle goes to banks.
[36:15.600 --> 36:16.180]  I have my ways.
[36:16.340 --> 36:18.380]  It's kind of like good-natured robbery.
[36:18.620 --> 36:21.420]  You know, you basically pick a string of banks but you go to them
[36:32.960 --> 36:34.480]  and also they're giving you some other things, too.
[36:34.540 --> 36:36.140]  I saw some dollar coins they're giving you.
[36:36.300 --> 36:38.180]  I didn't even realize these dollar coins existed.
[36:38.960 --> 36:39.520]  Oh, yeah.
[36:39.600 --> 36:40.400]  There's a whole...
[36:40.400 --> 36:41.600]  There's many different types.
[36:41.860 --> 36:42.100]  Uh-huh.
[36:42.440 --> 36:45.960]  Is this like the old Saturday Night Live sketch where the bank that just makes change?
[36:46.900 --> 36:47.300]  No.
[36:47.640 --> 36:48.440]  It could be.
[36:48.960 --> 36:49.320]  Wow.
[36:49.480 --> 36:51.320]  You know, the funny thing is you're noticing...
[36:51.320 --> 36:55.440]  Speaking of banks, I've noticed they're basically just trying to eliminate the tellers altogether.
[36:55.660 --> 36:55.800]  Yeah.
[36:55.920 --> 36:57.340]  And I overheard some people...
[36:57.340 --> 37:03.920]  I was at an ATM recently and they were commenting about how excited they were to not have to deal with a teller.
[37:04.160 --> 37:08.020]  So, apparently, society's ready that, you know, we just don't...
[37:08.020 --> 37:12.400]  We have too much human contact and we need robots to give us money.
[37:12.400 --> 37:13.540]  But you don't have to deal with a teller now.
[37:13.600 --> 37:14.200]  You can go to an ATM.
[37:14.480 --> 37:14.800]  Why?
[37:15.300 --> 37:19.200]  What is it that they think they have to do with a teller that annoys them so much?
[37:19.320 --> 37:19.720]  I don't know.
[37:19.780 --> 37:20.940]  It didn't make any sense to me either.
[37:21.100 --> 37:25.940]  They were waiting in line for an ATM and excited about how there wouldn't be ever any tellers.
[37:26.100 --> 37:26.700]  So, I don't know.
[37:27.000 --> 37:32.940]  I mean, my bank does not have any branches in a state I've really ever been in.
[37:33.840 --> 37:35.500]  I've never met any of their tellers.
[37:35.660 --> 37:36.740]  It doesn't seem to be a big problem.
[37:36.760 --> 37:36.940]  Wait, wait, wait.
[37:36.960 --> 37:37.200]  Hold on.
[37:38.400 --> 37:41.480]  Your bank doesn't have any branches in any state that you've been in.
[37:41.480 --> 37:42.100]  I'm not sure.
[37:42.140 --> 37:43.260]  So, you've never visited your bank?
[37:43.260 --> 37:46.280]  I've never visited my bank is the actual true version of that statement.
[37:46.480 --> 37:46.720]  Okay.
[37:47.040 --> 37:47.300]  Right.
[37:47.860 --> 37:52.000]  Is that the thing these days to have a bank that you never even know where it is?
[37:52.160 --> 37:55.440]  I mean, what does the teller do for me that I'm missing out on?
[37:55.880 --> 37:58.440]  Wishes you a nice day for one thing in a human contact.
[37:59.380 --> 37:59.780]  Lollipops.
[37:59.780 --> 38:02.560]  Well, you can get denominations, but now that's true.
[38:02.560 --> 38:03.300]  I mean, $2 bills.
[38:03.480 --> 38:03.700]  It's true.
[38:03.840 --> 38:05.320]  I'm missing out on the $2 bills.
[38:05.580 --> 38:06.600]  But other than that...
[38:06.600 --> 38:07.920]  One by me, you can get coffee, too.
[38:08.580 --> 38:08.760]  Yeah.
[38:09.420 --> 38:10.800]  I have coffee shops for that.
[38:11.000 --> 38:12.420]  I'm just saying, yeah.
[38:12.640 --> 38:16.260]  And I had actually a very nice conversation this morning with the guy who sold me coffee.
[38:16.440 --> 38:18.300]  So, I don't need to tell her for that either.
[38:18.380 --> 38:19.700]  you don't need him to get coffee either.
[38:19.700 --> 38:20.700]  You can get coffee from a machine.
[38:20.840 --> 38:21.160]  It's true.
[38:21.320 --> 38:21.460]  Yeah.
[38:21.620 --> 38:30.400]  There's a lot going on in this area and a bit of a push towards, yeah, no more, tellers anymore.
[38:30.740 --> 38:31.580]  It's cumbersome.
[38:31.780 --> 38:32.980]  Let me describe this a little bit more.
[38:33.140 --> 38:40.620]  The first generation of these new ATMs are going to allow customers to access the machine by inputting a code found on their Chase mobile app.
[38:41.260 --> 38:49.320]  Now, future upgrades of machines will allow customers to use their cell phones near-field wireless communication feature to access their accounts.
[38:49.320 --> 38:51.820]  What's the near-field wireless communication feature?
[38:51.980 --> 38:53.120]  This is the NFC thing.
[38:53.500 --> 38:54.480]  It's NFC.
[38:54.660 --> 38:54.760]  Yeah.
[38:55.400 --> 38:55.860]  Yeah.
[38:56.100 --> 38:58.400]  All you did was give initials.
[38:58.400 --> 38:59.480]  I don't really know how to...
[38:59.480 --> 39:01.300]  It's a little thing.
[39:01.620 --> 39:03.360]  It's an antenna on the back of the phone.
[39:03.440 --> 39:06.320]  Kyle has taken his phone apart and is now holding up a plastic...
[39:06.320 --> 39:07.680]  the plastic back of it looks like.
[39:07.680 --> 39:08.260]  Yeah, you see that loop?
[39:08.520 --> 39:09.220]  That black loop?
[39:09.460 --> 39:09.480]  Yeah, I do.
[39:09.660 --> 39:14.480]  Well, under there is a conductive loop of antenna-ish stuff.
[39:14.680 --> 39:14.880]  Uh-huh.
[39:14.880 --> 39:20.580]  And so basically, I can go up to things and it will receive and send information that way.
[39:20.660 --> 39:21.760]  And all the phones have this now?
[39:21.900 --> 39:22.880]  A lot of them do.
[39:23.100 --> 39:23.320]  Wow.
[39:23.600 --> 39:24.720]  Bernie, does your phone have this?
[39:25.060 --> 39:28.020]  Yes, I have a BlackBerry Z30 and it does have NFC.
[39:28.300 --> 39:31.340]  In fact, it has another coil in it that lets me charge it wirelessly.
[39:31.840 --> 39:32.140]  Yeah.
[39:32.740 --> 39:33.360]  Yeah, yeah.
[39:33.600 --> 39:33.860]  Okay.
[39:34.240 --> 39:39.260]  If you've ever used Apple Pay or Android Pay, then that's based on NFC.
[39:39.420 --> 39:43.920]  You can also use it to send data to someone who's standing right next to you.
[39:44.180 --> 39:53.300]  It's another sort of wireless-y kind of thing, but it's like maybe a Bluetooth or a Wi-Fi, but it's another specific...
[39:53.740 --> 39:55.380]  It's built for this kind of interaction.
[39:55.380 --> 39:58.300]  It's very short range on Wi-Fi or Bluetooth.
[39:58.440 --> 39:59.420]  How short range are we talking about?
[39:59.420 --> 39:59.720]  Proximity.
[40:00.060 --> 40:00.960]  A few inches at the most.
[40:01.020 --> 40:06.560]  Okay, so you're going to hold your phone up to this machine and I assume it's going to ask you for a password or something.
[40:06.840 --> 40:07.980]  Or does it not even do that now?
[40:08.120 --> 40:15.400]  Right, like the article said, it had some kind of key code it generates or you generate a code, then you enter that into the machine or maybe it's a PIN or both.
[40:15.660 --> 40:18.360]  You enter in after the phone is presented or something.
[40:18.520 --> 40:18.700]  I don't know.
[40:18.740 --> 40:21.720]  I think the article outlined it more or less.
[40:22.300 --> 40:24.740]  So it's two-step authentication is what it is.
[40:24.800 --> 40:28.760]  Yeah, kind of like brings it back to what we had been speaking about early on in the show.
[40:30.080 --> 40:31.660]  ATMs are already two-factor.
[40:31.880 --> 40:34.500]  You need both the card and your PIN, so...
[40:34.500 --> 40:34.680]  True.
[40:34.900 --> 40:36.080]  What's the second step there?
[40:36.100 --> 40:36.880]  You have the phone.
[40:37.380 --> 40:38.440]  What's the second step?
[40:38.680 --> 40:39.800]  Maybe you have to enter your PIN?
[40:39.880 --> 40:40.240]  I don't know.
[40:40.360 --> 40:41.060]  I don't know how it works.
[40:41.220 --> 40:42.380]  It hasn't been deployed yet.
[40:42.460 --> 40:45.440]  Yeah, the phone maybe says, I'm this person's phone.
[40:45.440 --> 40:54.920]  You have this code on file and then the person's prompted to enter their PIN as normally and the computer says, oh, the phone and the PIN and everything's happy.
[40:55.020 --> 40:55.220]  Yay.
[40:55.360 --> 40:56.220]  Get your money and leave.
[40:56.540 --> 40:57.680]  Or the fingerprint reader.
[40:57.840 --> 41:03.240]  It doesn't seem impossible that it's more secure than an ATM card, which is pretty easy to steal or copy or both.
[41:03.500 --> 41:05.020]  But I guess we'll find out.
[41:05.020 --> 41:10.940]  Yeah, but Chase has really slow tellers, so this could be good for them.
[41:11.960 --> 41:12.500]  All right.
[41:12.560 --> 41:16.360]  Well, you know how I feel about Chase, but that's interesting development there.
[41:16.540 --> 41:24.040]  There was this really good article I saw by Violet Blue on Gizmodo, not Gizmodo, Engadget, called Bad Password.
[41:24.140 --> 41:25.220]  It kind of ties into this.
[41:25.920 --> 41:26.920]  It starts this way.
[41:27.000 --> 41:32.220]  In the grab bag of Google slash Alphabet's big projects, 2016 is Project Abacus.
[41:32.440 --> 41:41.800]  It's basically the company's plot to kill the password in cold blood by replacing it with smartphone user authentication via an uncrackable collection of biometric readings.
[41:42.060 --> 41:58.900]  So Abacus would lock or unlock devices and apps based on a cumulative trust score as your phone continually monitors and recognizes your location patterns, voice and speech patterns, how you walk and type, and your face, among other things.
[41:58.900 --> 42:03.660]  Now, Google will do all the work, or actually, correction, the work is already being done.
[42:03.980 --> 42:08.860]  All the data and constant monitoring needed by Abacus is already happening with your smartphone.
[42:09.080 --> 42:15.320]  Like its contemporaries, Facebook and Apple, Google is already tracking and recording you up the you-know-where.
[42:15.760 --> 42:19.260]  And that's why law enforcement loves it when suspects use smartphones.
[42:19.680 --> 42:26.240]  To make Abacus use our tracked information as a security system, it's only a matter of putting it all together and giving it a shiny front end.
[42:26.540 --> 42:33.780]  What it also requires, however, is constant invasive surveillance and access to some pretty intimate records.
[42:34.240 --> 42:35.260]  So, um...
[42:35.260 --> 42:36.180]  That's a little ironic.
[42:36.820 --> 42:37.340]  You think?
[42:37.460 --> 42:37.620]  Yeah.
[42:37.780 --> 42:38.600]  It's, uh...
[42:38.600 --> 42:39.040]  Let's...
[42:39.040 --> 42:39.760]  The way of the future.
[42:40.040 --> 42:45.660]  Take all of my biometric everything so that I can be secure.
[42:45.740 --> 42:46.260]  So that...
[42:46.260 --> 42:50.980]  So some system knows it's me based on all the spying it's doing on me.
[42:52.020 --> 42:53.020]  Ironic, isn't it?
[42:53.080 --> 42:53.280]  Yes.
[42:53.800 --> 42:56.320]  That's making me feel more secure somehow.
[42:56.700 --> 43:01.560]  Kyle has turned his phone off and is gently depositing it in the waste bin.
[43:01.920 --> 43:04.400]  I have one more thought on the chase thing.
[43:04.580 --> 43:04.760]  Sorry.
[43:05.280 --> 43:05.720]  I...
[43:05.720 --> 43:08.140]  What I hope doesn't come of this is that you...
[43:08.700 --> 43:11.380]  The one good thing about ATMs is the network is interoperable.
[43:11.580 --> 43:15.280]  Maybe there's a fee attached, but you can use any ATM card basically at any ATM.
[43:15.520 --> 43:15.860]  Oh, yeah.
[43:15.860 --> 43:20.580]  And it would be really tragic if the result of this is you can only use your bank's ATMs.
[43:20.580 --> 43:21.420]  That's interesting.
[43:21.620 --> 43:28.080]  And that seems like that could fuel a bit of the arms race with banks to come up with this technology if they don't interoperate.
[43:28.180 --> 43:34.760]  Whoever's got the best, easiest thing, you know, if everybody jumps ship, you've seen that with services and stuff.
[43:34.760 --> 43:37.500]  It could be bad for interoperability.
[43:37.700 --> 43:43.560]  It would certainly be a problem for me that my bank is in another state if I had to travel to that state to get money out.
[43:43.800 --> 43:46.880]  Bernie, any thoughts on the bad password article?
[43:49.880 --> 43:51.420]  I'm freaked out by it, frankly.
[43:51.720 --> 44:01.760]  I don't want to give up my biometric information to corporations or government agencies because who knows what they're going to do with it later.
[44:01.840 --> 44:02.960]  Once it's out, it's out.
[44:04.500 --> 44:17.120]  So, Google's plan to just get rid of passwords and, like, peer into our face with a camera and look at our eyeballs and the shape of our face and maybe the sound of our voice.
[44:17.660 --> 44:30.820]  That freaks me out because all that can be recorded and replicated and played back just like on Mission Impossible back in the 60s where they recorded some voice and edited the tape to make the person say something else.
[44:31.000 --> 44:33.640]  I mean, what's to prevent that with this new technology?
[44:33.840 --> 44:46.460]  Except it's all digital now and you can, like, organize it and manipulate it and catalog it and tag it and do all kinds of wonderful manipulating and analyzing.
[44:46.800 --> 44:52.760]  It's not tapes and razors and tape tape or splice tape and stuff.
[44:52.960 --> 44:55.100]  I mean, it's a lot easier.
[44:55.440 --> 45:09.140]  Yeah, Bernie, you're touching upon the security aspects of it, saying it could be replicated easily, but I think you're also concerned about the privacy implications of having all this information about you under the scrutiny of a company someplace.
[45:09.140 --> 45:15.480]  Yes, and you have no, you will have no legal privacy right to what they do with that information.
[45:15.660 --> 45:26.240]  As soon as you entrust a third party, a company, with this sensitive biometric information about yourself, they have no legal obligation to protect it.
[45:26.400 --> 45:33.900]  In fact, a government agency can just go get it without having to provide a warrant or restoring it.
[45:34.000 --> 45:35.620]  Or a hacker can go get it too.
[45:35.880 --> 45:39.140]  Yeah, that's what wakes people up when you tell them a hacker could do this.
[45:39.300 --> 45:41.340]  A hacker can watch your baby monitor.
[45:41.600 --> 45:44.560]  Yeah, that's something that makes them really scared.
[45:45.120 --> 45:50.520]  So, yeah, the government and corporations but hackers, that really does the number.
[45:50.800 --> 46:03.240]  It's one thing to willingly click a checkbox or something and say, I'm, I want to say gender, like male, female, you know, that kind of information.
[46:03.400 --> 46:05.900]  It's still, it's demographic information, right?
[46:05.900 --> 46:12.060]  But you could lie about that, but you can't really like lie about your fingerprint if it's actually checking it and stuff.
[46:12.180 --> 46:29.520]  I mean, it gets, and the more services you're giving this, you're using biometrics with, the more places you're placing this stuff and organizing it, or it has more of an ability to be organized by many different entities that you have, as we said, no control over.
[46:29.520 --> 46:39.120]  You say you can't change your fingerprint and you're pretty much right, but what if every one of these developments, and by the way, I think they're all really cool.
[46:39.280 --> 46:40.700]  I just want to make that clear.
[46:40.820 --> 46:41.000]  Yeah.
[46:41.620 --> 46:54.540]  I'm scared of them, I'm critical of them, but I think it's really cool technology, one that we need to learn a lot about, but it can be used against us, and it is being used against us, but what if every single time we saw something like this, we saw it as a challenge,
[46:54.580 --> 46:56.040]  like how do we defeat this?
[46:56.040 --> 46:58.860]  How do we get on Facebook with a fake name?
[46:59.060 --> 47:03.140]  How do we tell Google where we work when we don't work there?
[47:03.440 --> 47:13.640]  How do we just basically defeat all of these intrusive little systems and make them worth a whole lot less by retaining control over our own data?
[47:14.000 --> 47:14.760]  Fingerprints too.
[47:15.040 --> 47:18.180]  What if there was a way that you could simply change your fingerprints?
[47:18.280 --> 47:22.960]  Yeah, it sounds crazy, it sounds criminal, but it's getting more and more necessary to think this way.
[47:23.560 --> 47:24.020]  Yeah.
[47:24.540 --> 47:25.100]  Go ahead.
[47:25.220 --> 47:27.580]  Maybe I should set my phone so it can only be opened.
[47:27.800 --> 47:36.940]  If you remember the CCC published the I think it was the interior minister's fingerprints some years back, maybe I can make those fingerprints open my phone.
[47:37.560 --> 47:38.540]  We have to think this way.
[47:38.680 --> 47:41.780]  Hey, our phone number is 718-780-8888.
[47:41.780 --> 47:47.060]  If you want to make a phone call to us and speak on the air about any of the issues we've talked about, I know we said we were going to take phone calls.
[47:47.140 --> 47:48.380]  Let's try and take as many as we can.
[47:55.760 --> 48:00.000]  employers who take biometrics and suffer access control and things like that.
[48:00.180 --> 48:14.600]  If you get your whole hand fingerprinted by say a government or some place that you work, right, wondering what happens to that data, it might make you wonder, how is that going to be handled?
[48:14.680 --> 48:16.020]  What happens when I leave this company?
[48:16.160 --> 48:17.700]  And I need this job, by the way.
[48:17.860 --> 48:26.860]  At the very least, you should have the option, at no penalty to you, to use a different method to verify your identity, not your biometrics.
[48:27.480 --> 48:27.920]  Yes.
[48:28.660 --> 48:29.740]  Yeah, stuff like that.
[48:30.040 --> 48:36.820]  And I don't know, I guess more experimentation with different types of it and so on.
[48:37.000 --> 48:37.280]  Yes.
[48:37.860 --> 48:40.180]  Our phone number is 718-780-8888.
[48:40.200 --> 48:41.540]  You know, there's no phone calls coming in.
[48:41.820 --> 48:44.600]  I know our phone lines were broken before, but I think they're fixed now.
[48:44.740 --> 48:46.980]  718-780-8888.
[48:47.220 --> 48:53.540]  I know we're talking about boring things like privacy and freedom and technology, but I'm sure there's some listeners out there.
[48:53.760 --> 48:55.700]  I unlock my cell phone with my fingerprint.
[48:56.040 --> 48:56.440]  Do you?
[48:56.660 --> 48:56.880]  Yeah.
[48:57.080 --> 48:57.280]  Okay.
[48:57.980 --> 48:58.640]  It's pretty good.
[48:58.820 --> 48:59.220]  Well, yeah.
[48:59.220 --> 48:59.680]  Very quick.
[48:59.980 --> 49:10.060]  It is, but you know, the feds can unlock your phone now without any password, and you have no rights to say, no, I don't want to use my finger to open the phone.
[49:10.400 --> 49:10.660]  it's true.
[49:10.840 --> 49:11.600]  It is a concern.
[49:11.840 --> 49:13.260]  So, convenience has a price.
[49:14.240 --> 49:20.720]  It only works for, if the phone is off, I can't use my fingerprint, so, you know, I should turn it off when I cross borders.
[49:20.860 --> 49:23.420]  Well, can't they just turn it on and say, hey, Mike, put your finger there?
[49:23.920 --> 49:26.380]  No, you have to enter the pin the first time you turn it on.
[49:26.380 --> 49:26.840]  so there's a pin as well?
[49:26.940 --> 49:27.080]  Yeah.
[49:27.360 --> 49:28.380]  The first time you turn it on?
[49:28.700 --> 49:28.820]  Yeah.
[49:29.160 --> 49:30.920]  But not, when's the last time you turned your phone off?
[49:31.260 --> 49:31.880]  This weekend.
[49:32.100 --> 49:32.300]  Really?
[49:32.300 --> 49:32.540]  Okay.
[49:32.860 --> 49:35.000]  I found out the last time I turned my phone off was in November.
[49:35.780 --> 49:36.780]  It told me that.
[49:36.860 --> 49:38.120]  It wanted me to turn it off for some reason.
[49:38.320 --> 49:38.960]  Let's take some phone calls.
[49:39.000 --> 49:39.280]  Good evening.
[49:39.380 --> 49:40.080]  You're on off the hook.
[49:41.000 --> 49:41.980]  Oh, okay.
[49:42.200 --> 49:42.860]  Hi, what's on your mind?
[49:43.260 --> 49:51.540]  Well, I was thinking about the issue of you said people are not worried about the loss of privacy.
[49:51.860 --> 50:00.200]  And maybe the problem is it's hard to imagine the onerous kinds of things that can be done with that.
[50:00.360 --> 50:10.380]  So maybe we need some more creative people you know, to make up you know, like they have these think tanks where people sit around think about the worst case scenarios.
[50:11.080 --> 50:35.060]  So maybe as some exercise your group you guys could do it or I don't know who but sit around and say okay, what's the worst thing that could happen when everybody you know, when they have your fingerprints and it's all over the place or what's the worst that can happen when they combine all the different metadata that's being collected and then you put it out there.
[50:35.280 --> 50:39.400]  See, I think the problem today is we lack imagination.
[50:39.400 --> 51:04.360]  You can't even comprehend terrible things and sometimes that's good because that's a protection for your mind but we need to maybe think in terms of you know it's not as harmless as you can imagine so let's get some people who got better imaginations imaginations can make up scenarios explain that to people and then maybe people would get a little more concerned about it.
[51:04.580 --> 51:06.360]  Alright, thanks thanks so much for that phone call.
[51:07.260 --> 51:18.540]  718-780-8888 and that's kind of what we're talking about as far as having people challenge the technology defeat the technology talk about it share stories and that's what the hacker community is all about.
[51:18.760 --> 51:19.320]  Let's take another phone call.
[51:19.400 --> 51:20.420]  Good evening you're on Off The Hook.
[51:21.260 --> 51:21.700]  Hello.
[51:21.900 --> 51:22.540]  Hi, what's on your mind?
[51:22.920 --> 51:24.720]  Very briefly two small points.
[51:24.720 --> 51:47.660]  One is the reason why they probably the corporate will probably not let you come up with an alternative approach is a simple word and that's liability and that might just be an excuse and a canard on their part but they're going to say well if somebody rips you off then we're going to be responsible and we can't let that happen so we have to rip your fingerprints off or tear your eyes out or
[51:47.660 --> 51:48.280]  whatever they're going to do.
[51:48.580 --> 52:05.780]  But the other question that I had for you guys is at what point do you think if we're not already there is it going to become illegal for you to say we want to use a different identity to get on Facebook?
[52:05.900 --> 52:07.260]  That's a very good question.
[52:07.380 --> 52:13.380]  That's a very good question and I see that day getting closer all the time where people say why would you want to be anonymous?
[52:13.620 --> 52:15.880]  Why would you want to not have your real information out there?
[52:15.960 --> 52:16.720]  What are you trying to hide?
[52:17.460 --> 52:31.040]  So it isn't just a matter of activism on the technical front but activism in terms of screaming at those people that we for whatever reason we did it put into the places that make these political decisions on our behalf.
[52:31.220 --> 52:39.380]  I mean I think it's important to distinguish there's no law against using a fake name on Facebook but Facebook is the entity that doesn't want you to do that.
[52:39.580 --> 52:52.860]  They have policies against it they kick people off it comes up a lot with people from various marginalized communities who need to use fake names or whatever and get thrown off the surface.
[52:53.280 --> 52:59.960]  So I think it's important to distinguish the government from Facebook which is the entity that's doing the harm here.
[53:00.140 --> 53:06.040]  Although it's getting harder and harder to tell the difference as corporates get more powerful and more intertwined.
[53:06.480 --> 53:18.360]  Well maybe we can still tell the difference to a degree but with the power and with the change in technology you could face all kinds of penalties for lying to a corporation someday.
[53:18.680 --> 53:19.800]  That's how I see it.
[53:20.340 --> 53:22.040]  Let's take one more phone call.
[53:22.340 --> 53:22.840]  Good evening.
[53:23.060 --> 53:23.720]  You're on off the hook.
[53:23.980 --> 53:24.660]  I have all kinds of penalties.
[53:24.880 --> 53:25.680]  Please turn down your radio.
[53:26.220 --> 53:27.600]  I just turned it down.
[53:27.740 --> 53:27.940]  Okay.
[53:28.400 --> 53:30.960]  I had two questions that I wanted to ask you.
[53:31.160 --> 53:43.680]  The first one was I work in tabulations and I deal with data every day and a lot of times I can take anything manipulate it and do what I once it's there for me to reach out to it.
[53:43.820 --> 54:04.560]  The fact that they're talking about things like that with biometrics, fingerprints and stuff like that, when these things get stored someplace, would it actually make it easier for somebody to be able to manipulate that kind of thing or reach out and grab a fingerprint or are they looking for a physical whatever it is that device that's locked down or what have you.
[54:04.680 --> 54:06.240]  Is it looking for a physical fingerprint?
[54:06.680 --> 54:15.840]  because if you can get at that stuff and manipulate it in some way or another and get a copy of it someplace, can't you use that to kind of go around those things the same way?
[54:16.280 --> 54:17.120]  Yeah, definitely.
[54:17.360 --> 54:20.140]  I mean, and it works the old school way too with fingerprints.
[54:20.460 --> 54:24.880]  I mean, there's, you know, plenty of places where things we touch doorknobs and stuff like that.
[54:25.000 --> 54:42.340]  You can still lift fingerprints that way and what I think Mike was talking about was a demonstration of a fingerprint that had been generated of a politician in Germany and other things have been done with high-resolution photos of, I think, Angela Merkel's eye or someone's retina,
[54:42.380 --> 54:44.040]  something funny like that.
[54:44.160 --> 54:47.360]  Where does one get a high-resolution photo of Angela Merkel's eye?
[54:47.440 --> 54:49.280]  Well, that's a good question.
[54:49.660 --> 54:53.980]  The cameras are getting really, really, they have really high megapixels.
[54:53.980 --> 54:56.320]  You can record 4K on your phone these days.
[54:56.320 --> 54:57.340]  It's not that hard anymore.
[54:57.680 --> 54:57.840]  Exactly.
[54:58.060 --> 55:02.900]  So there's been some examples and some sort of tongue-in-cheek, but it's...
[55:02.900 --> 55:08.100]  People take pictures of keys in a newspaper article and they're able to replicate a key based on that photo.
[55:08.460 --> 55:09.800]  So, yeah, it's...
[55:09.800 --> 55:11.180]  I think it's very possible.
[55:11.200 --> 55:12.020]  Also a good example.
[55:12.260 --> 55:13.900]  And the key...
[55:14.960 --> 55:32.600]  The important thing to remember, I guess, and I think to your point, is that, yeah, what a database is is a way to organize information and when you create this stuff, and digitize it and make it easy for a company to look at or a bureaucracy to look at,
[55:33.120 --> 55:38.920]  you're sort of pre-packaging it on a silver platter for anybody who might compromise it.
[55:39.460 --> 55:41.640]  And can I just ask one other thing also?
[55:41.800 --> 55:41.900]  Go ahead.
[55:43.240 --> 55:47.180]  Or not even so much ask, but just make a point because everybody gets...
[55:47.180 --> 55:53.340]  You know, I'm one of these people that, you know, by my friends, I'm considered somebody who, to some extent, lives under the radar.
[55:53.800 --> 55:58.580]  You know, I'm not online paying bills every day or, you know, even my E-ZPass.
[55:58.580 --> 56:05.080]  I physically go up to an office and physically put cash in somebody's hand and ask them to add it to my E-ZPass.
[56:05.080 --> 56:15.840]  I'm probably naive because every time I go through a toll someplace, there's probably some reader that's picking up, you know, my E-ZPass and saying, oh, he just went through this bridge or he just crossed this, you know.
[56:18.180 --> 56:26.380]  But one of the things that people always try to do every time the subject of privacy comes up, it's always like this, well, what do you have to hide?
[56:26.680 --> 56:39.700]  As if, you know, if you're concerned about your privacy or you would like to maintain your privacy, it's because you have some kind of nefarious objective or you're doing something wrong, when did that become like the norm?
[56:39.940 --> 56:43.740]  When we convinced ourselves that being anonymous was something to be afraid of.
[56:43.960 --> 56:51.940]  Yeah, and I think a lot of the rhetoric around fear and war fighting has fueled that and validated it.
[56:52.000 --> 56:57.240]  It's sick, but I think to a degree society is responsible for validating it through fear.
[56:57.920 --> 57:13.200]  And now, yeah, as you said, we look at each other, one another, with suspicion if someone's choosing not to use a smart device or someone's choosing to question a particular service, why they track this or why they don't have a checkbox for that.
[57:13.420 --> 57:15.660]  I mean, we end up having these arguments with each other.
[57:15.760 --> 57:20.460]  We're at each other's throat over it when really we're being handed these systems unjustly in a lot of ways.
[57:20.560 --> 57:21.520]  It's really up to us.
[57:21.520 --> 57:22.960]  We can change the dialogue.
[57:22.960 --> 57:24.220]  We can question these things.
[57:24.300 --> 57:24.760]  We can challenge.
[57:24.900 --> 57:27.760]  We can manipulate technology so we have control
[57:32.940 --> 57:34.060]  thanks everybody for calling in.
[57:34.180 --> 57:35.340]  Every call was right on topic.
[57:35.660 --> 57:39.120]  You can write to us OTH at 2600.com.
[57:39.300 --> 57:40.520]  Stay tuned for The Personal Computer Show.
[57:40.740 --> 57:44.160]  Again, we'll be back next week with a two-hour fundraising edition.
[57:44.420 --> 57:46.160]  And that will be tons of fun.
[57:46.360 --> 57:48.580]  Until then, Emmanuel for Off the Hook, have a good night.
[57:49.060 --> 57:56.960]  We see, don't we, all that we experience is understandable as a spectrum of vibrations.
[58:02.060 --> 58:04.220]  There are different kinds of spectrums.
[58:04.280 --> 58:05.480]  There's the spectrum of light, light, light.
[58:06.420 --> 58:08.080]  There's the spectrum of sound.
[58:08.600 --> 58:18.520]  We can also think of spectrums of smells, of tactile features, of emotions, and so on.
[58:18.620 --> 58:35.000]  All down the line, we are, as if we're living in the midst of a woven tapestry of many dimensions in which the warps and the woofs are all these different spectrums of various kinds of vibrations.
[58:38.100 --> 58:45.740]  and as on the loom the warp crosses the wolf and if you didn't have one you wouldn't have the other.
[58:46.340 --> 58:48.980]  It takes two to reveal the pattern.
[58:50.020 --> 58:56.360]  So see yourselves as patterns in a weaving system.
[58:56.820 --> 59:02.020]  You wouldn't be here if it weren't for the interlocking of all these different spectrums of dimensions.
[59:03.220 --> 59:04.800]  So then, here they go.
[59:04.900 --> 59:05.460]  Here they go.
[59:05.540 --> 59:06.100]  Here they go.
[59:06.200 --> 59:06.400]  Here they go.
[59:06.400 --> 59:06.460]  Here they go.
[59:06.460 --> 59:06.480]  Here they go.
[59:06.480 --> 59:06.560]  Here they go.
[59:06.560 --> 59:06.680]  Here they go.
[59:06.680 --> 59:06.720]  Here they go.