[00:12.380 --> 00:27.440]  And while he's thanking those folks, let me take this opportunity to thank all of you, our listeners and support staff, our contributors, our interns, the volunteers, producers, and the entire crew that works countless hours to bring WBAI into your lives.
[00:31.840 --> 00:33.100]  Thank you indeed.
[00:33.640 --> 00:40.020]  You are listening to radio station WBAI 99.5 FM, New York.
[00:40.540 --> 00:43.540]  The time is just about 7 p.m.
[00:44.420 --> 00:44.960]  Eastern Time.
[00:45.480 --> 00:49.100]  And it's time for an exciting edition of Off the Hook.
[00:55.850 --> 01:00.430]  The telephone keeps ringing, so I ripped it off the wall.
[01:01.290 --> 01:03.370]  I cut myself while shaving.
[01:03.970 --> 01:05.650]  Now I can't make a call.
[01:06.570 --> 01:08.810]  We couldn't get much worse.
[01:09.130 --> 01:14.170]  Von Dilly Bump with our best expect the worst.
[01:14.810 --> 01:16.690]  I hope that's understood.
[01:16.870 --> 01:17.750]  Von Dilly Bump!
[02:14.470 --> 02:16.170]  And a very good evening to you.
[02:16.590 --> 02:19.010]  The program is Off the Hook.
[02:19.450 --> 02:20.030]  Rob T.
[02:20.150 --> 02:21.210]  Firefly here with you.
[02:21.350 --> 02:23.190]  And I'm joined in this studio by Mike.
[02:23.410 --> 02:23.830]  Hi there.
[02:23.930 --> 02:24.370]  Happy Wednesday.
[02:24.810 --> 02:27.270]  And we're joined on the phone by Bernie S.
[02:27.590 --> 02:30.910]  Greetings from Philadelphia, where Verizon is still on strike.
[02:31.830 --> 02:35.670]  And, uh, Emanuel and Kyle are still on assignment in Mysterious Parts Unknown.
[02:36.650 --> 02:39.250]  Um, Verizon is still on strike, did you say?
[02:39.890 --> 02:52.390]  Yeah, I, uh, I just was, I just about an hour before the show, I was talking with a Verizon supervisor around the corner from where I'm living here in Philadelphia, uh, which is, like, right next to a central, a Verizon central office.
[02:52.990 --> 02:57.910]  And, uh, he was getting into his car to go home, and I said, hey, what's going on with the strike?
[02:57.950 --> 03:00.850]  He's like, oh, I wish it would come to an end.
[03:00.930 --> 03:02.170]  He's, uh, he's in management.
[03:02.170 --> 03:06.990]  So, he now has to do the job of the people that he supervises.
[03:06.990 --> 03:09.510]  And he says, it's been very eye-opening.
[03:09.850 --> 03:13.490]  Um, there's a lot I didn't realize that, uh, they have to put up with.
[03:13.830 --> 03:23.170]  So, kind of interesting that, uh, the supervisors are actually having to do the job of the people they supervise and, and, uh, and see what that's really like.
[03:23.170 --> 03:28.110]  Um, but whether that gets up to upper management or no, not, I don't know.
[03:28.490 --> 03:33.410]  Sounds like not a very good supervisor if you really had no idea what his staff was up to.
[03:33.870 --> 03:34.890]  Well, he had an idea.
[03:35.030 --> 03:35.650]  He just didn't think.
[03:35.750 --> 03:37.430]  He said it was a lot harder than he expected.
[03:37.710 --> 03:38.010]  All right.
[03:39.090 --> 03:40.790]  Well, that's how these things go.
[03:40.890 --> 03:44.890]  I actually saw a couple of the, uh, strikers in Midtown Manhattan, um, the other day.
[03:45.110 --> 03:47.010]  You were in Midtown Manhattan on purpose?
[03:47.110 --> 03:47.550]  I was.
[03:47.650 --> 03:47.930]  All right.
[03:48.030 --> 03:55.170]  I was, I was passing through, and, uh, I stopped in a store, and there were a couple of, uh, strikers there, and they were carrying the signs with them and knocking things off shelves.
[03:55.350 --> 04:00.050]  And not, not, not intentionally, but, uh, I think just as a fact of the largeness of the signs.
[04:00.410 --> 04:04.030]  But, uh, but yeah, I, I gave them a friendly wave and wish them good luck.
[04:04.190 --> 04:07.450]  And, uh, and, you know, we'll see, we'll see how it goes.
[04:08.230 --> 04:09.230]  Did you vote yesterday?
[04:09.670 --> 04:12.090]  I did not vote yesterday because I wasn't allowed.
[04:12.450 --> 04:13.010]  You weren't allowed.
[04:13.070 --> 04:13.370]  Why not?
[04:13.770 --> 04:16.570]  I was not allowed to vote because it's a primary election.
[04:16.790 --> 04:20.570]  And in this state, you have to be a member of the political party to vote in its primary.
[04:20.870 --> 04:21.670]  Ah, I see.
[04:21.670 --> 04:25.510]  I'm a member of no political parties, so I don't get to play in this, uh, reindeer game.
[04:25.670 --> 04:42.470]  That, that is, um, an ethical stand that I, I, uh, you know, I'm, I'm, I'm in, I won't say my age, but, uh, you know, as, as part of the, the gradual getting older and selling out process, I did join the Democratic Party a few years ago, um, so that I could vote in primary elections,
[04:42.710 --> 04:53.010]  uh, particularly local primary elections, I think are super important, uh, especially in places like New York where there's really only one party and, and, uh, the primary election is often the only election.
[04:53.410 --> 05:01.050]  But, uh, New York has the hardest, uh, primary to, to vote in.
[05:01.170 --> 05:07.130]  Uh, you have to have changed your party enrollment by last October if you wanted to vote yesterday.
[05:07.130 --> 05:08.810]  I should hurry up and do that, I guess.
[05:08.930 --> 05:10.930]  Yeah, get it, go, go get your time machine.
[05:11.070 --> 05:16.930]  And no small time machine that just goes back a month or two will do, you need one that can go all the way back to last October.
[05:17.150 --> 05:18.690]  Man, I have to get the deluxe model for this.
[05:18.830 --> 05:19.230]  Seriously.
[05:19.770 --> 05:27.730]  Um, so there were a lot of people who were disenfranchised because of not knowing they had to, uh, obey silly rules like this.
[05:27.950 --> 05:37.050]  Apparently Donald Trump's children among the, those people, um, I don't really feel too bad for, for them, but they have lawyers they could have learned.
[05:37.130 --> 05:43.270]  Uh, but, but normal people who don't know about these rules, uh, it's kind of, it's, it's nuts, really.
[05:44.030 --> 05:44.770]  I wish I had...
[05:44.770 --> 05:55.090]  Apparently, uh, apparently a lot of people who did register to vote in this primary by registering with the Democratic or Republican, um, party, they still couldn't vote.
[05:55.190 --> 06:04.610]  Wasn't that, I just read yesterday that last night that there were some 125,000 people who's were taken off the voting rolls for apparently no, no good reason.
[06:05.050 --> 06:05.530]  Yeah.
[06:05.530 --> 06:18.690]  I was, uh, I was gathering a little, uh, anecdotal evidence of this, um, just colleagues at my day job and, uh, some other people I knew had, uh, had complaints about the whole process and, um, either, either were not on the lists as they should have been or,
[06:18.850 --> 06:22.610]  or, you know, just, uh, just machines not working.
[06:23.090 --> 06:32.730]  Um, somebody, uh, there, there was telling, uh, some news article that I was reading about, uh, somebody trying to vote in a, vote, vote as a Republican and there were no ballots left.
[06:32.930 --> 06:37.630]  So they couldn't vote until more ballots were delivered, uh, which meant they were standing there and waiting two hours.
[06:37.770 --> 06:38.070]  Like...
[06:38.070 --> 06:40.510]  In New York City, they ran out of Republican ballots?
[06:40.510 --> 06:41.150]  Apparently.
[06:41.750 --> 06:43.130]  They only need, like, five.
[06:44.050 --> 06:46.050]  Maybe they only, maybe they only had four.
[06:46.190 --> 06:46.530]  I don't know.
[06:46.690 --> 06:47.910]  We, we look forward to your emails.
[06:48.390 --> 06:48.890]  Um, but...
[06:48.890 --> 06:49.850]  What are your emails?
[06:49.970 --> 06:51.190]  You can look at the vote totals.
[06:51.730 --> 06:58.810]  In my precinct, uh, there were about, uh, 150 Democratic, uh, ballots cast.
[06:58.950 --> 06:59.990]  I looked up the results.
[07:00.150 --> 07:01.830]  I'm like, 10 Republican ballots cast.
[07:02.310 --> 07:05.310]  It's not, uh, this is not a made-up number on my part.
[07:05.310 --> 07:13.410]  Well, apparently, were they, were they just deleted from the voting rolls or, or did they go out and delete the, the individuals or, you know, how, how does this all, how is this all shaking out?
[07:13.490 --> 07:13.590]  Yeah.
[07:13.710 --> 07:29.950]  I mean, so, I think one of the things we'll, we'll have to try and understand is to what degree are there people who did not know about stupid rules like the one we mentioned and therefore did not comply with them and therefore we need to get the undemocratic stupid rules changed?
[07:30.290 --> 07:36.950]  Um, and to what degree is the Board of Elections incompetent and deleting people's voting, people for literally no reason.
[07:37.090 --> 07:39.650]  And those people need to be looked into.
[07:40.050 --> 07:50.730]  Um, both are problems in New York City, but, uh, it's important, I think, to, to learn, uh, as we can, which of the problems is more important.
[07:50.990 --> 07:51.190]  Right.
[07:51.370 --> 07:56.430]  So, so what's the, uh, likelihood of all this, uh, magically being fixed by the time the, uh, the proper election comes along?
[07:57.470 --> 07:58.330]  Who cares?
[07:58.870 --> 08:03.670]  You don't get a vote in New York State in the general election for president.
[08:04.770 --> 08:06.970]  I'm just, so, so this leaves me way out in the cold.
[08:06.990 --> 08:08.870]  I just don't get to, I just don't get to play this game.
[08:08.990 --> 08:10.030]  I mean, you can go vote.
[08:10.030 --> 08:10.430]  It's fun.
[08:10.530 --> 08:11.610]  You get to fill in Scantron.
[08:11.750 --> 08:15.650]  I haven't done that since college, but, uh, other than that, this is fun.
[08:15.730 --> 08:21.350]  Well, I guess since the last election, but you know, there was a gap of some years after college before they had the Scantron had the voting.
[08:21.610 --> 08:21.610]  Yeah.
[08:21.690 --> 08:25.770]  There, there was also talk of, uh, polling places not being opened or being understaffed.
[08:25.790 --> 08:30.430]  Um, and you know, election, uh, election workers not, uh, not knowing their own processes.
[08:30.790 --> 08:35.730]  Um, so it's, it's, it sounds like it's been a magical sleigh ride of, uh, primary voting and this week.
[08:35.850 --> 08:40.630]  And, uh, I think it's, I think it's, uh, got everyone enthused about the next part of the process.
[08:41.510 --> 08:46.270]  I'm looking forward to, uh, maybe similar situations here in, uh, Philadelphia.
[08:46.270 --> 08:46.490]  Yeah.
[08:46.670 --> 08:47.970]  When is your, uh, primary?
[08:48.450 --> 08:51.650]  That's next Tuesday, a week, uh, uh, less than a week from tonight.
[08:51.930 --> 08:52.150]  So.
[08:52.310 --> 08:53.770]  Are you, uh, uh, prepared?
[08:54.490 --> 09:01.230]  Uh, yeah, well, I'm, I'm, I'm sort of connected with the, uh, with the, uh, Bernie Sanders campaign.
[09:01.430 --> 09:09.570]  I'll be Sunday, I'll be canvassing, uh, to get out the vote and, uh, I'll be at the polls, uh, volunteering at some of the polls on next Tuesday as well.
[09:09.570 --> 09:15.190]  It's, uh, going to be a very important primary, um, as last night's was in, uh, in New York.
[09:15.750 --> 09:18.190]  So, um, we'll just have to see what happens.
[09:18.350 --> 09:20.690]  But it's, uh, it, it, there will definitely be a problem.
[09:20.770 --> 09:25.670]  There's problems with every time there's, uh, voting here in Philadelphia, there's problems.
[09:26.090 --> 09:30.410]  So sometimes I experience them to myself, but we'll see what happens.
[09:30.430 --> 09:41.910]  And, uh, you know, I would really like to be there a stand, like there to be a standardized voting system throughout the country, like, like, uh, most sane countries have, but...
[09:41.910 --> 09:47.810]  Even plenty of otherwise not sane countries managed to get the actual, you know, counting the ballots part, right?
[09:48.230 --> 09:51.390]  Well, that, that bit's much easier when you've decided ahead of time what, what it's going to be.
[09:53.770 --> 09:56.790]  Well, that may have happened here in this country too, for all we know.
[09:57.870 --> 10:02.470]  I mean, I don't, I don't know, maybe I'm wrong, but I don't think there's a conspiracy of incompetence here.
[10:02.510 --> 10:04.750]  I think this genuine incompetence most of the time.
[10:06.710 --> 10:07.070]  Yeah.
[10:07.510 --> 10:07.830]  Well, uh...
[10:07.830 --> 10:11.190]  Although some of the rules, some of the party rules seem to be crafted...
[10:11.190 --> 10:15.830]  Some of the rules are, are definitely written to favor incumbents, um, that's true.
[10:16.130 --> 10:28.190]  But, uh, like, I, I don't think, I don't know, but I don't think, like, the, the, amongst the, the candidates, the primary candidates, I don't think, like, one of them went in and deleted a whole bunch of voters.
[10:28.810 --> 10:29.830]  Uh, I don't know.
[10:29.930 --> 10:30.430]  Maybe I'm wrong.
[10:30.830 --> 10:32.950]  We'll be proven wrong on that.
[10:32.950 --> 10:41.350]  So, like, you filled, so you, you filled out a, uh, Scantron ballot, like a card with, uh, you fill in the little circles with a lead pencil, or, I'm sorry, a graphite pencil?
[10:41.510 --> 10:41.890]  Is that what you did?
[10:41.990 --> 10:42.750]  Uh, I used a pen.
[10:43.450 --> 10:43.630]  Ah.
[10:43.770 --> 10:50.570]  They provided, uh, a pen, uh, black ink it told us to use, but also that's the one that's provided, so it wasn't very hard to comply with.
[10:50.950 --> 11:03.630]  It's a big piece of paper, like, uh, maybe what they call legal-sized piece of paper, or maybe, maybe even a little bit bigger, which is a lot for, uh, and, and so there was, uh, you voted for the, the candidate you wanted.
[11:03.750 --> 11:04.530]  There were two candidates.
[11:04.830 --> 11:09.090]  Um, I won't say what party I was in, but it was the one with two candidates.
[11:09.490 --> 11:27.290]  Um, and, uh, and then over, you also had, uh, 12 delegates to the convention, of which you could vote for up to six of them, and they told you which candidate each of those 12 preferred, so there were six for each.
[11:27.710 --> 11:35.330]  And I don't, I don't understand why I had to basically cast the same vote seven times, but, you know, like I said, I hadn't filled out a scantron in a while.
[11:35.830 --> 11:51.730]  And how do you, how do you even research, or were you able to research who these delegates are, and what they're about, and, and how do you, how do you even make an, any kind of an educated, well, there were, you get, you get, you get six votes, and there were six,
[11:52.730 --> 12:01.930]  uh, you know, there were a total of 12 delegates, but six had, uh, one candidate's name next to them, and six had the other candidate's name next to them.
[12:02.190 --> 12:13.770]  So I just voted for the six with the name, uh, next to them of the, the candidate who I had also already voted And I assume that was a reasonable strategy, but you're right, I didn't research any further.
[12:14.090 --> 12:15.850]  And they could change their minds.
[12:15.910 --> 12:18.270]  The whole thing is these delegates can change their minds later.
[12:18.510 --> 12:20.110]  I don't think so.
[12:20.630 --> 12:29.810]  Maybe if there's multiple ballots, but on the first ballot, which when there's only two candidates, you're pretty much guaranteed to have only one ballot.
[12:30.150 --> 12:35.790]  They have to vote in New York at least for that, for the candidate who they said they were going to vote for.
[12:36.250 --> 12:38.730]  This is meant to be what party politics does, isn't it?
[12:38.790 --> 12:47.710]  It's just some organization picks out the people to show you, and then you decide that those people probably are closest to you politically.
[12:48.490 --> 12:53.650]  I have heard, Bernie, that there's some difference in Pennsylvania, but I don't know the details there.
[12:54.290 --> 12:56.310]  I'm not really sure how the delegate systems work.
[12:56.570 --> 12:58.090]  I'll know next week.
[12:58.250 --> 13:03.730]  I'll give you guys a full report the day after the Pennsylvania primary next Tuesday.
[13:03.930 --> 13:05.510]  We expect you to have everything working down there.
[13:05.790 --> 13:08.150]  Well, we have different voting machines.
[13:08.350 --> 13:12.310]  We don't have a Scantron system here where you fill in the circles.
[13:12.510 --> 13:17.390]  You walk into a booth, and there's this giant membrane keyboard.
[13:17.650 --> 13:21.890]  It's about three feet wide and four feet high.
[13:23.230 --> 13:25.650]  It's like the old touch panel.
[13:25.930 --> 13:28.830]  It's not a video display.
[13:29.050 --> 13:40.330]  It's just a piece of plastic with printed a big template with the candidate names and boxes with red LED dots behind the little boxes.
[13:40.330 --> 13:54.670]  And you press it, and you can feel like a little momentary push button, like a membrane behind each place where you're supposed to press these buttons and press these dots behind the membrane keyboard.
[13:54.890 --> 13:55.710]  So you're using...
[13:55.710 --> 13:57.730]  Oh, it's like the Atari... it's like the Atari 400.
[13:57.930 --> 13:58.310]  He wrote it up.
[13:58.470 --> 14:00.970]  I'm sure everybody can relate to the Atari 400 keyboard.
[14:01.230 --> 14:02.250]  It's that kind of...
[14:02.250 --> 14:04.910]  You can probably... I'm going to Google it right now.
[14:05.150 --> 14:07.490]  I know what you're talking about, Bernie, but you're...
[14:07.490 --> 14:09.570]  So you're using speak-and-spell technology is what you're saying.
[14:09.870 --> 14:11.490]  Well, it doesn't talk to you, unfortunately.
[14:11.750 --> 14:12.570]  That would be kind of cool.
[14:12.730 --> 14:13.150]  So just spell.
[14:13.150 --> 14:16.010]  But then other people could hear what you were voting, and that wouldn't be good.
[14:16.290 --> 14:21.570]  I mean, I assume it has a talking mode for people with vision problems, but...
[14:21.570 --> 14:23.870]  No, I think they have... you know, that's a good question.
[14:23.870 --> 14:24.730]  How does that work?
[14:24.730 --> 14:34.270]  Mark, somebody submitted a really good COPA talk proposal for assisted technologies for the blind.
[14:34.510 --> 14:40.730]  But I think you could have someone come into the voting booth with you to help you in the right place.
[14:40.930 --> 14:49.210]  I actually, five, six years ago, whenever it was, when I used to live on Long Island, I actually worked for one election as an election worker.
[14:50.470 --> 15:01.610]  And yeah, that was the process, I think, just one of the, one of the election workers was allowed to go and assist anyone who needed assistance, whether for reasons of language or disability or what have you.
[15:02.050 --> 15:06.070]  But that was actually a fun experience because I had a political party for the day.
[15:07.030 --> 15:11.350]  Because you have to have a certain amount of election judges there for representing each party.
[15:11.550 --> 15:14.530]  And if like me, you don't have a party, they just assign you one to make up numbers.
[15:14.810 --> 15:17.450]  So for that day, I was there for on behalf of the Republicans.
[15:19.490 --> 15:19.910]  Wow.
[15:20.290 --> 15:20.610]  Yeah.
[15:21.230 --> 15:24.050]  So I was, I was insincerely making up their numbers, I guess.
[15:24.190 --> 15:26.010]  But that's how, that's how it goes.
[15:27.830 --> 15:35.030]  Well, I'm glad, I'm glad people, I'm hoping some of our listeners are involved in the political process and voted yesterday.
[15:35.310 --> 15:46.170]  And we'll, maybe we'll take some listener calls later this evening, in half an hour or so, and get to get some, some listeners feedback on how they, how they dealt with it.
[15:46.210 --> 15:53.930]  I guess it's not that exciting just filling out a Scantron sheet, but there's different, maybe there's, there's people in other states listening to the show who have...
[15:53.930 --> 15:55.170]  What are you talking about?
[15:55.310 --> 15:57.750]  Filling out a Scantron sheet, then you put it into a giant machine?
[15:57.750 --> 15:59.030]  It's very exciting, Bernie.
[15:59.270 --> 16:01.950]  Well, you, you put it into a machine yourself or you can hand it to them?
[16:02.070 --> 16:03.050]  No, you put it into a machine.
[16:03.210 --> 16:04.650]  You put it in yourself, yeah.
[16:05.270 --> 16:10.170]  And there's a, there's a person standing there watching you put it in who can see who you voted for.
[16:10.310 --> 16:13.210]  But, you know, that's another topic for another day.
[16:13.210 --> 16:19.730]  We had sort of a sleeve that you put the Scantron in and it stuck out the bottom and the sleeve was supposed to guard it from view.
[16:19.910 --> 16:22.610]  Yeah, you can do that, but very few people do.
[16:23.870 --> 16:25.650]  So the election, it's happening.
[16:25.790 --> 16:34.090]  I'm sure you're all as enthusiastic about continually hearing about it today as I am or as anyone who follows any news is.
[16:34.910 --> 16:38.630]  So we'll keep looking at that as it applies to what we try to do on this show.
[16:39.610 --> 16:49.930]  Also applying to what we have to... things that we've dealt with in the past, the NYPD, speaking of local government, they started a Twitter campaign.
[16:50.310 --> 16:52.150]  Now, we all like our Twitter campaigns, don't we?
[16:53.230 --> 16:54.030]  They're exciting.
[16:54.350 --> 16:57.190]  You get to take part in things by putting a pound sign in front of things.
[16:57.270 --> 17:00.470]  Well, the NYPD started a Twitter campaign against crypto.
[17:02.470 --> 17:06.610]  They decided to use the hashtag...
[17:06.610 --> 17:09.390]  Do they oppose all cryptography?
[17:09.530 --> 17:18.710]  Because I'm pretty sure to connect to Twitter, you must use HTTPS these days, which is an encrypted connection.
[17:18.970 --> 17:27.150]  Yeah, but I can only assume that the NYPD workers who are running their Twitter account are maybe doing so begrudgingly because they think it's not a good thing to do.
[17:27.150 --> 17:34.210]  But the NYPD wanted to start this campaign to raise awareness for the fact that they would really like to be able to read more things than they can.
[17:34.650 --> 17:37.450]  And this nasty cryptography keeps getting in their way.
[17:37.570 --> 17:40.930]  So they chose the hashtag on Twitter, unlockjustice.
[17:42.150 --> 17:46.210]  They posted a tweet trying to get this ball rolling.
[17:47.150 --> 17:51.070]  The district attorney was at the launch of this campaign, and he said,
[18:11.110 --> 18:16.830]  And so they decided to get this ball rolling because the NYPD has such a great history with hashtags as well.
[18:16.830 --> 18:22.210]  As we know from the MyNYPD campaign of a few years ago.
[18:22.650 --> 18:26.070]  So you can kind of imagine where it goes from here.
[18:26.210 --> 18:31.850]  The response to the campaign was not people agreeing with them for the most part, not quite what they were looking for.
[18:32.850 --> 18:43.610]  Matt Blaze, a security researcher and friend of the show, tweeted under the unlockjustice hashtag, Strong crypto prevents serious crimes like identity theft, stalking, sabotage, and espionage.
[18:43.810 --> 18:45.770]  Unlock justice with strong security and crypto.
[18:47.130 --> 18:47.610]  Great.
[18:49.150 --> 18:55.250]  Another researcher you might know the name of, Jonathan, how do you even pronounce, is it Zidziarski?
[18:55.870 --> 18:56.850]  I'm not going to try.
[18:57.810 --> 19:05.530]  I'm going to get letters about this too, but he writes, Giving government authority over every intimate aspect of your private life is a wide gate to enslavement.
[19:05.670 --> 19:06.730]  Pound unlockjustice.
[19:07.290 --> 19:08.710]  Or hashtag unlockjustice.
[19:09.870 --> 19:12.890]  And, you know, it kind of spiraled on from there.
[19:13.070 --> 19:19.110]  And, you know, the campaign kind of isn't looking like that great a success on the part of the NYPD.
[19:19.410 --> 19:20.050]  But, you know what?
[19:20.050 --> 19:21.030]  It doesn't matter.
[19:21.330 --> 19:22.590]  It really doesn't.
[19:22.630 --> 19:23.770]  They write the laws, these people.
[19:23.910 --> 19:27.770]  They're going to write the laws, Twitter campaign or no, unfortunately, for the rest of us.
[19:27.890 --> 19:28.110]  Yeah.
[19:28.250 --> 19:29.710]  And that's kind of gloomy.
[19:29.870 --> 19:35.210]  So we have to take our little victories, like when they ham-fistedly fail at the internet and social media and stuff.
[19:35.210 --> 19:40.010]  Maybe they're doing it on purpose so that we can feel like we've won something and then they win the things that matter.
[19:40.690 --> 19:41.090]  Maybe.
[19:41.190 --> 19:46.670]  Maybe this is the Ministry of Truth at the NYPD trying to just do this to get us all on the side.
[19:47.070 --> 19:54.370]  But beyond all this, the unlockjustice hashtag that they used was actually already in use by a different campaign.
[19:54.950 --> 19:56.530]  It was previously in use.
[19:56.590 --> 20:01.050]  And you could have found this if you worked for the NYPD and searched for your own hashtag before starting it.
[20:01.590 --> 20:06.590]  But it was in use by the Friends Committee on National Legislation, which is a lobbying group for the Quakers.
[20:07.150 --> 20:13.650]  And they've been using the unlockjustice hashtag since last year to highlight excessive mandatory sentences being handed out for crimes.
[20:14.910 --> 20:20.810]  So basically every aspect of starting a social media campaign was not successful on this point.
[20:20.970 --> 20:23.270]  But it's kind of fun to watch the fallout.
[20:25.730 --> 20:34.350]  I found it amusing that the spokesperson for the Friends, the Quakers, you know, I went to a Quaker school when I was a kid.
[20:34.530 --> 20:48.570]  The Friends Committee on National Legislation spokesperson, Jim Cason, said, quote, quote, they're obviously not the NYPD, they're very, they're obviously not very good at social media.
[20:48.650 --> 20:57.150]  This appears to have backfired in the NYPD's face and brought more attention to our campaign to reform the criminal justice system, end quote.
[20:57.330 --> 21:06.350]  So this actually was successful, in my opinion, this NYPD attempt at using social media.
[21:06.350 --> 21:14.730]  It was successful in a way that I would like it to be, which is that, one, it made them look not very competent.
[21:15.190 --> 21:23.010]  And it brought more attention to issues related to reforming the criminal justice system.
[21:23.130 --> 21:35.030]  And it allowed more people to express their voice in a newly promoted medium, a newly promoted hashtag, about why everybody should have strong encryption and why that's a good thing.
[21:35.030 --> 21:37.410]  So I love it.
[21:37.530 --> 21:39.450]  I'm glad this all worked out the way it did.
[21:40.890 --> 21:42.330]  It's kind of fun to watch.
[21:43.070 --> 21:57.090]  I mean, the unfortunate lesson, though, is that they're not going to give up on destroying the privacy, security of users' devices, of everyone's devices.
[21:58.190 --> 22:02.550]  Cryptography is really great, actually, at preventing all kinds of crime.
[22:03.430 --> 22:11.830]  Part of the reason smartphone thefts are down is because when you steal a smartphone, it's a lot harder to do anything useful with it than it used to be.
[22:11.930 --> 22:13.330]  That's due to strong cryptography.
[22:13.330 --> 22:20.570]  It's freeing the New York Police Department to investigate more serious crimes because smartphone thefts on the subway are down.
[22:20.990 --> 22:22.790]  They should be grateful for this.
[22:22.790 --> 22:27.430]  And instead, they're busy unlocking justice.
[22:28.350 --> 22:47.150]  I'm curious if the federal Department of Justice, the United States Department of Justice, has been encouraging state and cities like the New York NYPD law enforcement agencies to sort of...
[22:47.150 --> 23:01.090]  I wonder if the Department of Justice is trying to coordinate a national campaign for other law enforcement agencies to, you know, try to push this idea to people in their areas.
[23:01.370 --> 23:04.070]  You think this was an independent move by the NYPD?
[23:04.250 --> 23:06.770]  You think this was influenced by the Department of Justice?
[23:07.010 --> 23:10.890]  Well, the NYPD has never been shy about trying to grab for more power.
[23:11.090 --> 23:12.690]  And it usually succeeds in this.
[23:12.790 --> 23:17.370]  I think it was described as the 11th biggest army in the world by the...
[23:17.370 --> 23:18.650]  I think by the former chief.
[23:18.650 --> 23:21.190]  But the NYPD...
[23:21.190 --> 23:22.430]  The one who's in jail or a different one?
[23:22.650 --> 23:23.670]  I don't remember.
[23:24.090 --> 23:25.470]  They kind of blur together, don't they?
[23:25.890 --> 23:30.910]  But yeah, the NYPD in particular has always been very gung-ho about this stuff.
[23:31.090 --> 23:36.850]  But yeah, you wonder if the powers that be are trying to sort of uniformly get...
[23:36.850 --> 23:38.790]  turn attitudes toward their side.
[23:38.870 --> 23:41.890]  And I'm sure that's in their job description, basically.
[23:43.330 --> 23:46.690]  Yeah, I mean, to get to your question, Bernie, I don't think it...
[23:46.690 --> 23:47.650]  I almost don't think it matters.
[23:47.650 --> 24:00.830]  I mean, law enforcement on this issue is surprisingly united because you can, you know, pretty much guarantee that even when I want to do the thing that reduces crime, they don't want what I want.
[24:01.210 --> 24:03.090]  It's sort of guaranteed.
[24:04.410 --> 24:08.190]  So whether it's coordinated from the Department of Justice, probably not.
[24:08.330 --> 24:09.230]  But it's certainly...
[24:09.230 --> 24:12.950]  Their interests here, they think their interests align.
[24:12.950 --> 24:18.590]  I think they are not even, as I said, achieving their own objectives with campaigns like this.
[24:18.790 --> 24:19.870]  But what do I know?
[24:21.970 --> 24:41.190]  Well, talking of the powers that be, there's another story going around, this one from the Register in the U.K., about an anti-encryption law put forth by Senators Richard Burr, a Republican from North Carolina, and Dianne Feinstein, a Democrat from California,
[24:41.650 --> 24:43.970]  put forth this bill in the Senate to force U.S.
[24:44.070 --> 24:46.090]  companies to build back doors into their encryption systems.
[24:46.850 --> 24:54.670]  We've spoken a bit about this subject, and the proposed bill is being criticized as so brain-dead that it will outlaw file encryption.
[24:55.630 --> 25:06.290]  This from security researcher Bruce Schneier, a well-known name in tech circles, did call it, this is the most brain-dead piece of legislation I've ever seen.
[25:06.810 --> 25:07.730]  He pointed out that it's...
[25:07.730 --> 25:09.350]  Bruce Schneier has more experience than that.
[25:09.350 --> 25:09.810]  Come on.
[25:09.850 --> 25:10.670]  This is true.
[25:11.190 --> 25:15.970]  But he tells the Register, the person who wrote this either has no idea how technology works or just doesn't care.
[25:16.650 --> 25:19.350]  Which I think there's a very good chance of that.
[25:20.050 --> 25:36.950]  But according to the wording of the bill, Schneier says that this will outlaw other mathematical things besides encryption, like file compression, which is a vital part of basically running any kind of computer that you want to keep any kind of data on.
[25:40.130 --> 25:50.450]  And the president of the Business Software Alliance, Victoria Espinel, says, We believe this bill would stunt the development and use of security technologies such as encryption both today and into the future.
[25:50.670 --> 25:59.070]  We have serious concerns with the proposal because it effectively puts limits on data security and we are concerned it would ultimately undermine security, innovation, and public safety.
[25:59.790 --> 26:15.590]  You know, that's an interesting argument that was used maybe 20 years ago, more than 20 years ago, when, you know, what many people and myself call the first encryption wars that we had in this country, when the U.S.
[26:15.810 --> 26:35.890]  was trying to, Department of Justice was trying to force people to use something called T-Escrow, where, for instance, there was a device that AT&T released so you could plug it into your phone and have ostensibly secure voice communications with other people.
[26:36.510 --> 26:42.750]  And they didn't like that, so they bought all the units off the market and they convinced AT&T to put out a new device.
[26:42.870 --> 26:47.830]  They had a special chip designed by the NSA, the National Security Agency, called the Clipper chip.
[26:49.230 --> 27:08.550]  And that went down in flames when our friend Matt Blazer wrote a program that basically prevented what was called the Law Enforcement Access Field, or LEAF, from providing the key to these third parties.
[27:08.730 --> 27:12.430]  And he called it the... Matt called it the LEAF Blower, which I thought was a brilliant name for the program.
[27:12.550 --> 27:19.750]  But in any case, there were a lot of commercial companies 20-some years ago who said, hey, we really need this for commerce.
[27:19.750 --> 27:22.850]  We need encryption to have safe commerce.
[27:23.250 --> 27:27.710]  And that, I think, had a lot to do with why the U.S.
[27:27.750 --> 27:33.650]  lost the crypto wars against cryptography 20-some years ago.
[27:33.770 --> 27:46.750]  And I'm hoping the same thing happens again now as this discussion is going on in Congress and here, that commercial interests will say, listen, this is not going to work.
[27:46.750 --> 27:52.950]  We need to have secure encryption to protect our and our customers' data in commerce and other things.
[27:53.090 --> 27:54.730]  Because basically, money calls the shots.
[27:55.710 --> 27:57.430]  But money is at stake here.
[27:57.590 --> 28:09.930]  If there's no secure encryption, then your financial transactions, your online purchases, your bank accounts, all these things are at risk.
[28:09.930 --> 28:10.690]  Yeah.
[28:10.950 --> 28:20.030]  And those of us who have been around, I mean, this program definitely spoke about a lot about the clipper chip when that was going on.
[28:20.910 --> 28:22.790]  You guys remember this happening.
[28:23.130 --> 28:29.990]  And this was at a time in the 90s when technology was even more mysterious and people had no real concept of what was going on.
[28:29.990 --> 28:32.890]  And I think maybe today we can say that's possibly a little bit improved.
[28:33.030 --> 28:42.410]  But what do you think of just the path this has taken over the years, like from something like the clipper chip to where the public attitudes are now?
[28:44.030 --> 28:44.470]  Mike?
[28:44.810 --> 28:46.150]  I mean, I don't know.
[28:46.150 --> 28:48.490]  I wasn't really involved 20 years ago.
[28:48.730 --> 29:01.510]  But I think it's, I mean, the thing we've shown is that the forces of, you know, of destroying our civil liberties do not give up easily.
[29:02.850 --> 29:09.030]  I'm sure that the Feinstein-Burr bill is just so poorly written that it will be defeated.
[29:10.110 --> 29:11.990]  Not without work, by the way.
[29:12.130 --> 29:14.010]  And we have to be prepared to do that work.
[29:14.010 --> 29:21.430]  But I think it will be successful work because it's just, as we said, so poorly written that the forces of industry will oppose it.
[29:21.790 --> 29:26.110]  But we risk resting at that point.
[29:26.510 --> 29:31.830]  And it's clear that the Unlock Justice campaign will not rest.
[29:32.170 --> 29:34.190]  And that's what we have to be wary of.
[29:34.670 --> 29:35.050]  Right.
[29:35.530 --> 29:39.890]  And I want to, on to the point of this bill being poorly written, of course the bill is poorly written.
[29:40.130 --> 29:47.870]  Every single person who's capable of understanding the technology well enough to write a bill understands how bad an idea it is.
[29:49.250 --> 29:51.550]  It's not a coincidence in the slightest.
[29:51.770 --> 29:55.170]  But that doesn't necessarily, you know, stop anyone.
[29:56.230 --> 30:18.790]  And for folks interested in learning more about this at the 11th HOPE conference, this July 22nd, 23rd, and 24th, I understand there's going to be some talks about this very topic, about the crypto wars from back in the 90s, and what we learned from that war and how...
[30:18.790 --> 30:21.710]  I don't like calling it a war, frankly, but people call it a war.
[30:22.070 --> 30:22.370]  Yeah.
[30:23.510 --> 30:24.450]  But it's...
[30:24.450 --> 30:25.450]  You could use the word campaign.
[30:25.870 --> 30:26.730]  There we go.
[30:26.910 --> 30:27.090]  Mm-hmm.
[30:27.170 --> 30:34.750]  But there's going to be some interesting talk or talks about this topic at the 11th HOPE.
[30:34.750 --> 30:36.910]  So I guess people check out HOPE.net.
[30:37.130 --> 30:38.530]  And isn't there a...
[30:39.070 --> 30:52.870]  Aren't we promoting people to help the Electronic Frontier Foundation if they come to the HOPE conference?
[30:53.130 --> 30:53.450]  Yeah.
[30:53.650 --> 31:00.830]  If they buy their tickets during this month, the month of April, a certain amount of the purchase price will be donated to the EFF.
[31:01.290 --> 31:02.350]  What's the actual amount?
[31:02.370 --> 31:02.550]  10%, I believe.
[31:02.550 --> 31:03.290]  10%, yes.
[31:04.090 --> 31:14.550]  And so, yeah, if you'd like to get your HOPE ticket and at the same time give the EFF a hand, we spoke with a guest from the EFF last week talking a bit about why the organization is important.
[31:15.230 --> 31:21.070]  Of course, there are so many more things to say about the EFF than we have room for on a one-hour radio program.
[31:21.230 --> 31:22.490]  But check it out.
[31:22.610 --> 31:24.030]  EFF.org is their site.
[31:24.230 --> 31:36.510]  And HOPE.net, H-O-P-E.net, is the site for the HOPE conference where you can get your ticket, help out the EFF for the month of April, and come join us for our own hacker conference.
[31:36.690 --> 31:37.510]  It happens every two years.
[31:37.930 --> 31:40.930]  And right here in the heart of Manhattan at the Hotel Pennsylvania.
[31:41.550 --> 31:48.270]  Thousands of people who not only listen to this show but are interested in how all these types of issues affect us.
[31:48.390 --> 32:00.530]  Thousands of people from around the world come, about 100 speakers over three days, a lot of workshops and projects and talks and special events all going on for three days.
[32:00.670 --> 32:04.970]  It's in a break at the Hotel Pennsylvania across from Madison Square Garden on 7th Avenue.
[32:05.110 --> 32:07.670]  It's really a precious event.
[32:07.950 --> 32:09.490]  We've been doing it since 1994.
[32:09.650 --> 32:12.490]  And it's really all about education, learning more about this stuff.
[32:12.490 --> 32:14.610]  But it's just a lot of fun.
[32:15.070 --> 32:17.550]  So I encourage people to check that out.
[32:17.770 --> 32:18.930]  It's definitely worth...
[32:18.930 --> 32:20.350]  It only happens every two years, folks.
[32:20.670 --> 32:23.090]  It's too much work to do every year.
[32:24.130 --> 32:25.570]  So this is the year.
[32:26.010 --> 32:29.150]  Yeah, every so often someone does ask me, why don't you do this every year?
[32:29.250 --> 32:30.610]  And I respond to that.
[32:30.690 --> 32:35.870]  I like maybe breathing for a while and relaxing for a small amount of time in between these conferences.
[32:36.090 --> 32:37.030]  But it's worth it.
[32:37.130 --> 32:37.750]  It's a labor of love.
[32:38.110 --> 32:41.250]  Everyone on staff just does a bang-up job putting this together.
[32:41.550 --> 32:43.590]  And I'm really happy to be part of it.
[32:44.730 --> 32:46.270]  But yeah, hope.net.
[32:46.470 --> 32:50.670]  We're still accepting proposals for talks, although we are going through them.
[32:51.090 --> 32:52.630]  We're getting a lot of great proposals.
[32:52.770 --> 32:58.910]  I can't speak about any specifics at the moment beyond what we've announced publicly, which is our keynote, Corey Doctorow.
[32:59.310 --> 33:05.710]  But also, we want you to submit ideas for workshops and other things you would like to see at the conference.
[33:05.710 --> 33:06.610]  Go to hope.net.
[33:06.610 --> 33:15.290]  There are the info for speaker submissions and workshop submissions and all sorts of other things you could do if you want to be part of things.
[33:16.490 --> 33:18.110]  H-O-P-E dot net.
[33:18.710 --> 33:29.630]  Or they can just email us at O-T-H at 2600.com if they have any questions or comments or suggestions for the HOOP conference coming up this July 22nd, 23rd, and 24th.
[33:31.070 --> 33:33.850]  We will read all of these suggestions.
[33:34.510 --> 33:36.390]  And we've had some good suggestions already.
[33:36.530 --> 33:38.370]  Like, why don't you have somebody do a talk about this?
[33:38.510 --> 33:40.710]  Try to find somebody to do a talk about this.
[33:40.850 --> 33:42.130]  And it's good stuff.
[33:42.350 --> 33:45.290]  So you can be a part of the process.
[33:45.550 --> 33:46.830]  Just reach out to us.
[33:47.090 --> 33:47.250]  Yeah.
[33:47.510 --> 33:50.770]  So other stuff going on in the world, apart from our conference.
[33:50.970 --> 33:52.470]  But, you know, we're working to change that.
[33:53.470 --> 33:53.830]  But...
[33:53.830 --> 33:54.330]  Wait, what?
[33:55.410 --> 33:56.490]  Perhaps I've said too much.
[33:57.150 --> 34:01.250]  But this one story is in a field that I think is very important to all of us.
[34:01.250 --> 34:06.290]  I think we all acknowledge the vital part this field plays in our lives.
[34:06.750 --> 34:07.550]  Walnut farming.
[34:08.750 --> 34:10.470]  Of course, I'm talking about walnut farming.
[34:10.650 --> 34:12.170]  I mean, you guys knew where I was going with this.
[34:12.410 --> 34:13.150]  Walnuts are important.
[34:13.390 --> 34:13.550]  Yeah.
[34:13.690 --> 34:14.970]  And how do you get them without farming?
[34:14.970 --> 34:15.510]  You can't.
[34:15.990 --> 34:16.430]  Exactly.
[34:16.770 --> 34:29.970]  And a story from CBS Local in San Francisco talks about Central Valley walnut farmers and how they are teaming up with law enforcement to combat sophisticated criminals, maybe even cyber criminals.
[34:31.230 --> 34:35.190]  because they're posing as truck drivers to steal large quantities of walnuts.
[34:35.610 --> 34:36.410]  Cyber walnuts.
[34:36.590 --> 34:37.230]  Cyber walnuts.
[34:37.410 --> 34:38.290]  No, regular walnuts.
[34:38.490 --> 34:40.990]  But the cyber criminals are stealing regular walnuts.
[34:41.530 --> 34:43.410]  Fake drivers have been appearing at processing plants.
[34:43.650 --> 34:44.050]  Fake drivers?
[34:44.210 --> 34:45.010]  Yep, fake drivers.
[34:46.010 --> 34:47.410]  What is a fake driver?
[34:47.550 --> 34:50.910]  A fake driver is someone who's a driver, but not the driver you think they are.
[34:51.030 --> 34:59.430]  They have what seems to be genuine paperwork to get fuel and loads of processed walnuts, which they accept and then disappear.
[34:59.830 --> 35:15.530]  And to get this documentation, they have apparently moved into cyber crime and have been hacking to insert their information into farmers' computer servers to generate the paperwork they need and to get hold of the schedules and things for these pickups.
[35:15.530 --> 35:18.510]  So these cyber criminals, you know, nothing is sacred anymore.
[35:18.630 --> 35:19.750]  Now they're going after walnuts.
[35:20.070 --> 35:23.190]  This is still not as interesting as the Canadian maple syrup heist.
[35:24.090 --> 35:24.370]  But...
[35:24.370 --> 35:24.610]  Right.
[35:25.650 --> 35:26.710]  Maybe, but...
[35:26.710 --> 35:28.370]  But nonetheless, walnuts are important.
[35:29.330 --> 35:34.250]  Yeah, so according to this story, this is a quote from CBS, high-tech crime requires high-tech solutions.
[35:34.910 --> 35:36.290]  And one company...
[35:36.290 --> 35:37.890]  That's not true, but anyway...
[35:37.890 --> 35:43.170]  And they name one company who has never had a load stolen because they take their security seriously with fencing and cameras.
[35:43.390 --> 35:44.430]  So there you go.
[35:44.750 --> 35:44.870]  Wait.
[35:46.370 --> 35:47.130]  I'm sorry.
[35:47.530 --> 35:49.810]  I'm really struggling to understand this story.
[35:50.170 --> 35:53.070]  There are people producing fake paperwork.
[35:53.410 --> 35:53.510]  Right.
[35:53.610 --> 35:54.970]  And they solved it with fencing.
[35:55.430 --> 35:55.970]  Fencing.
[35:56.170 --> 36:02.350]  Not in the selling of stolen goods case, which is precisely what they're trying to prevent.
[36:02.610 --> 36:02.710]  No.
[36:02.710 --> 36:06.310]  Not that kind of fencing, but actual, like, mesh fences.
[36:06.630 --> 36:06.950]  Right, right.
[36:07.070 --> 36:10.310]  Not the bendy sword fighting kind of fencing either, but...
[36:10.310 --> 36:17.030]  And because the holes in the fence are too small for fake papers to fit through, how does this work?
[36:17.270 --> 36:30.410]  Well, they say that every driver that comes into their office is videotaped coming in, and in addition, they also take a still shot of the driver along with a thumbprint of the driver, and they get their photo identification, and all that information is compiled into their database.
[36:30.710 --> 36:32.210]  What does this have to do with a fence?
[36:32.510 --> 36:33.590]  The south cybercrime.
[36:34.290 --> 36:34.810]  All right.
[36:35.130 --> 36:36.030]  Do you not see...
[36:36.030 --> 36:41.430]  No, I don't understand anything about this story, but if cybercrime is solved, then we don't need the encryption bill, so good.
[36:41.590 --> 36:41.850]  Done.
[36:42.350 --> 36:47.910]  So, basically, you have to make sure you know exactly who you're doing business with, and they are who they say they are.
[36:48.570 --> 36:49.170]  But this...
[36:49.170 --> 36:52.330]  That's not actually terrible advice, finally, somewhere at this point in the story.
[36:52.450 --> 36:56.690]  But this seems like the methods for preventing regular crime, but apparently it works on cybercriminals too.
[36:58.410 --> 36:59.610]  Criminals don't seem very cyber.
[36:59.750 --> 37:01.950]  They're showing up and stealing the walnuts in person.
[37:02.550 --> 37:06.070]  Right, but it only works because of the cyber-ness.
[37:07.870 --> 37:08.690]  Whatever you're saying.
[37:09.150 --> 37:20.490]  Okay, well, we can do what we can to keep walnuts safe, and if any of you listeners have had your walnuts stolen by cybercriminals, get in touch with us because we would really like to speak with you about it.
[37:20.930 --> 37:22.350]  Rob, this story was just nuts.
[37:22.510 --> 37:24.170]  You should have moved on to something else.
[37:25.710 --> 37:26.310]  I'm sorry.
[37:26.490 --> 37:28.390]  I'm just a shell of a man right now.
[37:28.390 --> 37:35.730]  So, there was something you were talking about, Bernie.
[37:36.090 --> 37:48.470]  We got sent a story about an Israeli tech firm that created the Textilizer apparently to prevent deaths, but it's raising the ire of American civil liberties groups.
[37:49.370 --> 37:50.970]  Do you know more about this story, Bernie?
[37:51.330 --> 38:22.590]  Yeah, I was wondering if the listener who wrote to us, a guy named Joel, who I had said that we were talking about how annoying these ads are on webpages, and I use a tool that converts webpages to text so I don't have to look at these stupid ads, especially if I want to post the text of a story to OTH at 2600.com so we can talk about it on the air.
[38:22.890 --> 38:26.630]  But one of our listeners named Joel said that he...
[38:27.450 --> 38:33.430]  Well, I said that I used a program called TextEyes, T-E-X-T-I-S-E.
[38:33.550 --> 38:36.110]  It's actually a website, TextEyes.net.
[38:37.130 --> 38:40.510]  TextEyes.net, T-E-X-T-I-S-E.net.
[38:40.890 --> 38:51.170]  But he, Joel, our listener, said that there's an Israeli company called Textilizer that does something else.
[38:51.170 --> 38:55.310]  It supposedly presents death.
[38:57.090 --> 38:58.550]  Preventing death, that sounds right.
[39:01.990 --> 39:12.390]  Textilizer is a device to determine whether drivers have been using their phone at the scene of a car accident.
[39:13.330 --> 39:23.630]  So basically, New York is proposing legislation that would allow police to use a so-called Textilizer device to determine whether drivers have been using their phone at the scene of a car accident.
[39:24.550 --> 39:36.930]  And basically, if there was an accident, a police officer would plug your phone into some device and read out of the phone whether you've been texting over the past five minutes or so or using it for make a phone call or something.
[39:38.110 --> 39:58.030]  And the New York Civil Liberties, NCLU, I believe, is opposed to this bill because other civil liberties groups because it's basically a search and seizure of your phone without a warrant, you know, which is required under the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution.
[39:59.150 --> 40:15.570]  And believe it or not, this Textilizer program is a product of Celebrite, an Israeli company that had been reported to have been the company that helped FBI break into this iPhone that belonged to the San Bernardino shooters.
[40:15.950 --> 40:22.410]  There's some other stories saying that it wasn't Celebrite after all, but it was Black Hat hackers called Black Hat.
[40:22.610 --> 40:37.830]  But in any case, I think we should be on the lookout for these types of laws coming down the pike in not just New York but other states that would allow police officers to examine the contents of your cell phone without a warrant.
[40:38.510 --> 40:42.110]  If you got in an accident, I think there should be a warrant, just like anything else.
[40:42.210 --> 40:59.990]  I think the Supreme Court just ruled, is deciding today about mandatory breathalyzer tests for drivers and finding that it looks like the Supreme Court's thinking that, hey, there should be a warrant necessary for this because it's a search and seizure of something on your person.
[41:00.450 --> 41:01.150]  So, go ahead.
[41:01.150 --> 41:02.890]  I think this bill is pretty interesting.
[41:03.170 --> 41:13.970]  First of all, I want to say that if there is a collision between an automobile and a person because the person in the driver of the car was texting then I don't think accident is the right word.
[41:13.970 --> 41:17.370]  It's a very foreseeable consequence of the driver's stupid actions.
[41:17.650 --> 41:26.790]  But this bill came about allegedly, you know, because there's always an injured child when these sorts of bills appear.
[41:27.030 --> 41:44.490]  And the injured child, maybe killed child in question, was killed or injured, I'm sorry, I don't know the details, by a driver who was texting and they found this out using means that were already available to the civil lawsuit that was filed.
[41:44.810 --> 42:04.490]  The lazy police who declined to investigate this case to find out about the texting could easily have gotten the same data that the parents of the child ended up getting from the cell phone carrier using tools that are already available to them without stupid bills like this being passed.
[42:04.780 --> 42:24.730]  If the police were bothering to take killings caused by vehicles as seriously as they purport to take all these other killings, then they could investigate, they could get the data that's already available to them and convict the drivers already without the need for invasive laws like this one.
[42:24.850 --> 42:29.270]  I don't understand what purpose is possibly being served here.
[42:29.650 --> 42:50.630]  Well, if the police aren't using existing tools that would allow them to find out if someone was sending or receiving text messages around the time an accident happened or on the phone during or just before an accident, I don't see why we need new laws that would allow them to search for your phone.
[42:50.810 --> 42:51.650]  You just have to contact...
[42:51.650 --> 42:58.270]  There's already procedures in place for law enforcement to contact wireless phone companies and get this data.
[42:58.270 --> 42:59.750]  It's all stored on their servers.
[42:59.950 --> 43:00.950]  I mean, this is not...
[43:00.950 --> 43:06.250]  When your calls start, when you send a text message, when you receive a text message, all that's already readily available to the police.
[43:06.430 --> 43:09.990]  This is not difficult stuff even for police.
[43:10.690 --> 43:14.270]  When they want to invade people's privacy, they're really good at it.
[43:14.450 --> 43:15.530]  And they don't need a warrant.
[43:15.690 --> 43:23.610]  They don't even need a warrant to see if a text message was sent or received or if a phone call was sent or received because that's considered like pen registered data.
[43:23.810 --> 43:24.830]  It's not really...
[43:25.430 --> 43:28.770]  I think you're right, Bernie, but regardless, they could get a warrant.
[43:28.990 --> 43:29.610]  It's not that hard.
[43:30.530 --> 43:32.350]  These drivers are killing people.
[43:33.110 --> 43:35.690]  These are crimes that need to be investigated.
[43:35.970 --> 43:46.670]  And if the police took these crimes seriously enough to use the investigatory tools already at their disposal, then they wouldn't need new tools that invade people's privacy in an insane way.
[43:46.830 --> 43:54.310]  But we're constantly seeing the authorities rather than go to the trouble of using the existing tools and the existing laws to achieve their goals.
[43:55.430 --> 44:07.030]  It's much easier to point to something terrible that happens and say, here, this is why we need new sweeping powers and why you need to question us less and why we just need more and more authority over the minutia of your life.
[44:08.490 --> 44:12.510]  It seems like a whole PR thing rather than wanting to do their job and investigate things.
[44:12.510 --> 44:16.170]  I mean, and we can go into the minutia of this particular tool.
[44:16.530 --> 44:18.310]  Like, no one knows what it does, how it works.
[44:18.390 --> 44:29.550]  It just takes a phone and LaPierce to extract all data that it possibly can using some secret proprietary algorithm that would almost certainly be challenged in court if it ever went to court.
[44:30.690 --> 44:37.390]  It's, you know, the only people who benefit from this are, of course, the manufacturers of the software in question.
[44:39.270 --> 44:45.030]  You know, I wish I could believe the police when they said they wanted to take vehicular crime as seriously as they take other crime.
[44:45.310 --> 44:53.590]  But this is just going to be a tool that I'm sure is going to be used to harass people who they want to harass and those people are not drivers in general.
[44:53.830 --> 44:54.370]  Of course.
[44:54.650 --> 44:59.870]  Well, while we've got a little time, I want to see if maybe we can take some phone calls this evening.
[45:00.770 --> 45:07.190]  You can reach us on air at 718, country code 1, 718-780-8888.
[45:07.930 --> 45:13.450]  And tell us what's on your mind, what we've, you know, discuss what we've been talking about or bring us something new.
[45:13.970 --> 45:27.910]  While we're waiting for the switchboard to start showing up, I'll mention this other story sent in to us by a listener named Mark about the pioneering French electronic musician Jean-Michel Jarre, who has met up with Edward Snowden and is recording a track with him,
[45:28.110 --> 45:30.710]  apparently, which is kind of neat.
[45:30.830 --> 45:35.330]  I mean, Jarre's mother was apparently in the French resistance, so there's a bit of a crossover there.
[45:36.870 --> 45:44.090]  And there's coverage of this in The Guardian, which apparently is the agency that arranged the meeting between these two.
[45:44.630 --> 45:52.970]  Jean-Michel Jarre, of course, being a pioneering electronic musician whose work spans decades, and Edward Snowden being some guy we've mentioned once or twice on this program.
[45:54.390 --> 45:54.990]  All right.
[45:55.170 --> 45:56.230]  Well, we've got some phone calls.
[45:56.570 --> 46:01.590]  Let's take one if you wish to join the Q7187808888.
[46:01.890 --> 46:04.350]  But right now, hello, you're on the air.
[46:05.530 --> 46:06.010]  Hello?
[46:06.510 --> 46:06.810]  Hi.
[46:06.990 --> 46:07.690]  What's on your mind?
[46:08.710 --> 46:09.050]  Hi.
[46:09.050 --> 46:19.350]  I'm just calling about the despair a lot of New Yorkers are feeling after the primary yesterday, and that I did my...
[46:19.350 --> 46:27.990]  I didn't read this anyway, but I did my own calculations, and by the best I can guess, that Bernie Sanders needs 60% to win the...
[46:27.990 --> 46:29.050]  to win...
[46:29.050 --> 46:32.330]  or be tied with Hillary Clinton and pledged delegates.
[46:32.330 --> 46:36.070]  Is there an angle here that's related to anything we've been talking about on the show?
[46:40.030 --> 46:41.390]  Well, no, I don't think...
[46:41.390 --> 46:43.490]  I don't think that the police should be...
[46:44.190 --> 46:48.790]  I think the police should be more motivated to do their job, but how do you do that?
[46:49.830 --> 46:53.390]  You have to get the police to like their jobs and to want to help.
[46:54.290 --> 47:08.410]  I think one way would be to be to recognize the police that do go beyond and try to encourage it to other police, but I don't think you can legislate management.
[47:10.410 --> 47:12.770]  Yeah, I think I've known...
[47:12.770 --> 47:21.390]  I think some officers do enjoy their job when their job includes doing things that are maybe not so socially responsible, but yeah, we...
[47:21.390 --> 47:22.790]  how do we change the police?
[47:22.910 --> 47:24.230]  That's a very big question.
[47:24.590 --> 47:36.990]  It involves bits of the things we talk about, bits of the things other people on the station talk about, and eventually I think it's kind of scary to think about, but we all need to keep an eye on it where we can.
[47:37.130 --> 47:37.650]  Thank you for your call.
[47:38.810 --> 47:39.250]  Welcome.
[47:40.810 --> 47:48.490]  All right, we had a bunch of calls before, but they've all run away, so if you call 718-780-8888, we might talk to you soon.
[47:49.730 --> 47:51.130]  There's lots else.
[47:51.290 --> 47:54.990]  Oh, we've got lots else, including a phone call, so let's take this one.
[47:55.110 --> 47:55.530]  Good evening.
[47:56.550 --> 47:57.250]  Good evening.
[47:57.250 --> 48:03.390]  I just wanted to tell you, I was glad you put out the phone number when you did, because I really enjoy your talk about texting while driving.
[48:03.590 --> 48:05.730]  I don't think that's paid enough attention to.
[48:06.950 --> 48:12.770]  And I think overall, it's something that if you guys talked about more, I think you could get everybody stirring it more.
[48:13.830 --> 48:15.170]  Well, that's it.
[48:16.030 --> 48:17.030]  Thank you very much.
[48:17.990 --> 48:19.550]  All right, thanks for the call.
[48:21.890 --> 48:23.890]  Well, I personally never text while driving.
[48:24.230 --> 48:28.290]  I mean, I personally never drive, but I don't know.
[48:28.290 --> 48:34.150]  Emmanuel is convinced that he can text while driving and have just as much attention paid to his driving.
[48:34.510 --> 48:35.910]  Well, we can...
[48:35.910 --> 48:44.950]  There are studies have shown there's a very tiny percentage of the population where that's true, whether Emmanuel was in that tiny percentage of population, I don't know.
[48:45.130 --> 48:50.710]  The percentage of the population that believes they're in that tiny set is much, much higher than the percentage which is.
[48:51.050 --> 48:52.170]  That's very true.
[48:52.610 --> 48:57.750]  It seems safe to just not text while you drive.
[48:57.990 --> 48:58.330]  Yep.
[48:58.670 --> 48:59.550]  Take the subway instead.
[48:59.550 --> 49:02.590]  You can text all you want for the parts of the subway that are above ground.
[49:03.010 --> 49:03.570]  Indeed we can.
[49:04.370 --> 49:05.790]  We've got some more phone calls.
[49:05.890 --> 49:06.810]  Let's take this one.
[49:06.950 --> 49:07.310]  Good evening.
[49:08.450 --> 49:14.570]  That is like saying if you can pat your head and scratch your stomach at the same time, you can text while you drive.
[49:14.770 --> 49:16.410]  That was the stupidest thing I've ever heard in my life.
[49:16.530 --> 49:17.210]  Who said that?
[49:18.150 --> 49:19.690]  Whoever was just on the air with you.
[49:21.590 --> 49:25.890]  You went to somebody right after me and they said there's a small percentage of people that can text while they drive.
[49:26.010 --> 49:26.470]  No, there's not.
[49:27.030 --> 49:27.350]  All right.
[49:27.850 --> 49:41.210]  It's been proven that people cannot text while they drive, that it takes their attention off the necessary needs to drive correctly and to pay attention to what's around you correctly if you're looking down texting to drive.
[49:41.430 --> 49:48.790]  I'm not saying you can't speak on the phone if you're hands-free and I'm not saying you can't speak and text at the same time to speak to text.
[49:48.970 --> 49:59.530]  But if you're telling me that you think there's any percentage of people that can honestly look down at their phone and text while they're driving unless they're parked somewhere, they're out of their mind and whoever just said that's that little good idiot.
[49:59.530 --> 50:15.770]  No, I actually read a study that showed a very small percentage of the population, it doesn't make a significant difference in their attention paying capability, which I was really surprised to read, but it's like a tiny fraction of 1% of people, and I know I'm not one of them.
[50:16.390 --> 50:17.870]  Okay, so moving on.
[50:18.010 --> 50:19.050]  Thank you for that call.
[50:19.150 --> 50:19.690]  Let's see who else is out there.
[50:19.690 --> 50:29.570]  Let's also be clear, the evidence is that talking on a hands-free device also impairs driving much more than talking to people who are in the car with you.
[50:30.230 --> 50:32.970]  There's some theories as to why, but the evidence so far is clear.
[50:33.330 --> 50:43.210]  Listen, people, when you're driving, particularly in areas of the world where there are pedestrians around, focus on your driving.
[50:43.410 --> 50:57.810]  It seems actually that listening to the radio is fairly safe, and talking to people who are with you is relatively safe, but the evidence is fairly strong that talking on the cell phone because the person on the other end is not experiencing it with you,
[50:58.070 --> 51:04.010]  and you want to give them your attention, very dangerous for the people around you.
[51:04.870 --> 51:09.550]  Let's take some more phone calls, hopefully from different callers than we've had before.
[51:10.970 --> 51:11.930]  Good evening.
[51:12.110 --> 51:12.570]  You're on the air.
[51:13.410 --> 51:13.890]  Hello?
[51:14.390 --> 51:14.850]  Hello?
[51:15.730 --> 51:16.070]  Yes.
[51:16.470 --> 51:17.290]  Am I Andy here?
[51:17.450 --> 51:17.850]  You are.
[51:17.930 --> 51:18.530]  What's on your mind?
[51:19.170 --> 51:19.830]  Okay, hello.
[51:20.110 --> 51:22.910]  There is no safe way to text and drive.
[51:23.090 --> 51:24.170]  Let me tell you something.
[51:24.470 --> 51:31.250]  I work for a company where every year you got to do your driver's license over with a company called the CIMIT system.
[51:31.590 --> 51:33.650]  And this year they have a new testing.
[51:33.930 --> 51:34.870]  And what happened?
[51:35.010 --> 51:39.830]  They put up some cones, and they distract us while we were going through the cones.
[51:40.610 --> 51:43.110]  Nobody could pass that hazard test.
[51:43.350 --> 51:53.470]  Because what happened is that you're texting, and by the time you put your head down, before you touch the first number, you hit the cone.
[51:54.470 --> 51:58.770]  And they call you, and they say, okay, what's your first cat name?
[51:59.930 --> 52:07.190]  And by the time you think you're on the other cone, nobody could pass that test good, and it proved that there's no safe way to text and drive.
[52:07.750 --> 52:13.070]  Well, this all sounds pretty solid, and it sounds like something that Common Sense supports as well.
[52:13.170 --> 52:14.250]  Thank you very much for this caller.
[52:14.930 --> 52:16.730]  You're listening to Off the Hook, a.k.a.
[52:16.770 --> 52:18.830]  the Texting and Driving Hour, on WBAI Radio.
[52:18.950 --> 52:23.070]  Let's see if we can squeeze in another couple of phone calls while we've got some time left.
[52:23.270 --> 52:24.530]  Let's try this one.
[52:24.730 --> 52:25.910]  Good evening, you're on the air.
[52:26.710 --> 52:27.790]  Hey, good evening, guys.
[52:29.250 --> 52:32.010]  Steve from New Jersey, I'm a volunteer fireman.
[52:32.290 --> 52:33.110]  How you doing, Steve?
[52:33.250 --> 52:34.070]  Oh, good.
[52:34.250 --> 52:36.890]  And I'm listening to the conversation about texting and driving.
[52:37.190 --> 52:56.130]  Well, I'm 58 years old, and I can, as a first responder, as a fireman, I've been to more fatal accidents from people texting, and when we were doing Quaaludes and Second All and Smoking Reefer and Hash and drinking and driving 50 years, 40 years ago.
[52:57.050 --> 52:59.970]  You cannot drive when you're looking down at your lap typing.
[53:00.110 --> 53:00.510]  I'm sorry.
[53:01.450 --> 53:05.250]  This sounds pretty solid, and you sound like you speak from a place of knowledge.
[53:05.470 --> 53:08.570]  Oh, yeah, because I've had friends of mine's kids killed in it, doing it, you know?
[53:08.870 --> 53:09.030]  Yeah.
[53:09.030 --> 53:23.130]  And every time I pull up to a traffic light, I don't care who it is, and I see them looking down at their lap, I signal them to roll their window down, and I tell them I'm a firefighter, I said, please don't text and drive, because I don't want to come to no more fatal accidents,
[53:23.170 --> 53:26.370]  and they look at you funny, and maybe they'll think about it, you know?
[53:26.910 --> 53:27.250]  Mm-hmm.
[53:27.630 --> 53:29.090]  But, you know what?
[53:29.090 --> 53:33.290]  They should have a jamming device in your car so you can't do it, you know?
[53:33.950 --> 53:36.890]  I mean, they have devices in people's cars so they can't drive
[53:40.850 --> 53:50.490]  It seems like a good idea on its face, but it could jam other people near you from using their phone to call 911, so that could pose a problem.
[53:50.490 --> 53:51.570]  Yeah, that could be a problem.
[53:51.570 --> 53:55.550]  I agree that texting and driving is a very serious public health problem.
[53:55.830 --> 53:57.810]  Oh, yeah, I mean, there are so many...
[53:57.810 --> 54:02.130]  Every day there's accidents on the Garden State Parkway, the Thruway.
[54:02.230 --> 54:03.070]  It's just unbelievable.
[54:03.510 --> 54:05.830]  I've never seen so many accidents in my life.
[54:06.270 --> 54:06.570]  Yep.
[54:07.670 --> 54:14.590]  You know, so I just wanted to pass that on, and you've got a great radio show, and you folks have a great night.
[54:14.790 --> 54:15.450]  Thank you very much.
[54:15.610 --> 54:15.830]  You too.
[54:15.990 --> 54:16.870]  Thanks a lot, man.
[54:17.330 --> 54:18.790]  Give our power to Bernie Sanders.
[54:18.930 --> 54:19.530]  To hell with Hillary.
[54:20.190 --> 54:20.390]  Thanks.
[54:21.730 --> 54:26.250]  Okay, well, do you think we have time to squeeze in one more quick phone call?
[54:26.530 --> 54:26.890]  Yes.
[54:27.310 --> 54:27.770]  All right.
[54:27.890 --> 54:28.810]  Well, Bernie says yes.
[54:28.930 --> 54:30.110]  Let's try this phone call.
[54:30.190 --> 54:30.810]  What's on your mind?
[54:32.090 --> 54:32.890]  Hey, good evening, guys.
[54:33.050 --> 54:33.850]  Thanks for taking my call.
[54:33.930 --> 54:34.930]  This is Greg calling from Queens.
[54:35.510 --> 54:36.190]  How are you, Greg?
[54:36.210 --> 54:36.270]  Hey, Greg.
[54:36.890 --> 54:37.350]  Yeah, good.
[54:37.350 --> 54:44.190]  I'm hoping I'm going to be able to tie this in and up to today's conversation, but lifelong WBAI listener, first-time caller to this show.
[54:46.010 --> 54:50.250]  Basically, what I want to talk about is BAI relevant, but also in terms of encryption.
[54:50.710 --> 54:52.690]  We have only a few seconds left, so...
[54:52.690 --> 54:53.090]  Oh, yeah, yeah.
[54:53.170 --> 54:53.530]  I'm with you.
[54:53.590 --> 54:53.850]  I'm with you.
[54:54.090 --> 54:58.190]  So, basically, I think a lot of lay people are kind of into tech.
[54:58.290 --> 54:59.490]  I'm a millennial.
[54:59.690 --> 55:01.950]  I'm into this generation, but I don't know a lot about computers.
[55:02.790 --> 55:08.130]  I'd love it if you guys had a full package on what can I do to just ensure my own encryption and keep my own data.
[55:08.390 --> 55:12.570]  I think it would be a great thing for BAI to sell at a premium, and hardware as well.
[55:12.710 --> 55:14.030]  Just my two cents.
[55:14.190 --> 55:18.950]  I wish you guys had a package, you guys, and Off the Hook, or the personal computer show.
[55:19.030 --> 55:20.590]  I wish you guys had a package for the lay person.
[55:20.910 --> 55:21.170]  All right.
[55:21.330 --> 55:22.250]  That's not a bad idea.
[55:22.630 --> 55:30.050]  If you're in New York area at the Love of Hope Conference, July 22nd, 23rd, 24th, there will definitely be encryption workshops.
[55:30.470 --> 55:34.430]  So, if you might want to consider visiting hope.net and getting in on that, you can learn.
[55:34.430 --> 55:35.230]  I've got enough time for the day.
[55:35.310 --> 55:35.990]  I'll put it on the list.
[55:36.870 --> 55:37.190]  Okay.
[55:37.770 --> 55:37.930]  All right.
[55:38.470 --> 55:39.190]  Thanks for the show, guys.
[55:39.450 --> 55:39.670]  Thanks.
[55:39.790 --> 55:40.530]  Thanks for the call.
[55:41.990 --> 55:49.650]  Unfortunately, for offering it as a premium, most of the best stuff to use is free, but we certainly try to talk about it on this program, and we'll continue to do so.
[55:49.950 --> 55:50.450]  Yes, indeed.
[55:50.890 --> 55:53.490]  Send us an email, othat2600.com.
[55:53.730 --> 55:58.030]  Go to hope.net for all the info on the Hope Conference, and catch us next week.
[55:58.110 --> 55:59.470]  Stay tuned for the personal computer show.
[55:59.830 --> 56:02.070]  For Off the Hook, for WBAI, this is Rob T.
[56:02.070 --> 56:02.510]  Firefly.
[56:02.750 --> 56:03.690]  Have a very good night.
[56:04.810 --> 56:10.490]  Blue and there's red still for the lower case and
[57:12.820 --> 57:27.880]  And then one day your rocket ship came racing from the sky It landed on a hill and they're roping up a door and something started coming outside
[57:35.940 --> 57:51.240]  Lowercase and She's not lonely anymore They're standing over here I don't do this and for sure All the wonders that are still from the lower case and A little pause...