[00:01.050 --> 00:01.670]  Consciousness.
[00:01.990 --> 00:06.450]  We are the heartbeat of every freedom fighter who came before us.
[00:06.630 --> 00:08.810]  And all will come after.
[00:09.970 --> 00:12.290]  Alcatraz, Arab Spring, one billion rising.
[00:12.550 --> 00:14.810]  Freedom schools, the maroons, rebellion thriving.
[00:15.050 --> 00:17.050]  We've been rising since the dawn of creation.
[00:17.370 --> 00:20.070]  Son, in the blood of our veins, liberation runs.
[00:20.210 --> 00:30.670]  From Muhammad Ali to Sunniyada and Asada, Nugureta Menchu, Nkrumah to Zapata, Mahatma Gandhi and comadres, daughters, And every activist of the global interpada...
[00:32.510 --> 00:42.970]  And you are listening to WBAI 99.5 FM, where the time is just about 7pm, and it is time for Off The Hook.
[00:48.590 --> 00:53.130]  The telephone keeps ringing, so I ripped it off the wall.
[00:54.010 --> 00:58.590]  I cut myself while shaving, now I can't make a call.
[00:59.190 --> 01:06.870]  We couldn't get much worse, they would, but the best is back the worst.
[01:07.310 --> 01:10.370]  I hope that's understood, from Diddley Mo!
[01:26.520 --> 01:30.680]  The condolences of every person at Pepsi Cola are with you.
[01:31.340 --> 01:35.840]  I got fired by my boss, Pepsi.
[01:36.350 --> 01:38.710]  We have to look great for Pepsi Cola.
[01:38.710 --> 01:43.400]  I nailed Jesus to the cross, Pepsi.
[01:44.380 --> 01:46.240]  Well, you gotta pay the price.
[01:46.850 --> 01:52.480]  Powdered mashed potatoes for three years.
[01:52.510 --> 01:53.980]  I hope there's a son that'll make him sell the last one.
[01:55.010 --> 01:59.820]  Alcoholic husband vibes to tears.
[02:01.660 --> 02:05.780]  Poor old widow's house burned down, Pepsi.
[02:06.720 --> 02:09.100]  The genius of the soft drink world.
[02:09.260 --> 02:12.400]  We need to get the damn company to pay the bills!
[02:13.000 --> 02:15.960]  Tractors plowing down the hills.
[02:16.540 --> 02:17.020]  Pepsi.
[02:17.580 --> 02:20.240]  Kids are still drinking Pepsi at the general store while...
[02:20.240 --> 02:23.700]  The ghastly stench of puppy mills.
[02:23.920 --> 02:24.460]  Pepsi!
[02:27.490 --> 02:29.950]  Beats with stinking urine.
[02:30.010 --> 02:31.410]  You know what hard feelings are?
[02:31.530 --> 02:33.330]  Bloodied shards of glass.
[02:33.350 --> 02:34.470]  High-colored puppy.
[02:37.320 --> 02:37.940]  Hot exhaust.
[02:38.260 --> 02:38.900]  Against your product.
[02:39.100 --> 02:40.980]  Drunkards passing gas.
[02:41.240 --> 02:43.100]  You can see how much you say.
[02:43.260 --> 02:45.500]  The dying of disease.
[02:48.060 --> 02:51.080]  The press I delivered to Pepsi was my power!
[02:51.080 --> 02:53.500]  I can use it any way I want.
[02:53.900 --> 02:57.160]  Leading helpless teens astray.
[02:57.600 --> 02:58.140]  Pepsi!
[02:58.460 --> 02:59.180]  It's a sword.
[02:59.950 --> 03:01.240]  It cuts both ways.
[03:01.660 --> 03:04.260]  I can't find the strength to say...
[03:05.040 --> 03:05.580]  Pepsi!
[03:05.780 --> 03:06.440]  Forget it!
[03:09.480 --> 03:10.320]  Medicating.
[03:12.580 --> 03:14.660]  Spread on painful rash.
[03:15.160 --> 03:15.360]  Forget it!
[03:15.640 --> 03:16.120]  Forget it!
[03:16.320 --> 03:21.560]  Old outdated software getting thrown into...
[03:24.260 --> 03:26.940]  Everything still tastes the same.
[03:27.020 --> 03:27.600]  I think I can't.
[03:27.700 --> 03:28.060]  Pepsi!
[03:31.660 --> 03:33.480]  Very good evening to you.
[03:33.660 --> 03:34.620]  The program is...
[03:34.620 --> 03:35.460]  Off the Hook.
[03:35.740 --> 03:36.220]  Rob T.
[03:36.340 --> 03:38.500]  Firefly here with you in WBAI's studio.
[03:38.860 --> 03:40.780]  And I'm joined in said studio by Mike.
[03:41.060 --> 03:41.780]  Happy Wednesday.
[03:42.320 --> 03:44.600]  And we're joined on the telephone by Bernie S.
[03:44.960 --> 03:46.340]  Greetings from Philadelphia.
[03:47.160 --> 03:50.440]  And you were listening to an extended intro.
[03:50.440 --> 03:57.520]  The tune was The Greatest Taste Around by Negative Land with Richard Dwayne Lyons on vocals.
[03:58.160 --> 04:04.620]  Richard Lyons, one of the founding members of Negative Land, it's very sad for us to report that he has passed away.
[04:05.340 --> 04:07.720]  So, I thought I'd get that in there.
[04:07.860 --> 04:25.380]  And that's a little piece from the Negative Land release, DysPepsi, which combines Negative Land's normal cut-up anti-corporate activist musical artwork with bits and pieces from Pepsi advertising material.
[04:26.700 --> 04:31.660]  And, Bernie S., I believe you actually met Richard Lyons a while back.
[04:32.040 --> 04:32.700]  Oh, yeah.
[04:32.860 --> 04:36.320]  A good ten years ago, Negative Land was performing here in Philadelphia.
[04:36.320 --> 04:42.020]  And I met them after the show.
[04:42.020 --> 04:44.680]  And we hung out and went out to dinner.
[04:44.880 --> 04:45.680]  And it was just really...
[04:45.680 --> 04:56.060]  It was fascinating meeting with these guys who had done all this just amazing anti-corporate cut-up stuff that became very popular.
[04:57.140 --> 05:02.320]  Much to the dismay of the corporations who they were lampooning.
[05:02.600 --> 05:14.340]  But we stopped at one club, and Richard noted that almost all the folks there were born before their first popular album.
[05:14.660 --> 05:20.860]  So, they realized they were getting up and late, but Richard was only 57 when he passed away this past week.
[05:20.860 --> 05:25.960]  So, this is really a sad and untimely loss of a great artist.
[05:26.720 --> 05:27.740]  Indeed it is.
[05:28.260 --> 05:31.280]  Negative Land, of course, might be familiar to Hope attendees.
[05:33.220 --> 05:36.840]  They presented at H2K2 in 2002.
[05:37.020 --> 05:44.040]  We had Mark Hosler from Negative Land presenting some of Negative Land's music and films and things of that sort.
[05:45.780 --> 05:47.720]  They've been friends of the show.
[05:47.720 --> 05:51.960]  I believe Mark actually joined us on this show a couple of times some years back.
[05:52.120 --> 05:55.220]  You can find those in our archives on 2600.com.
[05:56.700 --> 06:04.980]  So, yeah, the work of Negative Land has always been brilliant, and Richard Lyons will be missed.
[06:05.160 --> 06:06.720]  The world is poorer for his loss, I believe.
[06:07.140 --> 06:09.920]  It has not been a good week for talented musicians.
[06:10.260 --> 06:10.980]  Indeed it hasn't.
[06:11.960 --> 06:13.160]  Richard Lyons passed away.
[06:13.320 --> 06:14.400]  Prince passed away.
[06:16.020 --> 06:17.860]  Earlier this year David Bowie passed away.
[06:18.060 --> 06:26.200]  And it's not been a good year for sort of people of legendary standing in the field of musical entertainment and art.
[06:27.500 --> 06:35.640]  So, you know, the rest of you, if you're in this line of work and you do clever work like this, you know, maybe go take your physical, take some vitamins, do what you have to do to take care of yourself.
[06:35.640 --> 06:35.920]  Yes.
[06:38.380 --> 06:40.020]  But beyond that...
[06:40.020 --> 06:44.660]  I have no good segue off of that, but a lot of other things are happening in the world.
[06:45.620 --> 06:50.620]  There is no good segue, but I'd like to think Mr. Lyons would approve of there being no good segue from that.
[06:53.380 --> 06:54.500]  FindFace, have you heard of it?
[06:55.340 --> 06:55.740]  FindFace?
[06:56.060 --> 06:57.120]  I have not heard of it.
[06:57.580 --> 07:17.260]  FindFace is a piece of software that was developed, and apparently what it can do is if you have a photograph of someone, say, someone that you meet or just surreptitiously snap on the street or, you know, a good friend of yours, anyone, you can upload it to this service,
[07:17.360 --> 07:21.600]  FindFace, and it searches the Russian social network vContact.
[07:21.600 --> 07:24.160]  And I apologize, there's some Russian words in this.
[07:24.160 --> 07:25.440]  I'm going to mispronounce all of them.
[07:27.340 --> 07:34.700]  And it searches the entire database of this large social network or at least a large portion of the database.
[07:34.700 --> 07:36.000]  I don't know how exactly it works.
[07:37.420 --> 07:39.880]  And it applies a facial recognition algorithm.
[07:39.880 --> 07:44.480]  So if you want to find someone, you can do it using their face.
[07:46.120 --> 07:52.420]  I don't know if you've read this story, Rob, but what do you think paragraph two of this story is going to say?
[07:52.420 --> 08:00.520]  Oh, I think it's going to be something just cementing this as a valuable tool and something that can well serve humanity in general.
[08:01.480 --> 08:07.740]  I thought you had been on this radio program longer than to make that guess.
[08:09.680 --> 08:18.680]  Instead, what people are doing is they're identifying and harassing Russian women who appear in pornography on April 19th.
[08:18.760 --> 08:24.020]  Sorry, April 9th, which is just three days after the Russian media reported on this project.
[08:24.260 --> 08:34.900]  Users of the Russian image board, Tvach, again, apologies, launched a campaign to de-anonymize actresses who appear in pornography.
[08:34.900 --> 08:56.240]  So it takes... they're taking, I guess, a still from the films and identifying them with Fineface and then making a copy of the V-Contacted pages so that even if they then take their pages down, it's spamming the women's families and friends with messages informing them about the discovery and on and on.
[08:58.600 --> 09:01.800]  I don't know why this wasn't a foreseen consequence.
[09:01.800 --> 09:07.840]  People on the internet will do anything to harass people, women in particular.
[09:08.920 --> 09:18.120]  I don't know if there's a lesson here, other than don't make services that can identify people who don't want to be identified.
[09:18.940 --> 09:19.460]  Mike?
[09:19.680 --> 09:19.920]  Yeah.
[09:20.300 --> 09:24.660]  I just want to point out some of our listeners who might want to...
[09:24.660 --> 09:27.220]  who may be curious if their...
[09:27.220 --> 09:30.720]  a picture of their face is on findface.com.
[09:30.720 --> 09:41.020]  If you upload your picture, they will have it and they will certainly store it and they will use it again in the future for who knows what.
[09:41.500 --> 09:54.600]  So, be careful about whose faces you upload to Fineface, including also Facebook and other social media applications and services.
[09:55.340 --> 09:56.260]  Once you...
[09:56.260 --> 09:58.900]  once you put your picture on...
[09:58.900 --> 10:03.140]  online like that, it will stay online and be...
[10:03.140 --> 10:04.880]  potentially abused forever.
[10:07.500 --> 10:16.680]  Speaking to the website T-Journal, the founder of Fineface, whose name is Maxim Perlin, said there's no way he can prevent people from using his service to harass women in this way.
[10:16.740 --> 10:18.080]  Here's a way he could take down the service.
[10:18.080 --> 10:18.620]  It has...
[10:18.620 --> 10:23.300]  I can't think of a single legitimate use for this service, although maybe I just lack imagination.
[10:25.600 --> 10:29.320]  Well, obviously you're not harassing enough celebrities or...
[10:29.320 --> 10:31.160]  I mean, I'm not going to judge your hobbies.
[10:31.300 --> 10:34.460]  If you don't want to harass celebrities with the rest of us, that's perfectly fine, but...
[10:34.460 --> 10:36.420]  Is there something you're trying to tell me here, Rob?
[10:37.200 --> 10:38.980]  The rest of us harassing people.
[10:39.380 --> 10:40.360]  Well, I'm...
[10:40.360 --> 10:44.020]  I mean, it's important to know that many of the harassed people are not that famous.
[10:44.820 --> 10:45.480]  Of course.
[10:46.020 --> 10:48.240]  And, you know, everyone is at risk.
[10:48.380 --> 10:55.240]  When you put information online, you're not just sharing it with your small, enclosed group of people who have you at it on some social network.
[10:55.240 --> 10:58.380]  You are, in essence, posting it to the entire world.
[10:58.760 --> 10:59.800]  I think you're right.
[10:59.940 --> 11:12.420]  But I think to blame this entirely on the users and say you shouldn't upload to this service, I think the greater part of the responsibility falls on the makers of these services to protect their users' privacy.
[11:12.420 --> 11:13.100]  Of course.
[11:13.200 --> 11:15.020]  And I'm not blaming the victims here.
[11:15.200 --> 11:25.200]  It's a sad reality of the media environment in which we find ourselves, that, yeah, everything you put out there is just out there for anyone to use for any reason they can think up.
[11:25.440 --> 11:35.520]  And so, you know, I'm not judging the people who do certain types of work or, you know, have certain types of hobbies, as long as they're not being jerks to people like abusers of this service.
[11:35.680 --> 11:37.860]  But, you know, it's out there.
[11:37.860 --> 11:53.280]  And I don't think we can quite depend on anyone apart from ourselves to keep information like this or resources like this, like pictures of ourselves in a quote-unquote safe place.
[11:53.280 --> 11:56.800]  And I say this as somebody with way too many pictures of himself on the internet.
[11:57.400 --> 12:01.420]  And you take many steps to avoid photographs of you being on the internet.
[12:01.640 --> 12:02.900]  And yet, there are a lot.
[12:04.540 --> 12:04.940]  Yeah.
[12:05.000 --> 12:06.020]  Imagine for normal people.
[12:07.400 --> 12:11.040]  Well, you know, pictures of me, there are very few normal people in those, but...
[12:11.040 --> 12:11.580]  Right, right.
[12:11.720 --> 12:12.100]  But still.
[12:12.300 --> 12:13.720]  I mean, I don't know.
[12:13.780 --> 12:14.920]  I've never met any normal people.
[12:14.980 --> 12:17.100]  I don't actually know how they live their lives, but...
[12:17.100 --> 12:18.760]  Normal people are actually very rare, I believe.
[12:20.160 --> 12:24.260]  But, yeah, there's something else to think about.
[12:24.260 --> 12:30.660]  There's a story that comes from Vice that, in a first, a judge has thrown out evidence obtained from FBI malware.
[12:31.180 --> 12:31.620]  Yeah.
[12:32.560 --> 12:34.240]  This story came out on the 20th.
[12:34.380 --> 12:38.720]  For the first time, a judge has actually thrown out evidence obtained via FBI malware.
[12:38.720 --> 12:52.880]  The move comes from a case affected by the FBI seizure of a dark web child pornography site in February 2015 and the subsequent deployment of a network investigative technique, which is the agency's term for a hacking tool, in order to identify the site's visitors.
[12:52.880 --> 13:02.320]  But, basically, they gathered a bunch of data and they gathered it outside of the normal accepted legal framework of such things.
[13:02.460 --> 13:07.160]  And the court actually concluded that the warrant was issued without jurisdiction and thus was void.
[13:07.500 --> 13:10.420]  And the collected evidence was, therefore, inadmissible.
[13:12.260 --> 13:15.720]  So, it's kind of strange because this was a court...
[13:19.280 --> 13:20.080]  Excuse me.
[13:20.240 --> 13:27.580]  This was a court that took this outlook on something the FBI has done.
[13:27.940 --> 13:30.960]  A spokesperson for the Department of Justice sent the statement...
[13:31.480 --> 13:33.840]  This is Peter Carr, sent the statement.
[13:34.040 --> 13:36.500]  We are disappointed with the court's decision and are reviewing our options.
[13:36.700 --> 13:50.040]  The decision highlights why the government supports the clarification of the rules of procedure currently pending before the Supreme Court to ensure that criminals using sophisticated anonymizing technologies to conceal their identities while they engage in crime over the internet are able to be identified and apprehended.
[13:51.460 --> 13:54.040]  But what strikes me about this is that we've seen...
[13:54.560 --> 14:05.520]  We've seen the FBI, the NSA, all these three-letter agencies basically form the laws to their own will and then, after they've done that, fail to follow said laws and still act outside them.
[14:05.980 --> 14:08.920]  And that, to me, seems kind of bizarre.
[14:09.100 --> 14:16.500]  I mean, if I were able to make the rules to suit whatever I wanted to do, I would maybe make the rules that way first and then do what I wanted or...
[14:16.500 --> 14:17.380]  I don't know.
[14:17.480 --> 14:18.340]  What do you guys think?
[14:18.340 --> 14:19.640]  I mean, what we see...
[14:19.640 --> 14:20.300]  And I don't know.
[14:20.400 --> 14:24.440]  There's a few similar cases going on, so I don't know if it's this one or a related one.
[14:24.620 --> 14:27.400]  The government is using these...
[14:28.540 --> 14:29.460]  I'll give them...
[14:29.460 --> 14:38.900]  I'll let them use their term and call them investigatory techniques, although that's really glossing over the fact that they're going into other people's computers and modifying how they work without their permission.
[14:39.120 --> 14:39.740]  But whatever.
[14:39.900 --> 14:42.000]  For now, we'll call that an investigatory technique.
[14:42.320 --> 14:46.500]  They're using these investigatory techniques and refusing...
[14:47.060 --> 14:52.900]  and, you know, arresting people and charging them with crimes and then refusing to say how they got the evidence that they got.
[14:54.140 --> 15:01.440]  We've seen this before with the so-called stingray technology and we're seeing it now with these sort of TOR exploits, whatever it is.
[15:01.900 --> 15:04.780]  The government really wants to have, you know, both sides.
[15:04.920 --> 15:09.960]  They want to be able to use techniques and they don't want to be able to say how they work so that defendants can't challenge them.
[15:10.540 --> 15:13.920]  And in cases, you know, like, governments are finding...
[15:13.920 --> 15:14.600]  governments, the U.S.
[15:14.700 --> 15:22.780]  government, is finding people who they believe to be criminals and choosing not to prosecute them because they don't want to say how they found them.
[15:23.920 --> 15:28.780]  And that, you know, should be worrying from literally every perspective.
[15:28.780 --> 15:37.360]  If you're a law and order type, you want these people locked up, so you want the government to say what it's doing so that, you know, if the evidence is real, then it can stand.
[15:38.040 --> 15:42.700]  If you are a privacy type, then you really want the government to not be doing this.
[15:43.680 --> 15:44.020]  It's...
[15:44.020 --> 15:51.000]  As Rob said, they're really, you know, trying to shape the rules and just doing such a terrible job of it.
[15:52.840 --> 16:20.020]  So, back on this case here, what it looks like to me is, you know, the FBI used malware, somehow got spyware on their target's computer without getting a warrant from a judge to do so, got information off their target's computer using this malware, and tried to admit that illegally obtained evidence with...
[16:20.940 --> 16:21.660]  in the court.
[16:21.960 --> 16:36.240]  And the judge, William Young of the District of Massachusetts, I think he deserves a lot of credit for noting that this was a violation of someone's Fourth Amendment rights against unwarranted, unlawful search and seizure.
[16:36.440 --> 16:48.120]  And he said, since warrantless searches are presumptively unreasonable and the good-faith exception is inapplicable, the evidence must be excluded.
[16:48.320 --> 16:52.160]  So this was a suppression motion from the defense, and a good one, I think.
[16:52.420 --> 16:53.780]  And I'm glad that...
[16:53.780 --> 16:59.800]  I hope this just teaches a lesson to the FBI, although they seem to have not learned from a lot of other lessons in the past.
[16:59.940 --> 17:08.760]  But I hope, being called to task for this, that they will reduce their doing this, although, I don't have high hopes.
[17:08.980 --> 17:09.320]  Right.
[17:10.580 --> 17:19.780]  And it's very easy to point to, especially a case like this, that involves child pornography, and just point at it and say, well, how could you be defending people who've done something like that?
[17:19.800 --> 17:23.980]  But the point is that they are not yet proven to have done something like that.
[17:24.100 --> 17:27.840]  And we are ostensibly an innocent until proven guilty society.
[17:29.180 --> 17:40.040]  And if the rights don't apply to the accused in this case, then they won't apply to the accused in your own case, whether it be for something earth-shattering or something minor.
[17:40.700 --> 17:42.180]  But basically...
[17:42.180 --> 17:42.680]  Let's be clear.
[17:42.780 --> 17:48.320]  The government here is deliberately sabotaging its own prosecutions because it doesn't want to say how it does what it does.
[17:48.400 --> 17:48.540]  Right.
[17:48.640 --> 17:51.020]  Because they don't want to follow their own rules for themselves.
[17:51.840 --> 17:53.060]  So I don't...
[17:53.580 --> 17:59.680]  I have a lot of sympathy for the victims of these people, assuming they're guilty, that they're not going to see justice.
[17:59.880 --> 18:03.920]  But let's be clear about whose fault that these people are remaining free.
[18:05.460 --> 18:05.940]  Right.
[18:06.080 --> 18:10.700]  Terrible things are very easy to use as excuses for even more terrible things in the guise of defense.
[18:11.400 --> 18:21.980]  It's also worth pointing out that the FBI and other law enforcement agencies have been caught in the past, in the past, countless times, illegally obtaining evidence, electronic evidence.
[18:22.500 --> 18:35.020]  And then, sometimes they're smarter about not trying to admit it, but will go through it, fish through it, and find something that will give them leads, illegally.
[18:35.380 --> 18:37.920]  And then they'll kind of use it as a pre...
[18:38.200 --> 18:48.060]  They'll use some other pretext to say they got this other information legally when they have this investigative advantage that was obtained illegally.
[18:48.860 --> 18:52.220]  So, it would not surprise me if this is going on on a wide scale.
[18:52.380 --> 19:04.460]  This is just a rare case where the FBI actually was stupid enough to try to admit illegally obtained evidence, and they got slapped down by the judge.
[19:04.660 --> 19:07.860]  So, listen, it's all our rights that are at risk here.
[19:07.860 --> 19:12.620]  It doesn't matter how bad the person is, allegedly is, that the target was.
[19:14.540 --> 19:17.060]  Once our rights start disappearing, it's going to happen...
[19:17.060 --> 19:18.420]  it could have happened to any of us.
[19:18.520 --> 19:22.000]  So, that's why it's important to pay attention to these cases, I think.
[19:22.440 --> 19:26.200]  And it's something that we've seen happen many times already, even in just recent memory.
[19:26.620 --> 19:31.940]  And once you give up a right, no matter what the reasons are, it's very difficult to ever see it come back.
[19:33.660 --> 19:34.080]  Indeed.
[19:36.220 --> 19:37.180]  So, where are...
[19:37.180 --> 19:40.920]  where are Kyle and Emanuel this evening?
[19:40.920 --> 19:41.920]  Kyle and Emanuel.
[19:42.600 --> 19:45.780]  They are still, they are still away on assignment, on a top-secret mission.
[19:46.140 --> 19:49.080]  They're in an undisclosed location somewhere in the Adirondacks, I believe.
[19:50.760 --> 19:54.660]  And yeah, if you're, if you're climbing any mountains at this point, you know, look around.
[19:54.740 --> 19:56.020]  You might, you might see our friends there.
[19:57.620 --> 20:02.660]  But we're, they've, they've been on a, they've been on a long and winding journey, and I'm sure we're going to hear all about it when they get back.
[20:03.800 --> 20:05.300]  And I look forward to it.
[20:05.620 --> 20:07.340]  I look forward to the tales of their adventures.
[20:07.700 --> 20:11.140]  So they're out of, they're out of telephone range, mobile telephone range.
[20:11.240 --> 20:11.740]  Is that the case?
[20:11.960 --> 20:13.500]  That, that would appear to be the case.
[20:13.900 --> 20:18.580]  We were, we were going to work out something where they would, they would contact us if they could, and join us tonight.
[20:18.580 --> 20:21.020]  But that is, that has not happened.
[20:21.260 --> 20:24.140]  So I'm going to assume that they're somewhere out of cell phone range.
[20:24.480 --> 20:27.500]  And there's maybe, there's maybe a horror movie about to break out or something.
[20:28.460 --> 20:31.500]  Well, you know, I wish they'd remembered to bring their satellite phones on this trip.
[20:32.900 --> 20:33.260]  Yeah.
[20:33.400 --> 20:35.120]  We, we really should stop hiding those from them.
[20:36.000 --> 20:37.120]  No matter how fun it is.
[20:38.240 --> 20:43.560]  So we've talked a lot about ad blockers on this program, something you don't have to use for our program because we don't have ads.
[20:43.740 --> 20:59.260]  But indeed, if you browse a lot of the rest of the web, you, you might see an ad and you might want to, you know, you just might not want to look at the ad, but you might also be more concerned with the privacy implications of having these random third party ad tracking companies run software on your computer.
[20:59.400 --> 21:00.840]  So you might have an ad blocker.
[21:01.280 --> 21:16.200]  And if the website you're visiting has a lot of people with ad blockers and they want revenue, then they might deploy an ad blocker blocker to attempt you from visiting their website with your ad blocker installed.
[21:16.200 --> 21:33.380]  Um, but there's some interesting news out of Europe, uh, which is that the European Commission says that browser-side web scripts that pick out advert blockers, um, may be accessing people's personal data, such as the plugin which is stored on your computer,
[21:33.720 --> 21:43.480]  and you can only do such data access in the European Union if you have permission from the user in question.
[21:43.480 --> 21:50.180]  Uh, this is the same rule that causes those annoying, uh, pop-ups that they, that you see about cookies.
[21:50.220 --> 22:01.100]  If you ever have visited a, uh, a website in Europe, uh, that applies to being in Europe and visiting a website and also to being elsewhere and visiting a website when, when the website is in Europe.
[22:01.100 --> 22:15.120]  Um, and so, uh, there's, there, you know, I imagine most people who run ad blockers do not want to give permission to run, uh, ad blocker detection.
[22:15.700 --> 22:24.740]  So, under EU law enforce, uh, people must give their consent before the anti-ad blocker script can run and hide content on a page.
[22:25.320 --> 22:30.900]  So, some interesting, uh, rulings from the European Commission.
[22:31.540 --> 22:34.700]  we'll continue to follow that and see if it actually is enforced or not.
[22:34.900 --> 22:35.160]  Yeah.
[22:35.320 --> 22:43.600]  I'm, I'm very interested to see how this shakes out because we, we know now about, uh, clicking okay or, um, dismissing the notices about cookies from, from European sites.
[22:44.020 --> 22:54.320]  But, uh, are we, are we now going to have to dismiss a message asking us permission to see if we have an ad blocker so they can pester us to block our ad blocker and, and reveal their ads or, or not?
[22:54.420 --> 22:55.700]  I mean, the, the,
[23:01.100 --> 23:01.360]  it's fascinating.
[23:02.060 --> 23:05.680]  But, uh, this, this, uh, kind of puts a new spin on it.
[23:06.180 --> 23:10.020]  Um, of course browsers give up a ton of information about you just every time you visit a site.
[23:10.220 --> 23:19.020]  From, uh, from your IP address and things like that to the configuration of your own browser, what browser you're using, what operating system you're using, the size of your screen, what fonts you have installed.
[23:19.760 --> 23:27.720]  Um, all kinds of, all kinds of things are just transferred in the normal course of your web browsing unless you're taking, um, sort of extreme measures to keep that info private.
[23:28.220 --> 23:31.860]  So, it, it's gonna be, it's gonna be definitely interesting to see where this goes.
[23:31.980 --> 23:32.480]  What do you think, Bernie?
[23:33.680 --> 23:45.780]  Um, I think the arms race will only continue between, uh, advertisers, online advertisers, and, uh, and technologies used to, uh, block those ads.
[23:46.040 --> 23:50.500]  And, uh, and the methods used by advertisers to, uh,
[23:55.180 --> 23:55.860]  can track us.
[23:56.640 --> 23:58.500]  And, between technology used to prevent that.
[23:58.660 --> 23:59.780]  It is never gonna stop.
[24:00.320 --> 24:02.400]  It's really, you know, we're at the infancy of this stuff.
[24:02.500 --> 24:07.000]  This stuff really only started maybe, what, 15, 20 years ago.
[24:07.220 --> 24:08.640]  The cookies and things like that.
[24:09.140 --> 24:21.300]  But, it just boggles my mind where we're gonna be in another 10, 15, 20 years, with all this, uh, spy counters, counter spy type, uh, type stuff.
[24:21.660 --> 24:24.120]  It's, who do you think's gonna win?
[24:26.420 --> 24:30.940]  I think the, the maybe, maybe start a company that makes both ads and ad blockers.
[24:31.140 --> 24:34.000]  So, uh, you'll be, that's, that's been done, Rob.
[24:34.500 --> 24:45.020]  You're, you're, you're joking, but the, for a long time, the most popular ad blocker, uh, and they now accept bribes from advertisers to show you ads.
[24:45.340 --> 24:50.820]  It's not, this is the kind of thing I would make up as a joke, but, uh, but I promise you, it's true.
[24:50.960 --> 24:52.820]  There, there really are no original ideas anymore.
[24:52.820 --> 24:53.820]  No, none.
[24:53.920 --> 24:57.700]  Especially when it comes to sort of being, creepy and evil to people over the internet.
[24:58.180 --> 25:03.400]  Well, in that case, unfortunately, it seems that there are, uh, new ideas being come up with all the time.
[25:03.820 --> 25:09.860]  But, uh, I, I struggle to know how it's still possible as well.
[25:10.400 --> 25:18.840]  Speaking of, the hidden creepy things, uh, a story that just came out today, um, and, uh, this is, this is from, uh, this is from Reuters, I think.
[25:19.020 --> 25:28.000]  The International Consortium of Investigative Journalists is about to unleash a huge data dump, um, of additional data from the Panama Papers leaks.
[25:28.620 --> 25:33.100]  Um, they're, they're going to, uh, they, they're going to release this on May 9th.
[25:33.520 --> 25:44.760]  And, uh, the, the ICIJ said in an email statement that they'll, quote, publish what will likely be the largest ever release of information about secret offshore companies and the people behind them based on data from the Panama Papers investigation.
[25:45.200 --> 25:54.060]  The searchable database will include information about more than 200,000 companies, trusts, foundations, and funds incorporated in 21 tax havens from Hong Kong to Nevada and the United States.
[25:54.880 --> 26:04.320]  Um, I, I'm normally, I'm normally not one to get all that excited about, uh, announcements of technical things, you know, a month before the fact or so, but, this, this caught me, this caught my interest.
[26:04.460 --> 26:06.740]  This I think, uh, will be worth keeping an eye on.
[26:08.100 --> 26:09.380]  This is a lot of data.
[26:09.580 --> 26:16.220]  What, I'm trying to remember from earlier stories about this, it was, uh, it was several terabytes of data.
[26:17.140 --> 26:21.060]  That's, that's, you know, that's several thousand gigabytes.
[26:21.600 --> 26:21.720]  Yeah.
[26:21.980 --> 26:39.440]  Of, of data that was, uh, obtained, um, surrepetitiously from this, uh, uh, law firm in Panama, uh, and, uh, who specializes in, uh, helping people hide their, hide their riches.
[26:39.980 --> 26:50.640]  And, uh, we've also, uh, you've already seen the, uh, prime minister of Iceland resign over this, because he had, uh, he was apparently, uh, using the same people who hide his money.
[26:51.040 --> 26:54.260]  Do you know he resigned, then he unresigned, then I think he resigned again.
[26:54.260 --> 26:54.520]  Oh yeah.
[26:54.520 --> 26:55.200]  I can't keep track.
[26:56.260 --> 26:56.980]  Good point.
[26:57.460 --> 27:03.400]  I think at this point, he's just, he's just standing halfway, he's standing halfway in the doorway of the office, like refusing to go one way or the other.
[27:03.460 --> 27:04.720]  It's like a quantum resignation.
[27:05.060 --> 27:06.420]  People are trying to kick him out.
[27:06.740 --> 27:20.100]  Um, but he was, he was basically cut, um, using, uh, services of some of the same companies that brought the Icelandic economy to, to, uh, into a practical depression a few years ago.
[27:20.100 --> 27:23.460]  So, and, uh, that did not go over well to the Icelandic populace.
[27:23.600 --> 27:24.620]  So they want him out.
[27:24.840 --> 27:37.900]  And I am, I don't think anybody could possibly have gone through these terabytes of data yet, and found every instance of, of, uh, these, uh, people that are, trying to hide their, hide their money.
[27:38.120 --> 27:43.420]  So we don't know, uh, they've, they've stolen tax money or, or whatever.
[27:43.620 --> 27:45.100]  But in any case, this is going to be interesting.
[27:45.320 --> 27:50.680]  I think we can use crowdsourcing for a lot of people to start, calling through all this data when it's released.
[27:51.020 --> 27:53.820]  So that, uh, there's going to be a lot of secrets that are on earth.
[27:53.960 --> 28:00.080]  And, I'm guessing that a lot of rich and powerful people are going to be, uh, very red faced or worse by this.
[28:01.020 --> 28:01.460]  Yeah.
[28:01.480 --> 28:04.040]  I mean, it's, this is just one law firm.
[28:04.280 --> 28:10.960]  Uh, and I imagine, I, I guess they're fairly large, but, uh, by no means the only law firm in this space.
[28:11.540 --> 28:19.780]  Uh, so there must be some, a lot of very wealthy people, very relieved that they chose a different law firm to handle their shady affairs.
[28:20.040 --> 28:20.480]  Right.
[28:20.640 --> 28:35.920]  According to the article I have here, over 11 million documents held by this law firm, which is a Panama based law firm, uh, Mossack Fonseca, um, are, are, uh, what have been leaked to, uh, a German newspaper, which, uh, shared the information with the international consortium of investigative journalists,
[28:36.000 --> 28:39.560]  who are the ones collectively combing through 11 million documents.
[28:40.020 --> 28:43.780]  Um, they've, they've already been through, uh, it looks like about 28,000 pages of them.
[28:43.880 --> 28:45.860]  That's resulted in the info that's come out so far.
[28:46.260 --> 28:49.220]  And, uh, there's, there's, it's, it's really just the tip of the iceberg.
[28:49.640 --> 28:53.900]  So, so they've, they've just scratched the surface on these millions of documents.
[28:53.900 --> 29:02.420]  So I think it's good that there's going to be released to the public so that, uh, a lot of people can, uh, use crowdsourcing efforts to, uh, to go through, through these documents.
[29:02.600 --> 29:08.640]  And, uh, I also want to point out something I pointed out on the show a couple, three weeks ago is that we would never know about this leak.
[29:09.180 --> 29:10.860]  Um, it wouldn't even be a leak.
[29:11.060 --> 29:31.620]  I think if, uh, if the person who, uh, to repetitiously obtain this, uh, this important data, uh, didn't use good encryption tools to, to communicate with, uh, uh, a German, uh, newspaper reporter, um, a news media reporter, um, they went through a lot of pain,
[29:31.760 --> 29:48.260]  to a lot of pains, the, the source and the, and the reporter to ensure that they were, to meet using secure encryption technology to, uh, to get all this information transferred from the source, uh, to the reporter, uh, because the source said he believed his life was in danger.
[29:48.520 --> 29:52.440]  If his identity became known, he thought he would be dead.
[29:52.920 --> 29:58.540]  So, um, this is another reason why secure encryption is really important to, to everyone.
[29:58.760 --> 30:09.000]  And we, if without secure encryption, uh, leaks of important information that we should know about, probably aren't going to happen because, people don't want to be found out.
[30:09.160 --> 30:11.340]  Sometimes people just want to leak stuff anonymously.
[30:11.340 --> 30:13.800]  It is, it is pretty vital to the whole process.
[30:13.980 --> 30:18.900]  I mean, whistleblowing has been long established as something that's important and vital and should be protected.
[30:19.300 --> 30:23.000]  Um, so many really important things have come out, uh, through the work of whistleblowers.
[30:23.140 --> 30:35.600]  And if you're going to do that now, you need to, you need to take certain measures because there are the, the, the sort of big name whistleblowers who have been caught and made examples of Chelsea Manning, Edward Snowden, um, people like that.
[30:35.600 --> 30:40.100]  they've, they, they have set an example, but I don't think the example that the authorities wanted.
[30:40.300 --> 30:44.600]  The authorities would rather everyone be too scared to do what they do, but now we could see how they were caught.
[30:44.860 --> 30:53.020]  Um, and we can see that it's actually fairly easy to, uh, get the right tools together and the right procedures together to avoid getting caught as they did.
[30:53.020 --> 31:03.040]  I mean, I also have a lot of respect for, uh, people who chose to act in the open, uh, as Snowden did and, um, Manning sort of did.
[31:03.220 --> 31:10.500]  Uh, but, uh, I think the option to be, uh, anonymous or not is important.
[31:11.700 --> 31:12.140]  Absolutely.
[31:12.300 --> 31:14.440]  And it's, it's a decision that everyone has to make for themselves.
[31:14.640 --> 31:24.980]  And now it's a decision that, can be made sort of with, with, with all the available data with, uh, with the right tools available and, keeping those available is, is vital to the whole process, I think.
[31:25.560 --> 31:44.840]  So, Rob, if you worked for a, uh, a government agency or a big corporation and you saw something that was, uh, really wrong happening, something illegal, uh, something, uh, highly unethical, and you felt like you needed to do something about it.
[31:44.920 --> 32:04.540]  And if you felt, as, um, Edward Snowden, um, reportedly did that, uh, him go, that going through official channels would just get him in a lot of trouble, like happened to, uh, Bill Binney, and Thomas Drake, and others, um, for going through official channels.
[32:05.160 --> 32:13.560]  Um, uh, you know, you could, I guess, be tempted to, want to release this information anonymously to a reporter.
[32:13.560 --> 32:16.260]  And the only way to really do that is through encryption.
[32:17.300 --> 32:19.960]  or, it's, it's one, one method.
[32:20.440 --> 32:24.860]  Um, it's very difficult to share information electronically and preserving your anonymity.
[32:25.460 --> 32:29.080]  Um, but, you know, that's why I think it's important that we keep this going.
[32:29.220 --> 32:32.820]  Are there any updates on this crazy, uh, Ross Feinberg bill that's been floating around?
[32:33.040 --> 32:34.260]  Mike, do you know anything about that?
[32:35.540 --> 32:37.000]  Uh, I, I don't have any updates.
[32:37.380 --> 32:38.540]  Uh, I'm not sure which bill you mean.
[32:39.360 --> 32:54.380]  Um, the, the, the so-called anti, uh, encryption bill that, from, uh, Senator Feingold is, uh, on the record as opposing it, uh, much to his credit.
[32:54.580 --> 32:55.760]  Uh, I haven't heard any updates.
[32:56.400 --> 32:56.800]  Okay.
[32:57.300 --> 33:01.200]  Well, it's, uh, I'm sure we only hear the last of it and we should be paying attention to it.
[33:01.400 --> 33:01.720]  Right.
[33:01.900 --> 33:07.460]  And this is of course the, sort of thing we are often, uh, trying to get the word out about at our hope conferences.
[33:07.460 --> 33:10.760]  Uh, the next one of which is ever closer.
[33:10.960 --> 33:16.780]  It's only, it's only, uh, it's only less than a few months away, maybe two and a half months away from now.
[33:16.900 --> 33:19.100]  It's, it's gonna be, yeah, it's, it's very soon.
[33:19.660 --> 33:28.200]  I mean, we, of course we've, we've been working very hard behind the scenes and we, uh, uh, we're very proud of what we're doing.
[33:28.340 --> 33:37.300]  There are really exciting things that I can't say anything about because they're not public yet, but, uh, I'm, I'm excited about them and I'll tell you that, um, um, the fact that I am indeed excited.
[33:39.240 --> 33:41.740]  And, uh, and, you know, some great stuff's gonna happen.
[33:41.920 --> 33:45.340]  Uh, if you're, if you're not familiar, go to hope.net, H-O-P-E.net.
[33:45.820 --> 33:52.800]  Um, and, uh, get all the information is coming up in July, midtown Manhattan, right at the Hotel Pennsylvania, our home from home.
[33:53.520 --> 33:56.720]  And, uh, there's gonna be, there's gonna be some really cool stuff going on.
[33:56.840 --> 34:01.060]  Our keynote speaker, Cory Doctorow, has been announced all sorts of other really good talks in the works.
[34:01.460 --> 34:06.500]  Um, our friends of Radio Statler have announced, uh, that their panel is, uh, going to be happening this, uh, this time.
[34:06.780 --> 34:11.000]  They're gonna be doing a panel as well as running the, radio station that, they run every two years at the conference.
[34:11.180 --> 34:12.600]  Well, they do both at the same time.
[34:13.260 --> 34:18.480]  Very, very trickly, I imagine, but, uh, if there's one thing that crew can do, it's, uh, it's keep a lot of balls in the air at once.
[34:19.000 --> 34:20.980]  And, uh, I, I look forward to seeing how they do it.
[34:21.660 --> 34:34.220]  Um, and yeah, we, we actually got an email, um, who can't actually make it to the conference, um, but they, but wanted to know if there are ways they can volunteer, um, off, you know, online outside the conference.
[34:34.660 --> 34:41.940]  And, uh, if anyone's interested in volunteering, whether at the conference or in other ways, um, go to hope.net and click on the volunteers page.
[34:42.060 --> 34:49.460]  All the info is there for you and, uh, the contact info, or you can email volunteers at hope.net, because it is, it is a major event.
[34:49.600 --> 34:51.520]  We do need all the, all the, uh, help we can get.
[34:51.960 --> 34:54.880]  And we totally appreciate anyone who wants to give us a hand with things.
[34:55.220 --> 34:57.160]  So, yes, volunteers at hope.net.
[34:57.400 --> 35:01.200]  Um, we're also still accepting, uh, proposals for talks and things.
[35:01.300 --> 35:03.520]  If you haven't gotten yours in yet, get it in damn soon.
[35:03.940 --> 35:07.440]  Uh, go to hope.net, click the speakers page, and, uh, the info is there.
[35:07.660 --> 35:12.240]  If you've got ideas for workshops, um, again, go to hope.net, the info is there for you.
[35:12.420 --> 35:19.480]  And, um, let us know what workshops you could do, what workshops you would like to see, maybe that you yourself, uh, can't do, but would want to attend.
[35:20.000 --> 35:23.620]  Um, all this, uh, because that's, that's what the event is for.
[35:23.740 --> 35:27.400]  It's for, it's for the things that, uh, that are important to the people who go to the event.
[35:27.680 --> 35:35.960]  And, um, before and behind the scenes where we, we want to make this, as we do every, every couple of years, um, we want to make this one the best one yet.
[35:36.580 --> 35:39.000]  So, yeah, take a, take a look.
[35:39.640 --> 35:45.480]  Speaking of hope, uh, I, I did mention that, uh, Negative Land presented at one of our earlier conferences, uh, at H2K2.
[35:45.660 --> 35:57.620]  You can find that, um, if you want to watch that whole presentation, it's worth, uh, going to channel 2600 on YouTube, and bringing it up that way because, uh, they, they presented some films and things which, which are, which do have the visual element to them.
[35:58.100 --> 36:01.340]  So, if you want to watch them on YouTube, um, you can search for it there.
[36:01.860 --> 36:05.140]  Or if you just want to get hold of the MP3, you can get that from the Hope website.
[36:06.260 --> 36:12.460]  And, uh, that, and tons more topics that, uh, to list here because we would be here all night.
[36:13.420 --> 36:16.820]  Um, Bernie, what do you, what are you thinking about this hope so far, this upcoming hope?
[36:17.760 --> 36:24.340]  Well, um, I, I'm privy to some information that is, made me, uh, very excited as well.
[36:24.840 --> 36:38.460]  And, uh, Well, I know we're just, this is very, this is very teasing, but, we, we can't blow it for some of our speakers and other things without releasing information that, uh, in the right way.
[36:38.540 --> 36:39.640]  But we will be doing it very soon.
[36:39.640 --> 36:44.200]  There's, uh, there's just some really great talks coming down, talks and panels coming down the pipeline.
[36:44.460 --> 36:47.220]  And, um, some great workshops as well.
[36:47.700 --> 37:03.660]  Mitch Altman is doing a great job along with Tech Darko, um, putting together the, uh, the workshops, um, part of, of, which has really grown a lot over the past few years, where, you know, if you don't just sit back and listen to a speaker, you, uh, you go into a room with the speaker and,
[37:03.820 --> 37:07.600]  do something hands-on with, uh, with whatever they're talking about.
[37:07.600 --> 37:24.580]  And, uh, whether it's building some electronic device or writing code or, um, uh, workshops on, on how to, uh, fill out a freedom of information request, uh, to your favorite government agency to find out what they know about this or that.
[37:24.740 --> 37:36.680]  There are going to be a lot of interesting workshops, and talks, and panels, and projects, and music, and all kinds of stuff for three days, July 22nd, 23rd, 24th.
[37:36.820 --> 37:45.180]  So like Rob said, check out, uh, I think during the months of, uh, April and May, is that right?
[37:46.000 --> 37:48.300]  Um, just, just the month of April.
[37:48.480 --> 38:04.420]  So before the end of this month, if you, if you obtained a ticket online, 10% of the proceeds will go to support the Electronic Frontier Foundation, who is, uh, which is an amazing organization that really helps all of us in the hacker community.
[38:04.640 --> 38:09.800]  And they will be doing, presenting some talks and panels, um, at the 11th Hope as well.
[38:10.540 --> 38:11.460]  Currently have a table.
[38:11.640 --> 38:17.980]  They are defending our rights in, uh, on the internet and, uh, and other electronic ways, electronic mediums.
[38:18.280 --> 38:20.380]  So, um, it's very important to support them.
[38:20.520 --> 38:27.360]  We had their, uh, I think their, their, uh, chief, uh, general counsel just on the air here a couple, three weeks ago.
[38:27.540 --> 38:38.220]  And, uh, they're fighting a good fight for us because if they don't do this, there aren't a lot of other organizations, maybe the ACLU, but they're not as skilled from a technology standpoint, quite as, or practice as EFF is, but they're very good as well.
[38:38.220 --> 38:45.100]  But there, there aren't a lot of, uh, legal organizations that are defending people's rights in, uh, in this electronic realm.
[38:45.260 --> 38:47.560]  So it's really important that we support the groups that do.
[38:47.840 --> 38:48.240]  Right.
[38:48.360 --> 38:53.780]  And yeah, only, only a few days left actually to, uh, help, uh, support the EFF with your hope ticket.
[38:53.780 --> 38:56.940]  Um, so yeah, hope.net, all the info is on there.
[38:57.740 --> 38:59.080]  Um, other stuff going on.
[38:59.240 --> 39:01.120]  it's, uh, you, you might've heard something about this.
[39:01.240 --> 39:08.260]  Uh, if you, if you listen to or, or read a kind of decent amount of news, there's kind of an election going on, um, in, in this country.
[39:09.120 --> 39:09.480]  Yeah.
[39:09.640 --> 39:10.960]  Is it still going on?
[39:11.100 --> 39:15.240]  Do you, do you know that this election won't be over until the summer hasn't even started?
[39:15.360 --> 39:16.160]  The summer is going to be over.
[39:16.400 --> 39:21.880]  It's going to be fall and, and, and miserable weather again before this thing is over.
[39:22.260 --> 39:23.380]  That's how long this is going.
[39:23.660 --> 39:24.000]  Yeah.
[39:24.160 --> 39:26.640]  And it, it just feels longer with every story that comes out of it.
[39:26.740 --> 39:32.720]  But, uh, last week we were talking a little bit about the local elections here in New York City and, how things weren't working.
[39:33.000 --> 39:36.720]  Uh, people were finding themselves deleted from rosters and things like that.
[39:37.520 --> 39:50.240]  Um, the, uh, the, the day after our program on Thursday, a story came out that a New York City Board of Elections official has been suspended, um, after voting issues arose in Brooklyn during the primary election, the preceding Tuesday.
[39:50.880 --> 39:58.660]  the, uh, commissioner's executive committee of the Board of Elections voted to suspend borough, office chief clerk, Diane Haslett-Rudiano.
[39:59.160 --> 40:00.620]  That's an interesting sentence to say.
[40:01.100 --> 40:01.840]  Uh, without pay.
[40:02.160 --> 40:08.080]  And, uh, the suspension takes effect immediately because apparently things were actually that bad and they're acknowledging it.
[40:08.560 --> 40:23.700]  So, uh, maybe, maybe this is, maybe this is a little, uh, a little reassuring to, people who had a hard time of it last week, that, uh, things will be in complete working order and entirely fixed by the time the actual election and not just the primaries come along.
[40:23.940 --> 40:25.040]  I, I, I don't know.
[40:25.100 --> 40:25.540]  Sure hope so.
[40:25.660 --> 40:33.160]  Last night, Rob, I was at a, uh, uh, what I was hoping would be a, uh, Bernie Sanders, uh, victory party here in, uh, Pennsylvania, Philadelphia.
[40:33.700 --> 40:37.440]  Unfortunately, he did not, he, he did not win the Pennsylvania primary, but, uh,
[40:41.560 --> 40:44.360]  last night after we were, uh, trying to get out the vote.
[40:44.740 --> 40:52.460]  And, uh, one of them is a, a delegate, uh, Democrat party, uh, delegate for Bernie Sanders.
[40:52.660 --> 40:53.260]  Her name is Carmen.
[40:53.720 --> 41:05.580]  And I had a really good conversation with her about this, uh, these voting irregularities in, uh, or I should say polling irregularities, in New York.
[41:05.820 --> 41:23.940]  And, uh, she's involved with, uh, with things up in New York, uh, to, uh, ensure this, this investigation goes, uh, goes the way it, it, it should, uh, that these things will be rectified prior to the November general election.
[41:24.220 --> 41:29.940]  So, uh, I'm glad we've got good people out there working on this, but it's really inexplicable how this could have happened in the first place.
[41:30.060 --> 41:31.860]  It's just, you know.
[41:32.020 --> 41:32.940]  Did you vote, Bernie?
[41:33.340 --> 41:34.480]  I absolutely did.
[41:34.780 --> 41:35.940]  Any stories to tell?
[41:36.900 --> 41:39.860]  Well, um, there was a, a moderately good turnout.
[41:40.120 --> 41:42.980]  It was a wonderful, it was a beautiful day, weather-wise, here in Philadelphia.
[41:43.320 --> 41:45.580]  I wasn't really looking for weather-related stories.
[41:45.720 --> 41:45.960]  Yeah, I know.
[41:46.000 --> 41:48.000]  But what I mean is that's linked to the turnout.
[41:48.140 --> 41:48.500]  Yeah, it's true.
[41:48.980 --> 41:57.760]  poor, poor weather results in, and some candidates, uh, uh, do especially well when there's a good turnout, and some candidates do especially well when there's not a good turnout.
[41:57.960 --> 41:59.560]  So that is, it is relevant, I think.
[41:59.800 --> 42:10.860]  Um, but yeah, aside from the weather report, um, there was a good report, a good turnout, um, a surprisingly number of, surprising number of young people at the, uh, voting precinct where I went.
[42:10.860 --> 42:12.900]  And, uh, there were no problems.
[42:13.060 --> 42:22.540]  I, um, I was able to, uh, just sign without showing any ID, and they looked at my signature, and it matched, and they escorted me into a booth for Democrat, people who registered as Democrats.
[42:23.180 --> 42:40.580]  And, uh, I used the giant, uh, membrane keyboard, reminiscent of the Atari 400, with, uh, this little, bendable, clickable buttons underneath, uh, this giant membrane with, uh, candidates, and delegates, and other things, and referenda.
[42:41.260 --> 42:51.400]  Um, so, uh, you know, you press them, and there's a red, a red LED lights up behind it, and I press the big vote button, um, at the bottom, and, uh, it, uh, allegedly records my vote.
[42:51.520 --> 42:57.100]  But what happens in that black box, is anybody's guess, I hope my vote was counted, but I have no way to verify that.
[42:57.400 --> 43:04.320]  I think what happens is, if you press the right series of light up buttons, a peanut will come out the bottom, and NASA will know whether they can send you to space.
[43:04.540 --> 43:09.420]  Ah, you know, there's probably Easter eggs, these voting machines, these electronic voting machines, probably do have Easter eggs built into them.
[43:09.580 --> 43:12.020]  I, I would design Easter eggs into such a thing, if that were my job.
[43:12.200 --> 43:13.480]  That's probably why that's not my job.
[43:13.600 --> 43:16.720]  But, uh, but yeah, a lot, uh, a lot going on.
[43:16.900 --> 43:18.840]  Um, we have a little bit of, uh, time left.
[43:18.840 --> 43:20.720]  I want to see if maybe we can take some phone calls today.
[43:20.940 --> 43:25.020]  Uh, give us a call at 1-718-780-8888.
[43:25.940 --> 43:32.980]  while we're waiting for the board to light up, I'll, I'll read the short story we've got about, uh, Microsoft and Google have agreed to end all regulatory complaints against each other.
[43:33.820 --> 43:40.580]  Um, they've, uh, in a statement to the site Recode, Google and Microsoft said that the companies should be competing on products instead of focusing on legal proceedings.
[43:41.020 --> 43:47.440]  Um, their companies compete vigorously, but they want to do so on the merits of their product, not in legal proceedings, um, from a statement from Google.
[43:47.960 --> 43:55.520]  So it's, if you're familiar with Tom and Jerry cartoons in the 1970s, when they were suddenly friends for no reason, um, instead of chasing one another, I think it feels a bit like that.
[43:56.140 --> 43:58.780]  But, uh, I mean, this is collusion, right?
[43:58.800 --> 43:59.900]  There's no other word for this.
[44:00.080 --> 44:01.920]  Uh, it's alien versus predator.
[44:01.920 --> 44:02.960]  Whoever wins, we lose.
[44:03.340 --> 44:03.580]  I think.
[44:04.600 --> 44:07.300]  Uh, how's that switchboard looking?
[44:07.440 --> 44:08.440]  It's, it's blinking.
[44:08.600 --> 44:14.980]  There's a lot of tape on it, so I can only press some of the buttons maybe, but I'll press this one and, uh, wish you a good evening until you're on the air.
[44:15.640 --> 44:16.320]  How you doing?
[44:16.620 --> 44:16.840]  Good.
[44:16.900 --> 44:17.140]  How are you?
[44:17.460 --> 44:18.560]  I'm well, thank you.
[44:18.740 --> 44:20.980]  I'm calling with a complaint about election day.
[44:21.180 --> 44:27.860]  I'm in Richmond Hill, Queens, and we got to the poll place at eight o'clock in the morning.
[44:28.700 --> 44:46.380]  The guy at our table said that in 10 years, in terms of being the, uh, polling supervisor, he had gotten three complaints, you know, three times when he had to fill out the, uh, affidavit in 10 years.
[44:46.660 --> 44:48.200]  We got there at eight o'clock.
[44:48.420 --> 44:50.240]  The polls were open for two hours.
[44:50.460 --> 44:55.520]  We were the hundred and fifty third persons to fill out, uh, an affidavit.
[44:55.520 --> 44:59.740]  We were all struck from the, from the books and we voted there twice before.
[45:01.540 --> 45:02.120]  Wow.
[45:02.400 --> 45:03.460]  How does that make you feel?
[45:03.920 --> 45:04.020]  Yeah.
[45:04.680 --> 45:10.040]  Well, you can feel as if you're, like, stripped of your citizenship.
[45:10.800 --> 45:15.720]  And, uh, these are supposed to be our people in our town.
[45:15.960 --> 45:19.560]  And all of a sudden, we're exiled from our town.
[45:19.560 --> 45:21.720]  We're stripped of our rights.
[45:22.020 --> 45:22.980]  It's terrible.
[45:23.520 --> 45:24.140]  It's not American.
[45:25.120 --> 45:29.360]  So are you, are you feeling like they'll have any, everything fixed by the, uh, time the proper election comes along?
[45:30.840 --> 45:31.560]  Good luck.
[45:33.400 --> 45:35.080]  Well, we'll, uh, we'll keep an eye on it.
[45:35.160 --> 45:35.580]  Thank you very much.
[45:37.120 --> 45:41.680]  They're supposed to, follow up with you and let you know the results of your affidavit.
[45:42.280 --> 45:44.640]  So I hope they, they do that in this caller's case.
[45:44.900 --> 45:46.000]  Uh, maybe he can let us know.
[45:46.180 --> 45:46.980]  If they've got that working.
[45:47.500 --> 45:50.540]  Um, well, we wait for, uh, more people to call us.
[45:50.660 --> 45:52.680]  718-780-8888.
[45:53.020 --> 45:55.040]  Uh, the story from Kuwait.
[45:55.180 --> 46:04.920]  Kuwait is going to DNA test the, everyone in the entire country, including all tourists arriving at the airport, uh, or DNA tag, I guess.
[46:05.320 --> 46:13.740]  Um, the story from news 24, which I'm not familiar with, but, uh, they, they cite the Kuwait times.
[46:13.780 --> 46:17.560]  The DNA testing law is aimed at creating an integrated security database.
[46:17.560 --> 46:19.700]  The first of its kind in the world.
[46:19.960 --> 46:23.760]  And the DNA tagging will only be used for criminal security purposes.
[46:24.060 --> 46:30.660]  I don't know if that means they want to commit crimes with this database or what, but, uh, it's scary stuff.
[46:30.660 --> 46:33.700]  And it's, and, you know, Kuwait, I'm sure it's just the test bed.
[46:33.880 --> 46:37.620]  I'm sure other lands will be doing it too.
[46:37.740 --> 46:41.240]  So wait, if, if you go to Kuwait soon, when they start this program, Yeah.
[46:41.320 --> 46:50.960]  after they start this program, they will be sampling your DNA and storing it, you know, indefinitely and using it in ways that you have no idea how they're really, really going to be using it.
[46:51.160 --> 47:02.560]  I mean, and then what governments, what governments, is the United States government, uh, an ally of Kuwait, um, providing them with, uh, resources and arms and things.
[47:02.740 --> 47:11.180]  So is it, is, can we expect them to, Kuwait to share this DNA data collected from people with, uh, with other countries intelligence agencies?
[47:11.440 --> 47:19.120]  I mean, I'm sure anything that the Kuwaiti government has, the U S intelligence agencies can get, uh, through cooperation or otherwise.
[47:19.400 --> 47:27.660]  But, um, yeah, I mean, I was not able to find a lot of information about what specifically they're collecting or what they're going to do with, what they say they're going to do with the data.
[47:28.160 --> 47:34.940]  But, uh, definitely we'll keep our eye on it and, uh, and, and look for more details as they come out.
[47:35.040 --> 47:38.480]  We've got some more, uh, people calling in only a short time to talk to them.
[47:38.700 --> 47:40.540]  So, uh, good evening.
[47:40.660 --> 47:41.200]  You're on the air.
[47:42.800 --> 47:43.160]  Hello.
[47:43.700 --> 47:44.020]  Hello.
[47:44.320 --> 47:44.420]  Yeah.
[47:44.520 --> 47:45.920]  This is Joel calling from New Jersey.
[47:45.920 --> 47:47.720]  I'm listening to your program on WBAI.
[47:47.840 --> 47:48.700]  I wanted to make a comment.
[47:48.960 --> 47:49.380]  Please do.
[47:49.380 --> 47:50.620]  On election integrity.
[47:51.240 --> 47:51.800]  Yeah.
[47:51.840 --> 47:52.440]  What's on your mind?
[47:52.760 --> 47:53.020]  Yeah.
[47:53.280 --> 47:53.600]  Okay.
[47:53.860 --> 48:07.580]  Um, uh, we've been following this issue and I'm in contact with people who've written books on it, like Jonathan Simons, uh, code red and, Mark Crispin Miller, who's written books on the, the theft of the 2000, 2004 election.
[48:08.320 --> 48:21.160]  Um, my great, uh, conundrum is why there has been very little press investigation about the, um, kind of behind the scenes vote counting, uh, the computerized vote hacking.
[48:21.400 --> 48:25.600]  They do a lot on the laws that are passed that restrict voting.
[48:25.600 --> 48:30.880]  Um, this you see in the New York times, but you will not see, uh, how votes are flipped.
[48:30.880 --> 48:34.160]  Uh, we have Bob Petrakis working on this in Ohio.
[48:34.680 --> 48:51.900]  Um, and I always wondered why the democratic party wasn't onto this since, since these things seem to favor Republicans and give us what we call a rolling coup, a rolling coup d'etat with governorships, legislatures out in many states like Wisconsin and Illinois and,
[48:51.940 --> 48:57.780]  and the U S Congress going over to Republicans, even though they're a minor, very much a minority party.
[48:57.780 --> 49:09.200]  And now with this election and Hillary being the establishment candidate, taking money from, from the big guys, from the deep state actors, the 1%, the oligarchy, call it what you will.
[49:09.740 --> 49:13.820]  Um, and Bernie contesting this, we're starting to see this happen to Bernie.
[49:14.040 --> 49:15.120]  We've seen it doc.
[49:15.260 --> 49:21.360]  It's been documented by the Washington post in, uh, Sussex County, Delaware, for example, and isolated places.
[49:21.620 --> 49:27.720]  But it's just very strange to see him coming out with these, uh, results.
[49:28.160 --> 49:31.960]  And now, of course we have the disappearing, uh, registrations in Brooklyn.
[49:32.280 --> 49:37.480]  Um, and your last caller who, who reported there's so many irregularities going on.
[49:37.600 --> 49:45.460]  So we seem to see the reason why the Democrats won't investigate, uh, these shady practices, really illegal practices.
[49:45.580 --> 49:48.860]  And it indicates that they're doing it themselves.
[49:48.860 --> 49:53.160]  And we need some good investigative reporting to go to the heart of the matter.
[49:54.660 --> 49:54.940]  all right.
[49:55.340 --> 49:55.600]  thanks.
[49:55.760 --> 49:57.320]  Thanks for that, uh, suggestion.
[49:57.320 --> 50:01.140]  We'll definitely keep an eye on these sorts of things, uh, as they continue.
[50:01.920 --> 50:02.300]  Okay.
[50:02.380 --> 50:04.100]  We're not going to get it from the New York times.
[50:04.320 --> 50:04.620]  All right.
[50:04.720 --> 50:09.080]  Well, well, that's, uh, that's why we need among other things, this place, WBAI.
[50:09.080 --> 50:11.600]  And, uh, we'll, we'll try and do our best with, uh, what we've got here.
[50:11.860 --> 50:12.860]  Thank you very much for your call.
[50:13.020 --> 50:13.220]  Yeah.
[50:13.540 --> 50:16.700]  Um, I think this phone is acting up very strangely.
[50:17.120 --> 50:21.280]  I don't know what all this tape means, but I, I have no blinking lights to press.
[50:21.440 --> 50:22.020]  It's pretty sad.
[50:22.380 --> 50:25.200]  Oh, 7 1 8 7 8 0 8 8 8 8 8 8 is our number.
[50:25.420 --> 50:26.640]  I could actually use some tape.
[50:26.720 --> 50:28.100]  So maybe I should grab some of that on the way out.
[50:28.220 --> 50:29.140]  There's plenty on this phone.
[50:29.320 --> 50:29.820]  I'll tell you that.
[50:29.980 --> 50:36.140]  I don't want to remove it cause it'll probably fall apart, but, um, but yeah, 7 1 8 7 8 0 8 8 8 8 8.
[50:37.000 --> 50:48.000]  Uh, there's a, there's a very good, um, opinion column on the site dw.com by someone named, uh, Kathleen Schuster, which is titled, why isn't the NSA a hot topic in the U S elections, which, uh, is an important question to ask.
[50:48.160 --> 50:51.940]  And the answers apparently are very myriad and subtle.
[50:52.160 --> 50:54.240]  And the, uh, the piece itself is an eye opener.
[50:54.360 --> 50:56.920]  We don't really have sufficient time to go into it, but, uh, look it up.
[50:57.040 --> 50:57.940]  It's from Deutsche Welle.
[50:58.520 --> 50:58.560]  Yep.
[51:01.180 --> 51:13.580]  Deutsche Welle dot com, and just search, uh, NSA and U S elections, and you can, you can find it, really is an interesting article about, uh, why the NSA doesn't seem to be a hot topic in, uh, U S elections.
[51:13.640 --> 51:23.480]  Although Senator Bernie Sanders has, uh, has come out and said, uh, uh, he's against the domestic, uh, surveillance here in the United States by, of, you know, by NSA.
[51:24.060 --> 51:29.400]  Um, and Hillary Clinton has said, she thinks we need a balance between security and privacy.
[51:29.760 --> 51:36.880]  So, um, but that doesn't seem to be, uh, you know, I had thought, you know, a month ago, this is going to be a front center topic.
[51:37.080 --> 51:40.720]  It was, how many months ago, Mike, wasn't this like a really important topic?
[51:40.860 --> 51:43.280]  A lot of candidates are talking about, and it just sort of disappeared.
[51:44.500 --> 51:50.380]  I don't really know how mainstream politics work, but maybe our listeners do, or maybe they have something, uh, else to say.
[51:50.960 --> 51:52.740]  Let's, uh, try it out either way.
[51:52.900 --> 51:53.320]  Good evening.
[51:54.580 --> 51:55.720]  Hi, what's on your mind?
[51:56.320 --> 51:58.140]  Um, I don't want to go on the air with this.
[51:58.260 --> 51:59.480]  Well, you're on the air right now.
[51:59.680 --> 52:02.040]  So, if you don't want to talk to us, you've called the wrong number.
[52:02.180 --> 52:02.500]  No, no.
[52:02.740 --> 52:03.460]  All right.
[52:03.680 --> 52:12.860]  Uh, I made a contribution, on February 4th, with the Hope 10 conference, Zoom Drive, and I still have not received it.
[52:13.100 --> 52:13.380]  Uh huh.
[52:13.540 --> 52:13.820]  Okay.
[52:13.820 --> 52:14.500]  This is important.
[52:14.500 --> 52:27.940]  Uh, send us an email, if you haven't already, to OTH at 2600.com, with the details of your order, um, the order numbers and such, if, uh, if you've got that available, um, the name and address on the order, because we are behind in some of our previous premiums,
[52:28.000 --> 52:31.300]  and we are working and behind the scenes to, uh, get this all straightened out.
[52:31.440 --> 52:33.140]  If you've emailed us, we do have your info.
[52:33.300 --> 52:41.100]  We've, uh, we're hanging onto it, and we're working to, um, we're working to get you what you deserve for supporting our show and our station.
[52:41.540 --> 52:49.980]  So, uh, we, we do, things have fallen behind, and that's very unfortunate and kind of aggravating, but, uh, we are working on it.
[52:50.660 --> 52:55.160]  We're trying to get, we're trying to get information from WPAI on, on, on what we need to provide them.
[52:55.400 --> 53:07.700]  Yeah, and actually, uh, we've, we've got our own, uh, sort of channels that we're working in, but, uh, you know, send us an email, if you haven't already, OTH at 2600.com, with, uh, with all the data about your order, and we will pursue this.
[53:07.960 --> 53:09.800]  So, thank you, uh, thank you very much for that call.
[53:10.340 --> 53:11.180]  Okay, thank you.
[53:11.180 --> 53:12.000]  Thank you.
[53:12.180 --> 53:13.260]  And thanks again for your support.
[53:14.280 --> 53:17.100]  Um, let's try this number.
[53:17.460 --> 53:18.820]  Good evening, you're on the air.
[53:19.460 --> 53:23.480]  I thought you might like to end with a bit more upbeat or humorous things.
[53:23.740 --> 53:28.080]  Um, are you gentlemen familiar with a film called The President's Analyst?
[53:28.320 --> 53:29.300]  Oh yes, very much so.
[53:29.400 --> 53:29.980]  Oh, that's a great movie, yeah.
[53:30.100 --> 53:32.060]  Okay, so we know who the bad guy really is.
[53:32.160 --> 53:38.180]  And the other thing is, did you guys hear the phone booth, uh, the drunken phone booth, complaining about being abandoned?
[53:38.180 --> 53:40.220]  It's been on John McDonough's show.
[53:40.540 --> 53:41.280]  Where was that?
[53:41.700 --> 53:42.120]  Oh, okay.
[53:42.620 --> 53:48.440]  Uh, go to John McDonough's show today, and he had it, and somewhere here is a note, which I've lost.
[53:48.760 --> 53:50.740]  Uh, there was a, uh, Arts Express.
[53:51.280 --> 53:55.840]  Arts Express on the 21st, 1400-1500 hours, had it.
[53:55.900 --> 53:57.540]  It's a monologue by The Forgotten Phone Booth.
[53:57.620 --> 54:04.620]  It also has, uh, some, um, it has, uh, some language issues in the middle when he, when the phone booth freaks out.
[54:05.020 --> 54:08.060]  It's a phone booth from New York, complaining that he's being abandoned.
[54:08.060 --> 54:09.180]  And nobody loves him anymore.
[54:09.480 --> 54:10.400]  We'll definitely check that out.
[54:10.500 --> 54:10.520]  I like it.
[54:10.520 --> 54:11.740]  And thank you very much for the pointer.
[54:12.300 --> 54:14.300]  The President's Analyst, definitely a good movie, if you haven't seen it.
[54:14.380 --> 54:15.060]  Highly recommended.
[54:15.860 --> 54:18.180]  Um, but yeah, we are just about out of time.
[54:18.380 --> 54:20.000]  So, thank you very much for listening.
[54:20.700 --> 54:22.880]  send us email, O-T-H at 2600.com.
[54:23.420 --> 54:27.240]  Stay tuned to hope.net, H-O-P-E dot net, for the info on the Hope Conference.
[54:28.020 --> 54:31.280]  And, uh, stay tuned for the personal computer show, following us.
[54:32.140 --> 54:33.980]  For Off the Hook, this is Rob T.
[54:34.080 --> 54:34.380]  Firefly.
[54:34.380 --> 54:35.360]  Have a very good night.
[54:35.360 --> 54:37.100]  We'll be in the street.
[54:38.260 --> 54:51.720]  If the crazy stalkers stand me o'er, If down the stairs I fill, My room would fill with flowers and wits.
[54:58.750 --> 55:07.350]  And I'd be your happy hero, Cause you'd heard my catchy song.
[55:07.810 --> 55:15.730]  And after being ripped apart, I could do no wrong.
[55:16.610 --> 55:24.190]  I know that I'd done nothing that a coward wouldn't do.
[55:24.610 --> 55:32.210]  But even I might see things different After listening to...
[55:36.580 --> 55:36.800]  After listening to...
[55:36.800 --> 55:36.820]  After listening to...
[55:36.820 --> 55:39.320]  I'd be so hot.
[55:40.080 --> 55:41.770]  Yeah, yeah.
[55:42.210 --> 55:49.840]  For the sale price of a press release, Success can still be bought.
[55:49.840 --> 55:52.020]  I'd sit so tall.
[55:54.740 --> 56:02.740]  They'd plug me in a wheelchair, And they'd push me down the hall.
[56:02.740 --> 56:07.100]  And I'd play a song for dying
[56:21.160 --> 56:21.960]  people.
[56:23.820 --> 56:32.620]  And I'd be your happy hero, And I'd sell another song.
[56:33.740 --> 56:41.320]  And after viewing my big heart, You'd have me goin' strong.
[56:41.960 --> 56:49.140]  I'd play a gentle lover, In a movie for TV.
[56:50.420 --> 56:52.580]  So I'd deserve,
[57:02.560 --> 57:04.580]  If someone told...
[57:05.740 --> 57:06.480]  No!
[57:08.060 --> 57:18.120]  Accused of f***ing teenage boys, And beating others cold, You'd side with me.
[57:20.330 --> 57:28.490]  And enough of you would doubt it, Which would likely set me free.
[57:28.490 --> 57:37.490]  You'd say I didn't do it, And that anyone could tell.
[57:37.850 --> 57:41.510]  Cause he's smooth, And smart, And pretty.
[57:41.970 --> 57:45.250]  And he reads his lines so
[57:49.880 --> 57:50.200]  well.
[57:50.820 --> 57:58.860]  And to be your happy hero, I'd just sing another verse.
[57:59.300 --> 58:07.500]  The more I sang, The more you would, Relieve me of my curse.
[58:08.220 --> 58:11.600]  Release me from your conscience.
[58:11.600 --> 58:13.100]  The more you would, The more you would,