[00:00.000 --> 00:08.540]  Jazeera X, Nataki Kambone, and leaders of the Movement for Black Lives, the Global Reparations Movement, and the Honorable Minister Louis Farrakhan.
[00:08.780 --> 00:12.980]  That's State of the Black World Conference 4, November 16th through the 20th in Newark, New Jersey.
[00:13.160 --> 00:26.080]  For further information and to register today, visit the website, ibw21.org, that's ibw21.org, or call 888-774-2921.
[00:26.080 --> 00:33.400]  Hi, I'm Rosie Perez, and this is WBAI, listener-supported, non-commercial radio in New York.
[00:34.180 --> 00:38.600]  And you're listening to radio station WBAI, as we just heard.
[00:38.940 --> 00:42.120]  It's 8 o'clock on a Wednesday night.
[00:42.420 --> 00:43.640]  Time for Off the Hook.
[02:11.630 --> 02:13.130]  And a very good evening to everybody.
[02:13.250 --> 02:14.950]  The program is Off the Hook.
[02:15.070 --> 02:19.090]  Emmanuel Goldstein here with you on this delightful Wednesday evening, joined tonight by Rob T.
[02:19.210 --> 02:19.650]  Firefly.
[02:19.870 --> 02:20.370]  Good evening.
[02:20.670 --> 02:20.910]  Kyle.
[02:21.510 --> 02:22.030]  Hey, hackers.
[02:22.570 --> 02:23.970]  Jim back there in the cheap seats.
[02:24.110 --> 02:24.310]  Hello.
[02:25.030 --> 02:26.130]  And Bernie S.
[02:26.430 --> 02:26.510]  somewhere.
[02:27.590 --> 02:28.850]  Greetings from Pennsylvania.
[02:29.250 --> 02:30.870]  And we're doing this all without telephones again.
[02:31.250 --> 02:31.610]  Amazing.
[02:32.270 --> 02:34.650]  And we will be taking phone calls again, too, without telephones.
[02:34.750 --> 02:35.870]  But I believe we will have phones.
[02:35.870 --> 02:37.290]  Do you think we'll have phones next week, Bernie?
[02:39.190 --> 02:41.470]  Looks like by the end of this week, they should be in the studio.
[02:41.710 --> 02:46.490]  So next week's Off the Hook, we might actually be able to take real telephone callers.
[02:46.570 --> 02:48.430]  Well, it'll be voice over IP, but better than nothing.
[02:48.770 --> 02:50.130]  It's real telephone callers now.
[02:50.190 --> 02:51.470]  They're just not using real telephones.
[02:51.830 --> 02:54.010]  It's a stopgap phone system, right?
[02:54.370 --> 02:54.610]  Yeah.
[02:55.550 --> 03:03.510]  Yeah, it's going to be Time Warner voice over IP, because WBA owes so much money to Verizon that it's not going to be paid off anytime soon.
[03:03.530 --> 03:06.470]  So we're just skipping to another vendor.
[03:07.650 --> 03:10.210]  Well, yeah, I'm not sure that's the best way to phrase it.
[03:10.310 --> 03:18.150]  But, you know, in situations like this where a phone company has ripped you off and, you know, okay, you can say BAI didn't pay the phone bill, but the phone bill was ridiculous.
[03:18.150 --> 03:21.350]  I mean, what did it cost to call you, for instance?
[03:23.030 --> 03:24.150]  I looked at some of the bills.
[03:24.330 --> 03:31.330]  It was about $3.50 to make a one-hour phone call from New York to Philadelphia, which is kind of silly.
[03:31.470 --> 03:35.010]  Well, in the 1980s, that might have made sense, but it doesn't make sense in 2016.
[03:36.110 --> 03:50.170]  So, you know, in situations like that, oftentimes, the phone company, in order to keep a customer and maintain their public image, rolls something back a little bit or applies something retroactively that, you know, is a more reasonable rate.
[03:52.250 --> 03:53.310]  One can only hope.
[03:53.490 --> 03:53.670]  We'll see.
[03:53.730 --> 03:55.090]  That's the strategy for negotiating.
[03:55.290 --> 03:56.970]  It's like, hey, do you want to keep it as a customer?
[03:57.210 --> 04:00.190]  Then cut a deal with this because you overcharge it.
[04:00.410 --> 04:03.930]  I don't know if keeping BAI as a customer is high on their priority list, but who knows?
[04:03.930 --> 04:15.810]  In your estimation, feel free to say you have no idea or you don't want to comment, but what do you think the phone bill should have been in 2016 phone rate land?
[04:17.450 --> 04:21.590]  You mean for that one call or just in general for what is owed to...
[04:21.590 --> 04:29.110]  Well, yeah, for the one call, but also for about the $20,000, just so it's put into perspective as to how much we actually did use the phone.
[04:29.170 --> 04:33.530]  These days, I mean, almost everybody has unlimited long distance, even for a landline.
[04:34.250 --> 04:35.710]  Not just mobile phones.
[04:36.190 --> 04:40.730]  So that call would have just been included for, you know, like $50 a month per line or something.
[04:40.930 --> 04:57.030]  But instead, we have thousands of dollars a month being charged by Verizon to WBAI for long distance calls and a handful of international calls, some of which added up to more than $100 for a one hour call to like Ireland or Sierra Leone for shows related to that stuff.
[04:57.270 --> 05:01.050]  And that's just highway robbery by today's standards.
[05:01.050 --> 05:04.210]  I think I get calls to Ireland for about $0.05 a minute.
[05:04.410 --> 05:06.410]  So was it 60 minutes?
[05:06.650 --> 05:07.850]  That's what, $3?
[05:08.190 --> 05:08.930]  That's what it should cost?
[05:09.570 --> 05:09.970]  Yeah.
[05:10.210 --> 05:11.050]  And it cost over $100.
[05:11.390 --> 05:14.730]  So yeah, that's the extent of the ripoff we're dealing with here.
[05:15.830 --> 05:17.370]  And yeah, you know, you can say a lot.
[05:17.470 --> 05:18.810]  I mean, I know things get out of control.
[05:19.470 --> 05:21.210]  All kinds of bills are flying around.
[05:21.510 --> 05:23.210]  I've experienced that many times firsthand.
[05:23.510 --> 05:27.690]  So I could see how this could easily be overlooked on our end.
[05:27.870 --> 05:35.990]  Still, you know, we can do a better job actually seeking out and securing certain contracts and rates.
[05:36.250 --> 05:42.130]  But the phone company, really, I mean, they're pulling one over on a lot of people.
[05:42.130 --> 05:49.750]  I imagine there are all kinds of people out there that don't know better, that are paying huge rates, probably still paying to rent their phones from the phone company.
[05:50.070 --> 05:50.190]  Yeah.
[05:50.270 --> 05:58.110]  And Bernie, you deserve a lot of credit for this, for just grabbing this by the horns and working with the station and with the phone company to figure out where we are and what's going on.
[05:58.150 --> 06:00.570]  Because our big problem was nobody was doing that.
[06:00.690 --> 06:03.010]  Nobody was paying attention to the things that need to be paid attention to.
[06:03.070 --> 06:06.070]  So thank you, Bernie, for taking all of that.
[06:06.070 --> 06:15.670]  Well, I have to actually thank Berthold Reimers, the much maligned executive general manager or interim general manager of WBAI.
[06:16.530 --> 06:22.990]  Because when I was in his office a couple weeks ago, he point blank asked me, Bernie, in this day and age, how can phone bills be tens of thousands of dollars?
[06:23.210 --> 06:24.290]  And he showed me the bill.
[06:24.410 --> 06:25.370]  And I looked at it.
[06:25.450 --> 06:32.570]  And had he not taken that initiative to point this problem out to me, which frankly he should have noticed earlier, but that's kind of besides the point.
[06:32.570 --> 06:36.430]  It started the ball rolling in this process to move, turn things around.
[06:36.770 --> 06:45.030]  And I did some research, had to do a lot of social engineering of Verizon, but got the billing information out of him and we're going over it and we're going to try to get this resolved.
[06:45.170 --> 06:51.130]  But in the meantime, we're going to have voiceover at Peace Service through Time Warner, probably a next week's show.
[06:51.230 --> 06:52.010]  So we're looking forward to it.
[06:52.070 --> 06:56.990]  It'll be all different phone numbers because Verizon won't let go of those phone numbers because, you know, they're kind of hold them hostage.
[06:57.370 --> 06:58.710]  But we're going to do the best we can.
[06:59.130 --> 07:01.230]  And it's really what it takes.
[07:01.230 --> 07:05.970]  You have to get past the sort of Fantasyland numbers and look at it with fresh eyes.
[07:06.130 --> 07:23.670]  And I'm echoing Rob's sentiment that your help, I think, was absolutely paramount to getting past the craziness of it and actually opening it up to how we can work a solution now and also get to the bottom of what actually was occurring on it.
[07:24.170 --> 07:33.650]  Yeah, and apply this to other things as well so that we're not being ripped off anywhere and so that the station can get back up on its two feet and we can move on.
[07:33.710 --> 07:36.690]  And we are talking to Bernie via Skype, right?
[07:36.870 --> 07:38.110]  Skype out, Skype in, what is it?
[07:38.110 --> 07:41.070]  Skype out from here to Bernie's phone.
[07:41.290 --> 07:48.430]  And later we'll be taking phone calls through the magic of forwarding phone calls on the internet head to a cell phone.
[07:48.870 --> 07:52.170]  And then Kyle plugging it into the board with magic.
[07:53.090 --> 07:53.530]  Yeah, yeah.
[07:53.710 --> 08:01.090]  Using the sort of things around us, patching together a bunch of different things and letting people speak.
[08:01.350 --> 08:01.710]  Yeah.
[08:01.950 --> 08:02.930]  Which is the goal here.
[08:02.990 --> 08:04.190]  You can take away our phones.
[08:04.390 --> 08:04.590]  Yes.
[08:04.590 --> 08:08.370]  But, as a bunch of hackers, we will not be cut off.
[08:08.370 --> 08:09.830]  We will always find a way to communicate.
[08:10.170 --> 08:11.310]  So, let that be known.
[08:11.470 --> 08:15.330]  Thank you, Kyle, for hacking together that cool solution.
[08:15.610 --> 08:23.650]  And, you know, this is a community radio station and the community has a right to have a voice on this radio station's airwaves.
[08:23.830 --> 08:28.410]  So, you know, without your efforts, Kyle, that wouldn't be happening on this show.
[08:28.570 --> 08:34.450]  And I'm hoping by next week all the other shows will be able to finally involve the community in their shows.
[08:35.270 --> 08:35.970]  Yeah, yeah.
[08:37.350 --> 08:40.250]  You've got to get past these little things to do more creative things.
[08:40.410 --> 08:55.230]  We've talked about other resources and things that the station can offer, but we can't actually pursue those until just the basics, like a functioning phone system, are under control and desirable, you know, a system that works for everyone here.
[08:55.430 --> 09:08.750]  So, hopefully this will be just a step in the way of getting more abilities at the new facility here, in addition to, like, the Comrex and other things we've talked about at length.
[09:08.830 --> 09:13.530]  So, this is a great, great positive step for that particular need.
[09:14.170 --> 09:14.630]  All right.
[09:14.670 --> 09:16.430]  Well, we do have things to talk about.
[09:16.570 --> 09:17.610]  Lots of things to talk about, in fact.
[09:17.750 --> 09:19.950]  We, no way we'll cram it all into one hour, but we'll try.
[09:20.670 --> 09:21.430]  Good news.
[09:21.650 --> 09:28.570]  Chelsea Manning has ended her hunger strike after winning a battle while in prison.
[09:28.570 --> 09:35.050]  She had a hunger strike after, she ended after the army said she would be allowed to receive gender transition surgery.
[09:35.350 --> 09:37.510]  It's according to the American Civil Liberties Union.
[09:37.650 --> 09:44.450]  As you know, Chelsea Manning is serving a 35-year prison term for passing classified files to WikiLeaks.
[09:44.770 --> 09:48.050]  And you may not have known she began the hunger strike on Friday.
[09:48.310 --> 09:53.050]  Now, her treatment would begin with the surgery that was recommended by her psychologist in April.
[09:54.050 --> 10:02.310]  And Manning had criticized the government in a statement for taking so long, but said, I am unendingly relieved that the military is finally doing the right thing.
[10:02.390 --> 10:03.310]  I applaud them for that.
[10:03.550 --> 10:06.670]  This is all that I wanted, for them to let me be me.
[10:07.790 --> 10:13.410]  Imagine something we all take for granted, that one basic thing, that one basic statement.
[10:14.330 --> 10:15.750]  It's incredible.
[10:16.730 --> 10:19.570]  The struggles that people have to go through just to get to that point.
[10:19.830 --> 10:42.050]  And it's been an inspiration to see someone taking on such formidable opponents, people and entities that are blocking what she needs to be a whole person, let alone being put in prison for 35 years for doing what I consider to be a public service.
[10:42.530 --> 10:43.010]  Yeah.
[10:43.170 --> 10:53.610]  And it really, it really speaks to the speed of bureaucracy, especially military bureaucracy, because according to the rest of the world, gender dysphoria is a recognized condition with recognized treatments that are made available to those suffering with the condition.
[10:53.610 --> 10:58.250]  And that's something that the military just had not dealt with to date.
[10:58.850 --> 11:03.830]  And so in this situation, they basically did not recognize that her dysphoria was a thing.
[11:04.030 --> 11:06.750]  And so therefore denied her the treatment for it.
[11:06.750 --> 11:15.310]  And if this were some other medical condition like diabetes or, you know, what have you, it would be cruel and unusual to deny somebody their necessary medical treatment.
[11:15.310 --> 11:22.830]  But in this case, because it's a gender thing, because it's this scary subject that the military doesn't seem to be able to figure out, it was denied her.
[11:22.850 --> 11:25.010]  So it's nice to see an end to that, although it's far too late.
[11:25.010 --> 11:28.630]  And it's not just the military, it's the prison complex in general.
[11:28.950 --> 11:36.650]  And what you say about certain diseases and conditions, it wouldn't be withheld as readily, but it still is withheld many times.
[11:36.830 --> 11:39.970]  There is cruel and unusual punishment that takes place every day in prison.
[11:40.090 --> 11:41.970]  We get letters, we hear from it all the time.
[11:42.170 --> 11:46.130]  And it's disgusting to think of that in this day and age.
[11:46.130 --> 11:50.010]  We don't care because these people did something to deserve it.
[11:50.170 --> 11:50.710]  They're in prison.
[11:50.870 --> 11:52.910]  They're second or third class citizens.
[11:53.270 --> 11:54.570]  It's horrible.
[11:54.790 --> 11:58.870]  It really is horrible to actually know that's going on and to know how powerless you are.
[11:58.990 --> 12:04.550]  This is something that we all should celebrate, not just Chelsea Manning, not just the transgender community.
[12:04.910 --> 12:10.770]  This is something... I mean, never before in prison has somebody received this surgical treatment.
[12:10.770 --> 12:12.290]  That's according to this article from The Guardian.
[12:12.470 --> 12:13.210]  It's the first time.
[12:13.350 --> 12:14.670]  So that is a step.
[12:14.830 --> 12:17.670]  That is a victory for so many people.
[12:18.150 --> 12:21.170]  And yet something else to thank Chelsea Manning for.
[12:21.610 --> 12:23.130]  And, you know, she's been through hell.
[12:23.270 --> 12:28.130]  In July, she tried to kill herself because of the hell she is going through.
[12:28.130 --> 12:32.250]  And let's just hope that the road gets a little brighter.
[12:32.450 --> 12:35.190]  Let's hope that saner minds prevail.
[12:36.870 --> 12:37.410]  Yeah.
[12:37.570 --> 12:43.370]  On that note, there's a petition that just got started to pardon Edward Snowden.
[12:43.550 --> 12:50.410]  You guys may know that there's a Snowden film coming out called Snowden, made by Oliver Stone.
[12:50.410 --> 12:52.650]  I mean, wow, it's going to be interesting.
[12:53.890 --> 12:59.690]  It's not a Citizen Four, but it's a different telling of the story, a fictionalized telling.
[12:59.910 --> 13:01.370]  And I'm looking forward to seeing it.
[13:01.410 --> 13:01.890]  What about you guys?
[13:02.870 --> 13:09.290]  I'll check it out because I'm certainly interested in what the general public, I think, is being told by mainstream Hollywood about this case.
[13:09.290 --> 13:19.550]  I mean, we've got experience of this sort of thing before about sort of the movie industry deciding to go with some other telling of a factual story that affects real people.
[13:19.750 --> 13:22.730]  So I'm wondering what this one's going to be like.
[13:23.590 --> 13:28.430]  Well, there is a website called pardonsnowden.org.
[13:29.470 --> 13:31.890]  And on there, you can sign the petition.
[13:32.050 --> 13:32.810]  It just got started.
[13:33.670 --> 13:40.330]  And they have a whole big list of questions and answers, including why should I support this campaign?
[13:40.710 --> 13:43.450]  Well, Snowden has spent the past three years exiled in Russia.
[13:44.010 --> 13:50.630]  Over this period, it has become obvious that he performed an important public service on behalf of a citizenry that had been in the dark.
[13:50.990 --> 13:55.250]  And early suggestions that he worked in the service of a foreign government have been widely debunked.
[13:55.350 --> 13:57.590]  He stood up for us, and now we should stand up for him.
[13:57.750 --> 14:00.750]  Your support will help make that case to the U.S.
[14:00.830 --> 14:01.090]  government.
[14:01.090 --> 14:03.150]  A lot of people have already signed this.
[14:03.590 --> 14:05.850]  As I said, the campaign just got started.
[14:06.470 --> 14:09.810]  There is hope that Obama will pardon Snowden.
[14:09.910 --> 14:11.850]  It's kind of unrealistic, I think.
[14:12.230 --> 14:23.310]  It's kind of unrealistic, I think, to expect any president to do something like this because of the flack that they will take from the right, the far right, everybody in that camp.
[14:23.310 --> 14:25.110]  But it is something that we have to try.
[14:25.330 --> 14:30.790]  They say we hope that Obama will pardon him or that somebody in the future will.
[14:31.270 --> 14:36.410]  Public opinion has certainly moved in Snowden's favor over time as people have learned more and more about him.
[14:36.530 --> 14:40.490]  And it's common for presidents to issue pardons in the final weeks of office.
[14:40.850 --> 14:44.530]  We're hopeful that Obama will allow Snowden to return home in dignity.
[14:44.910 --> 14:52.070]  And they say right now our focus is on President Obama, but if we don't succeed this year, we won't give up on our goal of enabling Snowden to come home.
[14:52.070 --> 15:01.270]  Now, keep in mind, Hillary Clinton has said some things against what Snowden has done, as I think almost any elected official will do.
[15:01.750 --> 15:10.090]  But I do think that public opinion, as with most politicians, can sway that particular opinion.
[15:10.230 --> 15:13.110]  She certainly is not saying the things that Donald Trump has said.
[15:13.250 --> 15:15.170]  He's calling for Edward Snowden's execution.
[15:15.170 --> 15:17.110]  This is something to keep in mind.
[15:17.230 --> 15:30.710]  While you may not like a lot of the things that Hillary Clinton stands for, think of the things that the other side stand for and how that will trickle down and all the other people that will be brought into power as a result.
[15:30.890 --> 15:36.350]  You're not going to get somebody who calls for the execution of Edward Snowden to ever change their mind.
[15:37.710 --> 15:44.770]  Yeah, and it's, as you said, it would be, if Obama were going to do this, you know, it'd be the time to do it now as his term comes to a close.
[15:45.030 --> 15:52.430]  But it is important to keep an eye on what those who will possibly, probably, maybe be in power in a few months have to say about it.
[15:53.030 --> 15:57.890]  Former candidate, I think we can call him former candidate, Bernie Sanders has said on Twitter that Snowden deserves clemency.
[15:58.830 --> 16:01.070]  But, you know, what are the others going to think of that?
[16:01.070 --> 16:07.690]  I don't know if I like, you know, certain New York landlords having say over who lives and who dies, but that's just me.
[16:08.030 --> 16:09.830]  Yeah, and yeah, that's correct.
[16:09.950 --> 16:14.310]  Bernie Sanders is really the only one, I think, that gets it.
[16:14.610 --> 16:16.350]  I mean, you could say Jill Stein does as well.
[16:16.990 --> 16:24.990]  But as far as people who are in the running to actually be elected, these are the people that have to be swayed.
[16:25.090 --> 16:26.550]  And it's going to take a lot of work.
[16:26.550 --> 16:34.010]  Now, the question also is raised, why not just give him a trial when he comes back?
[16:34.730 --> 16:43.650]  According to this site, he faces felony charges under the Espionage Act, which is a World War I-era law that prohibits him from making his case in court.
[16:43.670 --> 16:44.430]  I'll say that again.
[16:44.590 --> 16:48.110]  It prohibits him from making his case in court.
[16:48.110 --> 16:56.750]  If he went to trial today, he would not be allowed to explain to a jury why he felt compelled to share the NSA documents with the public.
[16:56.870 --> 17:02.430]  Nor would he be allowed to cite the historic legal and technological reforms that have occurred as a result.
[17:02.830 --> 17:06.690]  The government would not have to establish that the disclosures caused any harm.
[17:07.010 --> 17:12.270]  They would need to show only that Snowden gave the documents to people who weren't authorized to see them.
[17:12.370 --> 17:13.570]  That is, the journalist.
[17:13.570 --> 17:20.850]  The law does not distinguish between selling secrets to a foreign enemy for profit and giving information to journalists in the public interest.
[17:21.070 --> 17:24.470]  His conviction and severe punishment would be a foregone conclusion.
[17:24.470 --> 17:27.670]  So that is why he can't get a fair trial in this country.
[17:27.670 --> 17:29.870]  It's pretty much written down on a piece of paper.
[17:29.870 --> 17:31.590]  He will not get a fair trial.
[17:31.790 --> 17:32.750]  That is our system.
[17:33.410 --> 17:34.230]  Go ahead, Barney.
[17:35.330 --> 17:46.590]  I just want to also point out that a former Attorney General, Eric Holder, appointed by President Obama, has stated recently that he believes Edward Snowden performed public service.
[17:46.990 --> 17:59.330]  And it has not gotten any higher in our government or former government figures to have said it that way than the former Attorney General appointed by our own president.
[17:59.330 --> 18:09.690]  And that's the point I'm making, is that you can convince people it takes time, it takes effort, but the higher up the chain you go, and Eric Holder is pretty high up that chain, it shows that progress is being made.
[18:09.850 --> 18:11.550]  So yeah, this is a winnable battle.
[18:11.550 --> 18:33.230]  And it's important that it's showing the repercussions in the current situation, and I think that's what this film is going to shed a lot of light on in contrast to the leaks themselves that were showing what the government was actually doing with all of the technology and information flowing through the networks that they were compromising and still are probably.
[18:33.230 --> 18:57.450]  But it's important to make that distinction now in light of what these people's lives, what is actually, what they're facing reality-wise, and also sort of the impact that this administration and some of the institutional choices that are there has on us and people who are sort of at the forefront of this.
[18:57.450 --> 18:58.450]  Yeah, absolutely.
[18:58.770 --> 19:09.590]  Because people need to know, people need to share, people need to tell other people that, you know, there's suffering going on in the camp of journalists and of people who are really fighting for this.
[19:10.010 --> 19:10.410]  Yeah.
[19:10.970 --> 19:20.290]  The website is www.pardonsnowden.org, and it's pretty easy to navigate, and you can sign right there.
[19:20.510 --> 19:24.770]  I think there should be millions of people signing this thing, and I believe people from all over the world can sign.
[19:24.870 --> 19:26.810]  I don't think it's just, it's limited.
[19:26.810 --> 19:27.690]  Does anybody know otherwise?
[19:28.590 --> 19:28.990]  No?
[19:29.190 --> 19:29.930]  No, I don't know.
[19:30.810 --> 19:32.490]  Okay, well, regardless, it can't hurt.
[19:32.590 --> 19:33.370]  I don't see how it could.
[19:34.270 --> 19:36.070]  And you'll learn all kinds of things.
[19:36.070 --> 19:44.510]  If you want to know the things that Edward Snowden has accomplished by leaking this information, it's all there.
[19:44.550 --> 19:49.090]  It's all laid out, and you can see for yourself the good it's done.
[19:49.430 --> 19:53.250]  So www.pardonsnowden.org.
[19:53.250 --> 19:54.150]  And see the film, too.
[19:54.210 --> 19:55.910]  I think the film comes out, what, on Friday?
[19:56.390 --> 19:56.970]  I think so, yeah.
[19:56.970 --> 19:57.110]  Thursday?
[19:57.170 --> 19:57.890]  What day do films come out?
[19:58.050 --> 20:03.310]  It's being plugged hard, so yeah, it's going to be like this weekend or next, sometime very, very soon.
[20:03.470 --> 20:03.710]  Yeah.
[20:04.310 --> 20:08.010]  Well, I intend to see it and hopefully get a conversation going.
[20:08.250 --> 20:09.290]  It's well worth it.
[20:09.290 --> 20:16.990]  And also, you know, you've got to think, and this also is an argument against pardoning Snowden, his actions inspire others.
[20:17.550 --> 20:18.890]  I think that's a good thing.
[20:18.950 --> 20:19.910]  I think that's a great thing.
[20:20.230 --> 20:22.330]  We need information to be out there.
[20:22.410 --> 20:29.010]  We need for these secrets not to be kept inside government circles, inside corporate circles.
[20:29.010 --> 20:40.490]  Imagine all the things we would not know today about surveillance, about what the NSA is up to, about how secure our communications actually are, if he did not have the guts to say, hey, people, look at this.
[20:40.650 --> 20:41.910]  You need to know about this.
[20:42.150 --> 20:43.770]  There are so many other things like that.
[20:43.950 --> 20:50.070]  One thing that was revealed, long-secret Stingray manuals.
[20:50.410 --> 20:53.330]  Yeah, Bernie, I know you take a keen interest in this.
[20:53.510 --> 20:56.850]  You hear the Stingray manuals are out now?
[20:56.850 --> 20:58.810]  I thank Rob for pointing this out to us.
[20:58.950 --> 21:08.470]  There's, you know, finally, these Stingray devices, they're basically fake cell phone towers that Harris Corporation sells for six figures to law enforcement agencies.
[21:08.770 --> 21:23.970]  A lot of not just federal, but state and local law enforcement agencies have these things and are using them frequently without any warrants at all to listen to our cellular phone calls and track us and see where we go and who we're talking with in real time.
[21:24.510 --> 21:27.130]  And it's good that these manuals have finally been leaked.
[21:27.230 --> 21:29.570]  They were highly controlled documents by Harris.
[21:29.850 --> 21:31.970]  They, like, really tightly controlled.
[21:32.090 --> 21:33.490]  But they're finally seen the light of day.
[21:33.590 --> 21:35.130]  And you can see how these things work.
[21:35.230 --> 21:39.350]  And then once you understand how this equipment works, you can work on countermeasures.
[21:39.350 --> 21:43.470]  And that's what I think the hacker community will start doing after analyzing these manuals.
[21:43.470 --> 21:52.890]  But all it takes, or all it would have taken this whole time, is for one of those law enforcement agencies, for one employee in one of those agencies to leak this information.
[21:52.910 --> 21:55.590]  That's what it would have taken for us to have had this years ago, correct?
[21:56.910 --> 21:57.490]  Oh, yeah.
[21:58.530 --> 22:03.450]  These devices have been around for, actually, in various incarnations going back to the 80s.
[22:03.550 --> 22:07.810]  Harris' first product along these lines was called Triggerfish for the analog cell phone.
[22:07.810 --> 22:10.170]  So this technology has been around for a long time.
[22:10.410 --> 22:14.490]  And a manual, for them, has never been leaked to the public before.
[22:14.670 --> 22:16.310]  And now we're finally seeing it.
[22:16.310 --> 22:19.230]  If you have access to these things, you have power.
[22:19.230 --> 22:21.850]  You have the ability to educate a lot of people.
[22:21.850 --> 22:25.370]  And whoever got this out is a hero, as far as I'm concerned.
[22:25.370 --> 22:29.170]  And that's something that we need to celebrate and hopefully inspire more people.
[22:29.610 --> 22:31.990]  I mean, do you really consider this?
[22:32.010 --> 22:34.610]  I'm speaking to people out there in general.
[22:34.610 --> 22:42.390]  Do you consider this to be an illegal act to share information on how fake cell towers are put up to spy on us?
[22:42.490 --> 22:50.690]  Is that a crime just because the company that sells them for six figures says they don't want anybody to know about it and because the cops want to keep that to themselves?
[22:50.890 --> 22:52.210]  How can that be a crime?
[22:52.310 --> 22:54.790]  I mean, yeah, you can probably prosecute somebody for it.
[22:54.870 --> 22:57.370]  But morally, morally, is that a crime?
[22:57.850 --> 22:58.610]  I'd like to know.
[22:58.750 --> 23:00.050]  I'd like to know if anybody feels that way.
[23:01.130 --> 23:07.410]  I imagine they feel that way because they feel it is a crime because it prevents you from getting the bad guys.
[23:07.590 --> 23:09.070]  And that's the important thing, of course.
[23:09.230 --> 23:09.950]  I mean, you know that.
[23:10.170 --> 23:11.830]  I mean, how could you be so...
[23:11.830 --> 23:12.910]  Well, yes, Kyle.
[23:13.090 --> 23:14.070]  Okay, devil's advocate.
[23:14.430 --> 23:14.790]  You're...
[23:15.250 --> 23:15.950]  Oh, wait a minute.
[23:16.030 --> 23:16.830]  You actually believe this.
[23:17.170 --> 23:17.530]  Wow.
[23:17.670 --> 23:18.510]  You're a good devil's advocate.
[23:18.710 --> 23:19.150]  Okay, fine.
[23:19.310 --> 23:19.850]  You know what?
[23:20.510 --> 23:22.410]  How do you stop the bad guys if you don't have this?
[23:22.570 --> 23:25.010]  You can always go on that bad guy argument.
[23:25.130 --> 23:28.490]  You can always say, if we don't do this, we're not going to stop the bad guys.
[23:30.050 --> 23:33.050]  Wait, you know, that might work for a little while, but it doesn't work forever.
[23:33.270 --> 23:34.090]  It doesn't work forever.
[23:34.130 --> 23:36.230]  And you can extend it forever as well.
[23:36.330 --> 23:38.170]  You can tell people we have to get inside your head.
[23:38.310 --> 23:39.590]  We have to start the PsyCore.
[23:39.790 --> 23:44.190]  And like, learn what people are thinking because if we don't do that, we're not going to catch the bad guys.
[23:44.350 --> 23:45.490]  You see how this progresses?
[23:45.830 --> 23:48.530]  We lose more and more privacy every single year.
[23:48.570 --> 23:50.530]  And it's always to catch the bad guys.
[23:50.970 --> 23:51.750]  Well, guess what?
[23:51.810 --> 23:53.570]  There's always going to be bad guys out there.
[23:53.570 --> 23:56.670]  And you're always going to be able to catch them because bad guys do bad things.
[23:56.810 --> 23:58.050]  And bad guys conspire.
[23:58.290 --> 24:00.730]  And there are good guys out there watching them.
[24:00.850 --> 24:08.970]  But you don't need to watch everybody's every move, thought, saying, phone call, letter, correspondence of any sort.
[24:10.670 --> 24:12.390]  That's the easy way out.
[24:12.470 --> 24:13.910]  That's the way of just giving up everything.
[24:14.070 --> 24:16.190]  And once you give it up, you're never going to get it back.
[24:16.190 --> 24:24.010]  Well, as most hackers will tell you, in general, no matter what it's referring to, reading the fine manual is usually worth it.
[24:24.090 --> 24:25.210]  It's usually worth learning about it.
[24:25.310 --> 24:37.490]  And whether you're for or against this thing, you know, putting the politics completely aside for a moment, whether you're for or against it, it's still very illuminating to see how it works, to see what, you know, exactly what buttons these agencies have access to and how they can do it.
[24:37.570 --> 24:40.590]  Because, you know, you might think this is something totally justified.
[24:40.590 --> 24:42.010]  You might think it's the worst thing in the world.
[24:42.190 --> 24:44.650]  But either way, it's worth knowing.
[24:44.650 --> 24:46.030]  It's worth seeing.
[24:46.190 --> 24:50.510]  It's worth learning about the world around you and how it's being used for or against you.
[24:50.730 --> 24:54.910]  How does us knowing how it works prevent them from using it in the future?
[24:55.130 --> 24:56.230]  I mean, they could still use them.
[24:56.350 --> 24:57.270]  We just know how it works.
[24:57.610 --> 24:58.590]  I mean, they would prefer...
[24:59.550 --> 25:00.550]  I'll get to you in a second, Bernie.
[25:00.890 --> 25:03.270]  But they would prefer that we don't even know it exists.
[25:03.450 --> 25:12.390]  I'm sure if they could have controlled that, they would say, if you say, Stingray, if you say such a thing exists, you're stopping the bad guys.
[25:12.490 --> 25:13.190]  Isn't that right, Kyle?
[25:14.110 --> 25:14.470]  Yeah.
[25:14.470 --> 25:26.270]  If you're able to reveal the techniques of investigation that you're relying on to keep the community safe, then you end up shooting yourself in the foot.
[25:26.390 --> 25:30.910]  And that's just really bad because the good guys end up getting hurt and they become victims.
[25:31.170 --> 25:33.770]  Those guys are people who sacrifice so much for us.
[25:33.770 --> 25:38.310]  You know, and those blue lives, every day, they sacrifice for us.
[25:38.310 --> 25:39.250]  Okay, stop with the blue lives.
[25:39.390 --> 25:40.330]  I'm sick of the blue lives.
[25:40.370 --> 25:42.910]  The only blue lives that matter are blue man group, okay?
[25:42.910 --> 25:44.330]  Because blue is not a race.
[25:44.330 --> 25:45.950]  I am sick of people saying this.
[25:46.110 --> 25:49.830]  You know, if you're saying blue lives matter, odds are you're probably white.
[25:49.850 --> 25:51.490]  And in that case, your life definitely matters.
[25:51.510 --> 25:52.130]  We've proven that.
[25:52.390 --> 25:53.570]  It's in the Constitution and everything.
[25:53.830 --> 25:55.230]  So enough of that.
[25:55.230 --> 25:56.470]  I don't want to hear that phrase again.
[25:56.470 --> 26:04.410]  And I'd like to go back to this theory, this presumption that we're listening because we're not listening.
[26:04.410 --> 26:05.130]  It's algorithms.
[26:05.370 --> 26:06.450]  It's computers listening.
[26:06.450 --> 26:10.410]  It sends us an email when it's interesting and then we pursue it, okay?
[26:10.590 --> 26:12.150]  It's really, it's quite simple.
[26:12.350 --> 26:13.230]  It's painless.
[26:13.390 --> 26:14.750]  It's really, it's not harmful.
[26:15.150 --> 26:19.950]  Conservative Kyle, I think, could really be a character here that we can go to week after week.
[26:20.330 --> 26:22.190]  Okay, well, you've made your point.
[26:22.330 --> 26:24.430]  Bernie, please explain what you were going to explain.
[26:24.690 --> 26:26.030]  Let the computers do their job.
[26:26.470 --> 26:30.630]  Let's sort of enhance what Kyle said in a way.
[26:32.870 --> 26:49.610]  A frequent justification for using these so-called MC catchers or stingrays or devices that act as a man in the middle agents between your cell phone and the cellular network so you can be eavesdropped on and tracked is that we need them to catch terrorists.
[26:49.770 --> 26:51.270]  We need this technology to catch terrorists.
[26:51.530 --> 26:56.390]  And that's an argument that's been used by the FBI and other law enforcement agencies for a long time.
[26:56.470 --> 27:05.750]  Yet there hasn't been a single case where it's come out that this technology was actually used to catch a terrorist.
[27:05.990 --> 27:08.090]  Because, Bernie, I can answer, let me step in for Kyle here.
[27:08.210 --> 27:14.870]  Because they're so scared, they know that these guys are on top of them, that they're not committing crimes anymore.
[27:15.350 --> 27:15.910]  That's it.
[27:15.910 --> 27:24.450]  That's another thing I've heard in arguments that these documents being leaked is going to prevent terrorists from being caught because now they're going to know how to work around this.
[27:24.930 --> 27:38.050]  Well, frankly, someone else said, I think from the ACLU, said, well, if all it takes is for terrorists to realize they need to turn off their phones to prevent themselves from being eavesdropped on those phones and tracked with those phones, that's pretty much well-known already.
[27:38.050 --> 27:45.690]  So it's not helping anybody to say this should be the secret information.
[27:45.810 --> 27:54.110]  By the way, the Harris Corporation makes buyers of this equipment sign an agreement that they will not testify in court as to how this technology works.
[27:54.110 --> 28:12.130]  And the FBI has actually called for dismissal of serious criminal cases of people who were harmed instead of having to announce in court that this technology was used and how it worked to catch this bad guy.
[28:12.310 --> 28:13.510]  So that says a lot.
[28:13.690 --> 28:23.750]  And that raises a really interesting point because now that it's basically public info as to how these work, will that information be able to be used in any such cases?
[28:23.750 --> 28:34.730]  I mean, I remember when collateral murder came out and government employees were not allowed to look at it or acknowledge that it existed when the rest of the world were completely aware of it.
[28:34.830 --> 28:37.570]  And so what does this mean now for that sort of thing?
[28:37.650 --> 28:42.170]  If you're a legal expert, we'd love to hear some more informed data about this.
[28:42.170 --> 28:50.830]  I'd like to know also, Bernie, you mentioned that only law enforcement agencies are allowed to have these or permitted by...
[28:50.830 --> 28:51.670]  I mean, who makes the rule?
[28:51.670 --> 28:54.630]  Is it Harris that makes the rule or is it a law someplace?
[28:55.730 --> 28:57.110]  The Department of Justice makes the rules.
[28:57.270 --> 28:57.530]  Okay.
[28:57.630 --> 28:59.590]  It's considered a Title III device.
[28:59.830 --> 29:00.010]  Okay.
[29:00.090 --> 29:03.990]  Then my question is, what defines a law enforcement agency?
[29:04.310 --> 29:10.710]  I mean, you have all different kinds of cops of all different geographical definitions.
[29:12.330 --> 29:15.170]  Is a security company, is that considered law enforcement?
[29:15.770 --> 29:16.690]  No, no, it's not.
[29:16.690 --> 29:22.190]  And there's very clearly defined, it's pretty clearly defined language in what's called Title III.
[29:22.410 --> 29:23.950]  You have to have arresting power, right?
[29:24.130 --> 29:33.010]  And that means that only a law enforcement agency that has certain certifications and actually, you know, a deputized law enforcement agency.
[29:33.170 --> 29:33.430]  Right.
[29:33.570 --> 29:35.350]  And it's not a private organization.
[29:35.350 --> 29:38.310]  Okay, so who deputizes law enforcement agencies?
[29:38.470 --> 29:41.610]  How do you get to be a law enforcement agency is what I'm getting at?
[29:42.170 --> 29:44.130]  It's kind of like being blessed by the Pope.
[29:44.310 --> 29:48.110]  It gets handed down from the Department of Justice through federal to state to local.
[29:48.110 --> 29:51.090]  And then when they bring a new person on, they deputize you.
[29:51.330 --> 30:00.790]  Like, I remember a few years ago, Amtrak police were seeking to be deputized and accredited as a law enforcement agency.
[30:00.790 --> 30:06.930]  I would think back in the 80s or 90s when they were interfering with us at the 2600 meeting in Philadelphia.
[30:08.050 --> 30:13.430]  And so it's sort of like a blessing handed down from on high, this deputization.
[30:13.430 --> 30:20.570]  So it sounds like if you, say, were buying a small town on Craigslist or something, and, you know, that happens.
[30:20.570 --> 30:24.510]  A lot of these, like, rural communities, you know, there are tiny five people that live there.
[30:24.750 --> 30:32.490]  All of a sudden, you buy the town, pennies on the dollar, make yourself the sheriff, and all of a sudden, you're a law enforcement agency, right?
[30:32.510 --> 30:33.350]  I mean, it's simple as that.
[30:33.490 --> 30:34.430]  Probably, like, one form.
[30:34.510 --> 30:35.170]  You fax it?
[30:35.170 --> 30:36.570]  You have to go through your local government.
[30:36.710 --> 30:41.970]  You still have to go through, like, the state to be accredited as an actual government entity.
[30:44.590 --> 30:47.210]  How about Native Americans on reservations?
[30:47.590 --> 30:49.410]  I know that they have their own law enforcement.
[30:49.630 --> 30:49.810]  They do.
[30:49.950 --> 30:52.510]  Would they be able to buy one of these devices?
[30:53.450 --> 30:54.410]  That's a good question.
[30:54.530 --> 30:54.770]  Thank you.
[30:54.870 --> 30:55.650]  That's a really good question.
[30:55.710 --> 30:57.450]  They've got to get an important one, though, because they cost...
[30:57.450 --> 30:59.210]  Oh, I think we could raise the money.
[30:59.210 --> 31:02.250]  I really do think we can do that if they share the technology.
[31:02.630 --> 31:09.090]  Yeah, I think that would be a very small barrier if the right interests were involved.
[31:09.090 --> 31:21.470]  But I absolutely, I would say yes, because they have a lot of sovereign rights, and their police are themselves sort of in their own realm.
[31:21.650 --> 31:25.490]  Like, they have their own jurisdiction apart from even federal officers.
[31:25.770 --> 31:25.930]  Right.
[31:26.210 --> 31:29.210]  What I'm saying is that there are barriers, but we can always get past these barriers.
[31:29.310 --> 31:31.670]  We have to think like hackers and figure out a way around it.
[31:31.730 --> 31:33.450]  And we're only thinking inside this country.
[31:33.570 --> 31:36.030]  There are other countries, too, and they use stingrays as well.
[31:36.030 --> 31:42.530]  Well, and maybe our friends in Russia who are busy perusing the DNC's emails, maybe they can help us with this as well.
[31:43.590 --> 31:46.170]  Just drop it from a plane, send us the coordinates.
[31:46.530 --> 31:46.790]  Yeah, leaflets.
[31:47.110 --> 31:47.930]  That'd be nice.
[31:48.370 --> 31:55.390]  Also, kind of related to this in a different way, there's that Google incubated program we talked about last week.
[31:55.390 --> 32:00.170]  It's targeting potential ISIS members with de-radicalizing content.
[32:00.170 --> 32:10.130]  According to an article that appeared in The Intercept, this will soon be used to target violent right-wing extremists in North America.
[32:10.330 --> 32:16.050]  And that was said by a designer of the program at an event at the Brookings Institution last Wednesday.
[32:16.250 --> 32:31.370]  Now, using research and targeted advertising, the initiative by London-based startup Moonshot CVE and Google's Jigsaw Technology Incubator targets potentially violent jihadis and directs them to a YouTube channel with videos that refute ISIS propaganda.
[32:31.610 --> 32:32.050]  Isn't that nice?
[32:32.210 --> 32:39.310]  So not only do you get your videos taken down, but you get sent to a moralistic YouTube page.
[32:39.450 --> 32:52.870]  Now, in a pilot program that's countering ISIS, the so-called redirect method collected the metadata of 320,000 individuals over the course of eight weeks using 1,700 keywords and served them advertisements that led them to the videos.
[32:53.170 --> 32:56.350]  Collectively, the targets watched more than half a million minutes of videos.
[32:56.350 --> 32:59.810]  So at least the time of ISIS was wasted quite a bit.
[32:59.990 --> 33:04.970]  The event at Brookings was primarily about the existing program aimed at undermining ISIS recruiting.
[33:06.570 --> 33:17.410]  But apparently, the efforts during phase two, when we're going to focus on the violent far right in America, will be very much focused on the small element of those that are violent.
[33:17.530 --> 33:24.250]  The interesting thing about how they behave is they're a little bit more brazen online these days than ISIS fanboys.
[33:24.530 --> 33:28.330]  That's a quote from these guys developing this.
[33:28.850 --> 33:37.310]  In the UK, if someone in their Facebook profile picture has a swastika and is pointing a gun at the camera, that person is committing a crime.
[33:37.450 --> 33:39.450]  In the US, there is absolutely nothing wrong with that.
[33:39.550 --> 33:47.170]  So we found that when we're looking for individuals that are genuinely at risk of carrying out violence, that they're relatively open online.
[33:47.650 --> 33:49.150]  So, okay, this is interesting.
[33:49.330 --> 34:05.310]  So a private company is going to be looking for people doing things that are considered objectionable, even though they're not considered illegal, and blocking their messages, blocking whatever attempts they make to contact other people.
[34:05.830 --> 34:07.910]  And we're seeing this in the course of one week.
[34:08.030 --> 34:09.150]  We were talking about ISIS last week.
[34:09.210 --> 34:12.410]  Now it's the violent right wing, whatever that is in this country.
[34:12.690 --> 34:14.370]  Do you think it's going to end there?
[34:14.670 --> 34:15.050]  Yes.
[34:15.270 --> 34:16.070]  You think so, Jim?
[34:16.230 --> 34:16.730]  I don't think so.
[34:16.750 --> 34:17.770]  I think it's going to keep going.
[34:18.090 --> 34:18.330]  Yeah.
[34:18.490 --> 34:26.350]  I think they're going to keep expanding this and clamping down on anyone who's considered to be objectionable.
[34:26.430 --> 34:26.550]  Rob?
[34:26.690 --> 34:29.890]  Also, and the huge concern is that this is a private company making these decisions.
[34:30.270 --> 34:37.050]  You know, I don't know how much better I'd feel about it if it were just the federal government making these decisions or what.
[34:37.150 --> 34:40.550]  But the fact that this is a private company who's accountable to who?
[34:40.670 --> 34:48.850]  Their shareholders, if they have them, or, you know, people like that, rather than people who are actually, I don't know, accountable in a meaningful way, in a socially meaningful way.
[34:49.810 --> 34:50.830]  Remember all those names.
[34:50.970 --> 34:52.390]  They're like CVE.
[34:52.610 --> 34:58.430]  That's so like venture capital, like San Mateo money, like crazy.
[34:58.610 --> 35:00.210]  I mean, you just jigsaw.
[35:00.390 --> 35:02.750]  What the heck kind of name is that?
[35:02.890 --> 35:03.570]  I mean, it's just...
[35:03.570 --> 35:03.830]  Okay.
[35:03.850 --> 35:05.550]  I've worked in the startup scene.
[35:05.650 --> 35:10.010]  This is starting to really scare me if those are the people going to be who have the keys to this.
[35:10.170 --> 35:11.630]  Well, yeah, it's...
[35:11.630 --> 35:12.030]  Emmanuel?
[35:12.210 --> 35:12.790]  Go ahead, Bernie.
[35:13.650 --> 35:25.250]  I just want to point out that the FBI has labeled environmentalists and animal rights activists as American extremists.
[35:25.750 --> 35:27.830]  And so they could be next.
[35:27.990 --> 35:29.930]  That is an example of this slippery slope.
[35:30.710 --> 35:30.910]  Right.
[35:31.050 --> 35:34.450]  And you know, speaking for myself, I kind of want to trigger this thing.
[35:34.450 --> 35:35.630]  I want to see what makes it work.
[35:35.830 --> 35:47.930]  And, you know, see what words, what catchphrases, what images are going to make this thing label me as somebody to be aware of and direct me to some G-rated YouTube video.
[35:48.950 --> 35:56.930]  And yeah, as you said, it's going to be expanded not only by private companies, but by governments, by other countries.
[35:57.470 --> 36:01.230]  And do you really think it's going to stop the actual violence?
[36:01.370 --> 36:01.750]  It's not.
[36:01.970 --> 36:04.290]  They're simply going to reroute someplace else.
[36:04.530 --> 36:08.690]  And maybe it won't be as easy to spot and be warned about.
[36:09.230 --> 36:13.450]  But the real issue, the real problem is why are people doing this?
[36:13.530 --> 36:14.570]  Why are people like this?
[36:14.670 --> 36:15.650]  That's what you have to attack.
[36:15.810 --> 36:19.370]  And simply blocking the videos, that's not going to do it.
[36:19.570 --> 36:20.010]  Yeah.
[36:20.150 --> 36:27.930]  I mean, if all that's standing in between like a criminal doing something terrible and, you know, not doing something terrible is if they've watched the right YouTube video, I think we're all doomed anyway.
[36:28.610 --> 36:28.930]  Yeah.
[36:29.530 --> 36:31.990]  It's a very simplistic way to deal with a problem.
[36:32.090 --> 36:33.890]  But interesting, interesting tactics.
[36:34.050 --> 36:34.810]  We'll see how that goes.
[36:36.110 --> 36:41.430]  We're going to take phone calls in just a little bit, but I want to read some listener mail because we've got quite a bit of it this past week.
[36:41.630 --> 36:42.370]  Oh, man.
[36:42.750 --> 36:43.010]  What?
[36:43.270 --> 36:44.010]  No, I know.
[36:44.130 --> 36:44.790]  I already know.
[36:44.950 --> 36:49.550]  I mean, I read, you know, there are a couple of things I'm sure I'll have something to say.
[36:49.770 --> 36:50.050]  Okay.
[36:50.270 --> 36:52.450]  It's just, there's, you know, I'm already getting defensive.
[36:52.570 --> 36:53.190]  You haven't even read it.
[36:53.250 --> 36:54.910]  Is this conservative Kyle speaking or regular Kyle?
[36:54.910 --> 36:55.770]  No, this is regular Kyle.
[36:56.370 --> 36:57.970]  You better know it's regular Kyle.
[36:58.050 --> 36:58.450]  Well, okay.
[36:58.550 --> 36:59.390]  Let's start with this one.
[36:59.530 --> 37:02.930]  I got a random phone call from Glenhead, New York to my home's landline.
[37:03.530 --> 37:08.030]  Usually this is something that would get ignored, but since I've been inspired by your antics, I decided on another course.
[37:08.030 --> 37:11.130]  I answered and was greeted by what sounded like a robocall.
[37:11.270 --> 37:12.170]  In other words, a recording.
[37:12.310 --> 37:25.390]  The recording in question was informing me that my home was pre-selected to be an advertising home, whatever that is, and to receive a free wireless home security system if I put a sign on my lawn.
[37:25.670 --> 37:32.890]  Now, Jane, the supposed human, proceeded to ask me if I own my own home, to which I responded, you sound like a robot, Jane.
[37:33.050 --> 37:33.710]  Are you a robot?
[37:33.870 --> 37:41.030]  And the virtually instantaneous response, oh, of course I sound like a recording, but that's because I'm using a soundboard to speak with you due to my inability to clearly communicate.
[37:42.030 --> 37:44.890]  So therein comes the question, what is a soundboard?
[37:45.130 --> 37:50.470]  Is this a person who is disabled who works at a call center communicating to me via some piece of hardware, which I have no knowledge of?
[37:50.610 --> 37:58.390]  Or is this a cleverly crafted series of recordings where the perpetrator has attempted to anticipate every response I could muster?
[37:59.010 --> 38:03.030]  So I then asked, what's a home security system?
[38:03.210 --> 38:04.910]  And the phone hung up immediately.
[38:05.170 --> 38:06.370]  But thanks for that letter.
[38:06.670 --> 38:08.250]  Bernie, do you know what a soundboard is?
[38:09.010 --> 38:11.630]  It's kind of like what Stephen Hawking uses to speak.
[38:11.810 --> 38:14.930]  He presses buttons and then it says words or phrases.
[38:15.250 --> 38:17.710]  Okay, but you would know if Stephen Hawking was calling you.
[38:18.490 --> 38:19.750]  Maybe it was Stephen Hawking.
[38:19.830 --> 38:20.670]  No, it was a female voice.
[38:20.670 --> 38:22.370]  It could have been Stephen Hawking.
[38:22.510 --> 38:23.830]  He's a female voice on a soundboard.
[38:24.050 --> 38:25.810]  I kind of doubt he's doing telemarketing, though.
[38:27.150 --> 38:33.570]  A lot of... there's a requirement... the Federal Trade Commission has very strong rules about robocalling.
[38:34.050 --> 38:44.690]  And some companies are getting around that by having live people who may not even be able to speak clear English using soundboards, or at least they say they're doing that.
[38:44.870 --> 38:54.090]  You can't even really tell a difference, though, between somebody using a soundboard and just to pronounce canned words or phrases, and a robot.
[38:54.190 --> 38:54.830]  And an IVR.
[38:54.830 --> 38:55.590]  And algorithms.
[38:55.910 --> 38:56.870]  Yeah, yeah, yeah, exactly.
[38:57.050 --> 39:06.810]  That's where sort of that gray area is, like, is this really a soundboard or is this just a well-programmed IVR system that's recognizing my speech and pulling up the stuff on its own?
[39:06.810 --> 39:08.150]  What's an IVR system?
[39:09.570 --> 39:11.150]  I'm sorry, I didn't mean to put that in the spot.
[39:11.370 --> 39:12.730]  Interactive voice response.
[39:12.810 --> 39:13.530]  Interactive voice response.
[39:13.590 --> 39:13.870]  Got it.
[39:13.990 --> 39:15.130]  Interactive voice response.
[39:15.290 --> 39:23.230]  But the one comment I wanted to make is that it's probably not a large, like, board or a piece of hardware.
[39:23.230 --> 39:44.070]  It's probably an application in the browser with a bunch of buttons that the person can click on with a local script or a language that they do understand, so that if they're getting a response and they know what to say in their native language, they'll hit that button and it will respond in the translated term.
[39:44.210 --> 39:46.490]  But it's probably in a computer system on a screen.
[39:46.710 --> 39:47.670]  That's worth clarifying.
[39:47.730 --> 39:53.770]  It's not like Stephen Hawking, because he can type whatever he wants into his system and it'll say it, whereas a soundboard is just a series of very limited buttons.
[39:54.030 --> 40:01.450]  And, like, there was this fad, maybe back around the turn of the century, where people had these set up for prank calling, and each button would be like a different Arnold Schwarzenegger quote.
[40:01.690 --> 40:08.770]  And so you would call someone, put the mic up to the speaker and make it sound like Arnold Schwarzenegger was calling, you know, via just selected clips from the film.
[40:08.790 --> 40:10.450]  I'm sorry, when you say turn of the century, I still think 1900.
[40:10.650 --> 40:13.250]  I was trying to picture, how would they even know about Arnold Schwarzenegger then?
[40:13.450 --> 40:15.350]  I just want to point out Stephen Hawking twitches.
[40:15.450 --> 40:15.910]  He doesn't type.
[40:16.330 --> 40:16.430]  Right.
[40:16.630 --> 40:17.710]  Twitches his eye on that.
[40:18.210 --> 40:28.610]  You know, just on the subject of Stephen Hawking, just for a second, when they discovered that other planet, only 10 light years away, which hopefully we'll establish communications with fairly soon.
[40:29.090 --> 40:30.550]  Stephen Hawking was commenting on that.
[40:30.690 --> 40:37.190]  And you know, on the internet, how everybody has an opinion and how comment boards are the worst places in the world.
[40:37.330 --> 40:39.390]  And it's all these racist, hateful people out there.
[40:39.750 --> 40:46.770]  I didn't realize this, but Stephen Hawking even has haters that are attached to him that criticize everything he does.
[40:46.870 --> 40:49.190]  I thought he was the one person that wouldn't have that.
[40:49.310 --> 40:53.750]  But wow, I was blown away by the number of people that really resent everything he says.
[40:54.090 --> 40:56.930]  And, uh, nobody, nobody is immune.
[40:57.170 --> 40:59.230]  So, uh, sympathies to, uh, to him for that.
[40:59.730 --> 41:00.550]  Um, okay.
[41:00.670 --> 41:03.410]  So, um, the day will come and they will come fairly soon.
[41:03.530 --> 41:10.490]  I think within five, maybe 10 years where you won't be able to tell the difference between, um, a, uh, a robot and a human.
[41:10.630 --> 41:12.010]  Good of that listener to ask.
[41:12.190 --> 41:12.370]  Yeah.
[41:12.630 --> 41:12.790]  Yeah.
[41:13.250 --> 41:14.430]  Always ask your robots.
[41:14.550 --> 41:15.450]  Although, you know what?
[41:15.450 --> 41:17.630]  I'm not sure this actually came from a human.
[41:17.750 --> 41:20.710]  I think this might be a piece of, uh, computer generated spam.
[41:20.990 --> 41:25.610]  No, the reason is I looked it up and I saw the exact same phrasing, uh, with just a little bit of a difference.
[41:26.250 --> 41:27.230]  We fell for it, guys.
[41:27.330 --> 41:28.270]  We all fell for it.
[41:28.610 --> 41:29.930]  So lesson learned.
[41:30.170 --> 41:31.310]  Nice try out there.
[41:31.570 --> 41:32.310]  Singularities arrived.
[41:32.470 --> 41:32.710]  Uh-huh.
[41:33.030 --> 41:33.310]  Okay.
[41:33.470 --> 41:39.770]  Uh, a couple of people wrote in about, uh, our, our, uh, statement on SSL, which I'm glad they did because, uh, it's important to clarify this.
[41:39.930 --> 41:42.370]  Uh, SSL or more accurately TLS.
[41:43.050 --> 41:49.930]  That's the phrase I was looking for last week is the most common method to encrypt transfers between email servers or email servers and clients.
[41:50.110 --> 41:56.010]  If I'm communicating from a public hotspot, I would never read my email if I can't get an SSL connection to the email server.
[41:56.290 --> 41:58.490]  I routinely administer email servers professionally.
[41:58.670 --> 42:00.730]  All my servers run on Linux and BSD.
[42:01.350 --> 42:05.330]  Uh, Microsoft Exchange security is so laughably bad that I won't have anything to do with it.
[42:05.810 --> 42:09.230]  Uh, what Hillary Clinton did with email should have gotten her put in jail.
[42:09.530 --> 42:19.850]  Um, if, uh, if you have a security clearance and access to classified information, you have a legal obligation to keep any information, you know, should be classified away from public access.
[42:20.010 --> 42:22.230]  Does not matter if it is already marked as classified.
[42:22.710 --> 42:29.330]  Um, but it's interesting point, interesting question, but you know, are people calling for Colin Powell to be put in prison because he did the exact same thing.
[42:29.330 --> 42:30.190]  He's admitting to it.
[42:30.270 --> 42:33.590]  Well, he, his, his hacked emails are admitting to it.
[42:33.690 --> 42:38.570]  He didn't actually say it himself, but it's now obvious that he was doing the same basic thing.
[42:39.230 --> 42:52.770]  Um, and again, to speak to the subject of SSL, the point I was trying to make last week, um, I think it's possible that people might have gone to the website of Hillary Clinton's email and look for an SSL certificate for that.
[42:52.910 --> 42:57.610]  It's different than the, uh, the SSL or TLS that's used with email transfers.
[42:57.630 --> 43:07.510]  And if you didn't see it there, uh, and, and the site was rated as, as, uh, not supporting HTTPS, uh, you could jump to the conclusion that, oh, the whole thing is insecure.
[43:07.650 --> 43:08.250]  Not necessarily.
[43:08.250 --> 43:09.270]  So I'm not saying it isn't.
[43:09.370 --> 43:12.810]  So could be so maybe she didn't have our certificate for the actual email.
[43:12.970 --> 43:19.130]  Maybe it was horribly insecure, but the point I'm trying to make is that she's not the only one that's done things that, that are horribly insecure.
[43:19.350 --> 43:24.170]  If in fact she did, and I'm not really sure the state department is all that secure as well.
[43:24.670 --> 43:26.710]  So, um, jail, I don't know.
[43:26.930 --> 43:29.370]  I, you know, it seems a bit, a bit heavy handed.
[43:29.930 --> 43:36.190]  Um, I think, you know, you can accuse her of, of, uh, of not knowing everything there is to know about technology.
[43:36.510 --> 43:48.950]  Um, but, uh, this scandal, you know, I think if, um, I think there have been enough opportunities to, uh, to actually file charges by people that have the freedom to do that, have the ability to do that and to say they're all part of the conspiracy.
[43:49.290 --> 43:49.890]  I don't know.
[43:49.950 --> 43:51.050]  That's where you start to lose me.
[43:51.410 --> 43:51.730]  Yeah.
[43:51.850 --> 43:57.150]  And I, I think also she's the one, she was leading the entity that was classifying that material.
[43:57.830 --> 44:02.030]  That's another argument that was, was, uh, so she could be the one saying this is classified.
[44:02.210 --> 44:02.510]  Exactly.
[44:02.610 --> 44:05.290]  I mean, it was her, uh, agency at the time.
[44:05.330 --> 44:07.850]  So, uh, sort of, yeah, I don't know.
[44:07.950 --> 44:13.190]  And I think there were a lot of like transformative things going on with technology that were brought up in the hearings.
[44:13.210 --> 44:24.310]  Like, um, I watched a little bit of it and the mention of, uh, the life cycle of a particular device she was using was changing rapidly, which explains why she had so many handsets and so on.
[44:24.550 --> 44:24.690]  Yeah.
[44:24.790 --> 44:49.150]  So it was sort of a strange time going from Colin Powell's dial up, uh, on a laptop to, uh, have personal communication on the road to her actually running her own system, sort of side by side with her sort of foundation domain and stuff to where we have now this sort of heightened sense of disclosure of record keeping for particular offices,
[44:49.710 --> 45:06.190]  EG president or whatever, uh, office or administration, and then, uh, other policies and sensitivities around these agencies actually having, you know, smartphones now that's like pretty standard, uh, for a lot of them.
[45:06.310 --> 45:13.470]  And so I think a lot of the, um, software and practices around security have totally transformed even in the last four years.
[45:13.970 --> 45:14.330]  Absolutely.
[45:15.070 --> 45:16.650]  Uh, let me finish this letter from Ralph.
[45:16.830 --> 45:21.650]  Uh, they, they basically, they let her get away with it, uh, as part of the water pattern with both Clintons.
[45:21.730 --> 45:23.650]  And here we go into the whole Clinton thing.
[45:24.250 --> 45:27.210]  Uh, other problems with her email server usage.
[45:27.490 --> 45:31.030]  Remember the aide who sent an email telling people to remove classified notices from some emails.
[45:31.350 --> 45:33.670]  Hillary did not do that, but she was responsible for what happened.
[45:33.750 --> 45:34.810]  She was in charge of the organization.
[45:34.930 --> 45:36.110]  And that speaks to what you were saying, Kyle.
[45:36.410 --> 45:37.910]  She's in charge of the organization.
[45:37.910 --> 45:39.590]  She can say this isn't classified anymore.
[45:39.870 --> 45:41.930]  And, and, and yeah, I guess get away with it.
[45:42.010 --> 45:44.470]  But, uh, I'm more interested in what's in the emails.
[45:44.510 --> 45:52.030]  And I, I, I, I'm happy to see, uh, some details from Colin Powell's email, from, uh, uh, Condoleezza Rice's email.
[45:52.170 --> 45:54.130]  And yeah, you can say, oh, it's illegal to do that.
[45:54.250 --> 45:56.210]  But, um, that's where the real meat is.
[45:56.290 --> 46:05.290]  That's where, you know, if somebody, uh, is corrupt or not, if they're, if they're stealing or lying or, or doing all kinds of horrible things, uh, that is what I think we really should know.
[46:05.390 --> 46:09.030]  And, and I haven't seen that kind of a smoking gun as related to, uh, to Hillary Clinton.
[46:09.130 --> 46:09.770]  Let me just finish this letter.
[46:09.890 --> 46:10.890]  I'm not crazy about Trump.
[46:11.050 --> 46:13.910]  I think he has a lot of faults, but I think Clinton is really scary.
[46:14.230 --> 46:19.790]  Uh, this election is the best example of choosing the lesser of two evils that I've had to deal with personally.
[46:19.990 --> 46:20.990]  Thanks, Ralph, for that letter.
[46:21.130 --> 46:29.190]  And as far as lesser of two evils, yeah, I'm not sure which way you're going on that, but if Hillary Clinton scares you, and she does scare a lot of people, that is true.
[46:29.470 --> 46:32.290]  Uh, little children, especially, uh, no, that's not nice.
[46:32.590 --> 46:35.650]  But basically, um, she's just one person.
[46:35.710 --> 46:41.690]  She's just one person leading this campaign and she will bring in a whole flock of other people.
[46:41.770 --> 46:43.490]  Now, are you scared of those people?
[46:43.650 --> 46:48.890]  Think back, uh, go, go, go to C-SPAN and look at all the footage for the democratic convention.
[46:49.030 --> 46:51.290]  Then look at all the footage for the Republican convention.
[46:51.490 --> 47:03.550]  Look at the people who spoke at the democratic convention and how widely varied they are as far as, uh, uh, racial composition and, and background, ideology, preferences, you name it.
[47:03.730 --> 47:12.870]  And then look at the Republican convention and see the sameness, see the stilted, uh, attempts, uh, to, uh, to bring in minorities that never quite work.
[47:13.030 --> 47:20.210]  See the, uh, the bad jokes made by the military guys, just see the same old white faces over and over and over again.
[47:20.350 --> 47:22.870]  Those are the people that will be brought in with the Trump administration.
[47:23.650 --> 47:27.890]  And the people you saw at the democratic convention are a lot more likely to be brought in with the Clinton administration.
[47:28.130 --> 47:32.430]  So scary as she is, you know, keep all that in mind.
[47:32.470 --> 47:34.530]  That is something that I think we should be considering.
[47:34.830 --> 47:37.490]  And I don't hear that in, uh, in the analyses.
[47:37.690 --> 47:38.910]  I don't hear that in the news programs.
[47:39.270 --> 47:40.890]  It's all focusing on personality.
[47:41.050 --> 47:44.310]  And I think that's, uh, as far away from reality as you can get.
[47:44.650 --> 47:44.970]  Yeah.
[47:45.090 --> 47:58.650]  And I just, it also bugs me that there, I mean, if you look at anybody's working documents and, and, uh, stuff behind the scenes, if for whatever the product is, a service, or, um, in this case, public service, it's going to be messy.
[47:58.770 --> 47:59.950]  Like that doesn't shock me at all.
[48:00.050 --> 48:04.050]  But like you said, the substance, is it, is it something that could indict her?
[48:04.230 --> 48:07.130]  Well, actually, no, it hasn't.
[48:07.410 --> 48:09.010]  Well, I don't want to get too political.
[48:09.190 --> 48:10.370]  I know people don't like it when we do that.
[48:10.470 --> 48:10.750]  Oh yeah.
[48:10.750 --> 48:11.550]  Oh my gosh.
[48:11.550 --> 48:12.370]  Why'd we do that?
[48:12.430 --> 48:13.150]  You know what?
[48:13.310 --> 48:15.070]  Rob, you're supposed to throw stuff at us.
[48:15.150 --> 48:15.310]  Yeah.
[48:15.470 --> 48:21.730]  The thing is, uh, politics is kind of important and, uh, this year especially, and it's going to affect us all.
[48:21.890 --> 48:24.490]  It will, it will determine the laws that get passed.
[48:24.490 --> 48:28.050]  It will determine, uh, what we consider to be good and bad.
[48:28.170 --> 48:29.190]  It will determine foreign policy.
[48:29.310 --> 48:30.730]  People will live and die as a result of that.
[48:30.770 --> 48:31.770]  So yeah, I think it's relevant.
[48:32.230 --> 48:37.210]  And we are going to talk about it a bit, but we're also going to talk about technology and how it all relates, how it all ties together.
[48:37.470 --> 48:40.830]  And you are encouraged to write to us, OTH at 2600.com.
[48:41.010 --> 48:50.250]  And you are encouraged right now to call us 331-223-WBAI, 331-223-9224 with our magical technology that Kyle has rigged up.
[48:50.350 --> 48:53.610]  We will, um, take your phone calls on the air, Rob.
[48:54.090 --> 49:01.270]  Um, while we're waiting for phone calls, I have a quick announcement from Dalsini, a friend of the show, um, who has, uh, at the NYC privacy board advocates meeting.
[49:01.490 --> 49:08.210]  Uh, this is something that, uh, spawned from the local 2600 meeting and hope, uh, Monday, September 19th from seven to 9 PM at Fat Cat Fab Lab.
[49:08.450 --> 49:16.810]  Uh, what if we told you you're not powerless when it comes to protecting your privacy, come and learn how a local municipality legislated their own protections and learn how you can get involved here in New York city.
[49:17.370 --> 49:20.930]  Um, so find the information on the location at fatcatfablab.org.
[49:21.170 --> 49:26.110]  And the group itself has facebook.com slash NYC priv board advocates.
[49:26.610 --> 49:29.950]  So, uh, they're the NYC privacy board advocates and, uh, check that out.
[49:30.110 --> 49:30.470]  Okay.
[49:30.670 --> 49:32.190]  Uh, we have a phone call.
[49:32.330 --> 49:33.270]  We have a phone call from Florida.
[49:33.270 --> 49:34.030]  So I'm a little scared.
[49:34.370 --> 49:34.970]  Uh, good evening.
[49:35.150 --> 49:35.730]  You're on the radio.
[49:35.870 --> 49:36.190]  Go ahead.
[49:36.490 --> 49:36.710]  Yes.
[49:37.010 --> 49:38.250]  I am calling from Florida.
[49:38.730 --> 49:41.570]  And as someone who has a green face and yellow hair...
[49:41.570 --> 49:42.950]  Can you speak up just a little bit?
[49:44.090 --> 49:44.790]  Say again, please?
[49:44.930 --> 49:46.910]  Just speak up a little bit because your connection's a little poor.
[49:46.910 --> 49:52.230]  As someone who has a green face and yellow hair, I have a question for you.
[49:52.370 --> 49:54.230]  And I am calling from Florida.
[49:54.450 --> 49:54.650]  Okay.
[49:54.790 --> 49:55.030]  Go ahead.
[49:55.430 --> 50:11.470]  If, if as you are a technician, and I thank Bernie S for saying and acting upon the incompetence of a manager, if you are a manager and you don't know how to do something, then you go to a technician and you put out a query.
[50:11.730 --> 50:17.570]  And if you're really managing a large organization, then you're not expected to know how to do everything.
[50:17.570 --> 50:29.910]  But you are expected to access the services and supports needed to be fiscally, technologically, and even as you dare not say, politically astute.
[50:29.910 --> 50:31.230]  Not correct, astute.
[50:31.670 --> 50:33.110]  So, I have a question.
[50:33.310 --> 50:50.050]  If you are about to have telephone services back, and if you are about to manage your technical skills and capabilities to such an extent that they're back, why would you have the same person that was incompetent leading that organization?
[50:50.650 --> 50:51.450]  Thanks a lot.
[50:51.570 --> 50:53.470]  You have a great show, and I am calling from Florida.
[50:54.010 --> 50:54.230]  Okay.
[50:54.550 --> 50:56.590]  Say hi to everybody in Florida for us.
[50:57.110 --> 50:57.590]  I don't know.
[50:57.590 --> 50:58.830]  Bernie, was that directed at you?
[50:59.010 --> 50:59.770]  I think it was.
[51:00.490 --> 51:04.290]  I think it was more of a statement than a question, but...
[51:04.290 --> 51:04.330]  Yeah.
[51:04.370 --> 51:05.950]  Well, maybe we should leave it as that.
[51:06.250 --> 51:09.490]  Is he saying, like, it's like buying a drunk driver a new car or something?
[51:10.050 --> 51:11.150]  That's an analogy.
[51:11.370 --> 51:11.550]  Wow.
[51:12.130 --> 51:12.530]  Okay.
[51:12.750 --> 51:15.710]  331-223-9224 is our phone number.
[51:15.890 --> 51:17.090]  We had a few phone calls coming in.
[51:17.230 --> 51:19.170]  Those beeps, by the way, we can't turn that off.
[51:19.270 --> 51:20.050]  That's called waiting.
[51:20.690 --> 51:22.170]  And you're just going to get the beeps.
[51:22.270 --> 51:23.310]  You're going to have to live with it.
[51:24.090 --> 51:26.390]  Here's a call from, looks like, New York.
[51:26.530 --> 51:26.870]  Good evening.
[51:27.090 --> 51:28.250]  You're on Off the Hook.
[51:28.350 --> 51:28.610]  Go ahead.
[51:30.110 --> 51:31.650]  Yeah, I just want to make a quick comment.
[51:31.810 --> 51:33.870]  You were talking about a soundboard earlier.
[51:34.150 --> 51:47.550]  If you want to listen to some soundboard, you go on youtube.com, and you can just put in Barack Obama soundboard to Arnold Schwarzenegger soundboard, and you would see a lot of prank calls and a lot of funny usages of soundboards.
[51:47.730 --> 51:53.850]  So you're basically calling people up, pretending to be Barack Obama, and pressing a button, and he says one thing or another.
[51:54.690 --> 52:04.530]  Yeah, you can just respond with Barack Obama lines, and you can have... Sometimes you can hold, like, an entire conversation with people, and they won't even know that it's not really Barack Obama.
[52:04.750 --> 52:05.370]  It's kind of funny.
[52:05.590 --> 52:07.330]  I see what people in the studio are doing.
[52:07.430 --> 52:14.430]  If you even try doing that with my voice, there will be all kinds of horrors raining down from the sky.
[52:14.590 --> 52:16.910]  So, yeah, let's nip that in the bud.
[52:16.990 --> 52:25.410]  There's definitely enough sound, if you go back with all the recordings, to do a soundboard of your voice, probably my voice, and pretty much everybody who's been on the show.
[52:26.030 --> 52:27.110]  Suffolk County, New York.
[52:27.270 --> 52:27.670]  Good evening.
[52:28.470 --> 52:28.830]  Yes.
[52:29.010 --> 52:29.450]  Oh, I see.
[52:29.510 --> 52:29.810]  I'm on.
[52:29.910 --> 52:31.050]  I'm going to turn down my radio.
[52:32.530 --> 52:37.890]  Yeah, I got a notice on Facebook or email or something.
[52:38.550 --> 52:50.350]  That the UN is going to, or a UN-like organization, is going to take charge of the internet addressing system, which would take it outside the UN's first amendment.
[52:52.090 --> 52:53.650]  Can you speak up just a little bit, please?
[52:54.050 --> 52:58.670]  Yeah, the UN is government of the government, by the government, and for the government.
[52:58.950 --> 53:07.450]  And to give them control of the internet might be a bad thing for speech, especially since there is no first amendment outside the United States.
[53:07.730 --> 53:09.790]  So have you heard anything about that?
[53:10.110 --> 53:20.010]  Yeah, so the way this works is the IANA organization, the Internet Association for Assigned Names and Numbers Association, or something like that.
[53:20.110 --> 53:27.410]  IANA, I believe, is the organization that manages a lot of the domain structure.
[53:27.730 --> 53:29.770]  That's kind of a short, that's a short answer.
[53:29.970 --> 53:33.150]  And so there's been sort of a very unpopular move.
[53:33.270 --> 53:40.410]  And that is from my casual knowledge of it, just by hearing some of the reports this week.
[53:40.410 --> 53:41.710]  It's quite unpopular.
[53:41.850 --> 53:43.770]  People are not really enthused about it.
[53:43.870 --> 54:03.950]  But absolutely, as you've said, there is a push to have the management and structures that are currently represented by organizations, I believe, like IANA, to have those maintained and controlled by a arm of the United Nations.
[54:04.530 --> 54:11.590]  And resoundingly, I think a lot of people in the technology community are looking at that as a very bad idea.
[54:11.970 --> 54:19.810]  Because the UN has has a large charter and a lot of mandates and they're busy people.
[54:20.010 --> 54:22.350]  Perhaps this isn't something they should take on.
[54:22.470 --> 54:24.890]  I think that's the short attitude.
[54:24.890 --> 54:29.870]  Isn't the United States looked upon as as having having a little bit too much power over the internet?
[54:30.190 --> 54:32.850]  Like, we have all the dot coms and all the dot orgs.
[54:32.930 --> 54:34.030]  We maintain all this.
[54:34.610 --> 54:38.450]  But we have a First Amendment here in the United States.
[54:38.690 --> 54:39.170]  We have a First Amendment.
[54:39.170 --> 54:39.810]  Okay, we have a First Amendment.
[54:39.970 --> 54:40.010]  Great.
[54:40.150 --> 54:45.330]  But does that give us the right to tell other people in other parts of the world how to run something?
[54:46.770 --> 54:52.110]  Well, we're the United States set the thing up as a military tool.
[54:53.410 --> 54:57.230]  The ICANN is under contract to the United States.
[54:57.850 --> 55:01.930]  One of the one of the thoughts people had is if ICANN loses their U.S.
[55:02.070 --> 55:06.630]  contract and becomes a private organization, then it's a stress problem.
[55:06.910 --> 55:14.510]  I'm wondering if this does happen, is there a way to quickly set up internet over ultimate...
[55:15.830 --> 55:18.030]  Yeah, you're... I kind of got the gist of that.
[55:18.090 --> 55:18.330]  You're right.
[55:18.430 --> 55:18.610]  It is.
[55:18.690 --> 55:19.270]  It's ICANN.
[55:19.310 --> 55:19.870]  It's not IANA.
[55:20.110 --> 55:22.270]  It's the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers.
[55:22.430 --> 55:23.890]  And, yeah, it's...
[55:24.790 --> 55:27.610]  it's... currently... currently there in charge of it.
[55:27.790 --> 55:35.190]  And this argument's a little bit like... like saying... you know... explaining or rationalizing why we have...
[55:35.190 --> 55:37.010]  one as a dialing area...
[55:37.010 --> 55:41.350]  international dialing number and saying the reason why is because we're number one.
[55:41.550 --> 55:43.630]  I mean, yeah, we invented this stuff.
[55:43.850 --> 55:47.070]  We put a lot of these networks online first and...
[55:47.070 --> 55:51.290]  connected them across distances first and definitely developed a lot of the...
[55:51.950 --> 55:56.250]  technologies and supporting research that... that produce what we use today as the Internet.
[55:56.830 --> 55:59.270]  But in the future...
[56:01.730 --> 56:02.270]  actual...
[56:02.270 --> 56:05.750]  countries and... and... and who actually maintains that may become...
[56:05.750 --> 56:08.210]  very important and may become not important at all.
[56:08.430 --> 56:10.110]  The Internet is a malleable thing.
[56:10.290 --> 56:11.870]  It's a network of people...
[56:11.870 --> 56:12.550]  essentially.
[56:12.830 --> 56:14.110]  And those people can make choices...
[56:14.110 --> 56:16.380]  based on wherever they are, their regional preference...
[56:16.910 --> 56:18.150]  and on and on and on and on and on.
[56:18.310 --> 56:19.270]  And that...
[56:19.270 --> 56:21.930]  essentially will not change about the Internet...
[56:21.930 --> 56:23.310]  as far as I can see.
[56:23.310 --> 56:25.480]  it will definitely make things interesting though...
[56:25.830 --> 56:26.250]  when...
[56:26.250 --> 56:28.310]  entities and countries and corporations...
[56:28.830 --> 56:29.320]  try to...
[56:29.990 --> 56:31.810]  levy or otherwise influence...
[56:32.430 --> 56:32.890]  those...
[56:34.070 --> 56:34.530]  established...
[56:34.530 --> 56:35.710]  and traditional...
[56:35.710 --> 56:36.670]  ways of doing things.
[56:36.870 --> 56:38.250]  So it's definitely something to watch...
[56:38.250 --> 56:38.770]  and...
[56:39.730 --> 56:40.190]  certainly...
[56:41.310 --> 56:42.590]  certainly making things interesting.
[56:42.770 --> 56:43.450]  I don't know what else to say.
[56:43.590 --> 56:43.870]  All right.
[56:44.010 --> 56:44.390]  Well...
[56:44.390 --> 56:45.650]  we're gonna have to leave it there...
[56:45.650 --> 56:46.550]  because we're out of time.
[56:47.090 --> 56:47.550]  But...
[56:47.550 --> 56:48.190]  please...
[56:53.310 --> 56:54.490]  the show is coming up next.
[56:55.410 --> 56:56.770]  This is Emmanuel for Off The Hook.
[56:56.890 --> 56:57.450]  We'll see you next week.
[56:57.550 --> 56:57.670]  Good night.