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[00:33.200 --> 00:34.720]  This is Julian Assange.
[00:34.900 --> 00:37.500]  You're listening to WBAI New York.
[00:37.860 --> 00:39.480]  Stay strong and keep listening.
[02:31.510 --> 02:33.510]  And a very good evening to everybody.
[02:33.510 --> 02:39.060]  The program is off the hook, coming to you live at our new time of 8 p.m.
[02:39.450 --> 02:42.480]  This is Emmanuel Goldstein, joined tonight by Rob T.
[02:42.620 --> 02:43.070]  Firefly.
[02:43.380 --> 02:43.860]  Good evening.
[02:43.860 --> 02:44.600]  Kyle.
[02:45.440 --> 02:45.960]  Hi.
[02:46.520 --> 02:48.080]  And Bernie S.
[02:48.880 --> 02:50.440]  Greetings from Philadelphia.
[02:51.120 --> 02:52.640]  And Jim's over there in the peanut gallery.
[02:52.860 --> 02:53.080]  Hello.
[02:53.710 --> 02:58.260]  Well, we've had an exciting, action-packed week, doing all kinds of interesting things.
[02:58.300 --> 03:01.100]  We're going to be sharing that and also taking phone calls.
[03:01.600 --> 03:03.940]  I don't think... Bernie, do we actually have phone lines?
[03:04.000 --> 03:08.100]  I know we're getting phone lines, but I don't see any phone lines around here.
[03:08.100 --> 03:19.400]  Well, I've been advised that there were two phone lines, a public number and then a non-public number for, you know, secret callers, that are connected to the mixing board there.
[03:20.600 --> 03:21.000]  But...
[03:21.700 --> 03:22.770]  No one's told me anything.
[03:23.300 --> 03:25.120]  I emailed the numbers to you guys.
[03:25.140 --> 03:27.960]  Yeah, no, we have the numbers, but what's the point of giving out numbers if they don't work?
[03:28.920 --> 03:31.150]  Well, did anyone try it to see what happens?
[03:32.000 --> 03:34.140]  I guess somebody could try to see what happens.
[03:34.460 --> 03:36.940]  Hang on, I'm going to hand this piece of paper.
[03:37.600 --> 03:42.740]  Listeners, look away, because this piece of paper has the phone number that we're not supposed to give out yet to the studio.
[03:42.960 --> 03:49.800]  And Rob is going to call that number on his phone, which he brought in special for the occasion, and we're going to see if it rings anywhere.
[03:49.830 --> 03:51.940]  This is how we find things out at the radio station, folks.
[03:52.020 --> 03:53.520]  We actually have to try it ourselves.
[03:54.400 --> 03:57.210]  So I would be calling the one labeled studio, is that correct?
[03:57.960 --> 03:58.880]  Yes, call that one.
[03:59.350 --> 04:01.470]  And you might wonder, well, we have no phone lines.
[04:01.560 --> 04:02.270]  How are we talking to Bernie?
[04:02.620 --> 04:03.240]  It's magic.
[04:03.440 --> 04:04.140]  It's hacker magic.
[04:04.440 --> 04:07.560]  We just somehow make these things work, even though we're told it doesn't work.
[04:07.760 --> 04:09.090]  Hey, phone lines working.
[04:09.120 --> 04:09.640]  Hold on a second.
[04:09.700 --> 04:09.970]  Hold on.
[04:10.060 --> 04:10.300]  Hold on.
[04:10.960 --> 04:11.320]  Hello.
[04:11.500 --> 04:12.320]  Who is this?
[04:12.620 --> 04:13.820]  Hi, am I on air?
[04:14.260 --> 04:14.620]  Wow.
[04:14.700 --> 04:16.150]  We have a phone line.
[04:17.940 --> 04:18.300]  Yay!
[04:19.020 --> 04:20.330]  Hang on, let me turn on my radio.
[04:20.330 --> 04:24.920]  Okay, now we're hearing Rob both in the studio and on the phone, and we're hearing Bernie at the same time.
[04:25.020 --> 04:25.920]  This is very confusing.
[04:26.090 --> 04:26.620]  Please hang up.
[04:26.830 --> 04:27.560]  Sorry, I was driving.
[04:27.830 --> 04:28.180]  Wow.
[04:28.880 --> 04:33.830]  The good news is we don't have to do this concoction that Kyle puts together every week.
[04:34.200 --> 04:36.150]  Kyle, your services are no longer required.
[04:36.710 --> 04:37.380]  Yeah, all right.
[04:37.380 --> 04:38.360]  Pick up your check on the way out.
[04:38.360 --> 04:38.970]  But they were great.
[04:39.090 --> 04:40.760]  They were great while they lasted, I gotta say.
[04:40.900 --> 04:41.420]  They really were.
[04:41.580 --> 04:41.940]  They were highly innovative.
[04:42.140 --> 04:46.710]  And we know that he's here in case it happens again, and it probably will happen again at some point.
[04:47.240 --> 04:47.900]  No thanks.
[04:47.900 --> 04:49.960]  There is, though, some good news to report.
[04:50.120 --> 04:51.520]  A listener has received a premium.
[04:51.940 --> 04:52.150]  Yes.
[04:52.580 --> 04:53.020]  Yeah.
[04:53.260 --> 04:53.500]  Yeah.
[04:54.140 --> 04:58.420]  We got an email that a listener got a premium from our show.
[04:58.420 --> 05:00.090]  I think it was a DVD package or something.
[05:00.620 --> 05:03.400]  I don't even remember giving those out, but it must have been a while ago.
[05:03.880 --> 05:05.140]  So, okay, here's the thing.
[05:05.270 --> 05:15.830]  Since we have another fundraiser coming up next month, we need to know before that fundraiser begins that our listeners have gotten the premiums they pledged for in previous fundraisers.
[05:15.940 --> 05:26.120]  If they have not, if we are continuing to get emails that say, I have not gotten my premium that I pledged for many months ago, we are not going to be offering you premiums.
[05:26.180 --> 05:27.360]  We'll still pitch for the station.
[05:27.470 --> 05:34.320]  We'll still encourage people to call up, but we are not going to add to the backlog of premiums that people don't get in a timely fashion.
[05:35.080 --> 05:37.820]  So we need to know, have you gotten your premium?
[05:37.820 --> 05:42.320]  If you have not gotten your premium, email us, OTH at 2600.com.
[05:42.520 --> 05:43.920]  Let us know you have not gotten your premium.
[05:44.060 --> 05:48.040]  If you have gotten your premium in the last few weeks, let us know that too.
[05:48.200 --> 05:51.060]  Same email address, OTH at 2600.com.
[05:51.680 --> 05:53.780]  And we will take action accordingly.
[05:53.790 --> 05:56.520]  If people aren't getting the premiums, we're not going to add more to the list.
[05:57.460 --> 06:02.500]  If finally we've caught up to the backlog, then we can start offering more premiums.
[06:02.580 --> 06:04.560]  Either way, we need the station to stay on the air.
[06:04.610 --> 06:06.670]  We will be supporting the station in the next month.
[06:06.670 --> 06:08.780]  But we also have to support our listeners.
[06:09.060 --> 06:09.290]  Yes, indeed.
[06:09.440 --> 06:13.900]  If you have emailed us regarding a missing premium, we have delivered all those emails.
[06:14.200 --> 06:16.500]  We've collected them and delivered them to management.
[06:16.500 --> 06:17.350]  Actually, I did that.
[06:18.300 --> 06:22.060]  And so if you did that and you do receive your premium, let us know that too.
[06:22.220 --> 06:23.700]  But if you have not received your premium...
[06:23.700 --> 06:26.960]  But if you have not received your premium and you haven't gotten in touch with us yet, please do.
[06:27.140 --> 06:31.880]  Forward us your donation receipt from the transaction, your confirmation number, things like that.
[06:31.880 --> 06:43.820]  What address you put in, whether it's different now, if you moved, but all the relevant information to not only locate your past pledge, but to get it to you today, here in the present.
[06:44.000 --> 06:47.480]  And if we do not hear from you, we're going to assume you got your premium.
[06:48.000 --> 06:48.340]  All right?
[06:48.340 --> 06:50.540]  So let us know if you did not get your premium.
[06:50.610 --> 06:53.900]  Yeah, we're going to get a whole bunch of emails, I know, but we have to take care of this.
[06:54.000 --> 06:55.280]  This is called being responsible.
[06:55.520 --> 06:58.260]  It's definitely progress, but we have a lot further to go.
[06:58.560 --> 06:59.640]  It's a sad state.
[06:59.840 --> 07:03.790]  You know, we shouldn't be too thrilled because we can do better than this.
[07:03.900 --> 07:04.280]  We know it.
[07:04.340 --> 07:08.020]  It's a sad state, but it doesn't have to remain a sad state because we have so much potential here.
[07:08.200 --> 07:08.640]  Look at us.
[07:08.730 --> 07:09.600]  We're in the middle of Brooklyn.
[07:09.790 --> 07:10.780]  We're right here on Atlantic Avenue.
[07:10.900 --> 07:13.640]  We've got an amazing cafe downstairs, a performance space.
[07:13.640 --> 07:21.730]  We've got great people all around us, and the promise of a really professional, amazing studio right here that will be our home for many years to come.
[07:21.850 --> 07:22.840]  That is the promise.
[07:22.840 --> 07:34.980]  We can achieve that, but we all, including the people here, have to work together to get there and not do the traditional dividing and isolating that happens in so many organizations.
[07:35.260 --> 07:40.260]  So we hope to have some positive news in the weeks ahead.
[07:41.230 --> 07:48.040]  And, yeah, there being an election coming in the weeks ahead, I don't know how positive it's going to be, but we'll just have to live through it all together.
[07:49.340 --> 07:52.480]  I think we all saw the movie, the Snowden movie.
[07:52.660 --> 07:53.960]  I know, Bernie, you came up to town.
[07:54.110 --> 07:57.440]  Unfortunately, we didn't get to see it with you, but Kyle and I saw it on the island.
[07:57.700 --> 07:59.260]  Yeah, Bernie came up.
[07:59.340 --> 08:03.350]  He saw it with me and our guy, Junts, and a couple of other friends of ours.
[08:03.500 --> 08:07.260]  And, yeah, so we have, I think...
[08:07.260 --> 08:08.540]  Didn't walk out in the middle of it?
[08:08.700 --> 08:08.840]  No.
[08:08.840 --> 08:09.440]  Okay, good.
[08:09.500 --> 08:10.700]  No, we didn't walk out in the middle of it.
[08:10.760 --> 08:11.610]  We walked out afterward.
[08:11.840 --> 08:12.600]  We did too, okay.
[08:12.900 --> 08:17.100]  You know, the secret post-credit sequence telling you which Marvel movie is coming up next.
[08:17.320 --> 08:19.060]  And, no, that was something else.
[08:19.290 --> 08:21.600]  But, yeah, we saw the film.
[08:21.820 --> 08:22.230]  All right.
[08:22.320 --> 08:24.440]  Well, okay, I'll ask you guys first.
[08:24.520 --> 08:25.980]  First, I'll start with Rob, then I'll go to Bernie.
[08:26.760 --> 08:27.580]  What did you think?
[08:28.380 --> 08:32.000]  Okay, well, I thought it was a solid film.
[08:32.900 --> 08:34.080]  I thought it was...
[08:34.080 --> 08:35.920]  It had that eeriness to it.
[08:36.020 --> 08:40.240]  Like, when you're watching a fictionalized version of events, you're pretty familiar with the truth behind.
[08:41.860 --> 08:44.100]  But I think the film was engaging.
[08:44.290 --> 08:46.500]  It told an interesting story.
[08:46.670 --> 08:51.720]  It told a story very much like the events as they're understood, I think, by many people.
[08:52.580 --> 08:57.040]  And I think it will very probably be successful at getting the conversation going.
[08:58.160 --> 09:02.400]  As a depiction of the real events, it took certain liberties, as these things do.
[09:03.460 --> 09:03.960]  But...
[09:03.960 --> 09:05.290]  Can you name a liberty that it took?
[09:05.700 --> 09:08.120]  There was one liberty where...
[09:08.120 --> 09:13.290]  Well, a lot of times they condense things, you know, for time or for, you know, narrative purposes.
[09:15.290 --> 09:23.560]  And there's a scene in the film where Snowden basically makes the decision to copy certain files and take them out of the building where he is.
[09:23.940 --> 09:25.220]  And he does this all at once.
[09:25.240 --> 09:27.580]  And he copies them all onto a micro SD.
[09:28.260 --> 09:33.140]  And, you know, there's that dramatic scene of all the progress bars going because, you know, that's how we do things in film.
[09:33.900 --> 09:35.340]  And then he leaves.
[09:35.480 --> 09:37.880]  When in the reality, I think it's...
[09:37.880 --> 09:39.100]  Well, he dropped it on the floor, too.
[09:39.260 --> 09:40.660]  Yeah, he drops it on the floor, too.
[09:40.720 --> 09:43.400]  And there's that very tense moment where somebody steps on the SD card.
[09:43.480 --> 09:47.760]  But deliberately steps on it to shield, which tells me that he had co-conspirators.
[09:47.980 --> 09:48.120]  Right.
[09:48.120 --> 09:51.060]  Which, you know, I don't know if that's taking liberties, that he had co-conspirators.
[09:51.060 --> 09:55.840]  If he did not have co-conspirators, the people who actually were there must be saying, hey, wait a minute.
[09:55.880 --> 09:57.520]  I wasn't playing any part in this.
[09:57.600 --> 09:59.280]  And now all of a sudden, I've been roped into it.
[09:59.290 --> 10:03.080]  Yeah, all his former colleagues are getting eyes pointed in their direction now.
[10:03.400 --> 10:05.480]  And their shoe size is taken down.
[10:05.900 --> 10:15.140]  But no, but so apparently in reality, what he did was he made the decision much earlier in the course of events and was slowly gathering files over time.
[10:15.300 --> 10:19.240]  And it wasn't so much inspired by watching the testimony of Liar Clapper.
[10:20.160 --> 10:21.000]  That's his title now.
[10:21.180 --> 10:22.640]  He's an official liar of the U.S.
[10:22.920 --> 10:23.000]  government.
[10:23.280 --> 10:28.580]  Clapper, who said that the NSA does not knowingly collect data on U.S.
[10:28.980 --> 10:28.980]  citizens.
[10:29.840 --> 10:32.300]  And in the film, it was that moment where he said that.
[10:32.420 --> 10:33.580]  That's when he started collecting data.
[10:33.700 --> 10:37.680]  But you're saying that he was collecting data before that, which I believe is borne out in truth.
[10:37.840 --> 10:38.760]  I don't have a problem with that.
[10:38.760 --> 10:54.160]  The reason I don't have a problem with that is because I would imagine you would be collecting data slowly because of the policies you're becoming familiar with and the hints that something is seriously wrong.
[10:56.110 --> 11:04.200]  And what's happening is basically when Clapper gave his false testimony, that was sort of the nail in the coffin.
[11:04.360 --> 11:06.680]  That's when he said, okay, you know what?
[11:06.680 --> 11:09.920]  I'm just going to collect the rest of it and reveal it at some point.
[11:10.020 --> 11:11.220]  That's how I interpreted it.
[11:11.220 --> 11:13.900]  Yeah, it was the final Clapper caper that inspired him.
[11:14.220 --> 11:19.820]  But yeah, I mean, it shows, I think, the spirit behind what happened and the motivations.
[11:20.080 --> 11:27.480]  I mean, the character of Snowden is shown starting to question things far earlier and keep a closer eye on what's going on around him.
[11:27.480 --> 11:29.040]  I like how he started as a conservative.
[11:29.320 --> 11:29.480]  Yeah.
[11:29.520 --> 11:30.060]  I like that.
[11:30.740 --> 11:33.280]  And that ties into what I've heard in the past as well.
[11:33.500 --> 11:34.460]  Bernie, what are your impressions?
[11:35.040 --> 11:49.340]  And just to follow up on it, that's in keeping with what we learned from Snowden's father, who we met last at Pope X, who told us a little bit about his son, who's, you know, both he and his father are patriots.
[11:49.960 --> 11:55.400]  But from a constitutional standpoint, when they see stuff's going on like this, they've got to do something.
[11:55.560 --> 12:04.060]  So I think Snowden got some good influence from his father, who was very conspicuously absent from this film.
[12:04.060 --> 12:08.600]  He and his stepmom, who we met, are not in the film in any way, shape, or form.
[12:08.760 --> 12:15.380]  And my only guess is that Ed Snowden said, listen, leave my parents out of this.
[12:15.460 --> 12:16.260]  They don't want to be involved.
[12:16.760 --> 12:20.340]  And that was one of the deals he made with Oliver Stone.
[12:20.700 --> 12:24.200]  But yeah, there were some technical inaccuracies in the film.
[12:24.320 --> 12:25.360]  There were factual inaccuracies.
[12:25.360 --> 12:34.780]  But I think what those were, were sort of metaphors that the director, Oliver Stone, tried to use to represent bigger things that would just take too long to tell.
[12:34.980 --> 12:43.820]  Like, for instance, like all the cubicles or rooms or offices at NSA have these microphones hanging down in the middle of the room.
[12:44.220 --> 12:48.980]  But I mean, obviously, they're not going to have microphones hanging down from a cord in the middle of all the room.
[12:48.980 --> 12:53.740]  But that's a metaphor for, like, there's surveillance going on 24-7.
[12:53.900 --> 12:55.260]  You can't be... you have to be careful of what you say.
[12:55.260 --> 12:57.060]  Well, it's a way of depicting it pictorially.
[12:57.800 --> 12:58.920]  Like, you can see the microphone.
[12:59.120 --> 13:02.300]  If it's so tiny you can't see it, then you can't really depict it in a film.
[13:02.980 --> 13:03.340]  Exactly.
[13:03.340 --> 13:04.800]  You can't really tell that story.
[13:04.980 --> 13:05.560]  You could.
[13:05.720 --> 13:12.320]  You go into this whole long, you know, tangent about, you know, how everything is Orwellian there when you work there.
[13:12.460 --> 13:17.320]  But just having a microphone hanging in the middle of the room, that says it without having to use any dialogue up at all.
[13:17.320 --> 13:31.740]  So, the thing with Clapper, I think that was a representation of all the other misdeeds that he and probably others at NSA discovered and decided to blow the cover on.
[13:31.740 --> 13:41.820]  And, like, the micro SD card that his co-worker stepped on on purpose as the manager or the chief guy was coming in to hide it.
[13:41.920 --> 13:47.760]  And because that would, you know, result in his being probably locked up for life if the SD card was found on the floor.
[13:47.760 --> 14:00.900]  Or, so, I think that SD card was sort of a metaphor for the body of work that he tried to get out and did successfully get out and under a watchful eye.
[14:01.220 --> 14:05.180]  But it was an easier way to symbolize it with just an SD card on the floor.
[14:05.380 --> 14:06.640]  And there are other things like that, too.
[14:07.240 --> 14:09.580]  Movie making is, a lot of it is about metaphor.
[14:09.820 --> 14:13.840]  And as a movie maker yourself, Emanuel, you've probably seen that as an opportunity.
[14:14.820 --> 14:20.940]  Well, I was involved in making a documentary, and you're supposed to tell the truth as far as representing how things actually take place.
[14:21.080 --> 14:27.580]  My dramatic license wasn't as liberal, I guess, as a dramatization of something.
[14:27.700 --> 14:37.480]  But I think Oliver Stone knows how to make a movie, and I think he knows how to get the facts out there as well and represent it in a way that's overall accurate.
[14:37.520 --> 14:40.640]  And I think that's what we got out of this film.
[14:41.260 --> 14:48.840]  I've heard criticisms about it, but they seem to be nitpicking mostly about when something happened and how long was he in Hong Kong for.
[14:49.360 --> 14:51.600]  I mean, does that really matter how long he was in Hong Kong for?
[14:51.680 --> 14:55.900]  He said the phone didn't ring for three weeks, but he was actually only there for less than one week.
[14:56.320 --> 14:58.620]  I don't know if that really ties into the plot so much.
[14:59.080 --> 15:02.020]  He worked as a contractor.
[15:02.020 --> 15:07.780]  He found some amazing security issues that affect all of us.
[15:07.880 --> 15:08.940]  That's all true.
[15:09.140 --> 15:10.160]  That all happened.
[15:10.360 --> 15:18.380]  And I think just getting that out there, just like Citizen Four did, that's the real important thing that is accomplished here.
[15:18.540 --> 15:28.400]  And Citizen Four ties into all this very interestingly because, of course, the filming of that documentary is used in this fictional version as the framing story to connect everything together.
[15:28.400 --> 15:33.660]  But also, it's... yeah, the documentary is out there, and you can watch it, Citizen Four.
[15:33.820 --> 15:35.600]  It's very, you know, it's easy to get hold of.
[15:35.760 --> 15:42.180]  But not everyone will sit in front of a documentary, but a lot of people are familiar with just sitting back and being told a story.
[15:42.830 --> 15:46.580]  And I think Oliver Stone knows how to do that, and I think that's what he did successfully with us.
[15:46.840 --> 15:50.700]  Yeah, I mean, it was interesting how Citizen Four sort of took the backseat.
[15:50.840 --> 15:53.280]  They didn't want to get into too much detail about that.
[15:53.280 --> 16:05.780]  It did provide a narrative for him recounting his experience, and the real action you would see would be him as, like, through a flashback telling the story.
[16:06.540 --> 16:15.500]  So they cut back to this Citizen Four interview as a means to go from story to story as it progressed.
[16:15.500 --> 16:20.660]  But I think that it was definitely much more of a dramatization.
[16:20.980 --> 16:28.640]  And had they got too close to Citizen Four, it might not have given their film as much weight.
[16:29.080 --> 16:31.500]  Because that was a very serious treatment of it.
[16:31.820 --> 16:38.640]  And it just wasn't so clear that that part of it really got the message out.
[16:38.640 --> 16:48.520]  They did have some sort of back and forth with the reporters, but the impact of that film would have undermined this film, I think, if they had talked about it too much.
[16:48.660 --> 16:53.800]  Well, I do think, as far as people not sitting through documentaries, that's a very, very true statement.
[16:54.200 --> 16:56.860]  People are kind of impatient sometimes.
[16:57.420 --> 16:59.660]  Citizen Four doesn't even feel like a documentary.
[16:59.860 --> 17:03.720]  It feels like you're... because you're watching everything unfold as it unfolded.
[17:03.720 --> 17:08.960]  It's not telling a story of something that happened in the past with all kinds of still pictures and things like that.
[17:09.080 --> 17:10.040]  You're seeing it unfold.
[17:10.280 --> 17:12.820]  It is as exciting as anything fictionalized.
[17:13.660 --> 17:18.710]  So I think the two films are both very worth seeing, maybe even consecutively.
[17:20.440 --> 17:26.540]  Seeing how they tell the story and comparing one to the other, you learn an awful lot that way.
[17:26.640 --> 17:32.990]  I will comment that I think, personally, that this could have been an even stronger film.
[17:32.990 --> 17:40.200]  I mean, even in some of the resolution and the conclusion, you hear some of Snowden's own words and so on.
[17:40.280 --> 17:41.700]  And it's... I don't know.
[17:41.840 --> 17:44.080]  It didn't have the impact I thought it might.
[17:44.860 --> 17:49.580]  And it wasn't as clear to me what they're really communicating.
[17:50.840 --> 18:01.560]  Or if they're really taking any sort of... or pushing this story or this reality, like the stuff we're finding out, pushing that any further.
[18:01.560 --> 18:03.560]  It just sort of kind of ends.
[18:04.010 --> 18:07.040]  And you don't get the sense it's like an ongoing thing.
[18:07.040 --> 18:16.880]  As much as in Citizen Four, where they very famously, at the end, sort of show a bunch of things that sort of insinuate the next steps.
[18:16.880 --> 18:20.750]  And that this is ongoing, and we'll revisit this at some point.
[18:20.780 --> 18:22.620]  Well, it ends when he's in Moscow.
[18:22.860 --> 18:29.300]  And I guess, to tell the story of Snowden, that's kind of where that part of the chapter... that chapter of the story ends.
[18:29.440 --> 18:31.180]  Yeah, I just feel like they could have had a little more teeth.
[18:31.320 --> 18:35.660]  They did... it was strong, and it's great to, you know, see a dramatization of it.
[18:35.800 --> 18:37.740]  But it could have had more bite, you know?
[18:37.740 --> 18:38.680]  So you want to see a sequel.
[18:39.540 --> 18:40.320]  I didn't say that.
[18:40.980 --> 18:41.640]  Snowden, too.
[18:42.100 --> 18:42.320]  No.
[18:46.880 --> 18:53.960]  And I was... I hate to use the word shocked, but I was shocked and appalled by this editorial in the Washington Post.
[18:54.200 --> 18:55.680]  The Washington Post.
[18:55.860 --> 19:01.480]  Didn't they win a Pulitzer Prize for publishing material that Snowden provided?
[19:01.680 --> 19:16.060]  Here they come out with an editorial entitled, No Pardon for Edward Snowden, basically doing the job of the government, saying Edward Snowden, the former National Security Agency contractor who blew the cover off the federal government's electronic surveillance program three years ago,
[19:16.460 --> 19:17.880]  has his admirers.
[19:17.980 --> 19:23.320]  After the inevitably celebratory Oliver Stone film about him appears this weekend, he may have more.
[19:23.600 --> 19:33.040]  Whether Mr. Snowden deserves a presidential pardon, as human rights organizations are demanding in a new national campaign, time to coincide with the film, is a complicated question.
[19:33.040 --> 19:38.220]  However, to which President Obama's answer should continue to be no.
[19:38.740 --> 19:51.140]  And just, you know, the idea that a newspaper of the caliber of the Washington Post would come out and advocate for a whistleblower to be in prison, which is basically what you're saying.
[19:51.140 --> 19:57.900]  If you're saying he does not deserve a pardon, you're saying he deserves perhaps a lifetime in prison in the United States, it's unconscionable.
[19:58.080 --> 20:03.120]  It's just... I cannot, for the life of me, understand the motivation behind this.
[20:03.400 --> 20:13.140]  Now, I know we are all aware that the editorial board of a newspaper and the reporters of a newspaper are not necessarily the same people.
[20:13.140 --> 20:19.220]  So I imagine a lot of reporters are probably horrified by this, as I am.
[20:19.380 --> 20:24.300]  But there are just a couple of tidbits here that I have to focus on, specifically this.
[20:26.160 --> 20:30.060]  In justifying this position, they actually say this, and I want you guys to listen.
[20:30.560 --> 20:43.380]  No specific harm, actual or attempted, to any individual American was ever shown to have resulted from the NSA telephone metadata program Mr. Snowden brought to light.
[20:43.680 --> 20:45.260]  Can you believe that?
[20:45.440 --> 20:52.680]  They're telling us that having all of that information of ours, basically spied upon by the NSA, we weren't hurt by that.
[20:52.800 --> 20:54.480]  That didn't affect us at all.
[20:54.700 --> 21:00.860]  I mean, how dare you tell us that having our privacy violated did not cause any harm?
[21:00.940 --> 21:02.020]  Of course it caused harm.
[21:02.140 --> 21:16.920]  And they're saying that worse, far worse, he leaked details of basically defensible international intelligence operations, cooperation with Scandinavian services against Russia, spying on the wife of an Osama bin Laden associate, certain offensive cyber operations in China.
[21:16.920 --> 21:18.840]  How about spying on Angela Merkel?
[21:19.040 --> 21:21.760]  You know, things like that, that he basically...
[21:21.760 --> 21:25.980]  PRISM, they say PRISM was clearly legal and not threatening to privacy.
[21:26.260 --> 21:27.380]  What am I reading here?
[21:27.460 --> 21:33.140]  It feels like I'm reading some kind of Soviet-era publication that basically is defending everything the government does.
[21:33.380 --> 21:34.280]  It's disgusting.
[21:34.560 --> 21:34.760]  Wow.
[21:35.080 --> 21:36.340]  Yeah, it really is disgusting.
[21:36.900 --> 21:37.380]  Go ahead, man.
[21:37.380 --> 21:39.160]  That was a Washington Post, wasn't it?
[21:39.200 --> 21:42.600]  Which was purchased by Jeff Bezos of Amazon.com.
[21:42.600 --> 21:45.420]  I had to check to make sure I was actually reading the Washington Post.
[21:45.500 --> 21:46.880]  But yeah, it is the Washington Post.
[21:46.980 --> 21:50.020]  It's provoked some rather strong reaction.
[21:50.780 --> 21:51.660]  But it's purchased...
[21:51.660 --> 21:54.620]  The Washington Post is now owned by Amazon.com.
[21:55.580 --> 21:57.320]  And Jeff Bezos bought it.
[21:57.600 --> 22:05.440]  So you've got to wonder what the impetus is behind their editorial, you know, opinions.
[22:05.620 --> 22:07.040]  Where do you think that's coming from?
[22:07.560 --> 22:08.320]  I don't know.
[22:08.320 --> 22:09.240]  I mean, it's...
[22:09.240 --> 22:12.640]  I don't really have knowledge as to how the Washington Post puts together an editorial.
[22:12.860 --> 22:16.280]  I don't know if Jeff himself is responsible for any of this.
[22:16.780 --> 22:35.660]  But it's, you know, in this society of ours to have a major newspaper with the respect of the Washington Post come out and say something like this, especially having benefited so much from what Snowden has revealed and not recognizing the amazing public service that he has performed,
[22:35.660 --> 22:38.600]  the sacrifice he has made in doing this.
[22:38.720 --> 22:48.680]  And after having seen, I presume, the two films that basically show this, I don't understand the motivation.
[22:48.680 --> 22:53.020]  I really don't understand how you can, in all seriousness, say something like this.
[22:54.240 --> 22:56.650]  Yeah, it's funny how...
[22:57.180 --> 23:05.500]  I'd like to see the numbers about, like, exactly how much Snowden's revelations have increased Amazon shareholder value as a result of the Washington Post publishing stories about them.
[23:05.660 --> 23:07.700]  So, yeah, it's... they definitely benefited.
[23:08.160 --> 23:09.880]  Well, how... in what ways, like...
[23:10.740 --> 23:14.540]  what ways specifically... I'm not quite clear on...
[23:14.540 --> 23:17.960]  The Washington Post has published stories resulting from the leaks.
[23:18.080 --> 23:21.280]  Oh, you mean, like, they've profited through headlines, you mean?
[23:21.380 --> 23:21.680]  Of course.
[23:21.820 --> 23:22.360]  As a news outlet.
[23:22.680 --> 23:23.340]  As a poor profit.
[23:23.340 --> 23:23.980]  So now maybe...
[23:23.980 --> 23:28.260]  Yeah, and so now here they're going in a different direction, still getting all that money.
[23:28.480 --> 23:28.580]  Yeah.
[23:28.580 --> 23:29.460]  Just different headlines.
[23:29.760 --> 23:38.360]  Well, you know, they win respect by publishing something cutting edge, just like with the Pentagon Papers, and then to go and say, yeah, they deserve to be prosecuted, it was a crime.
[23:39.500 --> 23:41.040]  It's... you can't have it both ways.
[23:41.040 --> 23:41.880]  You really can't.
[23:41.980 --> 23:48.840]  But this... this... this... this shows how two-faced certain organizations can be.
[23:49.220 --> 23:50.280]  So that's pretty disgusting.
[23:50.420 --> 23:52.520]  I thought that was not a good thing at all.
[23:52.700 --> 24:04.560]  Yeah, it doesn't acknowledge the foundation, like, the underlying structure that is flawed and sets people up for being materially impacted by surveillance.
[24:05.280 --> 24:06.920]  Yeah, that's the issue they should be discussing.
[24:07.140 --> 24:07.600]  It opens the door.
[24:07.800 --> 24:09.040]  It opens the floodgates.
[24:09.220 --> 24:10.440]  Whatever analogy you want.
[24:10.600 --> 24:13.580]  There are so many things that we have learned through the Snowden revelations.
[24:13.780 --> 24:19.840]  I mean, you know, the sale of tape to cover up webcams has gone through the roof.
[24:19.960 --> 24:21.040]  Everyone's covering them up now.
[24:21.280 --> 24:21.440]  Yeah.
[24:21.440 --> 24:33.580]  The fact that we know that those can be turned on remotely, that phones can be used to spy on us against our permission, against our will, these are all public services.
[24:33.720 --> 24:36.700]  And, yeah, you can say, wow, this makes it harder to catch the bad guys.
[24:36.980 --> 24:41.520]  It also makes it harder to spy on the good guys and to invade all of our privacy.
[24:41.660 --> 24:44.100]  And that is something we deserve to know about.
[24:44.280 --> 24:49.180]  Now, if the Washington Post doesn't want to reveal stories like that anymore, I'm sure there are plenty of newspapers that do.
[24:49.180 --> 24:53.240]  So maybe they should take themselves out of the running for that and leave it to others.
[24:53.760 --> 25:07.280]  And in line with a lot of what we do here and the hacker community in general as far as sharing information is to educate people because through that education, people are empowered, right?
[25:07.440 --> 25:11.180]  You're empowered to take charge of your security or your privacy.
[25:11.640 --> 25:21.560]  And if you understand what kinds of things around you are vulnerable, you'll take steps at least to be aware and vigilant and so on and so forth in your everyday interactions.
[25:22.290 --> 25:34.220]  Whether you really can do anything about the sort of, as I said, systemic underlying problems that are being basically turned into legislation or have been for 10 years.
[25:34.280 --> 25:34.540]  I don't know.
[25:34.620 --> 25:35.540]  What do we talk about on the show?
[25:38.650 --> 25:40.600]  Well, and it's not the only case, obviously.
[25:40.760 --> 25:48.900]  There are all kinds of other people out there that are revealing things, whistleblowers of all sorts, but also just people who are involved in hacking in one sense or another.
[25:49.560 --> 26:07.240]  You guys heard of this case involving someone named Laurie Love, who actually spoke at our conference this past July via video link because he's in the UK and accused of hacking and being threatened with being extradited to the United States.
[26:07.380 --> 26:08.880]  That is the latest thing.
[26:09.040 --> 26:12.320]  Well, it's not really the latest thing, but it's something that you're seeing more and more of these days.
[26:12.700 --> 26:20.500]  If you commit any kind of a crime that the United States doesn't like, you get a free trip over to our country and you get to spend some time here.
[26:20.500 --> 26:24.240]  Yeah, it's really that in itself really bothers me.
[26:24.620 --> 26:30.600]  But what happened here in this particular case was last week, a UK judge said, you know what?
[26:30.680 --> 26:31.100]  That's OK.
[26:31.120 --> 26:37.600]  He can face nearly a century in prison for hacking into US government computers and he can get a trip over to the United States to do that.
[26:37.780 --> 26:41.000]  And that that alone just rubs me the wrong way.
[26:41.160 --> 26:54.740]  I was going to say you can add that it even entitles you to trips, free trips, other places if you count our rendition and all the things that could be possibly conflated with with terrorism these days.
[26:54.940 --> 26:56.560]  Yeah, it's and it's not even about terrorism.
[26:56.740 --> 27:08.060]  It's just about getting into a computer system, allegedly hacking into government agencies and and performing some kind of mischief things that many of us have done in the past.
[27:08.420 --> 27:10.940]  But it doesn't work the other way.
[27:10.940 --> 27:30.180]  If if after the show we decide we're going to hack into, oh, I don't know, pick a country, Iran, France, Japan, friendly countries, hostile countries, odds are even if we get into the most secretive of their computer systems, we're not going to be extradited to those countries.
[27:30.700 --> 27:32.280]  They don't get to do that.
[27:32.460 --> 27:33.700]  Why do we get to do that?
[27:33.840 --> 27:44.900]  Why do we get to say, yeah, this person, we want them over here because they pissed us off and and we want to hold them in one of our cells for a number of years.
[27:45.140 --> 27:47.920]  It's it's just it just strikes me as not being right.
[27:48.100 --> 27:48.220]  Yeah.
[27:48.320 --> 27:54.280]  And make no mistake, wherever you are in the world, as you go about your day, you're breaking several laws in other countries apart from your own.
[27:54.340 --> 27:56.280]  And it doesn't matter because that doesn't apply where you are.
[27:56.500 --> 28:00.240]  Yeah, we've probably broken several laws already just by talking on the air in some countries.
[28:00.800 --> 28:01.780]  Bernie, what do you think of this?
[28:01.840 --> 28:02.140]  Emmanuel?
[28:02.140 --> 28:05.160]  Well, yeah, these extradition treaties that the U.S.
[28:07.120 --> 28:16.960]  drafts and signs with most countries around the world are really a projection of American power, the American government power, I think.
[28:17.080 --> 28:17.340]  Yes.
[28:17.520 --> 28:20.320]  And as you pointed out, allow the U.S.
[28:20.460 --> 28:30.860]  to extradite people from around the world, numerous countries, while basically prohibiting Americans from being extradited to other countries.
[28:30.860 --> 28:34.860]  But, you know, I don't think Americans should feel so safe.
[28:35.000 --> 28:35.660]  If the U.S.
[28:35.660 --> 28:41.820]  starts following this crap, other countries might start doing the same thing and snatching us out of the United States and taking them.
[28:41.900 --> 28:57.520]  How about North Korea or Iran or any other country of the, you know, country of du jour that is hated could, you know, basically kidnap us, take us without our permission and take them over there.
[28:57.700 --> 29:02.460]  So this is like, this is something that should concern all of us, I think.
[29:02.600 --> 29:03.100]  Yeah, absolutely.
[29:03.340 --> 29:05.040]  And, you know, it's a disturbing parallel.
[29:05.260 --> 29:16.420]  We see increasingly the civil unrest in this country based upon the actions of police against the people, the civilians.
[29:16.920 --> 29:22.700]  And we realize we live in a two-tiered society where police can do certain things and get away with it.
[29:22.760 --> 29:28.880]  They can kill people and not even be named and not even lose their jobs and not be questioned.
[29:29.320 --> 29:34.240]  It's kind of like, you know, this person is really high up and you're really low down.
[29:34.660 --> 29:43.300]  And I'm seeing increasingly the United States as a country being viewed as cops and the rest of the world as civilians.
[29:43.300 --> 29:50.840]  We get to do this, but you don't get to do this, you know, because we're better, because we are trusted and you have to believe everything we say.
[29:51.340 --> 29:58.200]  We get to use the drones and bomb the smithereens out of foreign countries, but don't you dare do anything like that to us.
[29:58.600 --> 30:00.620]  And I'm not comfortable in that kind of a world.
[30:00.760 --> 30:01.840]  Are you guys comfortable?
[30:02.880 --> 30:03.760]  Not especially.
[30:03.760 --> 30:04.680]  You don't look comfortable.
[30:05.100 --> 30:05.560]  No.
[30:05.920 --> 30:06.160]  No.
[30:06.600 --> 30:06.960]  All right.
[30:07.520 --> 30:19.140]  I would say an analogy also that is apropos would be the sort of distinct difference in how you're measured, right?
[30:19.360 --> 30:21.760]  Civilians versus an authority, right?
[30:21.860 --> 30:25.640]  They're just simply measured by a completely different standard.
[30:25.800 --> 30:27.560]  Maybe not so much that they're higher up.
[30:27.660 --> 30:29.220]  There should be equity, right?
[30:29.300 --> 30:37.000]  It shouldn't be that they are higher up in any kind of hierarchical sense, but it's a completely different standard they're held to.
[30:38.220 --> 30:38.720]  Yes.
[30:39.980 --> 30:46.500]  Anyway, getting back to the Lori Love story, he's a 32-year-old native of Suffolk in the UK.
[30:46.800 --> 30:56.780]  He's accused of being involved in a series of anonymous affiliated hacks known collectively as Op Last Resort, in which the international hacking group infiltrated computers of U.S.
[30:57.020 --> 30:59.300]  government agencies, including the FBI, the U.S.
[30:59.420 --> 31:02.660]  Army, the Missile Defense Agency, and the Federal Reserve.
[31:02.780 --> 31:02.940]  Come on.
[31:02.980 --> 31:03.860]  Who hasn't hacked them?
[31:04.060 --> 31:04.760]  I mean, seriously.
[31:05.240 --> 31:10.560]  And also, I'm reading from a press statement here.
[31:11.420 --> 31:14.060]  I think we all know anonymous is not a hacking group.
[31:14.200 --> 31:18.180]  Anonymous is more of a, I don't know, a barometer of what is out there.
[31:18.380 --> 31:22.860]  It's very loosely, if it's even organized at all.
[31:23.160 --> 31:28.120]  But in any event, he's accused of being a part of that particular Operation Op Last Resort.
[31:28.400 --> 31:28.920]  U.S.
[31:29.160 --> 31:35.240]  authorities said his actions resulted in the release of employees' personal information caused millions of dollars in damage.
[31:35.500 --> 31:41.880]  You know, it's hard to believe some of the things they say, that one person is responsible for this.
[31:42.360 --> 31:44.460]  I know there are security issues.
[31:44.600 --> 31:51.720]  I know people's private information is compromised constantly, usually because of poor security.
[31:51.880 --> 31:56.320]  But to pin it all on one person, I think that's a bit of an exaggeration.
[31:56.440 --> 31:59.660]  And I don't see the evidence in this particular case.
[32:00.060 --> 32:02.180]  But anyway, Lori Love has Asperger's syndrome.
[32:02.180 --> 32:07.640]  He's warned that his mental health would pose a high risk of him committing suicide if he's sent to a U.S.
[32:07.800 --> 32:08.140]  prison.
[32:09.420 --> 32:29.640]  And his lawyer, actually the judge, said in her decision last week, I accept Mr. Love suffers from both physical and mental health issues, but I have found the medical facilities in the United States prison estate are such that I can be satisfied his needs will be comprehensively met by U.S.
[32:29.980 --> 32:29.980]  authorities.
[32:29.980 --> 32:47.900]  That is the most chilling statement that I think I've ever heard from a judge, especially a judge overseas, saying that, yeah, you know, we recognize that there are some cases to be concerned about, but he'll be fine in prison.
[32:47.980 --> 32:48.900]  They'll take good care of him.
[32:49.260 --> 32:53.400]  I mean, does anybody believe that he's going to be taken good care of in a U.S.
[32:53.760 --> 32:53.760]  prison?
[32:54.140 --> 32:55.720]  Quote, taken care of, unquote.
[32:56.560 --> 32:57.900]  I'm sorry, Bernie, mid-sentence.
[32:58.000 --> 32:58.120]  What?
[32:58.800 --> 33:00.300]  Oh, I'm sorry for interrupting.
[33:01.080 --> 33:08.020]  Apparently, they don't understand what the Bureau of Prisons, the Federal Bureau of Prisons health care program was like.
[33:08.160 --> 33:09.580]  I personally experienced it.
[33:09.620 --> 33:09.940]  That's right.
[33:10.000 --> 33:11.840]  You took advantage of their facilities, didn't you?
[33:11.840 --> 33:12.740]  Yes, I did.
[33:12.860 --> 33:15.300]  It was free of charge, so to speak.
[33:15.580 --> 33:31.320]  And I was pretty surprised that there was a certain level of medical care, but it was more to like cover the base, just cover the dots, the I's and cross the T's rather than provide the actual treatment.
[33:31.560 --> 33:39.500]  It was more like an administrative solution to saying that people were really cared for with just doing it on paperwork instead of really caring for them.
[33:40.660 --> 33:44.460]  Well, there is still hope in the case of Lori Love.
[33:44.780 --> 33:47.800]  I know that there is an appeal.
[33:47.980 --> 33:56.280]  Home Secretary Amber Rudd has until November 15th to rule on the extradition, and the legal team is appealing to the high court.
[33:57.160 --> 34:00.700]  Parallels to another hacker case, Gary McKinnon.
[34:00.900 --> 34:03.320]  I don't know if you guys remember this case.
[34:03.440 --> 34:13.720]  I think he was known as the UFO hacker or something and looking for evidence of UFOs, also from the UK, also the United States expressed a strong interest in having him visit us for an extended period of time.
[34:13.880 --> 34:22.190]  And his extradition was blocked on human rights grounds by then Home Secretary, wait for it, Theresa May.
[34:22.520 --> 34:23.940]  She's now the Prime Minister.
[34:24.220 --> 34:28.150]  So fingers crossed that justice will prevail in this particular case.
[34:28.280 --> 34:33.090]  But as I said, this is happening a lot, not just in the UK, all over the place.
[34:33.550 --> 34:35.440]  And it's not fair treatment.
[34:35.720 --> 34:37.860]  It's not fair treatment of people in other countries.
[34:37.940 --> 34:46.000]  If a crime is committed, okay, you know, be tried in your country, but not extradited someplace else where you've never even been.
[34:46.480 --> 34:55.240]  Yeah, but wasn't it under, also under Theresa May's watch that they extradited that English kid to the US for posting links to television shows on sites he didn't control?
[34:55.610 --> 34:56.130]  So...
[34:56.130 --> 34:57.220]  Yeah, that's true.
[34:57.280 --> 35:02.150]  But that also wound up not happening, which was a fortunate thing.
[35:02.340 --> 35:06.300]  Somehow I'm thinking about the stupid swimmers during the Olympics getting extradited.
[35:06.540 --> 35:06.880]  He had to come to the US.
[35:07.280 --> 35:07.900]  Say again?
[35:08.780 --> 35:14.630]  He had to come... he had to come... the guy you were talking about with the... I think it was TV Shack.
[35:15.460 --> 35:23.110]  He had to come to the US, but make a deal and try some paperwork, and then be allowed to go back.
[35:23.320 --> 35:26.040]  But it was... there was a lot of money that had to be paid.
[35:26.130 --> 35:27.820]  And lawyers and all that.
[35:28.220 --> 35:29.840]  So, it was not without consequence.
[35:30.020 --> 35:35.500]  He still had to come to the US, but he dealt... he had to deal with it here, and then he was able to go back.
[35:35.610 --> 35:41.300]  Yeah, and we had his mother... we had his mother, Julia O'Dwyer, on this show as a guest, talking about the case.
[35:42.380 --> 35:47.440]  And, yeah, it... it was bizarre, and it's still bizarre, and what's going on now is bizarre.
[35:47.440 --> 35:48.140]  Okay.
[35:48.380 --> 35:50.520]  Well, enough of the bizarreness.
[35:51.050 --> 36:04.960]  We had some bizarre incidents happening here in New York over the past week, specifically the Chelsea bombing, as I guess it's going to be known as, in years to come.
[36:05.340 --> 36:12.050]  And all of us in New York, in the city, apparently had an emergency alert go out over our phones.
[36:12.180 --> 36:15.680]  Bernie, I know you were in New York City, and you got to experience this as well, right?
[36:16.300 --> 36:22.540]  Yeah, I happened to be in Manhattan, and I was awoken at 8 a.m.
[36:22.620 --> 36:27.500]  by a wireless emergency alert.
[36:27.760 --> 36:29.500]  W-E-A is what it's called.
[36:30.040 --> 36:39.680]  Yeah, and it was... it's much like I've heard occasionally if there's a weather emergency, but it's the same tones.
[36:40.240 --> 36:43.320]  Well, it's the old EBS tone, right?
[36:44.260 --> 36:47.020]  Well, no, it's a different sequence of tones.
[36:47.200 --> 36:47.440]  Is it?
[36:47.520 --> 36:47.660]  Okay.
[36:48.320 --> 36:50.860]  But it definitely gets your attention, is the bottom line.
[36:50.900 --> 36:51.780]  Yeah, it's pretty jarring.
[36:52.160 --> 37:03.280]  Yeah, well, I remember during the monsoon after Hope, I got on my phone something... I thought somebody was honking behind me in a frequency that was the old EBS tone, but it was my phone trying to alert me to something.
[37:03.460 --> 37:03.900]  Yeah, that's it.
[37:04.220 --> 37:05.600]  Well, that's an EBS tone.
[37:05.780 --> 37:07.520]  That's that old frequency.
[37:07.660 --> 37:07.940]  I don't know.
[37:08.040 --> 37:09.920]  It could be a... It's different audio frequencies.
[37:10.040 --> 37:12.540]  It may sound similar, but it's different audio frequencies.
[37:12.920 --> 37:12.920]  Okay.
[37:12.920 --> 37:23.360]  But the bottom line about this wireless emergency alert message that came out Sunday morning, or in 8 a.m., I believe, was... it was a manhunt message.
[37:23.540 --> 37:38.140]  It was to be on the lookout for this individual who they believe was responsible for... connected with his bombings, and to tune into... it mentioned his name, I can't recall it, and to tune into media.
[37:38.160 --> 37:42.880]  I think it said tune into news media for photos and so forth.
[37:43.070 --> 37:44.300]  And they didn't have enough bandwidth.
[37:44.480 --> 37:46.480]  They couldn't... they couldn't actually show you the photo.
[37:46.780 --> 37:49.700]  They could only send an SMS, I believe, 90 characters.
[37:49.840 --> 37:54.320]  There's a text with this protocol for the wireless emergency alert messages.
[37:54.600 --> 38:06.720]  But people got the message, including one guy across from a bar that he owns, watching it on CNN minutes later, and saw a picture of a guy and then found that guy sleeping in his doorbell, apparently.
[38:07.360 --> 38:25.160]  So it is... to me, it's kind of a chilling... effective, but chilling method by which the entire populace can be alerted to look for this wanted person the government wants, and turn him in, who knows, you know, for whatever merit.
[38:25.340 --> 38:28.460]  But it... it... it's kind of scared me, honestly.
[38:28.780 --> 38:36.740]  Well, Bernie, I'm going to... I'm going to advocate for the devil here, just for a few moments, and ask you, what... what is there to complain about?
[38:36.800 --> 38:37.520]  I mean, it worked.
[38:37.680 --> 38:38.550]  The surveillance worked.
[38:38.600 --> 38:59.050]  All the cameras that saw the guy with the... with the suitcase, leaving the bombs in... in various locations, uh... the fingerprint that was on one of them that led to this guy, the alert that had people searching for him and his eventual capture, seems that all the surveillance worked in our favor.
[38:59.880 --> 39:00.860]  It... it did.
[39:01.020 --> 39:02.300]  It did in this case, Emmanuel.
[39:02.740 --> 39:11.220]  But... I would argue that, you know, this is going to be abused at some point, to look for someone who maybe doesn't deserve that kind of attention.
[39:11.920 --> 39:19.220]  Um... that's my personal opinion, because once you set an infrastructure, a system like this in place, it will be used, and it will eventually be abused.
[39:19.360 --> 39:20.000]  Because it's so powerful.
[39:20.300 --> 39:25.500]  If you can alert the entire... and this is a highly targeted messaging system, this wireless emergency alert stuff.
[39:25.680 --> 39:27.550]  It was just to the five bureaus.
[39:27.600 --> 39:30.840]  Any... any cell phone within the five bureaus, apparently, was alerted.
[39:30.920 --> 39:37.720]  Anyone out, like... if I happened to have been to Philadelphia that Sunday morning, it... my phone would not have been alerted.
[39:38.020 --> 39:46.260]  So it has to do with the geographical limitations, but it's a highly targeted way of getting propaganda... propaganda... propaganda not necessarily be a negative thing.
[39:46.380 --> 39:48.020]  Propaganda is just getting a message out.
[39:48.380 --> 39:50.540]  That's what the definition of propaganda is.
[39:51.000 --> 39:52.540]  And, um... I don't know.
[39:52.620 --> 39:58.680]  It's a powerful medium, and we should really be concerned about how it can be used and potentially abused.
[39:59.140 --> 39:59.740]  I agree.
[39:59.780 --> 40:04.520]  It's powerful, but, um... in what ways, like, do you see it being abused?
[40:04.600 --> 40:06.480]  Like, I think... I think of, like, the Amber Alert system.
[40:06.540 --> 40:08.340]  I don't really feel like that's being abused.
[40:08.820 --> 40:11.400]  I mean, it's... it's... it's used.
[40:11.570 --> 40:12.980]  It may be underutilized.
[40:13.140 --> 40:18.880]  It's there, uh... but it's... it's functions and... and is activated when it's needed.
[40:19.140 --> 40:27.620]  I think there's other sort of weather-related things that actually tie into this new mobile emergency alert system.
[40:28.380 --> 40:31.320]  Um... and... actually, I think it's a good thing.
[40:31.550 --> 40:39.140]  I mean, I think if there was something nationally that we needed to know about and it... or... and then they could, um...
[40:39.140 --> 40:45.840]  tailor those to a region or a specific populace, I think that's important, um... for, uh...
[40:45.840 --> 41:01.320]  an organization... from an organizational standpoint, uh... and, uh... a community like emergency response and... and that kind of thing, you really need that, uh... on a lot of levels to... to work the right way.
[41:01.460 --> 41:04.480]  So that... I mean, we have these powerful, powerful phones.
[41:04.600 --> 41:12.780]  The fact that they're even using something as old as SMS, I mean, it's sort of cute, but it... it should work, and it... it does, and it will serve us.
[41:12.860 --> 41:20.160]  And with this... all this technology to not have systems like that, I think we would be, uh... we would be really making a mistake.
[41:20.860 --> 41:26.260]  Oh, I... I... Emmanuel, I... I really agree with you, Kyle, on that, but it's not... we're on... it's not SMS.
[41:26.520 --> 41:30.860]  It's a different messaging protocol that phones are required to, uh... to carry, just for this...
[41:30.860 --> 41:32.960]  Well, it's very... it's very much like... it's like SMS.
[41:33.220 --> 41:34.800]  It's like... but it looks like a text message.
[41:34.880 --> 41:37.500]  It's just... it looks like a text message, but it's not actually SMS.
[41:37.800 --> 41:40.400]  But my point is, yes, this is a good thing.
[41:40.550 --> 41:41.740]  This is a good thing we have.
[41:42.020 --> 41:48.660]  However, this is the first instance this Sunday morning whereby it was used to look for an individual.
[41:49.460 --> 41:50.220]  And who knows?
[41:50.480 --> 41:51.360]  I mean, this is great.
[41:51.500 --> 41:57.820]  It worked out well, but I'm just saying there's an infrastructure in place now where the government can say, go, we want this person.
[41:58.160 --> 41:59.920]  Find him for us so we can get him.
[42:00.460 --> 42:02.740]  Um... who knows where that could lead eventually.
[42:02.960 --> 42:07.980]  But how... how is that... how is that really different than just airing something on television that everybody sees?
[42:08.020 --> 42:16.360]  I mean, it's more efficient now because everyone carries these phones around with them, but the mentality behind it, putting out an APB for somebody, how is... how is it different than that?
[42:17.070 --> 42:22.000]  I think it just reaches into more people's lives because these are not optional messages.
[42:22.000 --> 42:23.180]  You can't turn this off.
[42:23.380 --> 42:28.220]  Your phone will go off with just a message saying, find this person for us and turn him in.
[42:28.360 --> 42:30.050]  Well, that leads me to my next question.
[42:30.300 --> 42:35.840]  Um, if I had my phone on silent, I'm told that, uh, I would not hear this alert, correct?
[42:36.800 --> 42:38.180]  You know, that's a good question.
[42:38.400 --> 42:40.300]  My phone was not on silent and I heard it.
[42:40.460 --> 42:41.520]  You would receive it.
[42:41.660 --> 42:46.460]  You would receive a text and I don't know whether you would, it would override the silent thing.
[42:46.550 --> 42:47.740]  I guess it wouldn't, frankly.
[42:47.940 --> 42:48.570]  I don't think it does.
[42:48.980 --> 42:59.660]  And I think that's actually kind of stupid because let's say it's something that, you know, it's a life, uh, endangering event that you really want to be aware of and, but you don't want to be woken up by everybody who calls you or text you.
[42:59.860 --> 43:04.740]  Uh, it would be a good thing to have this thing alert you by your choice though.
[43:05.240 --> 43:05.320]  Yeah.
[43:05.550 --> 43:14.820]  And you, you could, there's, you could also have like a airplane mode or, or completely shut it off or not use a phone or put it in some sort of Faraday, uh, bag.
[43:15.000 --> 43:19.540]  There's lots of ways to, to not get this kind of information if that's your aim.
[43:19.640 --> 43:19.860]  You can turn your phone off?
[43:20.570 --> 43:22.050]  Yeah, some people can still do that.
[43:22.050 --> 43:22.820]  I can't turn my phone off.
[43:23.040 --> 43:24.600]  Sometimes you can remove the battery.
[43:24.760 --> 43:25.100]  Yes, Rob.
[43:26.050 --> 43:31.820]  If you're, if your, uh, phone is on silent or off, you'll just get the, you'll get the notification like you do for any text message.
[43:32.320 --> 43:33.660]  And next time you look at your phone, you'll see it.
[43:33.780 --> 43:38.960]  But, uh, to draw further parallels, uh, Jim passed me a note from the peanut gallery, which reads Fahrenheit 451.
[43:39.120 --> 43:39.500]  Uh huh.
[43:39.820 --> 43:40.500]  Oh yes.
[43:40.800 --> 43:41.380]  Yeah, definitely.
[43:42.620 --> 43:44.000]  What happens with Fahrenheit 451?
[43:44.080 --> 43:46.780]  They burn the books, but they, they burn the books.
[43:46.880 --> 43:47.000]  Yes.
[43:47.680 --> 43:47.940]  Okay.
[43:48.040 --> 43:48.880]  How does that relate to this?
[43:50.460 --> 43:51.720]  Different kinds of emergencies.
[43:52.040 --> 43:52.380]  Okay.
[43:53.280 --> 43:53.740]  All right.
[43:53.840 --> 43:55.720]  Well, we're moving steadily towards, I guess.
[43:55.960 --> 43:56.500]  Thank you, Jim.
[43:56.640 --> 43:57.040]  That's great.
[43:57.520 --> 43:58.820]  Any, uh, any other words, Bernie?
[44:00.300 --> 44:06.880]  Um, well, I'm just saying this is a technology was used effectively in this case to find an individual very quickly.
[44:07.060 --> 44:17.820]  I'm just saying we should be aware that such a powerful thing exists and be mindful that it exists and be, try to be watchful in how it's used and potentially abused in the future.
[44:18.480 --> 44:18.920]  Okay.
[44:19.200 --> 44:24.160]  Um, so I didn't get this, uh, this alert because I was on Long Island, Kyle, you're on Long Island as well.
[44:24.580 --> 44:29.880]  Um, so it's based on, on your location, your geographic location on your phone.
[44:30.540 --> 44:32.520]  Um, can you turn that off?
[44:32.640 --> 44:36.220]  Can you, can you tell your phone, don't, uh, identify where I am?
[44:36.400 --> 44:41.080]  It doesn't identify where you are because it goes from the cell towers to phones in its area.
[44:41.080 --> 44:47.700]  So that's why, that's why Bernie got it when he was in New York, even though his phone is registered, uh, I assume to, um, outside, outside.
[44:48.020 --> 44:50.960]  So if you turn GPS off, it doesn't make a damn bit of difference.
[44:50.960 --> 44:52.500]  I always have GPS off and it still goes through.
[44:52.580 --> 44:52.680]  Right.
[44:52.720 --> 45:00.560]  Because they're, they're sending the message to specific towers in a region and they send it indiscriminately to everyone, just like a page might go out.
[45:00.900 --> 45:05.000]  There's this other message that you can't turn off at all called the presidential alert.
[45:06.140 --> 45:06.580]  Right.
[45:06.800 --> 45:08.720]  And, uh, does anybody know what that is?
[45:08.820 --> 45:10.360]  I think, I think it's the same concept.
[45:10.900 --> 45:11.340]  Okay.
[45:11.720 --> 45:11.900]  Yeah.
[45:11.960 --> 45:14.140]  There's, there's different hierarchy of messages for this.
[45:14.260 --> 45:29.860]  I think it's emergency alert, um, system, but, uh, there's, and you can, you can turn off, I think on some phones, the alert, uh, but if there's a highest level of alert, which is from the president, the White House.
[45:30.160 --> 45:40.380]  So the president can literally take over all the cell phones in the United States instantaneously and blast, uh, a mess and audio message.
[45:40.860 --> 45:58.200]  Um, well, the, the tones and then the text message, um, on all the cell phones, the president could do this right, you know, 10 minutes from now, all the cell phones that, that of everybody that's listening to us, United States would go off if the president decided to send one of these messages out.
[45:58.300 --> 46:00.560]  But not if they're on silent, not if they're on silent, right?
[46:01.780 --> 46:02.380]  Probably not.
[46:02.540 --> 46:05.180]  I don't, I think the silence will Trump, Trump that.
[46:05.360 --> 46:06.180]  No, no pun intended.
[46:06.560 --> 46:07.300]  Don't say that.
[46:07.720 --> 46:08.840]  Don't, don't, don't use that word.
[46:09.300 --> 46:15.900]  Um, yeah, but I bet in future generations of phones that will override the silent, uh, uh, switch.
[46:16.640 --> 46:17.900]  I'll just, I'll just bet it will.
[46:18.560 --> 46:19.440]  Um, okay.
[46:19.560 --> 46:25.640]  So that was interesting little technological, uh, development that took place as a result of, uh, the chaos that was taking place in the city.
[46:25.660 --> 46:28.780]  And yeah, you know, it's, it's something to be worried about in the future.
[46:29.040 --> 46:43.440]  I do think though, in this particular case, as Kyle said, it, it worked, it, uh, it did serve us, but, uh, as Bernie has expressed concern, maybe in the future, it'll be used for something a bit less nefarious and, uh, or more nefarious on, on the authorities part.
[46:44.060 --> 46:48.460]  Uh, so, okay, that's, uh, something to keep an eye on and to understand the technology, how it works.
[46:49.280 --> 46:53.840]  Um, speaking of technology, do we want to try using these new phones for the first time ever?
[46:54.180 --> 46:55.360]  I think that would be cool.
[46:55.580 --> 46:56.460]  Bernie, what do you think?
[46:57.200 --> 46:58.680]  I, I think we should break the ice here.
[46:58.760 --> 47:02.080]  I don't know of any other, uh, producers who've taken advantage of this yet.
[47:02.260 --> 47:03.920]  Well, because they don't know there are phone lines here.
[47:04.020 --> 47:04.980]  We haven't been told by anybody.
[47:05.040 --> 47:08.220]  So, um, I know you were, uh, you played a part in this.
[47:08.320 --> 47:09.980]  So, uh, you actually found out the phone numbers.
[47:10.360 --> 47:13.380]  So, okay, uh, folks stand by for the first time ever.
[47:13.480 --> 47:17.940]  I believe we're going to be giving out the phone number, the new phone number, which is not at all easy to remember.
[47:18.140 --> 47:19.340]  It's not like the other one.
[47:20.200 --> 47:20.520]  Wow.
[47:20.800 --> 47:22.120]  And even the area code is weird.
[47:22.420 --> 47:23.420]  Um, okay.
[47:23.480 --> 47:24.360]  And we're going to take your phone calls.
[47:24.460 --> 47:24.600]  Ready?
[47:24.800 --> 47:25.240]  Everybody ready?
[47:25.300 --> 47:25.740]  Got your pencils?
[47:26.040 --> 47:26.360]  Yes.
[47:26.520 --> 47:26.720]  All right.
[47:27.300 --> 47:33.300]  Area code 347-335-0786.
[47:35.040 --> 47:35.900]  I'm not kidding.
[47:36.080 --> 47:37.140]  That is our phone number.
[47:37.460 --> 47:40.620]  Um, and, uh, the first person that calls in, we'll put you on the air right now.
[47:40.940 --> 47:43.840]  347-335-0786 just rolls off the tongue, doesn't it?
[47:44.380 --> 47:45.820]  Well, we're waiting for calls to come in.
[47:45.900 --> 47:46.460]  Oh, it's already in.
[47:46.680 --> 47:47.080]  Oh, okay.
[47:47.160 --> 47:47.540]  Well, go ahead.
[47:47.600 --> 47:48.040]  Make your announcement.
[47:48.220 --> 47:48.380]  Okay.
[47:48.480 --> 47:55.520]  Well, um, WBAI has screenings of a, uh, special movie called The Best Democracy Money Can Buy this Friday, Saturday, and Sunday in Manhattan.
[47:55.860 --> 47:58.900]  Um, go to WBAI.org to, uh, get those tickets.
[47:59.220 --> 47:59.540]  All right.
[47:59.860 --> 48:01.520]  Uh, we have our first phone call.
[48:01.840 --> 48:02.740]  Uh, caller, are you there?
[48:03.020 --> 48:03.800]  Yes, I am.
[48:03.940 --> 48:07.840]  Hey, congratulations on the phone's partially being restored.
[48:08.160 --> 48:09.160]  Yeah, you sound great.
[48:09.360 --> 48:10.440]  This is a good quality.
[48:10.680 --> 48:10.980]  Wow.
[48:11.180 --> 48:11.980]  I'm, I'm very impressed.
[48:12.100 --> 48:12.740]  Where are you calling from?
[48:13.020 --> 48:16.020]  I'm calling from, um, um, Nassau County on the South Shore.
[48:16.280 --> 48:16.520]  Wow.
[48:16.620 --> 48:16.780]  Okay.
[48:16.860 --> 48:17.560]  Long distance call.
[48:17.740 --> 48:17.940]  Good.
[48:18.100 --> 48:18.200]  Good.
[48:18.580 --> 48:28.040]  I just wanted to say, uh, I got that same, uh, uh, uh, intrusive beeping, uh, and I'm in the 516 area code and I got it on my stupid smartphone.
[48:28.260 --> 48:28.460]  Okay.
[48:28.580 --> 48:33.020]  And it went over about 830 as, uh, your, uh, uh, co-host says.
[48:33.600 --> 48:35.940]  And, uh, it was going on in consistently, repeatedly.
[48:36.160 --> 48:39.120]  I, I ignored it until I was fully conscious to see what it was all about.
[48:39.360 --> 48:40.720]  I figured it was some nonsense.
[48:41.100 --> 48:46.300]  Uh, it wasn't quite nonsense, but I recall also about a month earlier, there was an Amber Alert.
[48:46.500 --> 48:47.880]  I forget where that originated from.
[48:47.980 --> 48:48.840]  That went off also.
[48:49.040 --> 48:50.660]  So these are becoming more frequent.
[48:50.840 --> 48:53.640]  And I think, yeah, the potential for abuse is certainly there.
[48:53.980 --> 48:54.220]  Uh-huh.
[48:54.620 --> 48:55.960]  How do you see it being abused?
[48:56.760 --> 49:01.000]  Uh, for, you know, uh, all kinds of, um, uh, pseudo alarm.
[49:01.180 --> 49:03.700]  It's something that we should not be that afraid of.
[49:04.560 --> 49:08.540]  You know, like, uh, uh, uh, declared emergency, something like that.
[49:08.580 --> 49:10.320]  You know, some Orwellian notion.
[49:10.580 --> 49:16.860]  Uh, right now, I think it was put to good use in this instance, but, uh, but I, I was not in the 212 area code.
[49:16.880 --> 49:21.220]  So I just wanted to say that it goes beyond just the immediate confines of Manhattan, I think.
[49:21.460 --> 49:24.260]  Maybe the government could order a counter-protest.
[49:25.660 --> 49:43.040]  You know, like anybody who is with the, the, uh, regime and, uh, loyal American, American loyalists, you must gather now to fight these repulsive protesters from the mid-left to the upper right.
[49:43.180 --> 49:43.480]  Okay.
[49:43.620 --> 49:43.900]  All right.
[49:44.000 --> 49:47.920]  But with a President Trump, do you really think we're gonna have to wait very long for that to happen?
[49:48.280 --> 49:49.000]  No, they probably... All right.
[49:49.400 --> 49:50.240]  Just thought I had that.
[49:50.600 --> 49:51.040]  Congratulations.
[49:51.320 --> 49:52.960]  I hope to, uh, hear some good calls.
[49:53.140 --> 49:53.340]  All right.
[49:53.580 --> 49:54.560]  Well, you're a good call.
[49:54.760 --> 49:55.740]  Don't put yourself down.
[49:56.160 --> 49:57.100]  Thank you for that call.
[49:57.400 --> 50:01.300]  I do notice that we only seem to have, uh, the, the ability to have one call, though.
[50:01.380 --> 50:02.480]  I didn't see any other calls come in.
[50:02.680 --> 50:02.960]  Yeah.
[50:03.160 --> 50:05.920]  I, uh, I guess maybe, maybe it's a one at a time thing for now.
[50:06.200 --> 50:08.220]  Uh, Bernie, do you know how many actual phone lines we have?
[50:08.360 --> 50:09.360]  Let's not get greedy.
[50:09.860 --> 50:13.940]  There is supposedly one in the studio and then one is a secret number that people call.
[50:13.940 --> 50:14.120]  One?
[50:14.240 --> 50:15.260]  We had 12 before.
[50:15.420 --> 50:16.140]  Now we have one?
[50:17.160 --> 50:17.980]  Be thankful.
[50:18.480 --> 50:19.740]  No, I won't be thankful.
[50:20.020 --> 50:20.580]  I'm sorry.
[50:20.680 --> 50:20.920]  I know.
[50:21.040 --> 50:21.620]  There should be two.
[50:21.820 --> 50:23.040]  We should roll over, but... All right.
[50:23.100 --> 50:23.800]  We have another one.
[50:23.960 --> 50:24.320]  Good evening.
[50:24.420 --> 50:24.880]  You're on the air.
[50:25.900 --> 50:26.680]  Hey, can you hear me?
[50:26.820 --> 50:27.580]  Yes, we hear you fine.
[50:27.620 --> 50:28.180]  Where are you calling from?
[50:28.520 --> 50:28.880]  All right.
[50:29.240 --> 50:29.600]  Awesome.
[50:29.860 --> 50:31.260]  Uh, also from Nassau County.
[50:31.420 --> 50:34.180]  You just, uh, just blanketed with Nassau County calls.
[50:34.320 --> 50:36.160]  Maybe our signal is only reaching Nassau County.
[50:36.380 --> 50:37.400]  Well, it is the best county.
[50:37.660 --> 50:38.460]  No, it's not.
[50:39.120 --> 50:40.420]  Don't put me in that position.
[50:41.000 --> 50:41.360]  Wow.
[50:41.540 --> 50:42.380]  Uh, what's on your mind, caller?
[50:43.320 --> 50:51.940]  I just want to, uh, semi-correct you that at least on my phone, when my phone is on silent, the alerts come through loud and clear.
[50:52.140 --> 50:52.400]  Really?
[50:52.580 --> 50:53.520]  Or do they come out loud?
[50:53.800 --> 50:57.140]  So now we need to sample if that, and find out if that's model specific.
[50:57.680 --> 51:01.020]  Well, how do we create an emergency so that... Or brand or carrier specific.
[51:01.160 --> 51:03.380]  Yeah, we have to somehow create an emergency and test this out.
[51:03.560 --> 51:04.540]  How are we going to do that?
[51:05.620 --> 51:06.260]  Yeah, right.
[51:06.360 --> 51:07.180]  That's what you need to do.
[51:07.380 --> 51:13.140]  The only reason I, I mention it is because, or that I think it's, it may be brand specific.
[51:13.760 --> 51:22.700]  Um, if you Google, uh, how to turn off Amber Alert, or there are a lot of articles out there because people just don't lie to them.
[51:23.060 --> 51:24.160]  Find your own kid.
[51:25.000 --> 51:28.880]  Whatever would be that nefarious.
[51:29.120 --> 51:36.860]  But the point is, is that when they do these alerts, a lot of people were like, hey, you know, this doesn't have, has not much to do with me.
[51:37.240 --> 51:38.360]  I will say this.
[51:39.180 --> 51:41.880]  Maybe they changed it because that used to be a problem.
[51:42.060 --> 51:49.300]  And now, this latest alert, uh, I did not get the loud noise when my phone was silent.
[51:49.420 --> 51:51.680]  So maybe things have changed, I guess.
[51:51.820 --> 51:52.940]  Maybe people complained enough.
[51:53.260 --> 51:58.400]  Wait, you're saying that when you got the alert and your phone was on silent, you didn't get a tone?
[51:59.500 --> 52:00.420]  I did not.
[52:00.580 --> 52:10.620]  But when I got Amber Alert a couple years ago, when there were weather alerts a couple of times, a couple of years ago, uh, the silence would not silence the Amber Alert.
[52:10.900 --> 52:13.280]  And people would complain, how can you turn it off?
[52:13.460 --> 52:24.900]  So then what you say is correct, that every, I think they tried to change it so that if your phone is on silent, anything short of a presidential, um, you will not get the sound.
[52:25.100 --> 52:28.480]  However, the presidential, I think will still go on if your phone is on silent.
[52:28.820 --> 52:29.220]  Interesting.
[52:29.380 --> 52:34.260]  So if aliens come out of the, uh, galaxy, uh, we will, we will get all sounds.
[52:34.420 --> 52:34.520]  Yeah.
[52:34.660 --> 52:38.620]  You should be able to, uh, to have a little checkbox as to what kind of messages, alien messages.
[52:38.620 --> 52:39.720]  I like that to come through.
[52:39.960 --> 52:47.560]  I like messages, you know, from certain people to override my silence, uh, you know, and other things like that, but, uh, no presidential ones.
[52:47.700 --> 52:51.000]  I don't want to hear those, especially if, uh, worst case scenario happens.
[52:51.360 --> 52:53.260]  Um, you know, more, more choice to the user.
[52:53.500 --> 52:53.860]  There are settings like this.
[52:54.340 --> 52:57.000]  There are settings, but they're very rudimentary.
[52:57.100 --> 52:57.360]  Go ahead.
[52:57.860 --> 53:00.280]  The aliens have their own alert system.
[53:01.240 --> 53:03.600]  Well, yeah, they probably can override our phones.
[53:03.720 --> 53:04.000]  Yes, Rob.
[53:04.180 --> 53:04.320]  Yeah.
[53:04.700 --> 53:06.200]  I, uh, I got the alert as well.
[53:06.300 --> 53:07.260]  And, uh, I was in Queens.
[53:07.500 --> 53:10.820]  Uh, caller, do you mind if I ask where you, are you maybe in Nassau near the Queens border or?
[53:11.400 --> 53:12.060]  No, no.
[53:12.240 --> 53:14.980]  I was, I work in, uh, in, uh, near JFK.
[53:15.260 --> 53:16.940]  So I got the alert when I was working.
[53:17.380 --> 53:18.260]  Uh, oh, okay.
[53:18.360 --> 53:21.460]  So you're saying your phone number is 516, but you were in Queens.
[53:22.540 --> 53:22.940]  Correct.
[53:23.120 --> 53:30.020]  And I think everyone, like you said, I think everyone who was in the city limits, plus maybe Jersey was getting it.
[53:30.400 --> 53:40.440]  Uh, if you were outside of the city line, uh, in Nassau, I do not believe you got a couple of people who lived in Franklin Square, which is right on the border and they did not get the alert.
[53:40.660 --> 53:43.380]  Well, Bernie is in 215, uh, area code.
[53:43.560 --> 53:45.840]  I'm sorry, Bernie, I gave out, uh, your area code.
[53:46.360 --> 53:46.820]  That's okay.
[53:46.960 --> 53:48.160]  No, there's only seven digits left.
[53:48.340 --> 53:49.700]  People can guess your whole phone number now.
[53:49.800 --> 53:50.100]  I'm sorry.
[53:50.220 --> 53:50.940]  I gave away three of them.
[53:51.540 --> 53:54.140]  Uh, but yeah, he was, uh, he was in the New York area.
[53:54.140 --> 53:57.640]  So he's living proof that, yeah, you don't have to be from New York to have gotten that.
[53:57.800 --> 54:04.220]  And if you were in 516 with your 516 phone, then, uh, you wouldn't have gotten the, the alert.
[54:05.280 --> 54:05.400]  Correct.
[54:05.600 --> 54:07.720]  I think people, it didn't matter what area code you were in.
[54:07.800 --> 54:15.920]  If your phone was physically in the limit, the area they wanted, they could get you, which, you know, like you said, it could be open to abuse.
[54:16.160 --> 54:16.640]  It's kind of wild.
[54:17.040 --> 54:22.580]  It's funny though, because this guy could have taken a train out to 516 and, and then everybody'd be looking for him in the wrong place.
[54:22.600 --> 54:29.420]  It's probably like, it's probably like a web form with like a map and you just outline the area that you want.
[54:29.660 --> 54:35.700]  And then you fill in, you know, what is the alert and alert type and priority, and then you hit submit.
[54:36.660 --> 54:37.020]  Okay.
[54:37.700 --> 54:38.400]  Seems reasonable.
[54:38.680 --> 54:40.060]  Hey, thanks for that call.
[54:40.200 --> 54:41.380]  We're going to try and fit in one more.
[54:41.760 --> 54:42.300]  All right.
[54:42.480 --> 54:44.680]  And, uh, let me give out that phone number one more time.
[54:44.680 --> 54:46.080]  I have to read it because I can't memorize it.
[54:46.760 --> 54:48.860]  347-335-0786.
[54:49.120 --> 54:52.220]  I'm curious what happens when you call that line and somebody else is on it.
[54:52.520 --> 54:54.780]  In fact, Rob, could you do that after we get the next call?
[54:54.940 --> 54:55.260]  Sure.
[54:55.660 --> 54:57.320]  347-335-0786.
[54:57.480 --> 54:58.260]  We already have a call.
[54:58.580 --> 54:59.880]  Uh, we're going to take that now.
[54:59.960 --> 55:00.340]  Good evening.
[55:00.540 --> 55:01.560]  You're on off the hook.
[55:01.640 --> 55:01.900]  Go ahead.
[55:03.220 --> 55:03.860]  Uh, good afternoon.
[55:04.400 --> 55:04.840]  Uh, good evening.
[55:05.020 --> 55:09.660]  I would like to know that that web address I can call to about a delivered premium.
[55:10.140 --> 55:12.220]  Uh, Bernie, maybe you can help with this.
[55:13.380 --> 55:20.240]  Um, best to do is email us at O-T-H at 2600.com.
[55:20.440 --> 55:36.740]  Uh, we need your name, uh, address, phone number possible, your, your premium confirmation code, what it was you pledged for, um, how much you paid on your receipt and, um, what other information, just basically all that stuff.
[55:37.120 --> 55:39.000]  And we will try to track again for you.
[55:40.080 --> 55:40.560]  Okay.
[55:40.820 --> 55:42.040]  Hopefully that, that helps.
[55:42.200 --> 55:47.440]  And, uh, Rob is here with the report as to what happens when you call this line and someone's already on it.
[55:48.000 --> 55:49.160]  Let's see if I can get the sound across.
[55:50.720 --> 55:51.680]  What is that noise?
[55:54.360 --> 55:55.440]  What do you, what do you call that?
[55:55.560 --> 55:56.880]  It's a sickly busy.
[55:57.160 --> 55:59.060]  I haven't heard that sound in such a long time.
[55:59.320 --> 56:01.800]  It's an actual busy signal and now we know how to get one again.
[56:01.960 --> 56:04.960]  So folks, if you call us and we're using the phone, you'll get a busy signal.
[56:05.080 --> 56:06.120]  No call waiting for us.
[56:06.680 --> 56:07.000]  Wow.
[56:07.100 --> 56:07.320]  Okay.
[56:07.340 --> 56:08.660]  We have one phone line coming in.
[56:09.140 --> 56:10.120]  That's, that's kind of cool.
[56:10.280 --> 56:12.740]  Thanks for those people who called in, uh, write to us.
[56:12.980 --> 56:15.000]  OTH at 2600.com.
[56:15.260 --> 56:18.700]  We'll be happy to, uh, field your, uh, your opinions and requests.
[56:18.700 --> 56:20.440]  If you haven't gotten a premium, write to us.
[56:20.540 --> 56:22.020]  If you have gotten a premium, write to us.
[56:22.160 --> 56:23.980]  OTH at 2600.com.
[56:24.240 --> 56:25.060]  We'll be back next week.
[56:25.140 --> 56:27.220]  Hey, next week is our special Maker Faire show.
[56:27.460 --> 56:32.380]  Uh, yes, because Maker Faire is coming up, uh, not this weekend coming up, but the weekend after that.
[56:32.460 --> 56:33.840]  And we'll have, uh, tickets to give away.
[56:34.000 --> 56:38.500]  So mark it down on your calendars and, uh, we'll see you next week.
[56:38.700 --> 56:39.360]  Make stuff.
[56:39.560 --> 56:40.340]  Get ready for that.
[56:40.480 --> 56:40.900]  That's right.
[56:41.020 --> 56:41.200]  Yeah.
[56:41.340 --> 56:43.220]  And break stuff too, but then fix it.
[56:43.700 --> 56:44.000]  Good night.
[57:55.670 --> 58:00.530]  Well, it had been 987 years and that was space time when I got back.
[58:00.690 --> 58:04.670]  Couldn't seem to find any of my friends to tell my interesting stories to.
[58:04.810 --> 58:05.370]  Can't fly.
[58:18.700 --> 58:19.380]  out.
[58:19.380 --> 58:20.460]  Moving through the fear.
[58:20.940 --> 58:21.400]  And stop through
[58:32.540 --> 58:32.700]  the fear.
[58:33.360 --> 58:34.940]  We stay in space, running
[58:41.170 --> 58:42.250]  back to some places.
[58:42.590 --> 58:43.830]  We ain't still gonna be.
[58:47.580 --> 58:48.780]  On the bus.
[58:49.240 --> 58:50.740]  To the plane.
[58:51.360 --> 58:52.680]  To the UFO.
[59:14.290 --> 59:16.870]  The International Ares Racing.
[59:18.370 --> 59:20.550]  It's me, Marty.
[59:22.110 --> 59:24.290]  It's me, Marty.
[59:24.550 --> 59:27.930]  It's me, Marty.
[59:28.470 --> 59:31.670]  The International Ares Racing.