[00:00.000 --> 00:01.080]  So do it now.
[00:01.260 --> 00:11.480]  Go to GiveToWBAI.org and become a BAI buddy in the name of your favorite show or call us at 516-620-3602.
[00:11.860 --> 00:12.580]  That's right.
[00:12.720 --> 00:13.640]  Forget Black Friday.
[00:14.060 --> 00:14.940]  Ignore Cyber Monday.
[00:15.440 --> 00:18.360]  Remember BAI on Giving Tuesday.
[00:18.640 --> 00:19.400]  You have our back.
[00:19.500 --> 00:20.200]  We'll have yours.
[00:33.610 --> 00:37.610]  And you are listening to radio station WBAI in New York.
[00:37.950 --> 00:39.690]  The time is just about 8 o'clock.
[00:40.050 --> 00:41.030]  Time once again.
[00:41.650 --> 00:42.210]  For Off the Hook.
[00:43.330 --> 00:44.590]  We're sharing memories.
[00:44.830 --> 00:47.770]  We're sharing some thoughts about the life.
[00:47.850 --> 00:50.110]  Okay, all the knobs are in the wrong place.
[00:50.990 --> 00:52.910]  Hang on one second while I fix this.
[01:31.420 --> 01:32.900]  Hey, Reggie, just say it wasn't my fault.
[01:33.040 --> 01:33.740]  Can you say it on the air?
[01:34.160 --> 01:35.240]  No, it wasn't my fault.
[01:35.400 --> 01:36.380]  Oh, great.
[01:36.540 --> 01:36.800]  Thank you.
[02:35.240 --> 02:36.200]  Okay, here we are.
[02:36.380 --> 02:38.500]  Sorry about the weird start.
[02:38.800 --> 02:39.860]  Not my fault, though.
[02:40.880 --> 02:42.460]  Something was in the wrong position.
[02:42.460 --> 02:46.580]  This is Off the Hook, where things go technically awry more times than I can count.
[02:47.040 --> 02:48.740]  This is Emanuel, joined tonight by Rob T.
[02:48.840 --> 02:49.180]  Firefly.
[02:49.460 --> 02:49.940]  Good evening.
[02:50.440 --> 02:52.240]  Okay, for some reason, you're not coming up.
[02:52.300 --> 02:52.620]  Try that.
[02:52.860 --> 02:53.380]  Good evening.
[02:53.440 --> 02:53.840]  There we are.
[02:53.920 --> 02:54.140]  Okay.
[02:54.320 --> 02:56.320]  And something's technically wrong on your end, too, right?
[02:56.520 --> 02:58.780]  Yeah, I'm trying to get the headphones up, so...
[02:58.780 --> 02:59.280]  All right.
[02:59.380 --> 03:00.260]  Well, good luck with that.
[03:00.500 --> 03:04.540]  Bernie S., hopefully you're coming in loud and clear from wherever you are.
[03:05.240 --> 03:05.640]  Yes.
[03:05.640 --> 03:06.760]  Greetings from Philadelphia.
[03:07.000 --> 03:07.440]  Do you hear me?
[03:07.660 --> 03:08.860]  Yes, we hear you just fine.
[03:09.240 --> 03:09.480]  Great.
[03:09.480 --> 03:10.180]  That's amazing.
[03:10.620 --> 03:13.480]  I don't know how we got you, how that worked exactly.
[03:14.040 --> 03:25.520]  Tonight, we're going to be talking to the executive director of the Electronic Frontier Foundation about some of the challenges that lie ahead in the upcoming Trump administration.
[03:26.020 --> 03:27.120]  A lot of challenges.
[03:27.120 --> 03:31.460]  A lot of things will be happening in the months and, dare I say it, years ahead.
[03:31.660 --> 03:32.320]  Well, maybe not.
[03:32.440 --> 03:39.120]  Maybe not, because there are moves on the horizon to, well, at least get all the facts.
[03:39.120 --> 03:45.700]  You know, we talked last week about the, what do you call it again?
[03:45.880 --> 03:49.780]  The, I'm sorry, I'm drawing a blank here.
[03:50.200 --> 03:53.980]  The Electoral College compact from various states.
[03:54.220 --> 04:04.920]  That basically is a way to bypass the constitutional amendment that would need to be done in order to bypass it originally.
[04:04.920 --> 04:09.780]  What I neglected to say last week was, this whole thing was, was put together by a computer scientist.
[04:09.900 --> 04:10.280]  Did you know that?
[04:10.760 --> 04:17.180]  His name is John Koza, and he's a computer scientist from Stanford, I believe.
[04:17.580 --> 04:25.180]  And he just figured one day, yeah, this is something that we need to figure out a way to route around, a bypass, if you will.
[04:25.180 --> 04:39.460]  Just something, something a little bit, I guess, commonsensical, as opposed to the way that we're dealing with things right now, where we have a situation where the losing candidate is now ahead by just about 2 million votes.
[04:39.460 --> 04:40.380]  And it doesn't matter.
[04:40.580 --> 04:42.380]  She could be ahead by 2 trillion votes.
[04:42.560 --> 04:46.240]  It wouldn't make a difference unless those votes came from a particular area.
[04:46.940 --> 04:49.700]  So, yeah, there's a lot of lunacy out there.
[04:50.680 --> 04:59.940]  And currently, this bill that we talked about last week is in place, I believe, in 10 states and a district of Columbia.
[05:00.640 --> 05:01.460]  It's not enough.
[05:01.600 --> 05:02.720]  It needs a few more states.
[05:03.060 --> 05:04.240]  Pennsylvania is one of the states.
[05:04.420 --> 05:07.240]  Michigan is another one of the states that has it currently pending in legislation.
[05:07.740 --> 05:12.660]  For those of you interested in Pennsylvania, it's Bill HB 1542.
[05:12.660 --> 05:14.300]  It's currently in committee in the lower house.
[05:14.300 --> 05:17.920]  Michigan, it's Bill SB 88, currently in the upper house.
[05:18.260 --> 05:19.640]  So there's possibilities.
[05:19.640 --> 05:22.900]  But that's not the possibility that we're just learning about now.
[05:23.440 --> 05:34.920]  Apparently, more computer scientists are urging Hillary Clinton to go for a recount in the states of Wisconsin, Michigan, and Pennsylvania.
[05:34.920 --> 05:47.720]  Pennsylvania, because there's a possibility that those states where the voting was very close, the votes might have been manipulated or, dare I say, hacked.
[05:48.280 --> 05:48.740]  Yeah.
[05:48.920 --> 05:50.340]  I hate to use that term.
[05:50.460 --> 05:54.740]  I hate to go for the headline that, oh, my God, the election was hacked.
[05:55.780 --> 06:05.040]  But the fact that they're concerned, that there are unanswered questions, that's enough just to at least want to move forward and get the facts.
[06:05.700 --> 06:28.800]  Now, last Thursday, these activists held a conference call with Clinton campaign chairman John Podesta, campaign general counsel Mark Ilias, to make their case, the academics presented findings showing that in Wisconsin, Clinton received 7% fewer votes in counties that relied on electronic voting machines compared with counties that used optical scanners and paper ballots.
[06:29.380 --> 06:35.200]  Now, based on that statistical analysis, Clinton may have been denied as many as 30,000 votes.
[06:35.360 --> 06:37.580]  She lost by 27,000.
[06:37.580 --> 06:42.020]  And you see why this is interesting and why it's important to look into this.
[06:43.020 --> 06:47.400]  Now, it's important to also note that the group has not found proof of hacking or manipulation.
[06:47.680 --> 06:58.460]  They're simply arguing to the campaign that the suspicious pattern merits an independent review, especially in light of the fact that the Obama White House has accused the Russian government of hacking the Democratic National Committee.
[06:58.700 --> 07:01.080]  You can take that with a grain of salt if you want.
[07:01.080 --> 07:03.660]  But it seems like there's some oddities.
[07:03.660 --> 07:09.100]  There's some unanswered questions that deserve to be addressed.
[07:09.580 --> 07:13.780]  Now, according to current tallies, Trump has won 290 Electoral College votes.
[07:13.940 --> 07:15.260]  Clinton has 232.
[07:16.280 --> 07:21.140]  Michigan's 16 votes still not counted because the race there still has not yet been called, if you can believe that.
[07:21.300 --> 07:22.460]  I don't know why it's so hard to count.
[07:23.060 --> 07:31.820]  It would take overturning those results in both Wisconsin and Pennsylvania, in addition to winning Michigan, for Clinton to win the Electoral College.
[07:31.980 --> 07:34.240]  So that is a possibility, a slim one.
[07:34.320 --> 07:39.380]  And I honestly don't think it's going to happen because I don't think Clinton would even accept it if it did.
[07:39.720 --> 07:40.920]  But I want to know.
[07:41.060 --> 07:42.640]  And I don't see why anybody wouldn't want to know.
[07:42.820 --> 07:46.640]  And there's also, also the factor of what they call faithless electors.
[07:47.100 --> 07:53.240]  Those are members of the Electoral College who don't vote according to the popular vote in their states because the Constitution allows them to do that.
[07:53.340 --> 07:54.660]  They can vote for whoever they want.
[07:54.820 --> 07:55.880]  And that's our crazy system.
[07:56.380 --> 07:57.960]  So that could happen, too.
[07:58.400 --> 08:02.400]  And they all vote in all the state capitals on December 19th.
[08:02.780 --> 08:11.400]  And at least six, six of these electoral voters, this is unprecedented, have said they would not vote for Trump, despite the fact that he won their states.
[08:12.160 --> 08:14.180]  So that is pretty fascinating.
[08:14.180 --> 08:16.720]  Now, here's what makes this story even more interesting.
[08:17.300 --> 08:18.280]  There's a deadline.
[08:18.940 --> 08:25.700]  The Clinton camp has to challenge and ask for a recount by Friday in Wisconsin.
[08:25.900 --> 08:27.360]  Pennsylvania, it's by Monday.
[08:27.520 --> 08:28.920]  Michigan, it's by next Wednesday.
[08:29.320 --> 08:32.880]  Now, I know Clinton's not going to do this.
[08:32.900 --> 08:34.900]  I know Clinton lacks the spine.
[08:35.040 --> 08:36.540]  I'm not trying to challenge them.
[08:36.740 --> 08:39.760]  I know they're not going to do anything.
[08:41.560 --> 08:45.900]  But I have been proven wrong on somebody that I called an idiot on these very airways.
[08:46.000 --> 08:46.460]  Jill Stein.
[08:46.600 --> 08:47.620]  Jill Stein is not an idiot.
[08:47.860 --> 08:53.260]  Jill Stein is doing something amazing because she is a candidate and she's calling for a recount.
[08:53.520 --> 08:54.280]  She can do that.
[08:54.420 --> 08:56.120]  Only candidates can call for recounts.
[08:56.360 --> 09:00.460]  So as of today, Jill Stein has called for a recount in those three states.
[09:00.560 --> 09:01.640]  Now, it's not that easy, though.
[09:01.860 --> 09:04.440]  You can't just call for a recount being a presidential candidate.
[09:04.440 --> 09:06.040]  You have to somehow pay for it.
[09:06.140 --> 09:11.620]  I don't know what exactly you're paying for, I guess, for people to come in and count or run machines or something.
[09:12.360 --> 09:14.640]  So $2 million has to be raised.
[09:15.480 --> 09:21.400]  I hear that she's almost halfway to that goal already, and I hope she gets all the way to that goal.
[09:21.400 --> 09:34.900]  Because to do that, to challenge the system in that manner, and to actually get some kind of an answer, which probably is not the answer that many of us want, but at least let's get an answer.
[09:35.060 --> 09:39.740]  Because apparently after this week, we're not entitled to even get that unless it's asked for by a candidate.
[09:40.020 --> 09:42.440]  By the way, Gary Johnson has no interest in pursuing this.
[09:42.560 --> 09:43.660]  That should tell you something right there.
[09:44.540 --> 09:50.220]  So with that information, at least we know that we've done everything we can.
[09:50.620 --> 09:57.040]  And for people that keep saying, you've got to accept it, just deal with it, it's basically telling you to shut up.
[09:57.480 --> 10:01.900]  And listeners, you're going to hear a lot of this tomorrow when you're hanging out with your relatives.
[10:01.940 --> 10:07.320]  A lot of people will say, why can't you just accept what the people wanted, even though, of course, the people didn't really want that.
[10:07.320 --> 10:13.140]  But it's basically saying, stop complaining, stop whining, stop demonstrating.
[10:14.240 --> 10:21.580]  And when you're simply out there asking questions, wanting to know the facts, I don't think there's anything wrong with that at any point.
[10:21.920 --> 10:23.700]  That's something that we should be encouraging.
[10:23.840 --> 10:27.780]  It's something that we basically are doing all our lives.
[10:27.860 --> 10:29.420]  As hackers, we're always asking questions.
[10:29.500 --> 10:35.500]  We always want to know what the answer to something that people tell us not to pursue is.
[10:35.500 --> 10:41.040]  In the case of a computer program that does not work, you keep going back and you keep debugging it.
[10:41.300 --> 10:42.820]  Now, what's happening now in D.C.
[10:42.900 --> 10:43.960]  doesn't make any sense.
[10:44.220 --> 10:45.300]  We all know that.
[10:45.580 --> 10:51.680]  And it pays to go back a couple of times and just see what, you know, tweak the program a little bit and say, wait a minute, is this true?
[10:51.880 --> 10:58.400]  Or did we maybe have a line of bad code there that led to something that doesn't really add up?
[10:59.060 --> 11:01.240]  Once you've done all that, then you can say, OK, you know what?
[11:01.320 --> 11:02.100]  Release the damn thing.
[11:02.260 --> 11:02.840]  I'm done with it.
[11:02.840 --> 11:08.260]  But you can't do that in good conscience just by walking away, not asking questions.
[11:08.400 --> 11:12.120]  So for those people who say, why don't you talk about technology anymore?
[11:12.540 --> 11:15.540]  This all very, very closely related.
[11:15.800 --> 11:17.600]  Politics is a part of technology.
[11:17.720 --> 11:20.620]  Politics is a part of the hacker world.
[11:20.800 --> 11:24.140]  It's a part of everything that we're involved in.
[11:24.140 --> 11:33.500]  And right now, and this maybe is the difference between a podcast and a radio show, podcasts tend to be very narrowly focused on a particular topic.
[11:33.640 --> 11:36.380]  And people seek it out for that particular reason.
[11:36.700 --> 11:40.460]  When you're broadcasting on the radio, you're broadcasting on the radio.
[11:40.660 --> 11:45.400]  And anybody can tune in at any time without even knowing that they're about to do it.
[11:45.680 --> 11:46.880]  That's the magic of radio.
[11:46.880 --> 11:48.340]  That's what I consider the magic of radio.
[11:48.680 --> 11:55.420]  So what we do here at this particular radio show and on this particular radio station is talk about what's right in front of us.
[11:55.580 --> 11:56.640]  Talk about what's going on.
[11:56.780 --> 11:58.640]  Talk about the world in general.
[11:58.640 --> 12:06.900]  And we apply our particular expertise and interest to whatever stories are happening out there.
[12:07.040 --> 12:11.380]  So, you know, if the building across the street is on fire, we're going to talk about that.
[12:11.440 --> 12:12.600]  You know, because, hey, there it is.
[12:12.720 --> 12:13.160]  It's on fire.
[12:13.480 --> 12:20.240]  And we'll maybe comment on some of the technology that's being used to put out the fire because we're hackers and we're interested in that.
[12:20.920 --> 12:22.440]  That is what we are going to be doing.
[12:22.540 --> 12:27.040]  We're going to continue focusing on the story that is happening right in front of us.
[12:29.020 --> 12:36.700]  And much to the consternation of the people who want us to just shut up already and move on and accept it, it's not in our nature.
[12:36.900 --> 12:40.740]  It's not in the nature of hackers in general to just accept things.
[12:41.280 --> 12:48.320]  So we might be angering a lot of people, but I think we'll also be educating people as well and being educated by more people.
[12:48.500 --> 12:56.200]  Yeah, that's why it doesn't surprise me that a lot of computer scientists are now involved in asking these questions loudly and seeking the answers.
[12:56.200 --> 12:59.980]  Because computer science, as a subject, it's pretty much centered on logic.
[13:00.240 --> 13:04.960]  It's centered on asking questions and getting the answers to those questions and investigating further with the data you have.
[13:05.120 --> 13:17.760]  So, yeah, it's a very computer scientist and a very hacker way to, I think, process what's going on right now is to start asking these questions to see what needs investigating and how we can best do so.
[13:18.120 --> 13:18.460]  Absolutely.
[13:19.960 --> 13:23.260]  Bernie, anything to add while we get our phone guest on the line?
[13:24.000 --> 13:26.720]  Well, there's maybe a segue to Cindy coming on.
[13:27.340 --> 13:34.880]  There are obviously going to be some huge ramifications of the new Trump administration.
[13:35.060 --> 13:39.860]  I still can't wrap my mind around it when I hear the phrase, President-elect Trump.
[13:40.040 --> 13:42.760]  We practiced that earlier this year on this very radio show.
[13:42.800 --> 13:44.080]  We practiced saying President Trump.
[13:44.260 --> 13:45.440]  So I'm ready.
[13:45.440 --> 13:46.100]  I can say it.
[13:46.100 --> 13:46.940]  I just don't believe it.
[13:46.980 --> 13:49.620]  Every time I hear it, I'm like, I shake my head, like, what?
[13:50.320 --> 13:52.140]  Even though I know that's the case.
[13:53.460 --> 14:09.000]  There's already, we've known before his election and since, his stated positions with regard to digital rights, things that affect all of our listeners, and a lot of other, and practically everybody else, too.
[14:09.000 --> 14:22.380]  And with regard to regulating technology, consumer protection, that sort of thing, in the digital world, and we have our work cut out for us in the upcoming years.
[14:22.380 --> 14:31.160]  So it's going to be a wild ride, but we've got to keep aware, and be observant, and speak out.
[14:31.300 --> 14:33.400]  So I'm looking forward to starting that process.
[14:33.780 --> 14:54.100]  Yeah, Bernie, it's always, I think, been very central to the work that we've done on this program and elsewhere to basically see, you know, the people that are in control of certain things, basically seeing what their work and what their viewpoints and what they're doing means in the real world of our technical environment.
[14:54.860 --> 15:07.380]  You know, back in the old days of the 90s, when it seemed that the authorities really didn't know much about the Internet or computers or telephones or code or anything like that, that needed spotlighting and that needed investigating.
[15:08.300 --> 15:12.620]  And nowadays, I think, you know, the authorities know full well what's going on.
[15:12.700 --> 15:17.980]  They know full well, you know, they've got experts on their side just as much as anyone does.
[15:19.220 --> 15:28.560]  And, but what they're doing does impact, you know, more of our life day by day, just because the technological environment controls more and more of what goes on in our lives day by day.
[15:28.960 --> 15:37.200]  So, Bernie, what do you think is going to be, like, sort of the hacker thing to do now when facing an incoming administration?
[15:37.380 --> 15:39.300]  Such as, such as the one where we're on?
[15:39.840 --> 15:48.300]  Well, you know, spreading, spreading information, whether it's on social media, with your friends, family, other people in your community about what's going on.
[15:48.660 --> 16:02.980]  You know, just despite the Republican Party having a majority in the, in Congress, in the Senate, and obviously in control of the executive branch, we, I still think that the voice of the people makes a difference.
[16:03.380 --> 16:07.140]  A lot of these Republicans are going to be up for re-election in a, in a couple of years.
[16:07.380 --> 16:16.740]  And they can't just go hog-wild on, on making decisions that are going to harm most of the public.
[16:17.040 --> 16:24.260]  And there's some areas that are more technically, require more technical finesse in explaining to people.
[16:24.420 --> 16:26.500]  You can't really explain some of this stuff in a soundbite.
[16:26.680 --> 16:31.760]  So we, fortunately, we have an hour, which it wasn't, isn't enough every week to describe some of this stuff.
[16:31.760 --> 16:40.300]  But, you know, in a Trump world, where everything is defined in a soundbite, we need to explain things a little more, more clearly.
[16:40.300 --> 16:49.380]  Um, so I think we really need to put our nose to the grindstone, as it were, and, uh, look at what is happening before it blindsides us.
[16:49.540 --> 17:00.800]  Uh, we've already seen some, uh, announcements of, uh, uh, advisors and administration officials that we know are very unfriendly towards things like net neutrality, uh, digital privacy, that sort of thing.
[17:00.800 --> 17:02.960]  And it's probably not going to get any better anytime soon.
[17:02.960 --> 17:08.700]  So we just need to be really astute and observant and tell as many people as we can what's going on.
[17:09.240 --> 17:13.280]  I think if enough people notice and make noise, it can make a difference.
[17:13.680 --> 17:20.140]  Well, I can't think of a better segue to introduce our guest for tonight, the executive director of the Electronic Frontier Foundation.
[17:20.240 --> 17:22.140]  Welcome, Cindy Cohen to WBAI.
[17:22.780 --> 17:23.460]  Hi there.
[17:24.020 --> 17:30.400]  Well, um, we have a lot to, um, to take in, to think about with the election of Donald Trump.
[17:30.400 --> 17:32.640]  And, uh, the things that that could mean.
[17:32.640 --> 17:39.480]  I imagine you folks over at EFF are, are extremely, uh, uh, busy once, once you, um, were able to accept the reality.
[17:40.200 --> 17:45.460]  Um, how, um, how bad could it get, in your opinion?
[17:46.740 --> 17:58.740]  Well, I, you know, I think that there's, um, a real risk that we're going to see, you know, you know, what we need is a tremendous, um, adjustment.
[17:58.740 --> 18:15.580]  And reigning in of the surveillance state, and certainly the folks that Mr. Trump has appointed so far indicate just the reverse, an expansion of the surveillance state, a rolling back of some of the, uh, uh, the victories that we won over the last, uh,
[18:15.740 --> 18:18.000]  you know, well, 12 years or so.
[18:18.000 --> 18:25.640]  And, um, and, um, and really kind of turning our digital technologies into, uh, tools of repression.
[18:25.940 --> 18:28.020]  Uh, it's, it's a very, it's very worrisome.
[18:28.260 --> 18:44.020]  It's, it's early days, but, uh, but certainly, you know, for those of us who care about protecting strong encryption, for those of us who don't want the, uh, NSA to be able to spy on, uh, people with impunity, um, for people concerned about network neutrality,
[18:44.280 --> 18:47.680]  these are all issues where the early signs are not good.
[18:48.080 --> 19:04.960]  Well, uh, we're going to talk about net neutrality in some detail in just a little bit, but regarding surveillance, many people have been saying, well, uh, Barack Obama built this surveillance state, gave the NSA all these powers, um, is this not true of any regime that they simply want to be able to spy on all the people?
[19:05.100 --> 19:11.740]  Is it necessarily, um, going to be increased under Donald Trump, or is it just that it'll be in the hands of somebody who doesn't know what he's doing?
[19:12.780 --> 19:15.640]  Well, um, certainly Obama didn't build the surveillance state.
[19:15.840 --> 19:16.500]  President Bush did.
[19:16.700 --> 19:18.260]  So let's, let's, you know, be clear.
[19:18.360 --> 19:19.860]  It's nice to hear somebody say that.
[19:20.000 --> 19:20.140]  Wow.
[19:20.260 --> 19:22.360]  So few people actually admit that, but thank you.
[19:23.080 --> 19:36.920]  Oh, no, you know, of course I've been, I've been trying to stop the NSA from spying on the country since, uh, Mr. Klein walked into our office with evidence of this and the evidence showed up in 2006, but it goes back to 2001.
[19:36.920 --> 19:48.000]  So the, you know, and a lot of the surveillance stuff that got turned on the United States after September 11th was, uh, the same strategies that had been turned on the rest of the world prior to that.
[19:48.260 --> 19:55.940]  So, you know, pre September 11th, we had mass surveillance being deployed against the rest of the world by the NSA.
[19:56.280 --> 20:03.740]  And after September 11th, there was, uh, executive approval to turn most of those same powers on the American people.
[20:03.740 --> 20:05.420]  This isn't controversial.
[20:05.420 --> 20:06.080]  It's true.
[20:06.260 --> 20:13.400]  Now, what, uh, you know, I, I don't want to give, get Mr. Obama off the hook because Mr. Obama had an opportunity to dismantle this and to scale it back.
[20:13.520 --> 20:31.300]  And instead, while there was some tiny bits of scaling back of the surveillance state, what he really did was short it up with some better legal arguments and more, some internal checks and balances on the behaviors, uh, most of which are really vulnerable now to being repealed by President Trump.
[20:31.300 --> 20:37.700]  As he's indicated, you know, certainly, uh, you know, Representative Pompeo, who's in the CIA, has a very clear record on this.
[20:38.180 --> 20:54.320]  Uh, Mr. Sessions, who is up for, uh, Attorney General, has a very clear record on this, that they, that they want to, um, undo some of the, the, the marginal things that were done to, to, to rein things in, um, and indeed expand things.
[20:55.220 --> 21:15.620]  So, yeah, I mean, and to answer your question, I do think that the NSA has had the capabilities to do really invasive surveillance, um, and, uh, we know that they've done some of it, um, but now we've got somebody in charge of this surveillance state who I think it's fair to say is much more willing to use it,
[21:15.760 --> 21:20.820]  um, and use it in broader and perhaps, uh, political ways that, that are very troubling.
[21:20.820 --> 21:40.020]  Uh, again, it's, it's hard because it's hard to evaluate the kind of candidate bluster about what he wanted to do with what, uh, how someone might actually govern, but I, I don't, I don't think it's unfair to, um, take what he said as a candidate as a starting point for what could possibly happen.
[21:40.020 --> 21:54.380]  Well, I think what could possibly happen is that his entire family can get access to a lot of surveillance abilities that, uh, uh, previously only world leaders and, and, um, and, and people in the NSA, high ranking people in the NSA might have been able to manipulate.
[21:54.940 --> 21:58.560]  Um, so I'm, I'm very worried that he doesn't have that kind of sense.
[21:58.700 --> 22:02.420]  I'm, I'm also extremely worried that this has been created in the first place.
[22:02.540 --> 22:07.640]  And like you, yes, uh, Obama should not be, uh, left off the hook on, on, on this particular issue.
[22:07.640 --> 22:13.760]  Uh, when you create something, uh, a dangerous bit of technology, um, it doesn't go away.
[22:14.000 --> 22:16.060]  It gets passed on to the next leader.
[22:16.280 --> 22:21.440]  And if that leader happens to not be a good leader, then it's just fallen into bad hands.
[22:21.780 --> 22:23.140]  And that's, that's been it.
[22:23.200 --> 22:37.060]  I mean, imagine not to continuously bring up Nazis, but imagine the kind of surveillance ability that we have now in the hands of that regime, how quickly they could have rounded people up or categorize people in a particular way.
[22:37.640 --> 22:43.780]  Um, it's, um, it's, um, it's something that I don't think we've been really considering when we create all this.
[22:45.140 --> 22:47.740]  I, I, I worry as well about that.
[22:47.880 --> 22:58.320]  I think that especially inside the national security infrastructure, there has been a sense that, um, they were all good guys and they were all trying to make us safer.
[22:58.320 --> 23:05.080]  And so, therefore, the thing that they were building that could be very, very dangerous, we didn't need to worry about because they would never misuse it.
[23:05.440 --> 23:08.480]  And, you know, that was never a very good bet.
[23:08.480 --> 23:15.920]  And I think it was always inconsistent with the values of our country that value rule of law and have checks and balances against power.
[23:15.920 --> 23:32.580]  But now we're seeing that power shift from, you know, pretty dramatically into the hands of someone who's indicated that they really don't recognize any of the, uh, restraints, um, uh, the need to use restraint in using this power.
[23:32.580 --> 23:34.620]  And so, it's tremendously troubling.
[23:34.900 --> 23:38.180]  And, you know, it's, it's troubling, you know, even post-Trump, right?
[23:38.180 --> 23:41.560]  I mean, who knows who could be the next person who gets the reins of this.
[23:41.700 --> 23:49.000]  So even, you know, I, I'm not comfortable, uh, with, based on what this candidate, what candidate Trump said about him.
[23:49.140 --> 23:55.380]  But, but even if you are, and you think he's the best thing since sliced bread, somebody else is going to take over that office next.
[23:55.380 --> 24:01.520]  So, you know, this is the kind of power that we really, really need strong accountability and limits on.
[24:01.740 --> 24:09.160]  And, you know, uh, from my view, dismantling of some of it, um, in order to really be sure that we're going to have a democracy moving forward.
[24:09.400 --> 24:16.420]  Yeah, you raise an excellent point there because those people who, um, do support Trump and think he's going to make the changes that they, um, they need.
[24:16.740 --> 24:22.880]  Well, imagine this technology in the hands of Michelle Obama in eight years or whatever, you know, that's your worst nightmare probably.
[24:22.880 --> 24:28.320]  So, uh, yeah, there's always a scenario you can paint for somebody where they get it, where they see.
[24:28.460 --> 24:32.680]  Do you find, Cindy, that people don't care enough about surveillance?
[24:32.860 --> 24:45.200]  I'm reading this story now from The Guardian about, um, uh, in the UK, um, there's a bill that, uh, gives UK intelligence agencies and police the most sweeping surveillance powers in the Western world.
[24:45.260 --> 24:49.820]  It's been passed into law with barely any opposition whatsoever.
[24:49.820 --> 24:52.160]  It's called the Investigatory Powers Act.
[24:52.360 --> 25:04.140]  It was passed last Thursday and it legalizes a whole range of tools for snooping and hacking by the security services, which are completely unmatched by any other country in Western Europe or even the United States.
[25:04.700 --> 25:11.020]  And, um, Edward Snowden said about this, the UK has just legalized the most extreme surveillance in the history of Western democracy.
[25:11.020 --> 25:13.560]  It goes further than many autocracies.
[25:14.140 --> 25:17.180]  How, how is it that people didn't object to this strongly?
[25:18.060 --> 25:24.220]  Well, I think that, um, I, I think this is a really good question and I'm glad that you're asking the question and drawing attention to it.
[25:24.220 --> 25:32.960]  Well, we could barely, we've been talking about this Investigatory Powers, um, act since it was first, uh, first, um, you know, kind of floated, which wasn't very long ago.
[25:33.160 --> 25:45.580]  It was, it was kind of rushed through, um, and sadly, one of the people who is the most in favor of it is Theresa May, who, you know, in the interim went from being, um, you know, a member of the government to the, the prime minister.
[25:45.580 --> 25:47.760]  So, it gained even more power that way.
[25:47.920 --> 25:51.440]  I, I think that you're right that people don't want to think about surveillance.
[25:51.740 --> 25:56.000]  It's difficult to connect surveillance with the bad things that happen to people.
[25:56.620 --> 26:04.080]  Um, and so it's, uh, it, it, it makes it kind of a challenge to get people to think about this thing because it's kind of invisible.
[26:04.720 --> 26:14.840]  Um, but, you know, that Investigatory Powers Act is horrible and it's going to be the model, I, I predict, for what you're going to see some forces in the United States try to bring home.
[26:14.840 --> 26:18.800]  Um, it limits encryption, it gives very, very broad powers.
[26:18.980 --> 26:26.680]  There, you know, the UK has a different system and so there's some ways in which people are a little more protected than it might seem, but, but not much.
[26:26.860 --> 26:31.260]  And, um, it's really bad news for people who care about political action.
[26:31.560 --> 26:41.860]  You know, we know that this kind of surveillance, um, tools are, uh, almost inevitably used against people who are engaging in, uh, political dissent of one form or another.
[26:41.860 --> 26:49.300]  So, I, you know, I think it's a very big problem for people who, um, believe that we ought to be a self-governing country.
[26:50.720 --> 26:54.460]  It's, it's really kind of frightening, uh, to, to see something like this happen.
[26:54.800 --> 26:59.260]  Do you think it's the model for something that will happen in this country in the near future?
[26:59.840 --> 27:07.380]  Well, I think it's certainly going to be a model that, um, is going to get pointed to by people in Congress and elsewhere as, you know, everybody's doing it.
[27:07.440 --> 27:09.480]  Even the British did it, so we can do it too.
[27:09.920 --> 27:12.980]  Um, we've already started to see some hints in that direction.
[27:12.980 --> 27:18.700]  So, so I wouldn't be surprised, um, to, to, to, to see that.
[27:20.120 --> 27:20.640]  Wow.
[27:21.120 --> 27:30.700]  Uh, it's interesting, this quote from, uh, the liberal Democrat, uh, peer Lord Straussberger, who's one of the leading voices against the investigatory powers bill, uh, get this.
[27:30.720 --> 27:34.320]  He said, we do have to worry about a UK Donald Trump.
[27:34.540 --> 27:39.640]  If we do end up with one, and that is not impossible, we have created the tools for repression.
[27:39.640 --> 27:42.840]  If labor had backed us up, we could have made the bill better.
[27:43.020 --> 27:45.800]  We have ended up with a bad bill because they were all over the place.
[27:46.200 --> 27:51.160]  The real Donald Trump has access to all the data that the British spooks are gathering, and we should be worried about that.
[27:51.280 --> 27:57.520]  So it's amazing that they're seeing the nightmare scenario as somebody like Donald Trump getting his hands on that particular bill.
[27:57.900 --> 27:59.620]  And we've already got Donald Trump.
[27:59.800 --> 28:01.020]  All we need now is the bill.
[28:01.220 --> 28:02.360]  So that's what I'm afraid of.
[28:02.980 --> 28:04.700]  And, and, and it's even a little worse than that.
[28:04.700 --> 28:19.720]  I'm sorry to keep making this worse and worse, but we have this thing called the five eyes agreement, and so that is an agreement by the U.S., the U.K., Australia, Canada, and New Zealand, I think is the other one, to share intelligence information with each other.
[28:19.900 --> 28:28.060]  So whatever powers the, you know, GCHQ, the British have, that information can be shared with the United States.
[28:28.100 --> 28:30.540]  And the terms under which it's shared are pretty, pretty broad.
[28:31.240 --> 28:33.160]  We don't know the exact contours of it.
[28:33.160 --> 28:43.520]  That's all secret, but we know there are, that the five eyes, as they call them, are the most trusted with each other and have the widest range of access to each other, each other's surveillance.
[28:43.840 --> 28:47.500]  So that's also quite troubling.
[28:48.220 --> 29:01.600]  Another thing that, that just generally bothers me about the issue of surveillance, when, when you talk to the average person about this, generally they seem to be in favor of surveillance, thinking that this will somehow make things safer.
[29:01.600 --> 29:09.940]  If you go to a neighborhood where there have been a lot of shootings or crime is on the rise, you'll find that people are calling for more cameras.
[29:10.520 --> 29:12.680]  How do you, how do you combat something like that?
[29:13.320 --> 29:15.380]  Well, I think the first thing we need is data, right?
[29:15.440 --> 29:22.520]  Because anybody who seriously looked at this knows that cameras don't actually reduce crime in an area.
[29:22.600 --> 29:25.680]  They reduce, you know, some kinds of crime, loitering and a few other things.
[29:25.800 --> 29:31.160]  But when it comes to serious crimes, the fact that a camera's on people is not a particularly good deterrent.
[29:31.460 --> 29:35.860]  And, you know, there are studies out of the UK that have made that point for over a decade.
[29:36.160 --> 29:52.260]  So, you know, I think it's a false thing that lots of people, including people who sell cameras, are trying to convince people that cameras are, will keep you safer when, you know, that's not really evidently supported in the kind of broad mass surveillance cameras everywhere,
[29:52.320 --> 29:56.160]  kind of way of looking at it.
[29:56.220 --> 30:10.540]  It's one of the things that I think people are beginning to learn about police body cameras as well, is that, you know, they're not particularly effective in the ways that people had hoped in terms of retarding bad police behavior or catching bad police behavior.
[30:11.400 --> 30:16.780]  Cameras and increased surveillance are kind of a deal, you know, they feel quick and easy.
[30:16.780 --> 30:18.320]  They feel like a technical solution.
[30:18.320 --> 30:23.120]  But the truth is, they really haven't proven themselves to be useful.
[30:23.300 --> 30:38.300]  Now, what has proven to be useful is cameras in the hands of individuals, you know, not government cameras, but you and I having cameras and being able to film crime or government misbehavior and other things like that, that is actually demonstrated to be pretty useful.
[30:39.220 --> 30:45.020]  But not all cameras are equal, and not all access to cameras and surveillance is as effective.
[30:45.260 --> 30:49.420]  And I think that there's a lot of misleading of people going on.
[30:49.540 --> 30:52.220]  There's a difference between a camera and surveillance.
[30:52.440 --> 30:58.920]  A camera is something that you can point at a situation and record it for evidence or to show the truth about what's going on.
[30:59.000 --> 31:02.020]  But surveillance, it's just, you're always being watched.
[31:02.060 --> 31:05.920]  You always have to account for every movement, everything that you do.
[31:05.980 --> 31:14.480]  I remember a number of years ago when I was in Las Vegas, I was walking through one of their hotels, casinos, what have you, they're all the same thing.
[31:14.760 --> 31:19.740]  And I was noticing that every angle that I was at, there was always a camera.
[31:19.900 --> 31:23.380]  You know, I would stop everybody and say, hey, okay, where's the camera?
[31:23.580 --> 31:25.520]  And we would always be able to find it.
[31:25.600 --> 31:35.260]  And it was such an unusual, weird thing that we all thought it was fascinating to be able to stop anywhere and know that we're on camera.
[31:35.360 --> 31:36.240]  It was unusual.
[31:36.400 --> 31:37.580]  We did not have that in our lives.
[31:37.740 --> 31:41.620]  Today, I challenge our listeners right now, right now, at this moment, are you on camera?
[31:41.780 --> 31:42.560]  Look around you.
[31:42.760 --> 31:44.100]  Is there a camera pointed at you?
[31:44.460 --> 31:45.640]  Is there a camera pointed at us?
[31:46.840 --> 31:47.200]  Really?
[31:47.820 --> 31:48.700]  My God, is there a camera?
[31:48.840 --> 31:49.800]  I didn't know there was a camera there.
[31:50.520 --> 31:51.260]  Holy, wow.
[31:51.440 --> 31:52.680]  Okay, there's a camera in this room.
[31:52.820 --> 31:53.040]  Why?
[31:53.160 --> 31:54.060]  Who's watching that?
[31:54.380 --> 31:55.460]  Okay, we have a camera.
[31:56.740 --> 31:58.600]  Sandy, I assume you're not on camera.
[31:59.380 --> 32:01.020]  I don't think I'm on camera.
[32:01.160 --> 32:08.100]  But, you know, I can't speak for all the people who might But I think at the moment, there is certainly no camera on in my office.
[32:08.240 --> 32:12.380]  Of course, you know, I have a phone and I have a laptop and that laptop has a camera on it.
[32:12.580 --> 32:16.140]  The camera on my laptop has an EFF sticker over the front of it.
[32:16.220 --> 32:20.900]  So it may be on, but it can't be recording anything that's going on in the room.
[32:20.900 --> 32:22.680]  Well, you're in the EFF office.
[32:22.680 --> 32:26.520]  I'm sure the NSA has paid a visit and has all kinds of bugging devices.
[32:26.560 --> 32:28.560]  That's why I said I couldn't promise anything.
[32:29.100 --> 32:34.540]  But certainly, you know, we engage in attorney-client communications here.
[32:34.720 --> 32:38.540]  So it would be unethical for someone to be surveilling us.
[32:39.480 --> 32:41.040]  And I'd love to catch them at it.
[32:41.040 --> 32:51.020]  But I do think that, you know, there's lots of good research about how people alter their behavior when they're on camera.
[32:51.220 --> 32:57.680]  Not in ways that they won't necessarily break the law, but ways in which they might be afraid to take a stance.
[32:57.840 --> 33:04.740]  They might be afraid, you know, now that we've got cameras all over political protests, I've heard from lots of people, that they're kind of afraid to go to a protest.
[33:04.860 --> 33:05.100]  Yes.
[33:05.520 --> 33:07.780]  Because it's going to go down on their permanent record, I bet.
[33:07.940 --> 33:10.560]  And Facebook will go and identify them to everybody?
[33:11.040 --> 33:12.160]  With their facial recognition?
[33:12.760 --> 33:18.980]  And they might be in trouble at work or at home for showing up at something that is controversial.
[33:19.240 --> 33:21.720]  Bernie, down in Philadelphia, are you on camera right now?
[33:22.560 --> 33:26.720]  Not that I know of right now, but I'm sitting near a window, so one never knows.
[33:27.320 --> 33:36.820]  I have my cell phone pointed at me, but unless my BlackBerry has been hacked, that camera is not recording me right now.
[33:36.920 --> 33:43.300]  But, you know, if I step out the door and take a few steps, because I know I'll be in view of a camera, and the next block there, and the next block there.
[33:43.980 --> 33:47.280]  And, you know, it's an interesting game to play.
[33:48.600 --> 33:59.020]  Cindy, I wanted to ask what you think people should do with regard to maybe not overreacting to some things.
[33:59.020 --> 34:03.200]  I think we need to focus on what is most important instead of...
[34:03.200 --> 34:15.840]  I mean, I hear some people complaining about things that haven't happened yet, and things that really, you know, just maybe not even are true with what's going on right now with the incoming Trump administration.
[34:16.360 --> 34:31.800]  And I think if we complain about too many things that are maybe not what we should focus on, or maybe don't have as much merit, or maybe not be true, it waters down what we should be focusing on.
[34:31.880 --> 34:36.380]  So what areas do you think we should focus on most in the near future?
[34:36.980 --> 35:03.300]  Well, I think for the interim period before Mr. Trump takes office, it would be very useful for us to really push the companies that have all our data to encrypt it and to get rid of their logs and to get rid of any excess information they have so that they don't become conduits to government attempts to track down and locate people.
[35:03.880 --> 35:29.860]  I think that right now that is a tremendously important thing, and there's an opportunity before the law changes, before we have things like data retention laws and other kinds of restrictions that might come in or limitations on encryption, to get as much of our communications encrypted and to make companies really work hard to think about what data do they actually need about us and what data
[35:29.860 --> 35:33.040]  they should get rid of and scrub their logs and things like that.
[35:33.660 --> 35:39.000]  So that they are, you know, best positioned to protect us, depending on what comes forward.
[35:39.160 --> 35:41.940]  That's something EFF has been calling for for a very long time anyway.
[35:42.200 --> 35:44.700]  But now I think there's a particular urgency.
[35:45.640 --> 35:48.880]  And that's something that, you know, that can happen tomorrow.
[35:48.880 --> 35:50.940]  We don't have to wait and worry about what's happening.
[35:50.940 --> 35:52.460]  It's the right thing to do anyway.
[35:52.740 --> 35:56.300]  And I think that's someplace where we can focus our efforts.
[35:56.300 --> 36:11.320]  Today, we also did say that we supported efforts to do risk-limiting audits in the three states that came out very close, Wisconsin, Michigan, and Pennsylvania.
[36:12.000 --> 36:27.780]  There's been, I think, a pretty smart observation by a lot of the computer security people who have been for a long time sounding worry about the fact that our elections are not auditable or are not audited.
[36:28.180 --> 36:30.380]  And this would be a very good time.
[36:30.640 --> 36:41.440]  There are efforts that candidates are thinking about going ahead and asking for audits of the elections.
[36:42.780 --> 36:49.400]  So I think that if people wanted to put some effort in that and support those efforts, that's a good thing.
[36:49.480 --> 36:50.620]  It's a good thing in the short term.
[36:50.620 --> 36:57.240]  It's also a good thing for the long term, for the kind of hygiene of our election systems, that they be, you know, auditable.
[36:57.480 --> 36:59.520]  We don't let companies not have audits.
[36:59.880 --> 37:01.660]  I'm a nonprofit corporation.
[37:01.700 --> 37:05.020]  We have to have an audit every year by law.
[37:05.280 --> 37:16.120]  I just, the idea that our elections are something we just cross our fingers and hope work okay and that we don't use the auditing technologies that are available to us and systems that are available to us is just crazy.
[37:16.440 --> 37:20.500]  It's been crazy for a long time, but now we have a moment and I think we should seize it.
[37:20.920 --> 37:26.000]  Yeah, I mean, a lot of people want it just to be over with, but it is important to get it right.
[37:26.060 --> 37:29.920]  And sometimes that involves a little pain and prolonging it.
[37:31.000 --> 37:35.760]  Cindy, there was something interesting on the EFF webpage in the days after the election.
[37:35.760 --> 37:41.660]  That was a call for tech companies to fix a bunch of technical issues before it's too late.
[37:41.740 --> 37:42.580]  I'm going to read a little bit of it.
[37:43.060 --> 37:44.000]  The results of the U.S.
[37:44.080 --> 37:46.920]  presidential election have put the tech industry in a risky position.
[37:47.260 --> 37:55.380]  President-elect Trump has promised to deport millions of our friends and neighbors, track people based on their religious beliefs, and undermine users' digital security and privacy.
[37:55.840 --> 38:00.440]  He'll need Silicon Valley's cooperation to do it, and Silicon Valley can fight back.
[38:00.440 --> 38:08.660]  Now, if Mr. Trump carries out these plans, they will likely be accompanied by unprecedented demands on tech companies to hand over private data on people who use their services.
[38:08.940 --> 38:17.080]  This includes the conversations, thoughts, expressions, locations, photos, and more that people have entrusted platforms and service providers with.
[38:17.260 --> 38:21.900]  Any of these might be used against people under a hostile administration.
[38:22.220 --> 38:37.420]  So there are some recommendations that go above and beyond the classic necessities of security, and they involve things such as allowing pseudonymous access, give your users the freedom to access your service pseudonymously.
[38:37.720 --> 38:39.400]  I'm sorry, I have a problem with that word.
[38:40.120 --> 38:41.340]  But not with the concept.
[38:41.460 --> 38:45.860]  The concept is amazing because you should not have to use your real name everywhere.
[38:46.200 --> 38:47.480]  That's how I live my life.
[38:47.880 --> 38:49.400]  Stop behavioral analysis.
[38:49.400 --> 38:58.860]  Do not attempt to use your data to make decisions about user preferences and characteristics like political preference or sexual orientation that users did not explicitly specify themselves.
[38:58.860 --> 39:05.120]  If you do any sort of behavioral tracking, whether using your service or across others, let users opt out.
[39:05.240 --> 39:15.460]  This means letting users modify data that's been collected about them so far, giving them the option to not have your service collect this information about them at all.
[39:16.180 --> 39:17.380]  Free up disk space.
[39:17.540 --> 39:18.600]  Delete those logs.
[39:18.740 --> 39:20.200]  Now is the time to clean up the logs.
[39:20.200 --> 39:26.120]  If you need them to check for abuse or for debugging, think carefully about which precise pieces of data you really need.
[39:26.240 --> 39:27.700]  And then delete them regularly.
[39:27.880 --> 39:29.520]  Say every week for the most sensitive data.
[39:29.860 --> 39:32.140]  IP addresses are especially risky to keep.
[39:32.540 --> 39:33.440]  Avoid logging them.
[39:33.500 --> 39:39.880]  Or if you must log them for anti-abuse or statistics, do so in separate files that you can aggregate and delete frequently.
[39:40.120 --> 39:43.400]  Reject user-hostile measures like browser fingerprinting.
[39:43.780 --> 39:47.680]  And also encrypt data in transit.
[39:47.680 --> 39:49.160]  Seriously, you guys say.
[39:49.420 --> 39:51.840]  Why are you not already encrypting data in transit?
[39:52.000 --> 39:58.600]  Does the ISP and the entire internet need to know about the information your users are reading, the things they're buying, the places they're going?
[39:58.780 --> 40:00.080]  It's 2016.
[40:00.120 --> 40:02.700]  Turn on HTTPS by default.
[40:03.160 --> 40:06.080]  And finally, enable end-to-end encryption by default.
[40:06.200 --> 40:09.960]  If your service includes messages, enable end-to-end encryption by default.
[40:10.300 --> 40:16.760]  Are you offering a high-value service like AI-powered recommendations or search that doesn't work on encrypted data?
[40:16.760 --> 40:21.120]  Well, the benefits of encrypted data have just spiked, as has popular demand for it.
[40:21.200 --> 40:23.780]  Now is the time to re-evaluate that trade-off.
[40:23.880 --> 40:27.880]  If it must be off by default, offering an end-to-end encrypted mode is not enough.
[40:27.880 --> 40:37.120]  You must give users the option to turn on end-to-end encryption universally within the application, thus avoiding the dangerous risk of accidentally sending messages unencrypted.
[40:37.460 --> 40:43.880]  Cindy, I have to say to all of you at Electronic Frontier Foundation, these are some awesome tips that I think everybody should live by.
[40:44.880 --> 40:45.640]  Thank you.
[40:45.820 --> 40:49.520]  You know, I have some amazing technical people, right?
[40:49.620 --> 40:57.920]  So this is a conversation that they're having right at the companies that are holding our data and in the language that they can understand, right?
[40:57.920 --> 41:08.380]  That, you know, so that was, you know, I've got, we think this is an important call to the companies and there's something they can do that will protect all of us.
[41:08.760 --> 41:09.100]  Absolutely.
[41:09.300 --> 41:15.200]  One really brief summation of all this on behavioral data, don't collect it.
[41:15.280 --> 41:17.460]  If you have to collect it, don't store it.
[41:17.540 --> 41:20.060]  If you have to store it, don't store it long.
[41:20.820 --> 41:21.080]  Yep.
[41:21.360 --> 41:32.960]  And I think really that's something that we should make sure the companies that we use, the services that we have live up to this because, well, I mean, things can be abused in so many different ways.
[41:33.220 --> 41:48.920]  And our personal data, just not even recording conversations and looking at the actual communications, but the metadata, we've learned how valuable that is, how that can be used against people almost in a more complete way than the contents of the communication.
[41:49.820 --> 41:50.480]  That's right.
[41:50.640 --> 41:57.700]  I mean, there's a famous quote, I think it's D&I Clapper that, you know, we kill people based on metadata, right?
[41:58.880 --> 42:06.860]  Because if you know where someone is, in fact, if you know where someone spends their days and someone spends their nights, you really can get to their name pretty quickly, right?
[42:07.020 --> 42:17.400]  I mean, there's, you know, I think they say sometimes four to six data points and you can positively identify almost most people without content, without anything.
[42:17.400 --> 42:21.660]  If you know, you know, location and a couple other things, you can nail people.
[42:21.860 --> 42:32.420]  And so you don't need for, you know, for identification, for location, and often for the content of what they're communicating, you don't need the content itself.
[42:33.540 --> 42:34.580]  Yeah, absolutely.
[42:34.780 --> 42:40.120]  But, you know, so many people trade convenience for privacy.
[42:40.120 --> 42:43.700]  And sometimes it just happens without you having any say in it.
[42:43.700 --> 42:52.980]  I've made a point of not telling my phone where I live, where I work, or I feed it bad information sometimes.
[42:53.200 --> 43:01.740]  Yet still, the other day, when I was taking Kyle to the airport, it reminded me, it said, you need to leave now in order to get there by this particular time.
[43:01.860 --> 43:06.040]  It somehow figured out where I was going to be at a particular time, even though I wasn't telling it that.
[43:06.040 --> 43:08.420]  I had location data off.
[43:08.420 --> 43:17.200]  But it still sent me a little helpful reminder telling me what I needed to do, and how to get there, as if to just sort of rub it in that, yeah, you know what, I know who you are.
[43:17.340 --> 43:18.240]  I know about you.
[43:18.740 --> 43:20.280]  Most people would welcome this.
[43:20.720 --> 43:22.460]  And for me, it's...
[43:23.260 --> 43:29.800]  Yeah, I mean, I appreciate that you take, you know, sometimes heroic steps to try to protect your privacy.
[43:29.980 --> 43:32.680]  And I think that, you know, all power to people like that.
[43:32.700 --> 43:33.360]  I think that's awesome.
[43:33.440 --> 43:37.540]  But honestly, I just don't think we should accept that as the world, right?
[43:37.540 --> 43:46.720]  I mean, we should have laws and practices by, you know, our policy makers and by the companies that serve us that protect us.
[43:46.720 --> 43:49.540]  We shouldn't have to take these big measures.
[43:49.760 --> 43:57.420]  We should be able to have a relationship with our phone that isn't shared with a lot of other, you know, with other entities.
[43:57.440 --> 43:59.520]  It doesn't become a commodity.
[44:00.260 --> 44:02.340]  You know, people think about their phones.
[44:02.700 --> 44:08.740]  You know, we're having fights, you know, with the government about how to think about people's phones and when they can search it and stuff like that.
[44:08.840 --> 44:21.560]  And I'm increasingly trying to really suggest that, you know, we need to think about these devices as extensions of our bodies, extensions of our brains, extensions of our minds, because that's what they really are.
[44:21.640 --> 44:22.860]  That's how we use them.
[44:22.860 --> 44:30.420]  And the idea that we treat a phone like you might treat a backpack as opposed to treating a phone like you treat your brain is just not how people live, right?
[44:30.600 --> 44:32.800]  People don't remember phone numbers anymore.
[44:32.800 --> 44:34.480]  They're all stored in their phone.
[44:34.760 --> 44:36.220]  People's contacts are there.
[44:36.380 --> 44:40.100]  People's most intimate communications go through this device.
[44:40.600 --> 44:48.440]  So I think we need to start recognizing that these devices and services we use really have a duty.
[44:48.680 --> 45:00.800]  And, you know, a law professor at Harvard named Jonathan Zittrain has written a piece on this that, you know, we really should start thinking about these people who hold our data and these devices that hold our data as fiduciaries.
[45:00.800 --> 45:02.140]  This is a legal term.
[45:02.320 --> 45:11.420]  It's the term that you use, say, when you take responsibility for a child or you take responsibility for an older person who has dementia and can't take care of themselves anymore.
[45:12.200 --> 45:13.520]  You have a duty.
[45:13.520 --> 45:19.440]  It's called a fiduciary duty to protect their interests as if they were your own and more.
[45:19.680 --> 45:32.820]  And I think that we really need to start expecting that the companies that have access to our data and our most intimate lives have a responsibility to us to make sure that they protect it.
[45:33.040 --> 45:37.400]  That means they have to put real strong security in place and they have to defend it.
[45:37.560 --> 45:43.980]  There's no more of this sloppy data breach, you know, shrug your shoulders and give you extra protection kind of stuff.
[45:44.140 --> 45:46.440]  I mean, a real responsibility to protect our data.
[45:46.460 --> 45:49.020]  And that includes protecting it against our government.
[45:49.580 --> 45:49.980]  Yeah.
[45:50.080 --> 45:59.720]  And the convenience angle is so crucial, not only for what people are willing to trade for it, but for what people aren't willing to do to mitigate these risks.
[46:00.660 --> 46:01.460]  Tools like...
[46:01.460 --> 46:04.300]  There was a tweet by a man named John Rogers, who's a TV writer.
[46:04.480 --> 46:07.560]  And right after the election, he tweeted, Hey, no joke.
[46:07.560 --> 46:12.300]  If you plan on opposing Trump, get Tor, get Signal, get a VPN, 2FA on your emails, now.
[46:12.860 --> 46:17.500]  And the thing is that there were many responses to this tweet, like, I don't know what any of those are.
[46:17.500 --> 46:18.760]  I don't know what any of this is.
[46:19.280 --> 46:30.440]  And while those of us in this room and many of our listeners to the show recognize these as all tools that can be used to protect your privacy, these are not things that are in general use enough.
[46:30.740 --> 46:34.320]  These are not things that are easy enough for someone to use who isn't a technical expert.
[46:34.380 --> 46:36.300]  Maybe he should have said, listen to Off the Hook.
[46:36.500 --> 46:37.460]  Read 2600.
[46:37.560 --> 46:38.040]  Go to Hope.
[46:38.200 --> 46:39.860]  You know, that's the way you learn about these things.
[46:40.000 --> 46:43.800]  And that's why we try to reach out to the general public and let them know about that.
[46:43.900 --> 46:53.960]  But, you know, to expand on what Cindy was saying, to have a phone be the equivalent of your brain, it's very, very true and very, very scary because you can't lose your brain.
[46:54.120 --> 46:55.100]  Well, most people can.
[46:55.180 --> 46:56.460]  You can't just leave it on a subway.
[46:56.700 --> 47:00.200]  You can't have somebody access it remotely from far away.
[47:00.200 --> 47:08.240]  Yet, all these things are possible with our phones and all of our personal information by our choice most of the time is on there.
[47:08.400 --> 47:25.620]  And it's just amusing when we desperately need humor to hear authorities say that they have a hard time tracking people because of encryption, because of sophisticated technology, when they have access to more than they've ever had access to before.
[47:25.620 --> 47:38.420]  You go back even 10 years, let alone 20 or 30, people did not store this much information about themselves on devices where it can be obtained and unlocked if it is locked in the first place.
[47:39.060 --> 47:49.340]  So I don't think we say that enough, that these arguments, such as we saw with the San Bernardino fiasco earlier this year, it's just not true.
[47:49.460 --> 47:52.480]  And the authorities say that they can't get information on people.
[47:52.480 --> 47:54.820]  There's so much information out there for them to get.
[47:55.680 --> 48:07.080]  Yeah, I think that a lot of law enforcement's gotten a little lazy and that they think they can just go to these third parties and get everything about all of us instead of doing what they used to have to do, which is, you know, old-fashioned gumshoe investigation,
[48:07.320 --> 48:07.500]  right?
[48:07.740 --> 48:08.060]  Absolutely.
[48:08.300 --> 48:09.640]  They wanted to know what I was up to.
[48:09.720 --> 48:16.900]  They actually had to knock on my door and, you know, come and talk to me or talk to my neighbors or figure out, you know, do a real investigation.
[48:16.900 --> 48:37.180]  And, you know, to your point, Emmanuel, Peter Swire, who was a privacy czar under President Clinton, so, you know, not exactly a far-lefty guy, called this the golden age of government surveillance, when you add up all of the ways in which government has access to information.
[48:37.200 --> 48:38.600]  I'm actually working on a...
[48:38.600 --> 48:54.000]  We're working on a white paper here, a piece that...about...that's called...you know, the government calls what they have going dark, and we're writing a piece called Blinded by the Light, where we're kind of just trying to list all the different ways in which this information...you know,
[48:54.000 --> 48:57.880]  more information is available to law enforcement than ever before.
[48:58.320 --> 49:16.160]  And so when they come and they demand that we have weakened security in order to make their job a little easier, that's when we...we should say no, you know, that they should not weaken our security in order to make sure that they can make it slightly easier to solve some crimes.
[49:17.340 --> 49:21.300]  It's just not the right trade-off, and we should reject it.
[49:21.780 --> 49:34.880]  It's one of the things I'm worried about, about the new administration, because many of the people involved there were some of the people who have said most strongly that they are opposed to, you know, you and I having real security.
[49:36.740 --> 49:39.380]  Yeah, it's something that is...is our right.
[49:40.140 --> 49:59.960]  Looking at the clock, we're running out of time, and we haven't even touched on net neutrality yet, so let's...let's zero in on that, because Trump hired a couple of net neutrality opponents to oversee the transition at the FCC, and that could be really an ominous step for the future of net neutrality.
[50:00.140 --> 50:01.340]  Cindy, what's your take on this?
[50:02.100 --> 50:09.000]  Yeah, I think it's definitely worrisome, and, you know, it can be problematic in a couple of ways.
[50:09.180 --> 50:30.980]  One is that, you know, that Trump's going to get a chance to put in some FCC commissioners and put in some of the leadership there, and, you know, one of the things that they could do that might even be hard for us to track is just not enforce the new network neutrality rules that they worked so hard to get into place and got approved by the court.
[50:31.380 --> 50:40.900]  We may also see efforts in Congress to try to repeal those rules, or other internal efforts inside the FCC to try to repeal or shift those rules.
[50:41.060 --> 50:45.500]  So I think that's one of the things that looks likely to happen.
[50:45.680 --> 50:53.880]  You know, there's lots and lots of fears about what the Trump administration is going to do, but if you look at who he's putting into place there, that seems to be in his sights.
[50:54.140 --> 51:00.040]  And he is on record, you know, when he was a candidate saying he didn't like the network neutrality rules.
[51:00.180 --> 51:05.400]  So I think that is something that we're going to see, and I think, you know, we're going to fight it, of course.
[51:05.640 --> 51:17.020]  I think we also need to really work hard to continue to keep track of non-neutral behavior by providers so that we can build the record that we need, that this is a problem and it's affecting ordinary people.
[51:17.840 --> 51:35.980]  Because, you know, if you think you're standing up for the working man and, you know, you're trying to make things easier for, you know, the working people in this country who have been overlooked, you know, raising the price of their broadband access and limiting what,
[51:36.020 --> 51:50.520]  you know, what websites they can get to based upon which provider they have signed up with, the kinds of non-neutral behavior that, you know, those of us who stand up for network neutrality are worried about, you know, that's going to hit people in the middle of this country.
[51:50.520 --> 51:57.880]  It's going to hit people who are struggling to make ends meet, you know, or even just middle class people.
[51:58.020 --> 52:00.820]  It's going to make, you know, their monthly bills go up.
[52:00.900 --> 52:11.860]  And I think that, you know, if it looks like that's what's starting to happen, we need to, those of us who care about this, need to really build the case that, you know, this man who campaigned very strongly that he was going to be the voice of people,
[52:12.040 --> 52:20.680]  you know, who were feeling voiceless and And economically overlooked, was taking steps that was hurting the very constituency that he said he was going to protect.
[52:20.940 --> 52:23.420]  And I think there's an argument there with network neutrality.
[52:23.540 --> 52:24.360]  We just need to make it.
[52:24.560 --> 52:42.500]  I find it sometimes hard to explain it to people who listen to the propaganda from Donald Trump type... people like that who own big companies who say that net neutrality prevents them from developing new technology and is basically hurting everybody.
[52:43.320 --> 52:46.780]  How do you put it in terms that people can understand?
[52:46.780 --> 52:50.780]  And what should they be looking out for specifically as a sign of abuse?
[52:51.760 --> 52:59.120]  Well, I think that they should be looking for, you know, jacked up bills for broadband and limited choices.
[52:59.400 --> 53:00.980]  You know, can you vote with your feet?
[53:01.120 --> 53:02.060]  Do you have a marketplace?
[53:02.440 --> 53:11.160]  You know, do you have real choices in terms of broadband such that if somebody's starting to raise your rates or giving you a bad deal, you can go to someone else or not?
[53:11.160 --> 53:17.400]  If you have a lot of those choices, then you've got a functioning market and you might not need the network neutrality rules.
[53:17.560 --> 53:26.400]  But part of the concern and part of the reason why EFF got involved with network neutrality is we really don't see the market working very well for people who are trying to get...
[53:26.400 --> 53:31.140]  You know, most people in America don't have a lot of choices with regard to their broadband.
[53:31.140 --> 53:33.280]  And if the price goes up, they just have to pay it.
[53:33.340 --> 53:34.580]  They just have to swallow hard and pay it.
[53:34.680 --> 53:38.940]  If Comcast goes up or Verizon goes up, they just have to swallow and pay it.
[53:38.940 --> 53:41.060]  So I think that's one way to look at it.
[53:41.180 --> 53:56.240]  The other way that we kind of talk about network neutrality sometimes is that, you know, it's really kind of a shady operation, you know, for your broadband provider, say your Verizon, to go to somebody like Google or a website like Craigslist or, you know,
[53:56.320 --> 54:10.040]  a website that you might like to go to, 2600 magazine website, and say, you know, if you want your website to load really quickly for my, you know, for my customers, you're going to have to pay me a little extra money, right?
[54:10.180 --> 54:28.500]  It's really kind of a shakedown, this idea that the broadband provider gets to control, limit, and favor access to its customers because it, you know, it's the last, you know, it stands in between the customers and the places that they want to go to.
[54:28.500 --> 54:44.380]  I think I should be able to go to any place on the internet that I want to go, and the websites ought to load and be usable, you know, in exactly the same way, regardless of whether I choose Verizon or Amazon or AT&T or Comcast or somebody else for my provider.
[54:44.500 --> 54:52.400]  The provider should just not stand in the way of me being able to get where I want to go and use the services I want to use.
[54:52.480 --> 54:55.960]  And, you know, that's what network neutrality is trying to enforce.
[54:55.960 --> 55:00.740]  And I just think that a non-neutral internet just, it hurts.
[55:00.980 --> 55:10.760]  It hurts people all across the board, but it especially hurts the kind of, you know, people who want to play, you know, people who I think otherwise might be supporters of Mr. Trump.
[55:11.240 --> 55:16.960]  Well, I think you said it best in that most people, lots of people certainly, don't have choices.
[55:17.400 --> 55:24.140]  And the biggest argument in favor of getting rid of net neutrality is that it gives you back a choice.
[55:24.140 --> 55:28.020]  But if most people don't have a choice in the first place, they're not getting a choice at all.
[55:28.180 --> 55:31.680]  They're being forced to pay whatever they're told to pay and get access.
[55:31.780 --> 55:45.360]  I know Netflix is one of the best examples of how this service could hurt people because they would have to pay more to access a site like that because they're expecting something that they want desperately.
[55:47.140 --> 55:50.020]  Well, one more thing before we sign off tonight.
[55:50.180 --> 55:56.360]  There's a new organization that Electronic Frontier Foundation is a part of called the Electronic Frontier Alliance.
[55:56.580 --> 55:58.440]  In fact, 2600 joined it earlier today.
[55:59.140 --> 56:00.780]  You want to tell us something about this?
[56:00.880 --> 56:04.640]  Yeah, it's great to see people coming together, see organizations coming together.
[56:04.980 --> 56:08.760]  And I feel like this is something that we're going to really need in the years ahead.
[56:08.780 --> 56:12.600]  But can you tell us briefly something about what Electronic Frontier Alliance is all about?
[56:13.120 --> 56:29.620]  Yeah, you know, we discovered that everywhere we went, when we would go to give a talk or kind of meet with people, there were people all over the country who had little organizations and they really wanted to join into the kind of work that we're doing.
[56:29.840 --> 56:37.520]  And that we decided to build, try to be, you know, create a hub for all of these different groups all across the country.
[56:37.520 --> 56:44.220]  And eventually we're hoping all across the world to be able to share information, share knowledge, you know, organize together.
[56:44.860 --> 56:47.480]  And, you know, we're part of the alliance.
[56:47.980 --> 56:57.300]  But, you know, and we, you know, because we're kind of a big organization, we certainly want to provide people with information and resources and ideas about how to do what they're going to do.
[56:57.380 --> 57:05.680]  But we really don't want to, you know, we're not really in charge of it as much as we try to be the conveners of it and create a way for groups to work together.
[57:05.680 --> 57:17.960]  So if you're a group, you know, like 2,600 and you want to organize a protest around, you know, an encryption law, you can work through the alliance to find other groups all across the country who might want to do that.
[57:18.060 --> 57:25.160]  You might be able to share ideas, share logos, share information, and make your voice bigger by organizing together.
[57:25.400 --> 57:34.260]  And, you know, we created a set of, I think, six basic principles that we want all the groups to agree on so that we all are facing the same direction.
[57:34.260 --> 57:35.860]  They're pretty simple and straightforward.
[57:37.500 --> 57:49.460]  And, you know, try to find a way to be, you know, to make our voices collectively bigger than they would be individually and cross-pollinate ideas.
[57:49.880 --> 57:51.260]  Cindy, what's the best...
[57:51.260 --> 57:51.740]  Go ahead.
[57:51.940 --> 57:52.120]  Yeah.
[57:52.580 --> 57:56.500]  I was just asking what the best way to get involved in the alliance is.
[57:57.240 --> 57:59.840]  Well, the EFF Alliance has a website.
[58:00.180 --> 58:01.900]  It's part of the EFF website.
[58:02.100 --> 58:03.440]  You can go there and get information.
[58:03.440 --> 58:09.880]  And my colleague, Shahid Batar, and Camila Choa are the two people who organize it.
[58:09.920 --> 58:15.280]  But if you go to the website, you can, you know, drop them an email or find a way to get in touch with them.
[58:15.640 --> 58:17.780]  They do conference calls, I think.
[58:18.200 --> 58:22.680]  They're monthly for all the groups that want to do where they kind of talk over what's going on.
[58:22.800 --> 58:35.900]  We try to provide the best intelligence that we can from, you know, our legislative people or other people about issues that we think might be timely or if there's, you know, something, a moment coming up where pressure might work or things like that.
[58:36.060 --> 58:47.780]  So, you know, are the rest of the EFF staff feeds into Shahid and Camila to try to make sure that they give the broader network the best information that we can about what's going on.
[58:47.780 --> 58:51.100]  And finally, Cindy, how do people get a hold of EFF?
[58:51.200 --> 58:52.220]  How do people help EFF?
[58:52.220 --> 58:54.760]  Because we need you guys to be strong in what's ahead.
[58:55.400 --> 58:57.540]  Well, EFF.org is the website.
[58:57.540 --> 58:59.180]  And you can donate there.
[58:59.300 --> 59:00.260]  We are member supported.
[59:00.500 --> 59:10.540]  We have 27,000 members, which I think is awesome and terrific and way too small for the size of the jobs that we need to do.
[59:10.540 --> 59:14.060]  So we certainly could use people's financial support.
[59:14.060 --> 59:19.780]  If you've got an organization, you want to get active, there is the EFA.
[59:20.860 --> 59:26.240]  Individually, you know, we run an action center and we run actions for, you know, writing Congress on things as well.
[59:26.340 --> 59:27.300]  So if you join...
[59:27.300 --> 59:28.740]  And we also have really cool swag.
[59:29.080 --> 59:31.520]  So, you know, we're a nonprofit.
[59:31.700 --> 59:32.600]  This is the end of the year.
[59:32.700 --> 59:36.900]  If people think what we're doing is important, we really urge them to come and join us.
[59:37.080 --> 59:37.320]  Okay.
[59:37.400 --> 59:39.000]  EFF.org is the website.
[59:39.480 --> 59:41.740]  Cindy Cullen, Executive Director of the Electronic Frontier Foundation.
[59:41.740 --> 59:43.440]  Thanks so much for speaking with us tonight.
[59:44.040 --> 59:46.740]  And we hope to work with you again in the near future.
[59:47.520 --> 59:47.880]  Absolutely.
[59:47.880 --> 59:48.420]  My pleasure.
[59:48.520 --> 59:49.260]  Nice talking to you guys.
[59:49.420 --> 59:49.540]  Good night.
[59:50.660 --> 59:52.820]  And that's going to do it for another edition of Off the Hook.
[59:53.000 --> 59:53.960]  We'll see you again next week.
[59:54.060 --> 59:55.080]  Stay tuned for The Personal Computer Show.
[59:55.140 --> 59:55.340]  Good night.
[01:00:38.110 --> 01:00:38.830]  Good night.
[01:00:39.030 --> 01:00:39.790]  Good night.
[01:00:41.530 --> 01:00:41.730]  Good night.
[01:00:42.910 --> 01:00:43.570]  Good night.
[01:00:43.950 --> 01:00:44.190]  Good night.
[01:00:44.230 --> 01:00:45.890]  Good night.
[01:00:46.230 --> 01:00:46.990]  Good night.