[00:00.000 --> 00:04.180]  ...and betrayed by the state of the mainstream media in this country.
[00:04.600 --> 00:09.120]  A media whose priorities seem out of step with their responsibilities.
[00:11.300 --> 00:16.320]  We need a media that strengthens democracy, not a media that strengthens the government.
[00:16.700 --> 00:22.400]  We need a media that enriches public discourse, not one that enriches corporations.
[00:23.000 --> 00:30.060]  Hi, I'm Jane Fonda, and this is WBAI, listener-supported, non-commercial radio in New York.
[00:32.120 --> 00:35.000]  And yes, you are listening to WBAI in New York.
[00:35.280 --> 00:36.220]  It's 8 o'clock.
[00:36.500 --> 00:38.560]  Time once again for Off the Hook.
[02:29.370 --> 02:31.050]  And the very good evening to everybody.
[02:31.170 --> 02:32.390]  The program is Off the Hook.
[02:32.490 --> 02:36.790]  Emmanuel Goldstein here with you on this exciting Wednesday evening, joined tonight by Rob T.
[02:36.930 --> 02:37.330]  Firefly.
[02:37.550 --> 02:38.050]  Good evening.
[02:38.390 --> 02:38.650]  Kyle.
[02:39.030 --> 02:39.590]  Hi, everybody.
[02:40.070 --> 02:40.930]  Jim over there.
[02:41.110 --> 02:41.330]  Hello.
[02:42.090 --> 02:43.970]  And Bernie S., where are you?
[02:45.830 --> 02:46.470]  Bernie S.
[02:46.550 --> 02:46.910]  is not here.
[02:47.110 --> 02:48.190]  We've lost Bernie S.
[02:48.850 --> 02:52.110]  Unless he can't... is he coming up on the phone, right?
[02:52.110 --> 02:54.290]  We're not doing some crazy thing with Skype, right?
[02:54.290 --> 02:57.290]  He is, but the phone has lost the connection, so I will reestablish it.
[02:57.290 --> 02:57.750]  It's amazing.
[02:57.890 --> 02:59.310]  You know, we're here in... what is this?
[02:59.770 --> 03:01.230]  1990... no, this is... hold on a second.
[03:01.350 --> 03:02.670]  This is... wow.
[03:03.530 --> 03:05.990]  2016, and we still can't keep a phone connected.
[03:07.430 --> 03:08.990]  It's a cruel and unforgiving world.
[03:09.090 --> 03:09.950]  It really is.
[03:10.630 --> 03:12.510]  Well, we're cruel and unforgiving as well.
[03:12.610 --> 03:13.450]  Two can play that game.
[03:13.570 --> 03:15.690]  We have a lot of topics to cover tonight.
[03:15.710 --> 03:17.250]  We have a special guest.
[03:17.270 --> 03:17.970]  That's a dial tone.
[03:18.190 --> 03:18.890]  That is a dial tone.
[03:19.090 --> 03:21.190]  Is there a reason why we're playing it over the air?
[03:21.610 --> 03:24.890]  I'm just going to bring it down until you tell me that we found him again.
[03:26.450 --> 03:30.930]  Yeah, so we had a lot of good feedback to last week's show from Standing Rock.
[03:30.930 --> 03:31.370]  Remember that?
[03:31.430 --> 03:32.430]  We were talking to the people out there.
[03:33.670 --> 03:41.430]  Yeah, it was an excellent overview and kind of a little bit of the details of what's going on there.
[03:41.430 --> 03:50.350]  Maybe a little bit better information about some of the policies they have and so on and so forth.
[03:50.490 --> 04:02.050]  I think quite a bit of that is ongoing and there's a couple interesting things of note surrounding a pipeline in the area that...
[04:02.050 --> 04:04.750]  Oh yeah, the one that had an accident.
[04:04.990 --> 04:08.070]  Yeah, it's like Bell... something with an F.
[04:08.070 --> 04:11.130]  It doesn't matter because the one that leaks tomorrow is going to have a different name.
[04:11.290 --> 04:11.430]  Right.
[04:11.890 --> 04:13.890]  It's nearby and it's leaked into some creek.
[04:13.890 --> 04:20.030]  All you have to do is go to Wikipedia and look up pipeline accidents and you'll see how many accidents there are.
[04:20.550 --> 04:26.870]  So yeah, all of a sudden these concerns don't seem so unfounded if you are at all suspicious of them.
[04:26.990 --> 04:28.390]  It's just going to be added to the list.
[04:28.550 --> 04:30.350]  But we had some really nice feedback.
[04:30.410 --> 04:32.570]  Here's a letter we got from Bob in Minneapolis.
[04:32.570 --> 04:36.250]  When I started listening to the episode, I was skeptical of how things would tie together.
[04:36.750 --> 04:40.230]  And yeah, you know, a lot of people are skeptical of how we're going to make things tie together.
[04:40.230 --> 04:47.970]  If we're talking about the election, we're talking about oil spills, it does all tie together in the end in some way.
[04:48.550 --> 04:51.190]  Continuing here, I like how the show unfolded.
[04:51.210 --> 04:54.690]  I think I learned more from this episode than any other episode in a long time.
[04:55.070 --> 04:58.250]  I learned that through cultural divides, we can help each other.
[04:58.370 --> 05:03.810]  I also learned that hackers can make a difference regardless of where they are located and their skill set.
[05:04.010 --> 05:08.790]  I guess I knew these things all along but needed reinforcement given the political climate in the U.S.
[05:08.790 --> 05:14.230]  And also, being from a colder climate, I can understand the hardships of the cold weather.
[05:14.390 --> 05:17.730]  I've also worked with First Nation people and they are wonderful to work with.
[05:17.990 --> 05:22.550]  I also have some insight into the corporate structure that is trying to build the pipeline.
[05:22.850 --> 05:25.190]  They are really awful people.
[05:26.810 --> 05:29.590]  Thank you, Bob, from Minneapolis for that insight there.
[05:29.710 --> 05:31.110]  And do we have Bernie with us now?
[05:32.310 --> 05:33.110]  Hi, Emmanuel.
[05:33.110 --> 05:33.830]  I'm in Philadelphia.
[05:33.830 --> 05:36.750]  I don't know why the call got dropped, but I'm here now.
[05:36.890 --> 05:37.670]  I have a theory.
[05:37.670 --> 05:40.390]  The theory is that our infrastructure sucks.
[05:40.670 --> 05:42.630]  The pipeline to Bernie leaked.
[05:42.790 --> 05:44.350]  Yeah, that's what it was.
[05:44.990 --> 05:45.290]  All right.
[05:45.370 --> 05:51.990]  Well, if you can manage to keep the connection open for the next less than an hour, I think everything will be fine.
[05:52.710 --> 05:53.230]  I'll do my best.
[05:53.450 --> 05:53.710]  Okay.
[05:54.050 --> 05:59.650]  Speaking of things that never seem to get any better, you remember the games?
[06:00.010 --> 06:05.270]  Bernie, you remember this because I think we were with you when we did it for the film Freedom Downtime.
[06:05.270 --> 06:07.070]  And we pranked McDonald's.
[06:07.190 --> 06:08.990]  You know, that was a lot of fun.
[06:09.130 --> 06:19.110]  We basically figured out a way to override their radio system because they use a radio system to talk to the customer in the drive up.
[06:19.550 --> 06:23.350]  And they ask what they want and they hear what the customer wants.
[06:23.470 --> 06:26.770]  And by magic, they prepare it by the time they drive up to the window.
[06:26.770 --> 06:36.930]  So, but hackers are able to figure out, anybody really can do this, but hackers are the ones that get blamed for it, figure out basically how to broadcast on that frequency.
[06:37.090 --> 06:38.630]  You wouldn't have to know the frequency, would you, Bernie?
[06:39.410 --> 06:44.870]  I guess remember that it's a UHF frequency, I think in the 460 megahertz range.
[06:45.070 --> 06:46.930]  But with a scanner, you can find it very easily.
[06:47.130 --> 06:47.350]  Okay.
[06:47.550 --> 06:47.830]  All right.
[06:48.470 --> 06:52.910]  So, basically, this is a big story in the Daily Mail I just happened to come across.
[06:53.470 --> 06:56.830]  A few customers at a McDonald's in North Carolina...
[06:56.830 --> 07:03.750]  It's great to read British newspapers talking about America because, I don't know, it's just so much funnier when they report on these things.
[07:04.210 --> 07:09.930]  A few customers at a McDonald's in North Carolina were offered more than just a side of fries with their order.
[07:09.930 --> 07:17.110]  A video posted to YouTube captures the moment drivers were offered an order of obscene comments with their Happy Meals.
[07:17.190 --> 07:23.710]  I guess all you have to do is put something up on YouTube, leak it to a newspaper someplace, and it becomes news that way.
[07:24.030 --> 07:25.830]  You know, you have to remember to do that.
[07:26.570 --> 07:36.610]  The restaurant in New Bern has explained the incident occurred as a result of someone hacking the wireless frequency used by the drive-thru.
[07:36.710 --> 07:38.190]  Well, let me just make a little correction there.
[07:38.650 --> 07:39.870]  It's not really hacking.
[07:39.970 --> 07:41.250]  It's simply using.
[07:41.550 --> 07:42.770]  It's using the frequency.
[07:43.010 --> 07:44.150]  It's broadcasting on the frequency.
[07:44.330 --> 07:45.390]  I don't know, Bernie, is that a hack?
[07:45.790 --> 07:46.590]  I guess it's a hack.
[07:46.630 --> 07:47.050]  Not really.
[07:47.190 --> 07:53.050]  I mean, it's a cute prank, but you're just transmitting a radio signal on...
[07:53.050 --> 08:02.610]  I mean, you can get these handheld radios that you can program for any frequency within a particular range, and you just figure out what the frequency is with a scanner, and you punch it in.
[08:02.710 --> 08:04.010]  It's like dialing a phone number.
[08:04.130 --> 08:05.530]  It's not that much more difficult.
[08:05.970 --> 08:11.990]  So we'll just say we hack the phone number every time we dial the phone number now, and I think that would be more accurate.
[08:12.270 --> 08:19.330]  I'm just glad the news media is so on this story, considering you were doing it, what, 16, 17 years ago for the film?
[08:19.410 --> 08:21.150]  And it was considered old then.
[08:21.150 --> 08:24.670]  When we did it, this was an old trick because it had been going on for so long.
[08:24.790 --> 08:27.790]  I'm just amazed that McDonald's still uses the same system.
[08:27.910 --> 08:31.010]  I just assumed they moved on to something a little better.
[08:31.010 --> 08:36.750]  I had heard that the people that talk to you on the speaker are no longer people actually inside.
[08:36.750 --> 08:42.850]  They're people in, like, the Philippines or something, which is insane if you think about what's actually going on there.
[08:42.910 --> 08:46.150]  And then somehow they pass the order of information on to the people inside.
[08:47.070 --> 08:47.590]  Yeah.
[08:48.490 --> 08:50.190]  You're laughing hysterically, Kyle.
[08:50.290 --> 08:52.190]  Is that really that bizarre concept?
[08:52.770 --> 08:58.410]  I think that would be funny if they had, like, a call center sort of farmed out.
[08:59.690 --> 09:12.690]  It would be ironic that that service, that job, is actually in a facility that's got a whole bunch of people taking orders for which number or how many extra...
[09:12.690 --> 09:14.950]  Every McDonald's in the country, maybe in the same call center.
[09:15.150 --> 09:15.350]  ...condiments.
[09:15.590 --> 09:15.750]  Yeah.
[09:15.910 --> 09:21.050]  It could be totally centralized and maybe more cost-effective that way.
[09:21.050 --> 09:23.810]  You know, it's not something that's fiction.
[09:23.950 --> 09:24.950]  This actually is happening.
[09:25.070 --> 09:28.870]  I'm not sure it's happening here, but I've heard of this happening in various places.
[09:28.970 --> 09:30.590]  Yeah, it's called McOutsourcing, I think.
[09:30.590 --> 09:33.470]  I can see it, but is that really... is that true?
[09:33.650 --> 09:34.730]  Is that... that's really a thing?
[09:34.890 --> 09:35.790]  Bernie, back me up here.
[09:37.370 --> 09:40.470]  It could very well be that they have a call center in another country.
[09:40.650 --> 09:40.910]  There's no...
[09:40.910 --> 09:46.010]  The person who takes your order doesn't have to be necessarily under that roof.
[09:46.710 --> 09:48.530]  Yeah, in fact, that's what the hackers prove.
[09:48.530 --> 09:54.510]  They don't have to be under that roof because they're making the conversation happen without being under the McDonald's roof.
[09:54.770 --> 09:56.710]  But, I mean, how much cheaper...
[09:56.710 --> 10:00.990]  I mean, they're already paying people at McDonald's about minimum wage.
[10:01.370 --> 10:03.930]  So, they don't even want to pay that, McDonald's.
[10:04.010 --> 10:08.690]  Not that, you know, they make billions of dollars a year, but they don't even want to pay people minimum wage.
[10:09.030 --> 10:09.210]  Of course not.
[10:09.350 --> 10:09.690]  No.
[10:09.870 --> 10:10.250]  Of course.
[10:10.310 --> 10:12.270]  That's not good business to pay people minimum wage.
[10:12.270 --> 10:20.930]  But, that tells me that they upgraded something, that it would interface with some call center intercom employees.
[10:21.610 --> 10:24.390]  So, it's been enhanced in some way.
[10:24.850 --> 10:32.010]  Still on this frequency, but it talks to maybe some base station that connects over some telecommunications.
[10:32.010 --> 10:38.870]  I'm not saying necessarily that the New Bern, North Carolina incident took place with people from a different country.
[10:38.870 --> 10:44.090]  Right, you might be referencing a South Korean location that has this feature that offshores to...
[10:44.090 --> 10:44.630]  Some...
[10:44.630 --> 10:45.790]  Maybe it's not even McDonald's.
[10:46.010 --> 10:46.630]  Maybe it's Burger King.
[10:46.770 --> 10:47.110]  I don't know.
[10:47.330 --> 10:55.010]  Some fast food outlet someplace is using outsourced workers in a different country to take orders over the speaker when you're sitting in your car.
[10:55.310 --> 10:57.970]  And I'm sure our listeners have a lot more information on this.
[10:58.210 --> 10:59.910]  OTH at 2600.com.
[10:59.990 --> 11:01.010]  Let us know what you find out.
[11:01.170 --> 11:02.250]  But let me continue with the story.
[11:02.250 --> 11:10.230]  Anyway, so during the two-minute video recorded by an unsuspecting customer, if they were unsuspecting, why did they record the video?
[11:11.870 --> 11:13.430]  They were suspecting, I think.
[11:13.890 --> 11:18.770]  Maybe they thought it would be an appropriate time.
[11:18.930 --> 11:24.310]  They thought it would be likely that some sort of mischief had been going on.
[11:24.590 --> 11:25.870]  Then they're suspecting.
[11:25.910 --> 11:28.330]  They're not unsuspecting if they think some mischief is going on.
[11:28.330 --> 11:37.230]  Anyway, a voice can be heard making a number of unsavory statements, such as, you know, I'm actually on the toilet right now, and I'm just going to serve you your food.
[11:37.430 --> 11:39.110]  I'm not even going to wash my hands.
[11:40.070 --> 11:42.550]  I mean, why would you take anything like that seriously?
[11:42.630 --> 11:46.330]  That's obviously something that's not quite right.
[11:46.590 --> 11:49.130]  After a few brief moments, the taunting continues.
[11:49.570 --> 11:50.150]  You know what?
[11:50.150 --> 11:53.590]  Just pull forward because I'm going to give you whatever the F I feel like giving you.
[11:54.610 --> 11:58.890]  So, yeah, and I'm sure whoever was hearing that is suspecting at that point.
[11:59.330 --> 12:01.950]  On Monday, owner Bill Purcell...
[12:01.950 --> 12:05.130]  This story just goes on and on because it's a story.
[12:05.490 --> 12:06.910]  This is news these days.
[12:07.230 --> 12:09.530]  He issued a statement addressing the situation.
[12:09.950 --> 12:26.990]  According to a TV station, which also got involved, WCTI, we are investigating this matter with the help of the New Bern Police Department, who have nothing else to do, and all other crimes are being ignored as a result of this, which is something that any one of us could show them how to prevent and how it happened in the first place.
[12:27.390 --> 12:30.970]  We are taking steps to prevent this isolated incident from happening again.
[12:31.130 --> 12:33.430]  Okay, number one, it's not an isolated incident.
[12:33.630 --> 12:34.510]  It can happen anywhere.
[12:34.810 --> 12:36.750]  Number two, the steps are very simple.
[12:36.890 --> 12:41.290]  Stop using those kinds of radios to convey information.
[12:41.290 --> 12:48.670]  There's all sorts of other ways you can do this without opening it up to anybody that has a radio to transmit on that frequency.
[12:49.390 --> 12:59.510]  As local owners, our biggest priority is our customers and community, and we want to ensure that every experience at our restaurant is a positive one.
[13:00.890 --> 13:01.970]  I don't know.
[13:02.730 --> 13:08.690]  It's certainly bringing some laughter to people all over the world, so, you know, look at that as a good thing.
[13:10.010 --> 13:11.110]  They never learn.
[13:11.490 --> 13:12.490]  No, no, they never do.
[13:13.330 --> 13:31.470]  You know, another story that I just saw today, I don't have it in front of me, but I saw it on the news, there's this college professor, I think it was out in California, who went on a tirade against Trump, and somebody recorded her on their phone, saying all these anti-Trump things,
[13:31.610 --> 13:50.090]  such as, you know, Trump is basically the equivalent of a terrorist, and spreading fear and horror throughout the nation, and this person recorded her, and now she's in hiding and is in fear for her life and getting death threats and all kinds of horrible things,
[13:50.090 --> 14:04.750]  and I realized that in so doing, basically the point she was trying to make has been made, because this is exactly what she was talking about, except she was talking about it before it was actually demonstrated as far as what she was doing.
[14:05.670 --> 14:24.650]  So, yeah, she's supposedly left the state, she's in hiding, her teaching career is in ruins, all because she said that the election of Donald Trump is a hugely horrible negative thing, things we say without even thinking about it at this point, but you better be careful,
[14:24.670 --> 14:29.730]  because this is the kind of thing that's starting to happen now, that there are watch lists that are popping up.
[14:29.850 --> 14:30.750]  We've heard about lists.
[14:30.750 --> 14:32.270]  Lists are going to be a big thing.
[14:32.510 --> 14:37.970]  There's the list of the EPA employees that investigated climate change.
[14:38.590 --> 14:43.050]  They want to have a list of those people so they can purge them or just keep track of them.
[14:43.190 --> 14:52.850]  But now there's something called Professor Watch List, and it's a project of this organization, this evil terrorist organization known as Turning Point USA.
[14:53.370 --> 14:55.350]  And I'm saying that just to piss them off.
[14:55.790 --> 15:05.910]  The mission of Professor Watch List is to expose and document college professors who discriminate against conservative students and advance leftist propaganda in the classroom.
[15:06.510 --> 15:32.210]  Yeah, and if you go to professorwatchlist.org, you can see, you can get a whole listing of professors all over the country that have been targeted by this organization and the things that they have done that have made them target, such as maybe not saying something negative enough about Castro or encouraging people to study what socialism is or criticizing Donald Trump a little too much.
[15:32.990 --> 15:41.570]  They say this website is an aggregated list of pre-existing news stories that were published by a variety of news organizations throughout the past few years.
[15:41.910 --> 15:53.570]  While we accept tips for new additions on our website, if there's a professor you don't like, you might be able to get them in a lot of trouble, we only publish profiles on incidents that have already been reported somewhere else.
[15:54.390 --> 15:58.590]  TPUSA will continue to fight for free speech and the right for professors to say whatever they wish.
[15:58.670 --> 16:07.590]  However, students, parents, and alumni deserve to know the specific incidents and names of professors that advance a radical agenda in lecture halls.
[16:07.810 --> 16:12.130]  Now, you can bet a radical right-wing agenda is not an issue.
[16:12.290 --> 16:18.930]  This is only about radical left-wing agendas that will be reported and documented and blacklisted.
[16:18.930 --> 16:26.870]  And I love how you'll see this all the time they will pause to say, we believe in free speech and the right to say whatever you want.
[16:26.990 --> 16:37.690]  However, if you say this, we have the right to spread it all over the place and make you look bad and get some death threats headed your way because that's exactly what's going to happen every time.
[16:37.690 --> 16:40.090]  It's happening consistently.
[16:40.570 --> 16:42.550]  And I didn't know about any of this till today.
[16:42.650 --> 16:44.030]  So that's something.
[16:44.790 --> 17:02.650]  Yeah, it's like saying you have the right to take your speech out of context up to and including that speech that's been taken out of context becoming something that terrorizes you personally.
[17:05.250 --> 17:09.150]  I just want to say that I'm not and now or have I ever been a member of the Communist Party.
[17:10.250 --> 17:11.710]  You say that now.
[17:11.950 --> 17:13.330]  It's not even funny though.
[17:13.510 --> 17:15.610]  It's like very McCarthy era.
[17:17.410 --> 17:17.770]  Yeah.
[17:17.970 --> 17:18.810]  And this is how it starts.
[17:19.130 --> 17:20.290]  It doesn't start with a bang.
[17:20.410 --> 17:20.770]  It starts.
[17:20.890 --> 17:21.830]  It starts quietly.
[17:22.130 --> 17:22.670]  It revs up.
[17:22.770 --> 17:23.390]  Yeah, the parallels.
[17:23.810 --> 17:24.470]  Go ahead, Bernie.
[17:24.810 --> 17:25.270]  Go ahead, Bernie.
[17:25.270 --> 17:33.170]  A friend of ours who's a tenured professor at the University of Pennsylvania told me that he'd love to be on this list.
[17:33.290 --> 17:38.190]  He would be like a badge of honor like being on the Nixon enemies list if you remember that.
[17:38.950 --> 17:40.830]  And he's tenured so he can't be fired.
[17:41.010 --> 17:42.810]  So he just wanted to get on the list.
[17:42.930 --> 17:43.950]  He was trying to figure out how.
[17:44.310 --> 17:45.790]  Well, here's my idea.
[17:46.030 --> 17:47.770]  And I think anybody can participate in this.
[17:47.850 --> 17:57.430]  If you go to the website which is, again, professorwatchlist.org there is a section there for submit a tip.
[17:58.190 --> 18:11.650]  And what they would like is for you to tell what the professor said how they were offensive or whatnot and any kind of documentation such as video.
[18:12.230 --> 18:31.410]  Now, it could be a lot of fun to simply go through a list of professors all over the country and make up videos of people who are not those professors saying things that, you know, appear to be controversial submitting those, having those pop up on the list and have all kinds of inaccurate information on there.
[18:32.270 --> 18:44.150]  Names that don't match the faces and comments that were not made in any seriousness but to have thousands and thousands and thousands of names on this list that they will have great difficulty filtering out.
[18:44.570 --> 18:46.830]  This is how you defeat things like this.
[18:46.970 --> 18:51.250]  You defeat it with humor, with confusion, without thinking them.
[18:52.270 --> 18:55.490]  And also by letting people know this kind of crap exists.
[18:55.930 --> 18:56.590]  This is new.
[18:56.750 --> 19:03.550]  This did not exist before this year and I don't think it's going to be the last such thing that we see.
[19:07.640 --> 19:09.120]  I guess we have nothing else to say.
[19:09.680 --> 19:12.300]  Okay, well, guys, you know, you're on your own because I have to get the guest on the phone.
[19:15.120 --> 19:21.700]  Okay, well, while you're doing that, we should mention that this is a fundraiser week here at WBAI.
[19:21.700 --> 19:22.420]  Is it?
[19:22.540 --> 19:23.200]  Hold on a second.
[19:23.340 --> 19:24.520]  I honestly did not know that.
[19:24.860 --> 19:25.640]  There's nothing here to indicate.
[19:25.640 --> 19:27.080]  Are we fundraising tonight?
[19:27.260 --> 19:27.980]  I didn't think we were.
[19:28.160 --> 19:29.240]  Bernie, are we fundraising tonight?
[19:29.880 --> 19:31.660]  We're not responsible for fundraising.
[19:31.840 --> 19:34.460]  We're on and there was a fundraiser going on.
[19:34.500 --> 19:34.800]  Yes.
[19:34.980 --> 19:37.720]  It's like a mini one but we were not told we have to.
[19:37.940 --> 19:38.600]  But it's not a...
[19:39.860 --> 19:40.420]  Wait a minute.
[19:40.560 --> 19:41.320]  We weren't told.
[19:41.400 --> 19:41.840]  We should still tell people.
[19:42.700 --> 19:43.820]  Okay, I've not heard...
[19:43.820 --> 19:44.200]  I'm sorry.
[19:44.340 --> 19:48.140]  I don't mean to sound this ignorant on the air but I honestly didn't know today was a fundraiser.
[19:48.260 --> 19:49.140]  There's nothing to indicate.
[19:49.260 --> 19:50.600]  Okay, give out the damn number.
[19:50.600 --> 20:00.420]  It's sort of a mini fundraiser but yeah, you can always support us even when it's not a fundraiser by calling 516-620-3602 or by going to give2wbai.org.
[20:00.600 --> 20:02.920]  Wait, those people are there even when we're not having a fundraiser?
[20:03.040 --> 20:03.740]  I believe so.
[20:03.820 --> 20:06.440]  I believe it's the permanent contact...
[20:06.440 --> 20:07.180]  Who are those people?
[20:07.340 --> 20:08.200]  Wow, they're so good to us.
[20:08.200 --> 20:09.980]  I think they're the same people that are taking McDonald's orders.
[20:10.520 --> 20:11.600]  Oh, I hope not.
[20:11.700 --> 20:12.260]  I hope not.
[20:12.360 --> 20:15.600]  So if you'd like to donate maybe a burger and fries or...
[20:15.600 --> 20:19.580]  No, but you can always support this station even when it's not fundraising time.
[20:19.780 --> 20:20.400]  Okay, I'll tell you what.
[20:20.400 --> 20:21.280]  I'm going to get the guest.
[20:21.440 --> 20:25.600]  You guys raise a lot of money for the radio station and I'll be back when I get back.
[20:25.840 --> 20:32.600]  Give to wbai.org or you can call 516-620-3602.
[20:33.240 --> 20:33.680]  Yep.
[20:33.900 --> 20:50.540]  We don't have any special premiums like we've done in the past to give you in exchange for your support but what we do have is this program and this radio station and if you ask the operator or look around on the website there are other premiums that the station has that they can give you in exchange.
[20:50.900 --> 20:52.360]  And we are still working.
[20:52.480 --> 20:54.340]  I know listeners want to know this.
[20:54.440 --> 20:57.300]  I know we still get email about this and that's good because that's what we need.
[20:57.720 --> 21:03.400]  I know that people have supported this station in the past and this program in the past and have not yet received their premiums.
[21:03.680 --> 21:05.280]  We are keeping track of this.
[21:05.400 --> 21:10.040]  We are working toward getting everything fulfilled and we are collecting information.
[21:10.200 --> 21:34.240]  So if you haven't gotten in touch with us or even if you've gotten in touch with us in the past but maybe haven't updated us recently on the status do send us an email OTH at 2600.com with the relevant info what you pledged for when you pledged if you have a receipt or the emails that you get from donating forward that to us and we can follow up with that.
[21:34.340 --> 21:35.960]  We are following up with people here at the station.
[21:36.280 --> 21:40.700]  I personally am following up with people here at the station and it's looking promising.
[21:40.980 --> 21:56.660]  So we're looking toward fixing all that but yes, looking toward the present and toward the future if you go to give2wbai.org or call 516-620-3602 tell them you're supporting off the hook tell them you're supporting WBAI and do what you can.
[21:56.840 --> 21:58.280]  It's what keeps the lights on around here.
[21:58.300 --> 22:02.360]  Bernie, I understand there's a positive development on the premium front.
[22:02.500 --> 22:03.340]  Do you want to update us on that?
[22:04.660 --> 22:13.720]  Yeah, we've been collecting a lot of information from listeners who have emailed us in the past that we haven't gotten our premium.
[22:13.880 --> 22:21.000]  So we reached out to them and we filled this spreadsheet with dozens of listeners detailed information.
[22:21.260 --> 22:25.000]  Everything from their order number to how much they pledged, when they pledged, for what premium.
[22:25.940 --> 22:28.380]  WBAI management does not share this information with us.
[22:28.440 --> 22:37.200]  So we have to play detective and get all this and then present it to WBAI management and say, see, you really didn't send all this stuff out like you told us.
[22:37.380 --> 22:38.000]  We have it.
[22:38.140 --> 22:39.400]  We have the proof here.
[22:39.640 --> 22:42.580]  So we hope to give them that proof very shortly.
[22:42.780 --> 22:55.200]  That's why we've been reminding people to contact us so that we can compile a good list of people that are expecting something and we want to follow up with and just double check everything before we send those items out.
[22:55.200 --> 22:58.520]  So I believe the items in question were the Car Hacker's Handbook.
[22:58.620 --> 22:59.060]  Is that correct?
[22:59.760 --> 23:01.220]  Well, those were just...
[23:02.400 --> 23:06.700]  Some of our listeners had pledged for the Car Hacker's Handbook, which we offered back in...
[23:06.700 --> 23:07.860]  I think it was back in March.
[23:08.680 --> 23:10.740]  The station said that nobody pledged for them.
[23:10.900 --> 23:25.280]  Well, we found out that some listeners had pledged for them and we got all the information and we had some extra books here at 2600, so you did up there and they were, I think, sent out early this week.
[23:25.480 --> 23:29.360]  One to Germany and one to, I think, Minnesota or somewhere.
[23:29.540 --> 23:30.540]  It doesn't matter where they...
[23:30.540 --> 23:37.380]  The point is that because we were told there weren't any, we didn't bring any to the station because why would we do that?
[23:37.860 --> 23:40.620]  So what we're doing is we're just going to leapfrog over this.
[23:40.760 --> 23:46.860]  If you did pledge for that book at whatever fundraiser we offered the Car Hacker's Handbook, let us know.
[23:46.980 --> 23:49.820]  Show us some kind of receipt or something like that and we'll just send it out directly.
[23:50.040 --> 23:50.920]  That's an easy one.
[23:51.000 --> 23:51.780]  That's one we can just...
[23:52.260 --> 23:53.000]  deal with.
[23:53.160 --> 23:54.420]  The more difficult one...
[23:55.050 --> 24:03.480]  The more difficult ones are the ones we've already delivered to the radio station that are here someplace that we need to track down and have sent out to the right people.
[24:03.580 --> 24:08.620]  And again, we want to hear from people that have not gotten those things as well.
[24:09.900 --> 24:10.460]  All right.
[24:10.720 --> 24:11.440]  We have a guest.
[24:11.660 --> 24:12.440]  We have a guest.
[24:12.520 --> 24:17.080]  Well, we have a couple of other things to report on.
[24:17.240 --> 24:32.440]  This is something that we were following a couple of weeks ago concerning the election and which everybody is talking about now and that's hackable I guess voting machines and just the process in general.
[24:33.160 --> 24:53.060]  Jill Stein, who I've criticized in the past, I basically, she redeemed herself completely in my eyes by basically standing up and saying, yes, I have the right to ask for a recount in Wisconsin, Michigan, and Pennsylvania and I'm going to do that since Hillary Clinton won't do that and since our bizarre system doesn't allow for anyone else to do that.
[24:54.280 --> 24:58.000]  And she raised money in just a couple of days.
[24:58.000 --> 25:02.780]  People really wanted to have this recount take place because those states were so close.
[25:02.920 --> 25:06.840]  Why wouldn't you want to make sure it was done properly?
[25:08.400 --> 25:12.120]  Unfortunately, what happened was the reaction.
[25:12.320 --> 25:28.160]  The reaction from the Republican Party was ridiculously strong against this basic proving of what happened and in a couple of cases they even were able to get the thing stopped so that there was no recount.
[25:28.940 --> 25:40.760]  We have joining us a civil rights lawyer, Ilan Mazel, who represented Jill Stein in her quest to get a recount in Pennsylvania.
[25:41.140 --> 25:41.900]  Ilan, are you with us?
[25:42.760 --> 25:43.280]  I am.
[25:43.360 --> 25:44.060]  Nice to be with you.
[25:44.540 --> 25:46.940]  Well, thank you for your work.
[25:46.940 --> 25:58.900]  But I understand in Pennsylvania as of this Monday a judge struck down the attempt to have this recount take place.
[25:58.900 --> 26:07.520]  In fact, he was kind of I guess well, the Attorney General is who was really nasty about this.
[26:08.240 --> 26:15.540]  saying such things as tell me how one would introduce malware into a significant number of machines to change the result.
[26:15.840 --> 26:17.140]  No one has done that.
[26:17.440 --> 26:23.700]  Attackers would have to lie in wait for four months as machines were readied and tested before being brought to polling places.
[26:24.020 --> 26:27.100]  And then they'd have to break seals and apply counterfeit seals.
[26:27.100 --> 26:29.720]  and no one would have that kind of unfettered access.
[26:29.980 --> 26:41.160]  And basically in so doing it made it seem like this was something some kind of conspiracy theory when in actuality there's a lot more logic at work here, isn't there?
[26:42.400 --> 26:43.340]  Oh, absolutely.
[26:43.580 --> 27:04.160]  And we had a number of really the best computer scientists in the country Dr. Alex Alderman, Daniel Lepresti, Hadi Hursti, so many experts all of whom said the very same thing which is that these machines are antiquated, they're vulnerable, they're hackable,
[27:04.740 --> 27:07.360]  and they should not be used.
[27:08.260 --> 27:20.700]  And in Pennsylvania in particular a majority of Pennsylvanians use DRE machines, direct recording electronic machines that have no a paper verification at all.
[27:20.840 --> 27:26.600]  So you just go to a screen and you press buttons and you don't see any piece of paper.
[27:26.800 --> 27:30.820]  You have no real proof or confidence that your vote is being counted.
[27:31.300 --> 27:39.300]  And then Pennsylvania just says trust us it's being counted but people have reason to doubt that that's true.
[27:39.540 --> 27:41.700]  So is there any kind of paper trail?
[27:43.040 --> 27:43.600]  No.
[27:43.920 --> 27:50.980]  There's no paper trail in those DRE counties which are the majority of counties in Pennsylvania.
[27:52.060 --> 28:04.040]  There are similar DRE machines in other states where there is a paper trail where a voter can actually see his or her vote on a piece of paper before leaving the polling place.
[28:04.220 --> 28:08.240]  That is not the case in Pennsylvania in the overwhelming majority of counties.
[28:08.560 --> 28:13.640]  So there are if that is the case if there's no paper trail how do you do a recount?
[28:15.200 --> 28:18.460]  Well you can't do a quote recount in those counties.
[28:18.760 --> 28:26.000]  You can only do a recount in the minority of counties in Pennsylvania where there are actual paper ballots to go through an optical scan machine.
[28:26.200 --> 28:44.200]  So we were asking for recounts in the optical scan counties and in the DRE counties where there is no paper we were asking to do a forensic examination of the software to make sure that there was no hacking no malware in those election systems.
[28:46.360 --> 28:47.260]  Well interesting.
[28:47.980 --> 29:03.380]  And I just wanted to point out didn't didn't the judge was it the judge who said there's no evidence these machines were hacked yet there's no way to find out if there was evidence they were hacked unless you did a forensic analysis of the computer's memory isn't that that right?
[29:04.520 --> 29:29.720]  Yeah if you want definitive proof that a machine has been hacked you need to actually look at the machine which no one in Pennsylvania as far as I can tell is doing so these county boards of elections they are not checking after the election to make sure there's no malware candidates are not being allowed to do a forensic examination voters are not being allowed to do a forensic examination so no
[29:29.720 --> 29:46.640]  one is being allowed to do a forensic examination and we just have to you know hope and pray that the machines weren't compromised Because if you're a good hacker, you don't, you know, you don't leave traces of your hacking that are so obvious that, you know,
[29:46.680 --> 29:49.300]  a voter could tell while looking at the machine.
[29:50.020 --> 29:54.840]  You know, if you're a good hacker, you know how to transfer votes from one candidate to another.
[29:55.260 --> 29:59.760]  And people won't know that their votes have been transferred unless you look inside the code.
[29:59.760 --> 30:11.180]  If there was something that they could see through this analysis, would the next sort of expected time that they look at the machine be the next election cycle?
[30:11.400 --> 30:16.480]  Basically, like they're just being locked up and closed away from everyone, including candidates who want to review them.
[30:16.820 --> 30:19.860]  And they're not going to be looked at until maybe they're updated again.
[30:19.860 --> 30:20.760]  Is that what I'm hearing?
[30:22.080 --> 30:28.520]  Yeah, I mean, unless the court grants us access to do this examination, it's not clear to me that anyone will ever do this examination.
[30:29.840 --> 30:35.640]  I mean, what Pennsylvania does with these DRE machines is they allow for re-canvassing of the machines.
[30:36.100 --> 30:41.440]  That means that you press the same button that you pressed on election day to get the same result.
[30:41.580 --> 30:45.700]  And if you press the same button 100 times, you'll get the same result 100 times.
[30:45.700 --> 30:49.220]  So re-canvassing is utterly useless.
[30:50.360 --> 30:56.040]  The analogy we often use is it's like getting the same... or getting a second opinion from the same doctor.
[30:56.220 --> 31:02.880]  If you go to the same doctor and ask for his or her opinion the second or the third or the fourth time, you'll get the same opinion.
[31:03.680 --> 31:11.160]  What we were saying is, let's approach this a different way so that we can actually get behind the machine and inspect it.
[31:11.600 --> 31:13.800]  And so far, we've not been allowed to do that.
[31:13.800 --> 31:24.180]  Well, okay, so my immediate suggestion here is, can we somehow acquire one of these machines so that we can test it to our heart's content?
[31:25.380 --> 31:30.080]  Well, I mean, Dr. Halderman has taken apart these types of machines.
[31:30.240 --> 31:31.160]  He's hacked them.
[31:31.740 --> 31:40.520]  I mean, he convinced the machine to vote for Benedict Arnold against... I forget who it was.
[31:40.600 --> 31:41.560]  It might have been George Washington.
[31:42.140 --> 31:48.360]  No matter what votes people put in the machine, it always came out in favor of Benedict Arnold.
[31:49.060 --> 31:50.960]  So, I mean, we know they're hackable.
[31:51.280 --> 31:52.560]  That's not the issue.
[31:52.560 --> 32:00.280]  The question is, can we look at the actual election management systems of these counties in this election?
[32:00.960 --> 32:03.180]  That's the way to find out if there's malware in there.
[32:04.160 --> 32:09.840]  So, as far as what your biggest impediment was, was it the RNC?
[32:09.840 --> 32:14.000]  Was it the state, the judge?
[32:14.360 --> 32:16.400]  Who really blocked this?
[32:17.740 --> 32:27.200]  Well, you know, the lawyers for Donald Trump and for the Republican Party did everything they possibly could to stop voters from learning the truth.
[32:27.560 --> 32:32.120]  They did everything they could to stop voters from finding out if their votes were actually counted.
[32:33.480 --> 32:39.600]  And the Republican Party tried to stop these recounts, not just in Pennsylvania, but also Wisconsin and Michigan.
[32:39.820 --> 32:44.280]  They had absolutely no interest whatsoever in seeing if the votes were counted.
[32:44.280 --> 32:48.560]  And so they were definitely an impediment wherever we went.
[32:49.540 --> 32:54.680]  In Pennsylvania, there's also an election system that is just stacked against voters.
[32:54.980 --> 33:11.860]  I mean, if voters want to have recounts or even re-canvassing, in Pennsylvania, throughout the state, you need over 27,000 voters and over 9,000 election districts to sign and notarize petitions asking for recounts.
[33:11.860 --> 33:16.120]  And potentially to pay millions of dollars for that, you know, privilege.
[33:16.500 --> 33:23.420]  So the entire system in Pennsylvania is geared towards making recounts virtually impossible.
[33:23.480 --> 33:29.960]  And that's part of the reason why we argue that the election system in Pennsylvania violates the Constitution.
[33:30.560 --> 33:34.620]  Because it provides a right for recounts, but then makes it illusory and impossible.
[33:34.620 --> 33:41.440]  Well, I had heard that there was a $1 million price tag attached to the Pennsylvania recount.
[33:41.720 --> 33:49.400]  I was curious why that was such an impediment when Jill Stein had no trouble or very little trouble raising $7 million.
[33:49.740 --> 33:54.560]  Was it just $1 million or was it $1 million times a certain number of people?
[33:55.860 --> 33:57.240]  Well, there are two issues there.
[33:57.360 --> 34:03.080]  First of all, I mean, the $1 million bond imposed by a state court was the least of it.
[34:03.080 --> 34:05.860]  I mean, voters...
[34:05.860 --> 34:12.860]  The first thing we need to know in Pennsylvania is that candidates cannot ask for a recount, unlike Wisconsin and Michigan.
[34:13.080 --> 34:13.440]  Oh, really?
[34:13.600 --> 34:15.620]  So voters have to do it.
[34:15.860 --> 34:20.540]  And the voters were the ones who were responsible for that $1 million bond.
[34:20.960 --> 34:21.400]  Interesting.
[34:21.400 --> 34:33.300]  And if you're just an ordinary voter of ordinary means and you have the legal responsibility to pay $1 million or part of $1 million, I mean, that is a heavy responsibility.
[34:33.760 --> 34:36.780]  Mind you, the Republican Party wanted a $10 million bond.
[34:37.060 --> 34:42.300]  I mean, they were trying to price those voters out of this entire process.
[34:42.300 --> 34:46.400]  And that's just one fee in one case.
[34:46.560 --> 34:57.880]  In addition to that, if voters want to get recounts in state courts, they need to pay $50 fees for every petition and filing fees.
[34:57.880 --> 35:06.380]  It could be $200 to $300, all of which would add up if you managed to do a statewide recount to $2, $3, or even more million dollars.
[35:06.800 --> 35:12.720]  I mean, it's an incredible price for just ordinary people to have to pay just to make sure their votes counted.
[35:13.540 --> 35:15.160]  It's really highly disturbing.
[35:15.160 --> 35:22.360]  I clearly don't know a lot about this, but, you know, when I hear the word recount, it seems so simple.
[35:22.620 --> 35:34.420]  You're basically, you're taking a bunch of either pieces of paper or electronic results or preferably both and simply retabulating them like a computer would.
[35:34.540 --> 35:35.740]  It shouldn't take very long at all.
[35:35.840 --> 35:38.140]  It shouldn't cost anything or very much.
[35:38.140 --> 35:44.240]  And yet I'm hearing that it's phenomenally expensive, takes a very long time, is really complicated.
[35:45.200 --> 35:47.120]  Can we be doing this better somehow?
[35:48.380 --> 36:09.020]  Well, I think one thing we've all learned in this whole process is that every state should have an automatic auditing process after the election to make sure that computers, you know, the machines worked, to make sure they weren't hacked, just to make sure that the process went as it should.
[36:09.260 --> 36:10.460]  And that doesn't happen.
[36:11.420 --> 36:23.280]  It really should be a best practice that every county does an audit of some percent of the vote to make sure that the, you know, paper ballots are the same as the machines.
[36:23.400 --> 36:23.940]  That's one thing.
[36:24.080 --> 36:29.960]  The other reform we absolutely need is that every single voter in this country should have a paper ballot.
[36:30.320 --> 36:38.880]  Now, maybe you can run it through a machine, but you should always be able to check a paper ballot, because the one thing that you cannot hack is a piece of paper.
[36:39.480 --> 36:41.780]  No one has figured out how to hack paper yet.
[36:41.860 --> 36:43.100]  Okay, we have a challenge here.
[36:43.180 --> 36:43.540]  I don't know.
[36:43.860 --> 36:45.680]  We'll try to figure out how to hack a piece of paper.
[36:46.700 --> 36:48.640]  But, no, that makes sense.
[36:48.680 --> 36:52.940]  I'm wondering, though, is there any state, in your opinion, that does it right?
[36:56.960 --> 37:03.960]  Well, you know, it's funny because, you know, most states are not close when it comes to the election.
[37:03.960 --> 37:07.480]  And so, in most states, these issues don't come to the fore.
[37:07.800 --> 37:11.940]  It's usually the states that are very close where we realize the problems.
[37:12.860 --> 37:24.160]  So, you know, I don't even know what the problems may or may not be in a state like, you know, Texas or New York or Massachusetts or California, because no one ever litigates in those states.
[37:24.340 --> 37:25.500]  They're almost never close.
[37:25.800 --> 37:36.100]  I mean, we do know that California has decertified and rejected the very machines used in Pennsylvania because they're so vulnerable, because they're so easy to compromise.
[37:36.420 --> 37:38.820]  So, that should tell you something about what's happening out there.
[37:38.820 --> 37:47.080]  Yeah, I was going to ask, would replacing these machines with newer models with different auditing features, would that make a difference?
[37:47.220 --> 37:55.680]  Would that make this a less cost-prohibitive and sort of complex process to go back and look at these things?
[37:56.480 --> 38:06.800]  Yeah, I mean, I think if every county had an automatic auditing process, number one, and number two, if every county had paper ballots that were used with or without machines...
[38:06.800 --> 38:07.580]  So, at least technically...
[38:08.100 --> 38:08.720]  That would be...
[38:08.720 --> 38:08.920]  Yeah.
[38:09.040 --> 38:10.200]  That would be a great reform.
[38:10.420 --> 38:11.180]  I mean, that would be...
[38:11.180 --> 38:16.760]  Then we could really have much more confidence that, you know, votes were counted properly.
[38:16.920 --> 38:17.920]  I mean, I'll just give you an example.
[38:18.120 --> 38:18.240]  Okay.
[38:18.460 --> 38:24.920]  In Montgomery County in Pennsylvania, there were over 4,000 people in this county who supposedly showed up...
[38:24.920 --> 38:28.380]  And this is the DRE county with just these machines with no paper.
[38:28.380 --> 38:34.460]  Over 4,000 people supposedly showed up and didn't vote for anybody in any election.
[38:34.800 --> 38:36.940]  Not president, not Senate, not anything.
[38:38.940 --> 38:41.700]  And, you know, that's what the computers tell us.
[38:41.780 --> 38:41.940]  Wait.
[38:42.200 --> 38:50.400]  That they just showed up and decided, for whatever reason, I'm going to go all the way to the polls, go through all the trouble, but I'm not going to actually vote for anybody at all.
[38:50.720 --> 38:51.860]  By the way...
[38:51.860 --> 38:53.120]  4,000 people...
[38:53.120 --> 38:59.120]  You're saying 4,000 people showed up to the polls in one county and didn't vote for anybody.
[39:00.140 --> 39:04.040]  Over 4,000 people supposedly didn't vote for anybody.
[39:05.240 --> 39:07.880]  Their votes were registered as, quote, no votes.
[39:08.040 --> 39:17.360]  But we know from a lot of people who have filled out sworn statements that they were trying to vote for candidates, but a no vote button kept popping up.
[39:17.540 --> 39:24.520]  And so they would select their candidates, and just at the moment they were selected, the no vote button would pop up.
[39:24.520 --> 39:27.000]  So, you know, what is more believable?
[39:27.620 --> 39:31.020]  That over 4,000 people decided not to vote for anybody?
[39:31.320 --> 39:34.460]  Or is it more believable that the machines did not work?
[39:34.920 --> 39:41.680]  I think it's much more plausible that the machines didn't work and those people's votes did not count.
[39:41.880 --> 39:46.300]  And there's nothing in Pennsylvania right now that's allowing those votes to count, and that is a travesty.
[39:46.400 --> 39:49.040]  I'm very curious what this no vote button is.
[39:49.040 --> 39:53.780]  It's just basically telling somebody that the person didn't vote at all?
[39:54.700 --> 39:55.180]  Right.
[39:55.520 --> 39:57.020]  I mean, there shouldn't even be a no vote button.
[39:57.240 --> 39:57.520]  Yeah, exactly.
[39:57.740 --> 39:59.360]  I mean, what possible purpose does it serve?
[40:00.680 --> 40:06.460]  But there is such a button in that county and others, and it's not working.
[40:07.120 --> 40:11.620]  Are you able to find out how many no votes there were in the entire state?
[40:13.480 --> 40:15.080]  That's something we're trying to figure out.
[40:16.080 --> 40:16.520]  Wow.
[40:16.700 --> 40:17.220]  Because I can't...
[40:17.220 --> 40:25.100]  Like you said, I can't imagine somebody going all the way down to the polling place and simply doing nothing.
[40:25.300 --> 40:27.380]  I mean, maybe not voting for president.
[40:27.380 --> 40:28.520]  Okay, I can see that.
[40:28.740 --> 40:32.240]  But to not vote for anybody, that's an incredible waste of time.
[40:32.380 --> 40:33.920]  Yeah, it's really very easy to vote for anybody.
[40:34.580 --> 40:36.460]  To vote for nobody, you just stay home.
[40:37.120 --> 40:38.120]  Exactly, yes.
[40:39.200 --> 40:40.240]  That's really bizarre.
[40:40.240 --> 40:43.640]  Is that the only strange tale you have to tell us, or are there more?
[40:43.820 --> 40:45.300]  I know there are other tales.
[40:45.720 --> 40:47.900]  I mean, I shouldn't call it tales.
[40:48.020 --> 40:53.160]  There's other evidence of irregularities throughout the state, which we're collecting.
[40:54.760 --> 41:06.200]  But, you know, the one thing that we know is that when something goes wrong with machines where there's no paper backup, there's no system to allow those votes to be counted properly.
[41:07.080 --> 41:11.460]  And that is just a fundamental problem with those types of machines.
[41:12.740 --> 41:13.900]  They just shouldn't...
[41:13.900 --> 41:17.180]  No county should use them in Pennsylvania or in the country.
[41:17.420 --> 41:19.880]  It's flatly irresponsible.
[41:20.460 --> 41:21.720]  Yeah, no, I agree.
[41:21.920 --> 41:27.140]  And just the fact that, for instance, Michigan, how long did it take them to count the votes the first time?
[41:27.360 --> 41:30.040]  I don't understand how it takes so long to count something.
[41:31.240 --> 41:32.980]  You know, what am I missing?
[41:33.640 --> 41:36.320]  Well, the Michigan recount was stopped in the middle.
[41:37.300 --> 41:39.480]  I'm talking about the count, the first count.
[41:39.620 --> 41:42.940]  They didn't even have, you know, the number of electors until weeks afterwards.
[41:45.140 --> 41:45.760]  That's right.
[41:46.160 --> 41:53.060]  I mean, some of these states take a long time to count provisional ballots, military ballots, assity ballots.
[41:54.340 --> 41:58.180]  I mean, California was counting for a very long time.
[41:58.180 --> 42:08.440]  And that's why the Clinton margin of victory kept increasing over the weeks after election day because these western states just kept on counting votes.
[42:09.100 --> 42:21.300]  Yeah, you know, as somebody who works with computers a lot, it just seems like you should be able to calculate numbers quickly whether they come in on, you know, handwritten pieces of paper or forms of one sort or another.
[42:21.500 --> 42:27.200]  There should be a system designed to calculate all that in lightning quick speed.
[42:27.200 --> 42:34.260]  And as a matter of course, like you're saying, recount, audit every time.
[42:34.460 --> 42:44.540]  When I do anything involving numbers, whether it's balancing my checkbook or calculating anything, I always check again to make sure I didn't make some kind of mistake.
[42:44.700 --> 42:51.440]  And I just, I can't imagine how it can be seen as a bad thing to want to do that with something as important as an election.
[42:51.540 --> 42:54.020]  Yeah, they go over like lotto results with more scrutiny.
[42:54.420 --> 42:57.440]  Yeah, imagine if this was lotto, but they'd be checking that twice.
[42:58.360 --> 42:58.620]  Absolutely.
[42:59.160 --> 42:59.680]  Well, that's true.
[42:59.760 --> 43:05.760]  I mean, given that we are the world's oldest democracy, you'd think we do a better job at democracy.
[43:06.700 --> 43:08.880]  We really should be doing much better than we're doing.
[43:09.320 --> 43:10.180]  Yeah, absolutely.
[43:10.760 --> 43:11.460]  Go ahead, Bernie.
[43:11.720 --> 43:12.940]  I just wanted to ask you a question.
[43:13.060 --> 43:26.020]  I know you can't stay much longer on the show, but it just puzzles me why these machines that were purchased for Pennsylvania and many other states with no paper trail whatsoever.
[43:27.500 --> 43:29.300]  This is a no-brainer to me.
[43:29.580 --> 43:42.100]  You have a little printer like with a scroll of paper that goes through a window so, you know, after you're done voting, you can look at the paper printout in the window and say, okay, that's who I voted for.
[43:42.100 --> 43:45.560]  And then it scrolls on for the next person's vote to be recorded on paper.
[43:45.960 --> 43:46.460]  What is...
[43:46.460 --> 43:53.980]  This cannot be that expensive to have that as a integral feature on every voting machine in the United States.
[43:53.980 --> 43:56.640]  And it just baffles me why this isn't mandated.
[43:56.980 --> 44:03.280]  I guess the problem is that every state has their own laws and maybe there's reasons that some states don't want that.
[44:04.500 --> 44:05.980]  What's your understanding of this?
[44:07.420 --> 44:12.540]  Well, you're giving me some good questions when I cross-examined the Secretary Cortez in Pennsylvania.
[44:12.980 --> 44:13.140]  Oh, good.
[44:13.320 --> 44:15.160]  Look, I can't...
[44:16.400 --> 44:19.040]  You know, I don't understand that choice.
[44:20.920 --> 44:30.740]  And I certainly don't understand if you're going to make that choice why you would make it impossible or virtually impossible to verify the vote through any means.
[44:31.000 --> 44:43.700]  I mean, if you're going to deprive voters of paper verification, why would you also deprive candidates and voters of the ability to do an examination of the election management system?
[44:43.960 --> 44:49.800]  Why would you deprive them of the ability to seek any kind of meaningful recount or even a recanvass?
[44:49.980 --> 44:52.820]  I mean, why is the system so stacked against voters?
[44:53.180 --> 44:54.300]  Well, what is behind that?
[44:55.540 --> 45:01.840]  What possible justification is there to make it impossible for voters to know that their votes were actually counted?
[45:02.080 --> 45:05.980]  I don't think there's a justification and that's what we intend to prove in this case.
[45:06.220 --> 45:15.400]  Yeah, you know, I go to the corner drugstore to buy some toothpaste and I get a foot-and-a-half long receipt telling me what I spent, what I bought, and a whole bunch of other crap that I don't need and they won't stop doing that.
[45:16.180 --> 45:17.300]  I think it's also...
[45:17.300 --> 45:22.680]  It's funny you mention that because that's exactly what I said to a federal judge last Friday.
[45:24.160 --> 45:24.780]  But you're right.
[45:25.480 --> 45:26.360]  Yeah, it's all...
[45:26.740 --> 45:28.180]  What's the next step in this case?
[45:28.320 --> 45:29.440]  Where do you go from here?
[45:31.060 --> 45:39.020]  Well, I mean, we've gone past, I would say, the emergency phase of the case into a more long-term venture.
[45:40.620 --> 45:50.780]  I mean, when I first went to Pennsylvania, I didn't know that the election system was as burdensome and unfair as it is.
[45:51.740 --> 46:02.920]  But the next phase is to pursue the case until we declare the system of voting and just the general election system in Pennsylvania to be in violation of the Constitution.
[46:03.220 --> 46:08.540]  So that may take a while, but hopefully we can avoid these sorts of problems for future elections.
[46:09.060 --> 46:10.120]  Thank you.
[46:10.300 --> 46:14.200]  Yeah, is there anything we can do on the outside to help in the process?
[46:16.700 --> 46:20.840]  Well, are any of you from Pennsylvania?
[46:21.500 --> 46:22.320]  Yes, Bernie?
[46:22.900 --> 46:24.160]  Yes, I'm down here in Philadelphia.
[46:24.160 --> 46:27.540]  I actually voted on one of those machines that you're describing.
[46:28.060 --> 46:34.380]  I took photographs while I was in the booth of these red LEDs with this membrane panel.
[46:34.620 --> 46:35.540]  Bernie, you're not supposed to do that.
[46:35.980 --> 46:37.300]  And, well, I did it anyway.
[46:37.340 --> 46:38.360]  We talked about this.
[46:40.340 --> 46:47.300]  And, you know, because that was the only way I could document my vote, but it's not really any way of documenting it that matters.
[46:47.300 --> 46:50.740]  It was like a copy for myself, but that's no way for...
[46:50.740 --> 46:53.640]  I can't, like, walk back in and say, was this vote recorded?
[46:53.860 --> 46:57.840]  You know, so it was sort of a Pyrrhic victory, you know, I...
[46:58.480 --> 47:04.000]  But, you know, I don't think people should be able to take printed receipts home with them, because that's going to open up other cans of worms.
[47:04.180 --> 47:06.540]  But there should absolutely be a paper thing.
[47:06.800 --> 47:07.940]  One way people could...
[47:07.940 --> 47:09.080]  What about this, Ilan?
[47:09.260 --> 47:14.460]  Can people request a provisional ballot ballot and then vote on paper instead of on a machine?
[47:17.060 --> 47:30.680]  Well, you know, I have to tell you that provisional ballots are, you know, are generally not preferable methods of voting for voters because there are many legal hoops that have a provisional ballot count.
[47:33.140 --> 47:41.880]  And, you know, ideally, you want your vote to be counted in the regular method.
[47:42.800 --> 47:43.280]  Right.
[47:43.460 --> 47:44.380]  I mean, that's...
[47:44.380 --> 47:51.940]  Usually, I mean, when you do voter protection work, usually you do not want people doing provisional ballots unless they have to, unless they've been turned away for some reason.
[47:52.700 --> 47:57.900]  I had to use a provisional ballot once, I don't know, it was probably eight years ago in Pennsylvania.
[47:57.900 --> 48:01.060]  I had to, in Philadelphia, I had to use a provisional ballot.
[48:01.160 --> 48:09.640]  For some reason, they lost my voter registration and they gave me, it was a huge broadsheet piece of paper and it was very cathartic voting.
[48:09.800 --> 48:13.540]  It was a great big piece of paper and I could mark an X on all these squares.
[48:13.800 --> 48:14.640]  It was great.
[48:14.640 --> 48:15.420]  I loved it.
[48:15.500 --> 48:25.440]  It was, it was, it was, it was so visceral and, and, and physical and, and I knew that it was recorded on a piece of paper I could look at it.
[48:25.840 --> 48:28.580]  And, why can't we do that?
[48:28.680 --> 48:33.040]  I don't need to know if the election results are instantaneously or like two hours later.
[48:33.040 --> 48:35.700]  I can wait until the next day until they count all those pieces of paper.
[48:35.920 --> 48:37.180]  What's wrong with just paper?
[48:38.560 --> 48:45.840]  Well, I mean, I think the better approach is to have an election system that itself makes sense for everybody.
[48:46.060 --> 48:46.240]  Yeah.
[48:46.240 --> 48:58.440]  and, and that means paper ballots that are then run through machines and the paper ballots can be can be verified.
[48:58.780 --> 48:59.380]  Right.
[48:59.440 --> 49:03.300]  And, you know, that is both efficient and verifiable.
[49:03.620 --> 49:05.380]  You know, I think that's how they do it in Canada.
[49:05.560 --> 49:06.860]  I know it was at one point.
[49:07.700 --> 49:09.060]  And, it works.
[49:09.480 --> 49:11.100]  They do the same thing in Washington.
[49:12.060 --> 49:12.960]  Washington State.
[49:12.960 --> 49:14.840]  Yeah, Washington State.
[49:15.100 --> 49:21.040]  And so, you know, most of Wisconsin uses paper ballots with optical scan machines.
[49:21.180 --> 49:26.320]  And there was a recount in Wisconsin that was mostly done by hand.
[49:26.860 --> 49:30.660]  And that is a way to cross-check whether the machines worked.
[49:31.740 --> 49:38.440]  Now, it's not 100% perfect, you know, that someone can look at a ballot and, and, and make a mistake.
[49:38.620 --> 49:54.420]  But, you can't have mistakes of an order of magnitude anything close to what a, you know, a, a nation-state or a reasonably sophisticated hacker can, you know, can, can do to an election system.
[49:54.600 --> 50:00.300]  And it just, it seems like as a matter of maintenance, we're not actually looking at the machines to even see if they're broken.
[50:00.300 --> 50:05.900]  We're just going to put them right back into service and hope they say what we want them to say at the next opportunity.
[50:06.240 --> 50:13.200]  Not even, regardless of the fact that it's actually impacted the vote for a lot of people.
[50:13.360 --> 50:20.200]  And there are a lot of questions that are just simply not being addressed because we're, we're going to accept them as is.
[50:20.980 --> 50:26.180]  I, I had a question I wonder if, is the, are the optical machines, that's obviously a pretty diverse
[50:30.280 --> 50:30.800]  model.
[50:31.300 --> 50:34.060]  Like, there's a lot of different options there.
[50:34.200 --> 50:36.200]  It's not just one other machine, right?
[50:36.620 --> 50:44.020]  So, other states have chosen of the variety of optical scan machines that there are, which one works best for them, right?
[50:44.940 --> 50:45.280]  Right.
[50:45.540 --> 50:47.560]  I mean, there are also a variety of DRE machines.
[50:47.780 --> 50:53.120]  I mean, all these machines have different manufacturers and different makes and models.
[50:53.540 --> 51:00.580]  And, you know, if you ever get Dr. Halderman on your show, I'm sure he will tell you which are the better machines and which are the worst machines.
[51:01.420 --> 51:01.820]  Right.
[51:01.940 --> 51:06.880]  But the, but the one thing that's clear is that, I mean, all machines are hackable, right?
[51:07.000 --> 51:09.600]  I mean, some are less hackable than others.
[51:09.860 --> 51:18.760]  And we had experts in Pennsylvania testify that the password structure used for some of the machines in Pennsylvania was juvenile.
[51:19.240 --> 51:33.540]  I mean, that's an actual quote from a sworn statement that it would be easy, that you wouldn't even need a bachelor level of sophistication in computer science to hack these machines.
[51:34.160 --> 51:35.340]  I mean, it's incredible.
[51:35.640 --> 51:36.620]  It's just unbelievable.
[51:37.160 --> 51:42.200]  And that's why all the experts are saying it's much easier to hack a voting machine than an iPhone.
[51:42.580 --> 51:48.340]  So why would we make it, you know, easier to hack our democracy than an iPhone?
[51:48.480 --> 51:51.660]  And let's not forget the elephant in the room here, which is, you know, U.S.
[51:51.880 --> 52:01.340]  intelligence is telling us that there is a foreign power that has deliberately intervened in this election to help one candidate, Donald Trump, over others.
[52:01.760 --> 52:10.480]  And so we have, you know, we have a nation state that has the motive to hack machines.
[52:10.660 --> 52:12.760]  We have machines that are easy to hack.
[52:13.320 --> 52:24.960]  You put those two things together and it's really not rocket science to believe that there's a significant possibility, if not probability, that some machines have been hacked.
[52:25.120 --> 52:27.860]  So that's why we need to do these audits and these examinations.
[52:27.860 --> 52:40.640]  It bothers me to see people both from Republicans and Democrats ridiculing people like Jill Stein for wanting to have a recount, for wanting to get to the truth of the matter.
[52:40.820 --> 52:46.440]  You know, we come down hard on people who basically blame hackers for everything.
[52:47.180 --> 52:48.780]  This is not one of those cases.
[52:48.780 --> 52:52.460]  This is just saying, is it possible to hack something?
[52:52.980 --> 52:54.140]  Yes, it is certain.
[52:54.260 --> 52:58.180]  As you say, it's possible to hack anything, maybe not a piece of paper, not yet, but we'll figure that out.
[52:58.820 --> 53:02.640]  And basically, we need to address that, not ignore it.
[53:02.720 --> 53:07.760]  And I'm seeing a lot of people just wanting to move on and stop the discussion.
[53:07.840 --> 53:10.580]  And that's precisely the wrong thing to do.
[53:10.960 --> 53:16.860]  And hopefully, your efforts and the efforts of many others will ensure that we actually get some answers.
[53:18.380 --> 53:20.320]  Well, I certainly hope so.
[53:20.620 --> 53:22.120]  That is our...
[53:22.680 --> 53:23.800]  That's what we intend to do.
[53:24.060 --> 53:33.180]  I mean, I think Jill Stein, Dr. Stein, her spearheading of this recount effort has exposed serious problems in our...
[53:33.180 --> 53:38.640]  in the way we vote and problems just within our democracy.
[53:38.860 --> 53:41.580]  And those are problems that we should address.
[53:41.580 --> 53:42.920]  We shouldn't put our head in the sand.
[53:42.920 --> 53:45.220]  We need to acknowledge them, address them, and fix them.
[53:46.220 --> 53:47.700]  We've been speaking with...
[53:47.700 --> 53:49.240]  Go ahead, Bernie, and then we've got to go.
[53:49.720 --> 53:49.940]  All right.
[53:50.120 --> 54:01.740]  Ilana, we're going to go in a minute, but who is funding this litigation and how can our listeners and anyone else who's interested help continue to fund this kind of litigation that's so important?
[54:03.420 --> 54:06.860]  Well, I mean, my client is Jill Stein and her campaign.
[54:07.540 --> 54:15.620]  And as you know, she raised money on her website from just ordinary voters who wanted to make sure our democracy is working.
[54:16.060 --> 54:20.260]  And I believe that that's still possible, that people can still contribute.
[54:21.160 --> 54:22.200]  I think so.
[54:22.660 --> 54:25.320]  So, support the effort.
[54:25.940 --> 54:27.820]  Basically, you're supporting democracy.
[54:27.820 --> 54:31.000]  And that's something that every American should always support.
[54:31.400 --> 54:37.240]  Yeah, and also, you know, something we encourage here at this particular program and in this particular community is ask questions.
[54:37.420 --> 54:38.640]  Ask a lot of questions.
[54:38.860 --> 54:41.900]  Don't be satisfied with people that just tell you that never mind.
[54:41.900 --> 54:45.100]  It's not an issue and that everything works perfectly.
[54:45.260 --> 54:48.940]  Because everything doesn't work perfectly, there's always going to be a glitch or a hole someplace.
[54:49.220 --> 54:50.740]  It's up to us to find it.
[54:50.840 --> 54:57.240]  And when people stand in your way and say it's going to cost millions of dollars just to get an answer, suspect them.
[54:57.300 --> 55:00.040]  Suspect them of being up to something.
[55:00.620 --> 55:05.380]  We've been speaking with Ilan Mazel, a civil rights lawyer who represents Jill Stein.
[55:05.580 --> 55:10.160]  And Ilan, I want to thank you so much for your efforts and your conviction in pursuing the truth.
[55:10.320 --> 55:11.860]  And I hope you don't get discouraged.
[55:11.860 --> 55:13.260]  I hope you keep pursuing this.
[55:14.620 --> 55:17.720]  Well, I'm a civil rights lawyer, so my job is not to get discouraged.
[55:17.960 --> 55:18.900]  Thank you for having me on the show.
[55:19.180 --> 55:19.480]  All right.
[55:19.620 --> 55:20.140]  Thanks again.
[55:20.340 --> 55:25.140]  And we'll certainly be keeping people updated on this story because it's important.
[55:27.000 --> 55:29.040]  And I'm glad we're talking about this.
[55:29.040 --> 55:30.860]  And I hope others do as well.
[55:31.900 --> 55:34.980]  We are out of time, but you're not out of time.
[55:35.120 --> 55:38.060]  The people have called in to support the radio station while we were on the air.
[55:38.380 --> 55:39.900]  And you still can do that.
[55:40.060 --> 55:44.080]  The phone number is 516-620-3602.
[55:44.680 --> 55:47.660]  You can pledge support in all manner of ways.
[55:47.660 --> 55:49.020]  We take credit cards.
[55:49.260 --> 55:50.900]  We take checks.
[55:51.320 --> 55:57.420]  And you can be a BAI buddy, pay a certain amount every month, have it automatically withdrawn from your bank account.
[55:57.760 --> 56:00.440]  There's all kinds of different things.
[56:01.160 --> 56:03.740]  Give to WBAI.org.
[56:03.860 --> 56:04.520]  That's the website.
[56:04.720 --> 56:05.880]  That's the website version.
[56:06.400 --> 56:06.820]  Anytime.
[56:07.140 --> 56:07.740]  Go there.
[56:08.420 --> 56:09.360]  Contribute what you can.
[56:09.520 --> 56:11.340]  Support community radio just like this.
[56:11.500 --> 56:12.320]  And write to us.
[56:12.500 --> 56:14.260]  OTH at 2600.com.
[56:14.440 --> 56:17.040]  We want to hear your opinions, your theories.
[56:17.780 --> 56:21.780]  If you have anything to leak to us, obviously, we will treat that with the utmost confidence.
[56:22.380 --> 56:24.620]  And we will see you again next week at this time.
[56:25.000 --> 56:27.400]  Until then, it's Emmanuel Goldstein for Off the Hook.
[56:27.620 --> 56:28.280]  Have a good night.
[56:59.940 --> 57:00.740]  See you next week.
[57:00.740 --> 57:01.180]  See you next week.
[57:01.180 --> 57:01.680]  Thanks, Red Road.
[57:06.680 --> 57:08.060]  What I want to know is...
[57:09.960 --> 57:11.680]  Enter d-d-d-d-da...
[57:22.640 --> 57:23.520]  I'll be back!
[57:30.400 --> 57:32.020]  What I want to know is...
[57:33.900 --> 57:35.540]  Enter d-d-d-da...
[57:47.520 --> 57:48.480]  I'll be back!
[57:56.770 --> 57:57.410]  I'll be back!
[57:57.790 --> 57:59.530]  I'll be back!
[57:59.590 --> 58:00.490]  I'll be back!
[58:01.650 --> 58:03.210]  And I, and I, and I, and I know...
[58:03.210 --> 58:04.430]  I'll be back!
[58:04.690 --> 58:04.890]  Price!
[58:05.430 --> 58:06.210]  That I need to help!
[58:06.670 --> 58:07.050]  Max!
[58:07.330 --> 58:07.750]  Max!
[58:09.890 --> 58:11.570]  Enter d-d-d-d-da...
[58:29.630 --> 58:30.110]  Fry!
[58:30.730 --> 58:31.110]  Fry!
[58:31.110 --> 58:31.190]  Fry!
[58:33.430 --> 58:34.130]  Fry!
[58:42.070 --> 58:47.690]  We are back with the L.A.
[58:48.950 --> 58:55.470]  We are back with the L.A.
[59:17.980 --> 59:19.700]  Edison, we're gonna lead with you.
[59:19.780 --> 59:20.660]  Copy that, 23.
[59:21.360 --> 59:23.000]  On air, 15 seconds.
[59:23.580 --> 59:24.460]  Standby to rotate.
[59:25.080 --> 59:33.520]  5... 3... 2... 1... This is Edison Carter, answering the questions other people are afraid to ask.
[59:33.640 --> 59:34.500]  What I want to know is this.
[59:35.580 --> 59:37.000]  Baby, you're mine.
[59:37.380 --> 59:38.520]  I'll be back.
[59:38.720 --> 59:42.480]  And I'll be back.
[59:42.640 --> 59:55.500]  I'll be back about … That I entered..?ленday 3.
[59:56.520 --> 01:00:00.020]  This is… Its Prime and Direct.
[01:00:00.400 --> 01:00:01.680]  Network 23.
[01:00:02.500 --> 01:00:03.300]  Am I on air?
[01:00:09.220 --> 01:00:10.020]  I'll make your part.