[00:01.020 --> 00:04.320]  Thank you for thinking of me.
[00:04.560 --> 00:06.380]  And I thank you.
[00:06.520 --> 00:07.780]  And I thank you.
[00:07.840 --> 00:11.200]  Let us say thank you to all you people out there.
[00:12.280 --> 00:14.500]  I want to thank each and every one of you for coming by.
[00:14.740 --> 00:26.900]  And while he's thanking those folks, let me take this opportunity to thank all of you, our listeners and support staff, our contributors, our interns, the volunteers, producers, and the entire crew that works countless hours to bring WBAI into your lives.
[00:31.990 --> 00:36.450]  And you are listening to radio station WBAI in New York.
[00:36.790 --> 00:40.830]  The time is 8 o'clock and we know it's post-Trump inauguration.
[00:41.030 --> 00:45.710]  We were just hoping that maybe we could have a restart on that, but no such luck.
[00:46.270 --> 00:49.830]  It's WBAI New York, 8 o'clock, Wednesday.
[00:50.590 --> 00:52.610]  It's time for Off the Hook.
[02:31.610 --> 02:33.450]  And a very good evening to everybody.
[02:33.530 --> 02:34.790]  The program is Off the Hook.
[02:34.950 --> 02:37.510]  Emmanuel Goldstein here with you on this Wednesday evening, joined by Kyle.
[02:37.510 --> 02:37.510]  Kyle.
[02:38.350 --> 02:39.510]  I'm joining you, yes.
[02:39.670 --> 02:40.110]  Rob T.
[02:40.230 --> 02:40.710]  Firefly.
[02:40.890 --> 02:41.290]  Good evening.
[02:41.290 --> 02:42.010]  Change the order.
[02:42.510 --> 02:43.770]  And Bernie S.
[02:43.870 --> 02:44.770]  down in Philadelphia, I believe.
[02:45.330 --> 02:45.810]  Yes.
[02:45.950 --> 02:46.830]  Greetings from Philadelphia.
[02:47.370 --> 02:47.850]  Welcome.
[02:48.130 --> 02:52.210]  We have some important things to talk about tonight.
[02:52.210 --> 02:54.610]  We have a special guest coming in in just a few minutes.
[02:54.690 --> 02:55.810]  But first, some updates.
[02:56.230 --> 03:00.490]  You guys know there are a billion Yahoo accounts still for sale.
[03:01.250 --> 03:02.550]  Get your checkbooks out.
[03:02.550 --> 03:05.090]  One billion Yahoo accounts.
[03:05.630 --> 03:07.610]  $200,000 are best offer.
[03:07.850 --> 03:15.230]  Now, the passwords don't work, but the dates of birth, telephone numbers, and security questions could still be useful to an adept cyber thief.
[03:15.350 --> 03:16.730]  That's according to this New York Times article.
[03:16.990 --> 03:39.030]  Now, after federal prosecutors unsealed indictments against four men they say were responsible for a 2014 intrusion into Yahoo systems that affected 500 million, that's half a billion user accounts, and basically data on 1 billion accounts stolen in another attack on the company a year earlier appear to remain available on underground hacker forums.
[03:39.110 --> 03:40.170]  That's as recent as Friday.
[03:41.470 --> 03:42.670]  So, yeah.
[03:43.430 --> 03:54.590]  It's just crazy to see stories like this coming by where you can go and buy information, buy accounts, even though you can't actually log into them anymore.
[03:54.690 --> 04:03.770]  The information that is there is still quite relevant to people who want to cause mischief, open up credit cards, buy houses, whatnot.
[04:04.110 --> 04:06.810]  Anybody partake in any purchasing?
[04:07.910 --> 04:11.190]  No, but I'm kind of wondering how much I can get for my old Yahoo account.
[04:11.330 --> 04:12.650]  I haven't used it in maybe 15 years.
[04:13.990 --> 04:16.950]  I guess, what's one billionth of that $200,000?
[04:17.830 --> 04:18.190]  Yeah.
[04:18.450 --> 04:21.630]  Well, it's just... it's crazy because you do lose track of these things.
[04:21.710 --> 04:23.230]  I've got a Hotmail account out there someplace.
[04:23.230 --> 04:24.210]  I don't know where it is.
[04:24.450 --> 04:25.730]  I don't know the password.
[04:26.010 --> 04:27.530]  Somebody probably does have the password.
[04:27.650 --> 04:28.650]  They probably already hacked it.
[04:28.850 --> 04:29.850]  And I don't care.
[04:29.850 --> 04:30.750]  I really don't.
[04:31.230 --> 04:33.470]  And I don't give any real information anyway.
[04:33.470 --> 04:38.870]  So even if you do get whatever data I chose to give them, it's not going to do anybody any good.
[04:39.010 --> 04:40.630]  But I know a lot of people don't live that way.
[04:40.770 --> 04:43.850]  I certainly know someone who's affected by this.
[04:43.950 --> 04:44.230]  Do you?
[04:44.870 --> 04:47.690]  Not me, but I'm sure...
[04:47.690 --> 04:49.810]  I mean, it's still a popular enough email service.
[04:50.330 --> 04:52.230]  So you're just basically asking for a friend.
[04:52.790 --> 04:53.310]  Yeah, exactly.
[04:53.310 --> 04:53.650]  Okay, I get it.
[04:53.650 --> 04:56.450]  Well, I mean, you know, maybe a couple.
[04:56.590 --> 04:57.650]  This is a big deal.
[04:57.770 --> 04:58.650]  Do people still use Hotmail?
[04:59.570 --> 05:09.910]  The thing is, like, these things do still affect people because one of the shops here in the neighborhood where the station is, there's a big sign in front saying, Help Wanted, email, and then there's an AOL.com email address.
[05:09.910 --> 05:11.170]  People do use AOL.
[05:11.470 --> 05:12.450]  They still use AOL.
[05:12.650 --> 05:15.810]  The vice president uses AOL to do all his business.
[05:16.050 --> 05:18.170]  Wait, these were Hotmail or Yahoo Mail?
[05:18.510 --> 05:19.450]  This was Yahoo.
[05:19.690 --> 05:20.070]  Okay, okay.
[05:20.470 --> 05:22.910]  We're talking about the cream of the crop here.
[05:22.990 --> 05:25.150]  Yahoo, AOL, and Hotmail.
[05:25.150 --> 05:29.330]  Now, Bernie, did you say you knew somebody with Hotmail or do you use Hotmail yourself?
[05:29.670 --> 05:31.910]  I actually have a Hotmail account.
[05:32.050 --> 05:37.490]  I've had it since before Microsoft purchased Hotmail, which was, like, back in the 90s.
[05:37.770 --> 05:39.910]  So, and I still use it occasionally.
[05:40.250 --> 05:42.950]  Does Microsoft want to admit that they own Hotmail?
[05:43.170 --> 05:44.730]  Maybe people have forgotten about that.
[05:44.930 --> 05:52.390]  No, they actually are trying very hard to change the brand to Outlook.com, which is their email client, Outlook.com.
[05:52.390 --> 06:05.430]  So, I still have... it's still... my Hotmail address is still at Hotmail.com, but I can be reached by that same address at Hotmail.com.
[06:05.610 --> 06:10.950]  So, they're trying to get rid of the Hotmail brand, but they're keeping the account... the address is active.
[06:11.190 --> 06:12.350]  So, yeah, I don't understand this.
[06:12.410 --> 06:22.270]  And they probably paid a billion dollars for this, but they get a bunch of email addresses that, you know, so I spend all my time trying to block and not get any information from...
[06:22.270 --> 06:30.630]  And Microsoft goes and pays all this money, not for the Hotmail.com name, but just for the valuable information that is attached to the accounts.
[06:30.630 --> 06:31.510]  Is that correct?
[06:32.630 --> 06:36.810]  Well, Microsoft bought Hotmail back in the 90s.
[06:36.850 --> 06:40.030]  I think it was around 97 or so, 97, 98.
[06:40.030 --> 06:42.150]  That's pre-Google, isn't it?
[06:42.310 --> 06:42.850]  It is.
[06:42.990 --> 06:44.930]  And I think when they bought it, they were still...
[06:44.930 --> 06:50.930]  they were trying to get the online service MSN going, and I think they were trying to tie it into that whole online experience.
[06:51.270 --> 06:53.030]  That was... yeah, that was long before MSN.
[06:53.110 --> 06:56.890]  Yeah, it predates a lot of stuff that we know about.
[06:57.190 --> 07:02.870]  Yeah, I too had a Hotmail back then before Microsoft bought it, but I used it for a while, but it's been long since abandoned, and I believe closed.
[07:03.250 --> 07:07.850]  Didn't Chris Lilley play the MSN butterfly, I think, in some of those ads?
[07:08.050 --> 07:08.510]  Oh, really?
[07:08.510 --> 07:08.950]  Yeah.
[07:09.030 --> 07:09.730]  Okay, I didn't know that.
[07:09.790 --> 07:11.670]  Yeah, I think he was the MSN butterfly.
[07:12.650 --> 07:14.810]  Well, that's something to...
[07:14.810 --> 07:15.150]  Fun fact.
[07:15.190 --> 07:15.690]  ...to fathom.
[07:16.530 --> 07:20.990]  But it's not the only thing going on in the world of hackers.
[07:21.250 --> 07:25.890]  In fact, Google has said that hacked websites are on the rise.
[07:25.890 --> 07:31.710]  I guess another way of saying that is hacked websites are making a comeback, because do you remember back in the 90s?
[07:32.010 --> 07:34.630]  Hacked websites, that was the graffiti of the Internet.
[07:34.770 --> 07:36.230]  That was how people expressed themselves.
[07:36.230 --> 07:44.450]  That's how many people got the word out about Kevin Mitnick's plight and other injustices going on, both in the hacker world and in the world at large.
[07:44.910 --> 07:57.550]  But recently, in the last few days, actually, Google painted a bleak picture of cybersecurity, saying the number of websites hacked rose 32% last year, with little relief in sight.
[07:57.750 --> 07:59.590]  We don't expect this trend to slow down.
[07:59.590 --> 08:04.990]  As hackers get more aggressive, and we've noticed that amongst ourselves, we're getting more aggressive.
[08:05.230 --> 08:06.390]  We can't seem to stop it.
[08:06.530 --> 08:06.850]  Absolutely.
[08:07.990 --> 08:09.450]  Don't step up to me, Kyle.
[08:09.710 --> 08:11.930]  I'm just saying, I'm the one speaking here.
[08:11.930 --> 08:13.310]  Watch what you're pointing at, buddy.
[08:13.310 --> 08:14.670]  You put your finger down.
[08:14.790 --> 08:16.130]  Oh my God, will you guys shut up?
[08:16.190 --> 08:17.750]  Who are you to intervene in this?
[08:18.330 --> 08:19.370]  Bernie, don't even.
[08:19.570 --> 08:20.130]  Step off.
[08:20.130 --> 08:20.550]  I won't.
[08:20.650 --> 08:20.970]  All right.
[08:21.050 --> 08:21.210]  All right.
[08:21.330 --> 08:21.850]  I'll sit back.
[08:29.590 --> 08:30.530]  Hackers are getting more aggressive.
[08:30.670 --> 08:31.910]  More sites become outdated.
[08:32.670 --> 08:36.230]  Hackers will continue to capitalize by infecting more sites.
[08:36.690 --> 08:36.950]  Yes.
[08:37.530 --> 08:45.750]  Hackers will infect more sites with our words and our images and our hacked pictures and things like that.
[08:46.330 --> 08:49.250]  And Google said this in a post on its Webmaster blog.
[08:49.550 --> 08:50.330]  You guys ever read that?
[08:50.370 --> 08:51.470]  The Webmaster blog on Google?
[08:52.230 --> 08:52.710]  No.
[08:52.850 --> 08:53.450]  I don't.
[08:53.610 --> 08:54.190]  I might have seen it.
[08:54.210 --> 08:54.770]  I didn't know it existed.
[08:54.910 --> 08:55.790]  Well, now we do.
[08:55.930 --> 08:56.250]  Now we do.
[08:56.810 --> 09:09.750]  Google, which inserts security warnings when it detects hacked sites, said most of those warned can clean up their pages, but that 61% are not notified because their sites are not verified by the search engine.
[09:09.990 --> 09:10.130]  Okay.
[09:10.210 --> 09:12.090]  Can anybody explain what that sentence means?
[09:13.130 --> 09:23.430]  61% of Web sites that are insecure are not notified because Google hasn't verified them.
[09:23.570 --> 09:29.290]  Does that mean they haven't like had an email sent back from whatever contact email address?
[09:29.490 --> 09:30.770]  I mean, how do you get verified by Google?
[09:30.950 --> 09:32.490]  Well, it means you give them more information.
[09:32.710 --> 09:32.910]  Right.
[09:33.070 --> 09:38.810]  And I guess if you're not willing to do that or if you just don't respond to them, you're not verified and therefore you don't...
[09:38.810 --> 09:39.750]  It's like the mafia.
[09:39.950 --> 09:41.370]  It implies some kind of interaction.
[09:41.690 --> 09:45.370]  If you don't respond to us, something could happen.
[09:45.510 --> 09:46.350]  Maybe even transaction.
[09:46.350 --> 09:46.750]  Wow.
[09:47.590 --> 09:47.770]  Wow.
[09:47.770 --> 09:47.850]  Okay.
[09:48.010 --> 09:55.230]  As always, the blog continues, it's best to take a preventative approach and secure your site rather than dealing with the aftermath.
[09:55.490 --> 09:56.810]  That's almost exactly what I just said.
[09:56.930 --> 09:59.110]  It'd be a real shame if something happened to your website here.
[09:59.370 --> 10:02.350]  Remember, a chain is only as strong as...
[10:03.130 --> 10:03.570]  Together?
[10:04.030 --> 10:04.890]  It's weakest link.
[10:04.890 --> 10:05.890]  It's weakest link.
[10:06.790 --> 10:07.310]  Bernie.
[10:07.550 --> 10:07.730]  Okay.
[10:09.110 --> 10:19.290]  The news comes amid growing concerns over cybersecurity in the wake of massive hacks affecting Yahoo and, of course, Yahoo's counter the U.S.
[10:19.730 --> 10:19.790]  government.
[10:20.270 --> 10:23.990]  Because when you think of Yahoo, you think of who's in charge now.
[10:24.610 --> 10:30.990]  Hacking behavior is constantly evolving and research allows us to stay up to date on and combat the latest trends.
[10:31.490 --> 10:42.450]  And speaking of some of the mischief that's been going on, there has been a rash of pro-Turkish Twitter hacks.
[10:42.450 --> 10:45.770]  Now, I know Twitter is not necessarily hacking a website.
[10:45.950 --> 10:47.810]  It's hacking a Twitter account, which is almost as easy.
[10:48.250 --> 10:51.530]  In fact, it's probably easier because you can just guess a password.
[10:51.610 --> 10:58.830]  By the way, did anybody catch the tweet that 2,600 sent out the last week where somebody was trying to guess our password?
[10:58.970 --> 11:00.830]  You get notified when that happens.
[11:02.150 --> 11:10.130]  And we basically just sent out a tweet saying, you know, whoever's trying to do this, we change our password once a day for 30 seconds to the word password.
[11:10.490 --> 11:11.190]  Good luck.
[11:11.570 --> 11:13.490]  And that became so popular.
[11:13.990 --> 11:18.870]  Everybody wrote a script, in fact, to keep trying until they get it.
[11:19.490 --> 11:21.370]  You know, maybe we're not telling the truth.
[11:21.630 --> 11:23.770]  That's another thing we ought to tell people.
[11:24.370 --> 11:26.350]  But yeah, it's funny to see this.
[11:26.530 --> 11:31.250]  But that's the attitude I think you need to have is that it's all a game.
[11:31.250 --> 11:31.910]  It's all funny.
[11:32.070 --> 11:34.330]  It's all, you know, social media.
[11:35.610 --> 11:36.570]  It's IRC.
[11:36.790 --> 11:37.130]  It's the internet.
[11:37.270 --> 11:38.250]  Don't take it so seriously.
[11:38.550 --> 11:40.970]  I mean, take it, you know, as seriously as you need to.
[11:41.350 --> 11:42.910]  But let's not go overboard.
[11:43.210 --> 11:48.010]  And, you know, sending people to jail for hacking Twitter accounts, I think that's going way overboard.
[11:48.010 --> 11:50.990]  And unfortunately, we seem to be in that world.
[11:51.430 --> 11:57.330]  But you might have heard this because it was the lead story in all the evening newscasts, I believe.
[11:57.770 --> 12:04.070]  Multiple prominent Twitter accounts, including ones for Forbes, Justin Bieber, and the University of Chicago.
[12:04.430 --> 12:08.290]  And I hope those three things never appear in the same sentence again.
[12:09.130 --> 12:10.750]  They were hacked early Wednesday.
[12:11.390 --> 12:12.450]  Not this Wednesday.
[12:12.570 --> 12:12.990]  Last Wednesday.
[12:13.210 --> 12:16.390]  Began sending out anti-Dutch and German messages.
[12:16.970 --> 12:24.490]  I think they mean anti-German messages, not a bunch of German messages that were anti-Dutch because that's definitely not a good sign.
[12:24.850 --> 12:43.070]  The compromised accounts featuring a banner photo of the Turkish flag began tweeting out the same message featuring a swastika, always a way to win friends, as well as all kinds of hashtags involving Nazis and Dutch people.
[12:43.290 --> 12:53.990]  It wasn't immediately clear how many accounts were hacked, but prominent victims included Nike, Starbucks, the NHL Network, Duke University, and Floyd Mayweather, according to reports.
[12:54.210 --> 12:58.150]  I almost feel like we're left out because people can't guess our password.
[12:58.150 --> 13:01.330]  An account for Bieber in Japan was also attacked.
[13:01.330 --> 13:06.210]  So it wasn't the main, you know, mother's ship Bieber account.
[13:06.210 --> 13:08.330]  It was a Japanese subsidiary.
[13:09.030 --> 13:10.930]  How do you know that's not the main one?
[13:11.090 --> 13:12.450]  Oh, it might be.
[13:12.750 --> 13:13.070]  Okay.
[13:13.970 --> 13:14.490]  Wow.
[13:14.690 --> 13:19.110]  I guess that's an account in Japan that just tweets Bieber propaganda in Japanese.
[13:19.110 --> 13:20.810]  I think that's the whole purpose of it.
[13:20.970 --> 13:21.910]  Really well, yeah.
[13:21.990 --> 13:24.890]  Apparently they don't use a strong password or good security.
[13:25.150 --> 13:28.730]  Anyway, a Twitter spokesman said the problem links back to a third-party app.
[13:28.810 --> 13:34.190]  Actually, this is how they got in, which the company blocked access to once the breach occurred.
[13:34.430 --> 13:38.990]  That third-party app appears to be analytics service Twitter Counter.
[13:39.390 --> 13:40.890]  That's according to The Guardian.
[13:41.670 --> 13:51.390]  Twitter Counter CEO, Omar Guinard, confirmed to the New York Daily News that hackers did use the app to send out the messages and the company is investigating.
[13:51.930 --> 13:52.590]  What happened?
[13:52.590 --> 14:00.670]  He said a Twitter counter doesn't store account messages, account passwords, or other sensitive information.
[14:00.950 --> 14:07.990]  But apparently they do have enough so that when they're compromised, your Twitter account is compromised.
[14:08.250 --> 14:09.210]  Curious how that works.
[14:09.470 --> 14:12.450]  Well, it's like you said with the weakest link.
[14:12.610 --> 14:16.470]  It's not just Twitter's own security or your email's own security.
[14:16.470 --> 14:20.090]  It's every time you authorize a different app to use Twitter, which you do.
[14:20.090 --> 14:25.870]  Every time you install a new app on your phone or authorize something else to use it, this is another link in the chain.
[14:26.030 --> 14:31.030]  And that app is itself another thing completely outside of Twitter, completely outside of anything else that can be subverted.
[14:31.770 --> 14:37.610]  So yeah, be aware of how good the apps you're using are and how much security you're giving up every time you...
[14:37.610 --> 14:38.650]  It's a wake-up call.
[14:38.810 --> 14:43.810]  You know, if somebody figures out a way to do this using a third-party app, we all get to know about that.
[14:43.950 --> 14:45.950]  We all know that, hey, this is another point of entry.
[14:45.950 --> 14:49.730]  And I think we're more intelligent for that.
[14:50.090 --> 14:52.310]  So let's look at it as education.
[14:53.070 --> 14:55.130]  I know that's how McDonald's is looking at it.
[14:55.230 --> 15:05.090]  The McDonald's executives are recovering from their Twitter account being hacked and having a message that called President Trump a disgusting excuse of a president.
[15:06.030 --> 15:08.310]  That apparently is not the...
[15:08.310 --> 15:12.190]  I'll read you the actual tweet here.
[15:12.650 --> 15:19.110]  Real Donald Trump, which is his Twitter account, you are actually a disgusting excuse of a president, and we would love to have Barack Obama back.
[15:19.370 --> 15:20.750]  Also, you have tiny hands.
[15:21.110 --> 15:22.030]  That was...
[15:22.030 --> 15:24.010]  came directly from McDonald's.
[15:24.310 --> 15:30.170]  And they just want the world to know that that's not necessarily how they feel.
[15:30.350 --> 15:42.150]  In a statement to CBS Money Watch, because CBS Money Watch has nothing more important to talk about, McDonald's said, Twitter notified us that our account was compromised.
[15:43.050 --> 15:44.850]  They had to be told by Twitter, Twitter, okay.
[15:45.310 --> 15:49.810]  We deleted the tweet, secured our account, and are now investigating this.
[15:50.570 --> 15:54.450]  Later in the day, McDonald's said it determined a hack was behind the tweet.
[15:54.570 --> 15:56.850]  It took them almost a full day to figure this out.
[15:58.230 --> 16:01.250]  Based on our investigation, we have...
[16:01.250 --> 16:05.010]  In case you couldn't get McDonald's the other day, they were busy doing this.
[16:05.350 --> 16:09.990]  We have determined that our Twitter account was hacked by an external source.
[16:10.590 --> 16:13.850]  It's a statement we took...
[16:13.850 --> 16:16.470]  Because they asked everybody, did anybody do this?
[16:16.570 --> 16:17.590]  Come on, fess up.
[16:18.010 --> 16:19.370]  We took swift action.
[16:19.710 --> 16:20.570]  Nah, no, you didn't.
[16:20.950 --> 16:21.690]  It was not swift.
[16:21.790 --> 16:22.730]  That's swift action.
[16:22.850 --> 16:24.410]  I'd hate to see what your slow action is.
[16:24.770 --> 16:31.190]  We took swift action to secure it, and we apologize this tweet was sent through our corporate McDonald's account.
[16:32.630 --> 16:38.210]  But the funny thing is that it really heightened the popularity of their Twitter account while it was there.
[16:38.390 --> 16:42.410]  More people were retweeting and visiting them than ever before.
[16:43.490 --> 16:45.030]  So, you know, publicity.
[16:45.330 --> 16:46.990]  They win through that.
[16:47.130 --> 16:50.630]  Well, it's also peak shamrock shake season, so I hope this didn't interfere with that too much.
[16:50.750 --> 16:53.590]  It got people's mind off that, so that's a good thing too, right?
[16:53.850 --> 17:09.590]  But yeah, but there is significance to it being an external hack or an external attack versus often with these branded Twitters and social media accounts, there might be some rogue employee with access who decides to do something fun with it or something like that.
[17:09.670 --> 17:11.570]  Somebody's last day of work and they want to go out with a bang.
[17:12.930 --> 17:14.630]  It's the new take this job and shove it, maybe.
[17:15.250 --> 17:15.890]  Yes, absolutely.
[17:16.930 --> 17:27.730]  Okay, on a more serious note, though, there are things that we've been discussing here on this program over the weeks, months, years, and we had a listener write in, actually, this week.
[17:27.810 --> 17:35.750]  On last week's Off the Hook, there was a discussion of the Electronic Frontier Foundation's guide to protecting the privacy of data that can be accessed through your devices at the U.S.
[17:35.910 --> 17:43.810]  border, and I believe it was Emmanuel who asserted that the choices they present when agents tell you to give them access to your sensitive data are not acceptable.
[17:44.150 --> 17:47.890]  Well, the EFF has shown that they agree privacy should be protected.
[17:47.890 --> 17:52.570]  They are both taking action to assert that and providing the means for us to demand it.
[17:52.570 --> 18:03.950]  And that is true because this week the EFF released a news story saying that border agents need a warrant to search travelers' phones.
[18:04.130 --> 18:06.690]  That's according to what they have told the court.
[18:07.430 --> 18:17.530]  Border agents must obtain a warrant to search travelers' phones, tablets, and laptops which contain a vast trove of sensitive, highly personal information that is protected by the Fourth Amendment.
[18:17.910 --> 18:22.490]  And that was told to a federal appeals court on March 20th.
[18:22.570 --> 18:35.750]  Now, searches of devices at the border have more than doubled since the inauguration of President Trump from nearly, get this, nearly 25,000 in all of 2016 to 5,000 in February alone, the shortest month.
[18:35.870 --> 18:37.090]  5,000 in February alone.
[18:37.190 --> 18:40.810]  You do the math on that, you get over 60,000 in a year.
[18:41.150 --> 18:46.450]  That would be well over double if it continued and it's probably going to increase.
[18:46.730 --> 18:56.550]  Now, along with the increasing number of people who carry devices when they travel, this increases heightened awareness of the need for stronger privacy rights while crossing the U.S.
[18:56.710 --> 18:56.910]  border.
[18:57.270 --> 19:14.010]  Now, while the Fourth Amendment ordinarily requires law enforcement officials to get a warrant supported by probable cause before searching our property, in cases that predate the rise of digital devices, courts granted border agents the power to search our luggage without a warrant or any suspicion of wrongdoing.
[19:14.070 --> 19:15.450]  And we all kind of accept that.
[19:15.550 --> 19:21.570]  You know, we know when we go across borders, it's quite likely that you will be searched without a warrant.
[19:21.810 --> 19:51.890]  And I think why this is a good reminder is that it shouldn't be normalized in any way for electronic devices just because and we get lulled into believing that by talking tough about immigration and all this stuff that somehow and having these high-profile like the Apple case in San Bernardino with regard to people's phones,
[19:51.910 --> 20:04.190]  it gives the public the impression that this is vital and thus the people who are agents on the ground then feel emboldened and almost obligated to do this stuff.
[20:04.310 --> 20:17.310]  Well, that is true and I guess the idea here is to less embolden them by saying that portable digital devices differ wildly from luggage.
[20:17.630 --> 20:18.770]  Not the same thing.
[20:18.990 --> 20:37.890]  And that's kind of what we were talking about last week that people are being told that yeah, you can try to fight it but you're going to lose your device forever and you'll be held up for hours if not longer at the border so the best way to deal with this is simply to encrypt things or not have things on your devices in the first place.
[20:38.050 --> 20:58.610]  I like this approach better because it's more aggressive it's more fighting to preserve our rights they're saying that yes the portable digital devices differ wildly from luggage or other physical items that we carry with us to the airport because they provide access to the entirety of our private lives and that's EFF saying this in an amicus brief that was filed at the U.S.
[20:58.690 --> 21:02.190]  Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in the border search case U.S.
[21:02.550 --> 21:25.370]  Colsa's in 2014 the Supreme Court noted that cell phones now hold the privacies of life for people including highly personal private information such as photos text contact list email messages and videos many digital devices can access personal records stored in the cloud such as financial or medical information before smartphones were invented that kind of information would be kept in our home
[21:25.370 --> 21:40.150]  offices in our desk drawers or in our basement storage If law enforcement officers wanted to enter your home or lockbox as part of a search, they would need to go before a judge, prove probable cause that you're involved in the crime and get a warrant.
[21:40.350 --> 21:45.790]  The border is not a constitution-free zone, said Adam Schwartz, EFF senior staff attorney.
[21:45.790 --> 21:46.570]  The U.S.
[21:46.710 --> 21:59.150]  Supreme Court ruled in 2014 that mobile phones are a window into our private lives and police need to show this probable cause that the people they arrest have committed crimes and obtain a warrant to search their phones.
[21:59.330 --> 22:09.650]  There should be no less protection for individuals who have not been arrested or shown to have committed any crime, but who instead simply want to enter the United States or return to their country.
[22:10.670 --> 22:19.850]  So let's hope that this is listened to, that this is something that's taken seriously, because I don't think there are many more important rights that we have.
[22:20.070 --> 22:27.470]  It's the right to our privacy and to not be searched and to be told that when you're at the border, those rules no longer apply.
[22:27.470 --> 22:35.110]  And you've just got to submit to everything or take extra precautions to encrypt and protect.
[22:36.090 --> 22:43.170]  I think we're better off fighting the notion that we should even consider giving up that right.
[22:44.210 --> 23:03.730]  Yeah, I think if it becomes implicit that that's the case, even though it's not said explicitly, it can then be used to to actually have misinformation at the border and amongst citizens who maybe aren't following this as much or haven't traveled as much.
[23:04.550 --> 23:12.550]  It may lead to them being kind of led to believe duped into this in a time when you're you're vulnerable.
[23:12.550 --> 23:26.030]  For example, you don't have access to all your things, maybe your lawyer necessarily, and yeah, you get sort of isolated and you're you're at their mercy and sort of pseudo custody.
[23:26.890 --> 23:27.410]  Emmanuel?
[23:28.330 --> 23:29.090]  Go ahead, Bernie.
[23:29.910 --> 23:33.450]  Oh, I just wanted to say, we've all been saying we shouldn't normalize.
[23:33.590 --> 23:41.550]  We shouldn't allow our government to normalize the searching of our mobile devices, but the only way to do that is to just say no.
[23:41.550 --> 23:48.910]  And, you know, you don't have to be rude about it when a custom and borders protection agent says, give us your cell phone and your password.
[23:49.130 --> 23:51.870]  You've been just politely declined and say, no, I'm sorry.
[23:52.090 --> 23:58.110]  I either you say don't remember it or no, thank you sort of thing.
[23:58.250 --> 24:01.590]  If you're if you're mean, if you're I mean, if you're nasty, they're going to be nasty back to you.
[24:01.870 --> 24:09.750]  But if everybody does that, or if a lot of people just politely declined, then they can't keep you from entering the country.
[24:09.750 --> 24:10.770]  You're an American citizen.
[24:11.670 --> 24:14.290]  So and that is your property, that phone.
[24:14.530 --> 24:18.950]  So I think they can hold you maybe even for a day or two.
[24:19.370 --> 24:28.010]  But you can't become you can't be compelled to provide your access to your to the contents of your cell phone by giving up your password or whatever.
[24:28.370 --> 24:29.570]  They can't do it.
[24:29.570 --> 24:30.490]  You can just say no.
[24:30.790 --> 24:32.070]  And that's what people need to do.
[24:32.370 --> 24:40.370]  And the big thing about this is like when you're stopped at the border and there are officers there and they're armed and you're faced with, I just want to get back into my country.
[24:41.050 --> 24:44.470]  That's what that's one of the most vulnerable positions you can be in as a citizen.
[24:44.490 --> 24:44.750]  Yep.
[24:45.090 --> 24:46.490]  And it's it's very scary.
[24:46.490 --> 24:51.550]  Even if you know what your rights are, even if you know the law backwards and forwards, that's a scary thing to have happen.
[24:52.150 --> 24:53.650]  And it's not easy for anyone.
[24:53.650 --> 25:01.270]  And people are very likely in that position, I think, in general to just go along with it, to just go ahead with it and and say, yeah, you can do what you want.
[25:01.270 --> 25:02.070]  You can look what you want.
[25:02.190 --> 25:03.110]  Look at what you want.
[25:03.170 --> 25:05.310]  Just let me back into my damn country.
[25:05.510 --> 25:08.270]  And and that's that's how these things get normalized.
[25:08.270 --> 25:10.130]  It's it's the slow creep.
[25:10.130 --> 25:13.490]  And once you give up rights, it's very, very difficult to ever get them back.
[25:14.030 --> 25:14.790]  And indeed.
[25:14.950 --> 25:17.370]  And so let's let's remind them.
[25:17.630 --> 25:30.230]  And as Bernie said that through that, we can reiterate that these rights do apply and educate one another to not be intimidated about this.
[25:30.230 --> 25:47.030]  And and and approach it through through the law and what what citizens are entitled to under search and seizure and other provisions and make sure that that stuff actually followed.
[25:47.990 --> 25:59.050]  And of course, the enforcement of these things tends to in practice vary with with, say, what you look like, what you what you what you what you seem to be doing with yourself.
[25:59.050 --> 26:00.670]  It's it's it's very arbitrary.
[26:00.910 --> 26:04.350]  What may or may not be done to you by by authority figures.
[26:04.770 --> 26:13.930]  And think about the room for corruption that that then sort of opens up and in a lot of ways to and and and on and on.
[26:15.490 --> 26:15.930]  Absolutely.
[26:15.930 --> 26:19.010]  It's it's a really it's a really twisted state of affairs right now.
[26:19.010 --> 26:27.870]  I think now more than more than ever, and it behooves all of us to not only be aware of what we can do to to keep things on a more sane level.
[26:28.030 --> 26:30.750]  But but the fact that this is even a fight that's going on.
[26:32.130 --> 26:34.050]  OK, I have a confession here to make, guys.
[26:34.210 --> 26:36.490]  I've been off mic for a few minutes here.
[26:36.570 --> 26:39.370]  I've been trying to reach our guest and the number I'm calling is busy.
[26:39.710 --> 26:44.470]  But I realize after playing with the phone a little bit that every number I call in two on two is busy.
[26:44.790 --> 26:45.550]  Two on two area code.
[26:46.030 --> 26:50.050]  And I'm not sure why that is where we've got a phone here.
[26:50.610 --> 26:54.270]  I'm dialing nine to get an outside line.
[26:54.370 --> 26:55.130]  You don't have to dial nine.
[26:55.730 --> 26:57.430]  But you get another dial tone when you dial nine.
[26:57.550 --> 26:59.330]  Listen, listen, this is what I'm doing.
[26:59.550 --> 27:00.710]  Here's a dial tone, right?
[27:01.290 --> 27:02.250]  OK, I dial nine.
[27:02.910 --> 27:03.730]  And I get it out.
[27:03.810 --> 27:04.510]  I'm not supposed to do that.
[27:04.730 --> 27:05.790]  That's that's very strange.
[27:06.010 --> 27:08.250]  So I'm supposed to just dial the number without a nine.
[27:08.610 --> 27:09.390]  Yeah, try that.
[27:09.770 --> 27:10.030]  All right.
[27:10.050 --> 27:10.570]  I'll try that.
[27:10.730 --> 27:12.170]  You guys keep keep keep talking.
[27:12.610 --> 27:16.390]  OK, well, we could we could move on to another story that that's been going around this week.
[27:16.690 --> 27:18.190]  Bernie, you sent this in to us.
[27:18.610 --> 27:20.390]  This is yesterday on on Gizmodo.
[27:20.470 --> 27:23.730]  A grand jury just called tweeting an animated GIF assault with a deadly weapon.
[27:24.430 --> 27:28.650]  Was this the the flashing GIF that caused a seizure?
[27:28.850 --> 27:30.490]  Somebody said you deserve a seizure.
[27:30.950 --> 27:31.550]  Yes, indeed.
[27:31.890 --> 27:35.510]  There is a there is a Newsweek journalist named Kurt Eichenwald.
[27:35.670 --> 27:37.750]  Hang on, I'm back just for just to update you.
[27:37.910 --> 27:40.270]  As soon as I dial a single number, I get a fast busy.
[27:40.410 --> 27:41.130]  So that doesn't work.
[27:41.250 --> 27:41.710]  That's strange.
[27:41.770 --> 27:43.730]  I got to keep trying this on the other line is try.
[27:44.090 --> 27:45.450]  Try maybe I'm using line 12.
[27:45.590 --> 27:46.370]  Shall I use a different line?
[27:46.470 --> 27:47.430]  Is that the wrong line to use?
[27:47.550 --> 27:48.370]  I think that's the wrong line to use.
[27:48.490 --> 27:48.830]  Try one.
[27:49.070 --> 27:49.430]  One.
[27:49.630 --> 27:50.550]  OK, no one told me this.
[27:50.630 --> 27:50.850]  All right.
[27:51.290 --> 27:51.610]  Never mind.
[27:52.530 --> 28:00.890]  But but yes, it's a Newsweek journalist called Kurt Eichenwald, who who is an epileptic and and someone tweeted this GIF at him.
[28:01.170 --> 28:03.690]  And then along with comments, let's see if he has a seizure.
[28:03.850 --> 28:04.530]  I hope he dies.
[28:04.690 --> 28:05.270]  That sort of thing.
[28:06.430 --> 28:13.250]  And this this was a person from Maryland and a Texas grand jury charged him with aggravated assault with a deadly weapon.
[28:13.270 --> 28:15.230]  The deadly weapon being the GIF file.
[28:15.650 --> 28:18.290]  So this was this is this is a very interesting case.
[28:18.430 --> 28:19.890]  I don't think there's an easy answer to this one.
[28:20.610 --> 28:25.090]  On one on the one hand, it's it can seem ludicrous to call a digital file a deadly weapon.
[28:25.090 --> 28:30.630]  And on the other hand, if you know somebody suffers a certain condition and you you exasperated.
[28:31.290 --> 28:34.610]  You you you tailor your attack to that specific thing.
[28:34.710 --> 28:37.050]  I mean, anything's a deadly weapon if you use it to attack someone.
[28:38.070 --> 28:40.910]  So so this is this is a really interesting case.
[28:41.030 --> 28:51.670]  But it also it also brings up the the the info that or the concept that if you do suffer from certain medical conditions that can be exacerbated by things like this.
[28:52.010 --> 28:56.930]  Most browsers and apps nowadays can can disable the animation features for you.
[28:57.290 --> 28:58.830]  OK, we've solved the problem.
[28:58.970 --> 29:00.230]  We have our guest on the line.
[29:00.390 --> 29:02.150]  And I'm really sorry about this.
[29:03.490 --> 29:05.990]  Marika Hirose, am I pronouncing your name correctly?
[29:06.570 --> 29:06.990]  Yes.
[29:07.210 --> 29:11.190]  From the New York Civil Liberties Union is is on the phone with us right now.
[29:11.970 --> 29:19.070]  And joining us over a very important topic that we we've talked about in the past.
[29:19.190 --> 29:24.910]  In fact, Marika, you and and another panelist whose name escapes me at the moment.
[29:25.710 --> 29:26.490]  We're at the whole conference.
[29:26.990 --> 29:27.410]  Benjamin.
[29:27.410 --> 29:27.530]  Yes.
[29:28.550 --> 29:35.810]  It was one of the one of the most interesting talks, I think, at the whole conference all about these link NYC kiosks that are popping up all over the place.
[29:35.810 --> 29:44.510]  And the potential privacy issues that these these these gigantic creatures are posing for citizens of New York.
[29:44.790 --> 29:51.110]  So, Marika, let me ask you to outline what some of those some of those privacy threats were.
[29:51.750 --> 29:52.410]  Sure.
[29:52.410 --> 30:15.830]  So when we first started seeing the rollout of link NYC and we checked the privacy policies, we were concerned because we saw that the policy very broadly allowed collection and retention of data without specific data retention periods.
[30:15.830 --> 30:27.790]  And without specific strong assurances about people getting noticed if there are requests for that data from government agencies.
[30:28.110 --> 30:44.870]  We also had some questions about the cameras and the environmental sensors on these devices and exactly what the purpose and the limits of these cameras and environmental sensors were.
[30:44.870 --> 30:48.010]  I know at the time of the talk, the cameras were not in use.
[30:48.110 --> 30:50.030]  Do you know if the cameras have been turned on since then?
[30:52.050 --> 30:53.050]  I don't know.
[30:53.490 --> 30:58.790]  I think I saw some announcement that they either are or will be soon.
[30:58.790 --> 31:08.150]  And with the limitations that appear in the new privacy policy that was issued recently.
[31:08.430 --> 31:12.590]  Which you guys are largely responsible for.
[31:12.770 --> 31:23.230]  We were talking to the city trying to get them to strengthen the Wi-Fi privacy policy and just pay attention to other things that a lot of people would not have known about otherwise.
[31:23.230 --> 31:27.710]  Can you tell us what was significant that happened in the last few days?
[31:28.770 --> 31:29.490]  Sure.
[31:29.710 --> 31:29.850]  Yes.
[31:30.090 --> 31:48.050]  So the city and city bridge, which is a company behind LinkNYC, announced an updated privacy policy that greatly strengthens the privacy protections and responds to the concerns that we had raised last year.
[31:48.050 --> 31:57.090]  With some of the issues around the collection and retention of data and notice of requests for information.
[31:58.810 --> 31:59.270]  Interesting.
[32:00.250 --> 32:05.750]  And are you satisfied with the response that you've gotten up to this point?
[32:06.550 --> 32:16.530]  Yeah, we're really excited that the city and the company were responsive to our concerns and took our concerns seriously.
[32:16.950 --> 32:30.130]  And we think that the model of listening to community needs and concerns about privacy from the public is a really good and important one for municipal Wi-Fi projects.
[32:30.130 --> 32:34.490]  Well, from what I understand, what is in their privacy policy?
[32:34.610 --> 32:38.970]  First of all, you learn this from the talk, if you watch the talk, which I highly recommend.
[32:39.790 --> 32:45.650]  You learn that when you initially clicked on their privacy policy, it sounded so good.
[32:45.810 --> 32:48.610]  You know, we will never sell your name to anybody.
[32:48.610 --> 32:52.350]  And it seemed like they really cared about people's privacy.
[32:52.350 --> 32:58.970]  But when you really looked into it, they were talking about the privacy policy for their website, not for their actual machines.
[32:58.970 --> 32:59.770]  Is that correct?
[33:00.850 --> 33:02.530]  It was a little confusing.
[33:02.930 --> 33:12.010]  And I think it was Benjamin who pointed it out, that there were two privacy policies, one for the website and one for the link devices.
[33:12.150 --> 33:16.630]  And it could be a little confusing which one you were looking at.
[33:16.630 --> 33:17.170]  Yes.
[33:17.510 --> 33:19.090]  I don't know if that was intentional.
[33:19.530 --> 33:27.490]  And a question I had though, because I learned so much just by watching this, they have something known as beacons inside these devices.
[33:27.930 --> 33:33.790]  And beacons, they send out signals to other devices.
[33:33.810 --> 33:35.550]  They're contacting you.
[33:35.950 --> 33:39.630]  Do you know when beacons are used and what their purpose is?
[33:40.810 --> 33:54.690]  So that is in the policy around the collection of information and receiving certain communications.
[33:55.270 --> 33:57.070]  It was...
[33:57.320 --> 34:06.050]  There are parts of the policies that are strong in the sense of they say that they don't sell your information.
[34:08.090 --> 34:28.230]  And that's the part that we had focused on were just the general collection and retention of data, which we were pleased by the policies, the new policy changes, because it limited that retention period from what it was previously.
[34:29.050 --> 34:29.750]  Interesting.
[34:30.110 --> 34:30.370]  Emmanuel?
[34:30.630 --> 34:31.050]  Go ahead, Bernie.
[34:31.750 --> 34:32.430]  I just want...
[34:32.430 --> 34:32.910]  Hi, Mariko.
[34:32.910 --> 34:33.950]  This is Bernie.
[34:34.390 --> 34:34.870]  Hi.
[34:34.870 --> 34:36.890]  I just wanted to enlighten our listeners.
[34:37.150 --> 34:38.910]  Not everybody knows what we're talking about.
[34:39.090 --> 34:42.810]  We're talking about these big kiosks you see in Manhattan.
[34:42.870 --> 34:44.190]  I guess they're just in Manhattan, right?
[34:44.210 --> 34:45.650]  That's the only borough they're in right now?
[34:47.570 --> 34:49.990]  No, they're in other boroughs as well.
[34:50.230 --> 34:51.750]  They're starting to roll them out everywhere.
[34:52.010 --> 34:52.190]  Okay.
[34:52.190 --> 34:57.530]  These are these big monoliths that kind of look like from the movie 2001.
[34:57.530 --> 35:00.390]  No, they're not as big, and they're not completely black.
[35:00.930 --> 35:02.970]  They have replaced the payphone booths.
[35:03.390 --> 35:14.790]  And for our listeners who aren't aware of this, these things are replacing the payphones, and you can make telephone calls on them, but they're also basically spying on everybody who walks by with a cell phone.
[35:14.790 --> 35:32.770]  If your cell phone's Wi-Fi or Bluetooth is turned on, and frankly, if your face is turned on because there's cameras on these things, these new payphone booths are basically spying on everybody that's standing near them or walking by them.
[35:32.890 --> 35:34.070]  And that's what we're talking about.
[35:34.490 --> 35:37.790]  How many thousands of these things are there in New York City right now, Mariko?
[35:40.170 --> 35:42.250]  It's changing every day.
[35:42.530 --> 35:45.530]  I see them crop up all over the place.
[35:45.710 --> 35:55.670]  I think they just came into my neighborhood a couple weeks ago, so they're going to be in a lot of places.
[35:55.970 --> 35:58.670]  It's like City Bike, only they're watching everything you do.
[35:59.210 --> 36:01.870]  Mariko, there are sensors on these things?
[36:01.870 --> 36:04.290]  How many different sensors are on each one?
[36:05.390 --> 36:07.810]  There are environmental sensors.
[36:08.190 --> 36:15.810]  And one of the things we had asked for was to make clear what kinds of sensors we're talking about.
[36:16.290 --> 36:26.610]  And so the new privacy policy talks about temperature sensors, humidity, ambient noise, light pressure, and air pollutants.
[36:26.950 --> 36:27.610]  Ambient noise.
[36:27.630 --> 36:29.610]  Does that mean these things are always listening?
[36:31.210 --> 36:37.370]  Well, they're collecting some form of ambient noise around these devices.
[36:38.570 --> 36:39.610]  That is...
[36:39.610 --> 36:40.730]  That's scary.
[36:41.010 --> 36:41.690]  And I know people...
[36:41.690 --> 36:42.790]  That would require microphones.
[36:43.070 --> 36:44.250]  That means that there are microphones.
[36:44.710 --> 36:45.010]  Yeah.
[36:45.210 --> 36:46.470]  There obviously are.
[36:46.690 --> 36:49.050]  But, you know, people say this is a free service.
[36:49.050 --> 36:50.370]  You have no right to complain.
[36:50.630 --> 36:51.530]  But you do.
[36:51.690 --> 36:53.890]  You do because you may not be a customer.
[36:53.890 --> 36:55.210]  You're definitely a product.
[36:55.570 --> 37:00.590]  And you are at risk of losing a whole lot of privacy to something like this.
[37:01.890 --> 37:02.330]  Yeah.
[37:02.330 --> 37:08.990]  And also, if you're not a customer of the service, you're also still subject to having whatever you say as you walk past the thing, pictures of your face.
[37:09.130 --> 37:13.290]  You didn't agree to any of that because you're not a customer, but it's still out there.
[37:14.450 --> 37:38.330]  I think the important thing in every project like this is to think about what data is being collected and retained and shared and for what purpose and if it's necessary for the purpose of providing the service and whether that whole model is something that the community wants.
[37:38.330 --> 37:55.970]  And so, this exercise was helpful because the city and city bridge did take into account our concerns about the privacy policy.
[37:56.210 --> 38:10.010]  And going forward with these kinds of projects, it's really important that we have more open conversations and more channels for expressing concerns as early in the process as possible.
[38:11.050 --> 38:24.530]  So, is it through these changes, is it your opinion that the policy changes are a little bit more... they are... the language is a little bit more upfront about the cost of this service?
[38:24.570 --> 38:32.930]  Or have they changed their model as far as doing that kind of third-party selling of private data?
[38:33.870 --> 38:37.470]  Well, the language is definitely clearer in this version.
[38:37.850 --> 38:51.070]  And it clarifies certain items that we cared a lot about, including that browsing history from personal devices are... that kind of information is not going to be stored.
[38:52.530 --> 39:00.130]  That most technical information is going to be deleted after a certain period of time.
[39:00.130 --> 39:08.910]  That there will be notice given through an email address if they have an email address for you of any request for information.
[39:09.290 --> 39:12.270]  And then certain limits on camera use.
[39:13.010 --> 39:24.330]  So, these are changes that clarify the scope of what these links, these structures are doing.
[39:25.810 --> 39:40.430]  When we first expressed our concerns, some of the public response that we got from the company was that they were not doing any of these things, that any of these collection of data that we were concerned about.
[39:40.590 --> 39:48.730]  But the policy was so broadly written that it would have allowed the company to collect that information.
[39:48.730 --> 39:55.830]  So, this new policy is stronger in that it strengthened and tightened the language.
[39:56.130 --> 40:09.550]  And made sure that they could not... that the company can't collect and retain more information than what the privacy policy allows without giving the public notice.
[40:09.550 --> 40:19.690]  Well, Marika, I think the entire city owes you guys at the New York Civil Liberties Union a huge debt for tackling this, for pointing this out.
[40:19.830 --> 40:30.290]  Because it easily could have just gone without any challenge whatsoever and we could be facing a tremendous infringement of our privacies as we simply walk down the street.
[40:30.850 --> 40:36.210]  Is there anything the public can do to help out in this particular case?
[40:37.870 --> 40:40.110]  Well, I think it's always helpful.
[40:40.650 --> 40:47.510]  And it was very helpful that the public was very interested in what we were doing last year after we pointed out some of these concerns.
[40:47.970 --> 40:53.550]  And I know that a lot of people attended our panel during the conference and also expressed concerns.
[40:53.550 --> 41:17.850]  So, public interest and watching what the government is doing, reading the privacy policies, I know that's something that a lot of us don't do frequently, but if people can read the privacy policies and express the concerns that they have, that public conversation is very helpful for advancing all of our privacy interests.
[41:17.850 --> 41:24.710]  If somebody out there in the community just reads the privacy policy and tells the rest of us what it says, that alone is helpful.
[41:25.210 --> 41:28.010]  But yes, it's important to know what's in there.
[41:28.170 --> 41:35.130]  Because initially, like we said, it would just guide you to a web page policy and a lot of people didn't think it went any further than that.
[41:35.230 --> 41:37.370]  And you guys were able to figure out that it sure did.
[41:38.190 --> 41:39.270]  Bernard, did you have something?
[41:39.390 --> 41:39.530]  Go ahead.
[41:40.230 --> 41:40.730]  Yeah, I'm Rick.
[41:40.790 --> 41:56.630]  I know you don't have much time left, but I wanted to ask you what our listeners and anybody else, frankly, who really care about this important issue can do to help NYCLU, the New York Civil Liberties Union, continue this important work.
[41:56.790 --> 42:01.410]  I understand NYCLU is a 501c3 nonprofit organization.
[42:01.530 --> 42:07.190]  It relies on donors to continue this legal work that you're doing that's so important.
[42:07.330 --> 42:11.550]  How can people get involved and help NYCLU keep doing this work?
[42:11.550 --> 42:15.310]  What a great setup and pitch.
[42:15.490 --> 42:15.930]  Thank you.
[42:17.110 --> 42:24.670]  People can definitely come to our... visit our website and become a member, donate to us.
[42:24.730 --> 42:27.350]  You can also follow our work.
[42:27.490 --> 42:35.370]  We have email lists and other newsletters that will keep you informed about what we're doing.
[42:35.590 --> 42:44.170]  And we'd also love to just hear from you about what you care about, anything that you find concerning.
[42:44.170 --> 42:57.550]  I know a lot of people listening are interested in these privacy and technology issues and may have the expertise to notice concerns that you would want to report.
[42:57.730 --> 43:02.390]  So we are looking forward to working with...
[43:02.390 --> 43:07.810]  We always work with advocates and others who are paying attention to these issues.
[43:07.810 --> 43:11.210]  And, of course, that website is nyclu.org.
[43:11.530 --> 43:14.350]  And, Marika, let me just ask you one more question.
[43:14.630 --> 43:18.770]  If you join the ACLU, is that different from joining the NYCLU?
[43:19.970 --> 43:23.650]  The NYCLU is a New York affiliate of the ACLU.
[43:23.770 --> 43:34.630]  So we do specifically work within New York State, but we are the state-level organization for the American Civil Liberties Union.
[43:34.630 --> 43:35.290]  I see.
[43:35.450 --> 43:40.710]  So if you join one, are you joining the other, or should you specifically go to nyclu.org and join there?
[43:41.810 --> 43:44.750]  Yes, you are joining us.
[43:45.310 --> 43:56.050]  But if you want to follow specifically our work in New York, you should follow our email e-newsletters.
[43:56.050 --> 43:56.710]  Okay.
[43:57.050 --> 44:06.210]  Well, I hope lots of people do because the work you do is simply incredible and valuable to everybody in the city and surrounding regions.
[44:06.890 --> 44:11.430]  We've been speaking with Marika Hirosi from the New York City Liberties Union Senior Staff Attorney.
[44:11.970 --> 44:14.910]  And thank you again for everything you've done.
[44:14.910 --> 44:18.970]  And I hope we see more success in the future.
[44:19.910 --> 44:21.030]  Thank you for having me.
[44:21.330 --> 44:21.610]  Good night.
[44:22.270 --> 44:22.650]  Good night.
[44:23.930 --> 44:26.190]  Well, that was enlightening.
[44:27.870 --> 44:28.710]  Very much so.
[44:28.990 --> 44:37.810]  And on the point of the terms of service being unreadable and confusing, I've been handed something from one of our field reporters on the ground.
[44:37.970 --> 44:40.090]  There's a site called Terms of Service Didn't Read.
[44:40.270 --> 44:41.490]  We have field reporters on the ground?
[44:41.650 --> 44:42.050]  Yes, indeed.
[44:42.490 --> 44:44.610]  I thought they were all in the field, but okay, fine.
[44:44.610 --> 44:52.790]  Our anonymous field reporter on the ground, who is Voltaire, he handed me the website TOSDR.org.
[44:53.230 --> 44:54.990]  It stands for Terms of Service Didn't Read.
[44:55.130 --> 45:03.710]  And it's a community project to analyze the terms of service of various sites and services out there, break them down into plain English, rate them positive or negative.
[45:03.710 --> 45:05.290]  Are they helpful to the user?
[45:05.450 --> 45:06.890]  Are they detrimental?
[45:07.890 --> 45:10.570]  And it's a very interesting project, a very interesting site.
[45:10.610 --> 45:12.390]  And they've got browser add-ons and things.
[45:12.550 --> 45:13.350]  So yeah, check it out.
[45:14.170 --> 45:14.890]  TOSDR.org.
[45:15.350 --> 45:16.070]  TOSDR.org.
[45:16.130 --> 45:16.730]  Well, that's great.
[45:16.830 --> 45:18.330]  That's exactly what I was asking about.
[45:18.450 --> 45:18.730]  Thank you.
[45:18.930 --> 45:20.150]  And thank you to Voltaire.
[45:20.930 --> 45:22.650]  We want to take some listener phone calls.
[45:22.950 --> 45:23.530]  You know what?
[45:23.610 --> 45:28.730]  Someone's already calling into our one phone line, but we didn't ask you to do that.
[45:28.730 --> 45:32.170]  And yeah, the issue is that I don't know why you're calling.
[45:32.370 --> 45:33.550]  You know, it could be a bill collector.
[45:33.810 --> 45:35.430]  We have a lot of those calling us.
[45:36.810 --> 45:38.510]  So we're not going to take that call.
[45:38.690 --> 45:40.610]  We can't because we didn't ask for the call.
[45:40.770 --> 45:40.910]  All right.
[45:41.490 --> 45:42.350]  Our phone number.
[45:42.490 --> 45:45.050]  We're going to give out the phone number as soon as you hang up.
[45:45.370 --> 45:47.750]  We can't take that call.
[45:47.910 --> 45:48.450]  We can't.
[45:48.530 --> 45:49.350]  So please hang up.
[45:49.490 --> 45:52.770]  Our phone number is 347-335-0818.
[45:54.510 --> 45:57.750]  And how do I know that this person hung up and it's not another person?
[45:57.750 --> 45:58.470]  You know?
[45:58.670 --> 46:01.110]  What I have to do is I'm going to have to pick up and hang up.
[46:01.210 --> 46:01.950]  I'm going to do that.
[46:02.250 --> 46:04.610]  It's nasty, but what else can I do?
[46:05.050 --> 46:05.870]  There's no option.
[46:05.990 --> 46:07.950]  I think your course of action is clear.
[46:08.850 --> 46:09.250]  Yeah.
[46:09.450 --> 46:09.670]  Okay.
[46:10.030 --> 46:12.210]  Well, you guys keep talking while I do that.
[46:12.210 --> 46:13.070]  I'm good with it.
[46:13.210 --> 46:14.230]  I'm okay with this.
[46:15.810 --> 46:17.270]  I support you with this.
[46:17.430 --> 46:17.690]  Yeah.
[46:17.810 --> 46:20.030]  I'm still looking at Terms of Service and Read.
[46:20.090 --> 46:22.630]  It was founded by a hacktivist called Hugo Roy.
[46:23.790 --> 46:24.510]  I did it.
[46:24.590 --> 46:25.250]  I hung up on him.
[46:25.530 --> 46:25.850]  Sorry.
[46:25.850 --> 46:26.170]  Wow.
[46:26.450 --> 46:27.090]  So, yeah.
[46:27.430 --> 46:28.050]  Give us a call.
[46:28.290 --> 46:30.810]  347-335-0818.
[46:31.990 --> 46:33.030]  We'd like to hear from you.
[46:33.150 --> 46:33.270]  Yeah.
[46:33.330 --> 46:34.210]  And that's a real area code.
[46:34.410 --> 46:34.730]  347.
[46:34.850 --> 46:36.730]  I know it sounds funny, but it's real.
[46:36.850 --> 46:37.810]  And now the phone's ringing again.
[46:38.090 --> 46:40.550]  Did you want to finish what you were reading and I'll go to this phone call?
[46:41.250 --> 46:42.450]  I think we can go to the phone call.
[46:42.690 --> 46:42.870]  Okay.
[46:43.970 --> 46:45.770]  Again, 347-335-0818.
[46:45.930 --> 46:48.410]  If you want to hear a busy signal right now, you can call that number.
[46:48.670 --> 46:53.890]  Hear what I was hearing when I was calling any number on the other line, which apparently is just there to fool me.
[46:54.250 --> 46:55.270]  Let's take a phone call.
[46:55.370 --> 46:55.690]  Good evening.
[46:55.870 --> 46:56.970]  You're on off the hook.
[46:57.310 --> 46:57.630]  Hi.
[46:57.930 --> 46:58.890]  Guess who I am.
[46:59.030 --> 47:04.370]  I'm the last living person who's been using Windows XP.
[47:05.050 --> 47:06.350]  Oh, no, you're not.
[47:06.730 --> 47:07.610]  It's not true.
[47:07.890 --> 47:08.150]  You're on.
[47:08.250 --> 47:08.610]  It's not true.
[47:08.750 --> 47:12.950]  And the thing is, my computer caught a virus recently.
[47:13.130 --> 47:14.930]  And this is like kind of serious.
[47:17.310 --> 47:24.750]  And so I have Verizon's, what's called Verizon Premium technical support.
[47:24.750 --> 47:33.130]  And it seems like each technician you get has a different opinion about viruses because they wiped out the virus.
[47:33.570 --> 47:37.390]  And then when I went back on the internet, I caught the virus.
[47:37.690 --> 47:39.770]  It seemed like the same one again.
[47:39.770 --> 47:41.650]  So here's what I'd like to ask you.
[47:41.750 --> 47:45.910]  I have a new computer that I'm going to transfer files to.
[47:46.490 --> 47:49.270]  So this is like a two-part question, please.
[47:49.270 --> 47:58.330]  The first part is I'm going to transfer files from the old computer now that the virus has been knocked out again.
[48:00.810 --> 48:05.350]  But I'm afraid about transferring files and transferring the virus.
[48:05.610 --> 48:21.910]  Now, one computer technician today at Verizon said if you use a thumb drive and you transfer the files to the thumb drive and then put the thumb drive into the new computer, chances are you will not transmit the virus.
[48:22.350 --> 48:29.670]  Meanwhile, another, another, and the, the, I've been using AVG free, by the way.
[48:30.030 --> 48:39.970]  And the, another technician said most viruses tend to hide in like the my documents section.
[48:39.970 --> 48:44.990]  So I'd like to ask the first question is how do you do a file?
[48:45.210 --> 48:47.210]  I mean, I'm, I'm really not a computer person.
[48:47.210 --> 48:48.490]  You can probably hear it in my voice.
[48:48.770 --> 48:56.990]  How do you do a file transfer from one computer to another without infecting the new computer?
[48:57.110 --> 48:57.230]  Okay.
[48:57.270 --> 49:00.890]  Well, first of all, you may not be a computer person, but we're not the computer show.
[49:02.430 --> 49:04.130]  I figured you were the guys to ask.
[49:04.290 --> 49:07.910]  Well, we, we, we might know a thing or two about it, but it's not really our, our main expertise.
[49:08.030 --> 49:09.750]  The show after us does, but it's on tape.
[49:09.750 --> 49:11.770]  So you're going to have a hard time asking them as well.
[49:12.030 --> 49:25.990]  Uh, but what my, my, my general advice, uh, would be, uh, probably things you've already done is, is running files through a, um, a virus, uh, scanner, uh, and, um, and, and trying to make sure they're clean in that way.
[49:25.990 --> 49:38.710]  Um, as far as ensuring that you don't actually, uh, copy over, um, um, a virus, uh, to another machine, one sure way to do that is to go to a different operating system.
[49:38.710 --> 49:53.990]  For instance, if you, if you copied all of your files over to a Mac, uh, or a Unix system or something like that, at least you would know that, um, the files that, that, uh, you could open there, that not the executable files, um, they are clean if you can look at them there.
[49:54.430 --> 49:58.770]  Um, that's, that's the only thing I can really come up with, uh, off the top of my head.
[49:58.990 --> 50:06.530]  Yeah, and also, um, on the new computer, which, uh, which I'm guessing has, uh, up to date virus software of any flavor, whatever, whatever you've got.
[50:06.530 --> 50:15.830]  If it's a, if it's a good virus software with updated, uh, definitions and such, um, every time you put your USB in with files you're transferring over, just scan the USB first.
[50:16.410 --> 50:19.790]  Because if that's corrupted, then, uh, that could be the explanation there too.
[50:20.030 --> 50:32.230]  Yeah, or, or buy a, um, a small hard drive that connects via USB if your old computer has USB that, you know, is sufficiently large enough to copy, say, your entire file system.
[50:32.230 --> 50:36.890]  But we don't want to get into the specifics of how big or small your equipment is.
[50:37.190 --> 50:38.570]  Detective work is always good.
[50:38.710 --> 50:47.770]  Like, if you can, um, uh, say, copy a little bit of your system over, and then see if it gets infected, then you know that the infection is isolated to the little bit that you copied over.
[50:47.770 --> 51:00.310]  Then if that, if that works out for a few days, copy more and see, you know, try to make it happen, try to see when, uh, it gets triggered, and then maybe you'll be able to find the culprit and just isolate that.
[51:00.530 --> 51:02.230]  That, that's, that's really the best we can offer.
[51:02.850 --> 51:09.210]  Have you ever seen, um, when you're in Word, uh, a little extra dot by your cursor?
[51:09.650 --> 51:15.150]  Is that a sign of a virus when you have a tiny little dot wherever your cursor is?
[51:15.170 --> 51:17.210]  I seriously doubt that.
[51:17.390 --> 51:18.950]  Bernie, you seem pretty adamant about that.
[51:19.090 --> 51:23.610]  No, that's like, if you hear a click on your telephone line, you must be subject to a wiretap.
[51:23.670 --> 51:26.730]  No, no, Bernie, if you don't hear a click, that means you're being tapped.
[51:27.310 --> 51:27.710]  Probably.
[51:28.070 --> 51:29.570]  Yeah, that's, that's what it means.
[51:29.730 --> 51:30.410]  Rob, what do you have?
[51:30.410 --> 51:39.370]  Also, um, for, for anyone looking for tips like this, uh, our, our friends at the PC Radio Show pre-record their show now, but you can still email them through their website, which is pcradioshow.com.
[51:39.570 --> 51:41.290]  You can email the show and, uh, they can answer.
[51:41.370 --> 51:44.450]  And, uh, so you will get much better responses if you do that.
[51:44.530 --> 51:45.630]  What's that email address one more time?
[51:45.750 --> 51:50.590]  It's, I don't have the email address in front of me, but the website is pcradioshow.com and there's a contact us page.
[51:50.710 --> 51:51.870]  All right, well, good luck to you on that.
[51:51.990 --> 51:54.070]  We're going to try to open up the phone lines to, uh, to someone else.
[51:54.390 --> 51:57.750]  And again, our phone number is 347-335-0818.
[51:57.750 --> 52:03.090]  Now I've had, I've had experiences though, uh, with these virus scanners and some of them are so annoying.
[52:03.190 --> 52:07.510]  First of all, they, they eat up memory and they're invasive and they keep opening when you don't want them to.
[52:07.730 --> 52:12.770]  And one thing that I find super annoying is their assumption of what a virus is.
[52:12.850 --> 52:14.810]  Remember the Melissa virus many years ago?
[52:15.350 --> 52:23.150]  Well, uh, it turns out that if you have a file on your system called Melissa, it assumes it's a virus and erases it.
[52:23.930 --> 52:26.230]  I've had, I've had virus scanners do that.
[52:26.350 --> 52:34.050]  Or, you know, we, we, we, having a hacker magazine, we have articles that have code in them and, and, uh, refer to certain things.
[52:34.230 --> 52:40.190]  And they are labeled as suspect and, and either isolated or deleted without any, uh, any confirmation.
[52:40.330 --> 52:43.110]  Those are, those are the kinds of virus scanners you shouldn't get.
[52:43.410 --> 52:45.350]  And, um, there are many of those out there.
[52:45.490 --> 52:47.890]  So just be forewarned and be careful.
[52:48.050 --> 52:49.010]  Let's take another phone call.
[52:49.130 --> 52:49.490]  Good evening.
[52:49.490 --> 52:50.210]  You're on off the hook.
[52:50.670 --> 52:51.070]  Sure.
[52:51.570 --> 52:52.170]  Go ahead.
[52:53.070 --> 52:53.670]  Oh, hi.
[52:53.730 --> 52:54.130]  How are you?
[52:54.270 --> 52:54.450]  Hi.
[52:54.490 --> 52:54.970]  What's on your mind?
[52:55.890 --> 52:56.450]  Oh yeah.
[52:56.470 --> 52:57.530]  You don't have much time.
[52:57.830 --> 52:57.950]  No.
[52:58.230 --> 53:09.970]  I don't understand from your last guest to why I don't want to mispronounce the name that the new phone booths that are coming out actually hear what you say when you're walking by.
[53:10.250 --> 53:11.950]  Well, uh, we don't really know.
[53:12.110 --> 53:15.790]  We don't really know for sure that they're, they record ambient noise there.
[53:16.150 --> 53:17.610]  It might be doing that.
[53:17.610 --> 53:20.610]  We don't know the exact specification and at what distance.
[53:20.610 --> 53:26.490]  So like what the proximity of whatever ambient microphone is equipped with it.
[53:26.550 --> 53:35.710]  Um, if it's separate from what used to make phone calls or if it's that same microphone, we don't know how far away or how clear any of that would be or how much of it there is.
[53:35.710 --> 53:38.630]  I guarantee you the NYPD is very interested in this as well.
[53:38.790 --> 53:46.230]  And, and, uh, if it is recording what you're saying as you walk by, you will see prosecutions based on intercepted conversations.
[53:47.110 --> 53:50.210]  Oh, I have some, uh, I'll just say it.
[53:50.570 --> 53:54.670]  Don't keep your cell phone, especially with apps in your front pocket.
[53:55.910 --> 53:56.670]  Well, okay.
[53:56.810 --> 53:56.990]  Why?
[53:58.590 --> 53:59.470]  Reproductive damage.
[53:59.470 --> 53:59.550]  Reproductive damage.
[53:59.790 --> 54:00.150]  Okay.
[54:00.430 --> 54:00.770]  All right.
[54:00.930 --> 54:02.050]  Well, that's good advice.
[54:02.290 --> 54:02.770]  Well taken.
[54:03.670 --> 54:04.290]  Um, thanks.
[54:04.430 --> 54:05.090]  Thanks for the call.
[54:05.270 --> 54:05.470]  Yes.
[54:05.550 --> 54:06.810]  Be mindful of your soft tissue.
[54:07.010 --> 54:11.970]  I'm not really sure it has to do with link NYC, but, um, yeah, it's, uh, it's, it's best to be forewarned.
[54:12.390 --> 54:14.790]  Uh, let's take another phone call and good evening.
[54:14.990 --> 54:15.910]  You're on off the hook.
[54:16.890 --> 54:17.470]  Go ahead.
[54:17.590 --> 54:19.610]  Hey, um, it's Dalsini.
[54:19.970 --> 54:23.930]  I'm calling live from the privacy board meeting and we have a quick announcement.
[54:23.930 --> 54:32.230]  We have an event coming up regarding privacy on the steps of city hall on main, uh, 17th at 11 o'clock.
[54:32.470 --> 54:36.430]  Um, we have the steps reserved and we're looking for a big turnout for that.
[54:36.570 --> 54:40.270]  So this is a safe to date and we're going to provide more information next week.
[54:40.410 --> 54:41.470]  And do you have a website?
[54:42.490 --> 54:45.610]  Uh, no, not right now, but they'll all be shared.
[54:46.290 --> 54:46.650]  Okay.
[54:46.910 --> 54:47.130]  All right.
[54:47.270 --> 54:48.370]  Well, good luck with that.
[54:48.650 --> 54:53.890]  And, um, we look forward to, uh, to updates privacy on the steps of city hall.
[54:54.150 --> 54:56.370]  That's, uh, yeah, that's, that's a good idea.
[54:56.950 --> 54:59.770]  Uh, three, four, seven, three, three, five, 0818 is our phone number.
[54:59.930 --> 55:02.150]  We're taking phone calls only for a minute or two more.
[55:02.210 --> 55:04.630]  And then, then we have to, uh, get on out of here.
[55:05.010 --> 55:10.850]  But you know, as far as link NYC, I think we should be experimenting with these devices as much as possible.
[55:11.370 --> 55:15.490]  Um, the very first thing I did and Kyle, you're with me when I walked up to one.
[55:15.610 --> 55:16.430]  Yes, I witnessed this.
[55:16.490 --> 55:22.950]  I made a phone call to my cell phone, uh, and held it up to the speaker and started creating this amazingly loud feedback loop.
[55:23.630 --> 55:30.990]  It got really, really high pitch and, and, uh, and we started shouting into it and, uh, it was magnificent.
[55:30.990 --> 55:31.290]  Yeah.
[55:31.350 --> 55:33.550]  It didn't really prove anything, but, um, it was entertaining.
[55:33.710 --> 55:34.450]  It's experimentation.
[55:34.650 --> 55:39.650]  You got to experiment and, you know, let's, let's see what these things are doing and can do.
[55:39.890 --> 55:45.130]  And, um, and, um, that's what any device should be, uh, should be used for this experimentation.
[55:45.450 --> 55:46.430]  Let's take one more phone call.
[55:46.510 --> 55:46.750]  Good evening.
[55:46.830 --> 55:47.390]  You're on off the hook.
[55:48.670 --> 55:49.170]  Go ahead.
[55:49.470 --> 55:50.130]  Yes, go ahead.
[55:50.950 --> 55:51.930]  Hi, my name is Dan.
[55:52.090 --> 55:52.570]  Long time listener.
[55:52.710 --> 55:53.390]  First time caller.
[55:53.950 --> 55:55.530]  Uh, we're talking about Lincoln YC, right?
[55:55.710 --> 55:55.970]  Yes.
[55:56.630 --> 55:58.370]  So can you hit me with the question one more time?
[55:58.570 --> 56:00.310]  I kind of got lost with everyone talking.
[56:00.690 --> 56:01.410]  Uh, quite.
[56:01.530 --> 56:02.610]  We didn't really have a question.
[56:03.170 --> 56:04.130]  We were, we were just opinion.
[56:04.430 --> 56:06.170]  Uh, yeah, we're basically brainstorming.
[56:07.070 --> 56:07.390]  Okay.
[56:07.510 --> 56:09.890]  And the topic is giving out cell phones to people in NYC?
[56:10.650 --> 56:12.590]  Uh, well, um, have you used one of these devices?
[56:13.450 --> 56:15.030]  No, uh, my mom was eligible for one.
[56:15.070 --> 56:15.910]  I never used it though.
[56:16.370 --> 56:16.690]  Okay.
[56:16.790 --> 56:18.270]  I'm not sure we're talking about the same thing.
[56:18.270 --> 56:23.750]  Link NYC are the big monolithic, uh, devices where pay phones used to be, where you can make free phone calls.
[56:23.930 --> 56:25.390]  Oh, you can charge your phone and your mobile device, right?
[56:25.570 --> 56:25.930]  Exactly.
[56:26.070 --> 56:26.270]  Yes.
[56:26.730 --> 56:28.970]  Well, that's the modern day era of the pay phone, man.
[56:28.970 --> 56:30.770]  I mean, you know, they're good at keeping up with the time.
[56:30.990 --> 56:35.130]  I don't see too many other than in Midtown and in Kips Bay, Murray Hill area.
[56:35.430 --> 56:45.210]  Uh, I don't know if they have them too much in the outer boroughs, but I see, I think it's a good step towards, um, you know, offering something of, uh, use in today's age to the public.
[56:45.490 --> 56:46.690]  I agree with that.
[56:46.850 --> 56:47.050]  Totally.
[56:47.050 --> 56:47.150]  Absolutely.
[56:47.250 --> 56:55.330]  It's, it's, it's a good thing to give people internet access, the ability to make free phone calls, free wifi, but nothing is free, especially the things that don't cost anything.
[56:55.490 --> 56:56.870]  Sometimes they're more expensive than anything.
[56:57.210 --> 57:00.130]  What we mean by that is that they can invade your privacy.
[57:00.130 --> 57:02.390]  They can keep track of the websites you visit.
[57:02.530 --> 57:09.030]  They can keep track of your, of what you do with your phone, uh, copy your information and store it and use it against you.
[57:09.110 --> 57:15.130]  If, uh, if you're ever questioned for anything, they can record people as they walk by both with video and with audio.
[57:15.350 --> 57:20.010]  So we just need to know what these things are doing before we accept them in our communities.
[57:20.550 --> 57:33.010]  How many times do people usually know what they're signing up for before they hit agree to any terms on an app or anything that we use day to day that we take granted for, you know, our privacy is something that we don't even know if we have anymore.
[57:33.010 --> 57:33.770]  That's very true.
[57:33.930 --> 57:34.450]  That's very true.
[57:34.550 --> 57:37.250]  And I think those are very wise words, uh, to end on.
[57:37.430 --> 57:43.370]  Yeah, that's why we're saying, you know, realize what you're using and protect yourself if you're using it.
[57:43.550 --> 57:49.590]  And, uh, you know, do that for your community as well with, with how you, uh, set up and interface with it.
[57:49.730 --> 57:50.070]  Okay.
[57:50.070 --> 57:50.930]  We are out of time.
[57:51.370 --> 57:53.370]  I want to thank people for calling in and participating.
[57:54.170 --> 58:01.290]  And, uh, of course, we want to thank Mariko from the NYCLU for all the hard work she has done and all the hard work they are doing.
[58:01.290 --> 58:03.090]  We will be back next week.
[58:03.390 --> 58:06.410]  Our email address, OTH at 2600.com.
[58:07.130 --> 58:07.350]  Good night.
[58:39.700 --> 58:42.560]  We'll be right back.
[58:46.360 --> 58:49.440]  We'll be right back.
[59:12.580 --> 59:14.560]  Outro Music