[00:00.000 --> 00:03.020]  Known as Earth, Wind, and Fire.
[00:03.480 --> 00:12.880]  We'll be featuring an interview we did with bassist Verdeen White and also chopping it up with Spina as he plays some of his favorite Earth, Wind, and Fire tracks.
[00:14.880 --> 00:22.480]  That's The Sweet Spot, Thursday, June 15th at 10pm, only on WBAI 99.5 FM.
[00:22.660 --> 00:24.800]  Listener-sponsored community radio.
[00:32.380 --> 00:37.340]  And you're listening to radio station WBAI, New York.
[00:37.480 --> 00:40.440]  It's 8 o'clock time once again for another edition of Off the Hook.
[02:31.490 --> 02:34.050]  And a very good evening to everybody.
[02:34.300 --> 02:36.050]  The program is Off the Hook.
[02:36.170 --> 02:40.240]  Emmanuel Goldstein here with you on this Wednesday evening, joined tonight by Kyle.
[02:40.860 --> 02:43.340]  That is an actual fact.
[02:43.620 --> 02:44.640]  And thank you.
[02:44.740 --> 02:46.060]  And there's Walter over there.
[02:46.260 --> 02:47.040]  Also a fact.
[02:47.460 --> 02:47.760]  Rob T.
[02:47.840 --> 02:49.920]  Firefly is stuck on a train, if you can believe that.
[02:50.500 --> 02:55.120]  You know, this might be a good opportunity, actually, to talk to you guys sort of in private before he gets here.
[02:56.820 --> 02:58.240]  I just wanted to ask for your loyalty.
[02:58.480 --> 02:58.880]  All right?
[02:58.980 --> 03:00.170]  I expect loyalty.
[03:00.170 --> 03:01.060]  I need loyalty.
[03:01.230 --> 03:02.730]  I just want to know that I have your loyalty.
[03:03.880 --> 03:05.230]  Do I have your loyalty?
[03:07.140 --> 03:08.980]  You'll honestly have my loyalty.
[03:09.850 --> 03:11.500]  I don't want your damn honest loyalty.
[03:11.500 --> 03:13.460]  I want your blind loyalty.
[03:13.620 --> 03:13.860]  All right?
[03:13.880 --> 03:17.670]  I want you to follow me into the depths of fire, whatever.
[03:17.900 --> 03:18.120]  You know?
[03:18.260 --> 03:19.360]  I need that kind of loyalty.
[03:19.440 --> 03:21.300]  It's not unreasonable to ask for this.
[03:22.140 --> 03:23.200]  Do I have your loyalty?
[03:23.400 --> 03:23.900]  Yes or no?
[03:24.240 --> 03:24.940]  It's a simple question.
[03:25.100 --> 03:29.290]  And let's get this covered before Rob walks in the door, because I don't know if we have his loyalty.
[03:29.560 --> 03:30.860]  And we have to talk about that.
[03:33.060 --> 03:41.060]  We don't know about his loyalties, but we could suggest that his loyalties are in question.
[03:41.060 --> 03:43.730]  I notice you're ducking the question for whether I have your loyalty.
[03:43.850 --> 03:44.360]  Okay, you know what?
[03:44.420 --> 03:46.230]  My loyalty doesn't factor in.
[03:46.440 --> 03:48.360]  Voltaire, I have your loyalty, I take it.
[03:49.670 --> 03:51.760]  These long pauses, they're really disturbing.
[03:51.970 --> 03:53.350]  Wow, I understand now.
[03:53.350 --> 03:56.480]  I understand what our leader is going through.
[03:56.920 --> 04:01.040]  All he wants, all he wants is blind allegiance.
[04:01.320 --> 04:01.820]  I mean, come on.
[04:01.980 --> 04:03.420]  Human beings are capable of this.
[04:03.540 --> 04:04.740]  We've been doing it for centuries.
[04:05.620 --> 04:08.940]  All of a sudden, everyone's becoming moralistic and thinking.
[04:09.880 --> 04:11.180]  This is a sad day.
[04:12.300 --> 04:16.290]  Anyway, if you want to hear the conclusion to this story, tune in tomorrow morning at 10 a.m.
[04:16.380 --> 04:17.850]  for the James Comey testimony.
[04:17.850 --> 04:20.740]  It's going to be something else.
[04:20.740 --> 04:24.040]  Right here on WBAI, I think we're the only station in the city covering it.
[04:24.620 --> 04:25.470]  We might not be.
[04:25.520 --> 04:25.880]  I don't know.
[04:26.020 --> 04:28.670]  But there's no reason to tune anywhere else because we'll have the best coverage.
[04:28.850 --> 04:30.560]  So that's tomorrow morning, 10 a.m.
[04:30.920 --> 04:31.700]  But you know what?
[04:31.850 --> 04:37.290]  Keep your dial just set here because you'll hear all kinds of insight.
[04:37.670 --> 04:44.740]  Yeah, I think there's commentary and hours, of course, of the actual coverage.
[04:44.740 --> 04:49.760]  So it's going to be really, really quite active here at the radio station tomorrow.
[04:50.140 --> 04:52.500]  Yeah, it certainly will be, as well it should be.
[04:53.060 --> 04:54.320]  Interesting times we're living in.
[04:54.420 --> 04:58.080]  We really are living in some of the most interesting times I think I've ever seen.
[04:58.230 --> 04:59.120]  And I don't know.
[04:59.230 --> 05:00.320]  Where is it going to go?
[05:00.320 --> 05:09.020]  I mean, you know, we were making predictions in November and vows and, you know, impassioned statements.
[05:09.730 --> 05:15.000]  But honestly, it's more dramatic than I thought it would be.
[05:15.230 --> 05:15.670]  It's more...
[05:15.670 --> 05:19.140]  I thought, you know, eventually the regime would be brought down.
[05:19.290 --> 05:20.820]  I think I even used those words.
[05:21.470 --> 05:23.380]  But I thought it would take a bit longer.
[05:23.380 --> 05:31.000]  I didn't think there would be so much, I guess, kind of doing yourself in.
[05:31.220 --> 05:31.980]  Oh, Rob's here.
[05:32.100 --> 05:32.280]  Shh, shh.
[05:33.080 --> 05:33.660]  Hi, Rob.
[05:34.210 --> 05:34.900]  How you doing?
[05:35.220 --> 05:35.740]  Am I too late?
[05:35.800 --> 05:36.420]  Is all the news taken?
[05:37.000 --> 05:37.880]  No, no, no.
[05:37.900 --> 05:40.220]  We're just having a nice little private conversation.
[05:41.060 --> 05:41.820]  Why don't you have a seat?
[05:41.880 --> 05:44.040]  Why don't you have a seat right over there under that white light?
[05:44.270 --> 05:45.800]  Should we leave the room?
[05:45.940 --> 05:46.220]  No, no.
[05:46.280 --> 05:47.270]  I want you guys here.
[05:48.600 --> 05:50.920]  Well, I'd like to recuse myself, actually.
[05:50.920 --> 05:52.440]  You're staying right where you are, Kyle.
[05:52.440 --> 05:53.440]  Kyle, don't move.
[05:54.360 --> 05:54.940]  All right?
[05:56.020 --> 05:57.420]  Don't make me invoke security.
[05:57.420 --> 05:58.380]  We have a security guard.
[05:59.620 --> 06:03.270]  So, Rob, we were talking a little bit, the guys and us, guys and me.
[06:03.500 --> 06:03.740]  Uh-oh.
[06:03.900 --> 06:12.540]  And we just reached the conclusion that it's important that you, especially, be loyal.
[06:12.830 --> 06:13.480]  Show some loyalty.
[06:13.960 --> 06:15.020]  Do we have your loyalty?
[06:15.150 --> 06:17.840]  Do I have your loyalty is what we're trying to assess.
[06:18.780 --> 06:20.080]  Well, you have my honesty.
[06:20.620 --> 06:21.060]  Okay.
[06:21.060 --> 06:25.500]  You know, you guys, really, it's very, very disappointing what I'm hearing here.
[06:25.840 --> 06:30.840]  I'm hearing a lot of introspection and people thinking for themselves.
[06:31.270 --> 06:31.680]  Wait, wait, wait.
[06:31.860 --> 06:37.980]  And not simply saying, yes, whatever you ask for, and I will fall on the sword for you.
[06:37.980 --> 06:40.380]  Why is that suddenly so much to ask for?
[06:40.520 --> 06:41.780]  What has happened to this country?
[06:42.060 --> 06:43.500]  I think I changed my mind.
[06:43.720 --> 06:46.330]  But I want to know, like, how loyal.
[06:46.500 --> 06:47.500]  You do not get to change your mind.
[06:47.720 --> 06:49.660]  I will tell you when you change your mind.
[06:49.830 --> 06:50.000]  What?
[06:50.300 --> 06:50.580]  Yeah.
[06:50.580 --> 06:51.740]  You don't get to do that.
[06:52.340 --> 06:53.380]  Not in this studio.
[06:54.280 --> 06:54.560]  Uh-uh.
[06:56.240 --> 06:57.020]  It feels good.
[06:57.160 --> 06:59.180]  You know, I could work for those networks.
[06:59.380 --> 07:02.650]  You know, the ones where everybody, like, stands up on chairs and screams all the time.
[07:02.720 --> 07:03.500]  I could do that.
[07:03.560 --> 07:04.280]  It feels comfortable.
[07:04.280 --> 07:04.960]  It really does.
[07:06.150 --> 07:07.420]  Anyway, how's the train ride?
[07:07.560 --> 07:08.740]  I understand it was agony.
[07:08.740 --> 07:11.680]  The trains in Manhattan are less than wonderful.
[07:12.100 --> 07:17.120]  Well, they're better than driving a car into the sun, which a lot of people are doing right now.
[07:17.400 --> 07:21.360]  The sun, for some reason, sets directly down the street if you're heading west.
[07:21.400 --> 07:23.480]  And I don't quite understand why that is.
[07:24.420 --> 07:24.900]  Okay.
[07:24.920 --> 07:34.160]  So, yeah, we were telling people to tune in to the former FBI Director James Comey testimony tomorrow morning here on WBAI because it's going to be riveting.
[07:34.960 --> 07:36.940]  You might want to set aside a couple of hours.
[07:36.940 --> 07:39.280]  You just don't have any important meetings or anything like that.
[07:39.800 --> 07:49.000]  To your comments about the trajectory of all this, I think it's really amazing the speed with which it is run really hot.
[07:49.120 --> 07:53.440]  And now it's sort of, I guess, continuing to burn, maybe burn out.
[07:53.460 --> 07:53.880]  I don't know.
[07:53.960 --> 07:57.600]  It's like some celestial event.
[07:57.860 --> 07:58.600]  Oh, yeah.
[07:58.620 --> 07:59.620]  It's an event, all right.
[07:59.680 --> 08:01.040]  But not quite a shooting star.
[08:01.040 --> 08:05.520]  I want to say I'm not quite sure what the parallel would be.
[08:05.520 --> 08:11.240]  But it's certainly spun in all different directions.
[08:11.440 --> 08:17.360]  And I, for one, am amazed at the ineptitude.
[08:18.000 --> 08:22.780]  I thought it was going to be farcical, humorous.
[08:22.780 --> 08:24.500]  Yeah, I was counting on that, actually.
[08:24.500 --> 08:39.060]  Um, but they really didn't, that cohesion they didn't have, uh, and probably wish they had at this point, um, and needed, just never translated into momentum.
[08:39.060 --> 08:58.330]  Um, and, um, it's, I think, also very, very indicative of how foolish they are to think that, um, this opportunity wasn't going to be without peril or like, uh, something that, uh, would be challenged or not challenged.
[08:58.330 --> 09:00.120]  Because it certainly has been challenged.
[09:00.240 --> 09:03.800]  In fact, all they have now, it seems, is a lot of challenges.
[09:04.360 --> 09:04.760]  So...
[09:04.760 --> 09:04.960]  Yes.
[09:05.210 --> 09:05.830]  But we'll see.
[09:06.080 --> 09:10.380]  Eh, and, uh, of course, people can make their own conclusions tomorrow.
[09:11.040 --> 09:11.440]  Yes.
[09:12.100 --> 09:15.800]  Uh, if I sound distracted, it's because I'm on the web right now and I'm trying to open a web page.
[09:15.880 --> 09:21.000]  And for some reason, I don't know why we don't have ad blocker on our browser here.
[09:21.000 --> 09:24.340]  So many windows are opening up and, oh my God, it's driving me crazy.
[09:24.340 --> 09:26.420]  It's not really a browsing machine.
[09:26.420 --> 09:33.080]  That is a, a machine that is in charge of keeping the entire station running smoothly.
[09:33.640 --> 09:37.830]  And we don't just willy-nilly browse on that particular computer.
[09:37.830 --> 09:42.620]  It's the glue holding radio in New York City together.
[09:42.620 --> 09:42.980]  Uh-huh.
[09:43.120 --> 09:43.400]  Okay?
[09:43.880 --> 09:48.940]  And, uh, the staff here worked really hard installing Service Pack 2.
[09:49.900 --> 09:52.100]  So, it's gonna stay that way.
[09:52.520 --> 10:02.160]  And I insist, I implore you to stay away from dangerous sites, from one hacker to the next.
[10:02.580 --> 10:04.900]  Uh, this is how you make problems.
[10:05.000 --> 10:07.640]  Hang on, I've been selected to participate in a survey.
[10:08.160 --> 10:11.900]  Uh, let me just deal with that first and then I'll, I'll get back to the radio show.
[10:12.280 --> 10:16.000]  Uh, no, I want to talk about the, um, uh, the big story this week.
[10:16.000 --> 10:19.950]  Um, which was the, um, the new leaks.
[10:20.120 --> 10:22.720]  The new leaks that came from an NSA contractor.
[10:23.520 --> 10:24.280]  Um, and...
[10:24.280 --> 10:26.480]  A real winner.
[10:26.830 --> 10:29.120]  Yeah, you might, you might make fun of her name in that way.
[10:29.400 --> 10:35.860]  Her name, uh, that she changed it to actually, uh, her name is Reality Winner.
[10:36.310 --> 10:37.900]  Uh, Reality Lee Winner.
[10:38.080 --> 10:40.140]  Because you might as well have a normal middle name.
[10:40.620 --> 10:44.840]  Uh, but, uh, wow, you know, uh, and as you were saying, it's, it's very hard to search for that.
[10:44.840 --> 10:53.140]  Yeah, try searching this story and trying to find out anything, um, objective about, uh, her case.
[10:53.450 --> 11:00.400]  And, um, you might find a couple, a couple recent stories, but really digging and getting much further.
[11:00.800 --> 11:10.900]  Usually, at least in the couple minutes I spent on it, just, you delve, delve further into things that have nothing to do with, uh, what you're trying to figure out.
[11:10.900 --> 11:19.380]  Because the name is so, um, synonymous with other, other stuff that would yield a lot of results instead.
[11:19.700 --> 11:20.040]  That's right.
[11:20.260 --> 11:21.560]  And not attributed to this story.
[11:22.160 --> 11:28.400]  Well, um, what, um, what wound up happening was, uh, these, um, these documents were released.
[11:28.720 --> 11:43.800]  Um, and, um, they, they show, they show that, uh, Russian hackers have been attempting, or had been attempting, uh, to, um, um, basically try and, and hack the process.
[11:43.800 --> 11:47.680]  I, I'm not saying the election itself, election day, votes, that kind of thing.
[11:48.080 --> 11:52.080]  Uh, but Russian military intelligence basically attacked a U.S.
[11:52.180 --> 11:59.520]  voting software company, sent spear phishing emails to more than 100 local election officials at the end of October, beginning of November.
[11:59.920 --> 12:02.880]  Um, so, you know, that wasn't just, uh, a prank.
[12:02.980 --> 12:03.920]  That wasn't just a hobby.
[12:04.060 --> 12:08.960]  That was something with intent, pretty obviously, to, to screw up the election in some way.
[12:09.360 --> 12:13.780]  Yeah, and it's not, like, coincidental, oh, let's just see what this company here might do.
[12:13.920 --> 12:16.880]  No, that's, like, a pretty specific, uh, what would you say?
[12:16.920 --> 12:18.260]  Like, uh, equipment vendor?
[12:18.260 --> 12:20.120]  I guess that's a way to characterize it.
[12:20.260 --> 12:26.460]  I mean, that, that seems, uh, like, uh, a vulnerable or a critical, uh, uh, service provider.
[12:26.840 --> 12:27.700]  A named, a named U.S.
[12:27.840 --> 12:28.020]  company.
[12:28.020 --> 12:33.440]  And, in fact, the quote says, um, uh, they executed cyber espionage operations against a named U.S.
[12:33.580 --> 12:43.620]  company, uh, in August 2016, evidently to obtain information on elections-related software and hardware solutions, uh, according to information that became available in April 2017.
[12:43.840 --> 12:45.180]  That's what the document says.
[12:45.640 --> 12:53.560]  Uh, and, uh, the hackers are believed then to have used the data from that operation to create a new email account to launch a spear phishing campaign targeting U.S.
[12:53.720 --> 12:55.300]  local government organizations.
[12:55.720 --> 12:57.100]  And the document, again, is quoted.
[12:57.100 --> 13:08.480]  Lastly, the actors send test emails to two non-existent accounts ostensibly associated with absentee balloting, presumably with the purpose of creating those accounts to mimic legitimate services.
[13:08.840 --> 13:09.360]  Wow.
[13:09.500 --> 13:10.380]  I mean, this is huge.
[13:10.560 --> 13:14.560]  This is, this is, uh, an extremely, um, um, important revelation.
[13:14.560 --> 13:21.400]  And, of course, uh, right away, the, um, the trouble is identified as the person who leaked this information.
[13:21.680 --> 13:23.220]  Nothing could be further from the truth.
[13:23.460 --> 13:25.040]  We need to know about this.
[13:25.040 --> 13:31.480]  This, this, this is the actual, uh, evidence, uh, or part of it that, uh, that, that people have been looking for.
[13:31.800 --> 13:43.020]  Unfortunately, unfortunately, due to colossal ineptitude on the part of, uh, unfortunately, the intercept, uh, she was very quickly caught.
[13:43.260 --> 13:53.020]  And, um, the way this happened, uh, they basically sent copies of the document that she sent to them, actual copies.
[13:54.120 --> 14:02.500]  And, you know, you don't have to know very much to, um, uh, to have a sense that, um, documents are identified in one way or another.
[14:02.640 --> 14:04.360]  There might be, uh, a file name.
[14:04.420 --> 14:05.020]  There might be coding.
[14:05.120 --> 14:09.760]  There might be something that simply, um, makes every single copy unique.
[14:09.860 --> 14:18.820]  Kind of like when, you know, you get a hold of, uh, an Oscar screening film and you know what you have to, uh, you know, cut out or you have to keep it to yourself, that kind of thing.
[14:18.820 --> 14:21.500]  You don't share it with everybody because they'll know where it came from.
[14:21.640 --> 14:25.880]  If you don't know, those screening films are watermarked with your name.
[14:26.000 --> 14:26.320]  Exactly.
[14:26.500 --> 14:28.960]  So if you send it to somebody, it's going to have your name all over it.
[14:29.040 --> 14:29.240]  Right.
[14:29.460 --> 14:32.120]  So you, you, you best be careful, figure out how to get that name out.
[14:32.540 --> 14:38.140]  Unfortunately, the intercept just sent it right back to government officials to say, is this real?
[14:38.220 --> 14:39.720]  And they said, yeah, it is real.
[14:39.840 --> 14:49.360]  And not only is it real, but we're going to look at it and realize that because it's creased in certain areas, we're going to deduce from that, that it was printed or taken off premises.
[14:49.660 --> 14:57.240]  And then we can, we can narrow down, uh, how many people printed it and then figure out who the actual culprit was.
[14:57.360 --> 14:58.540]  It didn't take them very long at all.
[14:58.680 --> 14:59.480]  And then she confessed.
[15:00.140 --> 15:02.140]  So yeah, nice job there.
[15:02.400 --> 15:02.880]  Intercept.
[15:03.060 --> 15:13.860]  It's unfortunate that this happened, but really, uh, as journalists, you guys, we, we have to take steps to protect sources and we really should know better than this.
[15:13.960 --> 15:14.240]  Voltaire.
[15:14.420 --> 15:14.540]  Yeah.
[15:14.860 --> 15:16.820]  I'm definitely disappointed with the intercept in this.
[15:16.980 --> 15:24.680]  I mean, they have really, uh, top end hackers on their, uh, their defense team, like, uh, headhunter and Michael Lee.
[15:24.960 --> 15:25.940]  It would be nice if they talked to one of them.
[15:26.080 --> 15:26.240]  Exactly.
[15:26.420 --> 15:36.700]  But we should, uh, make clear that this person, uh, that truth probably would have been found either way because their internal log show that only six people printed this document.
[15:36.700 --> 15:38.280]  And I think that they would have...
[15:38.280 --> 15:38.980]  Yeah, but who says it was printed?
[15:39.440 --> 15:39.600]  Yep.
[15:39.720 --> 15:40.420]  They didn't have to know it was printed.
[15:40.420 --> 15:48.100]  But yeah, they really did a lot to help, uh, like, determine that it was printed out and that's how the media was able to get a hold of the story.
[15:48.100 --> 15:58.920]  But I'm sure their internal log team would have, uh, would have looked at the six people and they could have just looked at Truth's Twitter account where she follows WikiLeaks and the likes and, and tweets things in support of them.
[15:58.960 --> 15:59.580]  Well, okay, that's fine.
[15:59.680 --> 16:03.520]  You know, you, you could probably figure it out through other habits that she might have had.
[16:06.700 --> 16:20.080]  They just made it easy by, by basically saying, yeah, look, it was printed out, folded, uh, and, and, um, you know, they'd still be looking for her now probably, and maybe she would be able to, uh, go to a safe place and not be facing prison for 10 years instead of a ticker tape parade,
[16:20.240 --> 16:23.820]  which I think anybody who leaks information like this, uh, deserves.
[16:24.140 --> 16:27.260]  And I just think it's, it's, it's awesome that there are more leakers out there.
[16:27.400 --> 16:29.020]  There are more people trying to get the truth out.
[16:29.020 --> 16:30.640]  Uh, I think it's awesome.
[16:30.720 --> 16:36.360]  It's a female leaker because, you know, that sort of, uh, flies in the face of, of how things have been in the past.
[16:36.740 --> 16:39.200]  Uh, she's young, she's idealistic.
[16:39.880 --> 16:48.780]  It's, um, yeah, she's got a funny name, make fun of her name if you want, but, uh, don't make fun of, of where she stands because as far as I'm concerned, we need people to stand right where she is.
[16:49.140 --> 16:49.260]  Yeah.
[16:49.320 --> 16:53.180]  There, there are funnier names in this room, but, uh, yeah, it was the intercepts.
[16:53.180 --> 16:54.520]  Why are you looking at me when you said that?
[16:55.160 --> 17:05.640]  Because I, because the mirror is behind you and I'm looking at myself, but, uh, yeah, it was the intercepts job in this situation to protect their source, not make the whistleblow ease job so much easier.
[17:06.100 --> 17:12.920]  And, uh, it's, it's really disappointing, especially with an outlet like the intercept, which, uh, we, um, I think there's a general sense of respect for.
[17:13.040 --> 17:18.300]  I'll tell you when we get, uh, Trump's tax returns, when someone sends them to us, and what are you waiting for guys?
[17:18.500 --> 17:22.220]  The, the bounty is over 20 grand already and, uh, and, and going up every day.
[17:22.220 --> 17:31.380]  Uh, we're not going to send, uh, the copy with your fingerprints or whatever, uh, to the IRS or, or to, you know, some government official to say, is this real?
[17:31.560 --> 17:32.780]  Uh, we'll let them know.
[17:32.960 --> 17:41.620]  So, yeah, uh, we, we have these, these numbers, we have these, these, uh, particular, uh, bits of information, uh, and, um, and, and we'll release it in that way.
[17:41.680 --> 17:42.960]  Unless you tell us, yeah, go ahead.
[17:42.960 --> 17:45.360]  I don't care, you know, but it's gotta be up to you.
[17:45.460 --> 17:47.020]  It's gotta be, it's gotta be your decision.
[17:47.500 --> 17:51.880]  Uh, and that's, that's like the number one rule that, that I think journalists owe to any, any leakers.
[17:51.880 --> 17:52.200]  Voltaire?
[17:52.840 --> 17:58.420]  Recently, there's been a lot of talk in the hacker community, encourage, encouraging people to set up things like secure drops.
[17:58.680 --> 18:03.940]  And it's where every media outlet has their own system for, uh, getting leaked documents.
[18:04.140 --> 18:15.060]  And I actually think that this decentralization of leaking is, is a bad thing because like even the intercept who has all these talented hackers on their team wasn't able to keep their leakers source, uh, secure.
[18:15.280 --> 18:17.760]  Like what hope is there that some smaller outlet is.
[18:17.760 --> 18:22.880]  So I think that we, like, if you're a leaker out there, leak to one of the big trusted outlets.
[18:23.380 --> 18:27.860]  Don't, don't give it, like, um, Michael Moore just announced a new, like more leaks or whatever.
[18:27.860 --> 18:33.660]  And, and he promises it's going to be secure, but it's like, why do you have any reason to trust him?
[18:33.660 --> 18:43.270]  You know, I, also maybe, uh, if you are a leaker, think ahead, um, and just assume that it's going to be traced back and come up with, uh, come up with your story now.
[18:43.270 --> 18:45.010]  Like, oh my God, I lost the document.
[18:45.250 --> 18:46.300]  I don't know where it is.
[18:46.380 --> 18:47.290]  Somebody must've taken it.
[18:47.420 --> 18:48.860]  Then it becomes leaked months later.
[18:49.040 --> 18:55.380]  And well, obviously the person who stole it from me when I reported it months ago, you know, uh, is the person responsible, not me.
[18:55.530 --> 18:58.060]  Of course you'll fail a lie detector test, but maybe you won't get to that point.
[18:58.220 --> 19:01.860]  If your story is good enough and you wait, uh, before it actually becomes pop, I don't know.
[19:01.960 --> 19:02.880]  I'm just thinking way ahead.
[19:03.080 --> 19:06.790]  Uh, there are ways to, uh, to, to, to cover your tracks.
[19:06.800 --> 19:14.290]  But then again, in a situation like this, you kind of want to, uh, um, wear it as a medal and say, yeah, I did that.
[19:14.510 --> 19:15.880]  And I'm glad I did that.
[19:15.940 --> 19:17.320]  And hopefully somebody else will do it too.
[19:18.490 --> 19:23.580]  I think there is a little bit of a risk when you have like one entity who's controlling information.
[19:23.700 --> 19:42.250]  We've seen that, I think, oh, pretty glaringly with, uh, WikiLeaks in general, uh, being this arbiter of all the information, not, um, not as, um, things I think not things not being handled as I think they were, uh, with Edward Snowden, where there were multiple,
[19:42.250 --> 20:00.300]  uh, news entities, institutions rather that, that participated in, in the, um, sort of, uh, cooperative, cooperative, uh, uh, um, release at the same time and, and, and so on with that kind of level of, of thought put into it.
[20:00.800 --> 20:04.940]  You're saying we need, uh, not just one, uh, outlet.
[20:05.080 --> 20:06.040]  We need multiple outlets.
[20:06.300 --> 20:06.510]  Yeah.
[20:06.620 --> 20:19.100]  Those, those efforts I think, um, are, are a bit, uh, they tend to, to be stronger because you have, uh, different interests, different disinterested or objective parties going over it.
[20:19.200 --> 20:39.770]  And, uh, if we only have like one or two, um, um, main sources where you're getting this information or where people can trust, uh, the information will get out, um, you give a lot of control to that one or two, um, institutions as opposed to several of them getting the same thing and working together to,
[20:39.770 --> 20:44.840]  um, make it appropriate, uh, make it available to the public in the appropriate ways.
[20:46.060 --> 20:46.510]  Yeah.
[20:46.580 --> 20:51.940]  You know, and, and, um, continuing with just the thought of, of, uh, how to, uh, remain anonymous.
[20:52.600 --> 20:56.490]  Um, there are so many possible ways that they can track down documents.
[20:56.490 --> 21:02.400]  If you make a copy in a copy machine, for instance, um, there are ways to tell what exact copy machine made that copy.
[21:02.530 --> 21:03.660]  Try counterfeiting a hundred dollar bill.
[21:03.720 --> 21:04.250]  Now don't do that.
[21:04.300 --> 21:06.580]  But if you were to do that, they could track it back.
[21:06.920 --> 21:08.800]  It's, it's, it's not that difficult.
[21:08.990 --> 21:11.420]  It's, it's something that they have designed over the course of decades.
[21:11.560 --> 21:30.060]  I think the other thing that's related to that, that's really, um, I think possible or that, that stands out to me as the like willingness and, um, I guess forthrightness of the intercept to, uh, you know, be, uh, bending over, uh, backwards, uh, to make sure the government is,
[21:30.120 --> 21:33.270]  is abreast of everything they're planning to do.
[21:33.290 --> 21:46.360]  Um, maybe, uh, sound legal strategy, uh, but there, um, certainly was a lot more they ought to have thought of and, and, and in considering the impact of that.
[21:46.530 --> 21:58.300]  And, um, this technology you're talking about, uh, micro dots or, or water marking, uh, that technology has been around, I mean, for more than a decade, right.
[21:58.480 --> 22:12.320]  The ability to, um, to watermark, uh, images or, or in print and, um, you know, copiers, large copiers have, have had like full operating systems and hard drives for as long.
[22:12.500 --> 22:33.200]  So you have to really wonder why they were so concerned, uh, with, uh, pleasing their legal, uh, risk and, uh, liability and not really thinking about, uh, how in doing that, how many ways maybe they, they'd be overlooking that, that could put their, uh,
[22:33.260 --> 22:34.540]  source at, at liability.
[22:34.540 --> 22:34.540]  Absolutely.
[22:34.780 --> 22:39.440]  EFF has a really good page, uh, list of printers, which do or do not display tracking dots.
[22:39.680 --> 22:46.040]  Uh, so if you go to, uh, EFF.org, you can, you can find out just how safe you, you might be, but you know, that's not the only way.
[22:46.180 --> 22:54.840]  And I actually, Kyle, I wanted to ask you about this because I know you've, uh, you've been involved, uh, in, um, in, in covering this, uh, covering it up in a good way, not a bad way.
[22:55.140 --> 22:58.080]  Uh, but geolocation that you get from, from photographs.
[22:58.300 --> 23:04.140]  Uh, we all have it in our cameras, in our phones, uh, and by default, I believe it's turned on.
[23:04.260 --> 23:20.380]  So if you post something, someplace, uh, either social networking or on a webpage, um, and, and, and the service you're using has not by default, uh, disabled that, you can pretty much advertise to the entire world exactly where you were standing and when,
[23:20.580 --> 23:22.580]  when you took a particular picture.
[23:22.600 --> 23:37.780]  Most people, they don't care, but if you're trying to, you know, maintain some privacy or, or, uh, get away with something, yeah, you're kind of turning yourself in and, um, and an unknowing, uh, journalist could easily, um, uh, unfortunately get somebody turned in that way as well.
[23:38.060 --> 23:41.140]  Yeah, no, this is, uh, another kind of really fascinating.
[23:41.460 --> 23:47.860]  Um, it's almost in the realm of like puzzles and, uh, like steganography has been written about for a long time.
[23:48.000 --> 23:52.340]  It's the art of encoding messages in, in, uh, photos and imagery.
[23:52.720 --> 24:11.160]  And, um, what you're talking about are just the diligence that I think people should be aware of, of course, in, uh, operating system or in, uh, telephone applications, you want to be sure you're in control and have the power to say, turn on or off any kind of geolocation tagging.
[24:11.260 --> 24:30.680]  But at the file level, once you've created some images, if that was not turned off in the operating system or on the, um, the app itself, you would have a file tagging, which is in, um, I don't think it's, it's, I don't know if it's the same as EXIF, which is,
[24:30.760 --> 24:48.620]  I think the audio equivalent, but there's a metadata to, to say the least, there's metadata in, um, many, uh, modern JPEGs and, and of course raw files too, uh, for, uh, most modern video and still digital cameras, uh, including phones.
[24:48.720 --> 24:53.320]  So that information you want to very carefully remove.
[24:53.580 --> 25:03.120]  And there's software out there that can help you remove that, um, extra metadata that, that would include geolocation if it's, if it's active in the software.
[25:03.580 --> 25:23.260]  So, um, but that speaks nothing, says nothing, uh, uh, to the stegan, steganography, which is one step I think even further is, you know, do you know if your, um, image sensor is encoding something in, in more esoteric ways than in the file metadata?
[25:23.280 --> 25:26.660]  Could it actually be in the way the image is formed?
[25:26.820 --> 25:32.240]  Um, much in the way the micro dotting is patterns of dots, not necessarily micro printing.
[25:32.540 --> 25:38.400]  But also the technology keeps advancing, uh, I mean, in, in, in amazing ways, also in scary ways.
[25:38.520 --> 25:46.620]  And I think we're, we're quickly reaching the point where if you just take a picture anywhere, Google is going to step in and say, oh, I know exactly where that is based on the buildings and the trees and whatnot.
[25:46.880 --> 25:54.260]  Or if you record some audio, they'll be able to tell where the background sounds are from and it'll become harder and harder to avoid this.
[25:54.420 --> 25:55.640]  Yeah, that's been proven.
[25:55.860 --> 26:05.940]  There's, um, stuff with, uh, involving, um, pornography and, and projects where people have photographed hotel rooms and they've created databases of that.
[26:06.000 --> 26:07.480]  I know that was in the news a couple of years ago.
[26:07.500 --> 26:10.240]  Yeah, you always have to start with the pornography, the child pornography, you have to battle that.
[26:10.420 --> 26:16.320]  Well, and while we're at it, we're going to, uh, uh, do this to everything and, and basically cripple any privacy you have left.
[26:16.320 --> 26:24.900]  It's an easy platform to get funding and get people, uh, excited about working on, uh, as far as, uh, protecting children.
[26:25.260 --> 26:28.380]  Or, you know, seemingly endless, uh, resources for that.
[26:28.480 --> 26:29.460]  As a reaction to fear.
[26:29.580 --> 26:32.340]  I'm going to get into, uh, Theresa May in a second and her plans.
[26:32.520 --> 26:32.900]  It's true.
[26:33.020 --> 26:37.980]  But, uh, that is, that is always, uh, what propels this kind of motion forward.
[26:38.100 --> 26:40.820]  That and the interest in seeing just how good technology can get.
[26:40.920 --> 26:41.540]  Volta, you had something.
[26:46.320 --> 26:57.080]  A webcam pointed at it and they were able to, and these alt-right people on Reddit were able to, uh, look at the, the airplane lines that were flying past it and they were able to determine where it was.
[26:57.220 --> 26:58.220]  Who is this who did this?
[26:58.480 --> 26:59.800]  A group of alt-right people.
[26:59.980 --> 27:00.180]  Okay.
[27:00.480 --> 27:05.120]  And they were able to determine where it was and they found it and like started like defacing it.
[27:05.500 --> 27:07.240]  Wait, but who was it who started this whole thing?
[27:07.400 --> 27:07.400]  Who?
[27:07.740 --> 27:10.480]  Shia LaBeouf, the actor and artist.
[27:10.840 --> 27:10.920]  Okay.
[27:10.920 --> 27:20.800]  He did an art Our project also, I think, down at the MoMA downtown with a bunch of people reacting after the election, did a live streaming thing.
[27:20.800 --> 27:22.920]  So I guess this is another one of a camera.
[27:23.100 --> 27:24.760]  Figuring out where something is, that's fine.
[27:24.920 --> 27:27.440]  That's up to individual abilities.
[27:27.700 --> 27:35.920]  I'm just worried that we will always be accountable for where we are, what we say, when we say it, how we say it, where we're standing, why we were here and not there.
[27:36.500 --> 27:41.420]  And it just seems like a lot of people don't have a problem with that because they think they have nothing to hide.
[27:41.540 --> 27:43.340]  And in fact, we all have something to hide.
[27:44.040 --> 28:05.600]  Well, yeah, and it takes the ability to get away from public life, takes that power away from all citizens, something that some of us might enjoy or some of us may need to enjoy in order to have health and well-being.
[28:05.920 --> 28:11.960]  So we ought to also consider the implications for other people, not necessarily how we're directly impacted by that.
[28:12.060 --> 28:15.400]  When I say we all have something to hide, I'm not saying that in a bad way, like we're all criminals.
[28:15.420 --> 28:19.780]  No, we all have something to hide in that we want to not be trackable constantly.
[28:20.040 --> 28:28.180]  We want to be able to fall into the background and just be private and not be bothered by anybody on the phone, on the Internet, in person, whatnot.
[28:28.180 --> 28:29.600]  We all have that right.
[28:29.600 --> 28:31.180]  And I think we're starting to forget that.
[28:32.140 --> 28:34.760]  So, yeah, some dark days ahead.
[28:34.860 --> 28:37.600]  Let me get to the Theresa May story in a second.
[28:37.700 --> 28:47.920]  But first, I want to just read the quote, the quote of the week, which, of course, came from Vladimir Putin, talking about hackers, basically drawing a parallel.
[28:48.340 --> 28:58.200]  He said, artists paint if they wake up feeling in good spirits, while hackers respond if they wake up and read that something is going on in interstate relations that prompts them to take action.
[28:58.200 --> 29:07.660]  And here's the quote, if they are patriotically minded, they start making their contributions, which are right from their point of view to the fight against those who say bad things about Russia.
[29:07.660 --> 29:13.440]  And that has been widely interpreted as referring to the Hillary Clinton campaign.
[29:14.000 --> 29:20.000]  And, wow, OK, that's that's the closest we've had yet to to Putin actually saying, yeah, you know what?
[29:20.000 --> 29:28.980]  It's possible that that Russian hackers did do something to the electoral process in the United States, but not government hackers, just patriotically minded hackers.
[29:29.600 --> 29:30.120]  Wow.
[29:30.300 --> 29:36.920]  OK, well, you think maybe some patriotically minded hackers might be kind of working for the government or the military or something like that.
[29:36.920 --> 29:39.400]  And it just gets weirder every single week.
[29:40.440 --> 29:40.920]  Yeah.
[29:41.140 --> 29:46.820]  The interesting thing behind this is that, like, it's probably I mean, it's probably like a lie.
[29:46.960 --> 30:04.520]  But what separates the like Russian hacker, like state hackers from Americans is that the GRU, which is like their hacking unit, will recruit people from the criminal underground, whereas the FBI here won't even accept people that like smoke pot once a week or something.
[30:04.520 --> 30:07.220]  Yeah, well, they'll say that publicly and maybe so.
[30:07.300 --> 30:09.520]  But I'll bet there's an there's an agency that will accept them.
[30:09.620 --> 30:14.860]  And there's some place or private private security company that's then contracted.
[30:14.980 --> 30:17.980]  We saw that with Booz Allen and so on in the past.
[30:18.240 --> 30:21.580]  So, I mean, that's kind of how our country deals with it.
[30:21.720 --> 30:33.440]  It's like, yeah, you want to deal with you want the A team, you know, OK, you got to go talk to this contractor, you know, who keeps them all, you know, happy and, you know, with free snacks and beanbags and stuff.
[30:33.440 --> 30:41.580]  But, you know, again, I want to emphasize that we should not be angry at Russia for doing this because this is what countries do.
[30:41.780 --> 30:42.620]  We do it.
[30:42.740 --> 30:43.480]  They do it.
[30:43.580 --> 30:44.340]  China does it.
[30:44.960 --> 30:49.220]  Everybody who has any interest in what goes on in the rest of the world is playing these games.
[30:49.440 --> 30:50.160]  Don't blame hackers.
[30:50.300 --> 30:51.820]  Hackers are just doing what hackers do.
[30:52.220 --> 30:57.860]  These are people using hacking abilities in positions of power and directed against a particular target.
[30:57.860 --> 30:59.340]  And we should be ready for this.
[30:59.440 --> 31:02.780]  We should be able to detect it and prevent it from happening.
[31:02.940 --> 31:03.860]  And clearly, we're not.
[31:03.980 --> 31:05.620]  So we can't really be that surprised.
[31:06.280 --> 31:09.140]  So, yeah, it likely happened.
[31:09.580 --> 31:14.660]  But to demonize Russia, to demonize hackers, that's not how you solve the problem.
[31:14.780 --> 31:16.640]  That's not how you even address the problem.
[31:16.640 --> 31:21.900]  Now, Russia's President Vladimir Putin is lying, according to U.S.
[31:22.120 --> 31:23.460]  National Security Advisor, former U.S.
[31:23.700 --> 31:29.200]  National Security Advisor, Susan Rice, lying when he denies Russia's efforts to influence the 2016 election.
[31:30.480 --> 31:40.280]  We might have all seen the Megyn Kelly interview with Vladimir Putin where he dismissed the findings of American intelligence agencies that Russian intelligence directed hacking on U.S.
[31:40.400 --> 31:43.640]  political parties during the race for the White House as a load of nonsense.
[31:44.180 --> 31:55.220]  The reality is, said Rice, all of our intelligence agencies have come together to affirm with high confidence the Russian government at the highest levels was behind the very unprecedented effort to meddle in our 2016 presidential election.
[31:55.560 --> 31:56.300]  Probably true.
[31:56.520 --> 31:57.880]  Probably correct.
[31:58.320 --> 31:59.800]  Of course, Putin will deny that.
[31:59.920 --> 32:01.660]  What leader is going to say, yeah, we did that.
[32:02.400 --> 32:07.760]  But we as individual people can say it's very likely that is exactly what happened.
[32:07.760 --> 32:19.780]  And wow, we dropped the ball by not reacting to it, by falling for all the quote-unquote fake news on Facebook and believing the propaganda that was peddled to us from all parties.
[32:19.880 --> 32:20.000]  Rob?
[32:20.340 --> 32:23.580]  Well, first of all, as an artist, I take issue with that painting in the morning thing.
[32:23.660 --> 32:24.540]  I do mine in the evening.
[32:24.760 --> 32:33.400]  But also, this is also another case of someone in power using the idea of hackers and what they may or may not do when it's to their advantage.
[32:33.400 --> 32:37.520]  I mean, if you look at Donald Trump before the election, he loved leaks.
[32:37.620 --> 32:40.500]  He wanted leaks of Obama's Kenyan birth certificate.
[32:40.640 --> 32:41.960]  He wanted leaks of Hillary Clinton's emails.
[32:42.120 --> 32:45.520]  He was trumpeting the achievements of those who leaked those.
[32:46.370 --> 32:51.080]  And now that he's president and the leaks are very likely about him, he's not into it so much anymore.
[32:51.320 --> 32:51.520]  Yeah.
[32:51.680 --> 32:58.260]  And I think we're seeing the same thing from Putin, which is, you know, here's something which could get me a little nudge, nudge, wink, wink, notch in my political belt.
[32:58.260 --> 33:05.180]  And, you know, I'll conveniently use the hacker community as a little bell and whistle on my own thing.
[33:05.200 --> 33:07.340]  When you look at it, none of this is surprising.
[33:07.720 --> 33:10.980]  You know, Trump's reaction is not surprising for somebody in his position.
[33:10.980 --> 33:12.480]  That's exactly what he would do.
[33:13.180 --> 33:14.760]  So we shouldn't be shocked by it.
[33:14.820 --> 33:19.060]  We should just be reacting to it and fighting back in one way or another.
[33:19.060 --> 33:21.120]  But now to move on to the U.K.
[33:21.280 --> 33:22.780]  and Theresa May.
[33:24.000 --> 33:32.240]  Of course, we all know the tragic attack that took place in the U.K., in London, and, of course, Manchester before that.
[33:33.280 --> 33:40.420]  We don't know as much about all the attacks that take place in other parts of the world because, well, we don't really care about those parts of the world, so we won't even discuss them.
[33:40.500 --> 33:41.720]  We'll just talk about the West.
[33:41.920 --> 33:47.280]  And, you know, it's really disgusting how the media ignores certain things.
[33:47.280 --> 33:51.100]  You say, this is for Syria, and it gets attention, all right?
[33:51.220 --> 33:58.480]  If you're Muslim and you attack somebody, that's nonstop headline news for 24 hours.
[33:58.480 --> 34:00.420]  If you're Christian, you do the exact same thing.
[34:00.580 --> 34:01.660]  Well, it's just an angry white guy.
[34:02.640 --> 34:04.240]  We don't have time to get into all that.
[34:04.240 --> 34:08.040]  That's a whole diatribe that I can let loose at any time.
[34:08.300 --> 34:15.820]  But basically, we had the London attacks where people drove a van into a bunch of pedestrians and then went on a stabbing spree.
[34:16.660 --> 34:20.720]  And thank God they don't have guns over there because God knows what would have happened if they did.
[34:21.380 --> 34:25.240]  But Theresa May is taking advantage of this.
[34:25.420 --> 34:27.740]  I believe we call her the most dangerous person.
[34:27.740 --> 34:29.460]  What was the exact phrase?
[34:29.960 --> 34:35.640]  Over a year ago, I think, we called her the most dangerous person to democracy or something like that.
[34:35.900 --> 34:36.020]  Yeah.
[34:36.340 --> 34:39.560]  And it's holding true.
[34:40.320 --> 34:50.060]  She wants to have a big change in the way the internet works that would basically turn a lot of things on their head.
[34:50.280 --> 34:58.140]  She's planning to introduce huge regulations on the way the internet works, allowing the government to decide what is said online.
[35:00.360 --> 35:11.140]  Some people say that it is not for government to regulate when it comes to technology and the internet, according to a manifesto that the Tories apparently released.
[35:11.740 --> 35:14.920]  Some people say not for the government to regulate when it comes to technology and internet.
[35:15.040 --> 35:15.760]  We disagree.
[35:16.600 --> 35:16.980]  Yeah.
[35:17.280 --> 35:23.940]  The plans will allow Britain to become the global leader in the regulation of the use of personal data and the internet.
[35:24.660 --> 35:33.760]  It makes reference to those increased powers, saying the government will work even harder to ensure that there is no safe space for terrorists to be able to communicate online.
[35:34.780 --> 35:48.910]  That is apparently a reference in part to its work to encourage technology companies to build backdoors into their encrypted messaging services, which gives the government the ability to read terrorist messages, but also everyone's messages.
[35:49.140 --> 35:53.660]  Also weakens the security of 100% of the users.
[35:54.320 --> 35:57.200]  Of course, technology companies are opposed to this.
[35:57.320 --> 36:02.720]  Now, these new rules would include laws that make it harder than ever to access pornographic and other websites.
[36:02.960 --> 36:05.640]  Yeah, because we all know pornographers are going around killing people.
[36:07.080 --> 36:09.370]  So that's got to be stopped right there.
[36:09.460 --> 36:12.060]  Actually, well, some are, but that's not what this is about.
[36:12.720 --> 36:19.740]  The government will be able to place restrictions on seeing adult content, and any exceptions would have to be justified to ministers.
[36:20.300 --> 36:26.140]  The manifesto even suggests that the government might stop search engines like Google from directing people to pornographic websites.
[36:26.800 --> 36:35.340]  We will put a responsibility on industry not to direct users, even unintentionally, to hate speech, pornography, or other sources of harm.
[36:35.340 --> 36:37.240]  That's according to the Conservative Manifesto.
[36:37.370 --> 36:49.180]  And you better believe, hacking websites, like our website continues to be classified as, even though basically we just have copies of this radio show on it, we will be a target there as well.
[36:49.430 --> 36:52.160]  We will be seen as a source of harm.
[36:52.580 --> 36:58.460]  And it will be extended to people who criticize, people who urge rebellion and insurrection and things like that.
[36:58.700 --> 37:03.160]  Now, keep in mind, these attacks, what exactly did they have to do with the internet?
[37:03.540 --> 37:04.180]  Absolutely nothing.
[37:04.370 --> 37:12.060]  A bunch of guys got together and said, hey, I know, let's get a van and drive into a crowd of people and then go around stabbing, and it'll be a, you know, it'll be a victory for something.
[37:12.370 --> 37:19.240]  It had nothing to do with the internet, and how in God's name are you going to stop that by restricting how everybody else uses the internet?
[37:19.480 --> 37:43.280]  Yeah, you can tell by the fact that the conversation, the subject is being changed in this, and you're getting three, four very different crimes or issues lumped into one thing to sort of generate a vehicle to change drastically how information is handled and give a lot of power.
[37:44.830 --> 37:53.180]  to a government to dictate that to people where in the past people have had the control of that.
[37:53.340 --> 38:12.040]  And to criminalize anything that goes against that, to make that the problem, to make the pursuit of free speech or alternative thought or objectionable into the eyes of some images, this, you know, you get the feeling that Theresa May, along with a whole lot of other people,
[38:12.100 --> 38:19.950]  including many in this country, are just basically waiting for an opportunity to come along so that they can introduce this exact agenda.
[38:20.600 --> 38:24.000]  Now, you know, our friends in the UK, you guys have an election tomorrow.
[38:24.340 --> 38:25.140]  You have a...
[38:25.140 --> 38:26.260]  Well, is it today already?
[38:26.410 --> 38:26.540]  Yeah.
[38:26.580 --> 38:28.780]  Yeah, it's today over there, but I don't think you can vote at two in the morning.
[38:29.120 --> 38:29.840]  But maybe...
[38:29.840 --> 38:30.100]  I don't know.
[38:30.390 --> 38:33.300]  The thing is, you know, if...
[38:33.300 --> 38:34.680]  This should be enough.
[38:34.840 --> 38:38.280]  This should be enough for people to say, oh my God, this is a horrible thing.
[38:38.280 --> 38:39.000]  It must be stopped.
[38:43.100 --> 38:45.300]  People react through fear.
[38:45.460 --> 38:46.780]  And this speaks to them.
[38:46.910 --> 38:54.280]  And they will believe that Theresa May somehow, by regulating the internet, is going to make it safer on the streets.
[38:54.280 --> 38:55.600]  And it's impossible to do that.
[38:55.720 --> 39:04.040]  All this will do is make things all the more restricted for you as an individual to read, to write, to express yourself.
[39:04.410 --> 39:05.540]  And guess what?
[39:05.680 --> 39:08.950]  Terrorism is not going to be affected in any way.
[39:08.950 --> 39:11.320]  You know, it's existed long before the internet existed.
[39:12.640 --> 39:14.740]  You don't need these particular tools.
[39:15.540 --> 39:29.300]  I'm actually encouraged by the situation in the UK because after these two terrorist attacks, the conservatives vote even when they've said these things has gone down while they've been trying to exploit, or their polling has gone down while they've been trying to exploit terrorism.
[39:29.320 --> 39:29.910]  That's encouraging.
[39:30.140 --> 39:30.300]  Yeah.
[39:30.460 --> 39:35.500]  And I think we're breaking the post-9-11 pattern of relying on scare tactics.
[39:35.740 --> 39:41.740]  Yeah, but I just hope that it's not one of these victories where the opposition just loses by less.
[39:41.910 --> 39:46.300]  You know, it's got to be a victory where the opposition wins and turns things around.
[39:46.460 --> 39:50.740]  And also, you know, we have to make sure the opposition is saying the right things.
[39:50.910 --> 39:57.660]  If Jeremy Corbyn is saying, you know, just a toned-down version of what Theresa May is saying, are we really gaining anything?
[39:57.820 --> 40:01.100]  People have to realize, no, this is wrong and this is why this is wrong.
[40:01.260 --> 40:07.370]  You know, everybody in the UK should be able to challenge this plan to create a new internet, which is what it would be.
[40:08.360 --> 40:13.740]  And they should be able to stand up to any argument that says, oh, we need this to remain a free society.
[40:13.910 --> 40:15.300]  And, you know, she's not stopping there.
[40:15.460 --> 40:22.370]  She wants to basically be able to put people in jail longer who are suspected terrorists.
[40:22.660 --> 40:23.930]  Note the phrasing there.
[40:24.000 --> 40:25.340]  Not terrorists, but suspected.
[40:25.620 --> 40:31.700]  You know, the people who were rounded up in Manchester and London after the recent attacks and then released without charge.
[40:31.700 --> 40:33.020]  they were suspected.
[40:33.300 --> 40:35.120]  Then they realized they had nothing on them.
[40:35.280 --> 40:39.200]  But in her world, they would be able to keep them in prison for a long, long time.
[40:39.200 --> 40:46.140]  They would be able to deport them if they felt like it and they were immigrants all without any charges or evidence.
[40:46.410 --> 40:48.660]  And that is truly scary.
[40:48.980 --> 40:50.220]  This is what is being planned.
[40:50.320 --> 40:50.460]  Rob?
[40:50.620 --> 41:05.580]  And the instant you point at the internet and say, we can't have a safe space for some subset of people, whether it's people who think this way or act this way or whatever, if you were to take away the safe space on the internet for some people, it takes away the safe space on the internet for all people.
[41:05.780 --> 41:10.980]  Nobody would be safe on the internet if this was brought forward.
[41:11.180 --> 41:19.500]  And I think the actions really must reflect the history and what leads to these outcomes on these different issues.
[41:19.950 --> 41:22.950]  It may serve her to...
[41:22.950 --> 41:24.180]  It may be cheaper.
[41:24.390 --> 41:44.740]  You know, it's good for them on a number of counts in that it's cheaper or it may be good politically that she could point to something and say, well, look, this huge, overarching, big, hyped-up thing is me proving that I am in action on X, Y, or all of these issues,
[41:44.820 --> 41:44.980]  right?
[41:45.140 --> 41:47.060]  As we said, they're all lumped in.
[41:47.240 --> 42:00.430]  And that then changes it completely, gives them tons of power for very little effort and they don't have any political consequences except for the possibility of being voted out.
[42:01.260 --> 42:05.410]  Hopefully, now, as we said, with people worth replacing them.
[42:05.890 --> 42:15.890]  But it's not surprising that this is an alluring choice because you don't have to actually look at systemic issues.
[42:15.890 --> 42:28.700]  You know, why people are being abused or why people are refugees and what other geopolitical impacts led to those instances.
[42:29.220 --> 42:32.600]  And then they get this massive, massive control.
[42:32.780 --> 42:44.760]  And you can continue to control how people are thinking and what they're thinking about, which goes into many more avenues other than this issue because you're really affecting the ability to have that dialogue.
[42:44.980 --> 42:52.460]  And it is so easy to be tempted to give up little slivers of your civil rights when you're afraid, when things are scary.
[42:52.660 --> 42:53.500]  Because we all know this.
[42:53.560 --> 42:54.060]  We're in New York.
[42:54.180 --> 42:56.340]  We've all ridden a plane before and after 2001.
[42:57.200 --> 43:01.040]  And, you know, when you give up a right, you're not getting it back.
[43:01.140 --> 43:02.520]  Not very easily at all.
[43:02.930 --> 43:08.020]  Possibly not without generations of work back creeping toward where things once were, freedom-wise.
[43:08.280 --> 43:11.740]  And so, yeah, it's very dangerous and it's a very slippery slope.
[43:11.870 --> 43:18.580]  I just want to give out our phone number because we haven't talked to our listeners in a while and we'd like to have you weigh in on some of the things we're talking about or other topics.
[43:18.580 --> 43:22.800]  Our phone number is 347-335-0818.
[43:23.140 --> 43:24.890]  Country code one if you're out of the country.
[43:25.060 --> 43:27.370]  347-335-0818.
[43:27.680 --> 43:29.240]  We still just have one phone line.
[43:29.480 --> 43:31.700]  So, only one person can call at once.
[43:31.950 --> 43:33.930]  And I don't know what happens to the other people that call.
[43:34.080 --> 43:35.260]  So, it's very important though.
[43:35.480 --> 44:04.900]  We've got to let leadership know that the cost, they can't just pass something, get all this power and have that cheaply and not look back and really understand the cost of what led to the issues that they're saying this control will affect because it's probably misleading and probably convenient more for them than for the people.
[44:05.540 --> 44:05.980]  Absolutely.
[44:06.420 --> 44:16.460]  Hey, while we're talking about listeners and the station and all that, I want to thank everybody who called in over the last few weeks for our fundraiser which is now over.
[44:16.700 --> 44:25.700]  And I have to say it was the best one for us in a long time because we had so much listener support, so many people who called and took advantage of premiums.
[44:25.760 --> 44:30.660]  Voltaire, I understand that the tickets to SummerCon were grabbed up and that's all taken care of.
[44:30.800 --> 44:30.980]  Yep.
[44:31.240 --> 44:31.540]  All right.
[44:32.760 --> 44:47.860]  So, if you pledge for other premiums what we're doing now taking a couple of weeks just to let the dust settle people who are sending checks make sure they send those checks in and then in a couple of weeks what we're going to do is start sending out the premiums ourselves to those of you who pledge for particular things.
[44:48.060 --> 45:02.980]  So, you know, we're all caught up and we're doing really well as far as fulfilling things and those of you who have any outstanding issues from the past we're also working on those as well but we're pretty much caught up and we're in a very good spot.
[45:03.140 --> 45:06.000]  Again, our phone number Area code 347-335-0818.
[45:06.160 --> 45:09.020]  I'm sorry if people call in, and I still keep talking.
[45:09.400 --> 45:13.320]  Sometimes the time's out, and they wind up someplace, and I don't know where that is.
[45:13.760 --> 45:16.680]  We're working on getting the phones fixed, so we have multiple lines again.
[45:16.820 --> 45:18.840]  That would be very nice, but right now we just have the one.
[45:19.200 --> 45:22.180]  Area code 347-335-0818.
[45:22.940 --> 45:28.360]  Voice your opinion on any of these issues, and we'll be happy to put you on the air.
[45:28.480 --> 45:28.680]  Walter?
[45:28.680 --> 45:28.720]  Sure.
[45:29.020 --> 45:32.620]  I'd also like to encourage our listeners to tweet at us if they have comments or questions.
[45:32.780 --> 45:33.500]  Yeah, tweet at us.
[45:33.560 --> 45:34.940]  But, you know, not that many people tweet at us.
[45:35.040 --> 45:35.780]  I don't know why that is.
[45:36.060 --> 45:37.260]  Are you monitoring it right now?
[45:37.420 --> 45:37.620]  Yep.
[45:37.780 --> 45:39.160]  We're a hacker radio show.
[45:39.300 --> 45:40.200]  Hacker radio show.
[45:40.320 --> 45:41.160]  Don't tweet off the hook.
[45:41.260 --> 45:41.880]  I don't know who that is.
[45:42.220 --> 45:43.860]  I think it's a seafood restaurant or something.
[45:44.460 --> 45:46.060]  But, yeah, hacker radio show.
[45:46.500 --> 45:54.100]  Tweet at us, and Voltaire will receive that and transmit it to us, and we'll act upon it or something like that.
[45:54.780 --> 45:59.140]  But we also have this news from Albany.
[45:59.560 --> 46:01.080]  We found out about this.
[46:01.200 --> 46:07.380]  Actually, these guys wrote to us wanting the magazine to cover or to promote this conference that's happening.
[46:07.900 --> 46:11.200]  Unfortunately, the magazine is coming out after the conference happens, so it wouldn't do them much good.
[46:11.200 --> 46:13.760]  Basically, it's a hacker conference known as AnyCon.
[46:14.440 --> 46:24.300]  It's being billed as the area's first hacker conference, and it's basically, well, they're describing it as for white hat hackers.
[46:24.400 --> 46:25.240]  I really hate that phrase.
[46:25.360 --> 46:33.680]  I hate the phrase white hat hackers because it assumes that we all are either white hat or black hat, and there's no middle road, or, I mean, there's gray hats and all that.
[46:33.680 --> 46:35.120]  But, you know, the labeling.
[46:35.320 --> 46:36.300]  The labeling has just got to stop.
[46:36.460 --> 46:44.600]  What you want to do is have an event where people are just welcome to express their opinions and share their knowledge and figure it out from there.
[46:44.720 --> 46:47.020]  But regardless, I don't want to be too petty about this.
[46:47.620 --> 46:53.900]  AnyCon stands for Albany Convention, and it's happening June 16th and 17th.
[46:53.900 --> 47:04.200]  And I'm looking for a website, actually, but I'm sure if you type AnyCon into a web browser, you will get more information on that.
[47:04.280 --> 47:07.260]  So that's happening in just a... is that this next weekend?
[47:07.360 --> 47:08.320]  No, it's the weekend after that.
[47:09.040 --> 47:14.860]  The 16th and 17th, if you're in Albany, check out AnyCon, Albany's first hacking conference.
[47:15.000 --> 47:21.660]  Of course, Albany also has 2,600 meetings, first Friday of every month, so I'm sure some people there will be aware of that as well.
[47:22.240 --> 47:24.900]  Our phone number, 347-335-0818.
[47:25.140 --> 47:26.080]  I don't know if the phone's broken.
[47:26.460 --> 47:27.560]  It's not lighting up.
[47:27.600 --> 47:33.320]  So I don't know if it's going someplace else or if it's not going here.
[47:34.560 --> 47:36.680]  But please give that number a call if you want to be on the air.
[47:36.780 --> 47:37.840]  We only have a few minutes left.
[47:38.060 --> 47:45.600]  Well, while we're waiting for something to light up, I want to give a quick shout-out to BattleForTheNet.com because, as we know, net neutrality is under threat once again.
[47:46.500 --> 47:54.640]  So Fight for the Future, Free Press Action Fund, Demand Progress, these organizations have gotten together with a whole bunch of entities signing on to it.
[47:54.800 --> 47:58.660]  There's an internet-wide day of action coming up July 12th to save net neutrality.
[47:58.880 --> 47:59.260]  Oh, boy.
[47:59.640 --> 47:59.840]  Okay.
[47:59.840 --> 48:01.500]  And we'll definitely be keeping an eye on this.
[48:01.600 --> 48:03.960]  For more info, go to BattleForTheNet.com.
[48:04.080 --> 48:05.200]  Here's a challenge.
[48:05.320 --> 48:08.640]  Can somebody figure out what day of the week July 12th is by the end of the show?
[48:08.780 --> 48:12.540]  And then if we're on the air, then we can maybe do something special.
[48:13.700 --> 48:15.360]  You don't have the information already, do you, Rob?
[48:15.360 --> 48:19.180]  It looks like you're about to tell me what it is, but I have a caller on the line, so...
[48:19.180 --> 48:23.460]  Let's get to the caller, but July 12th is a Wednesday, yes.
[48:23.580 --> 48:24.300]  It's a Wednesday!
[48:24.480 --> 48:25.020]  Oh, my God!
[48:25.160 --> 48:27.040]  Well, the day of action is when we're on the air.
[48:27.100 --> 48:27.780]  How about that?
[48:28.600 --> 48:29.560]  Caller, are you with us?
[48:30.160 --> 48:31.120]  I am with you.
[48:31.260 --> 48:32.020]  How are you doing today?
[48:32.040 --> 48:33.120]  Okay, where are you calling from?
[48:34.400 --> 48:36.320]  Calling from Blairstown, New Jersey.
[48:36.760 --> 48:38.600]  Never heard of it, but sounds pleasant.
[48:39.460 --> 48:41.080]  It's kind of nice, yeah.
[48:41.300 --> 48:41.520]  Okay.
[48:41.900 --> 48:47.220]  I agree with everything you guys are saying, and I've got to add one or two points.
[48:48.900 --> 49:00.800]  One is, I agree totally with the fact that every time you give up a little bit of control, you never get it back.
[49:00.800 --> 49:04.880]  And it's an incremental procedure, and it's planned.
[49:05.120 --> 49:06.500]  So, think about that.
[49:06.760 --> 49:06.980]  Yep.
[49:07.420 --> 49:14.320]  And then, there's an analogy I want to point out, and it's kind of like a hive, and it's, the pun is intended.
[49:14.620 --> 49:16.020]  It has to do with the queen.
[49:16.920 --> 49:18.700]  And the queen has all the control.
[49:19.740 --> 49:24.140]  So, people need to look into that, and where the control originates from.
[49:24.400 --> 49:28.100]  You're speaking directly of the queen of England, or just a queen in general?
[49:29.660 --> 49:30.360]  Either or.
[49:30.680 --> 49:30.800]  Okay.
[49:30.800 --> 49:31.820]  I mean, take your pick, right?
[49:32.140 --> 49:32.880]  Well, yeah.
[49:32.940 --> 49:34.320]  What can Elizabeth do about this?
[49:34.420 --> 49:36.660]  Can she just tell Teresa to take a hike?
[49:36.980 --> 49:55.800]  I think the caller's maybe pointing out that culturally, it's in the interests of the royal family to go in a particular moral and cultural direction that this initiative may be in line with, and also serve these other immediate interests, right?
[49:56.020 --> 49:56.200]  Right?
[49:56.460 --> 49:56.700]  Yeah.
[49:56.740 --> 49:59.240]  I don't see the queen as basically taking a very progressive role in that.
[49:59.240 --> 50:00.280]  No, no.
[50:00.380 --> 50:01.580]  It's not going to happen.
[50:01.580 --> 50:02.320]  It never has.
[50:02.400 --> 50:03.000]  It never will.
[50:03.200 --> 50:04.460]  She's ultra-conservative.
[50:04.760 --> 50:19.200]  But change needs to start there, because the level of control exhibited from that entity throughout the planet is, it's unparalleled in human history.
[50:19.200 --> 50:27.420]  So, there's got to be changes right there, and everything else is secondary and tertiary to that.
[50:28.300 --> 50:28.740]  Yeah.
[50:28.900 --> 50:31.840]  And everything has a relationship to each other.
[50:31.960 --> 50:37.500]  I mean, you know, don't think that Trump isn't watching what's happening in the UK and isn't going to pull something similar.
[50:37.700 --> 50:40.980]  Don't think they're not watching what's happening in the US to see what he can get away with.
[50:40.980 --> 50:57.260]  We see in the Middle East, Saudi Arabia takes action as soon as Trump goes over there, because he gives them the green light, and Qatar is all of a sudden alienated, and there's terrorist attacks in Iran for the first time in ages, based on all of a sudden this new criticism towards their particular part of the world.
[50:57.400 --> 51:02.320]  Everybody is watching everybody and trying things out and seeing how they float.
[51:02.460 --> 51:06.580]  And if it works, if it's not challenged, you can bet it's going to happen here as well.
[51:06.740 --> 51:07.880]  Yeah, and exactly.
[51:07.880 --> 51:13.840]  And going back to the internet, the fear of losing that control is a huge issue.
[51:15.360 --> 51:15.720]  Absolutely.
[51:15.840 --> 51:17.020]  For any government, absolutely.
[51:17.200 --> 51:18.720]  But they never had the control to start with.
[51:18.820 --> 51:26.620]  That's the thing that really peeves them about the internet, is that this was an incredible power grab by the people, and they didn't see it coming.
[51:26.820 --> 51:29.200]  And now that it's here, they want control.
[51:29.300 --> 51:31.060]  And this is true of every government in the world.
[51:31.200 --> 51:31.920]  They want control.
[51:32.060 --> 51:36.120]  They want to be able to monitor people, keep track of who accesses what, and use it to their advantage.
[51:36.120 --> 51:40.380]  And that does not serve the interest of individual people anywhere.
[51:40.800 --> 51:41.360]  Right.
[51:41.520 --> 52:02.940]  And if you take it to the next level, which is like spiritual creativity, anybody who sat in a meeting with stifling control can understand immediately that it totally kills spontaneity, and spontaneity is where creativity comes from, and creativity breeds further innovation.
[52:03.300 --> 52:07.160]  So, you know, the whole process is backwards.
[52:08.120 --> 52:08.600]  All right.
[52:08.640 --> 52:09.540]  Thanks very much for your call.
[52:09.960 --> 52:10.620]  All righty.
[52:10.800 --> 52:11.120]  All right.
[52:11.160 --> 52:13.860]  And we're going to open up the phone lines to anyone else who wants to speak up.
[52:13.860 --> 52:16.700]  3-4-7-3-3-3-5-0-8-1-8.
[52:16.800 --> 52:18.660]  Always a pleasure to speak with BAI listeners.
[52:19.320 --> 52:19.440]  Yeah.
[52:19.520 --> 52:21.480]  It was a very enlightened conversation.
[52:22.560 --> 52:34.360]  Felt like it was stepping back, I guess, and thinking about things on more of a fundamental basis instead of with any kind of national meaning or anything attached.
[52:34.360 --> 52:34.580]  Yeah.
[52:34.720 --> 52:35.280]  It's very good.
[52:35.440 --> 52:40.520]  You have to have these conversations, whether it's on the radio or with people you know or with your family.
[52:40.520 --> 52:44.800]  It's important to converse, to share ideas, to come up with differing opinions.
[52:45.040 --> 52:47.320]  However abstract they may be.
[52:47.480 --> 52:49.700]  It's just a conversation.
[52:50.160 --> 52:50.320]  Yeah.
[52:50.360 --> 52:56.800]  I just missed the days when we had a phone line, a phone system that had 12 lines ringing at the same time, so I could just go from one to the other.
[52:57.240 --> 53:06.800]  Now I've got to wait for, you know, the phone company to process, and I don't know how many calls are winding up in purgatory, but our phone number is 347-335-0818.
[53:07.000 --> 53:08.580]  If you're calling us now, we don't see you.
[53:08.660 --> 53:09.460]  You're ringing someplace.
[53:09.580 --> 53:10.440]  We don't know where that is.
[53:10.900 --> 53:15.460]  So just hang up and call again, 347-335-0818, and we only have a couple minutes left.
[53:15.460 --> 53:20.580]  So if you want to say anything to us, now is the time to give a call.
[53:22.980 --> 53:23.900]  I'm out of things to say.
[53:24.920 --> 53:34.440]  In the meantime, yeah, tune in here on BAI tomorrow for live coverage of the Comey's testifying and everything echoing off of that.
[53:34.960 --> 53:45.480]  Yeah, there's going to be a number of different, I think, news outlets that they'll be either checking in with or syndicating the coverage from those entities.
[53:45.540 --> 53:48.460]  So you can get it all here at WBAI.
[53:48.660 --> 53:50.580]  And we have another call, which I have captured.
[53:50.820 --> 53:51.500]  Good evening, caller.
[53:51.600 --> 53:52.240]  You are on the air.
[53:53.080 --> 53:53.460]  Hi.
[53:53.680 --> 53:54.440]  Just a quick question.
[53:54.540 --> 53:59.600]  Why can't we focus our energies and fix WBAI, like maybe get an asterisk?
[54:00.080 --> 54:05.200]  Up and running, or some other innovative technologies to make sure VA is still up on there?
[54:05.380 --> 54:06.900]  And I'll take my response off there.
[54:07.020 --> 54:07.240]  Okay.
[54:07.280 --> 54:08.540]  It's a very good question.
[54:08.840 --> 54:10.480]  I know people have tried.
[54:10.480 --> 54:11.420]  People are trying.
[54:12.480 --> 54:17.900]  It's basically, you know, the situation you have in any organization where you have to do things the right way.
[54:18.400 --> 54:22.040]  I think what the previous caller was talking about, having meetings where you don't really go anywhere.
[54:22.200 --> 54:23.160]  Sometimes that happens, too.
[54:24.340 --> 54:29.440]  But what we've seen over recent weeks and months is initiative.
[54:29.440 --> 54:32.700]  It's people really wanting to fix things and get things working properly.
[54:32.880 --> 54:35.200]  And, you know, I have to give Trump some credit here.
[54:35.280 --> 54:38.520]  He's really invigorated us into wanting to get things to work really well.
[54:38.780 --> 54:46.660]  So I think whether it's an asterisk system or some other phone network that we have, we're going to have this addressed and fixed relatively soon.
[54:46.660 --> 54:54.260]  I would suggest maybe contacting the station if you have some expertise to lend your supports.
[54:54.260 --> 54:58.320]  If you have advice or expertise in this technical issue.
[54:58.560 --> 55:05.780]  It's also the kind of thing, just to give perspective, you're not walking into something that's brand new or we're starting over.
[55:06.020 --> 55:08.880]  There have been phone systems that were purchased in the past.
[55:09.080 --> 55:17.980]  There's things that you have to take into consideration and you're going to be working from and there's also certain specific needs the station has.
[55:18.160 --> 55:18.520]  There's a lot.
[55:18.680 --> 55:21.160]  You have to be a patient person and it can be frustrating.
[55:21.160 --> 55:23.780]  But I think we all agree it does need to be done.
[55:23.920 --> 55:27.200]  And you can go to WBAI.org to get more information on how to contact people.
[55:27.280 --> 55:28.400]  Hey, we have another caller on the line.
[55:28.500 --> 55:29.020]  Good evening, caller.
[55:29.760 --> 55:30.940]  Hey, good evening, folks.
[55:31.200 --> 55:32.600]  Hey, talking about off the hook.
[55:32.760 --> 55:33.060]  Yes.
[55:33.180 --> 55:33.580]  I don't know.
[55:33.720 --> 55:34.720]  I'll make it real quick.
[55:34.800 --> 55:42.500]  I know we're running out of time, but I come home from work on Tuesday night and I get a phone call on my cell phone.
[55:42.660 --> 55:44.720]  My sister says, well, you didn't pay your phone bill?
[55:44.800 --> 55:45.620]  And I'm like, what do you mean?
[55:46.720 --> 55:48.580]  She says, well, your phone shut off.
[55:48.720 --> 55:50.060]  Temporally disconnected, right?
[55:50.580 --> 55:50.940]  Okay.
[55:51.360 --> 56:01.040]  And after like 45 minutes of sitting on the cell phone trying to reach through to Verizon, I got somebody at Syracuse Service Center.
[56:02.400 --> 56:04.000]  I assume you're in Syracuse.
[56:04.120 --> 56:04.760]  That would make sense.
[56:05.340 --> 56:06.220]  I mean, in Albany.
[56:06.440 --> 56:06.880]  I'm sorry.
[56:07.080 --> 56:07.320]  Okay.
[56:07.320 --> 56:07.820]  In New Jersey.
[56:08.220 --> 56:14.180]  And they said, my phone's been shut off because I have to go to Fios because I got a copper landline.
[56:14.360 --> 56:15.380]  Now, is that right?
[56:15.480 --> 56:15.560]  Oh, wow.
[56:16.000 --> 56:16.380]  Yeah.
[56:16.580 --> 56:20.480]  They're putting the pressure on you trying to get you to give up your copper line.
[56:21.080 --> 56:22.920]  You do not have to give up your copper line.
[56:23.020 --> 56:25.720]  They will play every dirty trick in the book to get you to do that.
[56:25.740 --> 56:26.300]  Well, they shut it off.
[56:27.020 --> 56:27.780]  They shut off.
[56:27.840 --> 56:29.060]  They can't get my number now.
[56:29.060 --> 56:32.520]  Now, wait, they shut it off because a bill was late?
[56:33.100 --> 56:33.380]  No.
[56:33.620 --> 56:39.580]  They shut it off because they said that I had a notice that was given.
[56:39.920 --> 56:44.440]  I had 30 days to sign up for Fios, which I didn't get.
[56:44.580 --> 56:45.520]  I didn't get it.
[56:45.680 --> 56:46.760]  I got my bill.
[56:46.900 --> 56:47.840]  What phone company is this?
[56:48.160 --> 56:48.880]  It's Verizon.
[56:49.060 --> 56:49.660]  This is Verizon.
[56:49.760 --> 56:53.740]  So you're saying Verizon is actually shutting off people's copper lines and forcing them.
[56:53.880 --> 56:57.540]  My copper line has been shut off since Tuesday, and I paid my bill the week before.
[56:57.540 --> 57:01.740]  So you're probably one of a very few number of customers in that area.
[57:01.940 --> 57:09.460]  And maybe there was maintenance that they put in or something was moved for construction somewhere else.
[57:09.460 --> 57:14.980]  And it ended up that if they can just get you to switch, they won't have to maintain that.
[57:15.120 --> 57:18.000]  And this is something we've heard quite a bit about in recent years.
[57:18.000 --> 57:19.600]  Can I ask, what state are you in?
[57:20.380 --> 57:21.620]  In Fairhaven, New Jersey.
[57:21.860 --> 57:22.040]  Okay.
[57:22.360 --> 57:31.340]  What you should do, and I really suggest you do this, is contact your Public Utilities Commission and start an inquiry there and say, this is what happened to you.
[57:31.480 --> 57:40.720]  I don't think they can just disconnect your copper line in good standing and force you to get something else, which, you know, in some ways, it's a better technology.
[57:40.820 --> 57:42.360]  In other ways, it's not a better technology.
[57:42.360 --> 57:50.820]  It doesn't last long if there's a power failure, for instance, but it sounds like what they're doing is pressuring you in a way that they are not allowed to do.
[57:51.340 --> 57:51.740]  Yeah.
[57:51.900 --> 57:55.700]  Well, why do you think they're replacing all these old railroad lines with copper again?
[57:55.880 --> 57:57.300]  They know it never goes down.
[57:58.120 --> 57:58.440]  Interesting.
[57:58.600 --> 57:59.740]  I didn't think about that.
[57:59.920 --> 58:00.160]  Yeah.
[58:00.360 --> 58:05.340]  But please keep us updated on this because we do want to follow this story.
[58:05.500 --> 58:07.320]  But do contact your Public Utilities Commission.
[58:07.340 --> 58:11.300]  That strikes fear into the heart of any phone company, by the way, when you say you're going to do that.
[58:11.920 --> 58:13.060]  Well, I'm going to do it.
[58:13.180 --> 58:13.400]  Yeah.
[58:13.440 --> 58:15.220]  I hope you get your line back.
[58:15.240 --> 58:15.740]  I really do.
[58:15.920 --> 58:18.540]  And I'm sure a lot of listeners will be paying attention to this.
[58:18.680 --> 58:18.780]  Yeah.
[58:18.840 --> 58:20.040]  It certainly isn't good faith.
[58:20.540 --> 58:32.060]  And they're not exactly preparing you to make that change by yanking it from you and not really informing you about the implications and what you're going to have to face.
[58:32.240 --> 58:33.340]  And we are out of time.
[58:33.340 --> 58:36.900]  So thanks, everybody, for calling in and for supporting the show.
[58:37.080 --> 58:37.860]  Volter, any tweets?
[58:38.680 --> 58:40.720]  We've got a session for the Hope Conference.
[58:40.720 --> 58:41.240]  Oh, yeah?
[58:41.580 --> 58:42.480]  Hope Under Siege.
[58:42.680 --> 58:43.800]  That's the name of our conference.
[58:43.860 --> 58:44.120]  Okay.
[58:45.060 --> 58:46.540]  Yeah, I don't know about that.
[58:47.000 --> 58:47.800]  But thanks.
[58:47.900 --> 58:48.320]  Thanks for that.
[58:48.400 --> 58:50.560]  And you can continue tweeting at us, Hacker Radio Show.
[58:50.700 --> 58:52.900]  Write to us, OTH, at 2600.com.
[58:52.900 --> 58:58.160]  A full archive of every show we've ever done can be found at 2600.com slash off the hook.
[58:58.520 --> 59:03.700]  This is a manual for off the hook, for Rob, for Kyle, for Voltaire, and everybody else.
[59:04.100 --> 59:04.860]  Have a good night.
[59:04.860 --> 59:04.880]  Have a good night.
[59:05.300 --> 59:05.480]  Have a good night.
[59:05.480 --> 59:05.680]  Have a good night.
[59:05.680 --> 59:05.900]  Have
[01:01:00.070 --> 01:01:00.070]  a good night.
[01:01:00.070 --> 01:01:00.170]  Have a good night.
[01:01:00.170 --> 01:01:00.630]  Have a good night.
[01:01:00.730 --> 01:01:01.350]  Have a good night.
[01:01:01.390 --> 01:01:01.610]  Have a good night.
[01:01:01.610 --> 01:01:02.210]  And this is the second one.