[00:00.000 --> 00:03.240]  On behalf of Progressive Values, Saturday in Charlottesville would be a good time.
[00:03.380 --> 00:05.260]  Sounds like one of them died, actually.
[00:05.560 --> 00:08.540]  So, it sounds like the Bernie bros kind of took one for the team.
[00:08.860 --> 00:10.300]  Yeah, and they were Bernie sisters, too.
[00:10.540 --> 00:14.820]  That was Jack Smith, a Mike reporter, a reporter at Mike, Mike.com.
[00:14.920 --> 00:18.900]  And he was talking to me at Sunday, 1 a.m.
[00:19.040 --> 00:20.500]  about his experience at Charlottesville.
[00:20.780 --> 00:22.600]  Thanks so much for listening to The Katie Hopper Show.
[00:22.600 --> 00:24.960]  You can hear us every Wednesday at 7 p.m.
[00:24.960 --> 00:25.760]  on WBAI.
[00:25.760 --> 00:28.760]  That's 99.5 FM or WBAI.org.
[00:30.420 --> 00:31.440]  Thank you, Katie.
[00:32.920 --> 00:36.140]  And as we approach the hour of 8 p.m.
[00:36.520 --> 00:41.780]  in just another minute and a half or so, you are listening to WBAI.
[00:41.780 --> 00:45.080]  That's 99.5 FM in New York.
[00:45.300 --> 00:48.360]  It's WBAI.org on the Internet.
[00:49.920 --> 00:57.160]  And as we approach that hour, it's just about time for another exciting edition of Off the Hook.
[02:29.690 --> 02:31.670]  And a very good evening to you.
[02:32.850 --> 02:34.610]  This program is Off the Hook.
[02:34.790 --> 02:35.210]  Rob T.
[02:35.330 --> 02:36.470]  Firefly here with you.
[02:36.910 --> 02:38.930]  I am joined in the studio by Voltaire.
[02:39.210 --> 02:39.590]  Hello.
[02:40.690 --> 02:41.690]  And by Alex.
[02:42.130 --> 02:42.530]  Good evening.
[02:44.490 --> 02:48.350]  Our colleagues, Emmanuel and Kyle, are off chasing some sort of eclipse.
[02:48.670 --> 02:51.730]  I'm sure we'll hear more from them as that situation develops.
[02:52.350 --> 02:58.050]  But we are also joined by a special guest here in the studio today to talk about one of our stories.
[02:58.390 --> 03:03.350]  We are joined by Lorenzo Franceschi-Bicari from Motherboard at Vice.
[03:03.810 --> 03:05.030]  Lorenzo, thank you for joining us.
[03:05.310 --> 03:05.590]  Thank you.
[03:05.790 --> 03:06.490]  Excited to be here.
[03:08.490 --> 03:23.030]  Well, we're so happy to have you here today, Lorenzo, because you've been doing some excellent reporting on something we've been covering for a little while now and that the world should be aware of, which is this malware tech arrest.
[03:23.610 --> 03:29.410]  And there's been some rather interesting developments since the beginning of this week.
[03:29.830 --> 03:44.510]  And I think for the benefit of some of our listeners who may perhaps have not been sober for the last couple of weeks or maybe the conditions of their bail don't allow them to use a computer, so they may not be aware of what's been going on with malware tech.
[03:44.670 --> 03:50.670]  So I think we can just go into a little bit of background about who he is and, you know, what's going on here.
[03:50.870 --> 04:03.970]  And so this whole story seems to really have started last month, really, if you think about it, because there was an indictment for the security researcher that came down on 11 July.
[04:04.150 --> 04:21.950]  And the security researcher was made extremely famous the world over because he had identified a domain name that was essentially the off switch for the WannaCry or the WannaCrypt ransomware that was spreading globally through the world, shutting down hospitals at the NHS.
[04:23.670 --> 04:30.650]  And whether he liked it or not, the British tabloids identified who he was and he became a sort of overnight celebrity.
[04:31.230 --> 04:44.830]  And then when he came over to the United States, ostensibly to attend DEFCON in Las Vegas, on his way out in McCarran Airport on 2 August, he was arrested by the FBI.
[04:46.270 --> 04:54.030]  Taken into custody, held, I think, for an extended period of time without an attorney present, had been interrogated.
[04:54.490 --> 04:58.070]  I presume his Miranda rights were read to him.
[04:58.690 --> 05:04.410]  And then on 4 August, there was an initial appearance at which bail was set.
[05:04.410 --> 05:09.490]  And those conditions of bail, I think they required $30,000 to be posted.
[05:09.830 --> 05:11.830]  And the conditions were actually quite onerous.
[05:11.890 --> 05:13.350]  He wasn't allowed to use a computer.
[05:13.670 --> 05:24.290]  And because of the late hour of the day, that was on a Friday, he wound up spending that weekend in jail and he wasn't bailed out until Monday, which was 7 August.
[05:25.150 --> 05:34.770]  And then, I believe, not much has happened in this particular case until this past Monday in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, when he was arraigned.
[05:34.970 --> 05:40.290]  And we're very grateful to have you here, Lorenzo, because you were actually in Milwaukee, weren't you?
[05:40.650 --> 05:41.390]  Yes, correct.
[05:41.390 --> 05:45.470]  I flew to Milwaukee on Sunday night and attended the hearing, which was Monday morning.
[05:45.990 --> 05:47.950]  And how did you like Milwaukee, by the way?
[05:48.090 --> 05:52.510]  I didn't have a chance to see too much of it, but it seemed like a nice town.
[05:52.670 --> 05:53.390]  The weather was great.
[05:53.390 --> 05:54.770]  Very diplomatic response.
[05:54.990 --> 05:55.770]  Yeah, you know.
[05:55.890 --> 05:56.490]  Very diplomatic.
[05:57.010 --> 05:58.130]  So, tell us about this.
[05:58.230 --> 06:03.630]  So, you flew into Milwaukee, you stayed in some kind of motel or something, somewhere near the courthouse.
[06:03.830 --> 06:09.670]  You got up early in the morning and you went to the Federal District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin.
[06:09.850 --> 06:11.310]  What's the courthouse like, by the way?
[06:12.070 --> 06:13.610]  It's actually really nice.
[06:13.750 --> 06:19.150]  It's sort of like a kind of old-fashioned building with some towers.
[06:19.150 --> 06:21.110]  I guess it's pretty similar to the one in New York.
[06:21.110 --> 06:25.050]  You know, I guess they tried to convey, you know, history with these buildings.
[06:26.470 --> 06:33.050]  And one of the things that surprised me actually about the court was that I was expecting not to be able to bring in any devices.
[06:34.170 --> 06:39.510]  Because as you know, in New York courts, I think all courts in New York just take all your devices.
[06:40.830 --> 06:50.070]  Whereas, in this particular court, they just asked me to turn in my camera, like my old-fashioned camera, and my old-fashioned recorder, but they allowed my phone.
[06:50.450 --> 06:50.910]  That's interesting.
[06:50.910 --> 06:54.910]  Which I was like, okay, you guys realize that this is also a recorder and a camera.
[06:55.170 --> 07:02.570]  But that was, you know, that helped because I also, I was able to bring in my laptop and take notes with that because my handwriting is terrible.
[07:02.850 --> 07:05.730]  They actually let you bring a laptop in as a member of the public.
[07:05.730 --> 07:07.370]  That would never happen here in New York.
[07:07.570 --> 07:14.710]  I mean, and it's mostly the federal courts here in New York that make you deposit your devices with the federal marshals when you're going in.
[07:15.090 --> 07:16.270]  I'm not so sure about it.
[07:16.270 --> 07:21.110]  I think state court will allow you basically to walk in with anything short of a shotgun these days.
[07:22.070 --> 07:26.850]  And if you have an attorney ID card, you can bring in really whatever the hell you want.
[07:27.110 --> 07:29.390]  In that case, they actually give you a gun if you don't have one already.
[07:29.470 --> 07:29.910]  That's true.
[07:30.030 --> 07:33.270]  Well, you don't go through a metal detector, so it's rather interesting.
[07:33.850 --> 07:42.670]  So you get in there, it's this really kind of ornate, beautiful, old-school-looking courthouse that is a grand example of our tax dollars at work.
[07:44.330 --> 07:46.670]  And where were you sitting when you got into the courtroom?
[07:47.110 --> 07:51.790]  So I got there pretty early, just in case I wanted to get, you know, I didn't want to miss anything.
[07:52.290 --> 07:55.150]  So I sat outside and just waited until everyone...
[07:55.150 --> 07:58.390]  I was actually the first one to show up, which doesn't happen very often with me.
[07:59.270 --> 08:00.250]  You are Italian.
[08:00.450 --> 08:01.110]  Yeah, I'm Italian.
[08:01.250 --> 08:02.010]  They're usually late.
[08:02.010 --> 08:12.790]  And so, yeah, I sat outside and I actually saw Marcus Hutchins, also known as Malware Tech, come in at some point.
[08:13.250 --> 08:24.990]  His lawyers, whom at the time actually were not known, in the sense that in Nevada, he hired a local lawyer and now two new lawyers have taken over the case.
[08:24.990 --> 08:28.090]  So they showed up with him.
[08:28.350 --> 08:29.330]  His family was there.
[08:29.450 --> 08:30.890]  His mother and his brother were there.
[08:32.190 --> 08:40.250]  And there was a pretty sizable crew of journalists, considering that, you know, it's sort of a...
[08:40.250 --> 08:48.470]  I mean, it's a big case in the hacking community, but it's probably not, like, something that mainstream journalists, like, would know or cover too much.
[08:49.650 --> 08:52.610]  Mostly it was, like, local journalists, just me.
[08:52.930 --> 08:59.850]  And there was also Marcy Wheeler, also known as Empty Wheel, who traveled there as well to follow the case.
[09:00.370 --> 09:01.190]  That's interesting, too.
[09:01.390 --> 09:10.910]  You know, you bring up an interesting point, I think, because, you know, when the story broke, I think you and Motherboard were actually the first organizations to break it.
[09:11.030 --> 09:11.710]  Is that right?
[09:12.050 --> 09:12.310]  Yeah.
[09:12.430 --> 09:17.950]  When Hutchins or Malware Tech was arrested, my colleague Joseph Cox broke the story.
[09:18.610 --> 09:21.410]  So we were the ones that would basically reveal that he was detained.
[09:21.650 --> 09:23.590]  And at the time, actually, we didn't even know why.
[09:23.790 --> 09:29.630]  Like, when we reported that he had been detained, all we knew was that he had been stopped at the airport.
[09:29.790 --> 09:32.450]  A lot of people will probably agree with that even still today.
[09:32.470 --> 09:35.310]  They don't know why he's being detained.
[09:35.310 --> 09:41.330]  If you actually read that indictment really closely, like we did last week, sort of like the Micro Machine Man.
[09:41.650 --> 09:44.690]  So you get in there, you see Marcus Hutchins, you see Malware Tech.
[09:44.790 --> 09:47.690]  What was his demeanor like when you saw him, when he was with his family?
[09:47.990 --> 09:49.390]  He seemed pretty calm.
[09:50.710 --> 09:55.270]  He didn't seem, you know, too nervous or, you know, spooked or anything like that.
[09:55.470 --> 09:57.650]  He seemed to be very, just very calm.
[09:58.850 --> 10:01.730]  The whole, and the whole hearing was very, very short.
[10:01.970 --> 10:04.610]  I think it lasted, you know, around 30 minutes.
[10:05.230 --> 10:10.810]  And what struck me the most during the hearing was how, just how friendly everything was.
[10:11.770 --> 10:26.010]  Because in the, in the previous hearing in Nevada, the one on August 4th, the prosecution tried to essentially convince the judge not to give bail and not to, you know, not to let Hutchins out.
[10:26.450 --> 10:41.490]  And their arguments were that, you know, he's a suspected criminal and one of the most controversial arguments was that he had like shot a bunch of guns and machine guns and shotguns and whatever.
[10:41.890 --> 10:43.330]  I mean, it's Las Vegas.
[10:43.770 --> 10:45.370]  That's what everybody does over there, right?
[10:45.390 --> 10:50.030]  Yeah, which was the, which was the answer of his lawyer and the judge didn't buy it.
[10:50.150 --> 10:54.530]  You know, the judge was like, you know, this is posted, you know, at the airport there are advertisements for it.
[10:54.790 --> 10:55.890]  This is ridiculous.
[10:56.290 --> 11:06.730]  So, but, you know, but in, in, in Milwaukee on the other hand the prosecutor just seemed to give the defense whatever they wanted in terms of conditions for bail.
[11:08.430 --> 11:13.910]  The defense lawyers were like, we want him to be, we want him to get out.
[11:14.270 --> 11:18.110]  We want him to be able to travel in the United States which was granted.
[11:18.590 --> 11:25.910]  We wanted to be able to live in Los Angeles which is, you know, pretty far from Milwaukee but neither the judge nor the prosecution seemed to care about that.
[11:26.410 --> 11:34.630]  And most importantly and which I think was also most surprisingly they allowed him back on the internet which as far as I know it's kind of strange for a hacking case.
[11:34.630 --> 11:36.790]  Yeah, that is really very unique.
[11:37.030 --> 11:48.910]  I mean, I guess it's part and parcel with his job and his ability to make a living and I'm not sure if that was brought up but I'm actually I'm quite surprised that the prosecution at DOJ didn't press back on that.
[11:49.450 --> 12:07.210]  It's sort of weird to me and I'm not sure if you can shed any light on this but he's allowed on the internet but he's not allowed to access the sinkhole or the domain name that he uncovered when he was analyzing the source code of WannaCrypt that ended up being the sort of the kill switch.
[12:07.550 --> 12:07.930]  Is that right?
[12:08.130 --> 12:08.770]  Yeah, that's correct.
[12:09.070 --> 12:19.910]  That's basically the only condition that the government seemed to be interested in which is very interesting because WannaCry as far as we know today doesn't have anything to do with the case itself.
[12:20.650 --> 12:31.770]  So, yeah, in court basically the prosecutor was like we, you know, we're going to allow him back on the internet with one exception he cannot access the sinkhole of WannaCry.
[12:32.990 --> 12:38.430]  And, um, so, yeah, basically the government doesn't want him to have any access to that anymore.
[12:38.670 --> 12:40.470]  I mean, it's such a weird condition.
[12:40.610 --> 12:51.490]  I mean, what do they think they were going to I guess there wasn't much talk about this on the record but did they think he was going to deactivate the domain name and allow WannaCrypt to, you know, spawn again?
[12:51.690 --> 12:53.690]  I mean, that's the only thing I could think of.
[12:54.050 --> 12:56.290]  Yeah, I mean, this is, we can only speculate.
[12:56.670 --> 13:01.770]  Maybe they're doing some investigative work just because of the geopolitical implications of WannaCrypt.
[13:01.770 --> 13:05.010]  Maybe they're still trying to find out like the causes of it and stuff.
[13:05.430 --> 13:10.570]  Yeah, I mean, they could have set one of the conditions to transfer ownership of the domain to the FBI.
[13:10.750 --> 13:12.330]  I'm sure the defense would have granted it.
[13:12.330 --> 13:13.890]  Yeah, it's pretty interesting.
[13:14.150 --> 13:29.750]  He returned to Twitter on August 14th but as he's mentioned there he really can't do much he can't speak about the case or anything that he's going through so he's basically telling jokes and, you know, doing, talking about generic InfoSec stuff.
[13:29.890 --> 13:33.190]  But his first tweet when he returned was, things to do during DEFCON.
[13:33.330 --> 13:37.830]  Attend parties, visit Red Rock Canyon, go shooting, be indicted by the FBI, rent supercars.
[13:38.230 --> 13:38.770]  I think so.
[13:39.190 --> 13:40.470]  I saw that too.
[13:40.470 --> 13:45.810]  I mean, it's amazing that he still has a sense of humor about this when he's facing these, you know, really serious charges.
[13:47.030 --> 13:56.750]  One of the things that we went into last week in the show that is still, I think, a mystery for everybody on this planet and elsewhere is this unnamed co-conspirator.
[13:57.790 --> 13:59.190]  You know, we don't...
[13:59.190 --> 14:03.630]  I guess he's not an unindicted co-conspirator because he's in the indictment and he's just unnamed.
[14:03.990 --> 14:07.150]  And was there any discussion about this whatsoever?
[14:07.670 --> 14:09.170]  No, there was no discussion.
[14:10.910 --> 14:13.030]  Unfortunately, they didn't talk about it at all.
[14:13.750 --> 14:21.670]  You know, maybe when the prosecutor and the defense lawyers met beforehand, before the hearing, they talked about it.
[14:21.750 --> 14:26.330]  But on the record, in front of the judge, there was no mention of the co-defendant on Monday.
[14:26.890 --> 14:28.350]  And it's interesting too.
[14:28.410 --> 14:30.770]  I actually don't remember if we brought this up last week.
[14:30.850 --> 14:37.890]  But if you look at the indictment right here, you know, it says, it starts off with defendants and then defendant and then it's redacted.
[14:38.470 --> 14:43.090]  That's paragraph A and then paragraph B names Marcus Hutchins or Malware Tech.
[14:43.370 --> 14:50.390]  But defendant who is unnamed and redacted from the indictment, it's a really long redaction.
[14:50.630 --> 14:52.350]  I mean, it's about an entire line.
[14:52.590 --> 15:02.650]  So either this person has an extraordinarily lengthy name or they have a lengthy alias or perhaps, more likely, they have several aliases.
[15:02.650 --> 15:08.790]  And yesterday there was some weird stuff that happened with respect to PACER.
[15:09.710 --> 15:11.410]  Do you know anything about this, Lorenzo?
[15:11.710 --> 15:12.190]  Yeah.
[15:12.430 --> 15:14.930]  As many other things in this story, we don't know too much about it.
[15:15.010 --> 15:25.990]  But basically what happened is that at some point either yesterday or two days ago in PACER, the public system to track court documents in the U.S., something changed.
[15:26.110 --> 15:29.690]  Like the name of the defendant in the case changed.
[15:29.750 --> 15:31.130]  So instead of being U.S.
[15:31.770 --> 15:31.950]  v.
[15:32.470 --> 15:33.770]  Hutchins, it became U.S.
[15:33.890 --> 15:34.050]  v.
[15:34.370 --> 15:34.650]  Tran.
[15:35.650 --> 15:40.990]  And someone, a couple of people on Twitter noticed it and, you know, were puzzled by it.
[15:41.310 --> 15:43.430]  And we can only speculate again.
[15:43.790 --> 15:54.150]  Maybe someone at PACER or someone at the DOJ made a mistake and, you know, unwillingly revealed the name of the other defendant.
[15:54.750 --> 15:56.570]  Maybe it's some sort of glitch or bug.
[15:56.870 --> 15:57.650]  Who knows?
[15:57.850 --> 15:59.670]  For now, DOJ is not talking about it.
[16:00.230 --> 16:01.230]  So they're not talking about it.
[16:01.370 --> 16:05.290]  I mean, Tran is only four characters, T-R-A-N.
[16:05.530 --> 16:10.230]  I mean, unless there was some kind of full justification error, it wouldn't take up that entire line.
[16:10.530 --> 16:12.510]  But it is really weird, right?
[16:12.590 --> 16:14.270]  I mean, because we have Hutchins et alia.
[16:14.390 --> 16:15.150]  It's United States v.
[16:15.290 --> 16:17.170]  Hutchins et alia, which is, you know, and others.
[16:17.710 --> 16:32.730]  It's really quite possible that a clerk who was changing something or rearranging the DACA or putting in minute entries or something may have accidentally switched the names of the defendants and put it on there and it changed the caption.
[16:32.910 --> 16:34.630]  I don't really know how Pacer works.
[16:34.670 --> 16:46.570]  I do know it's really old and stale and, you know, fraught with all kinds of ridiculous problems, one of which is that it charges you for every single damn thing that you do on it.
[16:47.230 --> 16:49.990]  But, I mean, it's such a weird mystery.
[16:49.990 --> 16:58.290]  I'm trying to, you know, well, I'm sure we'll unriddle this in the weeks to come, but so there was no discussion about the unnamed co-conspirator there.
[16:58.450 --> 16:59.970]  I mean, I think that's interesting as well.
[17:00.130 --> 17:02.010]  What about Milwaukee itself?
[17:02.070 --> 17:05.870]  Was there any discussion about why you're in Wisconsin?
[17:06.450 --> 17:10.870]  Also, no discussion of that in the hearing on Monday.
[17:11.090 --> 17:29.950]  But just to go back quickly to the co-defendant, all we know about him or her at this point is that the prosecutors in Las Vegas at the hearing the week prior said that it's still at large or still, you know, uncaught.
[17:30.130 --> 17:33.930]  He hasn't been or she hasn't been caught, which is interesting.
[17:34.190 --> 17:37.710]  And it's kind of like the only thing we know on the record.
[17:38.270 --> 17:42.450]  Yeah, I'm curious also about, like, suspicious about why he was in Milwaukee.
[17:42.730 --> 17:48.950]  Like, my initial suspicion is that the FBI was trying to, like, shop for a friendly judge.
[17:49.690 --> 18:03.950]  With the CFAA, maybe you can explain this more, Alec, but they can basically claim that any, because if you just cross the world, you can claim that anybody is a victim of the CFAA, which is why we have a non-American citizen being tried in the U.S.
[18:04.070 --> 18:06.030]  Yeah, I think it's a possibility.
[18:06.030 --> 18:12.150]  I think it's more likely that there's some sort of nexus to Milwaukee or the eastern district of Wisconsin.
[18:12.730 --> 18:16.570]  The unnamed co-conspirator may reside there.
[18:16.570 --> 18:18.230]  Something may have happened there.
[18:18.410 --> 18:26.850]  I think there's probably something going on there because there's plenty of friendly judges to the Department of Justice these days.
[18:27.050 --> 18:28.930]  And, you know, they could have chosen anywhere.
[18:28.930 --> 18:44.730]  If they would have chosen anywhere, I mean, you know, there's really sophisticated judges here in New York and the southern district that deal a lot with the CFAA and technology and if I were DOJ, I would probably want to bring it in a forum like the SDNY,
[18:44.850 --> 18:54.750]  the southern district here in New York, where judges have a lot of familiarity with these types of technical issues or maybe even possibly somewhere like the eastern district of Texas where all the patent claims are brought.
[18:54.950 --> 18:55.410]  Not anymore.
[18:55.710 --> 18:56.330]  That's true.
[18:56.530 --> 18:57.470]  That has changed.
[18:57.650 --> 18:59.690]  But they're still being filed there, believe it or not.
[19:00.630 --> 19:03.390]  And, you know, these counts too.
[19:03.570 --> 19:05.290]  I mean, we go back to the indictment.
[19:05.510 --> 19:08.290]  It does seem, you know, really flimsy.
[19:08.310 --> 19:14.110]  And as far as I know, there was no real discussion about the indictment either.
[19:14.310 --> 19:19.530]  Is that, you know, another thing that's still a bit of a black hole as to the government's real theory of this case?
[19:19.850 --> 19:27.370]  Yeah, unfortunately they also didn't talk about it at all other than, you know, the judge reading the charges and Hutchins' lawyer saying not guilty.
[19:27.630 --> 19:31.570]  The judge didn't laugh when they were reading any of the charges or snicker or anything?
[19:31.950 --> 19:32.910]  No, no hints like that.
[19:33.210 --> 19:47.730]  The only funny moment in the hearing was when the prosecutor mentioned that Hutchins couldn't access the sinkhole and the judge seemed very puzzled and after a little pause he was like, okay, can you guys please repeat, you know, what is that sinkhole?
[19:47.810 --> 19:48.690]  I don't know what you're talking about.
[19:49.210 --> 19:49.510]  Oh, really?
[19:49.850 --> 19:51.470]  No clue, the sinkhole.
[19:51.570 --> 19:52.070]  That's interesting.
[19:52.710 --> 19:56.250]  Yeah, and so this whole thing took about 30 minutes.
[19:56.430 --> 20:00.470]  At the end of it, I guess, Marcus Hutchins was probably pretty happy with the result.
[20:00.990 --> 20:08.610]  Yeah, I think, you know, it's hard to tell what he thought, but I think that for the defense, this was a good day.
[20:08.830 --> 20:14.470]  You know, they got him, they improved his bill conditions, which, as you said, were pretty strict.
[20:15.270 --> 20:19.990]  And essentially, he's a free man except for the fact that, you know, he'll have to be back in court.
[20:20.210 --> 20:20.710]  That's right.
[20:20.810 --> 20:23.570]  I imagine he still doesn't have a passport as well.
[20:24.810 --> 20:26.530]  There was some discussion about that.
[20:26.630 --> 20:33.290]  I think they'll, actually, they will return his passport at some point so that he can travel within the U.S., but obviously he cannot leave the U.S.
[20:33.330 --> 20:34.190]  No, he can't leave the U.S.
[20:34.190 --> 20:38.070]  I mean, if he could get to Morocco, there's no extradition treaties.
[20:38.450 --> 20:39.050]  Just saying.
[20:39.770 --> 20:49.430]  I think we've come a long way with, since the day that Kevin Mitnick when the judges said that he couldn't get bail because he could blow a whistle into a phone and start a nuclear war.
[20:49.730 --> 20:51.270]  Yeah, I think that's right.
[20:51.530 --> 20:51.670]  Yeah.
[20:52.970 --> 20:55.970]  So, what happened at the conclusion of the proceedings?
[20:56.210 --> 20:59.570]  You know, the judge, it's a magistrate judge, I think, right?
[20:59.570 --> 21:02.910]  So, it's not a federal district court judge, it's a federal magistrate judge.
[21:03.190 --> 21:12.390]  It deals with a lot of, the only difference being between those two is that the magistrate judge deals with a lot of the administrative issues and discovery disputes, things like that.
[21:13.510 --> 21:16.230]  Oh, of course, there was, I guess, a trial date set.
[21:16.930 --> 21:20.550]  Yeah, if I'm not mistaken, the trial date was set for October 23rd.
[21:21.070 --> 21:29.770]  But my understanding is that, and there was some mention of it at the hearing itself, is that there's a chance that this might get delayed.
[21:30.110 --> 21:33.030]  Yeah, I can't imagine this going to trial so quickly.
[21:33.170 --> 21:34.750]  I mean, this is a really complicated case.
[21:34.830 --> 21:37.110]  They haven't located the unnamed code defended.
[21:37.610 --> 21:40.930]  Just the exchange of discovery in this case is going to take a long time.
[21:41.490 --> 21:42.670]  And that's another issue, too.
[21:42.790 --> 21:48.010]  So, pre-trial motions, discovery, exchanges of documents, anything like that that was discussed on the record?
[21:48.230 --> 21:49.030]  No, not really.
[21:49.130 --> 21:50.510]  Other than the dates, not really.
[21:50.710 --> 21:51.950]  That's interesting.
[21:52.190 --> 21:56.670]  I mean, I would be shocked if October 23rd came around and there was actually a trial starting.
[21:57.510 --> 22:02.710]  so they concluded the proceedings and people were happy.
[22:02.950 --> 22:03.730]  They left the courtroom.
[22:04.070 --> 22:07.430]  There wasn't too many members of the media there.
[22:07.630 --> 22:11.450]  So, was there a press conference or anything in the courthouse steps?
[22:11.530 --> 22:12.150]  Anything dramatic?
[22:12.430 --> 22:13.770]  The prosecutors left.
[22:14.030 --> 22:17.950]  The one prosecutor left without talking or anything.
[22:18.410 --> 22:21.870]  He basically just escaped the room as soon as quick as possible.
[22:22.730 --> 22:27.650]  Hutchins' lawyers, on the other hand, did come out and release a very short statement.
[22:28.110 --> 22:32.610]  And by the way, his lawyers are Marsha Hoffman and Brian Klein.
[22:34.210 --> 22:38.650]  And, yeah, they both came out and they also released a very short statement.
[22:38.910 --> 22:47.950]  They basically just said that Hutchins is a hero and a very respected security researcher and they'll fight, you know, he will fight these charges.
[22:47.950 --> 22:51.910]  Yeah, Marsha Hoffman used to be with the EFS so she's really top-notch in these issues.
[22:52.630 --> 22:53.470]  Yeah, no question.
[22:53.530 --> 22:56.010]  I've seen her speak at DEFCON and various places.
[22:56.290 --> 22:57.230]  She's a great attorney.
[22:57.350 --> 22:57.970]  She's a good person.
[22:58.070 --> 23:00.290]  I think he's in very good hands here.
[23:02.090 --> 23:09.450]  And then, after everything concluded, they left the building and they just sort of went their separate ways and you went back to the airport?
[23:10.430 --> 23:13.270]  Yeah, essentially that's, yeah, that's kind of what happened.
[23:15.270 --> 23:16.890]  But I think it was interesting.
[23:16.890 --> 23:27.970]  I mean, you know, just to, again, to highlight it, I think that the change in tone, the government's change of tone is the big takeaway of the hearing on Monday.
[23:28.310 --> 23:38.890]  You know, whereas in Nevada, the prosecutor was trying to paint Hutchins as some sort of like dangerous, young, like reckless guy that could, you know, take a gun and shoot someone.
[23:39.870 --> 23:49.390]  The prosecutor in Milwaukee was basically just like, yeah, you know, sure, he can go back to work, he can go back to the internet, Twitter, whatever, as long as he doesn't touch one to cry.
[23:49.910 --> 23:52.070]  It was just very, very strange.
[23:52.290 --> 23:53.950]  Yeah, it's a big change.
[23:54.130 --> 23:57.370]  I mean, I guess there's a big difference between Vegas and the Midwest.
[23:57.690 --> 24:00.070]  Maybe it's just that Midwestern charm and sensibility.
[24:00.370 --> 24:05.870]  And even DOJ prosecutors have assimilated that into their everyday life.
[24:06.790 --> 24:08.870]  You know, perhaps, we don't know.
[24:08.870 --> 24:16.490]  I do have to ask you about something else though because I saw on your Twitter feed that you had this, you know, really interesting picture of Marcus Hutchins.
[24:17.050 --> 24:32.450]  Yeah, so since I was able to take the phone into the courtroom while we were waiting outside, you know, for the clerks to let us in, I noticed that Hutchins was sitting with Marsha Hoffman at the table and they were just chatting, I guess.
[24:32.730 --> 24:39.990]  And I could see them because there was a door with like a little window and so I thought, well, let's take a, you know, I'll take a picture.
[24:40.390 --> 24:41.990]  You know, I'm a journalist and then a writer.
[24:42.150 --> 24:43.730]  I'm also supposed to take pictures once in a while.
[24:44.470 --> 24:51.610]  And I posted it on Twitter and I later heard that maybe that was against the rules of the court.
[24:51.850 --> 24:52.730]  Let's put it that way.
[24:52.830 --> 24:53.830]  I think so, yes, yeah.
[24:53.990 --> 24:56.410]  I was going to say you could take the fifth year, yeah.
[24:56.790 --> 24:57.810]  Yeah, maybe I should.
[24:58.130 --> 25:03.630]  Yeah, they may recognize you the next time you go back to the Eastern District of Wisconsin over there.
[25:03.770 --> 25:05.190]  They're not going to let you bring anything in.
[25:05.190 --> 25:06.290]  Now, I mean, who knows?
[25:06.430 --> 25:07.390]  It's a great photo, though.
[25:07.390 --> 25:08.710]  You took that with an iPhone?
[25:08.970 --> 25:09.170]  Yeah.
[25:09.690 --> 25:10.050]  Fantastic.
[25:10.450 --> 25:11.830]  What's the passcode to your iPhone?
[25:12.490 --> 25:13.170]  I'll say it to you.
[25:13.290 --> 25:15.090]  You're about to tell me anything, so yeah.
[25:15.230 --> 25:16.110]  I've already got it, actually.
[25:16.110 --> 25:17.090]  I'll give it to you later.
[25:17.170 --> 25:17.730]  You've got it.
[25:17.830 --> 25:18.150]  Fantastic.
[25:18.590 --> 25:20.930]  That was a great picture and I was really surprised.
[25:21.110 --> 25:23.270]  I said, wow, he's got some balls on him.
[25:23.390 --> 25:25.370]  He's taking pictures in the federal court over there.
[25:25.470 --> 25:26.350]  That's amazing.
[25:26.790 --> 25:28.030]  You know, he's really going at it.
[25:28.370 --> 25:40.750]  I mean, this is such a fascinating story, though, and I think, you know, when we see it unfold over the next weeks and months, you know, I really just want to know what the hell is the theory of the government?
[25:40.750 --> 25:47.410]  And it's so disappointing that we don't really have much more insight after the arraignment here.
[25:48.850 --> 25:53.550]  Oh, and by the way, I guess the most important point of the arraignment we completely skipped over.
[25:54.810 --> 25:56.090]  Did he plead something?
[25:56.950 --> 25:59.290]  Yes, yes, he pled no guilty to all charges.
[25:59.530 --> 26:01.510]  right, we wouldn't be talking about it, I guess, right?
[26:02.590 --> 26:08.810]  But these charges, they're kind of weird, and I think we could go into them after Voltaire says something.
[26:09.090 --> 26:15.030]  Yeah, on the topic going into them, if you look at the wording, they don't charge him with, like, raiding the Kronos malware.
[26:15.350 --> 26:19.050]  They charge him with the software that would later become, is the exact quote.
[26:19.450 --> 26:39.910]  And if you ask me, that sounds like it could have just been like an open source library that he wrote and put on his GitHub, and then they found that that was incorporated and now they're charging him with that, which would have very serious negative repercussions for security researchers like who are releasing the open source code all the time that can be used for malware.
[26:41.230 --> 26:52.130]  He actually, somebody retweeted a tweet of him from like around 2014 where he basically said the same thing, like, oh, I found a piece of malware that's using a piece of my code.
[26:53.150 --> 26:55.610]  It pisses me off, but like, what can I do about it?
[26:59.910 --> 27:04.490]  Something on the record, Voltaire, that indicates your innocence way back in the day?
[27:05.990 --> 27:06.430]  True.
[27:07.010 --> 27:07.850]  True, yes.
[27:08.210 --> 27:08.450]  Perhaps.
[27:09.010 --> 27:22.710]  Now, I think you raise a good point here, too, though, because if you look at count one of the indictment, which is this conspiracy to cause damage to a computer, it's kind of a strange thing here.
[27:22.790 --> 27:36.650]  And I do have to say, Oren Kerr, who's a professor at GW, wrote a really great piece for the Washington Post, which, you know, like Motherboard, has been really knocking it out of the park lately in terms of their stories, in particular, with respect to Trump and Russia,
[27:36.750 --> 27:37.050]  of course.
[27:37.630 --> 27:59.810]  But, this whole notion of the conspiracy to damage a computer, as Oren Kerr pointed out in this article, what they're doing, really, and why this indictment does appear to be quite flimsy, is conflating the sale of malware or the sale of a program with its actual use.
[28:00.090 --> 28:03.050]  I mean, nobody said that he used anything whatsoever.
[28:03.070 --> 28:04.850]  And that's the first count in the indictment.
[28:04.950 --> 28:10.070]  And the sixth count also, which is the conspiracy to damage a computer, has the same issue.
[28:10.170 --> 28:15.610]  They're conflating the sale of something together with the actual use.
[28:15.750 --> 28:18.610]  So, I think that's a real problem here.
[28:18.770 --> 28:23.670]  And, as you mentioned, Voltaire, there's going to be a spillover effect in terms of the security researcher community.
[28:23.930 --> 28:26.490]  People are going to be very reluctant to cooperate with the government.
[28:26.590 --> 28:27.950]  They're going to be reluctant to go to cons.
[28:28.130 --> 28:31.030]  We've got the Circle of Hope coming up next year.
[28:31.050 --> 28:39.130]  And we're going to have a lot of very reluctant people who may be hesitant to come to the United States because they don't know if there's a sealed indictment waiting for them.
[28:39.290 --> 28:46.050]  You know, when they go back to JFK, are they going to be picked up like Marcus Hutchins was at McCarran Airport?
[28:47.010 --> 28:54.270]  Meanwhile, this whole thing, as we touched on last week when we reported on his initial arrest, it just all seems very weird.
[28:54.370 --> 28:57.790]  I mean, now we go into the indictment and it seems like they're not really sure what they're indicting him for.
[28:58.590 --> 29:07.890]  When they picked him up, it was they let him go to a conference, apparently followed him around, waited till it was over and got him at the airport waiting for his flight home, which happened to be delayed.
[29:08.790 --> 29:16.490]  So just so many elements of this don't seem like your standard straightforward case of the government wanting someone and picking him up and going for it.
[29:16.710 --> 29:18.370]  It's certainly not straightforward.
[29:18.770 --> 29:21.790]  I mean, it's downright unusual, too.
[29:22.190 --> 29:27.510]  I mean, let's very briefly talk about the other remaining counts because I think our listeners will find this somewhat interesting.
[29:27.670 --> 29:29.830]  And again, it's something that Oren Kerr went into in his article.
[29:30.030 --> 29:37.950]  But counts two, three, and four, count two really has to do with advertising for some sort of wiretapping device.
[29:37.950 --> 29:40.590]  That's the violation of the law that is specified in count two.
[29:40.850 --> 29:45.690]  Count three has to deal with sending a wiretapping device across state lines.
[29:45.850 --> 29:52.450]  And of course, everything has to be across state lines because we're dealing with a federal indictment here as opposed to something that's just at the state level.
[29:52.710 --> 29:58.670]  And count four has to deal with selling a wiretapping device through interstate commerce.
[29:59.170 --> 30:03.550]  So, device is a really interesting word here, right?
[30:03.690 --> 30:11.430]  Because, you know, they are treating first of all malware, number one, as a wiretapping type of incident.
[30:12.130 --> 30:14.870]  which has been the case in the past.
[30:15.070 --> 30:20.310]  Spyware and things have constituted wiretapping type devices.
[30:20.490 --> 30:30.370]  But this issue of device, there have been cases in the past where wiretapping devices have been spyware that have been installed on people's phones without their consent.
[30:30.630 --> 30:37.090]  And since it captures keystrokes or it captures communications, they're violating the federal wiretapping statute.
[30:37.430 --> 30:43.690]  But, those cases always had software running on a device.
[30:43.970 --> 30:49.510]  Here, we just have source code unconnected, divorced, out there in the ether.
[30:50.390 --> 30:54.590]  Arguably, uncompiled source code constituting a device.
[30:54.950 --> 30:57.570]  And I ask you guys, can source code be a device?
[30:57.670 --> 30:58.950]  I mean, what do you think about this?
[30:59.670 --> 31:01.110]  It's really bizarre to think of it.
[31:01.190 --> 31:14.430]  I mean, if we were to draw some kind of analogy for maybe people who aren't so elbow deep in Infosec, it's like posting a recipe online for your favorite pizza and then someone somewhere in the world makes that pizza, whomps someone over the head with it,
[31:15.070 --> 31:20.510]  gets hauled away to jail for assault and the person who posted the recipe is now somehow at fault for that assault.
[31:21.270 --> 31:23.630]  I think that's actually a pretty good analogy.
[31:23.970 --> 31:29.410]  Yeah, I thought we had moved past this in the 90s when we stopped treating encryption and stuff as munitions.
[31:30.450 --> 31:31.550]  I mean, perhaps.
[31:31.550 --> 31:46.450]  it's an odd thing, and there's going to be a lot of fallout here because if source code can constitute a device, who's going to develop anything that could arguably violate the federal wiretapping statute?
[31:46.730 --> 31:51.490]  I mean, you've probably been in contact with a lot of people on this subject, Lorenzo.
[31:52.270 --> 31:57.590]  Are you seeing any kind of major fallout, issues of distrust, reluctance?
[31:58.230 --> 31:59.190]  Yeah, definitely.
[31:59.410 --> 32:11.490]  I mean, when the arrest was reported, a lot of people were outraged just because Hutchins is such a popular figure.
[32:11.670 --> 32:17.790]  But then when the indictment was published and people could finally see what it was accused of, it was even worse.
[32:17.970 --> 32:35.010]  Everyone was like, well, wait a second, am I going to be indicted because I create some sort of strings of code that eventually someone else that I have no knowledge will use for bad actions and to make some money.
[32:36.010 --> 32:39.110]  And there were a lot of people that were outspoken about it.
[32:39.210 --> 32:53.810]  There was another UK researcher called Kevin Beaumont who published a blog post saying, I'm not going to collaborate with GCHQ anymore because of this case.
[32:53.970 --> 33:08.730]  He essentially said, I used to share intelligence on threats and attacks with GCHQ because of the uncertainty surrounding this as a symbolic gesture of support and protest.
[33:08.730 --> 33:09.790]  I'm going to stop.
[33:10.790 --> 33:16.350]  There was also Rob Graham, another pretty well-known security researcher.
[33:16.350 --> 33:18.410]  You might follow him on Twitter.
[33:18.950 --> 33:21.170]  His handle is radar rob.
[33:21.450 --> 33:27.110]  He also essentially said, I wrote malware in the past for work many times.
[33:27.770 --> 33:33.630]  If someone picks it up and writes friends somewhere or something like that, am I going to go to jail too?
[33:34.570 --> 33:35.670]  It's really amazing.
[33:36.210 --> 33:38.510]  There's real danger of a chilling effect here.
[33:38.630 --> 33:51.230]  We're already seeing effects of that when other respected members of the security community start to withdraw from what they do because they're now feeling unsafe in their vocation because of what's happening to Hutchins.
[33:51.670 --> 33:55.930]  The open source community and the open source programming world is decades old now.
[33:56.270 --> 34:00.950]  There is so much code out there over the years that so many uncountable people have written.
[34:01.570 --> 34:13.630]  Are people who wrote some fragment of something 20 years ago now going to be at fault if something gets used that used code from something that used code from something that used code that they might have written when they were a kid?
[34:14.250 --> 34:14.870]  You're right.
[34:14.950 --> 34:19.770]  This could make people really nervous and I'm sure people are really nervous about this.
[34:20.550 --> 34:43.690]  It's a very strange thing too because intent obviously is a core component of any kind of criminal offense and any criminal offense you have two components you have the mens rea or the mental element the intent and the actus reas the actual act here and in this indictment both of them seem to somewhat really be lacking because if you look at count six they seem to indicate or drop a couple of
[34:43.690 --> 34:59.030]  hints that what they're talking about here is an attempt a conspiracy to damage computers that was really an attempt it's not really clear that that's their theory but the word attempt is in count six and with respect to all of
[35:13.910 --> 35:17.430]  A malicious manner when he first created it as well.
[35:18.430 --> 35:32.970]  Or perhaps they could proceed on an alternate theory, which is he either knew that it would be used in a malicious way or should have known that it was going to be used in a malicious way.
[35:33.110 --> 35:40.690]  And if it is the latter, well, that's really scary, too, because that's going to have the same chilling effect that we had just discussed on the show.
[35:40.690 --> 35:46.230]  Because knew or should have known, I mean, that puts a lot of people at jeopardy.
[35:49.370 --> 35:50.930]  It's definitely a whole lot to think about.
[35:51.050 --> 35:51.290]  Voltaire?
[35:51.410 --> 35:51.630]  Oh, no.
[35:53.030 --> 35:54.510]  Okay, not that much to think about, I guess.
[35:55.490 --> 36:00.970]  Well, we'll talk about some other things, but our guest will be sticking around.
[36:01.930 --> 36:04.190]  Lorenzo, let me make an attempt at this again.
[36:04.550 --> 36:05.310]  Franceschi Bicari?
[36:05.710 --> 36:06.110]  Perfect.
[36:06.470 --> 36:06.790]  Excellent.
[36:07.970 --> 36:10.830]  And, of course, people can find you on Twitter at LorenzoFB.
[36:12.190 --> 36:19.610]  People can also find Marcus Hutchins on Twitter and the interesting things he's posting about MalwareTechBlog on Twitter.
[36:19.930 --> 36:25.990]  And right now it paints a picture of a guy who's keeping a good sense of humor despite being really inconvenienced by his situation.
[36:26.210 --> 36:31.650]  And if you have any questions for us about the case, you can tweet us at HackerRadioShow.
[36:32.490 --> 36:33.770]  At HackerRadioShow on Twitter.
[36:34.670 --> 36:36.370]  A couple other things going on in the world.
[36:36.870 --> 36:38.510]  There's many other things going on in the world.
[36:38.670 --> 36:42.130]  But in our particular real house here, also a couple of other things going on in the world.
[36:42.650 --> 36:54.850]  One of them, talking of chilling effects, there was a story by our pals at TorrentFreak about the DMCA being used to remove an ad server URL from the EasyList adblock list.
[36:55.970 --> 37:00.950]  EasyList, which is an adblock filter used by millions of subscribers, appears to be under attack.
[37:01.490 --> 37:07.630]  GitHub, where the project is hosted, received a DMCA notice requiring a domain URL to be removed from that list.
[37:07.630 --> 37:18.150]  For those unfamiliar, these are the addresses that, this list collects addresses of basically advertising malware things people might not want to load in their browsers.
[37:18.370 --> 37:23.250]  So they engage these filters to filter out the sites on the list.
[37:23.250 --> 37:32.170]  But the owners of one of these sites basically used the DMCA to get their URL removed from the list.
[37:34.670 --> 37:39.230]  The commit appeared in the EasyList repo on GitHub a few days ago.
[37:40.430 --> 37:46.850]  And it was added with the comment, removed due to DMCA takedown request.
[37:47.350 --> 37:52.250]  And it was for the domain functionalclam.com.
[37:52.770 --> 37:54.330]  Right, yes, that's right.
[37:54.570 --> 37:56.770]  Filtering out things from functionalclam.com.
[37:57.230 --> 38:04.050]  So, apparently, whoever is in charge of that site really wanted to get off of that list and decided to use the Digital Millennium Copyright Act.
[38:04.190 --> 38:08.130]  Now, Alex, how does this smell from a legal standpoint?
[38:08.410 --> 38:09.330]  I mean, it's really odd.
[38:09.330 --> 38:11.470]  I've never seen the DMCA used in this way.
[38:11.590 --> 38:15.330]  And on the other hand, to be fair, I think it's really quite innovative.
[38:16.130 --> 38:19.050]  I give kudos to the lawyer who drafted that request.
[38:19.870 --> 38:21.670]  Like, nothing was filed in court.
[38:21.670 --> 38:24.130]  It was just a DMCA request, right?
[38:24.270 --> 38:25.130]  I mean, that's my understanding.
[38:25.130 --> 38:32.850]  Well, GitHub received and then basically told them they would take down the repo if they didn't remove it.
[38:33.050 --> 38:33.690]  Oh, is that right?
[38:33.830 --> 38:45.970]  Which also speaks to the wider implications of, like, having a lot of open source projects or development done through GitHub and using them as a centralized repo of source code.
[38:46.070 --> 38:50.670]  And that's, like, very problematic now that GitHub is, like, basically censoring things.
[38:50.670 --> 38:52.610]  And they could have fought this.
[38:52.890 --> 38:58.290]  A lot of tech companies do a good job of fighting back against egregious DMCA notifications.
[38:58.510 --> 39:00.090]  And this certainly seems like one of them.
[39:00.170 --> 39:02.310]  But in this case, it looks like GitHub did not do that.
[39:02.790 --> 39:03.150]  Yeah.
[39:03.290 --> 39:08.910]  I mean, again, this is just really a sort of strange thing to use the DMCA for.
[39:09.730 --> 39:10.290]  It's odd.
[39:10.310 --> 39:10.810]  It's innovative.
[39:10.870 --> 39:11.790]  And it seems to have worked.
[39:11.790 --> 39:19.630]  I mean, I imagine that they probably made some sort of normal attempt to have their domain name removed from this ban list.
[39:20.070 --> 39:24.130]  Or did they just go full bore with a DMCA takedown request?
[39:24.330 --> 39:26.130]  I mean, that I don't know.
[39:26.310 --> 39:33.930]  The company that sent the request is, like, they just shoot, like, blanket email, blanket requests for, like, lots of write holders.
[39:33.930 --> 39:36.630]  So they probably, like, don't even have the time to do this.
[39:38.190 --> 39:41.390]  The who is for the domain functional clam is hidden.
[39:41.530 --> 39:48.150]  But a user of GitHub basically sleuthed out that it's apparently operated by an anti-ad blocking company called Admiral.
[39:48.710 --> 39:52.030]  There is also a username that popped up on GitHub commenting on a commit.
[39:53.270 --> 39:56.050]  Username DMCAhelper, which commented,
[40:05.430 --> 40:16.610]  But this was a newly registered user account, not apparently something from GitHub staff or anything like that.
[40:16.670 --> 40:20.370]  So it's an unusual way for this to be used.
[40:20.490 --> 40:21.730]  And what do you think?
[40:21.850 --> 40:23.010]  Could something like this stick?
[40:23.270 --> 40:24.110]  I think so.
[40:24.210 --> 40:24.750]  I think it could.
[40:24.750 --> 40:26.030]  I mean, it's definitely going...
[40:26.030 --> 40:27.870]  It seemed to have worked, right?
[40:28.130 --> 40:32.890]  Yeah, but this list consists of a list of domain names, basically, a directory.
[40:33.510 --> 40:37.230]  How does that jive with the claim of copyright infringement?
[40:37.470 --> 40:41.550]  Can someone own a copyright on their domain name and choose it to be removed from a directory?
[40:41.750 --> 40:47.390]  I mean, that's an interesting question, because if a domain name is content, then perhaps, yes.
[40:47.650 --> 40:52.950]  Now, functional clam, I don't really know if that's, you know, a copyrightable term.
[40:53.250 --> 40:54.450]  That's actually an open issue.
[40:54.750 --> 41:01.630]  But, yeah, if your domain name is essentially creating some sort of content, then arguably you would have a copyright to it.
[41:02.430 --> 41:03.910]  But, yeah, functional clam.
[41:04.150 --> 41:05.370]  I mean, look, these guys are innovative.
[41:05.550 --> 41:12.410]  They have DMCA helper elves, I guess, running all around GitHub, making takedown requests.
[41:12.650 --> 41:13.730]  I mean, this is an odd story.
[41:13.730 --> 41:21.330]  I think people are probably going to wake up to the fact that, you know, the DMCA can be used in many different ways on account of this story.
[41:21.730 --> 41:24.010]  And we'll probably see this more often.
[41:24.450 --> 41:35.390]  Even if the DMCA can consider domain names as copyright, then this domain name should also still be qualified as fair use.
[41:36.110 --> 41:37.030]  Yeah, absolutely.
[41:37.150 --> 41:43.970]  Especially if it's used to critique or criticize, something like that, then definitely it should constitute fair use.
[41:44.110 --> 41:44.510]  Absolutely.
[41:44.750 --> 41:48.230]  I'd imagine adding a domain to an anti-spam list is a form of criticism.
[41:48.230 --> 41:57.350]  Yeah, I mean, what's really odd, too, is that, you know, in the usual sphere of IP protection when it comes to domain names, you're not really dealing with copyright at all.
[41:57.450 --> 41:58.770]  You're always dealing with trademarks.
[41:58.890 --> 42:15.850]  And that's what, you know, ICANN has taken great pain since the late 90s to establish the UDRP, or the Uniform Domain Name Resolution Policy, whereby arbitrations are initiated with either the National Arbitration Forum or the Walled Intellectual Property Organization to take down domain names that are infringing on other people's IP.
[42:16.590 --> 42:21.030]  And we file these types of UDRPs on behalf of our clients all the time.
[42:21.790 --> 42:24.550]  We never, of course, trample on people's fair use rights.
[42:24.810 --> 42:26.410]  That would be a bad thing to do.
[42:26.910 --> 42:30.690]  Not the best way to win friends and influence people in this community, no doubt.
[42:31.450 --> 42:33.750]  But, yeah, we're generally dealing with trademark.
[42:33.990 --> 42:35.290]  We're not generally dealing with copyright.
[42:35.530 --> 42:37.530]  So, yeah, this is an innovative thing.
[42:37.710 --> 42:44.530]  And, I mean, I'm always happy to see innovative uses of the law, but this one seems like it could be particularly damaging.
[42:44.530 --> 42:51.030]  Our friends at the EF have already reached out to the parties involved, so hopefully we'll have a positive update soon.
[42:51.470 --> 43:00.650]  In the meantime, I don't think anything's stopping users from using some sort of local filtering to block out functionalclam.com from their travels.
[43:00.670 --> 43:03.750]  But I may get in trouble for suggesting that now.
[43:04.550 --> 43:05.510]  I bet, yeah.
[43:05.790 --> 43:11.110]  Hey, can we talk about this story with the Ukrainian consultant to the Russians?
[43:11.330 --> 43:12.110]  What do you say, Rob?
[43:12.330 --> 43:12.790]  Absolutely.
[43:12.790 --> 43:22.010]  Because I think there's some interesting crossover between that story and what happened with malware tech, or at least some interesting comparisons to be made.
[43:22.350 --> 43:24.010]  Do you want to give some background on it?
[43:24.030 --> 43:25.230]  Do you want me to give some background on it?
[43:25.250 --> 43:25.930]  If you could, please.
[43:25.930 --> 43:26.630]  Okay, all right.
[43:26.730 --> 43:26.970]  I guess.
[43:27.270 --> 43:30.730]  So, the New York Times, I believe it is, came out with a story.
[43:31.750 --> 43:32.830]  When did this story come out?
[43:32.930 --> 43:33.690]  Was it...
[43:33.690 --> 43:33.910]  Today.
[43:34.190 --> 43:34.490]  Today.
[43:34.730 --> 43:35.110]  It was today.
[43:35.310 --> 43:35.570]  Interesting.
[43:35.810 --> 43:35.970]  Okay.
[43:37.130 --> 43:40.390]  I read it earlier today, so I'm right on top of things.
[43:40.610 --> 43:41.270]  This is unusual.
[43:42.790 --> 43:46.350]  I also have Italian heritage, so I'm usually late and behind the times.
[43:46.570 --> 43:47.590]  You know how it is, Lorenzo.
[43:48.010 --> 43:50.070]  Yeah, it still comes with the blood, I guess.
[43:50.430 --> 43:50.950]  Exactly.
[43:51.770 --> 44:12.190]  So, this is a very interesting story because they've broken some sort of news about what appears to be a consultant, some sort of malware consultant who had done what Hutchins was alleged to have done, which is create some kind of malware or provide some sort of source code that was then used to hack the DNC.
[44:12.790 --> 44:25.830]  And as far as we can tell from the story, this source code also seemed to have popped up in 2014 in an election hack of the Ukrainian national election.
[44:25.830 --> 44:40.250]  And so you compare the source code of the malware and there were certain, I guess, I don't know, they don't go into the technical details of exactly what it is that was contained in the Ukrainian election hack in 2014 and what was contained in the DNC hack,
[44:40.310 --> 44:41.350]  I guess, for obvious reasons.
[44:41.650 --> 44:50.410]  But Ukraine, according to this article, appears to be some sort of staging center for Russian hacks these days.
[44:50.410 --> 44:55.250]  And, you know, it's like a proving ground or a testing ground for their types of malware.
[44:55.490 --> 45:02.610]  And what's rather interesting with this particular case is this consultant didn't really know that he was working for the Russians.
[45:02.730 --> 45:19.710]  So this gives us some insight as to the MO of the Russian intelligence services, that they're willing to essentially hire freelancers, hire consultants, find anything, anywhere that could be used against, you know, a potential target.
[45:20.870 --> 45:29.710]  You know, we also saw this actually in another somewhat related story because this has to deal with, you know, APT-28 or Fancy Bear, as it's known.
[45:29.850 --> 45:43.750]  And there was an earlier story earlier, I guess it was last week, about Fancy Bear targeting hotel guests using Eternal Blue, which was disclosed by the shadow brokers and originally developed by the NSA.
[45:44.210 --> 45:46.510]  So yeah, the Russians are pretty resourceful.
[45:46.650 --> 45:51.170]  They'll find people and they will employ them and they may not know that they're working for them.
[45:51.370 --> 46:03.970]  But as it turns out, this particular consultant pieced together the puzzle after the fact and realized that what he had done was help hack the DNC quite likely on behalf of the Russians.
[46:04.490 --> 46:07.350]  So it's a sort of odd thing that happened.
[46:07.570 --> 46:11.490]  He turned himself... well, he went dark first, if I recall correctly.
[46:11.990 --> 46:14.490]  And then he turned himself into the Ukrainian authorities.
[46:15.110 --> 46:20.490]  And here's the really weird thing, is that the Ukrainian authorities didn't arrest him.
[46:20.930 --> 46:22.550]  He developed this malware.
[46:22.550 --> 46:26.570]  It was used to hack the US election.
[46:26.890 --> 46:30.430]  And they didn't arrest him because it's a sort of gray area of the law.
[46:30.570 --> 46:33.770]  And he developed the malware, but he didn't use it.
[46:34.210 --> 46:43.110]  So there's a big kind of, there's a real distinction between how these types of people are treated in Ukraine and how they're treated in the United States.
[46:43.270 --> 46:48.350]  Well, also, the reason why he wasn't arrested is because he turned himself in and he's cooperating with them.
[46:48.510 --> 46:48.890]  So...
[46:48.890 --> 46:50.910]  Well, you could still be arrested too, right?
[46:51.030 --> 46:52.510]  I mean, don't kid yourself, right?
[46:53.370 --> 46:57.110]  I think his cooperation definitely has something to do with it.
[46:57.250 --> 47:00.410]  It's also neat too, that he went to Ukrainian authorities.
[47:00.630 --> 47:06.370]  I mean, he could have possibly just walked into the US embassy and cooperated with US authorities.
[47:06.570 --> 47:11.230]  But I think he felt probably more comfortable going to the Ukrainian authorities.
[47:11.470 --> 47:15.710]  But I mean, this is a case that I think has some interesting parallels with the malware tech case.
[47:16.410 --> 47:20.310]  And it gives us a lot of insight as to what's going on with Russia.
[47:20.610 --> 47:38.150]  And this is the first person who is... well, this is the first piece of evidence, which happens to be a person that can provide testimony and evidence and documentation as to who contacted him, how they did it, you know, how long it lasted, what was he paid,
[47:38.350 --> 47:38.830]  all of this.
[47:38.950 --> 47:44.070]  So, you know, how this plays out over the next couple of weeks and months is going to be really fascinating.
[47:44.910 --> 47:48.030]  Yeah, I think this was definitely a story that sort of came out of the blue.
[47:48.170 --> 48:04.650]  And as you said, I think the most interesting thing is that finally we have a person, you know, even though like his role seems to be sort of like, you know, on the fringes of the hack, it doesn't seem to be, it doesn't look like he was, you know, had an incredible,
[48:04.990 --> 48:07.910]  incredibly important role in the whole DNC hack.
[48:08.330 --> 48:17.030]  But I guess that's why, you know, his knowledge is so interesting that the FBI wants to talk to him.
[48:17.910 --> 48:24.790]  Another interesting aspect is how it illustrates how decentralized the Russian hacking effort is.
[48:24.970 --> 48:38.850]  They rely on like outside malware distributors, whereas in the US, like the FBI won't even employ somebody that, or not the FBI, but like the security services, like the NSA and folks won't even employ people that like smoke weed.
[48:39.310 --> 48:41.070]  So like, totally different style.
[48:41.910 --> 48:42.930]  Yeah, I think you're right.
[48:42.990 --> 48:44.630]  I mean, they're very resourceful.
[48:44.810 --> 48:47.030]  And, you know, this, this brings up an interesting question too.
[48:47.110 --> 48:54.310]  I mean, this whole story is geared towards, you know, this individual, I guess his name was Profexor, or his alias was Profexor.
[48:54.490 --> 49:03.290]  And he was very well known, I guess, in the malware, sort of dark web community in Ukraine and Eastern Europe, as somebody who was highly respected.
[49:04.190 --> 49:08.910]  I wonder, you know, is there any real connection to Russia though?
[49:09.150 --> 49:11.210]  Or is, is it hypothetical?
[49:11.510 --> 49:18.490]  I mean, because, you know, we're all operating on the assumption, and it may be an erroneous assumption that he was working directly for the Russians.
[49:18.630 --> 49:22.310]  The Russians could have employed a third party who then hired this guy as a freelancer.
[49:22.310 --> 49:30.170]  This could have gone through five or six third parties before it ended up, before the traces of it ended up in the DNC hack.
[49:30.310 --> 49:32.450]  You know, we just don't really know.
[49:33.270 --> 49:35.810]  And I think there probably were intermediaries here.
[49:35.890 --> 49:41.150]  I don't think that the Russians are so naive as to just hire a freelancer directly.
[49:41.350 --> 49:46.030]  There probably had to be some sort of proprietary corporation or organization that was hiring this person.
[49:46.230 --> 49:52.370]  Because if they were doing it directly, I seriously doubt that they would not keep him on a really tight leash.
[49:52.590 --> 50:01.690]  If this is somebody who could provide critical evidence about the DNC hack, why is he walking into the police station voluntarily?
[50:01.690 --> 50:10.470]  Why did he, why was he able to go dark, evade detection and walk into the Ukrainian police station and provide this evidence, which is the basis of the New York Times story?
[50:12.290 --> 50:27.650]  Also, I think it's kind of fascinating that, you know, given the fact, as you said, that Ukraine has become some sort of a testing ground for Russian cyber attacks and, and not just, you know, not just cyber attacks, there's basically a war going on there.
[50:27.870 --> 50:33.230]  It's interesting to think that they thought it was a good idea to tap into someone from Ukraine.
[50:33.230 --> 50:37.230]  I mean, who knows about his politics, maybe he's a pro Russian Ukrainian.
[50:37.890 --> 50:46.690]  But it's just like, it's fascinating to see that in Russian intelligence is willing to go into enemy territory to get knowledge and skills.
[50:47.130 --> 50:48.290]  Absolutely, absolutely.
[50:48.490 --> 51:02.330]  And I, I think too, if we go back to the malware tech case, the Marcus Huston's case, if he's cooperating with the United States, and he's providing evidence here, and this also goes back to what you had mentioned, Voltaire, if he developed this malware,
[51:02.550 --> 51:13.750]  then shouldn't he work rather, I guess I shouldn't say shouldn't, but couldn't he then also be charged with the same exact types of crimes that Marcus Hutchins is being charged with right now.
[51:14.310 --> 51:14.770]  Yeah.
[51:14.890 --> 51:24.710]  And how much voluntary help from the security community is, are the powers that be basically cutting off by, by continuing along these lines.
[51:25.230 --> 51:27.070]  Anyway, it's a very, it's a very interesting story.
[51:27.210 --> 51:28.870]  And we're definitely keeping an eye on that.
[51:29.210 --> 51:31.030]  We have a little bit of time left.
[51:31.170 --> 51:32.750]  I want to maybe try and take a couple of phone calls.
[51:33.430 --> 51:39.310]  Um, you can reach us, uh, on the air, uh, three, four, seven, three, three, five, zero, eight, one, eight.
[51:40.310 --> 51:42.790]  That's a three, four, seven, three, three, five, zero, eight, one, eight.
[51:42.930 --> 51:44.730]  And, uh, we'll see if we can squeeze a couple of you in.
[51:45.070 --> 51:47.950]  Um, while we're waiting for the board to light up, I'll read a listener email.
[51:48.210 --> 51:51.530]  Uh, Angelo writes, you didn't mention Trump on your, uh, July 19th show.
[51:51.770 --> 51:52.050]  Congratulations.
[51:52.070 --> 51:55.190]  You resisted being trolled by the president for an entire show.
[51:55.190 --> 51:56.710]  Well, now we just mentioned it.
[51:56.930 --> 51:59.110]  I think it was, he was, wasn't he happy about that?
[51:59.170 --> 52:00.990]  Now we read his story and now we mentioned Trump.
[52:01.150 --> 52:01.870]  We just mentioned who?
[52:02.330 --> 52:02.910]  Uh, exactly.
[52:03.350 --> 52:03.410]  Oh, Trump.
[52:03.650 --> 52:03.770]  Oh.
[52:03.850 --> 52:06.290]  I don't think we mentioned him by, did we mention him by name in the show?
[52:06.370 --> 52:09.270]  I don't think we've mentioned Trump today on, on, it's been a Trump free show.
[52:09.430 --> 52:14.090]  Although if you're interested in Trump, uh, you could tune into WBAI an hour and a half earlier before our show.
[52:14.230 --> 52:20.090]  And, uh, you can, uh, hear our colleagues at Trump watch our devoted, uh, our Trump devoted show.
[52:20.570 --> 52:22.830]  Anyway, we have, uh, we have a call coming in.
[52:23.090 --> 52:24.890]  Um, let's see what What they have on their mind.
[52:25.010 --> 52:25.490]  Good evening.
[52:25.690 --> 52:26.270]  You're on Off The Hook.
[52:27.710 --> 52:28.030]  Hey, hey!
[52:28.550 --> 52:30.430]  Long time listener, few time caller.
[52:30.730 --> 52:31.670]  Glad to hear you guys.
[52:31.850 --> 52:33.570]  So far, the show is doing great.
[52:34.290 --> 52:34.650]  Excellent.
[52:34.770 --> 52:35.210]  What's on your mind?
[52:36.030 --> 52:37.190]  I just wanted to say hi.
[52:37.390 --> 52:41.250]  I also wanted to just let you guys know it's been a long time.
[52:41.310 --> 52:43.310]  I really had a chance to listen to you guys again.
[52:43.490 --> 52:44.270]  It's nice hearing you all.
[52:44.870 --> 52:47.330]  Nice hearing the quality is still great, of course.
[52:48.290 --> 52:53.850]  I just wanted to plug out Lanechan.jp and to check out our LaneZine as well.
[52:54.730 --> 52:55.170]  Excellent.
[52:55.330 --> 52:56.290]  Well, thank you for your call.
[52:56.470 --> 52:57.710]  And thank you for your kind words.
[52:58.870 --> 53:00.050]  Man, that was cool.
[53:00.430 --> 53:02.710]  Everyone who's calling the show should basically...
[53:02.710 --> 53:06.550]  Can we arrange for everyone calling to just say a bunch of nice stuff about us?
[53:07.230 --> 53:09.110]  It doesn't usually happen like that.
[53:09.370 --> 53:10.810]  Well, we'll see who comes in next.
[53:10.930 --> 53:13.470]  347-335-0818.
[53:13.730 --> 53:16.130]  I think that's my favorite caller in all the time I've been doing the show.
[53:17.690 --> 53:19.750]  There's a little more listener email.
[53:19.750 --> 53:22.850]  Pico writes, Malware Tech got pretty wrong casted.
[53:22.970 --> 53:27.450]  It seems cruel to see how quickly he became cast as the bad person.
[53:27.630 --> 53:32.350]  I feel it's safe to say some people collected some bank by help of his disclosure on the BitLocker Mirai.
[53:33.270 --> 53:38.350]  Leading to a link on MalwareTech.com talking about Mirai, which I'm sure you could search for and get hold of.
[53:39.230 --> 53:40.810]  Bonus, not necessarily air question.
[53:41.010 --> 53:42.730]  Well, now it's on the air, so deal with it.
[53:42.730 --> 53:43.970]  How about Reality Winner?
[53:44.070 --> 53:45.650]  She got her story buried pretty quickly.
[53:46.490 --> 53:57.410]  Well, actually, a story just came out that it turns out that the election workers whose machines were targeted did not know about this until the story came out.
[53:57.410 --> 54:06.050]  And, like, when the story came out, lots of people were saying, like, oh, this is so inconsequential, like, quote, unquote, everybody knew that the records were hacking.
[54:06.230 --> 54:09.990]  But the fact that they attested to not knowing about this, the people affected it.
[54:10.210 --> 54:19.470]  And it's also strange that the security community, the intelligence community would keep it secret from the election workers, which kind of speaks to the over-classification.
[54:20.450 --> 54:20.890]  Interesting.
[54:21.290 --> 54:26.890]  Well, the switchboard is decidedly dark at the moment, so I'll quickly mention this other news story that I thought was very interesting.
[54:26.890 --> 54:27.510]  It's from Wired.
[54:27.910 --> 54:34.990]  A group of researchers from the University of Washington has shown for the first time that it's possible to encode malicious software into physical strands of DNA.
[54:35.410 --> 54:42.850]  So that when a gene sequencer analyzes it, the resulting data becomes a program that corrupts gene sequencing software and takes control of the underlying computer.
[54:42.850 --> 54:43.850]  This is so cyberpunk.
[54:44.130 --> 54:56.030]  While that attack is far from practical for any real spy or criminal, it's one of the researchers argue could become more likely over time as DNA sequencing becomes more commonplace, powerful, and performed by third-party services on sensitive computer systems.
[54:56.610 --> 54:58.810]  You could have malware encoded into your very DNA.
[54:58.930 --> 54:59.470]  Well, it's true, actually.
[54:59.550 --> 55:02.950]  And, in fact, you know, we actually deal with some clients that deal with DNA sequencing.
[55:04.330 --> 55:08.530]  And, you know, sometimes, you know, DNA sequencing is shared between third parties.
[55:08.650 --> 55:17.310]  So it is quite possible that one could decidedly or just rather decide to infect another, you know, through the sharing of this particular type of DNA sequencing.
[55:17.310 --> 55:18.530]  So I saw that story.
[55:18.590 --> 55:19.910]  I thought it was really fascinating.
[55:20.090 --> 55:21.030]  I'm glad you brought it up.
[55:21.410 --> 55:25.490]  I want to bring up one other question to Lorenzo, too, while we still have a couple of minutes.
[55:25.730 --> 55:25.870]  Sure.
[55:26.470 --> 55:32.850]  The reality winter story and how it sort of dissipated into nothingness is what made me think of this.
[55:32.970 --> 55:35.410]  But, you know, you were in Milwaukee on Monday.
[55:36.070 --> 55:38.930]  Things are arguably going to keep happening in Milwaukee.
[55:39.150 --> 55:40.830]  Do you know if you're going to keep going back?
[55:41.010 --> 55:43.230]  Is Motherboard going to send you back to Wisconsin?
[55:43.890 --> 55:45.150]  Yeah, I think that's the plan.
[55:45.150 --> 55:53.750]  As long as, you know, there's nothing or there's no other, like, crazy story going on and we can afford to have me there, I think that's the idea.
[55:53.750 --> 55:57.610]  We, you know, we broke the story and we follow the story pretty closely.
[55:57.610 --> 56:12.010]  And I think that the main argument for us paying attention to this is not just that the case is interesting itself, is that as we spoke, as we explained in this show, it's just, you know, it could be a very dangerous precedent.
[56:12.990 --> 56:24.050]  If all of a sudden, people that just write code get ensnared in criminal charges because someone else picks it up and uses it, that could open a Pandora's box.
[56:25.550 --> 56:34.690]  And, yeah, and more to that point, it's also, it's just, this just seems to be a story where we don't know the most important points and the most important parts yet.
[56:34.690 --> 56:35.310]  That's right.
[56:35.450 --> 56:36.590]  It's going to be teased out.
[56:36.770 --> 56:39.590]  Well, we hope that you guys continue to do some excellent reporting on it.
[56:39.670 --> 56:41.250]  We're so happy that you broke this story.
[56:42.070 --> 56:43.770]  It really had a spillover effect.
[56:44.010 --> 56:45.890]  And lots of people are following this.
[56:45.970 --> 56:47.110]  Our listeners are following it.
[56:47.490 --> 56:50.090]  And you're a man with a lot on your plate as well.
[56:50.210 --> 56:53.430]  You, I don't know how you write so prolifically every week.
[56:53.430 --> 56:55.670]  You seem to have really interesting stories coming out.
[56:57.030 --> 57:01.070]  Keep up the good work, Lorenzo, and we're so happy to have had you here this evening.
[57:01.070 --> 57:03.650]  Thank you so much for coming in and spending some time with us.
[57:03.730 --> 57:04.190]  Thank you.
[57:04.250 --> 57:04.590]  My pleasure.
[57:04.830 --> 57:05.230]  Absolutely.
[57:05.390 --> 57:10.390]  We've been speaking with Lorenzo Franceschi Bicari from Vice Motherboard.
[57:10.710 --> 57:16.830]  That's at, let's see, motherboard.vice.com is the web address where you can find this.
[57:17.030 --> 57:19.130]  We can find you on Twitter at LorenzoFB.
[57:19.870 --> 57:23.430]  Anywhere else you would like our listeners to know about, where they can find your work?
[57:24.410 --> 57:25.410]  Yeah, that's all.
[57:25.510 --> 57:30.370]  And like I have all, you know, if anyone has any suggestions or tips, they're all welcome.
[57:30.370 --> 57:33.290]  And you can find all ways to contact me via Twitter.
[57:34.490 --> 57:34.750]  Excellent.
[57:35.170 --> 57:38.350]  Well, we'll wrap things up here.
[57:38.530 --> 57:40.070]  It's been an interesting episode.
[57:40.430 --> 57:43.490]  We'll definitely keep an eye on the stories we've talked about.
[57:43.610 --> 57:44.950]  Send us email with your thoughts.
[57:45.210 --> 57:50.230]  O-T-H at 2600 dot... O-T-H at 2600 dot com.
[57:51.830 --> 57:58.370]  Get us on Twitter, Hacker Radio Show, and just keep doing what you do in interesting ways.
[57:58.370 --> 58:00.390]  For Off The Hook, this is Rob T.
[58:00.510 --> 58:00.810]  Firefly.
[58:01.050 --> 58:02.070]  Have a very good week.
[58:03.110 --> 58:04.830]  Have you heard it on the news?
[58:05.890 --> 58:07.750]  About this fascist groove thing.
[58:09.210 --> 58:11.030]  Evil men with racist views.
[58:12.450 --> 58:14.070]  Spreading all across the land.
[58:15.430 --> 58:17.630]  Don't just sit there on your ass.
[58:18.470 --> 58:20.470]  And look that funky chain dance.
[58:21.750 --> 58:23.570]  Brothers, sisters, shoot your best.
[58:23.570 --> 58:27.370]  We don't need this fascist groove thing.
[58:27.930 --> 58:33.150]  Brothers, sisters, we don't need the fascist groove thing.
[58:35.330 --> 58:39.190]  Brothers, sisters, we don't need the fascist food.
[58:40.530 --> 58:42.510]  History will repeat itself.
[58:43.790 --> 58:45.710]  Crisis point, we're near the hour.
[58:47.230 --> 58:48.910]  Counterforce will do no good.
[58:50.290 --> 58:51.990]  Heart to us, I feel your power.
[58:53.550 --> 58:55.110]  Hitler proved that funky stuff.
[58:56.150 --> 58:58.290]  It's not for you and me, girl.
[58:58.410 --> 58:59.370]  No, no, no.
[58:59.370 --> 59:01.470]  Europe's an unhappy land.
[59:02.110 --> 59:04.710]  We've had the fascist food thing.
[59:05.990 --> 59:11.090]  Brothers, sisters, we don't need the fascist food thing.
[59:11.830 --> 59:17.470]  Brothers, sisters, we don't need the fascist food thing.
[59:31.280 --> 59:33.240]  Democrats are out of par.
[59:34.140 --> 59:36.200]  Across the worldwide ocean.
[59:37.740 --> 59:39.400]  Regan's president-elect.
[59:40.720 --> 59:42.480]  Fascist guard in motion.
[59:43.940 --> 59:45.740]  Generals tell him what to do.
[59:46.820 --> 59:48.820]  Stop your good time dancing.
[59:50.340 --> 59:52.080]  Train their guns on me and you.
[59:53.440 --> 59:55.300]  Fascist and advancing.
[59:56.520 --> 59:58.540]  Sisters, brothers, lend a hand.
[59:59.860 --> 01:00:01.380]  Increase our population.
[01:00:02.960 --> 01:00:04.820]  Grab that green thing by the throat.
[01:00:06.000 --> 01:00:07.840]  And throw it in the ocean.
[01:00:09.300 --> 01:00:11.260]  You're real tonight, you move my soul.
[01:00:12.540 --> 01:00:14.300]  Let's cruise on on the dance floor.
[01:00:15.540 --> 01:00:17.720]  Come out your house and dance your dance.
[01:00:18.820 --> 01:00:20.760]  Shake that fascist groove thing.
[01:00:21.440 --> 01:00:21.920]  Shake it.
[01:00:21.920 --> 01:00:27.180]  Brothers, sisters, we don't need the fascist groove thing.
[01:00:28.140 --> 01:00:33.620]  Brothers, sisters, we don't need the fascist groove thing.
[01:00:40.760 --> 01:00:46.320]  Brothers, sisters, we don't need the fascist groove thing.