[00:00.450 --> 00:03.130] You're listening to WBAI New York. [00:03.290 --> 00:05.110] Stay strong and keep listening. [00:07.190 --> 00:08.690] This is Julian Assange. [00:08.810 --> 00:09.110] Hi, Julian. [00:09.310 --> 00:12.350] And you're listening to Off the Hook at WBAI New York. [00:12.490 --> 00:13.610] Okay, yes, Julian. [00:13.610 --> 00:14.470] This is Julian Assange. [00:14.550 --> 00:15.390] Julian, enough already. [00:15.910 --> 00:17.610] Thank you very much for stopping by, though. [00:17.830 --> 00:18.530] It's 8 o'clock. [00:18.650 --> 00:22.670] Yes, as he said, you are listening to Off the Hook here on WBAI New York. [00:22.810 --> 00:27.270] The time is just about 8 o'clock, it looks like. [00:27.270 --> 00:33.210] And that means it's time for another exciting edition of Off the Hook. [00:38.400 --> 01:00.190] The telephone keeps ringing So I ripped it off the wall I cut myself while shaving Now I can't make a call We couldn't get much worse Good, bon diddly bon But the best is paid for worse I hope that's understood Bon diddly bon [02:23.380 --> 02:25.640] And a very good evening to everybody. [02:25.640 --> 02:27.080] The program is Off the Hook. [02:27.080 --> 02:28.140] Emmanuel Goldstein here with you. [02:28.240 --> 02:31.660] Joined tonight by Kyle. [02:32.560 --> 02:33.780] Yeah, I'm joining you. [02:35.220 --> 02:36.100] And Alex. [02:36.560 --> 02:37.640] I am joined. [02:37.880 --> 02:38.300] Rob T. [02:38.480 --> 02:38.920] Firefly. [02:39.220 --> 02:39.900] Good evening. [02:39.960 --> 02:41.780] Wait a minute, hold on a second, so I'm going to press the wrong button there. [02:41.820 --> 02:42.280] Go ahead again. [02:42.580 --> 02:43.040] Good evening. [02:43.540 --> 02:44.120] And Voltaire. [02:44.520 --> 02:44.940] Hello. [02:45.140 --> 02:49.080] We went from a couple of people last week to the whole full room now. [02:49.200 --> 02:49.820] That's amazing. [02:50.140 --> 02:55.280] And hopefully the pledges that come in will be reflected by your presence. [02:56.560 --> 02:57.960] Why is everyone giving me funny looks? [02:58.820 --> 02:59.540] It's like... [02:59.920 --> 03:00.660] Just the usual. [03:00.960 --> 03:01.460] Am I annoyed? [03:01.560 --> 03:02.760] Is the sound of my voice annoying you? [03:03.340 --> 03:04.600] No more than usual. [03:04.760 --> 03:04.820] Okay. [03:04.900 --> 03:05.920] No less either, though. [03:06.540 --> 03:07.460] Well, thank you for that. [03:08.680 --> 03:09.360] Yeah, okay. [03:09.500 --> 03:13.000] Well, I think everything is in order here. [03:14.480 --> 03:17.260] Yeah, just another lovely day at WPAI. [03:17.960 --> 03:20.400] I have my nice Havana cigar right here. [03:22.040 --> 03:23.340] That's what that is. [03:23.780 --> 03:24.260] Okay. [03:24.440 --> 03:24.640] No. [03:25.560 --> 03:30.960] There were a bunch of Cuban embassy people downstairs hooking something up. [03:31.000 --> 03:32.300] And now I think I know what they were doing. [03:32.500 --> 03:34.700] They were trying to torture us. [03:35.160 --> 03:38.620] This is the sound that came out of Havana, the mystery sound. [03:38.620 --> 03:39.500] Somebody recorded it. [03:39.700 --> 03:49.840] They're accusing the Cuban government, or the Trump administration at least, is accusing the Cuban government of having a mystery sound that allegedly will drive people crazy. [03:50.080 --> 03:57.060] And we have the extended mix of it, apparently, permanently wired into the WPAI transmitter. [03:57.380 --> 03:58.980] I knew something was weird. [03:59.220 --> 04:01.400] And actually, can I stop us right here for a second? [04:02.360 --> 04:04.680] I think most people are trying to stop us right now. [04:04.680 --> 04:04.900] Yeah. [04:05.140 --> 04:05.480] I think so. [04:05.620 --> 04:06.860] Is that a puddle on the floor? [04:07.620 --> 04:08.320] Well, no. [04:08.560 --> 04:09.840] That was here when I got here. [04:09.960 --> 04:10.600] Are you sure about that? [04:11.060 --> 04:11.560] Believe me. [04:11.640 --> 04:13.720] This didn't cause any incontinence that I know about? [04:13.880 --> 04:14.500] Here's the thing. [04:14.600 --> 04:14.780] Okay. [04:15.920 --> 04:17.320] We can turn it down. [04:17.460 --> 04:18.480] We can turn it down. [04:19.100 --> 04:20.440] If people call to pledge. [04:20.540 --> 04:21.140] No, I'm kidding. [04:21.300 --> 04:21.880] I'm kidding. [04:22.160 --> 04:25.360] But if you were to do that, 516-620-3602. [04:25.540 --> 04:26.400] Just think about it. [04:26.500 --> 04:29.800] Think about the freedom we have here to play this horrible noise on the radio. [04:31.100 --> 04:34.020] And what commercial station would ever allow you to do that? [04:34.820 --> 04:35.680] Think about that. [04:35.980 --> 04:36.500] Think about that. [04:37.220 --> 04:37.820] That's true. [04:37.960 --> 04:40.460] Outside of, you know, Cuban shortwave or something like that. [04:40.640 --> 04:42.880] You're not going to hear this for an extended period. [04:43.160 --> 04:43.340] Yeah. [04:43.560 --> 04:44.480] It's not so bad. [04:44.660 --> 04:46.140] We can go the whole hour like this. [04:46.240 --> 04:47.580] I don't want people complaining about Havana. [04:47.800 --> 04:48.340] You know, it's... [04:49.120 --> 04:50.380] It's like going to the dentist. [04:50.680 --> 04:51.820] It is like going to the dentist. [04:51.820 --> 04:51.900] Yeah. [04:51.960 --> 04:59.240] This reminds me, excuse me, a lot of sort of Northern Virginia, 2004, the cicadas. [04:59.580 --> 04:59.980] Yeah. [05:00.260 --> 05:02.440] They sound very serious down there. [05:02.700 --> 05:03.260] It is very... [05:03.260 --> 05:04.380] It's like insect-like. [05:04.560 --> 05:06.100] It has that... [05:08.160 --> 05:08.960] It's not that bad. [05:09.020 --> 05:11.780] I do have to say, though, it is fairly annoying. [05:12.000 --> 05:12.260] Yeah. [05:12.360 --> 05:13.000] It is fairly annoying. [05:13.000 --> 05:15.840] And imagine it's hitting you in different ways. [05:16.060 --> 05:17.420] I mean, this is sort of filtered. [05:17.760 --> 05:23.480] This is, I believe, from the analysis that AP did over the weekend or released parts of it. [05:23.700 --> 05:28.300] And it very well may be different when you're actually being exposed. [05:28.300 --> 05:29.320] Oh, who turned it off? [05:30.060 --> 05:30.580] Whoa. [05:31.540 --> 05:32.820] Somebody's messing with us. [05:32.920 --> 05:34.400] Somebody turned off the annoying sound. [05:34.580 --> 05:35.620] Why would you do that? [05:36.360 --> 05:37.740] We're trying to make a point here. [05:39.260 --> 05:39.780] Wow. [05:40.660 --> 05:42.500] So much for freedom of speech. [05:42.700 --> 05:43.940] You know, that was... [05:43.940 --> 05:44.800] Thank you. [05:44.960 --> 05:45.400] Thank you. [05:46.320 --> 05:50.060] I mean, for God's sake, people, if we can't do this, what's the point? [05:50.160 --> 05:50.940] What's the point of any of it? [05:51.120 --> 05:57.740] But what I would like, you know, because this sound has been making its way around the net, is for somebody to analyze it for us. [05:57.780 --> 05:59.940] We're going to play a few seconds without us babbling over it. [06:00.060 --> 06:07.500] And maybe somebody with a spectrum analyzer or some kind of way of figuring things out can dissect this and tell us exactly what it is. [06:07.500 --> 06:11.240] Yeah, particularly what it might be used in conjunction with. [06:11.440 --> 06:14.160] And this is probably some of the investigative work that's going on. [06:14.260 --> 06:22.000] But basically, what would these sounds be attributed to that might be out of the spectrum that you can hear? [06:22.360 --> 06:36.680] Because what that would point to is a typosonic device that is outside of the audible spectrum, but has parts of its signal that dip into it on one or the other end, either the infra or ultrasonic band. [06:37.540 --> 06:41.540] And that's where you would use something akin to, like, a weapon. [06:43.080 --> 06:46.160] In a lot of ways, there's been some research around this. [06:46.160 --> 06:55.380] It's low, very low, low-frequency sounds as well as ultrasonic, which would be a little bit different than the ones used in the medical field, but the same philosophy. [06:55.640 --> 07:00.200] Well, let's let people listen and enjoy the sound just for a few uninterrupted seconds. [07:00.200 --> 07:04.320] And then we'll come back with another exciting edition of Off the Hook. [07:13.220 --> 07:16.080] Well, maybe this will make the Empire State Building people blink, you know? [07:18.560 --> 07:25.220] You're causing people to go crazy through our transmitters, through our antennae, or whatever it is they own over there. [07:26.840 --> 07:28.980] But, yeah, don't cross your fingers on that. [07:28.980 --> 07:33.520] This thing is really annoying, but, you know, has anybody ever thought that there may be a very innocent explanation for this? [07:33.660 --> 07:36.260] Has anyone ever tried to Shazam this, by any chance? [07:36.260 --> 07:38.240] Well, you shocked me into silence. [07:38.680 --> 07:39.420] I know, yeah. [07:39.760 --> 07:41.000] Because, you know, I suspect... [07:41.000 --> 07:41.960] What, Shazam is gonna pick... [07:41.960 --> 07:43.420] Well, you can try it. [07:43.520 --> 07:44.820] I've gotten Shazam on my phone. [07:45.020 --> 07:49.740] Well, this could just be something as innocent as a new Philip Glass track. [07:50.560 --> 07:51.580] Oh, that's nice. [07:51.620 --> 07:52.260] That's good. [07:52.460 --> 07:53.680] Oh, you're proud of yourself there? [07:53.780 --> 07:54.780] How long have you been holding that one in? [07:55.100 --> 07:56.000] About a half hour. [07:56.120 --> 07:56.420] Wow. [07:56.720 --> 07:56.980] Okay. [07:57.840 --> 07:59.940] Sounds more like Steve Reich, actually, but... [07:59.940 --> 08:00.940] Yeah, I guess. [08:01.060 --> 08:01.760] I guess you would know. [08:01.880 --> 08:04.720] You like these kinds of weird, modern musicians. [08:04.720 --> 08:06.460] Yeah, I'm weird that way. [08:06.540 --> 08:08.180] You're a 21st century man. [08:08.280 --> 08:09.320] All that long hair music. [08:09.600 --> 08:10.420] Yeah, no question. [08:10.780 --> 08:15.680] Okay, well, we have a bit to talk about tonight, in addition to Crazy Annoying Sounds. [08:16.280 --> 08:18.440] Which, think about it. [08:18.440 --> 08:20.980] Why would someone do this, exactly? [08:21.640 --> 08:25.760] What's the end game here, just to drive people out of their minds? [08:26.040 --> 08:27.460] There's so many ways to do that. [08:27.680 --> 08:29.940] Well, it's a very weird thing. [08:30.220 --> 08:37.160] And the investigation of this seems to have been somewhat stalled by mutual diplomatic recriminations. [08:37.320 --> 08:40.840] I guess I didn't need the word mutual there, because that's what recriminations means. [08:40.840 --> 08:42.700] It could be something unintentional. [08:42.840 --> 08:50.680] It could be some kind of electronic device that is going haywire, that people can't seem to track down and figure out what's causing the noise. [08:50.820 --> 08:51.380] It's very hard. [08:51.440 --> 08:53.560] Have you ever tried to find a cricket, you know? [08:53.740 --> 08:54.540] Oh, yes. [08:54.540 --> 09:00.200] On the island, many people have been, this year, infested with crickets inside their houses. [09:00.440 --> 09:05.340] And if you think you hear one, you go to where you think you'll find it, and you never will. [09:05.440 --> 09:07.360] And then it'll seem like it's coming from someplace else. [09:07.580 --> 09:07.900] Well... [09:07.900 --> 09:10.940] This could be some kind of really intelligent cricket type... [09:11.440 --> 09:16.140] This actually reminds me of a very funny story that I'll tell, you know, the 30-second version of. [09:16.280 --> 09:19.920] Because that sound also reminds me of the Annoyatron 2000. [09:20.000 --> 09:23.400] I think it may still be available from thinkgeek.com. [09:23.400 --> 09:28.840] I installed that in a colleague of mine's office, who's now actually one of my law partners. [09:29.060 --> 09:30.100] It drove him nuts. [09:30.200 --> 09:31.420] This is how you get your law partners? [09:31.720 --> 09:32.120] Yes. [09:32.120 --> 09:32.820] It drove him nuts. [09:32.980 --> 09:34.280] He didn't know where it was coming from. [09:34.280 --> 09:38.380] He took all the electronic devices outside of his office, took the batteries out and everything. [09:38.460 --> 09:40.060] I let him suffer for about five days. [09:40.260 --> 09:47.360] He got me back by reinstalling this in our new office, which was in the Grace Building on the 35th floor, and turning on... [09:47.360 --> 09:49.300] Why are you telling us exactly where your office is? [09:49.300 --> 09:50.160] It used to be there. [09:50.260 --> 09:50.800] It's not there now. [09:50.800 --> 09:51.040] Okay. [09:51.040 --> 09:51.480] All right. [09:52.400 --> 09:54.260] But it's relevant to the story. [09:54.380 --> 09:54.600] All right. [09:54.720 --> 09:57.560] He turned the cricket sound on and hid it in the radiator. [09:57.920 --> 09:59.940] I was way too busy to deal with the cricket. [10:00.000 --> 10:00.780] I knew he hid it somewhere. [10:01.000 --> 10:07.360] This cricket sound, unbeknownst to either of us, was radiating through the radiator and going into everybody else's office. [10:07.540 --> 10:11.200] They all thought there was a cricket somewhere on the 35th floor of the Grace Building. [10:11.380 --> 10:12.020] Which could happen. [10:12.020 --> 10:16.360] It would be unusual, but the office manager called in an exterminator. [10:16.440 --> 10:18.140] The exterminator came in to look at this. [10:18.320 --> 10:18.440] For a cricket? [10:18.580 --> 10:19.260] For one cricket? [10:19.540 --> 10:30.500] There was one sort of petty associate who was claiming that this was really distracting her from concentrating on various document reviews. [10:30.500 --> 10:30.960] Uh-huh. [10:31.060 --> 10:36.960] But it was pretty obvious that, you know, that this wasn't a real cricket to the exterminator. [10:37.640 --> 10:42.720] Then once the office manager got wind of that, she immediately pointed the finger at me. [10:42.720 --> 10:44.400] I must have installed something. [10:44.560 --> 10:45.560] It had to be you, Alex. [10:45.740 --> 10:46.800] You know, tell me who did this. [10:46.820 --> 10:48.440] Well, I mean, it's the obvious choice. [10:48.660 --> 10:49.020] Absolutely. [10:49.160 --> 10:51.120] But I didn't rat out my colleagues. [10:51.540 --> 10:54.920] They tried to make me pay for the exterminator, by the way. [10:55.280 --> 10:56.340] I told them to stuff it. [10:56.920 --> 11:00.640] But it seems like it could be something crazy like that. [11:01.140 --> 11:03.640] The sound is very, very similar to the Annoyatron. [11:03.740 --> 11:04.300] Yeah, it is. [11:04.340 --> 11:05.160] But it's... [11:06.040 --> 11:11.980] Unlike the Annoyatron, this was supposedly played at obscenely loud volumes and blasted at people. [11:12.860 --> 11:16.600] So, I mean, if we were playing that really, really loudly, it might be... [11:16.600 --> 11:17.880] You want to factor in the dynamics. [11:18.140 --> 11:25.180] Definitely, a lot of the people that were injured by this report the pressure and the intensity as being very, very loud. [11:25.920 --> 11:29.220] And that's where a lot of the damage, I think, was happening. [11:30.760 --> 11:40.660] But if you think about it, just one thing that kind of came to me is that we've only had normal, quote, normal diplomatic relations with Cuba reinstated for how long? [11:40.660 --> 11:42.120] Like less than six months? [11:42.280 --> 11:42.980] Less than a year? [11:43.160 --> 11:44.180] Has it been a full year? [11:44.340 --> 11:45.500] I can't even really remember. [11:45.600 --> 11:45.980] I don't think it's been a full year. [11:46.280 --> 11:46.440] Yeah. [11:46.620 --> 11:51.680] I mean, recall late in the Obama administration, we were just recently, you know, getting flights there and so on and so forth. [11:51.680 --> 12:13.440] So if the about-face for diplomatic relations with Cuba is kind of going the direction that has been threatened, it wouldn't surprise me there would be kind of a little bit of a retribution or like sort of an immediate about-face to relations that were sort of emerging in Cuba. [12:13.800 --> 12:17.480] Cubans would be like, all right, you're not going to be here, then, you know, good riddance. [12:17.480 --> 12:20.900] Well, or you could look at it a little bit differently. [12:21.440 --> 12:26.880] Every single legacy thing that Obama ever accomplished is being dismantled by the Trump administration. [12:26.880 --> 12:32.140] What better way to sow discontent than to make a mystery sound that nobody can track down? [12:32.440 --> 12:36.840] And that might ruin yet another thing that Obama accomplished. [12:37.060 --> 12:39.980] I don't want to sound too paranoid, but we can't discount that. [12:39.980 --> 12:45.380] Yeah, the Cuban government has to do everything that they can to like try cooperating in the investigation. [12:45.700 --> 12:52.900] So there's speculation that it could be a third-party government that would benefit from having worsened relations between the U.S. [12:52.900 --> 12:52.980] and the U.S. [12:52.980 --> 12:54.680] Well, the thing is, where were the noise? [12:54.820 --> 12:56.540] What kind of damn cricket sound? [12:56.800 --> 12:57.500] I'm sorry. [12:57.900 --> 12:58.300] I don't know. [12:58.300 --> 12:58.820] It's weird. [12:58.900 --> 12:59.600] I got used to it. [12:59.660 --> 13:00.400] I sort of miss it now. [13:00.860 --> 13:02.080] It's a YouTube thing. [13:02.080 --> 13:08.480] 2.4 million people have watched this video, which is hours long. [13:08.920 --> 13:10.600] It's 10 hours long of crickets. [13:11.200 --> 13:13.100] Can you believe that's what people watch on YouTube? [13:13.360 --> 13:14.360] Well, maybe they're not watching it. [13:14.360 --> 13:14.540] Yes. [13:14.640 --> 13:15.180] They have it on. [13:15.380 --> 13:15.860] Yes. [13:16.280 --> 13:23.160] But going back to this, I'm definitely with you, Voltaire, as far as the possibility of a third-party entity. [13:23.160 --> 13:38.580] To say nothing of internal actions, as you implied, E, but we've seen Cuba be used as a proxy or a foil before, a la the Cuban Missile Crisis. [13:38.980 --> 14:03.440] So it's not outside the realm of possibility that actors could be in Cuba sort of spoofing the Cuban government or putting them in a position to have to investigate something and everybody sort of being not in the know and this third party sort of basically getting away with it in a country that might not have the intelligence resources to see, [14:03.660 --> 14:07.420] to attribute them to this as a third party in that country. [14:07.860 --> 14:10.840] Well, here's the other weird thing from some of the reports as well. [14:10.840 --> 14:30.200] Well, the advice that, I guess it's DSS, the Diplomatic Security Services, has been telling people in Cuba is that if you have this, if you hear the sound, if you think you're under attack, one thing we learned from, I think it was an AP report, was that certain people have been given devices that may record the sound, [14:30.220 --> 14:36.920] but then others have been told to move away from a certain area because they don't think the sound can follow you. [14:36.920 --> 14:40.020] But that's what's very odd to me as well. [14:40.280 --> 14:55.200] Because some people have reported hearing this in one portion of a room and moving to the other portion of the room and not hearing it anymore, which would indicate that the origin of the sound was perhaps placed into a room or broadcast through a window. [14:55.760 --> 14:56.140] Yeah. [14:56.340 --> 15:01.420] And identifying who's doing that at any particular time shouldn't be all that difficult. [15:02.400 --> 15:15.580] I know from reading up on this, a hotel owner named Benjamin Horne, out on the West Coast, was trying to track down a similar sound at the hotel that he, the Great Northern Hotel that he owns in Twin Peaks. [15:15.880 --> 15:15.980] Oh, I've been there. [15:15.980 --> 15:19.880] And they were trying to track down the sound inside the hotel. [15:19.980 --> 15:21.260] And I don't think they ever were able to do it. [15:21.320 --> 15:30.200] In fact, I don't think we ever got a firm answer on that and so many other things as to exactly what the conclusion was, but that's a whole other issue. [15:30.880 --> 15:35.600] The strange sounds are things that, you know, prevail a lot in our society. [15:35.780 --> 15:40.360] This is a particularly aggressive one, but I think we can figure it out. [15:40.580 --> 15:40.960] Yeah. [15:41.020 --> 15:52.340] It'll be interesting to see what kind of signals are captured by people with the type of device that is sensitive enough to get a little bit more scientific understanding of what it is. [15:52.340 --> 16:06.760] The fact that it's directional, too, kind of implies that it would be a temporary installation, something that was set up specifically for one building or one part of a building, and that when you do move away, you're outside of that sort of temporary install. [16:06.900 --> 16:26.520] To permanently install something that could comprehensively emit this, I think would be prohibitively expensive over a large area and also unwelcome as far as establishing a diplomatic neighborhood if the entire thing was susceptible to something like this all the time. [16:26.700 --> 16:27.380] Well, that's true. [16:27.620 --> 16:43.060] The other thing to think about as well is if we don't know who has done this now, it means that we don't have things like CCTV data about who may be broadcasting this from a particular location, all the perpetrators would have to do is simply stop and then pick it up, [16:43.140 --> 16:47.060] let's say, six months, a year, two years from now to evade detection. [16:47.260 --> 16:47.660] Yeah. [16:47.660 --> 16:48.280] It wouldn't be that difficult. [16:48.480 --> 16:49.520] It could be coming from anywhere. [16:49.840 --> 16:52.540] They don't have to reassemble it there. [16:52.880 --> 16:54.320] It could be coming from space. [16:54.540 --> 16:54.740] Mm-hmm. [16:55.140 --> 16:55.340] Mm-hmm. [16:55.580 --> 16:55.900] Yes. [16:56.260 --> 16:57.960] Or the middle of the earth. [16:58.600 --> 16:59.800] We just don't know. [17:00.560 --> 17:01.060] All right. [17:01.160 --> 17:10.460] Well, one thing we do know is that we're here doing another fundraising edition, and we need people to call up and pledge support to the kinds of things that we do. [17:10.940 --> 17:12.880] Sometimes we talk about serious things. [17:12.980 --> 17:14.340] Sometimes we don't talk about serious things. [17:14.440 --> 17:16.080] Tonight happens to be a particularly serious show. [17:17.560 --> 17:21.780] So, you know, sometimes we balance it out in different ways. [17:22.400 --> 17:36.720] If you support that kind of radio, if you support something that you do not hear on commercial radio or even a lot of other non-commercial stations, then why not give a call and pledge whatever you can afford to WBAI so that this radio station will continue to exist. [17:36.720 --> 17:39.120] We're facing all kinds of challenges, as always. [17:40.060 --> 17:45.920] A couple of million dollars in judgment against us for the Empire State Building, trying to work that out. [17:47.180 --> 17:55.820] We've faced so many challenges over the decades, many of which were before my time, but it's inspiration that you draw from seeing how people got past it. [17:55.820 --> 18:08.780] And when you consider what WBAI is, it's really a couple of hundred people, a couple of hundred volunteers that get together and put out radio in all different varieties. [18:09.260 --> 18:15.980] Unlike anything you'll hear on the FM dial here in New York City, unlike anything you'll hear on the FM dial almost anywhere else. [18:17.040 --> 18:30.020] So supporting that is something that I think is in all of our interest is because we are able to talk about things that would never make it to the airwaves, would never make it to the public otherwise, without that kind of access. [18:30.860 --> 18:32.380] And radio is something... [18:32.380 --> 18:43.920] We were talking about this last week, about how radio is this way of reaching people in an anonymous fashion, where you basically don't know who's listening. [18:44.200 --> 18:46.420] It could be a million people listening. [18:46.540 --> 18:47.700] There could be five people listening. [18:47.700 --> 18:48.560] We don't know. [18:48.700 --> 18:51.340] And if you're listening, we can prove that you are. [18:52.520 --> 18:55.080] Unlike on the internet where there are logs. [18:55.360 --> 19:01.980] You know, if you connect to something, unless you are very good at covering your tracks, there is a way to trace it back to you. [19:02.320 --> 19:16.420] But, you know, in times of war, in times of insurrection, hiding a transistor radio in a particular part of your house became the ultimate sign of resistance because it was a way of getting the news from a different source. [19:17.080 --> 19:19.220] And that's the freedom that we have here. [19:19.480 --> 19:31.280] Broadcasting off the Empire State Building, we're able to reach four different states and however millions of people that could choose to listen at any time to something that really might challenge their way of thinking. [19:31.480 --> 19:38.480] So, anyway, you can call 516-620-3602 and pledge your support to WBAI. [19:38.480 --> 19:52.220] What we are offering tonight is what we were offering last week, which is the Hope keynote series on either DVD or flash drive, your choice, for a pledge of $75. [19:52.280 --> 20:02.400] You'll get all the keynote addresses that we have had at the Hackers on Planet Earth conference, which has been taking place since 1994 at the Hotel Pennsylvania in New York City. [20:02.400 --> 20:05.100] We have another one coming up next year. [20:05.280 --> 20:08.100] You won't get that talk because it hasn't happened yet, but you'll get all the other ones. [20:08.500 --> 20:12.520] And you'll also get some bonus talks thrown in, some featured speakers. [20:13.500 --> 20:29.980] I want to play an excerpt of one of our speakers, our last keynote speaker, in fact, the most recent one in 2016, a certain Cory Doctorow, who has appeared on this radio show and writes for Boing Boing, works for the Electronic Frontier Foundation, is an amazing writer, [20:30.710 --> 20:35.660] and just all-in, clued-in person that really gets it. [20:35.760 --> 20:45.020] You can put a lot of this stuff in perspective, and I know this talk in particular, every part of it was really an education and simply eye-opening. [20:45.260 --> 20:45.860] Yes, yes. [20:45.860 --> 20:48.980] It really is succinct and says it like it is. [20:49.180 --> 21:11.900] And you'll get a video, full video of that talk, plus all the other keynote talks that we have presented, including people like Daniel Ellsberg and Edward Snowden, Jello Biafra, Wozniak was there, Steve Wozniak, Richard Stallman, all kinds of luminaries in the computer-slash-hacker world, [21:11.900 --> 21:15.340] and you'll get all kinds of other talks as well. [21:15.400 --> 21:19.000] That's for a pledge of $75 to 516-620-3602. [21:19.000 --> 21:32.680] You can also go to give2wbai.org, that's the number 2, give2wbai.org, and look for the help keynote series and choose either flash drive or DVD. [21:33.000 --> 21:42.880] And you can also text to 41444 with the letters WBAI if you want to make a recurring payment, however much you want to make per month. [21:43.160 --> 21:45.120] That's probably the easiest way to do that. [21:45.120 --> 21:51.560] Anyway, let's listen to a brief excerpt from the Cory Doctoral talk from last year, the HOPE conference. [21:51.740 --> 21:53.100] No, not that one. [21:53.240 --> 21:53.580] Sorry. [21:54.020 --> 21:56.460] No, that's a lot more pleasant sound. [21:56.880 --> 22:07.100] Now, the early pioneers of the net set out to build a decentralized open system to let anyone talk to anyone else without anyone being able to stop them. [22:07.480 --> 22:13.600] But along the way, we accidentally built the world's biggest surveillance system. [22:13.880 --> 22:26.600] A surveillance system that's so advanced that now, when there's a coup or an uprising, the chances are pretty good that rather than shut the internet off to stop the coup, the powers that be will leave it on to spy on it. [22:27.340 --> 22:29.820] Now, no one is the villain of their own story. [22:30.480 --> 22:45.800] The net's pioneers went from don't be evil to surveillance capitalism, not by twirling their mustache and deciding to sell out, but by taking one tiny compromise one step at a time, each one only a little distance from the last one. [22:45.940 --> 22:51.840] Because as humans, we cognitively really only sense relative differences, not absolute ones. [22:51.940 --> 22:57.980] You know that exercise where you have a black stripe or a grey stripe in between a black stripe and a white stripe. [22:58.020 --> 23:01.420] And if you cover the black stripe, the grey stripe looks lighter. [23:01.640 --> 23:03.620] And if you cover the white stripe, it looks darker. [23:03.620 --> 23:07.180] Because we really only sense the relative differences between things. [23:07.180 --> 23:16.420] And so when you make a little compromise, you evaluate the next compromise you're asked to make, not against the position you were in when you started, but against the position that you've come to. [23:16.720 --> 23:23.440] And any compromise can be arrived at in a series of sufficiently small steps that each one seems harmless. [23:24.400 --> 23:31.720] So there is this great project underway to reverse that, to harden the internet against surveillance, to re-decentralize it. [23:31.720 --> 23:46.740] And if we're going to prevent the network that we're building through the re-decentralization project to de-re-decentralize, then we need rules and tools to guard us from our future selves and our moments of weakness. [23:47.080 --> 23:53.240] The rules that will defend us now when we're pirates from the admirals that some of us will inevitably become. [23:54.320 --> 23:58.040] So on those lines, I'm going to propose two rules today. [23:58.040 --> 24:05.500] Two ironclad principles that we can evaluate any potential solution to any problem that we have in the future against. [24:05.500 --> 24:07.980] Rules that will make us fail gracefully. [24:08.420 --> 24:12.760] The first one is that computers should be designed to obey their owners. [24:13.140 --> 24:21.760] When a computer receives two conflicting instructions, one from its owner and one from a remote party, the owner should always win. [24:23.080 --> 24:30.380] The second principle is that true facts about computer security should always be legal to disclose. [24:30.780 --> 24:32.500] When people rely... [24:32.500 --> 24:32.940] Thank you. [24:38.340 --> 24:51.660] When people rely on a computer and you know that it isn't suitable for them to rely on it, there should never be a legal barrier to you telling those people that they can't trust the computer, that they're relying on them. [24:52.500 --> 25:06.740] And the way that we're going to make those stick, the way that we will armor ourselves against future moments of weakness, is by building them in to the legal code and the moral code of our network, by making them our principles and by making them our rules. [25:07.080 --> 25:08.600] We'll make them license terms. [25:08.780 --> 25:12.100] We'll make them conditions of membership and consortiums and standards bodies. [25:12.400 --> 25:14.820] We'll make them conditions of regulatory approval. [25:15.060 --> 25:33.640] At EFF, we've just asked the FDA to tell medical device manufacturers, implant manufacturers, that as a condition of having their devices certified to be put in people's bodies, they have to promise never to invoke Section 12.1 of the DMCA against security researchers who know true facts about the flaws in those devices. [25:34.660 --> 25:35.420] Thank you. [25:39.090 --> 25:53.590] We've asked the FCC to make that a condition of their new set-top box rules, so that as 80 million households transition from having those terrible cable boxes in their living rooms to having new independently certified boxes in their living rooms that can be made according to open standards, [25:53.790 --> 26:09.670] that the definition of open standard include that to comply with the standard, you have to make a legally binding promise never to attack people who know about flaws in those devices that are camera-equipped, microphone-equipped, that sit at the boundaries of our networks and that live in our living rooms. [26:10.290 --> 26:15.350] We should ask the Department of Transport to make that a condition of certifying firmware for cars. [26:16.210 --> 26:20.830] Every regulatory forum should have as a rule that you can never... [26:20.830 --> 26:27.190] as a condition of being approved for regulation, you can never threaten people who know true facts about the dumb mistakes you've made. [26:28.290 --> 26:43.610] We can incorporate these into the definition of open standards, and the Open Source Initiative, which is one of the great keepers of definitions, have in fact amended their definition of open standard to say that when you certify something through which the DMCA or laws like it can be invoked, [26:43.830 --> 26:57.010] it is not an open standard unless you also make everyone who implements that standard make a legally binding promise not to attack people who implement new features for it or people who discover and report flaws in it. [26:57.730 --> 27:00.910] Now, there's places where this is a live issue today. [27:01.290 --> 27:14.710] The World Wide Web Consortium is the very long-running and correctly respected organization that has been one of the forerunners of open standardization on the web and one of the great flag barriers for it. [27:14.790 --> 27:16.370] But they've made a dumb mistake. [27:16.730 --> 27:38.970] They've allowed the Hollywood studios and the major browser vendors to corner them into incorporating DRM into the core standards for HTML5, which is envisioned as a mechanism for replacing apps as the control interfaces for actuating and sensing tools as varied as airplanes and nuclear reactors to pacemakers and your home thermostat. [27:39.410 --> 27:53.470] And by incorporating DRM into that standard, they are potentially making them off-limits to external auditing, disclosure, and the addition of new features that unlock functionality that has been irrigated to the manufacturer at the expense of the user. [27:53.950 --> 27:56.330] We tried to get them not to do this at EFF. [27:56.350 --> 28:00.950] We joined the W3C and made a principled argument for them not to do it, and it fell on deaf ears. [28:01.210 --> 28:09.590] But we've since made another argument, which is that the W3C already has policies about other kinds of government-imposed monopolies. [28:09.690 --> 28:17.070] They have a patent policy that says that if you join the W3C, you have to promise never to use your patents to attack people who implement its standards. [28:17.610 --> 28:25.910] We've asked them to extend that policy to say that if you join the W3C to make DRM, you must promise never to use the rights that you get under statutes like the DMCA. [28:26.150 --> 28:30.010] And the DMCA has international equivalents all over the world because the U.S. [28:30.090 --> 28:38.370] trade representative is patient zero in an epidemic of internet law that has been spread to every country that America trades with. [28:40.230 --> 28:53.390] So we've asked them to adopt this as a rule that if the W3C makes a standard that gives you the right to sue people under one of those laws, they have to make you promise not to use it as a condition of participating in that standard. [28:53.590 --> 28:56.430] We tried to get it through in the last round of voting on this. [28:56.430 --> 28:57.170] We didn't get it through. [28:57.270 --> 29:00.470] Now we have a much larger constituency who have supported this. [29:00.690 --> 29:20.530] Organizations as diverse as Oxford University and the Royal National Institute for the Blind who are correctly worried that if you make it a felony to add functionality to tools within the manufacturer's consent that you will wall off people who want to add and extend functionality to allow for accessibility. [29:21.150 --> 29:24.210] And there are ways that I want you folks to help in this. [29:24.210 --> 29:26.290] This is a campaign that's live underway right now. [29:26.430 --> 29:27.730] It's occupying the majority of my time. [29:27.870 --> 29:30.550] And you can help in meaningful ways, in two ways. [29:30.770 --> 29:37.430] The first is, if you are a security researcher, please sign on to our petition asking the W3C to take this step. [29:37.570 --> 29:38.690] Ron Rivest has signed. [29:38.830 --> 29:40.250] The CORE TOUR team has signed. [29:40.330 --> 29:41.570] Bruce Schneier has signed. [29:41.690 --> 29:42.670] I want you to sign. [29:42.730 --> 29:45.210] And the way that you sign that petition is you send me an email. [29:45.510 --> 29:48.250] Corey at EFF.org. [29:48.390 --> 29:50.210] C-O-R-Y at EFF.org. [29:50.310 --> 29:50.970] Tell me your name. [29:51.490 --> 29:57.030] Tell me what country you're in because we want them to know how many different territories support this because it's the World Wide Web. [29:57.170 --> 30:01.730] And tell me if you have an institutional affiliation like a company or university that can accompany your name. [30:01.890 --> 30:03.610] And we will add you to that petition. [30:03.830 --> 30:05.430] And that petition, you should go look at it. [30:05.470 --> 30:06.970] It's long and awesome. [30:07.210 --> 30:25.450] It's full of some of my personal security heroes, all of whom have come together to tell the W3C that it is a terrible mistake and terrible for the future of the web to introduce a weapon that allows companies to punish security researchers who discover embarrassing mistakes that they've made. [30:26.010 --> 30:29.330] The other way that you can help is by auditing these implementations. [30:29.590 --> 30:30.450] So there are... [30:30.450 --> 30:33.250] The standard is called EME, encrypted media extensions. [30:33.610 --> 30:35.810] There are EME implementations already in the wild. [30:35.930 --> 30:37.430] The major browser vendors all have them. [30:37.670 --> 30:41.290] There's a Microsoft one, a Google one, an Apple one, and a Mozilla one. [30:41.970 --> 30:45.210] The Google one was just audited by an Israeli researcher. [30:45.210 --> 30:49.850] Israel is one of the only industrialized nations that doesn't have an analog to DMCA 1201. [30:50.030 --> 30:57.010] And this researcher discovered that it had showstopper bugs that he thinks might have existed since 2010, right? [30:57.170 --> 31:02.890] And as we know, requiring people not to disclose bugs doesn't mean that they don't get independently discovered. [31:02.950 --> 31:06.790] It just means that the last people to find out about them are the people who rely on them. [31:06.970 --> 31:17.410] So if you're looking for something to audit, we want you to take a good, hard look at these tools and then contact us if you find something that you worry will impose liability about disclosing it. [31:17.510 --> 31:20.190] Info at EFF.org is our intake address. [31:20.370 --> 31:32.810] And we want to hear from you if you find something in these because we want to be able to make the case to the W3C that they're living in a fool's paradise if they think that they can be secure by passing rules against auditing their own implementations. [31:35.850 --> 31:37.450] So we need... [31:37.450 --> 31:45.850] Your rule-breaking needs principles like these two principles that computers should obey their owners and that true facts about security should always be lawful to disclose. [31:46.250 --> 31:54.770] We need these simple minimum viable agreements, these rules for rule-breaking, principles that you can be so hardline on that they call you an extremist. [31:54.930 --> 32:01.930] If someone's not calling you an unrealistic utopian Puritan about these rules, you're not trying hard enough. [32:05.050 --> 32:06.030] Amen to that. [32:06.190 --> 32:09.550] That's Corey Doctorow speaking at the 11th HOPE Conference. [32:09.610 --> 32:11.330] It took place last July... [32:11.330 --> 32:13.470] Actually, July 2016 in New York City. [32:13.950 --> 32:16.290] And part of the package that we are offering tonight... [32:16.290 --> 32:24.270] And by the way, if you're scrambling to sign that petition, don't bother because actually W3C did not see the light. [32:24.270 --> 32:30.290] EFF actually resigned on September 18th from W3C membership. [32:30.650 --> 32:31.270] So that's... [32:31.270 --> 32:38.490] But you would have known about that so much earlier, watching that talk and hearing things that Corey was saying. [32:38.630 --> 32:45.290] Now, that's just one talk that we're offering tonight for a pledge of $75 to 516-620-3602. [32:45.770 --> 32:49.350] You'll get the video of that keynote address from our 2016 conference. [32:49.350 --> 32:55.670] You'll get video of every keynote address from all 11 of our conferences, plus some extra talks as well from featured speakers. [32:56.050 --> 33:08.510] Again, 516-620-3602, or go to www.givetowbai.org and look for the HOPE Conference keynote series. [33:09.730 --> 33:10.650] Amazing talk. [33:10.750 --> 33:12.650] Amazing talk that Corey gave at the conference. [33:13.570 --> 33:20.950] Just as inspiring non-live, you know, on recording, as it was, frankly, in person. [33:20.950 --> 33:22.350] I mean, it was great. [33:23.610 --> 33:25.370] You know, this is... [33:25.370 --> 33:32.030] I think of all of the annoying frequencies on the airwaves, including that one. [33:32.130 --> 33:35.070] You know, WBAI has got to be one of the least annoying. [33:36.010 --> 33:37.010] And, you know... [33:37.010 --> 33:39.230] You would get some arguments from some people. [33:39.230 --> 33:39.830] I know that. [33:40.050 --> 33:41.330] I could see that. [33:41.330 --> 33:41.730] But you know what? [33:41.750 --> 33:43.450] If you didn't, I'd be worried. [33:43.570 --> 33:45.610] I would be worried if we weren't annoying people. [33:46.270 --> 33:52.190] But we're annoying people with our thoughts, our ideas, our opinions, not just crappy sound. [33:53.070 --> 33:53.510] Absolutely. [33:53.710 --> 33:55.490] But this outlet, it's critical. [33:55.710 --> 33:58.710] It's crucial, like you said, you know, to beat a dead horse. [33:58.710 --> 34:01.330] But you're never going to hear this anywhere else. [34:01.550 --> 34:01.650] Yeah. [34:01.770 --> 34:05.490] I mean, the rest of the spectrum, frankly, is just total crap. [34:05.850 --> 34:08.270] Well, you know, I don't want to be too judgmental. [34:08.550 --> 34:08.910] There are some outliers. [34:08.950 --> 34:10.870] Yeah, there's some nice people that work for those places. [34:11.010 --> 34:12.410] But basically, they're big music boxes. [34:12.410 --> 34:14.570] Around this frequency as well. [34:14.750 --> 34:15.990] I mean, around 99.5. [34:16.190 --> 34:17.550] I mean, you get all these commercial stations. [34:17.750 --> 34:22.110] You know, this is really something that you stumble upon by accident, and it changes your life. [34:22.210 --> 34:22.330] Yeah. [34:22.410 --> 34:24.390] And that's another thing about radio that's unique. [34:24.390 --> 34:25.490] You stumble upon things. [34:25.670 --> 34:30.230] You can't really stumble upon a podcast because you're generally looking for it. [34:30.830 --> 34:37.130] Unless you type random numbers and letters into your browser and just pull up a random podcast. [34:37.130 --> 34:44.470] Maybe there's a random podcast thing that's out there where people wind up getting connected to all sorts of... [34:44.470 --> 34:46.670] I think it's called Narrowcast. [34:46.970 --> 34:48.050] Well, that's what we do. [34:48.310 --> 34:49.450] No, actually, that's not what we do. [34:49.510 --> 34:49.990] We broadcast. [34:50.270 --> 34:51.930] Narrowcasting is what podcasts do. [34:51.950 --> 34:55.010] Yeah, because it's going to a specific audience or an audience that has sought it out. [34:55.150 --> 34:55.770] Right, right. [34:55.950 --> 34:57.190] What we do is broadcast. [34:57.390 --> 35:01.670] But we have some narrow focusing within our broadcast schedule. [35:02.790 --> 35:04.150] Oh, that's true for sure. [35:04.350 --> 35:05.030] Yeah, definitely. [35:05.030 --> 35:06.430] As you might expect on any station. [35:06.430 --> 35:07.470] All kinds of specialists. [35:07.470 --> 35:13.170] Well, you wouldn't expect it on a commercial station because everything there is to cater to the biggest audience possible. [35:13.430 --> 35:17.950] Well, only, yeah, fundamentally different shows on a station. [35:18.090 --> 35:20.330] But yeah, here it's a lot deeper than that. [35:20.390 --> 35:25.450] Right, because what you have right now tuning in are people that are interested in the hacker world, people that are interested in technology. [35:25.970 --> 35:29.290] And the cooking show will have all kinds of people that are interested in... [35:29.290 --> 35:30.250] There's no cooking show. [35:30.630 --> 35:31.650] Why isn't there a cooking show, Kyle? [35:31.650 --> 35:32.330] Is there a cooking show? [35:32.350 --> 35:33.210] There probably is. [35:33.270 --> 35:34.910] Why can't there be a cooking show on the radio? [35:34.910 --> 35:37.030] At WBAI, I would not be surprised. [35:37.210 --> 35:37.790] It's probably in the works. [35:37.970 --> 35:39.030] Think how awesome it would be. [35:39.090 --> 35:42.230] And now you take two cups of sugar and you pour it in and you stir. [35:42.430 --> 35:44.310] It could have the bubbling sound in the background. [35:44.490 --> 35:45.530] What about a vegan cooking show? [35:46.070 --> 35:46.550] Why not? [35:46.770 --> 35:48.010] Why would I exclude vegan? [35:48.270 --> 35:54.090] Well, a lot of people don't know really that it's possible to cook that way and it might be interesting. [35:54.330 --> 35:57.830] Sounds like you got the pilot for the show right there. [35:57.890 --> 35:58.170] Go ahead. [35:58.270 --> 35:59.250] I'm going to go fill it out right now. [35:59.290 --> 35:59.770] I'll be right back. [35:59.950 --> 36:02.190] This is the kind of station where you can do something like that. [36:02.190 --> 36:09.710] And by pledging to 516-620-3602, you are keeping that door open for all kinds of future ideas. [36:10.030 --> 36:13.150] I'm sure everybody here can come up with an idea for a show that somebody else can do. [36:13.490 --> 36:16.070] Because we have more too busy to do it ourselves. [36:16.310 --> 36:18.810] But I'm sure there are all kinds of talented people out there. [36:18.850 --> 36:19.590] That's how we started. [36:19.990 --> 36:21.950] Just barged through the door and said, well, we not. [36:22.110 --> 36:27.610] But, you know, it's basically nobody was doing this kind of material and WBAI was open to it. [36:27.930 --> 36:28.870] Nobody else was. [36:29.270 --> 36:30.870] Yeah, it's pretty hot in the studio right now. [36:30.950 --> 36:31.910] Maybe we're the cooking show. [36:32.290 --> 36:32.890] Oh, yeah. [36:33.070 --> 36:33.410] Possibly. [36:33.610 --> 36:38.110] But no, I wanted to go back to that Cory Doctorow excerpt that we played. [36:38.250 --> 36:44.270] Because I think that exemplifies just the spirit of what we do, not only at Hope, but here at the station, on this program. [36:44.470 --> 36:50.110] Because Cory Doctorow is somebody, and I think this is known, he's somebody that we were trying to get to come to Hope for ages. [36:50.490 --> 36:51.970] And the man is insanely busy. [36:52.130 --> 36:53.370] He's got so much work he does. [36:53.370 --> 36:58.470] He's, as a writer, as a publisher, as you know, his work with EFF and things like that. [36:58.810 --> 37:05.810] And we've been trying to get him and finally got him after a long time of just trying and trying and trying. [37:06.370 --> 37:13.510] And that, yeah, it would have been easy to give up and just move on down the list to the next person who we were considering. [37:13.510 --> 37:27.930] But he was... his work and the way he puts things and his speech is something that we wanted to help put out there and just direct out into the world and to our community and to the people who come to our events. [37:27.950 --> 37:29.330] Because it's important to us. [37:29.490 --> 37:31.370] And at BAI, we can do that. [37:31.490 --> 37:40.250] We can take what we've got to contribute and add it to what this station has to offer to you, the listener, to the world in general. [37:40.730 --> 37:43.910] And, you know, we would not be allowed to do this elsewhere. [37:43.910 --> 37:48.050] We would have been forced to give up long ago had we been doing this elsewhere. [37:48.170 --> 37:59.630] So if you call 516-620-3602 or go to give2wbai.org and throw in what support you can to help keep us here doing what we do, it's more important now than ever. [37:59.790 --> 38:00.670] And, yes, we've said that a lot. [38:00.770 --> 38:06.990] But, yes, it's more important now than ever that we have your support and that we're able to keep things going around here. [38:07.070 --> 38:07.810] So become part of it. [38:07.810 --> 38:12.250] But 516-620-3602, give2wbai.org. [38:12.410 --> 38:16.630] And thanks to those people calling in and pledging all kinds of different amounts. [38:17.250 --> 38:27.410] Again, you will get a package with all of the keynote addresses from all 11 HOPE conferences that have taken place since 1994, plus some additional talks thrown in. [38:27.810 --> 38:35.770] Your choice, whether it's on DVDs or whether it's on a flash drive, just simply tell the operator at 516-620-3602 which you would prefer. [38:35.950 --> 38:47.530] Or if you're going to give2wbai.org, you can select either the HOPE keynote conference, HOPE conference keynote series flash drive or DVD for a pledge of $75. [38:47.870 --> 38:53.110] Again, the phone number 516-620-3602, website give2wbai.org. [38:54.630 --> 38:58.570] Now, we've offered all kinds of premiums in the past, and most of them have been sent out. [38:58.690 --> 39:01.470] Some are still in the process of being sent out. [39:01.650 --> 39:02.990] We got this letter from somebody. [39:03.150 --> 39:04.510] I received a parcel this past week. [39:04.510 --> 39:07.710] I think it's from a premium of you guys from some months ago. [39:07.830 --> 39:12.890] The problem is I'm a little leery of receiving packages due to unknown circumstances with our postal service. [39:12.890 --> 39:15.170] I'd like to know if this is your P.O. [39:15.190 --> 39:15.470] box. [39:15.610 --> 39:16.530] And they sent us our P.O. [39:16.530 --> 39:18.990] box number, which actually comes from a P.O. [39:18.990 --> 39:23.710] box in Middle Island, New York, because at 2600 we sent it out ourselves to make sure it got to the right people. [39:23.930 --> 39:26.970] So, yes, it is safe for you to go and get that package. [39:26.970 --> 39:29.290] It is from us, by all means. [39:29.890 --> 39:34.070] Ordinarily, you'd see WBAI's address, I believe, but in this case it was ours. [39:34.290 --> 39:35.210] Yes, yes. [39:35.550 --> 39:40.030] So, by all means, run down to the post office and get that package. [39:40.030 --> 39:46.910] You may have just inspired people to spoof your return address and send all kinds of nefarious things. [39:47.090 --> 39:49.930] Well, if people really want to go to that much trouble, yeah, that'll be... [39:49.930 --> 39:52.910] You've got to be careful about, you know, just giving blanket authorization to open packages. [39:52.910 --> 39:56.050] Well, you can check the postmark to make sure it actually did come from Middle Island. [39:56.230 --> 39:58.390] You know, maybe there's a way. [39:58.550 --> 40:05.110] Or I guess if they're really motivated, they'll drive to Middle Island and send their nefarious wares or whatever from there. [40:05.650 --> 40:08.390] You know, at some point you just have to give up and admit defeat. [40:08.650 --> 40:09.310] That's right. [40:10.030 --> 40:14.570] Another letter, which hopefully will lead to more interesting discussion, from Neil. [40:14.870 --> 40:19.050] I noted with interest last week your discussion of the concept of no one knows you're listening with radio. [40:19.290 --> 40:21.610] The same goes for satellite transmissions. [40:21.970 --> 40:27.230] During that discussion, HF numbers spy stations were mentioned. [40:27.970 --> 40:32.830] Did you know that simple, old, analog radio transmissions are still important to the U.S. [40:32.950 --> 40:33.230] as well? [40:33.230 --> 40:34.970] Every day, the U.S. [40:35.330 --> 40:38.970] military communicates one way to their aircraft via HF radio. [40:38.970 --> 40:41.950] You have no way of knowing where the receiving station is. [40:42.210 --> 40:47.310] These are coded and are called emergency action messages, EAMs. [40:47.630 --> 40:54.050] The more sensitive ones are prefixed with the words, Sky King, Sky King, do not answer. [40:55.070 --> 40:57.430] That's a good phrase to use. [40:57.610 --> 40:59.550] Sky King, Sky King, do not answer. [40:59.830 --> 41:00.970] Who is Sky King? [41:01.390 --> 41:02.750] Who is the Sky King? [41:02.750 --> 41:04.430] The people with air supremacy. [41:05.570 --> 41:06.050] Okay. [41:06.590 --> 41:06.770] Yes. [41:07.110 --> 41:08.310] So the North Koreans, I guess. [41:08.430 --> 41:20.730] In fact, those broadcast messages, I think, if I'm remembering correctly, I think it was 2015, I may have went to a talk in London at 44Con about spoofing those particular messages. [41:21.630 --> 41:23.930] So, yeah, really, really fascinating stuff. [41:23.930 --> 41:27.850] And the fact that it's a one-way transmission, I mean, that's just how radio works. [41:27.850 --> 41:35.250] And with respect to the number stations, it's designed, obviously, those were designed to keep us anonymous. [41:35.530 --> 41:38.770] And that is so incredibly important these days. [41:38.990 --> 41:40.570] And WBAI is under attack. [41:40.730 --> 41:44.130] Journalists are under attack by the president, by the administration. [41:44.670 --> 42:04.530] Journalists are literally under attack and being murdered in places like Malta, where you have a very prominent reporter recently killed by a car bomb, ostensibly for reporting about cronyism and corruption, and specifically with relation to the Panama Papers and the data that was derived from that, [42:04.570 --> 42:08.050] which is also something that we have talked about extensively at Hope. [42:08.050 --> 42:09.810] We've never talked about it at the Hope Conference. [42:09.950 --> 42:10.670] That's right. [42:10.850 --> 42:12.210] Yep, last year. [42:12.390 --> 42:13.250] It's all relevant. [42:13.250 --> 42:16.930] It's all something that, you know, we can talk about for hours and hours. [42:17.090 --> 42:22.650] And we just keep expanding the world that we encompass here, just in this one particular show. [42:23.150 --> 42:31.150] Imagine the other 23 hours of the day and the other 24 hours of the other six days, how much material gets broadcast over these radio waves. [42:31.330 --> 42:39.190] But to get back to what Neil was talking about here, the emergency action messages, a Sky King do not answer, the way the U.S. [42:39.310 --> 42:40.750] military communicates to their aircraft. [42:40.750 --> 42:45.050] He was kind enough to send us an excerpt of what this sounds like. [42:45.190 --> 42:45.610] Let's take a listen. [42:46.550 --> 42:47.390] Golf. [42:48.030 --> 42:48.930] Victor. [42:49.810 --> 42:50.670] Oscar. [42:51.550 --> 42:51.910] Quebec. [42:52.710 --> 42:53.370] Stand by. [42:54.310 --> 42:55.050] Lima. [42:55.670 --> 42:56.470] Hotel. [42:57.450 --> 42:58.250] Golf. [42:59.170 --> 42:59.910] Victor. [43:01.090 --> 43:01.770] Oscar. [43:02.790 --> 43:03.270] Quebec. [43:04.030 --> 43:04.850] Stand by. [43:05.690 --> 43:06.370] Lima. [43:07.070 --> 43:07.950] Hotel. [43:08.850 --> 43:09.530] Golf. [43:10.750 --> 43:11.250] Victor. [43:11.730 --> 43:12.870] Oscar. [43:14.410 --> 43:14.630] Oscar. [43:15.630 --> 43:16.350] Stand by. [43:16.670 --> 43:17.390] Message follows. [43:18.630 --> 43:19.070] Lima. [43:19.850 --> 43:20.510] Hotel. [43:21.450 --> 43:22.230] Golf. [43:23.230 --> 43:23.950] Victor. [43:24.830 --> 43:25.610] Oscar. [43:26.670 --> 43:27.130] Quebec. [43:28.130 --> 43:28.710] India. [43:29.930 --> 43:30.430] Delta. [43:31.790 --> 43:31.990] Delta. [43:33.030 --> 43:33.890] Whiskey. [43:34.590 --> 43:35.310] Seven. [43:36.170 --> 43:36.870] Romeo. [43:37.830 --> 43:38.530] Lima. [43:39.570 --> 43:40.190] Five. [43:40.630 --> 43:41.230] Victor. [43:42.010 --> 43:43.110] Victor. [43:44.410 --> 43:45.010] Papa. [43:45.690 --> 43:47.130] I say again. [43:47.870 --> 43:48.070] Four. [43:48.450 --> 43:48.910] Baldy. [43:49.330 --> 43:50.030] Twenty-seven. [43:50.910 --> 43:51.110] Four. [43:51.430 --> 43:51.890] Baldy. [43:52.310 --> 43:52.930] Twenty-seven. [43:53.910 --> 43:54.350] Lima. [43:55.190 --> 43:55.890] Hotel. [43:56.890 --> 43:57.550] Golf. [43:58.570 --> 43:59.230] Victor. [44:00.290 --> 44:00.830] Oscar. [44:01.790 --> 44:02.170] Quebec. [44:02.970 --> 44:03.830] India. [44:04.890 --> 44:05.390] Delta. [44:06.690 --> 44:06.910] Delta. [44:06.910 --> 44:07.090] Delta. [44:08.610 --> 44:08.970] Whiskey. [44:09.150 --> 44:09.490] Okay. [44:09.750 --> 44:11.330] Sorry, I didn't mind to jam him there. [44:11.510 --> 44:14.130] But if you were to jam him, that's how it would sound. [44:14.730 --> 44:14.750] Five. [44:14.970 --> 44:17.530] Wow, maybe that's what it is, a jamming device just for your thoughts. [44:17.930 --> 44:17.990] November. [44:18.690 --> 44:20.670] Okay, well, this guy seems harmless enough. [44:20.670 --> 44:24.490] We can leave him on in the background, talking via HF radio. [44:25.870 --> 44:27.410] Oh, did he stop? [44:27.930 --> 44:28.370] Okay. [44:30.910 --> 44:34.250] So, this kind of transmission still goes on to this day. [44:34.410 --> 44:42.230] And it's really the only effective way to get the information to somebody without them acknowledging that they are the recipient. [44:43.030 --> 44:45.450] So, as Neil says, hooray for good old analog radio. [44:45.590 --> 44:48.750] Keeps the world safe from accidentally dropping bombs, or so we hope. [44:48.750 --> 44:54.650] Also, as a side note, the BBC transmits via a very old transmitter on longwave. [44:54.770 --> 44:55.750] You guys ever listen to longwave? [44:56.710 --> 44:58.490] 198 kilohertz, 24-7. [44:58.810 --> 45:00.610] Nobody in the States has a longwave radio. [45:01.030 --> 45:04.730] Believe it or not, our smart car has a longwave radio, but nothing broadcasts on it. [45:05.410 --> 45:10.890] It was revealed a few years ago the UK's nuclear-armed submarines used to listen to this longwave transmission every day. [45:10.890 --> 45:19.570] And if it went off the air for, I believe, three days, they were to assume that the UK was under attack and opened their sealed orders. [45:20.470 --> 45:21.270] Lots of fun. [45:21.730 --> 45:22.570] Keep up the good work. [45:22.630 --> 45:24.770] Hope WBAI can dig itself out of the hole they are in. [45:24.890 --> 45:31.870] Thanks, Neil, for your kind thoughts and for this information and for opening up even more of the world to us. [45:32.970 --> 45:45.670] It's really fascinating because if you really think about it, radio is so important to so many components of government, of the world, and it really is ultimately a dark art. [45:45.930 --> 45:52.150] It is something that's incredibly fascinating, something that's used to get the word out about sealed orders. [45:52.150 --> 46:02.770] It's used to convey coded messages to agents in a field, operatives in a field, to decode something from a one-time keypad on the basis of number stations. [46:03.850 --> 46:10.910] In a very real sense, you know, we are sending out very similar signals to people who don't have to acknowledge receipt from WBAI. [46:11.050 --> 46:17.770] You know, not to be conspiratorial about it, but it's so important to have a station like this to get the word out. [46:17.770 --> 46:28.490] The fact that we have this ongoing battle with Empire State Realty Trust that puts us under siege, that prevents this, that may prevent this station from existing. [46:28.690 --> 46:30.310] I mean, it's a real existential threat. [46:30.470 --> 46:45.930] Without your support, without you calling 516-620-3602 and pledging what you can, we may lose another one of these voices that has been a crucial member of the chorus of dark arts in one way or another for many decades. [46:45.930 --> 46:52.730] Yeah, you know, you hear a lot of talk in various circles about how irrelevant things are. [46:52.970 --> 46:55.610] Everything becomes irrelevant when it stops being a fad. [46:55.830 --> 47:00.870] You hear it talked about with regards to, I guess, the AIM messaging system. [47:00.870 --> 47:02.850] That's going away because it's not relevant anymore. [47:03.030 --> 47:04.250] I can't believe anybody still uses that. [47:05.010 --> 47:06.090] That's not me saying that. [47:06.110 --> 47:08.650] That's just people that make these judgments. [47:08.870 --> 47:10.570] Well, you hear the same thing said about radio. [47:10.570 --> 47:12.830] You hear the same thing said about books. [47:12.830 --> 47:14.850] You hear the same thing said about magazines. [47:15.290 --> 47:17.790] And it's very, very rarely true. [47:18.030 --> 47:19.490] Radio is certainly not irrelevant. [47:19.710 --> 47:21.050] If radio... irrelevant, I'm sorry. [47:21.350 --> 47:22.890] Radio is certainly not irrelevant. [47:23.370 --> 47:28.710] If it was, radio stations would not sell for tens of millions of dollars or even higher. [47:29.770 --> 47:34.310] It's basically still a very important way to get the message out. [47:34.430 --> 47:38.530] And it's a way that remains when all of the ways fail. [47:38.530 --> 47:43.230] And just ask yourself in an emergency, what is it you're listening to? [47:43.470 --> 47:44.730] You're listening to the radio. [47:44.730 --> 47:47.150] You're trying to find out what's actually going on. [47:47.270 --> 47:48.870] It can't be shut down, not easily. [47:49.290 --> 47:59.690] I think it's sort of selfish, that attitude, to say, oh, this medium is not relevant simply because you've had your fill. [47:59.690 --> 48:11.290] Or you've not been able to seek out enough variety to keep you stimulated such that everything sounds the same. [48:11.290 --> 48:14.950] And you feel that this medium is only being used to sell ads. [48:15.070 --> 48:21.330] And that's just simply not true, as we've listed many different examples of how radio is so important. [48:21.330 --> 48:31.950] And, yeah, you know, just because you're sort of tired of it or you've decided in your head that it isn't relevant, it does not mean that it is new and exciting. [48:32.030 --> 48:34.230] It isn't new and exciting for someone else. [48:34.750 --> 48:48.950] A lot of students and young people who've never been exposed to some of the technologies you've listed off, they might have a way of using it or things to communicate over it that no one has thought of before. [48:48.950 --> 48:53.090] And that's one of the other benefits of a place like WBAI. [48:53.150 --> 49:01.510] We can bring in people who might not have ever, really ever, never listened to radio, much less broadcast over it themselves. [49:02.190 --> 49:03.830] That's the opportunity we have here. [49:03.870 --> 49:10.690] And your contributions go to keep that going, whether the Empire State Building likes it or not. [49:11.490 --> 49:12.410] Well said. [49:12.530 --> 49:12.970] Well said. [49:13.630 --> 49:24.830] As we broadcast from the Empire State Building with all kinds of diverse opinions and bits of information, phone number to call to support this place, 516-620-3602. [49:25.010 --> 49:26.830] And, you know, you can pledge any amount. [49:26.930 --> 49:28.470] You can get all kinds of other premiums as well. [49:28.610 --> 49:37.210] Simply ask the people there or go to give2wbai.org and check out all the different premiums that are available for your support in exchange for your support. [49:37.210 --> 49:47.450] Speaking of relevance, while regular landline phones, I think, are still relevant, we can't deny that that world is changing. [49:47.670 --> 50:00.090] And one indication of how dramatically that world is changing came in the last few days when AT&T announced that it is going to be shutting down its wholesale inward service. [50:00.090 --> 50:02.930] Now, I don't know if a lot of people know what inward service is. [50:03.030 --> 50:11.010] Basically, it's something that the phone companies would use as basically an operator-to-operator assistance service. [50:11.430 --> 50:23.030] Allows subscribing carriers operated to contact an AT&T operator and requests dialing information, all kinds of other things that an operator would know. [50:23.030 --> 50:26.470] So, and this predates when there were other carriers. [50:26.690 --> 50:31.530] This goes back to the days when there was just AT&T and the local bell companies. [50:32.130 --> 50:37.390] But basically, the way it works, or the way it has been working, you subscribe to inward assistance. [50:37.570 --> 50:46.710] A service provider has to order, install, maintain inward trunks in every local access and transport area, known as LATAs, to reach an AT&T operator for assistance. [50:46.710 --> 51:00.170] Now, they say since the demand for inward assistance has declined at a rate of about 17%, 17%, rather, per year for the last several years, AT&T said that the public convenience and necessity will not be impaired by the service discontinuance. [51:00.470 --> 51:01.530] Hard to argue that. [51:01.870 --> 51:03.870] Yeah, it was never convenient in the first place. [51:04.070 --> 51:06.130] I mean, they weren't really helping anybody, so... [51:06.130 --> 51:07.030] Oh, I disagree. [51:07.290 --> 51:09.770] I think, well, in the past, it certainly was. [51:09.870 --> 51:10.830] I'll get to that in a moment. [51:10.830 --> 51:22.390] But they say they've experienced an 86.7% decline in the volume of its inward service over the last five years, as obviously more customers take advantage of more modern technologies and or services. [51:23.470 --> 51:29.310] So, yeah, the days of the inward operator, which, you know, the average person may never have even heard the inward operator. [51:29.310 --> 51:42.670] Sometimes, if you called an operator in the past, and you asked for, say, rate information, or if you wanted to find out if a particular, get this, a particular phone number was a coin box, which basically means, is this phone number belong to a pay phone? [51:42.750 --> 51:43.590] Does it belong to a pay phone? [51:43.770 --> 51:48.750] They would call another operator, and they would ask that operator for that information. [51:49.330 --> 51:49.990] It was really... [51:49.990 --> 51:55.010] Fortunately, there are all kinds of recordings that are out there where you can hear these things. [51:56.110 --> 52:06.270] Evan doorbells are probably the best online, but we have a few on some of our old radio shows as well where we would call an operator and ask her a particularly confusing question, and she'd have to call another operator to get the answer. [52:06.450 --> 52:14.870] But phone freaks of the past would be able to call directly to inward operators, and they were the operator in the eyes of the inward operator. [52:15.030 --> 52:24.730] What you would do, you'd use a blue box, you'd hit the KP tone, you would hit the NPA, which is basically the area code, and then the three-digit code. [52:24.730 --> 52:27.090] And the three-digit code for inward operators? [52:27.850 --> 52:28.290] Nobody? [52:29.210 --> 52:30.650] No, I don't expect people to know this. [52:31.250 --> 52:32.230] It's unfair, yeah. [52:32.690 --> 52:35.990] It's not something that has been bandied about that much, but 1-2-1. [52:36.110 --> 52:37.090] 1-2-1 was the code. [52:37.550 --> 52:38.890] And then the start button. [52:39.010 --> 52:45.050] So KP, area code, 1-2-1, start, would get you to an inward operator for whatever area code that you designated. [52:45.530 --> 52:57.510] Information was 1-3-1, and there were all kinds of other three-digit codes that always began with a 0 or a 1 that allowed you to connect to various operator services. [52:57.750 --> 53:02.850] I'm just looking at a list of them here now, and some of them I've never heard of before, like 1-1-5, Operator Leave Word. [53:02.950 --> 53:03.810] I don't know what that is. [53:04.030 --> 53:07.650] 1-2-0, Network Emergency Center. [53:08.390 --> 53:10.630] 1-2-2, AT&T Ready Line. [53:12.010 --> 53:13.890] Okay, 1-4-1 is one I was familiar with. [53:14.050 --> 53:21.250] Rate and Route, that would give you the basic rates of phone calls and things like that. [53:21.250 --> 53:24.590] I do remember, though, I used to live in a crossbar switch. [53:24.750 --> 53:30.930] I didn't live in the switch, but my phone lines were part of a crossbar, number 5 crossbar. [53:31.110 --> 53:36.630] And it had some kind of a bug where you could dial these numbers directly sometimes. [53:37.270 --> 53:43.930] The whole point of having it begin with a 0 or a 1 is that a customer could not dial that number. [53:44.390 --> 53:50.010] If you tried to dial 2-1-2, 1-2-1, first of all, it would wait for four more numbers. [53:50.190 --> 53:51.150] You'd have to dial four more numbers. [53:51.250 --> 53:54.110] And then once you entered those four numbers, it would say, what are you trying to do? [53:54.270 --> 53:56.130] There's no such exchange as 1-2-1. [53:56.590 --> 54:00.790] That's why you needed the blue box to do the KP and the area code and the 1-2-1 and the start. [54:00.790 --> 54:10.690] But the number 5 crossbar that we were in had a bug where if you dialed that number directly, most of the time you'd get a fast busy, a reorder is what they call that. [54:11.130 --> 54:13.210] One in ten times, you wouldn't. [54:13.210 --> 54:15.550] And it would go right through without a blue box. [54:15.710 --> 54:17.750] You could blue box without a blue box. [54:17.850 --> 54:19.210] It was the most amazing thing. [54:19.350 --> 54:24.110] And just one of many, many stories that we can tell about the old days with the phone system. [54:24.550 --> 54:25.790] And that's the magic of it all. [54:25.850 --> 54:27.010] That's the magic of the technology. [54:27.010 --> 54:32.090] The things that work now, the things that used to work and learning from one thing to another. [54:32.230 --> 54:33.810] It's really pretty amazing. [54:34.070 --> 54:40.110] So to go back to my old phone freaking days, if I dialed 1-800-288-2880, remember that? [54:40.170 --> 54:41.890] That was ATT, ATTO. [54:41.990 --> 54:42.810] You would get the operator. [54:43.050 --> 54:44.590] That wasn't the inward operator. [54:44.750 --> 54:45.570] They would have to... [54:45.570 --> 54:48.610] The next line of defense, so to speak, would have been the inward operator. [54:48.670 --> 54:49.030] Is that correct? [54:49.190 --> 54:51.510] Well, you probably weren't connected to an inward operator directly. [54:51.510 --> 54:55.050] You were connected to some kind of customer service that could connect you to an inward operator. [54:55.270 --> 54:55.510] Interesting. [54:55.950 --> 54:58.090] It might not have been that different from dialing zero. [54:58.510 --> 55:04.230] The other thing, though, that phone freaks really had a blast with were the international dial tones. [55:04.390 --> 55:06.350] And you'd get those by... [55:06.350 --> 55:09.690] 182, for instance, was another code that was White Plains, New York. [55:10.550 --> 55:12.190] 183, New York City, downtown. [55:13.830 --> 55:14.670] 184, Pittsburgh. [55:15.250 --> 55:17.390] 185, Atlanta, et cetera, et cetera. [55:17.970 --> 55:19.250] They're all different areas. [55:19.250 --> 55:24.670] And if you had that tone, you could use that tone to do all kinds of other things on the international level. [55:25.250 --> 55:32.970] And, yes, we were able to dial that number, 914-181-XXXX, and occasionally it would go through. [55:33.630 --> 55:39.550] Actually, you know, I'm not sure if any area code would work, and there's no way to ever find that out, I guess, if you dial 181 afterwards. [55:40.410 --> 55:42.530] But, yeah, that's some of the magic of the old phone system. [55:42.550 --> 55:43.710] Things we can talk about for hours. [55:43.710 --> 55:46.590] There's things at the Hope Conference we do talk about for hours. [55:46.890 --> 55:52.270] I just want to say, it's worth pointing out that the way that was done, like, it's funny that they're... [55:52.270 --> 55:57.790] The way they wanted it set up is that they'd bring a line to you to have you access the N-word dialing. [55:58.050 --> 56:03.670] And hackers proved that, no, you don't need to do it the way they want you to, because it works anyway. [56:04.610 --> 56:05.010] Yes. [56:05.330 --> 56:06.130] Yes, absolutely. [56:07.410 --> 56:11.870] Again, let's give out that phone number one last time, because we are out of here in just a minute. [56:12.990 --> 56:18.130] Phone number is 516-620-3602. [56:19.410 --> 56:23.590] And we invite you to call, and please support the radio station. [56:23.790 --> 56:24.270] Keep us going. [56:26.190 --> 56:27.790] That's pretty much all we have to say, I think, right? [56:27.950 --> 56:29.050] Any closing remarks? [56:30.050 --> 56:32.570] I think we should talk about phone freaking more often. [56:32.850 --> 56:33.030] Yeah. [56:33.050 --> 56:34.510] It's so much fun. [56:34.510 --> 56:37.030] There's so much nostalgia involved in these conversations. [56:37.250 --> 56:38.470] We need more of this. [56:38.750 --> 56:39.250] Yes, we do. [56:40.530 --> 56:42.450] Unfortunately, our theme seems to have stopped. [56:42.830 --> 56:48.010] Please write us at O-T-H at 2600.com. [56:48.850 --> 56:51.090] We'd love to hear from you, your comments. [56:51.230 --> 56:56.530] Also, Hacker Radio Show, at Hacker Radio Show, on the Twitter platform. [56:57.090 --> 56:57.890] That's right. [56:57.890 --> 57:04.710] And if any of the annoying sounds that we have played tonight have caused you to become incontinent, we'd love to hear from you. [57:07.430 --> 57:07.930] All right. [57:08.310 --> 57:09.650] O-T-H at 2600.com. [57:09.810 --> 57:10.450] That's our email address. [57:11.290 --> 57:12.590] 516-620-3602. [57:12.630 --> 57:13.090] Give a call now. [57:13.170 --> 57:13.350] Good night. [57:13.350 --> 57:14.450] We'll [57:36.580 --> 57:38.120] be right back.