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[00:04.160 --> 00:08.800]  That's Monday, April 2nd, and the first Monday of every month from here on in.
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[00:21.320 --> 00:24.580]  April 2nd at 7pm at the Brooklyn Commons.
[00:24.900 --> 00:28.540]  388 Atlantic Avenue in the Burham Hill section of Brooklyn.
[00:31.760 --> 00:35.760]  And you are listening to Radio Station WBAI New York.
[00:35.900 --> 00:37.220]  The time is 8 o'clock.
[00:37.620 --> 00:39.880]  Time once again for Off the Hook.
[00:45.120 --> 00:47.060]  The telephone keeps ringing.
[00:47.380 --> 00:49.600]  So I ripped it off the wall.
[00:50.560 --> 00:52.580]  I cut myself while shaving.
[00:53.240 --> 00:55.100]  Now I can't make a cough.
[00:55.760 --> 00:57.920]  We couldn't get much worse.
[00:59.900 --> 01:00.480]  They would.
[01:00.740 --> 01:01.460]  From Diddley Bump.
[01:01.640 --> 01:02.680]  But the best is fake.
[01:02.840 --> 01:03.380]  The worst.
[01:03.960 --> 01:05.880]  I hope that's understood.
[01:06.060 --> 01:06.940]  From Diddley Bump.
[02:29.400 --> 02:31.240]  And a very good evening to everybody.
[02:31.360 --> 02:33.420]  The program is Off the Hook.
[02:33.540 --> 02:35.280]  Emmanuel Goldstein joining you tonight.
[02:35.300 --> 02:36.880]  Joined by Rob T.
[02:37.000 --> 02:37.420]  Firefly.
[02:37.700 --> 02:38.220]  Good evening.
[02:38.640 --> 02:39.060]  Alex.
[02:39.580 --> 02:40.020]  Good evening.
[02:40.160 --> 02:40.580]  Voltaire.
[02:41.000 --> 02:41.300]  Hey.
[02:41.540 --> 02:42.240]  And Kyle.
[02:42.600 --> 02:43.380]  Hey, what's up?
[02:43.580 --> 02:45.260]  Well, it looks like we're all here today.
[02:45.440 --> 02:46.400]  I'm fine.
[02:46.500 --> 02:48.880]  My voice is cracking a little bit because I've been sick.
[02:48.880 --> 02:50.840]  And I might still have more ahead of me.
[02:51.300 --> 02:52.540]  So bear with me on that.
[02:52.540 --> 02:54.340]  But we have lots to talk about.
[02:54.620 --> 02:55.860]  And, well, Alex, welcome back.
[02:55.860 --> 02:56.840]  You were overseas.
[02:57.280 --> 02:57.980]  I was indeed.
[02:58.320 --> 02:58.600]  Wow.
[02:58.740 --> 03:00.060]  I was over in London last week.
[03:00.140 --> 03:01.840]  That's why I missed the show.
[03:02.060 --> 03:03.720]  I wasn't a victim of the snowstorm.
[03:03.880 --> 03:05.160]  Get any good pizza over there.
[03:06.840 --> 03:15.220]  As a matter of fact, right when I landed, it just so happens that two friends of mine happened to be passing by Heathrow.
[03:15.220 --> 03:20.660]  And they were on their way to the countryside over to Salisbury, as a matter of fact.
[03:20.860 --> 03:21.040]  Okay.
[03:21.140 --> 03:23.900]  The site is of the latest Russian assassination attempt.
[03:24.300 --> 03:25.560]  So, of course, I had to join them.
[03:26.760 --> 03:27.080]  And...
[03:27.080 --> 03:27.460]  Wait, wait.
[03:27.640 --> 03:29.360]  Tell me you didn't go to the actual place.
[03:29.760 --> 03:31.100]  Well, we went very close to it.
[03:31.100 --> 03:37.260]  I don't think you can actually get into Zizi's Pizza right now or, you know, last week as well.
[03:37.280 --> 03:37.700]  Oh, that's what it's called?
[03:38.180 --> 03:38.760]  Zizi's, yes.
[03:38.800 --> 03:39.060]  Okay.
[03:39.060 --> 03:39.880]  Yeah, Zizi's.
[03:39.980 --> 03:42.740]  In fact, but we were really quite close.
[03:42.760 --> 03:43.860]  And it was beautiful.
[03:43.860 --> 03:45.100]  And it was in the countryside.
[03:45.120 --> 03:47.180]  And it was a nice respite from London.
[03:47.260 --> 03:48.420]  It was snowing.
[03:48.520 --> 03:50.260]  It was very picturesque, very pastoral.
[03:51.640 --> 04:01.140]  One thing I did notice, though, was when I was looking up how close we were to Zizi's, was that somebody had actually posted a rather interesting review.
[04:01.340 --> 04:02.500]  I can't imagine.
[04:02.640 --> 04:04.620]  Of the restaurant on TripAdvisor.
[04:04.620 --> 04:08.280]  Well, you know, it's funny that you should mention, because I was just looking it up right now.
[04:08.960 --> 04:10.960]  I just typed in pizza.
[04:11.720 --> 04:13.260]  Well, I guess it's not London, is it?
[04:13.560 --> 04:16.220]  No, it's far outside of London.
[04:16.500 --> 04:21.260]  Well, I type pizza, London, poison, and I got all these replies, all these results.
[04:21.900 --> 04:24.900]  Lovely staff, terrible food poisoning, got myself food poisoning twice.
[04:25.220 --> 04:28.400]  And it's all about food poisoning, but none of it has to do with this particular place.
[04:28.520 --> 04:34.000]  Yeah, this is a solid hour and a half or so away from London, I guess, depending upon how quickly you drive.
[04:34.860 --> 04:39.740]  But, yeah, I can imagine London pizza joints don't necessarily have, you know, the best reputation.
[04:39.840 --> 04:44.340]  Well, I don't want to diss London pizza too much, but it's not the same.
[04:44.440 --> 04:45.120]  Let's just put it that way.
[04:45.180 --> 04:46.320]  It's not the same as here.
[04:46.440 --> 04:47.260]  That's very...
[04:47.660 --> 04:52.700]  Not meaning that you always get poisoned if you go over there, but it's just, it's different.
[04:52.900 --> 04:53.520]  Well, anyway...
[04:53.520 --> 04:54.360]  It's one way of putting it.
[04:54.440 --> 04:55.640]  We're veering way off the rug.
[04:55.640 --> 04:57.760]  So, you went near this place.
[04:57.920 --> 04:59.080]  Yeah, we went near this place.
[04:59.080 --> 05:04.920]  And I do think this review possibly justifies reading.
[05:05.260 --> 05:06.560]  It's really quite funny.
[05:06.680 --> 05:16.340]  And it was attacked in various news stories as a troll posting a sick review of restaurant where poisoned ex-Russian spy ate lunch on TripAdvisor.
[05:16.340 --> 05:31.440]  You know, I just think that when you have a place where somebody was confirmed to have gotten poisoned and put into a coma, two people in fact, there's really not much you can say in a review that's going to violate any other norms.
[05:31.480 --> 05:32.240]  I can imagine.
[05:32.440 --> 05:35.180]  I mean, business is definitely interrupted at that point no matter what.
[05:35.600 --> 05:37.240]  TripAdvisor reviews don't really come into it.
[05:38.060 --> 05:44.460]  But this particular review begins off with the title, Spicy Doesn't Begin to Describe It...
[05:44.460 --> 05:45.020]  Dot, dot, dot.
[05:45.340 --> 05:45.600]  Okay.
[05:45.920 --> 05:46.200]  All right.
[05:46.300 --> 05:47.060]  I can see that.
[05:47.260 --> 05:47.740]  I can imagine.
[05:47.980 --> 05:54.680]  And then it says, I recently had cause to visit this establishment, Zizzy's, and felt my experience warranted a review.
[05:54.940 --> 06:00.100]  My daughter and I received a glowing welcome from all the staff who positively radiated courtesy.
[06:00.160 --> 06:00.320]  Okay.
[06:00.340 --> 06:01.500]  I see what's happening here.
[06:01.660 --> 06:03.880]  All these, yeah, radioactive type things.
[06:04.040 --> 06:05.040]  Very, very funny there.
[06:05.040 --> 06:11.320]  Our drinks glowed brightly against the candle that had been lit in the table after we had been seated, although the water was a touch heavy.
[06:11.920 --> 06:15.460]  Our waiter, however, was surly, with a hint of vodka on his breath.
[06:15.680 --> 06:22.240]  His shaved head and hunched shoulders were intimidating, and his insistence on us selecting from the specials menu bordered on dictatorial.
[06:22.520 --> 06:24.560]  I ordered the pizza from the specials menu.
[06:24.560 --> 06:26.660]  It was Uncle Vlad's Atomic Sausage.
[06:26.740 --> 06:28.720]  How long does this go on for, pray tell?
[06:28.720 --> 06:29.620]  Oh, there's a couple of paragraphs.
[06:29.920 --> 06:35.980]  And tasted wonderful, piquant with a crisp base and an interesting sizzle that tasted well after I had cleared my plate.
[06:36.180 --> 06:41.720]  My daughter had a slice and commented on the unusual metallic tang present in the tomato bowl.
[06:41.720 --> 06:42.780]  I doubt there was a daughter.
[06:43.120 --> 06:44.440]  I doubt he brought his daughter there.
[06:45.100 --> 06:45.580]  Okay.
[06:45.840 --> 06:48.120]  It's pretty funny.
[06:49.520 --> 06:50.820]  I'll read one more paragraph.
[06:50.820 --> 06:59.140]  After paying and providing our increasingly distant waiter with a tip, and then in parens, he refused to come within two meters of us after our meal.
[06:59.660 --> 07:02.900]  We left sated, feeling incredibly warm despite the chill of the evening.
[07:03.120 --> 07:06.500]  The light rain sizzled off my forehead as I walked to the car.
[07:06.500 --> 07:18.820]  You know, it makes you think, when something like this happens, when, you know, an international web of intrigue unfolds in your establishment, putting you in the headlines, what recourse is there?
[07:18.940 --> 07:27.540]  Now, you know, countries send home diplomats and all kinds of threatening talk, but what of the business establishment that is caught in the middle of all this?
[07:27.620 --> 07:28.760]  Is this place still open?
[07:28.760 --> 07:29.620]  I'm very curious.
[07:29.880 --> 07:30.760]  Can you still go there?
[07:30.880 --> 07:32.220]  I don't think you can go there now.
[07:32.460 --> 07:32.600]  Really?
[07:36.500 --> 07:40.220]  You can find them all throughout London, and they're pretty popular throughout the UK as well.
[07:40.600 --> 07:41.620]  That might change.
[07:41.800 --> 07:42.860]  Yes, it very well may.
[07:43.120 --> 07:43.420]  Yeah, that might change.
[07:43.420 --> 07:44.700]  I think it very well may.
[07:44.860 --> 07:45.080]  Walter?
[07:45.460 --> 07:50.100]  I was going to ask how the food compares to Comet Ping Pong Pizza.
[07:50.260 --> 07:52.300]  Well, I don't think you actually had anything there, did you?
[07:52.340 --> 07:52.960]  No, no, no.
[07:53.040 --> 07:53.340]  We didn't.
[07:53.340 --> 07:54.340]  We didn't actually eat there.
[07:54.860 --> 08:00.760]  That's the whole month of the Pizzagate conspiracy, but they actually, their business has been up since they got in the conspiracy.
[08:00.760 --> 08:02.360]  Well, it was never about the food with Pizzagate.
[08:02.420 --> 08:05.260]  It was about the trafficking going on in the back rooms.
[08:05.260 --> 08:06.740]  That's what Pizzagate was about.
[08:07.040 --> 08:08.360]  So, I think the food...
[08:08.360 --> 08:09.900]  I don't think anybody criticized the food.
[08:10.440 --> 08:11.800]  Even the right-wing zealots.
[08:11.840 --> 08:12.840]  I don't think they criticized the food.
[08:13.040 --> 08:13.140]  No.
[08:13.820 --> 08:14.980]  And that was in D.C.
[08:15.120 --> 08:15.580]  too, right?
[08:15.700 --> 08:16.020]  Right, right.
[08:16.020 --> 08:16.980]  So, I mean...
[08:16.980 --> 08:17.800]  Well, it's hard...
[08:17.800 --> 08:18.580]  It still is in D.C.
[08:18.980 --> 08:21.260]  Well, yeah, it still is in D.C., but I mean, come on, D.C.
[08:21.340 --> 08:21.620]  pizza?
[08:22.120 --> 08:23.200]  I mean, we're talking about U.K.
[08:23.300 --> 08:23.740]  pizza, D.C.
[08:23.740 --> 08:23.740]  pizza.
[08:23.740 --> 08:25.420]  This is getting a little out of hand now.
[08:25.940 --> 08:28.420]  I'm not going to upset the people in D.C.
[08:28.540 --> 08:28.780]  You could go on with that.
[08:28.800 --> 08:30.140]  Yeah, there's all sorts of ramifications.
[08:30.840 --> 08:31.480]  Giant slices.
[08:31.620 --> 08:34.000]  We have all kinds of things to talk about tonight.
[08:34.000 --> 08:35.180]  Now, this is interesting.
[08:35.300 --> 08:41.200]  As long as we're looking down south, employees for the city of Atlanta have not been allowed to turn their computers on.
[08:41.280 --> 08:41.700]  Did you know this?
[08:41.900 --> 08:43.340]  There was a major hack.
[08:43.480 --> 08:44.680]  It put the city at risk.
[08:45.240 --> 08:46.420]  This happened last week.
[08:46.600 --> 08:50.400]  But now, as of now, they are allowed to turn their computers back on.
[08:50.420 --> 08:53.200]  I'm not sure how written in stone that law rule was.
[08:53.200 --> 09:10.080]  But Atlanta mayor Keisha Lance Bottoms says teams of city IT experts and outside companies are still trying to diagnose what happened during the cyber attack that crippled the city's computer systems and left business at a standstill.
[09:10.440 --> 09:18.820]  Computers at City Hall were turned off for several days, and experts believe the hackers gained access to computer systems through a remote portal.
[09:19.420 --> 09:20.620]  Usually how it works.
[09:20.620 --> 09:22.600]  You don't walk in there and just sit down.
[09:23.120 --> 09:28.720]  The attack continues to cause all kinds of problems, and it's frustrating people who are trying to conduct business with the city.
[09:28.860 --> 09:34.220]  It's a big pain for people who need to take care of business, for instance, at courtrooms.
[09:34.880 --> 09:35.460]  All kinds.
[09:35.540 --> 09:36.160]  You can just imagine.
[09:36.320 --> 09:40.000]  Anybody needs to do anything in Atlanta probably has been inconvenienced by this.
[09:41.220 --> 09:48.720]  But again, you know, without details as to what it was that actually happened, it's hard to point the finger and say who is responsible for this.
[09:48.720 --> 09:57.580]  Of course, people like to say hackers do it all, but leaving wide open security holes doesn't necessarily mean a hacker is the one that's going to take advantage of it.
[09:58.720 --> 10:04.720]  I just assume that someone in Atlanta had a Windows 95 machine that they shut down and got that it is now safe to turn off your computer screen.
[10:05.000 --> 10:11.500]  And then when time came to turn it back on, they were just waiting for it to now safe to turn on your computer, and it never happened, and so they panicked.
[10:12.200 --> 10:14.500]  Yeah, that could be, you know, it could be something like that.
[10:14.700 --> 10:16.600]  There's all sorts of possibilities.
[10:18.460 --> 10:22.580]  But apparently it's safe to turn on your computer if you're in Atlanta, if you work for the city.
[10:22.740 --> 10:24.040]  So feel free.
[10:24.160 --> 10:32.580]  Well, one interesting thing about this, too, is that they seem to be reverting to all these manual processes, you know, going back to actual paper and pen forms, filling things out by hand.
[10:33.360 --> 10:35.120]  That's kind of fascinating, right?
[10:35.120 --> 10:39.560]  If you think that these manual processes aren't really all that obsolete.
[10:39.820 --> 10:45.740]  They're really only, what, a decade or two at most, you know, out of reach from us.
[10:45.820 --> 10:56.160]  But the idea of going back to filling out forms and using pens and paper to actually do things like run a county or a city is, you know, completely bizarre to us at this point.
[10:56.160 --> 11:03.040]  You know, the other thing to mention, too, is I think the ransom demand was 51,000 in bitcoins.
[11:03.300 --> 11:04.220]  Oh, I didn't know there was a ransom.
[11:04.480 --> 11:04.820]  Yes.
[11:05.040 --> 11:07.940]  So this was a, one of those...
[11:07.940 --> 11:09.020]  It was a ransomware attack.
[11:09.320 --> 11:09.700]  Ransomware attack.
[11:09.880 --> 11:24.660]  So they demanded 51,000 in the equivalent of bitcoins, which if you think about how long the city has been down and how much they're spending on companies like SecureWorks to go in there and perform forensic analysis of what's happening together with the money spent by Homeland Security,
[11:24.820 --> 11:28.500]  FBI, all these people investigating this, I mean, that's kind of a sweet spot.
[11:28.620 --> 11:29.720]  51 grand is not that much money.
[11:29.720 --> 11:37.500]  Yeah, but Alex, there's no guarantee that that money being paid is going to result in the problem going away or the problem not coming back in another week.
[11:37.540 --> 11:38.300]  I understand that.
[11:38.360 --> 11:43.780]  But $51,000 is probably two hours worth of time, given the amount of people that they have working on this.
[11:43.940 --> 11:45.320]  It's not a good way to look at it, though.
[11:45.620 --> 11:45.920]  It might be worth a shot.
[11:46.100 --> 11:46.940]  Yeah, but...
[11:47.620 --> 11:50.320]  Then if you pay the ransom, then you begin to trace the money.
[11:50.460 --> 11:52.120]  There's other ways that you can do this.
[11:52.120 --> 11:52.420]  Uh-huh.
[11:52.560 --> 11:54.920]  And then maybe fine the people behind it.
[11:55.100 --> 11:59.140]  But $51,000 doesn't seem like a whole hell of a lot of money to me to just give it a shot.
[11:59.440 --> 12:01.180]  That's really a sweet spot kind of deal.
[12:01.320 --> 12:02.940]  I mean, I wonder why they picked $51,000.
[12:03.240 --> 12:03.600]  That's...
[12:03.600 --> 12:07.520]  Well, it probably is based on Bitcoin, the value of it at that particular moment in time.
[12:08.660 --> 12:10.320]  But yeah, you know, we're seeing a lot of this.
[12:10.480 --> 12:11.680]  We're seeing a lot of attacks like this.
[12:11.800 --> 12:17.060]  And I've seen police departments pay money to get their computers unlocked.
[12:17.720 --> 12:30.340]  It's much more of a wise investment to spend money on security training and getting good practices down, such as daily backups onto tape, you know, so that if something does happen...
[12:30.340 --> 12:31.560]  This happened to my dentist, in fact.
[12:31.760 --> 12:34.500]  They were the victim of ransomware.
[12:34.640 --> 12:36.080]  And they had a backup.
[12:36.300 --> 12:37.120]  And they were able to...
[12:37.120 --> 12:41.420]  They lost the afternoon's x-rays, okay, but they were able to restore it from the previous day.
[12:42.640 --> 12:46.240]  And, you know, if that day was corrupted, they can go back to a previous date.
[12:47.000 --> 12:50.580]  We all need to be able to do that so that we don't fall victim to this.
[12:50.720 --> 12:55.060]  Yeah, this takes away a lot of the argument for the ease of deployment for off-the-shelf systems.
[12:55.060 --> 13:06.760]  So if you're not adding things or changing some of the default setup for a lot of these systems, you pay dearly in the long run, as in a case like this.
[13:06.920 --> 13:22.600]  Whereas maybe if you had customized it a little more or if you had chosen something that was less popular or prone to these kinds of attacks, you may have realized the expense by not then being susceptible to this downtime, as Alex was talking about.
[13:22.600 --> 13:25.860]  Well, Baltimore had a problem.
[13:26.000 --> 13:28.540]  Their 911 dispatch system was hacked over the weekend.
[13:29.020 --> 13:31.100]  Authorities temporarily shut it down.
[13:31.260 --> 13:32.860]  I'm not quite sure how that works.
[13:33.500 --> 13:43.980]  The mayor's office confirmed to the Baltimore Sun that the system was digitally infiltrated early Saturday morning, provided no other details while the investigation is ongoing.
[13:44.660 --> 13:56.420]  We don't know yet how that particular system was vulnerable, but they basically say a limited breach of the computer-aided dispatch, C-A-D, that automatically routes emergency requests to dispatchers.
[13:56.680 --> 13:58.560]  And that was what was affected.
[13:58.700 --> 14:02.840]  The department switched it to manual mode while the affected server was isolated and taken offline.
[14:03.900 --> 14:06.420]  So it seems like they did things in the right way.
[14:06.500 --> 14:10.580]  They were able to switch to manual mode and continue doing the job that was important.
[14:10.740 --> 14:13.560]  Hacking 911, obviously, is a very serious thing.
[14:13.660 --> 14:17.120]  And it should not be in a state where you can do that in the first place.
[14:17.120 --> 14:22.480]  Do you remember a long time ago the E-911 hack with Night Lightning and all of that?
[14:22.560 --> 14:25.360]  I mean, there's a lot of history when it goes to hacking 911.
[14:26.540 --> 14:29.760]  But I think with that particular case, that must have been the early 90s?
[14:29.760 --> 14:32.160]  That was 1989, and it led to the...
[14:32.160 --> 14:35.860]  It was one of the events that led to the founding of the Electronic Frontier Foundation the year following.
[14:36.080 --> 14:36.440]  That's right.
[14:36.600 --> 14:41.120]  And in fact, I think Night Lightning, who was the hacker charged with the theft of these...
[14:41.120 --> 14:47.320]  I guess the information relating to the E-911 system, I think he actually went on to become a lawyer after his trial.
[14:47.460 --> 14:47.760]  Is that right?
[14:47.880 --> 14:48.020]  Okay.
[14:48.620 --> 14:50.340]  Craig Neidorf, I think, was his name.
[14:50.780 --> 14:51.000]  Okay.
[14:51.140 --> 14:51.820]  Is his name, perhaps?
[14:52.060 --> 14:53.260]  Well, I had no idea of that.
[14:53.380 --> 14:54.940]  But that's...
[14:54.940 --> 15:00.760]  You know, these things have been happening throughout the course of computers being connected to anything.
[15:00.980 --> 15:02.400]  And they will continue to happen.
[15:02.540 --> 15:07.600]  We need to be able to prepare for that and actually move on.
[15:08.380 --> 15:10.860]  They really do have a profound effect on people's lives, too.
[15:11.120 --> 15:14.360]  So they end up turning to a career path like that.
[15:14.680 --> 15:21.520]  You have to imagine it's impressed upon them, at least a sense of justice or lack thereof.
[15:21.760 --> 15:21.980]  Yes.
[15:23.000 --> 15:23.620]  Okay.
[15:23.740 --> 15:25.480]  And we have this out of China.
[15:25.640 --> 15:36.700]  Traffic police in the southern Chinese city of Shenzhen have always had a reputation for strict enforcement of those flatting road rules in the metropolis of 12 million people.
[15:37.290 --> 15:48.520]  And now, with the help of artificial intelligence and facial recognition technology, jaywalkers will not only be publicly named and shamed, they will be notified of their wrongdoing via instant messaging along with the fine.
[15:48.780 --> 15:50.260]  Yeah, that's right.
[15:50.700 --> 15:52.920]  This comes from scmp.com.
[15:54.440 --> 16:17.920]  Intellifusion, a Shenzhen-based AI firm that provides technology to the city's police to display the faces of jaywalkers on large LED screens at intersections, is now talking with local mobile phone carriers and social media platforms such as WeChat and sign-out Weibo to develop a system where offenders will receive personal text messages as soon as they violate the rules.
[16:17.920 --> 16:21.160]  So, wow, this is really some scary stuff here.
[16:21.260 --> 16:27.640]  Jaywalking has always been an issue in China and can hardly be resolved just by imposing fines or taking photos of the offenders.
[16:27.640 --> 16:35.220]  But a combination of technology and psychology can greatly reduce instances of jaywalking and will prevent repeat offenses.
[16:35.680 --> 16:43.300]  You know, speaking as a New Yorker where jaywalking is encouraged, this strikes me as being incredibly offensive.
[16:44.180 --> 16:46.380]  Isn't it like a birthright in New York City?
[16:46.740 --> 16:48.100]  Yeah, absolutely.
[16:48.640 --> 16:50.140]  You know, cross when it's convenient.
[16:50.660 --> 16:51.140]  And...
[16:51.800 --> 16:54.900]  But this is what we're going to be seeing more and more of.
[16:55.320 --> 17:02.760]  Cameras taking pictures of you, committing some sort of a force as red light cameras, you know, where they have a picture of you in the car.
[17:03.860 --> 17:10.620]  Now it's you crossing a street and getting texted on your phone or publicly shamed on a billboard.
[17:11.020 --> 17:12.320]  Wow, where does this end?
[17:12.760 --> 17:14.720]  I mean, I think this is really terrifying.
[17:14.740 --> 17:16.340]  But, you know, I mentioned this before.
[17:16.400 --> 17:19.000]  I think it's a great time to be in the balaclava business.
[17:19.500 --> 17:30.480]  You know, you could jaywalk to your heart's content so long as you're wearing some kind of mask that would prevent the facial recognition demons from above from recognizing who you are and then just, you know, go run out into the room.
[17:30.560 --> 17:31.540]  But I think you're totally right.
[17:31.600 --> 17:37.640]  I think if jaywalking were to be criminalized in New York, I mean, people would...
[17:37.640 --> 17:39.320]  I mean, there would be hell to pay.
[17:39.700 --> 17:41.120]  There would be a full-out rebellion.
[17:41.120 --> 17:47.280]  I mean, but other cultures do seem to take jaywalking much more seriously.
[17:47.500 --> 17:53.840]  I remember the first time I was in Finland and I went to Helsinki and I came from St. Petersburg and ended up in Helsinki.
[17:54.000 --> 17:55.660]  And, you know, there was a...
[17:55.660 --> 17:56.700]  There were no cars coming.
[17:56.840 --> 17:59.380]  There were virtually tumbleweeds coming across the street.
[17:59.580 --> 18:04.900]  And I walked across because, you know, the light was red, but I could safely cross.
[18:04.900 --> 18:09.300]  I'm from New York and people looked at me like I was some kind of outlaw.
[18:09.880 --> 18:13.600]  And this happens all the time in these kinds of Scandinavian cultures where they...
[18:13.600 --> 18:18.160]  I feel like they subjugate their will to a blinking red or green light.
[18:18.280 --> 18:19.280]  And it's very strange to me.
[18:19.780 --> 18:25.680]  Well, there's a strong sense of obedience, I think, following the rules and these sorts of things when something is not allowed.
[18:25.960 --> 18:34.880]  You know, you tend to go with what the sort of hegemonic dominant social attitudes would direct you towards.
[18:35.120 --> 18:39.480]  But, you know, this is a great way to make these places undesirable to go to.
[18:39.580 --> 18:50.680]  Could you imagine traveling to a place like Shenzhen and being a visitor and maybe crossing when you weren't supposed to inadvertently and then having your face broadcast on something?
[18:50.680 --> 18:53.580]  Or, how are you even on the same network?
[18:53.660 --> 18:54.660]  How do they know to IM you?
[18:54.740 --> 18:56.540]  What if you don't have that instant messenger?
[18:56.540 --> 19:04.040]  You're traveling, you got a ticket, and now you're not able to even get the punishment that you somehow deserve and you don't even maybe realize it.
[19:04.140 --> 19:08.620]  I could just see this, you know, being kind of aggravating for someone who's new to an area.
[19:09.160 --> 19:13.060]  I really thought you were going to say something else, Kyle, about the issue of jaywalking.
[19:13.540 --> 19:17.020]  Because you're from a city where jaywalking is not encouraged.
[19:17.020 --> 19:20.240]  And where I've gotten the same kinds of looks that Alex is describing.
[19:21.540 --> 19:24.000]  You have nothing to say about this at all, no?
[19:24.280 --> 19:25.380]  I don't have anything to say.
[19:25.500 --> 19:36.560]  All right, well, let's just suffice to say that there are certain cities in this country where jaywalking is not encouraged and you will be looked upon like you've grown three heads if you cross the street, even if there are no cars within a mile of you,
[19:36.580 --> 19:38.640]  if you cross against the red.
[19:39.020 --> 19:40.660]  It's not necessarily a U.S.
[19:40.700 --> 19:41.700]  It's definitely a New York thing.
[19:41.700 --> 19:47.320]  But I've been threatened in other places by cops who saw me crossing against the light.
[19:47.460 --> 19:50.560]  And it's definitely awakening.
[19:50.740 --> 19:55.600]  I've been hanging around New York for almost a decade, so I'm easily corrupted in this area.
[19:56.800 --> 20:03.460]  My favorite part of this whole thing is that we have computer vision now basically issuing tickets and citations.
[20:04.740 --> 20:08.820]  Is there like some sort of human mid-level here where these things go through?
[20:08.880 --> 20:13.140]  Or is the thing just automatically recognizing a face, sending that person the penalties?
[20:13.340 --> 20:14.960]  Because computer vision is very good.
[20:15.060 --> 20:16.260]  Facial recognition is very good.
[20:16.280 --> 20:17.600]  But it's not perfect.
[20:17.600 --> 20:20.080]  It's easy to mess with if you know what you're doing.
[20:20.080 --> 20:26.920]  So if I had, say, makeup or a mask or something on to make myself resemble someone I maybe didn't like.
[20:27.060 --> 20:28.480]  And I can go get them a bunch of fines.
[20:28.940 --> 20:32.460]  Or, you know, if I had a twin, I could aggravate him.
[20:32.920 --> 20:39.960]  What I would do is I would organize some kind of mass protest where everybody put on masks with President G's face.
[20:40.100 --> 20:43.700]  And then just jaywalked continuously throughout the entire city.
[20:44.260 --> 20:45.920]  I think that would be rather interesting.
[20:45.920 --> 20:51.320]  I will say, though, I mean, this has to have something to do with traffic and real statistics on the amount of people that are injured.
[20:51.560 --> 21:01.640]  And surely Shenzhen is a very populous city, very busy and very high traffic area to be living and working.
[21:01.680 --> 21:03.700]  And so they have to have some numbers.
[21:03.880 --> 21:04.620]  I've never been there.
[21:04.900 --> 21:04.920]  Good reason.
[21:05.120 --> 21:10.240]  But if the driving is anything like it is in Beijing, I think the problem is with the cars, not with the people crossing the street.
[21:10.400 --> 21:12.940]  I've seen right on reds made from left lanes.
[21:13.040 --> 21:13.300]  Sure.
[21:13.540 --> 21:14.400]  Without even stopping.
[21:14.400 --> 21:22.980]  And they're levying as many controls over drivers as they can, maybe even up to and including relinquishing entire control of the vehicle a la AI.
[21:23.220 --> 21:27.380]  But, I mean, this is a form of control for those who choose not to be in some kind of machine.
[21:27.540 --> 21:33.540]  But it's interesting to ask the question, how do they know that they're getting to you?
[21:34.220 --> 21:38.020]  And I think the answer to that is that everybody is using these apps.
[21:38.020 --> 21:41.000]  And that is the problem, that we're all using these things.
[21:41.000 --> 21:57.980]  And I think that's a good lead into the whole Cambridge Analytica story that has been exploding over the past couple of weeks, where they've had access to personal information of tens of millions of unwitting Americans and how that was used to help Trump get elected.
[21:57.980 --> 22:15.480]  People are starting to realize how much information about them is available on Facebook just by their logging in and communicating with people, sharing things, liking things, commenting on news, what they read, what they search for.
[22:16.240 --> 22:22.420]  A lot can be gleaned from that, and unfortunately, it took this to wake people up to it.
[22:22.980 --> 22:24.600]  Yeah, it's the collective use.
[22:24.620 --> 22:26.300]  I would definitely put that out there.
[22:26.420 --> 22:35.600]  I think people are realizing, yes, perhaps their individual posts or specific points in their personality that could be gleaned are one thing.
[22:35.600 --> 22:44.200]  But collectively, all of the data can be leveraged and exploited in really interesting ways, in ways you never, ever would have conceived possible.
[22:44.540 --> 22:50.100]  And just the way this was executed, it's quite simple.
[22:50.160 --> 23:00.460]  And yet, there's a lot of technology and sort of interesting stuff that we already know that was incorporated into this.
[23:00.460 --> 23:02.880]  And it seemingly worked.
[23:03.100 --> 23:11.920]  Well, I'm curious if anyone here in this room was affected by this in ways that surprised them or in ways that they felt violated their privacy.
[23:13.160 --> 23:15.240]  Frankly, I'm not surprised about any of this.
[23:15.380 --> 23:17.720]  I mean, this is something that we've been saying for years to people.
[23:18.000 --> 23:22.520]  We've been constantly banging on about the fact that you are the product, right?
[23:22.540 --> 23:32.320]  I mean, this has become a platitude on this show and across the security and the privacy and the hacker community that if something is free, your data is being monetized in ways that you don't necessarily understand.
[23:32.600 --> 23:37.920]  And so why is it such a damn shock to everybody that their data is being weaponized and used against them?
[23:38.260 --> 23:43.480]  I mean, we all know and we've gone through so many different stories about anonymous data being de-anonymized.
[23:43.600 --> 23:48.240]  You know, all of this is just eminently foreseeable and predictable to me.
[23:48.420 --> 23:49.760]  If you listen to us, it is.
[23:50.260 --> 23:50.620]  Absolutely.
[23:50.620 --> 23:51.860]  A lot of people are waking up.
[23:51.860 --> 23:52.440]  I get it.
[23:52.520 --> 23:54.300]  But, you know, this is what happened.
[23:54.300 --> 24:07.960]  And now I think that the horse is out of the barn, but I think a little bit of the silver lining here is that now that so many people have woken up to this, not just the privacy, security, hacker community, but this data that's out there already will,
[24:08.140 --> 24:10.960]  to some extent, I think, become stale.
[24:11.220 --> 24:17.620]  Because once we change our lifestyles, we change our patterns, that data does not necessarily reflect who we are forever.
[24:18.060 --> 24:29.180]  So if you are cautious and you are judicious about sharing this nonsense going forward with these social media companies, I think you can begin to actually protect yourself, especially as your lifestyle changes.
[24:29.600 --> 24:30.000]  Walter?
[24:30.140 --> 24:32.560]  Yeah, I think when it comes to Facebook, they're tracking you.
[24:32.720 --> 24:36.640]  Even if you don't have a Facebook profile or if you log out, they still track you.
[24:36.680 --> 24:39.540]  So it's not really enough to, like, hashtag delete Facebook.
[24:40.540 --> 24:43.960]  That's why it is so pernicious and, like, it will require legislation.
[24:43.960 --> 24:45.580]  Well, you have to actually delete Facebook.
[24:45.800 --> 24:48.180]  You have to actually not use it for it to become effective.
[24:48.240 --> 24:49.080]  You can't just say it.
[24:49.460 --> 24:50.560]  Yeah, well, true.
[24:50.700 --> 25:00.620]  But even then, they're still using, like, if you delete your Facebook account, they still, like, track you, your IP, and they build a profile against you.
[25:00.760 --> 25:03.360]  But they're not going to trace you if you don't have a Facebook account.
[25:03.420 --> 25:04.240]  You're not saying that, are you?
[25:04.240 --> 25:10.460]  Not you as a person, but they still attach to your IDs and your IP address and browsing habits.
[25:10.640 --> 25:12.500]  They have, like, you as a...
[25:12.500 --> 25:16.180]  It's basically, like, they build a profile about you even if you don't have an account.
[25:16.180 --> 25:20.320]  What, you're saying Facebook will continue to monitor you even if you delete your account?
[25:20.320 --> 25:20.720]  Exactly.
[25:20.880 --> 25:24.280]  Like, any, like, salon.com or, like, New York Times.
[25:24.420 --> 25:27.640]  All these news websites have Facebook tracking in them.
[25:28.600 --> 25:29.000]  Yeah.
[25:29.620 --> 25:33.640]  Well, I always assumed you had to have an account to be tracked by Facebook.
[25:33.640 --> 25:35.480]  You're saying it goes beyond that?
[25:35.640 --> 25:35.800]  Yep.
[25:36.600 --> 25:36.780]  All right.
[25:36.800 --> 25:38.360]  I'd like to see some evidence of this.
[25:38.500 --> 25:38.600]  Yeah.
[25:38.800 --> 25:40.560]  The term for it is shadow profile.
[25:40.740 --> 25:51.780]  And this is basically when your friends and associates who have Facebooks, even if you don't, they've all, or the great majority of them, have uploaded their contacts to Facebook in hopes of finding their friends.
[25:51.920 --> 25:57.740]  So Facebook knows that there is person X here, that all this circle of friends all have in their contacts.
[25:57.740 --> 26:11.900]  They also know that person X goes to these Facebook pages, goes to these other pages with Facebook bugs on them, and they will build a profile about you, whether or not you have an account, whether or not you're signed in, whether or not you're in, you know,
[26:11.980 --> 26:15.600]  incognito mode or what have you, because they know that you are a person.
[26:15.740 --> 26:24.280]  They might not have your Facebook account info, but they know that you are a person who's got these bugs, And they track you just like any other ad network will track you, and it goes from there.
[26:24.420 --> 26:30.800]  So yes, even if you don't have Facebook, even if you've never had Facebook, there is a shadow profile about you very likely in Facebook's system.
[26:30.920 --> 26:33.780]  But how do they... you say they don't know who you are.
[26:33.860 --> 26:35.100]  How do they identify you then?
[26:35.520 --> 26:41.740]  Because you can identify unique visitors to a site in the manner of any ad network, any sort of cookie-based thing.
[26:42.440 --> 26:49.360]  And so they can track that this person is looking at this Facebook page or this other page with a Facebook bug on it or whatever.
[26:49.360 --> 26:56.320]  You're still a unique user ID, basically, in the grander scheme of Facebook's tracking of people all over the web.
[26:56.380 --> 26:57.420]  What if you change your IP?
[26:58.120 --> 26:59.560]  Do they think you're unique then?
[26:59.680 --> 27:01.440]  Do they think you're a different person?
[27:01.660 --> 27:17.740]  Well, there's tons of other info that you can get based on the browser plugins you have installed or your operating system, the size of your web browser, like how many pixels it is, like the EF has a project like this where you can determine how unique your web browser is.
[27:17.740 --> 27:23.220]  And it's surprisingly easy to de-anonymize people based on any of these things, even if you don't have your IP.
[27:23.260 --> 27:29.040]  Well, if you run the Tor browser, which I recommend everybody do, they warn you.
[27:29.180 --> 27:32.280]  They say, okay, you're switching to full-screen mode for something.
[27:32.920 --> 27:35.540]  This could make it easier to figure out who you are.
[27:35.640 --> 27:38.080]  And they'll hold your hand through the whole process.
[27:38.080 --> 27:39.080]  It's really quite fascinating.
[27:39.080 --> 27:44.160]  But, you know, this is something, this is what we are facing today in the 21st century.
[27:44.340 --> 27:46.780]  This level of tracking is a reality.
[27:46.780 --> 27:49.360]  And we're seeing it uncovered day after day.
[27:49.540 --> 27:51.640]  And this is just another example of it.
[27:51.960 --> 28:06.980]  You know, another instance of fallout from this Cambridge Analytica fiasco with respect to Facebook specifically is this story about Android users that I don't think really got a lot of attention or maybe not enough attention as it should be getting.
[28:06.980 --> 28:25.000]  And this is about, you know, people who were uploading their contacts to Facebook Messenger on an Android phone apparently had every single one of their text messages, along with metadata, call location information, et cetera, and every single one of their calls to their contacts uploaded to Facebook.
[28:25.140 --> 28:26.080]  I had heard about this.
[28:26.260 --> 28:28.680]  For years and years, this has been happening.
[28:28.680 --> 28:35.860]  And when confronted with this information, Mark Zuckerberg had said, well, yeah, it was all in the fine print.
[28:35.860 --> 28:40.320]  We said we were going to do this and users agreed to upload their contacts.
[28:40.500 --> 28:41.720]  You didn't necessarily have to do it.
[28:41.840 --> 28:58.640]  But here's a really kind of scary instance where every time you used your phone, if you were an Android user, every time you made a phone call, every time you received or made or sent a text message, there's a log of that in some place that is not your phone and is not the telephone company.
[28:58.640 --> 29:06.420]  You know, this is a huge repository of data that everybody knows is stored by Facebook now.
[29:06.580 --> 29:08.560]  So think about that for a second.
[29:08.760 --> 29:10.000]  Who can access that now?
[29:10.480 --> 29:14.920]  Law enforcement can send subpoenas and get your entire call history by going directly to Facebook.
[29:15.280 --> 29:28.380]  Let's say you're in a really hairy divorce and your spouse wants to figure out with whom you've been communicating for several years or on a particular date three years ago and she knows that you had an Android phone and used the Messenger app.
[29:28.520 --> 29:34.780]  Well, her attorney could hypothetically subpoena Facebook for your records because they're relevant to a litigation.
[29:35.040 --> 29:44.460]  I mean, this is like a huge treasure trove of data for lawyers that I think is going to inundate Facebook with subpoena requests.
[29:44.600 --> 29:49.680]  Well, it's interesting too because you can get your records from Facebook supposedly.
[29:50.020 --> 29:51.380]  You can get a zip file downloaded.
[29:51.380 --> 29:54.240]  I did this the other day and I have an Android phone.
[29:54.240 --> 29:55.780]  None of my phone calls were there.
[29:55.920 --> 29:56.980]  None of my text messages were there.
[29:57.080 --> 29:58.120]  Did you upload your contacts?
[29:58.440 --> 30:01.580]  I have never done that and I've never opened Facebook on my phone.
[30:01.800 --> 30:02.900]  I think those are two things.
[30:03.260 --> 30:17.700]  However, when you asked me that question, my contacts from Twitter were automatically put into my Android contacts, which is a major pain because I have a lot more people there than I would speak to and people I would never speak to.
[30:18.120 --> 30:23.600]  And it's not like phone numbers were included in that contact list and it was a major pain to get rid of that.
[30:24.200 --> 30:34.440]  But lots of things like this happen where you're not asked permission or something reverts back to a less secure platform than what you want.
[30:34.920 --> 30:36.560]  And we have to be on top of this.
[30:36.620 --> 30:40.260]  We have to be aware of what is changing in our day-to-day lives.
[30:40.300 --> 30:46.460]  And if we keep using these apps and these devices out of convenience, there is always a price to pay for that.
[30:46.980 --> 30:53.160]  Well, the other issue here, I think, is that, you know, for Zuckerberg to come back and say, well, sure, it was in the fine print.
[30:54.120 --> 30:57.380]  That's such a nonsensical response to this.
[30:57.480 --> 30:58.640]  You know, it's really unfair.
[30:59.340 --> 31:04.900]  To give you an example of this, last year I did an interview with CNBC on the Snatch application.
[31:04.900 --> 31:06.100]  That's really popular in the UK.
[31:06.120 --> 31:07.640]  It's one of these augmented reality things.
[31:07.880 --> 31:11.440]  And we were talking about the privacy issue stemming from the use of applications on phones.
[31:11.440 --> 31:20.700]  And as a test, they wanted me to read all of the privacy policies, the terms of service, the terms of use, the cookie policies, all the policies that related to this particular application.
[31:21.060 --> 31:22.220]  I read through all of them.
[31:22.500 --> 31:27.440]  And it took me, as a lawyer who's familiar with this, about six hours to read through that.
[31:27.900 --> 31:30.960]  I mean, Facebook is infinitely more complex than Snatch.
[31:31.480 --> 31:43.200]  Could you imagine, you know, relying on the fact that this was somewhere buried in some boilerplate, fine print, and that that equals knowing and voluntary consent to share this particular data?
[31:43.480 --> 31:53.240]  I mean, I think it's going to be a tough sell for Facebook's lawyers in the face of what is already becoming a gigantic amount of regulatory scrutiny.
[31:53.480 --> 32:09.800]  I mean, I think just this week, 37 attorneys general have signed on to a letter from the National Association of Attorneys General demanding answers to questions like, were you auditing other researchers that had access to this data that was then weaponized by Cambridge Analytica?
[32:09.920 --> 32:14.020]  And how many other researchers were out there that had access to this repository of data?
[32:14.140 --> 32:17.140]  And what are you doing going forward to prevent this from happening?
[32:17.300 --> 32:19.320]  So there's a lot of tough questions that they're going to be facing.
[32:19.720 --> 32:28.220]  Well, there's also the issue of ICE, which is the federal agency that is tasked with Trump's program of mass deportation.
[32:28.340 --> 32:29.260]  We may have heard of them recently.
[32:29.260 --> 32:33.540]  They've been using back-end Facebook data to locate and track suspects.
[32:33.540 --> 32:39.000]  That's according to a string of emails and documents obtained by The Intercept through a public records request.
[32:39.200 --> 32:46.500]  The hunt for one particular suspect provides a rare window into how ICE agents use social media and powerful data analytics tools to find targets.
[32:47.500 --> 32:51.200]  They basically have been using this for quite some time.
[32:51.340 --> 33:01.960]  Now, the story at first erroneously reported that they were using private Facebook data, but actually, it is data that almost anyone could get their hands on.
[33:02.620 --> 33:04.640]  Here's what they learned.
[33:04.740 --> 33:13.400]  February and March of 2017, several ICE agents were in communication with a detective from Las Cruces, New Mexico, to find information about a particular person.
[33:13.400 --> 33:21.440]  They were ultimately able to obtain back-end Facebook data, revealing a log of when the account was accessed, the IP addresses corresponding to each login.
[33:21.440 --> 33:35.080]  An agent of Homeland Security Investigations, which is their investigative arm, emailed the team a Facebook business record, which revealed the suspect's phone number and the locations of each login into his account during a date range.
[33:35.700 --> 33:44.300]  Law enforcement agents routinely use bank, telephone, and internet records for investigations, but the extent to which ICE uses social media is not well known.
[33:44.440 --> 33:49.920]  But, you know, I can just pretty much predict that they use it a lot more than we believe.
[33:50.640 --> 33:51.400]  Crossing borders.
[33:51.560 --> 33:56.180]  We see them accessing the internet to see what is said about us.
[33:57.680 --> 33:58.720]  They're looking on Facebook.
[33:58.720 --> 33:59.540]  They're looking on Twitter.
[33:59.700 --> 34:00.680]  They're looking all over the place.
[34:02.060 --> 34:04.660]  And the more information we give them, the more they have.
[34:04.740 --> 34:05.460]  This is all voluntary.
[34:05.460 --> 34:14.320]  And that's why it's a little hard for me to be completely sympathetic when people are voluntarily giving out this information because it's convenient, because it's cool.
[34:14.880 --> 34:16.200]  There's always a price.
[34:16.200 --> 34:19.740]  And we just have to remember that and realize what it is we're giving away.
[34:19.900 --> 34:20.140]  Volter.
[34:20.300 --> 34:31.780]  It's really, in many ways, not voluntary because there are so many things that, like community organizing, activist organizing, restaurants that only, you can only find out information about them on Facebook.
[34:32.300 --> 34:38.160]  And we were talking earlier about, like, WeChat and Sina Weibo and, like, these services.
[34:38.420 --> 34:40.180]  Like, in China, it's even more so necessary.
[34:40.180 --> 34:50.020]  You can't, like, quote-unquote, opt out of these services because, like, they're, like, that's literally the only, like, dining establishments there and shopping places.
[34:50.080 --> 34:51.240]  They don't have websites.
[34:51.240 --> 34:54.740]  They only have, like, WeChat presences.
[34:54.740 --> 34:59.660]  So if you want to, like, order takeout or find out hours of places, you literally have to go to these places.
[34:59.660 --> 35:04.920]  Well, I've never heard of a place that only is on Facebook, and you can't get any information on them unless you go to Facebook.
[35:05.060 --> 35:16.620]  But what you say does carry truth because, Kai, what was that lecture we saw at CCC about China and how they are basically implementing this personality code?
[35:16.860 --> 35:18.920]  Yeah, it's the social credit system.
[35:19.260 --> 35:19.820]  Social credits.
[35:19.820 --> 35:21.300]  Yeah, it's fascinating.
[35:21.500 --> 35:31.020]  But they're incorporating a lot of the different technologies that have been, you know, emerging in individual contexts and tested out.
[35:31.160 --> 35:32.260]  I'm thinking, like, cryptocurrency.
[35:32.260 --> 35:38.760]  Obviously, we've seen a huge, I guess, adoption of that, you know, worldwide.
[35:38.760 --> 35:48.080]  And then other things sort of, like, social media and even, like, social payment or crowdfunding.
[35:48.320 --> 35:52.160]  You know, a lot of that, parts and pieces of that are being incorporated.
[35:52.700 --> 35:54.800]  But you can get blacklisted really easily.
[35:55.100 --> 35:57.280]  And when you're blacklisted, things happen.
[35:57.280 --> 36:00.100]  For instance, you still owe money for child support.
[36:00.100 --> 36:02.280]  So why are you renting this particular type of car?
[36:02.500 --> 36:02.800]  Sure.
[36:02.800 --> 36:03.880]  You should be renting something cheaper.
[36:04.000 --> 36:05.740]  And you're not allowed to rent something.
[36:06.300 --> 36:10.760]  And, you know, at first, people will say, yeah, that makes sense.
[36:10.760 --> 36:12.660]  Why should somebody be allowed to do this?
[36:12.920 --> 36:14.600]  But it gets bigger and bigger.
[36:14.620 --> 36:17.700]  And before you know it, every aspect of your life is being controlled.
[36:17.840 --> 36:19.680]  And a big part of this is gamifying.
[36:19.800 --> 36:20.940]  So making it fun.
[36:21.100 --> 36:30.960]  And that was a big thrust of the talk and how people were, I guess, lulled, conditioned into being excited about it.
[36:30.960 --> 36:37.060]  Like, hey, I just got a gold star and, you know, three turnips.
[36:37.060 --> 36:40.700]  And, oh, yay, you know, I'm winning at life or whatever.
[36:41.100 --> 37:01.140]  And that comfort with this, then when there are consequences, makes it acceptable, right, to cast someone aside who does not meet the minimum of your social credit criteria or is thus losing at the game, we've talked about this being something on, you know,
[37:01.980 --> 37:04.940]  TV shows and series and movies.
[37:05.100 --> 37:06.440]  Oh, this is real life Black Mirror stuff.
[37:06.560 --> 37:06.760]  Absolutely.
[37:06.760 --> 37:07.200]  I was just...
[37:07.200 --> 37:10.060]  I didn't want to drop the name drop.
[37:10.240 --> 37:16.800]  But, yeah, there's a lot of these themes in science fiction and futurism.
[37:16.800 --> 37:37.880]  But in real ways, places and regimes like China want to implement this as a form of, as a form of transaction, you know, incorporating social and transactional life into one sort of grand system that polices itself and adheres to their sort of social mores.
[37:37.880 --> 37:42.660]  I remember a few years ago, I was shocked at how many people were playing Farmville.
[37:43.020 --> 37:45.140]  Right, Farmville, that's what it is, the Facebook game?
[37:45.140 --> 37:45.580]  It's one of them.
[37:45.760 --> 37:49.260]  Yeah, and, you know, you basically, you build your farm or whatever.
[37:49.500 --> 37:50.680]  There's also Second Life.
[37:50.940 --> 37:55.460]  Okay, and people are paying real money for virtual real estate.
[37:56.420 --> 38:02.200]  And I still cannot get my head around that concept, but people do this.
[38:02.260 --> 38:04.040]  And they pay a lot of money for this.
[38:04.040 --> 38:11.560]  For a damn video game, which is all it is, but it's also a social construct, and people take it very, very seriously.
[38:11.960 --> 38:15.860]  We are in charge of how much this controls our lives.
[38:15.940 --> 38:17.020]  At least we are now.
[38:17.280 --> 38:19.380]  And we had better take a good look at this.
[38:19.740 --> 38:26.500]  This became really popular with, you know, game systems being online and networked.
[38:26.520 --> 38:41.540]  As that became popular, you know, allowing people to access other features and other levels in games, it became something that they were able to transmit through game systems like, you know, the big ones, the big Xbox or Sony systems.
[38:41.760 --> 38:55.700]  But then in-app purchases, as smartphones became more and more prevalent, were another way to commodify a game that maybe you bought once, but then other features then, or other levels were something that you could buy at a cost.
[38:55.700 --> 39:03.680]  And, you know, telephone providers had the ability to allow these purchases and allow this mechanism to work on their platforms.
[39:03.680 --> 39:08.020]  And it's grown ever more ubiquitous from there.
[39:08.260 --> 39:11.640]  And you mentioned gamifying, like, our own invasions of privacy.
[39:11.980 --> 39:13.060]  There was a...
[39:13.060 --> 39:15.200]  There's a very good case with Snapchat.
[39:15.200 --> 39:16.780]  Very popular app.
[39:16.920 --> 39:18.040]  A lot of people still use it.
[39:18.040 --> 39:27.840]  But some time ago, they instigated a system where, in order to upload a user pic of yourself, you're limited to this other app they own, which makes a little cartoon version of you.
[39:27.960 --> 39:28.840]  And it's very cute.
[39:28.860 --> 39:30.520]  And you can, you know, dress it up like you.
[39:30.660 --> 39:32.300]  And it'll play with emojis and stuff like that.
[39:32.460 --> 39:35.640]  But in order to do this, you have to turn on your location services.
[39:35.840 --> 39:36.760]  You have to turn on your GPS.
[39:37.620 --> 39:42.260]  Because somehow to upload a user pic to a service, now this involves your GPS.
[39:42.520 --> 39:44.760]  So, you know, it's a fun thing.
[39:44.900 --> 39:46.180]  And younger people are using it.
[39:48.040 --> 39:50.100]  In order to use it, you'll click OK on...
[39:50.100 --> 39:53.180]  If it's fun enough, you'll click OK on whatever terms and conditions pop up.
[39:53.460 --> 39:57.560]  And in the meantime, you're basically being milked for very private, personal data.
[39:57.800 --> 40:01.220]  You know, there's other ways where you find yourself being sucked into this.
[40:01.500 --> 40:02.440]  Now, I don't use...
[40:02.440 --> 40:05.080]  I'm on Facebook, but I don't use Facebook a lot.
[40:05.080 --> 40:07.500]  And I certainly don't tell Facebook all of my innermost secrets.
[40:07.620 --> 40:10.700]  In fact, I feed it a good amount of fake info, which you can do.
[40:10.860 --> 40:14.000]  You can feed it all kinds of lies.
[40:14.320 --> 40:15.780]  It's not a crime, at least not yet.
[40:16.600 --> 40:19.720]  And I've been connected ever since AIM went away.
[40:19.960 --> 40:24.460]  I connected my Trillian account to Facebook chat, whatever it's called.
[40:24.680 --> 40:27.860]  And I found that I'm able to communicate with more people that way, which is kind of cool.
[40:28.040 --> 40:35.140]  But for some reason, a whole bunch of them were notified literally months after I connected that I was suddenly available to chat.
[40:35.440 --> 40:41.480]  So in one day, I got all these messages from these people I hadn't talked to in years saying, hey, what's up?
[40:41.580 --> 40:43.120]  You know, and I was wondering what's going on?
[40:43.200 --> 40:44.880]  Why are all these people suddenly messaging me?
[40:45.260 --> 40:55.080]  And for whatever reason, Facebook had decided that was the day it was going to reveal that I was there, even though they could have seen that I was there before if they had just looked at their list of people available on chat.
[40:55.460 --> 41:01.640]  But what Facebook had done was open up the door to all these conversations I wound up having with people I hadn't spoken to in years.
[41:01.760 --> 41:05.860]  And I realized, wow, what a way I just got manipulated into reconnecting with people.
[41:05.860 --> 41:06.740]  It was pleasant.
[41:06.840 --> 41:08.620]  It wasn't, you know, a bad thing.
[41:08.880 --> 41:18.560]  But it was a little creepy that they were able to just, at some kind of a click of a button, whether it was a human or a computer that did it, control my life that way.
[41:18.780 --> 41:19.060]  Voltaire?
[41:19.240 --> 41:22.920]  Yeah, I think in the West, we kind of have our own social credit system.
[41:22.920 --> 41:25.760]  It's like, but it's privatized, not run by the government.
[41:26.160 --> 41:41.640]  But you have things like, based on your number of social media followers you have on like Twitter or something, when you, if you get bumped from an airline, you likely end up getting like, rebooked is based on how many Twitter followers you have, or if you like tweet at the airline to complain to them,
[41:41.820 --> 41:49.360]  or we have like insurance where your insurance rates will go up if you, if you have certain preconditions.
[41:49.620 --> 41:50.660]  Well, that's an interesting point.
[41:50.780 --> 41:53.360]  Now, you know, I complain quite a bit on Twitter sometimes.
[41:53.580 --> 41:56.040]  I don't have that many followers, but I have, you know, a bunch.
[41:57.080 --> 42:00.040]  And sometimes the company responds very quickly.
[42:00.040 --> 42:05.320]  You're saying that, depending on how many followers you have, that would indicate how quickly they respond.
[42:05.720 --> 42:06.020]  Definitely.
[42:06.480 --> 42:11.980]  There are lots of, there are companies like, like Cloud, which basically build algorithms around social media followers.
[42:12.160 --> 42:18.740]  And they sell this information to, to companies like airlines, and they help them choose who to respond to most.
[42:19.300 --> 42:19.640]  Uh-huh.
[42:19.960 --> 42:32.880]  And then like with the West Virginia teacher strike, recently that one of the things they were fighting against was the requirement with their insurance that they were tracked all the time and have their insurance rate affected by how many steps they take out of the day.
[42:33.400 --> 42:36.280]  So it's not like I'm wearing a mandatory Fitbit or something.
[42:36.460 --> 42:40.060]  So it's not like, uh, it's not like China is alone in this.
[42:41.020 --> 42:52.980]  I think, I think what you're saying here, Voltaire, is really terrifying and, and on, on one level and just annoying on another level, because I, I just really, you know, to be honest, I really hate Twitter.
[42:53.160 --> 42:54.080]  I hate using it.
[42:54.280 --> 42:55.120]  I hate reading it.
[42:55.120 --> 43:04.660]  I feel like I have to, and to determine my level of customer service based on the number of Twitter followers you have is just such an abhorrent notion to me.
[43:04.840 --> 43:12.160]  It, it, it defies this concept of an egalitarian society in which we're supposed to live in, you know, that we're all treated equally.
[43:12.380 --> 43:14.300]  They were all born with these inalienable rights.
[43:14.480 --> 43:18.200]  And, but somehow, you know, our Twitter following dictates, you know, where we are.
[43:18.200 --> 43:33.820]  But, you know, on this level and, and to, to bounce off something that, that Rob had mentioned as well, which is the idea of turning location services on for seemingly innocuous purposes and then having that misused, um, which goes back to the original issue we were discussing with regard to ICE.
[43:34.220 --> 43:38.160]  I mean, I think on the other hand, of course, they're going to try to get at this data.
[43:38.460 --> 43:54.140]  It would be, I think, legal malpractice for ICE or Homeland Security attorneys to just turn a blind eye to the fact that these are gigantic repositories of data that could have actionable intelligence that could lead to them doing their jobs more effectively.
[43:54.480 --> 44:09.920]  I mean, if you can find photos on Facebook of people with MS-13 gang members and you need to present that to an immigration court, then of course you're going to subpoena Facebook or you're going to subpoena Twitter and you're going to look for these particular types of photographs or data.
[44:10.160 --> 44:28.600]  And to be honest with you, um, in fact, Steve Rambam and I deal a lot with these social media companies and, and we often send subpoenas to get information from companies like Twitter or Facebook and they do not make it easy for you.
[44:28.720 --> 44:32.360]  They really actually discourage compliance with their subpoenas.
[44:32.460 --> 44:50.400]  And most of the time when you send a request for lawful information about somebody who may be doing harm to another person, you're met with a nonsensical response that says, based on the Stored Communications Act, we can't fulfill your request, which is a completely bogus legal argument if you're asking for non-content information.
[44:50.660 --> 45:00.160]  And they rely on a misinterpretation of, let's say, your subpoena or the law to deny you your lawful right to access certain data.
[45:00.340 --> 45:03.940]  Um, look, if you know they're keeping it, you can get it.
[45:04.040 --> 45:07.660]  If you're a lawyer and you have subpoena power, you have to use it.
[45:08.040 --> 45:14.340]  So it's not about, I think, ICE and lawyers misusing their powers to get at this data.
[45:14.420 --> 45:17.140]  It's about why the data is there in the first place.
[45:17.340 --> 45:19.740]  I mean, I think it's a real chicken and egg problem.
[45:19.940 --> 45:31.140]  And finally, people are waking up to the idea that it's really a bad idea to have all this centralized personal information in the hands of companies who are unaccountable to anybody but their shareholders.
[45:31.140 --> 45:34.000]  The thing to remember also is that it's a choice.
[45:34.000 --> 45:35.740]  You're choosing to do this.
[45:35.840 --> 45:36.660]  You're choosing to use Twitter.
[45:36.820 --> 45:37.760]  You're choosing to use Facebook.
[45:38.240 --> 45:46.980]  And if people are suddenly aware of the fact that this information is being abused, something better can be designed.
[45:47.160 --> 45:49.340]  And who better to design it than hackers?
[45:49.940 --> 45:54.560]  Who better to respect privacy than people that understand it?
[45:54.620 --> 46:05.160]  And I think the time is right for something that gives the same convenience and utility as Twitter, as Facebook.
[46:05.440 --> 46:11.600]  The time is now for something like that to exist that also respects the privacy rights that we all have.
[46:11.940 --> 46:17.260]  And I'm sure things are being developed right now as we speak.
[46:17.600 --> 46:20.940]  But they have yet to catch on this level.
[46:21.140 --> 46:21.800]  And I think they will.
[46:22.020 --> 46:24.580]  Now that this is happening, I think they certainly will.
[46:25.080 --> 46:28.580]  I do want to move on to another story, though, because we are running out of time.
[46:29.020 --> 46:30.900]  And this is certainly fascinating.
[46:30.900 --> 46:32.660]  We could talk for hours about this.
[46:32.840 --> 46:36.880]  But Rob, you posted this story to our list.
[46:37.420 --> 46:38.860]  And you had me going.
[46:38.860 --> 46:40.280]  I got to say, you had me going here.
[46:40.340 --> 46:41.120]  It's an April Fool's story.
[46:41.260 --> 46:43.080]  So, you know, it's a little early for this.
[46:43.240 --> 46:48.720]  But basically, the headline reads, Microsoft to ban offensive language from Skype, Xbox, Office, and other services.
[46:48.820 --> 46:50.480]  It's well written.
[46:50.480 --> 46:51.120]  I'll say that.
[46:51.260 --> 46:52.780]  But let me just get into this a little bit.
[46:52.860 --> 46:54.580]  And we'll see just how silly this is.
[46:55.460 --> 47:02.640]  Microsoft will ban offensive language and inappropriate content from Skype, Xbox, Office, and other services on May the 1st.
[47:03.020 --> 47:05.700]  Good that he didn't say April 1st, because everybody would have seen through it then.
[47:06.280 --> 47:09.200]  Claiming it has the right to go through your private data to investigate.
[47:09.540 --> 47:10.240]  So you better watch out.
[47:10.320 --> 47:17.780]  If you're playing Xbox or you get ticked off and you start cussing, Microsoft might ban you for the offensive language.
[47:17.880 --> 47:24.960]  Or if you and a significant other are getting hot and heavy via Skype, you better watch your language and any nudity, because that too can get you banned.
[47:25.180 --> 47:30.040]  Yeah, all this is something that we're facing in the future.
[47:30.140 --> 47:32.100]  Offensive language is, of course, fairly vague.
[47:32.340 --> 47:33.520]  Who is it offensive to?
[47:34.300 --> 47:38.320]  What your grandmother might find offensive and what you might find offensive will be vastly different.
[47:39.240 --> 47:50.540]  So basically, the code of conduct enforcement from Microsoft says, when investigating alleged violations of these terms, Microsoft reserves the right to review your content in order to resolve the issue.
[47:51.000 --> 47:56.440]  Microsoft adds, however, we cannot monitor the entire services and make no attempt to do so.
[47:57.340 --> 48:10.760]  Now, some folks believe the changes in Microsoft's terms may be related to Congress passing the Fight Online Sex Trafficking Act, known as FOSTA, which was combined with the Stop Enabling Sex Trafficking Act known as SESTA.
[48:11.000 --> 48:12.880]  So the whole thing is known as FOSTA-SESTA.
[48:14.120 --> 48:21.060]  Hold platforms responsible for users' speech, illegally shared content, and anything that might be construed as trafficking.
[48:21.060 --> 48:23.220]  It has been called the death of the open internet.
[48:23.380 --> 48:25.020]  A little dramatic there, Rob.
[48:25.160 --> 48:26.200]  It's kind of going over the top.
[48:26.880 --> 48:31.240]  The Department of Justice warned that the bill raises a serious constitutional concern.
[48:31.240 --> 48:33.580]  The Department of Justice warned this.
[48:33.960 --> 48:34.480]  Wow.
[48:34.840 --> 48:44.080]  As it shall apply regardless of whether the conduct alleged occurred, which doesn't even make sense, or is alleged to have occurred before, on, or after such date of enactment.
[48:44.520 --> 48:45.040]  Okay.
[48:45.120 --> 48:53.800]  In short, since it applies retroactively, it applies to trafficking that took place before the law passed, which the DOJ believes violates the Constitution's ex post facto clause.
[48:54.720 --> 48:55.580]  Um, yeah.
[48:56.080 --> 49:06.300]  Um, okay, Rob, what, uh, I, you know, great sense of humor, as always, but, um, you could have, could have, uh, maybe proofread this a little bit and made it a little bit more believable?
[49:06.520 --> 49:07.100]  I, I know.
[49:07.220 --> 49:09.880]  It's, it's just really, it's just really wacky and out there, isn't it?
[49:09.940 --> 49:12.860]  I, I mean, it's kind of laying on, laying it on a little thick.
[49:13.040 --> 49:13.240]  Uh-huh.
[49:14.040 --> 49:23.480]  Um, so we, we, we're to believe that, um, that Skype will be monitored for offensive language and you will not be allowed to use it if you use offensive language.
[49:23.740 --> 49:25.240]  That's, that's what you're saying here.
[49:25.320 --> 49:25.940]  That's the gist.
[49:26.060 --> 49:26.140]  Yeah.
[49:26.540 --> 49:26.700]  Uh-huh.
[49:26.700 --> 49:26.780]  Uh-huh.
[49:27.520 --> 49:29.420]  Um, very, very clever, very creative.
[49:29.700 --> 49:29.940]  Yeah.
[49:30.620 --> 49:34.360]  And where did you get this little, uh, uh, um, jokester of an article here?
[49:34.840 --> 49:36.540]  Oh, well, it's, it's kind of all over the place.
[49:36.560 --> 49:39.680]  I mean, CBS, uh, has got a copy of the story I'm looking at right now.
[49:39.740 --> 49:40.880]  So they're, they're in on it.
[49:40.960 --> 49:54.260]  It's, uh, everyone's calling for this, you know, it's, uh, it seems, it seems to like a lot of people are in on this particular gag and I, I can get behind a big, a nice big, uh, crazy sort of, uh, sort of hoax or, or, you know, just something funny, something ridiculous.
[49:54.480 --> 49:54.700]  Uh-huh.
[49:54.840 --> 49:55.020]  Uh-huh.
[49:55.260 --> 50:00.360]  Um, except I, I, um, You have another April Fool's joke for us right now?
[50:00.500 --> 50:01.200]  What's, what's that?
[50:01.660 --> 50:04.940]  Well, uh, it, it actually, it looks, it looks legit, guys.
[50:05.380 --> 50:13.180]  Wait, you're saying, you're saying that us telling you that this is an April 1st joke is the April 1st joke and that this is really true.
[50:13.700 --> 50:14.500]  That's what you're saying.
[50:14.500 --> 50:17.660]  Yeah, I mean, there are layers upon layers, uh, right here.
[50:17.740 --> 50:24.960]  I mean, that's, that's what makes a good joke is, you know, multi-layered, uh, you know, things just are, are, are just unexpected and coming from nowhere.
[50:25.180 --> 50:27.560]  And, um, actually, uh, I don't know.
[50:27.660 --> 50:29.480]  What, what, what does, uh, what is our lawyer?
[50:29.640 --> 50:30.940]  Yeah, Alex, you've got your lawyer glasses on.
[50:30.980 --> 50:32.220]  So what, what do you, what do you make of this?
[50:32.760 --> 50:33.660]  I'm confused.
[50:34.080 --> 50:34.440]  Okay.
[50:34.600 --> 50:34.960]  All right.
[50:34.960 --> 50:36.320]  That's always bad when you're confused.
[50:36.500 --> 50:37.820]  I'm a little confused here.
[50:38.420 --> 50:43.360]  Um, look, I wouldn't put it beyond the pale for something like this to actually happen.
[50:43.700 --> 50:52.400]  It seems totally crazy and, um, wouldn't be the best way to win friends and influence people if you were trying to encourage people to use your particular platform.
[50:52.600 --> 50:56.400]  But on the other hand, Skype is so goddamn hard to use lately.
[50:56.740 --> 50:57.120]  Whoa, whoa, whoa.
[50:57.180 --> 50:57.780]  You're off Skype.
[50:58.340 --> 50:58.740]  That's it.
[50:59.060 --> 51:00.040]  No, you're done.
[51:00.420 --> 51:01.620]  You are banned from Skype.
[51:02.000 --> 51:05.640]  You know, please ban me from it because I can't figure out how to use it anymore.
[51:05.760 --> 51:07.980]  It seems like it's impossible to make a goddamn call.
[51:08.300 --> 51:09.020]  Oh, wow.
[51:09.200 --> 51:10.540]  And now you're off Facebook.
[51:10.840 --> 51:11.520]  Okay, good.
[51:11.740 --> 51:12.360]  Even better.
[51:12.760 --> 51:16.760]  You know, hashtag delete me, whatever, you know, let me download my data first.
[51:16.920 --> 51:17.480]  I don't know.
[51:17.680 --> 51:19.220]  This is all very confusing to me.
[51:19.300 --> 51:20.380]  I'm, I'm a bit mystified.
[51:20.580 --> 51:21.480]  I don't know if this is real.
[51:21.620 --> 51:22.620]  I don't know if this is fake.
[51:23.160 --> 51:26.340]  Um, I feel like, you know, I feel like I'm watching the regular news.
[51:26.560 --> 51:28.860]  This seems to be real, but how is it possible?
[51:29.080 --> 51:29.780]  There's no way this is real.
[51:29.780 --> 51:31.160]  And what else, what else is it going on?
[51:31.160 --> 51:33.040]  I heard people saying it's going to affect email.
[51:33.340 --> 51:36.020]  Rob, are you aware of, of email that could be scanned for bad language?
[51:36.340 --> 51:50.340]  I don't know, but I, I, I felt like a parallel to, uh, to kind of, uh, compare this to is that, um, imagine if the telephone company themselves, uh, basically listened in on the telephone calls you were making to make sure that you weren't saying anything naughty or that,
[51:50.340 --> 51:56.540]  uh, you weren't, you weren't being, uh, basically, uh, a bad, uh, a bad hombre in any, in any sense.
[51:56.640 --> 52:00.620]  Well, we all know Ma Bell used to listen to everybody on the phone, but they, they would let you talk.
[52:00.720 --> 52:03.500]  In fact, they wanted you to talk so they could, uh, build a case against you.
[52:04.240 --> 52:04.600]  Right.
[52:04.740 --> 52:11.180]  But, uh, it, it looks like, uh, Microsoft is, you know, getting in on that action maybe 30 years later and it's, it's kind of, it's kind of frightening.
[52:11.420 --> 52:18.040]  Well, if this is in fact true, which it's starting to look like it is, our choice is not to use Microsoft, right?
[52:18.040 --> 52:21.480]  We've already said Microsoft sucks many times, so we're probably already banned.
[52:21.580 --> 52:24.340]  This is sort of in the theme of, uh, something you choose to use.
[52:24.500 --> 52:31.140]  It's, um, a lot of technologies that they, um, they run privately and, uh, and for commercial purposes.
[52:31.540 --> 52:35.420]  So, you know, you, you have to, I guess, look at alternatives if they're serious about this.
[52:35.420 --> 52:40.420]  The problem with that approach, though, is that, uh, uh, it affects everybody.
[52:40.620 --> 52:48.980]  So anybody that has, like, uh, unless you're willing to, like, run your own XMP piece or something, you're not, it's gonna be very difficult because the liabilities are so onus.
[52:49.140 --> 53:00.140]  Um, even, like, like, places like Reddit who are traditionally very, uh, friendly towards free speech are banning, like, lots of, uh, subreddits for, like, sex workers and stuff that help them communicate and do their job safely.
[53:00.420 --> 53:00.660]  Uh-huh.
[53:00.820 --> 53:07.600]  But that's specifically related to sex trafficking, supposedly, and, and a very, uh, wide interpretation.
[53:08.020 --> 53:10.360]  Uh, this seems to go well beyond even that.
[53:10.720 --> 53:11.640]  Just language.
[53:12.340 --> 53:21.040]  Yeah, it's like if, uh, if a game system became run by, like, a church group and they're like, hey, we only want you talking about Jesus Christ.
[53:21.320 --> 53:21.900]  Uh-huh.
[53:22.040 --> 53:22.200]  Yeah.
[53:22.320 --> 53:25.780]  And you can't say anything else or whatever it is, you know?
[53:26.000 --> 53:32.480]  I mean, and, and honestly, if any of you actually listen to gaming and, like, the kind of chat and discussion that goes on there?
[53:32.600 --> 53:35.080]  There's discussion that goes on during... Oh, I know there's a lot of screaming.
[53:35.700 --> 53:36.020]  Yeah.
[53:36.180 --> 53:39.180]  A lot, a lot of discussion about, uh, people's mothers and what they might do.
[53:39.480 --> 53:39.940]  Oh, really?
[53:40.100 --> 53:40.300]  Interesting.
[53:40.500 --> 53:41.340]  In their recreational time.
[53:41.440 --> 53:41.540]  Wow.
[53:41.540 --> 53:43.060]  It's not a very welcoming place.
[53:43.140 --> 53:43.360]  Uh-huh.
[53:43.800 --> 53:45.100]  You know, I mean, it's...
[53:45.100 --> 53:49.960]  Well, I wish tremendous luck to anyone trying to govern that because that's certainly not going to go far.
[53:50.340 --> 54:05.960]  But, uh, actually, the long and the short of this is that, uh, Skype is, uh, as, as, uh, on the current internet, Skype is very popular with people like sex workers, consenting adult sex workers, doing their thing, um, and, uh, you know, to, in, in an attempt to crack on,
[54:06.140 --> 54:18.720]  crack down on that, uh, with this really wide-ranging, uh, sort of crackdown that's going on, it's just driving that sort of thing underground and stripping a lot of the safety protections that people in that line of work, um, have been able to, uh, to have for themselves.
[54:19.100 --> 54:24.560]  So, uh, this is actually, like, really dangerous for, uh, for people who do that sort of thing.
[54:24.720 --> 54:34.280]  And, um, it's not, uh, it's not helping sex trafficking so much as it is, uh, punishing people who are in lines of work that maybe the powers that be don't totally approve of.
[54:34.440 --> 54:40.520]  So, it's making things a lot more dangerous and, um, people have to, uh, fly under the radar for things that are completely legitimate.
[54:40.780 --> 54:40.940]  Yeah.
[54:41.100 --> 54:53.760]  And, uh, there was, uh, also Craigslist, uh, the, you know, very famous, uh, classified ad site, um, basically had to close down their entire personal ad section because, uh, it was being used by sex workers to, uh, you know, run their businesses.
[54:54.460 --> 54:55.300]  Backpage as well.
[54:55.440 --> 54:56.200]  Backpage as well.
[54:56.380 --> 55:11.880]  Um, basically a lot of these sites that, uh, people used to be able to, um, use for other purposes as well as this now find whole chunks of their, uh, of their utility, um, being, uh, thrown aside because of a misguided attempt to crack down on, uh, but think of the children type things.
[55:11.960 --> 55:19.420]  Isn't the fear of being liable a little bit of, like, an admission of, uh, of the of, uh, that, you know, that kind of stuff is going on on your, on your site?
[55:20.220 --> 55:24.280]  I don't, I don't know if, uh, I don't know if maybe, maybe Alex has an opinion on that.
[55:24.580 --> 55:25.440]  The fear of liability.
[55:25.820 --> 55:35.680]  But the fear of liability is a big thing, but, uh, also it's just like a way to, uh, yeah, punish a certain, uh, strata of society for, for being who they are and trying to do what they do.
[55:36.340 --> 55:41.260]  Um, I found the article online that we were actually referencing here.
[55:41.260 --> 55:45.540]  And what I wanted to check was that, because we have the print version here.
[55:45.740 --> 55:45.920]  Okay.
[55:46.080 --> 55:48.680]  And there is a link that says the Department of Justice warned.
[55:48.820 --> 55:49.780]  That's what I wanted to check out.
[55:49.780 --> 55:50.560]  Yeah, that's kind of weird.
[55:50.660 --> 55:54.360]  When the Department of Justice warns you that something doesn't add up, that's, uh...
[55:54.360 --> 56:02.680]  This actually looks real to me because there's a, a memorandum dated 27 February, 2018, signed by an Assistant Attorney General, Stephen E.
[56:02.820 --> 56:08.760]  Boyd, that actually raises the constitutional concerns with the retroactivity of this particular bill.
[56:08.760 --> 56:16.680]  Well, it doesn't relate specifically to Microsoft's terms of service changes, as far as I can tell, with my cursory scan of the memo here.
[56:17.020 --> 56:19.780]  But, um, yeah, there's a lot of issues here.
[56:19.880 --> 56:25.520]  And I can completely understand why service providers would be overreacting to something like this.
[56:25.760 --> 56:31.580]  And, and I'm also interested to see how this will play in with things like DMCA safe harbor.
[56:31.820 --> 56:40.280]  So, you know, you're not responsible for illegal content going over your networks, but all of a sudden you seem to be responsible for certain types of illegal content going over your network.
[56:40.600 --> 56:44.260]  It's amazing to me that we've been talking about net neutrality and all kinds of other issues.
[56:44.380 --> 56:45.840]  This one kind of snuck up on us.
[56:46.500 --> 56:48.560]  And now everybody is concerned about this.
[56:48.660 --> 56:53.400]  And, of course, you, you can go see the Electronic Frontier Foundation, EFF.org.
[56:53.520 --> 57:01.540]  They'll be talking all about this and figuring out ways to battle it and, and, and, uh, get this, uh, wiped into history.
[57:01.680 --> 57:04.960]  Hopefully we'll certainly be talking about it more in, in, in weeks ahead.
[57:05.080 --> 57:17.540]  By the way, speaking of EFF, um, and, uh, the hope conference coming up, uh, we have a special, um, um, thing we do during April of, of hope years where 10% of ticket sales go to the Electronic Frontier Foundation.
[57:17.720 --> 57:19.840]  In fact, if you look now, hope tickets are sold out.
[57:19.920 --> 57:30.540]  You can't get them, but starting Sunday, April 1st, you can, and 10% of the purchase price will go to, uh, a donation to the Electronic Frontier Foundation who fight things like this.
[57:30.640 --> 57:36.700]  And, uh, I am just very happy that they're around to do that because, uh, if they weren't, I don't know where we'd be.
[57:37.100 --> 57:39.400]  Uh, that's gonna have to do it for us this night.
[57:39.640 --> 57:41.200]  Uh, we could talk about this for hours to come.
[57:41.380 --> 57:44.020]  You can write to us, O-T-H at 2600.com.
[57:44.180 --> 57:46.200]  We'd love to hear from you and we'll see you again next week.
[57:46.280 --> 57:46.460]  Good night.
[58:27.400 --> 58:46.280]  Oh, oh, oh, oh, oh, oh, oh, oh, oh, oh, oh, oh, oh, oh, oh, oh, oh, oh, oh, oh, oh, oh, oh, oh, oh, oh, oh, oh, oh, oh, oh, oh, oh, oh, oh, oh, oh, oh, oh, oh, oh, oh, oh,
[58:56.340 --> 59:00.600]  oh, oh, oh, oh, oh, oh, oh, oh, oh, oh, oh, oh, oh, oh, oh, oh, oh, oh, oh, oh, oh, oh, oh, oh, oh, oh, oh, oh, oh, oh, oh, oh, oh, oh, oh, oh, oh, oh, oh, oh, oh, oh, oh, oh, oh, oh, oh, oh, oh, oh, oh, oh, oh, oh, oh, oh, oh, oh, oh, oh, oh, oh, oh,
[59:00.600 --> 59:00.600]  oh, oh, oh, oh, oh
[59:14.120 --> 59:28.220]  The end of the day...
[59:30.600 --> 59:36.770]  I always feel love and I'm just like one of
[01:00:05.290 --> 01:00:38.930]  my victims.
[01:00:38.930 --> 01:00:39.910]  I always feel strong with death.
[01:00:39.910 --> 01:00:44.790]  I always feel love and I have no promise.
[01:00:45.850 --> 01:00:49.070]  I always feel love and I really love you.
[01:00:49.070 --> 01:00:50.510]  I always feel love and I feel like somebody is watching me.
[01:00:50.510 --> 01:00:52.470]  And I am the rock.
[01:00:52.850 --> 01:00:55.650]  Oh, I wanna be my...