[00:01.560 --> 00:06.580]  We're coming up to the end of our broadcasting from the Empire State Building.
[00:06.840 --> 00:12.480]  It is an exciting time looking toward our broadcasting at four Times Square.
[00:12.800 --> 00:18.180]  Over the next several days, we will be moving our transmitter from the Empire State Building.
[00:18.600 --> 00:22.480]  There might be a few bumps in our broadcasting during this time.
[00:22.760 --> 00:25.600]  Please be patient and stay tuned.
[00:33.800 --> 00:36.480]  And you're listening to Radio Station WBAI New York.
[00:36.660 --> 00:38.520]  Actually, we are in some of those bumps right now.
[00:38.640 --> 00:45.900]  We are broadcasting from four Times Square, which might explain why you don't hear us in certain places and might explain why you hear us better in others.
[00:46.300 --> 00:47.320]  We'll keep you updated.
[00:47.460 --> 00:51.560]  But right now, it's eight o'clock time for another edition of Off the Hook.
[02:23.390 --> 02:25.110]  And a very good evening to everybody.
[02:25.170 --> 02:26.490]  The program is Off the Hook.
[02:26.590 --> 02:28.910]  Emmanuel Goldstein here with you, joined tonight by Kyle.
[02:29.310 --> 02:30.170]  Hey, how are you doing?
[02:30.350 --> 02:31.050]  Pretty good, pretty good.
[02:31.450 --> 02:31.810]  Voltaire.
[02:32.010 --> 02:32.250]  Hey.
[02:33.050 --> 02:33.590]  And Rob T.
[02:33.690 --> 02:34.010]  Firefly.
[02:34.250 --> 02:34.810]  Good evening.
[02:35.070 --> 02:35.670]  Mr. Rob T.
[02:35.770 --> 02:35.890]  Firefly.
[02:35.950 --> 02:37.290]  Actually, you were Mr. Rob T.
[02:37.390 --> 02:37.930]  Firefly before.
[02:38.130 --> 02:39.390]  Now you are married, Rob T.
[02:39.490 --> 02:39.830]  Firefly.
[02:39.830 --> 02:40.730]  I am indeed.
[02:40.910 --> 02:43.110]  He was Master Firefly before.
[02:43.350 --> 02:43.770]  Master Firefly.
[02:43.790 --> 02:44.790]  Now he's Mr. Firefly.
[02:44.910 --> 02:45.910]  That sounds like a demotion.
[02:46.090 --> 02:48.610]  And Mrs. Firefly is in the background there.
[02:48.610 --> 02:50.870]  Yeah, she's in the front row of the Off the Hook studio audience.
[02:50.910 --> 02:51.270]  Wow.
[02:51.590 --> 02:51.890]  Okay.
[02:51.990 --> 02:54.190]  And that's a prime place to be.
[02:54.330 --> 02:56.090]  Most people get fifth or sixth row.
[02:56.330 --> 02:57.350]  Most people don't marry me.
[02:57.490 --> 02:58.570]  Yes, that's true.
[02:58.690 --> 03:00.690]  That's the price you have to pay, I guess, to get the first row.
[03:01.570 --> 03:04.110]  So anyway, congratulations on that.
[03:04.230 --> 03:04.350]  Thank you.
[03:04.350 --> 03:04.910]  Welcome back.
[03:05.390 --> 03:07.910]  And a long life ahead.
[03:08.610 --> 03:09.210]  All that.
[03:09.910 --> 03:10.550]  Hi, I am.
[03:11.210 --> 03:12.010]  Yeah, everything.
[03:13.270 --> 03:13.370]  So.
[03:13.990 --> 03:14.430]  Congratulations.
[03:14.930 --> 03:15.430]  That too.
[03:15.670 --> 03:16.110]  Absolutely.
[03:17.470 --> 03:21.670]  We are here for our non-fundraising edition of the show.
[03:21.830 --> 03:23.770]  So congratulations to us for making it that far.
[03:23.910 --> 03:25.810]  And thank you to all the listeners who pledged support.
[03:26.830 --> 03:30.010]  Most people should have received some kind of notice by now of your premium.
[03:30.030 --> 03:33.190]  If you have not, email us, OTH at 2600.com.
[03:33.330 --> 03:34.670]  That goes for this fundraiser.
[03:34.790 --> 03:36.330]  That goes for previous fundraisers as well.
[03:36.330 --> 03:41.990]  We are making a valiant effort to make sure everybody gets what they pledged for.
[03:42.470 --> 03:46.150]  And hopefully everybody pays their pledge and keeps us going.
[03:46.150 --> 03:47.770]  As you can hear, there are improvements.
[03:47.770 --> 03:49.910]  We did move the transmitter.
[03:50.330 --> 03:55.030]  Or actually, we put in a temporary transmitter at four times square.
[03:56.750 --> 03:59.430]  And we walked out of the Empire State Building.
[03:59.690 --> 04:00.990]  Literally walked out of there.
[04:01.190 --> 04:03.690]  And we are no longer in the Empire State Building at all.
[04:04.250 --> 04:05.470]  We're up a few blocks.
[04:05.690 --> 04:06.530]  Four times square.
[04:06.670 --> 04:07.350]  It's a bit lower.
[04:07.630 --> 04:13.110]  The Empire State Building is one of the high buildings in the city, in case people don't know that.
[04:13.410 --> 04:16.030]  And four times square is slightly below that.
[04:16.030 --> 04:20.610]  Which means we have to raise our power to make the same listening range.
[04:20.610 --> 04:24.710]  And we haven't quite gotten the permanent transmitter in place yet.
[04:24.710 --> 04:29.050]  So you might notice there are some fringe areas that don't get the signal quite as well.
[04:29.170 --> 04:34.070]  I know Long Island, in particular, we used to be received, I think, out by Riverhead.
[04:34.110 --> 04:35.510]  Now it's barely Smithtown.
[04:35.650 --> 04:36.970]  So we're working on it.
[04:37.090 --> 04:41.830]  We're working on it with your help, with your listeners' reports and suggestions.
[04:42.070 --> 04:42.850]  We'll get there.
[04:43.350 --> 04:44.650]  But progress is being made.
[04:44.650 --> 04:46.370]  The studio will be built up soon, hopefully?
[04:46.930 --> 04:54.070]  Yeah, this is, I think, probably the phase after the permanent installation of the transmission equipment is complete.
[04:54.430 --> 05:07.650]  I think the very next thing that the station and the community at large here is really, really excited and focused about is improving some of the ergonomics and tools that we use to broadcast to you.
[05:07.730 --> 05:09.270]  Of course, there's a downside to that as well.
[05:09.310 --> 05:12.310]  You won't be able to hear all the chatter of the people as they walk by the studio.
[05:12.310 --> 05:14.310]  You won't be able to hear the sirens in the street.
[05:14.310 --> 05:16.510]  You won't be able to hear thunder during thunderstorms.
[05:16.630 --> 05:20.110]  So, you know, we're giving up some things when we build the soundproof studio here.
[05:20.310 --> 05:24.410]  Well, we'll remain the same in spirit and so on.
[05:24.510 --> 05:32.110]  But yes, those sort of basic variables that we get in the background now hopefully will be mitigated.
[05:32.110 --> 05:35.870]  But you know what's amazing is that despite it all, we're still here.
[05:36.090 --> 05:43.930]  I mean, all the doomsayers, all the naysayers, all the sayers in general just basically were we're counting the days till we were dead and buried.
[05:44.130 --> 05:45.870]  And somehow we always bounce back.
[05:46.090 --> 05:47.110]  I don't know how we do it.
[05:47.210 --> 05:49.670]  I honestly don't know what goes into it.
[05:49.750 --> 05:51.470]  But we're here week after week.
[05:51.510 --> 05:52.930]  And I'm happy for that.
[05:52.930 --> 05:55.270]  I have a pretty good idea how we do it.
[05:55.510 --> 05:58.730]  And that's people just like those listening to us right now.
[05:58.910 --> 06:06.870]  It's always the listeners who have kept this station going and who have kept us doing what we do here at Off the Hook at WBAI, at Pacifica.
[06:07.030 --> 06:08.890]  It's all you out there.
[06:08.970 --> 06:10.930]  And for that, we are eternally grateful.
[06:11.070 --> 06:11.510]  Thank you again.
[06:11.630 --> 06:12.370]  It is all you.
[06:12.490 --> 06:15.310]  And it's nobody else because we don't have corporate sponsorship.
[06:15.550 --> 06:16.510]  Verizon sucks.
[06:16.510 --> 06:17.690]  I can say that.
[06:18.330 --> 06:19.990]  Nobody's going to come after me for saying that.
[06:20.870 --> 06:21.870]  ExxonMobil, the U.S.
[06:21.970 --> 06:22.830]  government, you know, everybody.
[06:22.830 --> 06:25.210]  I can just go after one after the other.
[06:26.030 --> 06:29.050]  And we don't have to worry about anybody but the listeners.
[06:29.350 --> 06:30.430]  We don't even take underwriting.
[06:30.730 --> 06:33.730]  You know, I think we could maybe take underwriting and raise more that way.
[06:33.850 --> 06:34.610]  But whatever.
[06:34.790 --> 06:36.790]  The fact is we don't have commercials.
[06:36.790 --> 06:38.050]  We don't have underwriting announcements.
[06:38.190 --> 06:41.990]  We don't have sponsorships of any kind other than our listeners.
[06:42.090 --> 06:44.130]  And that's what makes the magic happen.
[06:44.410 --> 06:46.870]  Yeah, and people really enjoy broadcasting here.
[06:46.870 --> 06:55.710]  One constant across the producers and programmers and so on at the station is that they really do enjoy what they do.
[06:55.810 --> 06:59.810]  They like to communicate and speak over the airwaves to everyone.
[06:59.870 --> 07:01.710]  And it's just so important to them.
[07:01.710 --> 07:04.610]  And the listeners, too, really, really enjoy what we do.
[07:05.210 --> 07:15.110]  Even if, you know, they haven't fired up their old radio in a while or they stream, you know, from a distant place, they really do enjoy what is aired over this station.
[07:15.110 --> 07:17.690]  And if they don't, they let us know about it.
[07:17.790 --> 07:24.550]  So we're always open to story ideas and so on and listener phone calls, even.
[07:24.730 --> 07:27.190]  We really enjoy those when we can take them.
[07:27.330 --> 07:28.430]  I think we can take them today.
[07:28.710 --> 07:29.570]  Oh, that sounds fantastic.
[07:29.830 --> 07:30.470]  A little bit later in the show.
[07:31.130 --> 07:32.010]  Here's the phone number.
[07:32.130 --> 07:32.470]  Write it down.
[07:32.590 --> 07:35.050]  3-4-7-3-3-5-0-8-1-8.
[07:35.150 --> 07:37.630]  In case you didn't realize, 3-4-7 is the area code.
[07:37.970 --> 07:39.670]  3-3-5-0-8-1-8.
[07:39.670 --> 07:46.130]  But we speak our minds, you speak yours, and we get to an approximation of what this place is all about.
[07:46.370 --> 07:57.250]  And we have Pacifica, the larger network, sort of as a support and a big part of that, too.
[07:57.270 --> 08:03.330]  And we're happy to keep that alive and available to everyone out there.
[08:03.410 --> 08:04.650]  And there's a lot we can do better.
[08:04.650 --> 08:08.730]  We know that here at this show, other shows, the station in general, the network in general.
[08:09.770 --> 08:13.490]  And we'll get there with support, suggestions, involvement.
[08:13.950 --> 08:17.470]  You know, we're on the air because we walked in here and said, hey, we want to do radio.
[08:18.030 --> 08:19.470]  Other people can do the same thing.
[08:19.470 --> 08:21.990]  If you have ideas for radio shows, that's what we're here for.
[08:22.090 --> 08:24.030]  And one of the radio stations anywhere can say that.
[08:24.130 --> 08:24.370]  Oh, yeah.
[08:24.470 --> 08:33.150]  And I would say, you know, if you feel very strongly about it and you're very serious or, you know, passionate about doing something, absolutely.
[08:33.650 --> 08:37.670]  There's no shortage of things to do and to ways to get involved.
[08:37.830 --> 08:39.410]  And that includes programming.
[08:39.410 --> 08:59.770]  If you have a fantastic idea or an audience that you think is sort of underserved or out there but not something that we normally reach in our programming or, you know, in schedules of, in the past, this is a place where you can actually innovate and you can bring that and open up a new audience for the station.
[08:59.970 --> 09:01.270]  So many communities out there.
[09:01.470 --> 09:01.630]  Yeah.
[09:01.730 --> 09:04.670]  And that's a really special thing about community radio.
[09:04.810 --> 09:07.370]  I mean, we, you know, we represent the hacker community.
[09:07.510 --> 09:07.990]  One community.
[09:08.090 --> 09:12.270]  One small community in this whole city, the country, the world.
[09:12.750 --> 09:16.410]  There are many, many more communities represented here and many that are not.
[09:16.630 --> 09:17.550]  And that could be.
[09:17.710 --> 09:20.790]  So that's what the involvement is all about.
[09:20.790 --> 09:25.110]  Hey, I, I, I might've given the wrong impression before because I see the phone lines are lit up.
[09:25.410 --> 09:26.690]  We're not taking phone calls right away.
[09:26.870 --> 09:30.790]  We will be taking phone calls right down the number three, four, seven, three, three, five, zero, eight, one, eight.
[09:30.870 --> 09:35.170]  And when we give the signal, that means, uh, yes, jump on the phone and call us.
[09:35.290 --> 09:39.870]  Uh, but right now you're, you're just going to hear a phone ringing and then eventually you'll hear a fast busy when it times out.
[09:39.990 --> 09:41.310]  So there's no point.
[09:41.550 --> 09:41.670]  Yeah.
[09:41.710 --> 09:45.850]  We haven't, we haven't installed the new, um, hold music yet, but that, that too is changing.
[09:46.130 --> 09:46.570]  There's no hold.
[09:46.750 --> 09:47.790]  You won't even be on hold.
[09:47.970 --> 09:50.470]  It's not as nice as we'll, we'll make the, um, the, uh, virtual.
[09:50.790 --> 09:56.130]  Uh, uh, uh, telephone hold lounge, um, much more, um, interesting and exciting.
[09:56.370 --> 09:58.970]  It's not like the old days either where the phone would ring forever and ever.
[09:59.090 --> 10:04.930]  And you used to be able to call people and have the phone ring all weekend long in their homes, uh, if they weren't home just to drive them crazy.
[10:05.090 --> 10:05.290]  Right.
[10:05.370 --> 10:09.110]  But now it times out because the phone company wants you to connect, not just ring a phone.
[10:09.430 --> 10:12.190]  And in this case, it'll bounce over to another extension.
[10:12.430 --> 10:14.890]  We won't even know where it is and we'll never find it.
[10:15.010 --> 10:18.210]  And you'll just ring, you know, until it times out somewhere else.
[10:18.310 --> 10:19.110]  But we'll give the word.
[10:19.290 --> 10:21.410]  And, uh, at that point, uh, please do.
[10:21.570 --> 10:28.850]  We would love to hear what people have to say and, uh, maybe stories that, uh, that we haven't covered, but boy, is there a lot to talk about.
[10:28.970 --> 10:32.930]  Well, we have our conference coming up next month, uh, and that's getting closer than ever.
[10:33.030 --> 10:34.810]  It wasn't next month last, last week.
[10:35.610 --> 10:40.350]  Now it's June and our conference is July 20th through 22nd at the hotel, Pennsylvania.
[10:40.530 --> 10:42.090]  The circle of hope is what we're calling it.
[10:42.330 --> 10:46.450]  And the, um, the deadline for speaker submissions came and went on Monday.
[10:47.150 --> 10:49.870]  And wow, did a lot of people wait to the last minute.
[10:50.170 --> 10:51.870]  We're still processing them now.
[10:51.870 --> 10:57.310]  If you're one of them, uh, we, uh, we, uh, we either have gotten to it or we will get to it fairly soon.
[10:57.730 --> 11:01.650]  And, um, if, if, um, if your talk is accepted, you will hear from us.
[11:01.650 --> 11:03.830]  So if you don't hear from us, it doesn't mean that you're rejected.
[11:03.830 --> 11:06.790]  It just means that at the moment we don't have room.
[11:07.150 --> 11:14.250]  Uh, and, um, I would say pretty much everybody will have heard something if, if they are on the schedule, uh, within the next week.
[11:14.250 --> 11:18.670]  And if you don't hear something from us by then, uh, it doesn't mean you still can't give a presentation.
[11:18.670 --> 11:19.970]  We have the unscheduled track.
[11:20.090 --> 11:21.850]  We also have last minute cancellations.
[11:22.030 --> 11:23.390]  Sometimes we can fit somebody in then.
[11:23.590 --> 11:32.510]  Uh, so we try to be positive in any event coming to the conference, uh, is, is a great thing to do, and you can still get information on how to do that at hope.net.
[11:32.730 --> 11:35.350]  Uh, but we are really looking forward to, uh, this conference.
[11:35.590 --> 11:38.990]  The, the, uh, caliber of submission so far has, has simply been incredible.
[11:39.270 --> 11:44.410]  Yeah, I've, I've, uh, I've gone, uh, I've gone down this, uh, path for a few conferences now being on speaker committee.
[11:44.790 --> 11:51.190]  And, uh, I, I gotta say this time around, I mean, we always get a bunch of cool stuff, but this time around there is just so much awesome stuff.
[11:51.190 --> 11:58.110]  I'm already, uh, seeing like more than I think we could possibly fit in to one conference because it's just the, the caliber of the submissions.
[11:58.110 --> 11:59.450]  People have worked really hard on them.
[11:59.550 --> 12:04.970]  People are really, um, submitting interesting things, stuff that hasn't been, uh, done at a conference like this before.
[12:05.350 --> 12:09.650]  Um, and I, I'm really excited to see, uh, to see what the schedule shapes up like.
[12:09.830 --> 12:16.070]  And, and, uh, we are not at liberty to give out information yet on, um, on, on exactly what will be scheduled.
[12:16.490 --> 12:23.890]  Um, we will be doing that though, starting, uh, in the next week or so as, uh, things are finalized, as the schedule begins to, um, uh, to come together.
[12:24.070 --> 12:27.950]  Uh, and as Rob said, yeah, the, the caliber is just simply incredible.
[12:28.110 --> 12:30.150]  Uh, and it's, it's, it's great to see.
[12:30.290 --> 12:37.210]  Uh, one thing we're doing on our, our website is, um, uh, on, unfurling, uh, different types of hackers.
[12:37.390 --> 12:39.110]  We have a dozen, a dozen hackers.
[12:39.250 --> 12:42.470]  Hackers dozen is what we're calling, uh, um, the subtext of this conference.
[12:42.770 --> 12:47.270]  Uh, and, uh, we are open to, uh, suggestion as to other types of hackers to add.
[12:47.270 --> 12:58.350]  So far, uh, we have, uh, the coder, uh, we have, um, uh, the phone freak, the, or the, the, the freaker is what we're calling them, the social engineer, the lock picker.
[12:58.810 --> 13:00.910]  Um, and, uh, there are more.
[13:01.050 --> 13:02.970]  I think one is going to be revealed later on today as well.
[13:03.110 --> 13:04.250]  Uh, and we'll have 12.
[13:04.410 --> 13:14.870]  No, it's not, it's not the entire community for sure, because there's a lot more than 12 types of hackers, but, uh, we're kind of putting together a bunch of them as sort of a a representation of how diverse our community is.
[13:15.050 --> 13:15.390]  Yeah.
[13:15.530 --> 13:23.250]  And, uh, I would also add that it's not, um, it's not that, uh, anyone would fit in one, uh, or the other of these sorts of identities.
[13:23.250 --> 13:33.070]  I think that, that, um, there's, uh, a lot of fluidity between them and, and there's maybe several of these, uh, that, um, any individual hacker might relate with.
[13:33.870 --> 13:34.750]  No, I think so.
[13:34.770 --> 13:34.930]  Yes.
[13:35.030 --> 13:41.810]  For instance, you know, the freaker, uh, as, as described here, uh, hears random noises over phone lines and understands their meaning.
[13:41.970 --> 13:43.230]  Experimentation is their motto.
[13:43.710 --> 13:45.830]  Learning to manipulate the world with sound and signal.
[13:45.910 --> 13:49.870]  In the digital age, they experiment with radio, fiber, and light.
[13:50.510 --> 13:50.910]  Yeah.
[13:51.130 --> 13:53.430]  That's, that's one type of hacker right there.
[13:53.590 --> 13:54.850]  They all have their, their magic.
[13:54.990 --> 13:55.790]  They all have their skills.
[13:56.250 --> 14:01.610]  And it's something that we'll be, uh, focusing on, uh, in the weeks leading up to the conference and at the conference itself.
[14:02.310 --> 14:11.870]  So, uh, your suggestions, uh, visit our website, hope.net, uh, follow us on Twitter, uh, hope conf, H-O-P-E-C-O-N-F, or 2600.
[14:11.970 --> 14:17.210]  Or, uh, hacker radio show is our, uh, Twitter account for this particular radio program.
[14:17.730 --> 14:18.210]  Yeah.
[14:18.250 --> 14:21.030]  It's really exciting to, uh, uh, get ready for these things.
[14:21.250 --> 14:33.310]  I, I know you guys through, um, some of the submissions are, are eager to, uh, uh, hear some of the, uh, discussion and, and, um, and talks and, and what everyone is, um, really focused on this time around.
[14:33.310 --> 14:48.090]  And, uh, yeah, these, these kinds of things, uh, uh, uh, uh, identities and, um, you know, the types of people that are, are represented in the hacker community, I think are important and sort of emblematic because we're seeing, um, the, uh, the community used and,
[14:48.090 --> 15:03.390]  and, um, and talked about, uh, more and more and, and really expand, um, in ways that I think hadn't, uh, people had not really envisioned, um, you know, in the onset when, when people were just barely getting online and, and, uh, communicating and, and,
[15:03.490 --> 15:09.130]  um, uh, finding affinity groups and, and, um, becoming, you know, sort of associated.
[15:09.290 --> 15:14.530]  And this is a time I think where we want to hear ideas, you know, what are the other, what are, what groups are we missing?
[15:14.570 --> 15:20.930]  What are we forgetting about that is a part of our community because it is, uh, so expansive it seems, uh, every day.
[15:21.130 --> 15:30.350]  So, um, I'm really thrilled and, and I can't wait for the next, uh, the next, uh, of this dozen, uh, sort of symbolic, uh, uh, groups come about.
[15:30.530 --> 15:30.650]  Yeah.
[15:30.650 --> 15:31.430]  It's really kind of cool.
[15:31.530 --> 15:34.170]  Perhaps I should say, uh, Hackers Dozen, it's our 12th conference.
[15:34.410 --> 15:34.710]  That's right.
[15:34.830 --> 15:35.810]  That's kind of why we're doing that.
[15:36.010 --> 15:37.170]  Uh, it's not an every year thing.
[15:37.170 --> 15:39.630]  We started in 1994 and we have them every two years now.
[15:39.990 --> 15:41.330]  Uh, so this is the 12th one.
[15:41.590 --> 15:43.010]  Uh, next, next one will be 13th.
[15:43.030 --> 15:45.830]  That'll be, uh, I guess luck will be the theme for that one.
[15:45.930 --> 15:46.190]  Yes.
[15:46.670 --> 15:47.410]  Superstition or something.
[15:47.530 --> 15:47.810]  Who knows?
[15:48.270 --> 15:49.570]  Too early to plan that yet.
[15:49.930 --> 15:52.150]  How about baked goods for Hackers Bakers Dozen?
[15:52.310 --> 15:54.910]  Well, yeah, uh, we will have baked goods.
[15:54.910 --> 15:58.230]  I'm pretty sure of that, but, uh, we'll probably count them correctly.
[15:58.430 --> 15:58.830]  I don't know.
[15:59.010 --> 16:00.230]  There's all sorts of possibilities.
[16:00.230 --> 16:05.430]  I think we've, we've had talks before about, um, gas, you know, molecular gastronomy and, um, food hacking.
[16:05.750 --> 16:05.770]  Food hacking.
[16:05.770 --> 16:06.630]  Food hacking, yes.
[16:06.850 --> 16:08.090]  Has, uh, made appearances.
[16:08.310 --> 16:11.730]  There've been really exciting talks, um, you know, several conferences ago.
[16:11.930 --> 16:12.970]  Uh, so absolutely.
[16:13.210 --> 16:20.870]  Even bartending, I think has, has, uh, you know, mixology and, and, um, robotics have, have had their presence and entire events.
[16:20.870 --> 16:22.730]  So, there's certainly room for that.
[16:22.770 --> 16:24.470]  There is nothing you cannot hack.
[16:25.310 --> 16:26.370]  It's not just elections.
[16:26.390 --> 16:27.670]  All sorts of things you can hack.
[16:28.170 --> 16:29.850]  Um, all right, let's look at some news.
[16:29.970 --> 16:34.090]  We'll take some phone calls in a little bit, uh, get some, uh, feedback and, uh, ideas and things like that.
[16:34.630 --> 16:36.890]  Uh, this is, uh, tell me if this is good news.
[16:37.090 --> 16:43.290]  Uh, Google will not be seeking another contract for its controversial work, providing artificial intelligence to the U.S.
[16:43.590 --> 16:50.010]  Department of Defense for analyzing drone footage after its current contract expires in the year 2419.
[16:50.810 --> 16:52.850]  Uh, I don't know when it expires.
[16:53.310 --> 16:55.270]  Um, Google Cloud CEO.
[16:55.770 --> 16:57.110]  That's, what, what a great title that is.
[16:57.230 --> 16:58.310]  Google Cloud CEO.
[16:58.570 --> 17:02.970]  Uh, Diane Green announced the decision at a meeting with employees last Friday.
[17:03.290 --> 17:06.430]  Uh, the current contract actually expires next year, 2019.
[17:06.430 --> 17:12.230]  There will not be a follow-up contract, uh, the meeting, which is dubbed Weather Report.
[17:12.430 --> 17:14.410]  They dubbed their meetings Weather Report.
[17:14.590 --> 17:17.110]  Yeah, it's a weekly update on Google Cloud's business.
[17:17.910 --> 17:19.490]  That's like a, a cloud joke.
[17:20.150 --> 17:21.570]  Oh, yeah, and I get it now.
[17:21.630 --> 17:21.850]  Yeah.
[17:22.030 --> 17:22.230]  Okay.
[17:22.690 --> 17:23.930]  Clever, those people at Google.
[17:24.470 --> 17:28.630]  Uh, now, Google would not choose to, uh, pursue Maven, uh, today.
[17:29.050 --> 17:33.710]  Uh, this, this, uh, this new story from Gizmodo does not tell us what Maven is.
[17:33.810 --> 17:34.590]  They just launched into it.
[17:34.610 --> 17:35.870]  I guess we're supposed to know what Maven is.
[17:35.870 --> 17:37.190]  Is that the name of the, the project?
[17:37.470 --> 17:37.810]  Yes.
[17:37.950 --> 17:40.410]  It's their artificial intelligence for drone program.
[17:40.570 --> 17:44.910]  Well, they would choose not to pursue Maven today because the backlash has been terrible for the company.
[17:45.450 --> 17:50.770]  Uh, she added the decision was made at a time when Google was more aggressively pursuing military work.
[17:50.890 --> 17:54.950]  Uh, the company plans to unveil new ethical principles about its use of AI.
[17:55.270 --> 17:56.270]  That's this week, actually.
[17:56.410 --> 17:57.250]  They're planning on doing that.
[17:57.810 --> 18:01.730]  Uh, so I guess congrats are in order to people that, um, said something.
[18:01.730 --> 18:02.810]  And this is the effect.
[18:05.870 --> 18:07.030]  That, uh, quit over this.
[18:07.250 --> 18:19.210]  Um, especially when it comes to, um, like AI, where it's such specialized knowledge required for this, uh, that, and they're paying like such huge salaries and they're willing to quit, uh, like lose their jobs over this.
[18:19.650 --> 18:27.150]  And also another thing, the reason why this happened at Google and not like say Amazon is that Google has a, even though like they've dropped the whole don't be evil thing.
[18:27.150 --> 18:30.450]  And they still have, uh, compared to other companies that uniquely open culture.
[18:30.670 --> 18:43.610]  And I heard from friends that worked there that like in, in literally every bathroom stall, they would have like posters with links to an internal website about demanding that they turn down the, uh, the, uh, they stopped doing the drone warfare.
[18:44.090 --> 18:44.370]  In bathroom stalls?
[18:44.590 --> 18:44.730]  Yep.
[18:44.910 --> 18:45.170]  Wow.
[18:45.370 --> 18:47.110]  So their minds are never not at work.
[18:47.210 --> 18:47.370]  Yeah.
[18:47.930 --> 18:48.350]  Incredible.
[18:49.010 --> 18:51.730]  Uh, well, uh, again, maybe those 10 people can come back now.
[18:52.050 --> 18:52.150]  Yeah.
[18:52.150 --> 18:57.150]  Wouldn't that be nice if they were welcomed back as, as heroes or at least given the good position someplace else?
[18:57.850 --> 18:58.670]  Um, okay.
[18:58.750 --> 18:59.570]  Well, good news, right?
[18:59.610 --> 18:59.890]  We agree.
[18:59.990 --> 19:00.450]  That's good news.
[19:00.550 --> 19:00.710]  Yes.
[19:00.910 --> 19:01.250]  All right.
[19:01.610 --> 19:02.930]  An encouraging development.
[19:03.130 --> 19:03.270]  Sure.
[19:03.490 --> 19:03.690]  Okay.
[19:03.790 --> 19:04.010]  Yes.
[19:04.390 --> 19:05.630]  Uh, here's something else.
[19:05.790 --> 19:07.390]  Uh, maybe, maybe not as good.
[19:07.530 --> 19:21.490]  Uh, a young hacker reeling from the Philando Castile case and the acquittal of the cop who killed him, uh, is, uh, basically broke into several state databases last year and boasted about his exploits.
[19:21.890 --> 19:24.530]  Uh, an innocent man is dead while a guilty man is free.
[19:24.750 --> 19:27.970]  The hacker known as vigilance tweeted in part last year.
[19:28.110 --> 19:32.290]  Uh, the hacker also taunted authorities tweeting, where am I clock is ticking?
[19:32.870 --> 19:35.870]  Uh, but the authorities found them on Tuesday.
[19:36.050 --> 19:52.790]  They identified the alleged anonymous hacker as Cameron Crowley of Lino lakes and charged him in federal court, uh, investigation by the FBI and Minnesota Bureau of Criminal Apprehension revealed that Crowley went by the nickname vigilance and hack servers owned by the state and other entities between May 28th,
[19:53.130 --> 19:55.390]  2017 and June 17th, 2017.
[19:55.790 --> 20:05.690]  Uh, he was charged in federal court with three counts of intentional access to a protected computer, one count each of intentional damage to a protected computer and aggravated identity theft.
[20:05.690 --> 20:12.010]  Um, he basically transmitted programs, codes, and commands to the protected computer servers.
[20:12.170 --> 20:15.610]  Uh, that's according to what the U S attorney's office said in a news release.
[20:15.610 --> 20:25.230]  And those crimes caused damage, uh, and, and cost the state of Minnesota more than $5,000, according to the news release, which actually doesn't sound like that much at all.
[20:25.310 --> 20:28.270]  That's about what, uh, what a computer would cost.
[20:28.410 --> 20:37.270]  Uh, June 16th, jurors acquitted then St. Anthony officer, uh, Geronimo Yanez, a fatally shooting Castile during a traffic stop.
[20:37.470 --> 20:43.490]  Uh, the next day vigilance who used the Joker as a profile picture tweeted that the state databases were hacked.
[20:43.630 --> 20:51.370]  The next day vigilance tweeted that Minnesota state university Moorhead was hacked, uh, tying the hacks to the Yanez case.
[20:51.610 --> 20:57.130]  Uh, a Twitter user by the name of vigilance corresponded with the star tribune last year and several Twitter direct messages.
[20:57.470 --> 21:02.670]  Uh, the tweet said at the time that the hack involved 23 state of Minnesota databases and quite a lot of information.
[21:02.850 --> 21:08.610]  The data included about 1400 emails and passwords from state employees and private citizens.
[21:08.930 --> 21:11.930]  Uh, vigilance said the passwords were easily decrypted.
[21:11.950 --> 21:13.410]  The hacker told the star tribune.
[21:13.570 --> 21:16.450]  These actions were timed to Yanez's trial.
[21:16.730 --> 21:25.530]  I chose the Philando case because I was so fed up with all the injustices in the news about cops killing innocent men, women, and children, then walking free.
[21:25.530 --> 21:27.950]  When I saw the verdict, I knew I had to take action.
[21:28.410 --> 21:35.950]  Vigilance said hacking was the platform for six years and that it was used to speak for those whose voices have fallen on deaf ears.
[21:36.270 --> 21:37.590]  Well, a couple of things here.
[21:38.290 --> 21:40.670]  It's not very clear to me what the damage was.
[21:40.830 --> 21:47.070]  I'm hearing $5,000 and believe me, you can, you can say $5,000 in damage was caused by virtually anything.
[21:47.090 --> 21:48.550]  That's a very low figure.
[21:48.730 --> 21:54.330]  I mean, you know, look at the Kevin Mitnick case and they were, uh, accusing him of, of hundreds of thousands of dollars of damage.
[21:54.510 --> 21:57.490]  And in the end, it turned out to be very little that was actually done.
[21:57.790 --> 21:59.310]  What was done in this case?
[21:59.550 --> 22:04.370]  Uh, and can we take into account, uh, what was actually going on at the time?
[22:04.730 --> 22:09.150]  Uh, are we talking about something that is the equivalent of graffiti hacking a website?
[22:09.150 --> 22:13.010]  Are we talking about something that, uh, is, is malware or ransomware?
[22:13.230 --> 22:20.230]  Uh, without these details, it's very hard to, um, uh, to judge this case, uh, in a coherent manner.
[22:20.590 --> 22:30.590]  And I just hate to think that somebody is actually going to go to prison for something like this, uh, based on an injustice that occurred, uh, in front of all of us.
[22:31.770 --> 22:41.770]  I think it's like the case we talked about last week where like doing something like a protest or something that would be a crime if it happened in real life, but it would be treated like maybe defacing city hall or something.
[22:42.030 --> 22:46.870]  Whereas if it happens like with a computer, then they tack on 10 years of, uh, your prison sentence.
[22:47.310 --> 22:47.710]  Yeah.
[22:47.870 --> 22:56.270]  I mean, is this the equivalent of a demonstration of, of maybe, you know, turning over a garbage can or, or, you know, uh, even breaking a window?
[22:56.450 --> 22:56.810]  I don't know.
[22:57.110 --> 22:58.370]  Uh, is it less than that?
[22:58.450 --> 22:59.250]  Is it more than that?
[23:00.590 --> 23:04.630]  I'm, I'm very cautious of stories that, uh, don't go into detail.
[23:04.630 --> 23:08.810]  They say that he hacked into a state database, was able to decrypt passwords.
[23:09.110 --> 23:11.430]  You know, that's really not that difficult to do.
[23:11.550 --> 23:13.310]  And, um, what are we talking about?
[23:13.370 --> 23:14.170]  Are we talking about websites?
[23:14.310 --> 23:21.890]  Are we talking about, uh, you know, the motor vehicle department, you know, what, what computers, what data, what was actually revealed, what was actually done?
[23:22.130 --> 23:26.410]  Can we take into account the emotions that were, uh, uh, running rampant at the time?
[23:26.710 --> 23:30.770]  Uh, and, uh, maybe, you know, put a little humanity into this.
[23:31.890 --> 23:32.250]  Yeah.
[23:32.410 --> 23:45.390]  Without, without knowing more about, uh, what exactly, uh, this, this guy did or, you know, what he accessed, what he did with the information, if anything, um, there's really, there's really no way to put any kind of figure or value or, uh, or anything on,
[23:45.470 --> 23:46.110]  on what he's done.
[23:46.110 --> 23:51.050]  Or, you know, I think, uh, I think, um, decide whether the punishment is fitting the crime.
[23:51.410 --> 23:52.890]  That, that seems to be the problem though.
[23:52.890 --> 23:57.910]  And, and we've seen this over the decades when covering hacker stories is that you're not given the details.
[23:58.170 --> 24:04.990]  You're just told that somebody did something involving computers and, uh, they need to pay the price now and everybody is at risk.
[24:05.050 --> 24:06.810]  And it's, it's extremely vague.
[24:07.350 --> 24:11.390]  Um, really when you look at it, the, the, the problem is that there's no security to start with.
[24:11.470 --> 24:13.090]  How did this guy manage to get in so easily?
[24:13.310 --> 24:15.450]  Uh, and, and, and what data are we talking about?
[24:15.750 --> 24:17.990]  Specifics don't hurt in a situation like this.
[24:18.290 --> 24:22.790]  Uh, we, we, we need to know more than, yeah, he broke the law and therefore he has to pay the price.
[24:22.790 --> 24:27.790]  I hear that way too much without any actual, uh, definition as to what happened.
[24:29.350 --> 24:29.830]  Yeah.
[24:29.930 --> 24:35.350]  It seems like, um, he would have been rewarded that 5,000 had it not had a political motivation.
[24:35.410 --> 24:45.090]  In other words, had he been disclosing that this, this, uh, government site is handling personal information and, you know, improperly or in an unsafe manner.
[24:45.430 --> 24:47.510]  And, um, you know, I just want to disclose this.
[24:47.630 --> 25:02.590]  It seems like that, um, security problem that he identified and exploited you know, were it not in a political context like this, or, or, I mean, I'm sort of emotional, as you said, it would have been, uh, um, something that he would have been, I guess,
[25:02.770 --> 25:18.770]  lauded more for, for having pointed out and, and that, um, the way of looking at it and, you know, fault, putting fault at this individual kind of, um, allows them to sort of relinquish the liability or, or, or, you know, um, you know, resist being responsible with that stuff.
[25:18.930 --> 25:22.530]  But again, we, we need more details, details to actually know what's, what's at stake.
[25:23.010 --> 25:37.270]  And it's also a matter of routine when, uh, people are tried for other crimes, um, from violence to like out and out murder, uh, what state their mind is in, what, uh, what emotional state things are in, if there were circumstances that, uh, precipitated this behavior and stuff.
[25:37.470 --> 25:42.330]  And, uh, you know, I'm, I'm not saying murder can be justified, but, uh, the law does.
[25:42.890 --> 25:45.290]  And I'm sure if Alex were here, he'd have a whole lot to say about this.
[25:45.410 --> 25:51.190]  But, uh, as I understand it, the law does allow for things like temporary insanity or, you know, what have you.
[25:51.350 --> 25:59.430]  And if this, if this was an act committed out of sympathy for, uh, a murdered human being, as it seems to be, then, um, really should that count for something?
[25:59.670 --> 26:07.390]  And, and, you know, the, the, the amount of leeway that we give to the case itself, uh, what was the state of the officer's mind?
[26:07.550 --> 26:08.850]  What did he feel he was in danger?
[26:09.270 --> 26:13.810]  Uh, is this why he killed that person, you know, while his girlfriend was, was videotaping it?
[26:14.170 --> 26:16.670]  Uh, all, all kinds of, of questions like that.
[26:16.750 --> 26:21.350]  And, and, and we're able to, uh, live with, uh, how that plays out.
[26:21.710 --> 26:28.790]  And in this particular case, we are given virtually no information and just, um, the, the, the perpetrator must pay the price.
[26:29.350 --> 26:30.330]  It's a double standard.
[26:30.490 --> 26:40.770]  And, um, I, I think, you know, this case is illustrating that unintentionally in ways that, um, um, I'm sure this guy didn't mean for it to, uh, uh, to play out like this.
[26:41.070 --> 26:45.910]  Um, the, the question is what is an appropriate response to something like this?
[26:46.110 --> 26:47.170]  Several state databases.
[26:47.170 --> 26:47.810]  That's all we know.
[26:47.970 --> 26:49.110]  That's all we're told in this story.
[26:49.410 --> 26:50.690]  Uh, that could mean anything.
[26:50.850 --> 26:51.650]  That could mean a website.
[26:51.850 --> 26:56.390]  It could mean, uh, you know, something, uh, with, with very personal information.
[26:56.590 --> 27:05.510]  When you consider how many times state databases or, or commercial databases, uh, things with our private information are compromised because of incompetence.
[27:05.870 --> 27:08.450]  And, uh, you know, you read about it every, every day in the papers.
[27:08.610 --> 27:18.290]  Millions of names, uh, were, uh, were, were, were, um, basically compromised because somebody didn't have a password on a particular, um, uh, particular system.
[27:18.770 --> 27:19.910]  Uh, here, here's one ticket fly.
[27:20.550 --> 27:23.210]  Ticket fly site, uh, is still offline.
[27:23.330 --> 27:24.430]  You've got a ticket fly.
[27:24.550 --> 27:25.350]  I've never heard of them before.
[27:25.810 --> 27:27.370]  Uh, you've got a ticket fly.com.
[27:27.550 --> 27:32.250]  They're still offline as of now, uh, six days after being hacked and hit with a ransom demand.
[27:32.650 --> 27:45.890]  Uh, many of the venues and promoters that servers were coming back online, including flagship clients, IMP and jam productions, but an analysis of database, uh, posted publicly show that the personal data of 26 million users was stolen.
[27:46.390 --> 27:47.770]  You know, that's a serious deal.
[27:47.890 --> 27:52.730]  That's certainly much more serious than, uh, what we're reading about in, in, in, in that particular story.
[27:53.250 --> 27:55.930]  Uh, and, and it's not just attacks.
[27:56.130 --> 28:01.730]  Sometimes it's just things that are left on laptops, uh, left online with no password whatsoever.
[28:02.530 --> 28:04.870]  Our data is constantly being compromised.
[28:04.870 --> 28:05.670]  Yeah.
[28:05.750 --> 28:18.870]  The type of data really, uh, really does matter because it could be, uh, just a bunch of passwords, maybe disassociated from things, things that are sort of unintelligible or things that are like sales figures that may be internal, but you know, really of not,
[28:19.050 --> 28:31.450]  uh, very much consequence or, um, things that you could find publicly that happened to have been stored on an internal machine, but are, are, you know, discernible from, uh, whatever tax filings or, or other sort of public documents.
[28:31.450 --> 28:32.830]  So it really does matter.
[28:32.950 --> 28:48.010]  That's of course, in stark contrast from other, um, forms of data, like with, uh, sort of credit agencies, uh, um, as we've seen, or private, uh, uh, data collecting, uh, firms like Equifax, Equifax and all of these sorts of things.
[28:48.150 --> 28:57.050]  But, but then, um, you also have the sort of like governmental stuff where you have like the government personnel office, uh, uh, having been hacked and, and so on and so forth.
[28:57.150 --> 29:06.030]  So it really does, you know, you have to have that, uh, uh, distinction to understand the context of, of what that means for, um, having those databases exposed.
[29:06.270 --> 29:06.530]  Yeah.
[29:06.570 --> 29:09.090]  I mean, I'm not necessarily saying that there should not be a penalty.
[29:09.510 --> 29:11.110]  I'm just saying, I'd like to know the facts.
[29:11.150 --> 29:16.110]  I'd like to know what's actually happening and what we're talking about, because when you know that, then you can put it into context.
[29:16.230 --> 29:22.030]  And as Voltaire says, what, what's, what's the real, uh, equivalent of this in, in, in, in the streets and physical life?
[29:22.390 --> 29:28.550]  Uh, many times, uh, when, when you look at it in that way, you realize, wow, it's really not that big a deal and it's easily fixed.
[29:28.870 --> 29:31.270]  So, uh, what are we dealing with in this, in this case?
[29:31.430 --> 29:32.770]  And will we ever get the details?
[29:33.090 --> 29:39.270]  Uh, we, uh, also heard about another story, which I'm sure has shocked a lot of people, Buffalo Wild Wings.
[29:39.750 --> 29:40.150]  Yes.
[29:40.250 --> 29:47.850]  Their Twitter account was, was compromised and all kinds of horrible things were being said on their, on their, uh, Twitter feed.
[29:48.150 --> 29:56.330]  Uh, they, uh, basically had a trail of annoying messages, uh, which left 700,000 followers of Buffalo Wild Wings stunned.
[29:56.710 --> 30:00.810]  Really all 700,000 followers of Buffalo Wild Wings were stunned.
[30:01.310 --> 30:03.530]  First of all, I don't even know if I'm a follower.
[30:04.150 --> 30:05.690]  That's how unstunned I am.
[30:05.810 --> 30:08.330]  And if I was a follower, I probably wouldn't have noticed.
[30:08.650 --> 30:11.330]  Uh, and if I did notice, I probably wouldn't have cared.
[30:11.390 --> 30:25.190]  And if I did care, I probably would realize that it wasn't them because they're unlikely, you know, to be posting things, um, talking about, um, uh, well, I can't even say any of these things, uh, uh, some really disgusting thing.
[30:25.270 --> 30:26.830]  Well, obviously it wasn't them saying it.
[30:27.290 --> 30:28.090]  Um, so...
[30:28.090 --> 30:30.890]  Let me guess, it's a, it's like related to food handling?
[30:31.190 --> 30:38.450]  Food handling, sex, uh, racism, yeah, the usual, the usual American, uh, uh, you know, smorgasbord of offensive, uh, language.
[30:38.950 --> 30:41.330]  Uh, six tweets, 20 minutes, that's all it took.
[30:41.710 --> 30:43.470]  Uh, and, uh, it upset their followers.
[30:43.590 --> 30:48.090]  Buffalo Wild Wings officials, uh, behaved graciously according to this story as they apologized for the post.
[30:48.650 --> 30:56.690]  Uh, they also alerted followers followers to the hack on their official Twitter account, which I don't know how they did that if they were hacked, but I guess they got it back.
[30:56.930 --> 30:59.610]  Uh, and they, they said, well, we were hacked and it wasn't funny.
[30:59.810 --> 31:03.210]  We apologize for the awful post, which obviously did not come from us.
[31:03.970 --> 31:04.330]  Okay.
[31:04.410 --> 31:04.810]  You know what?
[31:05.170 --> 31:06.230]  That should be it.
[31:06.350 --> 31:06.830]  Don't you think?
[31:06.870 --> 31:09.370]  I mean, is there, is there a reason to go further than this?
[31:09.570 --> 31:11.590]  Uh, figure out what went wrong.
[31:11.770 --> 31:13.230]  Did you have a stupid password?
[31:13.610 --> 31:19.770]  Did, did somebody, uh, um, give out the password to somebody or do you have a crazy person working for you?
[31:20.450 --> 31:24.710]  Um, figure out what happened, change the password, move on, right?
[31:24.870 --> 31:27.070]  Is, is there any reason to go further than this?
[31:27.570 --> 31:28.910]  Enable two-factor authentication.
[31:29.650 --> 31:32.870]  Well, you know, two-factor authentication can be compromised too.
[31:33.070 --> 31:37.870]  Well, SMS-based ones, but not, um, not like a two-factor authentication.
[31:37.870 --> 31:41.630]  There is no kind of, of authentication that cannot be compromised somehow.
[31:41.930 --> 31:43.250]  I'm, I'm, I'm saying it's a good idea.
[31:43.690 --> 31:46.910]  Definitely do it, but don't assume that that's going to solve all the problems.
[31:47.150 --> 31:47.710]  It's much, much harder though.
[31:47.830 --> 31:48.330]  It's harder.
[31:48.510 --> 31:48.650]  Yeah.
[31:48.810 --> 31:56.470]  But you know, as long as you have human beings in the mix somewhere, there's always going to be the possibility of somebody messing something up and, um, this could happen again.
[31:56.710 --> 31:57.530]  And that's the point.
[31:57.670 --> 31:59.030]  You know, we're, we're all only human.
[31:59.390 --> 32:03.490]  Um, as far as I know, uh, we make, uh, we make stupid mistakes, careless mistakes.
[32:03.730 --> 32:08.750]  Uh, sometimes it bites us in the butt and we learn from the experience, move on and, uh, not make that mistake again.
[32:09.210 --> 32:12.090]  And, uh, you know, that's, that's the, that's the way to go about it.
[32:12.210 --> 32:21.750]  I think, yeah, I'm going through the story, I'm not seeing any FBI quotes or, you know, the Organized Crime Task Force.
[32:21.850 --> 32:27.410]  Nobody is really going after this as far as I'm concerned, as far as I see from the news story.
[32:27.430 --> 32:29.210]  And I hope that's how the story ends.
[32:29.810 --> 32:37.210]  Buffalo Wild Wings gets some publicity and some hacker somewhere, if you want to even call them a hacker, gets attention.
[32:38.310 --> 32:40.790]  And the rest of us just get on with our lives.
[32:40.790 --> 32:47.410]  But would we be so low-key about it if the person who broke into this account used it to post about slaughtered people by cops?
[32:47.550 --> 32:47.790]  I don't know.
[32:48.230 --> 32:49.070]  Well, that's a good point.
[32:49.170 --> 32:56.650]  If you get political, if you say something that wakes people up a little bit, maybe then it would be a different story.
[32:56.950 --> 32:57.510]  We'll see.
[32:57.610 --> 33:03.330]  We'll keep our eye on the Buffalo Wild Wings story here, which I can't believe we're talking about.
[33:04.290 --> 33:14.350]  Meanwhile, also in the Department of Cluelessness on the Net, police officers have threatened to arrest people and ban them from their Facebook page.
[33:15.310 --> 33:15.830]  Yes.
[33:16.390 --> 33:18.130]  After... what a threat.
[33:18.290 --> 33:21.190]  After they made fun of their tiny cannabis bust online.
[33:21.410 --> 33:22.390]  This is in England.
[33:22.550 --> 33:23.370]  This could only be in England.
[33:23.670 --> 33:29.710]  West Yorkshire police shared a post about a small quantity of cannabis, which was seized from a young man who was parked up alone.
[33:30.710 --> 33:37.050]  Comments then flooded in, making light of the bus, comparing the drug bust to notorious Colombian cartel runner Pablo Escobar.
[33:37.350 --> 33:48.190]  The police post said PCSO 687 Ian Campbell and PCSO 882 Ben Hughes attended Walton Cagliari Nature Park.
[33:48.730 --> 33:51.190]  They give their numbers and names of the cops.
[33:51.310 --> 33:52.450]  Wow, that's something we don't do.
[33:52.670 --> 33:56.450]  And seized a small quantity of cannabis from a young man who was parked up alone.
[33:56.450 --> 34:02.730]  Walton Cagliari Nature Park will be firmly on our patrol plan in the future to prevent this behavior.
[34:03.350 --> 34:07.310]  The incident happened... the incident happened in Wakefield.
[34:07.590 --> 34:12.070]  And after the post went up, the force then issued a further warning to people in the comments.
[34:12.190 --> 34:17.130]  It read, Unfortunately, we have had to ban a number of people from using this page today.
[34:17.210 --> 34:20.490]  I would like to remind everyone that this is a police page.
[34:21.750 --> 34:23.270]  I capitalize police.
[34:23.270 --> 34:36.250]  This is a police page, and whatever your thoughts on one of my officers seizing drugs in the community, being insulting, abusive, or offensive, can and will result in a prosecution under the Malicious Communications Act 1988.
[34:36.970 --> 34:41.270]  We will not overlook the significant harm that illegal drugs cause to our communities.
[34:41.550 --> 34:51.310]  We know from experience that this can progress from using what are perceived to be recreational drugs to more addictive and harmful substances and the resulting criminality used to fund their continued use.
[34:51.730 --> 34:56.030]  Please use this page with respect, or you will be banned and maybe even prosecuted.
[34:56.550 --> 34:56.990]  Wow.
[34:58.110 --> 35:06.170]  So, I suppose bad commenting on Facebook is a gateway to recreational drugs, which are a gateway to the harder drugs.
[35:06.190 --> 35:08.350]  That's pretty much the line of thinking that I see here.
[35:08.950 --> 35:09.770]  Yeah, I don't know.
[35:09.850 --> 35:11.370]  This is like the height of humorlessness.
[35:12.150 --> 35:13.570]  Well, it's making me laugh, though.
[35:13.570 --> 35:14.410]  So, I'll say that.
[35:14.710 --> 35:24.710]  If I knew how to find their page, I would be on there right now making sarcastic comments and getting prosecuted by some obscure police department somewhere in England.
[35:24.890 --> 35:36.830]  All I know is if they're deciding to actually make it a priority to prosecute people who are mean in internet comment sections, they're not going to have any time for anything else, much less cannabis busts.
[35:36.910 --> 35:38.010]  Well, they can start a whole new department.
[35:38.750 --> 35:40.050]  It's a police page after.
[35:40.110 --> 35:42.190]  I didn't know that was a thing on Facebook, a police page.
[35:42.590 --> 35:43.030]  Wow.
[35:43.030 --> 35:45.010]  Don't tell the police officers about IRC.
[35:45.470 --> 35:47.690]  Oh, no, I don't have the heart to do that.
[35:48.770 --> 35:52.550]  Staying with Facebook, though, for a moment, and then I guess we can take phone calls after that.
[35:53.390 --> 36:11.110]  Facebook says they had data sharing partnerships with four Chinese consumer device makers, including Huawei Technologies Company, escalating concerns that the social network has consistently failed to tell users how their personal information flows beyond Facebook.
[36:11.110 --> 36:22.130]  Now, that disclosure came after Mark Warner, the top Democrat on the Senate Intelligence Committee, said on Tuesday he saw a serious danger that Facebook shared user information with Chinese device makers.
[36:22.510 --> 36:29.810]  Facebook said it was careful about the partnerships, which were designed to help smartphone makers build custom versions of Facebook's app.
[36:29.810 --> 36:36.790]  Still, the confirmation is likely to heighten security of the company's privacy policies if the deals weren't explicitly disclosed to users.
[36:37.310 --> 36:38.070]  Yes, Voltaire?
[36:38.330 --> 36:52.750]  It was a really sad story for me because, like, apparently Facebook had been sharing things like private messages and other personal details of users with device manufacturers, and nobody really cared about it until it turned out that a Chinese company was one of them.
[36:52.850 --> 36:58.410]  And then it's like... and then because of all the xenophobia going on in this country, like, oh, no, well, China's getting it, then that's bad.
[36:58.410 --> 37:01.090]  But it's fine if, like, other corporations get your personal information.
[37:01.090 --> 37:05.670]  Yeah, I don't really see the problem with China getting information everybody else is getting anyway.
[37:05.670 --> 37:08.830]  I see a problem with giving out all this information in the first place.
[37:09.090 --> 37:12.470]  You can control what you give out on Facebook or any social media.
[37:12.690 --> 37:21.350]  So, yeah, I think, you know, the consumer needs to be careful as to how much they disclose because there's ears out there of all sorts listening.
[37:21.570 --> 37:24.150]  Well, this is not only private data, such as private messages.
[37:24.150 --> 37:28.790]  So, like, if you looked at Facebook's tone of service, it said that this data is private.
[37:28.970 --> 37:29.610]  And apparently...
[37:29.610 --> 37:30.270]  And do you believe that?
[37:30.410 --> 37:31.890]  Do you believe data on Facebook is private?
[37:31.950 --> 37:32.530]  Because I don't.
[37:32.630 --> 37:39.270]  I don't think anything I say on Facebook, whether it's quote-unquote private or not, is going to remain confidential.
[37:39.930 --> 37:41.030]  I just... I don't trust them.
[37:41.410 --> 37:42.350]  Yeah, I don't know.
[37:42.410 --> 37:54.810]  I think that there's definitely, like, a problem with the sort of self-providing, you know, self-submitting, you know, providing information just so freely that you're just...
[37:54.810 --> 38:01.250]  you're not comprehending, like, you know, the impact that it could have and the fall on effects were it to be used by someone else.
[38:01.590 --> 38:04.310]  And I agree that there is a little bit of a xenophobia.
[38:04.310 --> 38:05.530]  And you said xenophobia?
[38:05.910 --> 38:06.790]  What does that mean?
[38:07.510 --> 38:07.970]  Like, sin...
[38:08.590 --> 38:09.750]  S-A-N as in China.
[38:10.510 --> 38:11.250]  Ah, got it.
[38:11.290 --> 38:11.630]  Okay.
[38:11.710 --> 38:13.270]  I have not heard that word.
[38:13.410 --> 38:13.870]  That's a good word.
[38:13.990 --> 38:14.650]  That's a good word.
[38:14.870 --> 38:15.790]  I'm the king of China.
[38:15.790 --> 38:17.830]  I would say that they're not an ally.
[38:18.030 --> 38:32.910]  So that is a factor, I think, in how that is discriminated against, you know, versus, you know, giving an American, you know, Delaware-based corporation your information.
[38:33.270 --> 38:40.170]  I think that that has come up and is a factor in, like, or a propellant for that.
[38:40.250 --> 38:42.370]  But I don't want Luxembourg to have it either, you know?
[38:42.510 --> 38:43.610]  I think they're an ally, right?
[38:43.690 --> 38:44.910]  Are they a threat to us?
[38:44.910 --> 38:45.950]  Did they burn down the White House?
[38:46.410 --> 38:46.610]  No.
[38:46.810 --> 38:48.470]  No, they're not a threat in any way, so...
[38:48.470 --> 38:49.950]  I feel like our government is just as...
[38:49.950 --> 38:53.070]  Especially because they're closer to us, they're just as much, if not more, of a threat.
[38:53.250 --> 38:53.970]  Yeah, there you go.
[38:54.350 --> 38:54.890]  Yeah, I mean...
[38:54.890 --> 38:57.530]  Like anyone in this room I would consider to be a threat for my private information.
[38:57.730 --> 38:58.050]  Right.
[38:58.170 --> 38:59.030]  I'm sorry, I just do.
[38:59.910 --> 39:03.070]  Absolutely, but there's an assumption, I think, that the...
[39:03.670 --> 39:04.790]  Are you an American?
[39:04.970 --> 39:09.290]  Yes, okay, so the American government is probably more...
[39:09.290 --> 39:16.330]  Has your interest and your loyalty more so than an adversary, okay?
[39:16.850 --> 39:16.910]  Yeah.
[39:17.210 --> 39:18.570]  I think that's the attitude.
[39:18.570 --> 39:20.070]  I'm not endorsing it.
[39:20.230 --> 39:20.950]  I'm not saying...
[39:20.950 --> 39:26.350]  But it is a factor in why that discrimination persists, especially in this moment.
[39:26.350 --> 39:28.930]  I just said that's a factor, but you're correct.
[39:29.050 --> 39:29.810]  Well, it's...
[39:29.810 --> 39:34.510]  You know, we seem to be concerned when it's China and just not concerned when it's something in America.
[39:34.670 --> 39:35.970]  And I think it's...
[39:35.970 --> 39:40.170]  The way we are concerned when it's China, that's the way we should be with everybody.
[39:40.530 --> 39:44.210]  So it's not like we're doing something wrong by saying it's bad that China has this.
[39:44.430 --> 39:47.830]  We're doing something wrong by not saying that when it's anybody else.
[39:48.770 --> 39:49.490]  That's what I'm saying.
[39:49.630 --> 39:52.010]  Yeah, I mean, corporations are sort of stateless.
[39:52.010 --> 40:00.470]  That's its own, I think, has its own fraught sort of inherent problems as far as trust and handling that stuff.
[40:00.630 --> 40:06.710]  But I think intellectual property and the sort of rhetoric of this administration is definitely fueling that discrimination.
[40:06.970 --> 40:09.370]  Now, one more story before we go to the phones.
[40:09.470 --> 40:14.790]  And this is the cryptocurrency irresponsible act of the decade, I think.
[40:15.370 --> 40:21.390]  It was a stunt designed to play on one of cryptocurrency's most resilient memes, to the moon.
[40:21.390 --> 40:22.550]  Is that a meme?
[40:22.790 --> 40:24.730]  I guess it is, for cryptocurrencies.
[40:25.070 --> 40:27.210]  Is that from the Honeymooners?
[40:27.210 --> 40:31.070]  Yeah, but I don't think Ralph Crandon had cryptocurrencies or really any kind of currencies.
[40:31.230 --> 40:33.610]  But yeah, and Edith was a different show altogether.
[40:34.790 --> 40:42.870]  So basically, it was the idea that prices will skyrocket, leaving currency holders rich in the process.
[40:43.590 --> 40:48.290]  But unfortunately, it left a Sherpa dead on Mount Everest.
[40:48.650 --> 40:50.790]  And how in God's name did that happen?
[40:51.390 --> 41:04.450]  Ask FM, one of the world's top 10 social media networks, was about to release a brand new initial coin offering, unknown as an ICO, giving early investors the chance to pre-buy some of its cryptocurrency before its launch.
[41:04.750 --> 41:11.170]  Now, to promote the ICO, Ask FM sent four crypto enthusiasts on an expedition to Mount Everest.
[41:11.170 --> 41:21.570]  The plan was to bury $50,000 worth of ASKT, that's Ask FM's cryptocurrency, in a nano ledger at the top of the mountain.
[41:21.810 --> 41:26.150]  The team of four made it to the top on May 14th and got back relatively safely.
[41:27.630 --> 41:32.390]  One of the people suffered multiple instances of frostbite on their fingers and feet, but they recovered.
[41:34.190 --> 41:40.430]  And basically, in a statement on its Medium page, Ask FM explained the reasons for the trip.
[41:41.530 --> 41:44.930]  They basically said they are not at all afraid to rise to challenges.
[41:44.930 --> 41:47.910]  They're conquering Everest because it's out there to conquer.
[41:47.910 --> 41:57.350]  By doing so, they claim if they're bold enough to do it, they're bold enough to turn a social network into a blockchain ecosystem, and they're definitely bold enough to overturn the market with their new product.
[41:59.090 --> 42:03.070]  Later, it explained the expedition in terms of the to-the-moon crypto meme.
[42:03.230 --> 42:09.130]  While others try sophisticated marketing techniques, these guys went out there and put themselves right on top of the highest mountain on the planet.
[42:09.430 --> 42:15.750]  An elegant way to boast ideological superiority to every other crypto, a way quite strangely unexplored before.
[42:15.750 --> 42:19.850]  Or even memes-wise, think about the closest starting point to reach the moon.
[42:20.030 --> 42:22.430]  It seems so obvious, yet no one has done it.
[42:22.970 --> 42:33.270]  But, but, the Medium's statement did not mention Lam Babu Sherpa, a man who helped the Ask FM's four-man team get to the top of Mount Everest.
[42:33.490 --> 42:45.450]  And according to extensive reports by the Financial Times and climbing site Rock and Ice, Lam Babu Sherpa was left behind during the descent from Mount Everest and is now presumed dead.
[42:45.750 --> 42:50.510]  Lam Babu Sherpa was a veteran of three Mount Everest summits.
[42:50.650 --> 43:00.190]  In a statement to the Financial Times, Ask FM CEO Max Tazarek said they had later been made aware that someone had gone missing on the trip.
[43:00.350 --> 43:04.570]  Not quite sure how you are later made aware of that if that person's part of your trip.
[43:04.570 --> 43:13.890]  But, that the conditions and location of the missing Sherpa was unknown and it was not their place to make public statements which could have resulted in false information being circulated.
[43:14.210 --> 43:17.090]  So, they basically just kept quiet about it.
[43:17.510 --> 43:21.110]  Ask FM did not immediately respond to a request for comment.
[43:21.110 --> 43:29.390]  But, yeah, in answer to everyone's question, the buried nano-ledger containing Ask FM's cryptocurrency is still on the mountain.
[43:30.250 --> 43:39.230]  500,000 ASKT will stay on the peak of Mount Everest at Ask FM in a celebratory medium post for someone who is brave enough to climb the mountain.
[43:39.810 --> 43:44.550]  That's from, that's from the San Francisco Chronicle, I believe.
[43:45.090 --> 43:48.750]  Wow, that is, that is an incredible story.
[43:49.130 --> 43:54.530]  And I guess they expect somebody to risk their life climbing Mount Everest to find this and dig it up.
[43:54.690 --> 43:58.290]  And who knows how many other lives we put at risk for this insanity.
[43:58.590 --> 44:05.950]  Yeah, this is by no means the first time that a stupid, stupid publicity stunt by some company has resulted in a death.
[44:05.950 --> 44:08.750]  But I think it might be the first time that blockchain was involved.
[44:08.930 --> 44:10.350]  So, you really can use blockchain for anything.
[44:11.170 --> 44:18.210]  I'm sure somebody will launch something up to the moon and bury something there as well, which probably won't result in as many casualties.
[44:18.210 --> 44:22.590]  But, you know, we really have to use some common sense here.
[44:22.870 --> 44:25.850]  And, wow, I was blown away by that story.
[44:26.370 --> 44:28.770]  They're forever going to be associated with the death.
[44:29.010 --> 44:29.390]  Yeah.
[44:29.490 --> 44:39.570]  You know, it's weirdly like, I don't know, there's something just in this that, like, you take the risk to do something kind of crazy and stupid like this.
[44:39.850 --> 44:44.630]  You run the risk of forever being associated with the tragedy that was a part of that.
[44:44.750 --> 44:46.310]  And I don't think that calculation was in there.
[44:46.470 --> 44:48.290]  Especially if you don't say something about it at the time.
[44:48.630 --> 44:50.830]  And distancing yourself from it after the fact.
[44:50.990 --> 44:59.130]  And then sort of lauding the overall goal in complete disregard for the loss that occurred as a result.
[44:59.130 --> 45:00.170]  I think it's...
[45:00.170 --> 45:07.870]  I'm trying to get my head around, yeah, I'm going to climb Mount Everest and bury $50,000 somewhere and expect somebody to climb there.
[45:08.070 --> 45:09.570]  And what are they supposed to dig up all of Mount Everest?
[45:09.710 --> 45:10.470]  Is there a map to it?
[45:10.770 --> 45:11.910]  How are they supposed to find this?
[45:11.950 --> 45:16.670]  So all these people in search of this money are going to go up there and be digging around.
[45:16.690 --> 45:18.390]  What's that going to do to nature?
[45:18.730 --> 45:24.330]  And it's really well thought out or so poorly thought out, that is, on so many levels.
[45:24.470 --> 45:24.630]  Rob?
[45:24.630 --> 45:27.570]  And I'm just going to say, what's this currency called?
[45:27.690 --> 45:28.490]  A-S-K-T?
[45:28.690 --> 45:28.850]  Yeah.
[45:29.910 --> 45:31.770]  You could also call it blood money now.
[45:31.970 --> 45:32.890]  Well, I think you can.
[45:33.070 --> 45:34.090]  I think you absolutely can.
[45:34.350 --> 45:43.030]  Well, in most of the comments I read about stories and this, I did read a couple stories about this and sort of the history of deaths on Mount Everest.
[45:43.030 --> 45:49.130]  It sort of led me off fragmented and wandering in those sort of articles.
[45:49.130 --> 45:52.570]  But it was really like, oh, is Ask.FM still around?
[45:52.870 --> 45:54.410]  Like, this exists?
[45:54.630 --> 46:02.790]  And then, of course, so you've done enough to revamp your brand and get it out there again, only to be forever associated, as we said, with this tragedy.
[46:02.990 --> 46:05.710]  It's kind of short-sighted.
[46:05.730 --> 46:07.930]  And it's going to be tough to disassociate from.
[46:08.070 --> 46:12.590]  You better have a real differentiation in whatever you're bringing to market there.
[46:13.190 --> 46:16.790]  There's easier ways to get involved in cryptocurrency, less deadly ways.
[46:16.950 --> 46:18.110]  So keep that in mind.
[46:18.290 --> 46:19.150]  Hey, let's take a phone call.
[46:19.430 --> 46:21.550]  347-335-0818.
[46:21.770 --> 46:23.270]  We have our first caller on the line.
[46:23.370 --> 46:23.670]  Good evening.
[46:23.790 --> 46:24.170]  You're on the air.
[46:24.250 --> 46:24.490]  Go ahead.
[46:24.630 --> 46:25.430]  Good evening.
[46:25.510 --> 46:25.850]  How are you?
[46:26.110 --> 46:26.310]  Good.
[46:26.390 --> 46:26.530]  How are you?
[46:26.630 --> 46:26.890]  I have a question.
[46:27.230 --> 46:30.790]  I got a Samsung flip phone.
[46:31.230 --> 46:32.230]  I have no web.
[46:32.390 --> 46:34.690]  They all have it, like, you know, voice and texting, and that's it.
[46:35.470 --> 46:43.490]  And when I put on the voice command, you know, the phone status, it says that the GPS is on.
[46:43.550 --> 46:46.490]  Now, you know, this is not for my benefit, really.
[46:46.490 --> 46:53.930]  It's just that I asked them, they said, for one thing, families can go on the web and sign to where all your kids are and things like that.
[46:54.030 --> 46:55.870]  If you want to activate it, it costs more money.
[46:56.390 --> 47:02.710]  And the other thing is, you know, for a 911 call or something like that, so the cops can locate you, you know.
[47:02.710 --> 47:05.150]  But the thing is, I want to be able to turn it up.
[47:05.250 --> 47:06.910]  There seems to be there's no way to turn it up.
[47:07.010 --> 47:09.150]  I asked my salesman, he said, you can't do it.
[47:09.210 --> 47:15.510]  Is there any way to bypass the unaccessible GPS on the flip phone?
[47:15.510 --> 47:17.090]  That's a really good question.
[47:17.250 --> 47:23.490]  I'm going to say the ease of doing this is probably going to be very hard.
[47:23.830 --> 47:43.030]  If the phone itself has an operating system or firmware from the provider, and they want that on all the time, unless you see the option and you've thoroughly looked, both people asking about that particular model online, you know, doing your research or physically yourself going through menus,
[47:43.350 --> 47:52.350]  looking very, very comprehensively for that option, if you can't find it, it probably is going to be much harder to deactivate.
[47:52.870 --> 48:05.030]  I'm talking like you would have to locate the components and remove them from the circuitry unless you were brave enough to maybe reload the software in some way.
[48:05.170 --> 48:11.290]  Again, the ease of doing that would be additional research and work.
[48:13.210 --> 48:20.070]  And they're probably covered with epoxy also, probably seems to be jammed up with epoxy covers.
[48:20.750 --> 48:30.490]  I'm not entirely clear on what you mean by that, but I was going to ask you, could you just let us know what, for example, what model number of Samsung you've found?
[48:30.610 --> 48:34.830]  Yeah, yeah, it's called the Samsung Gusto 3, and the carrier is Verizon.
[48:35.410 --> 48:36.230]  The what 3?
[48:37.130 --> 48:38.310]  G-O-S-C-O.
[48:39.070 --> 48:48.530]  Okay, well, if anybody out there is familiar with this or has done some hacking on these particular handsets with that provider, perhaps they'll write in and let us know.
[48:48.610 --> 48:50.070]  We'll definitely update people.
[48:50.970 --> 48:52.150]  And I just, thanks for that.
[48:52.190 --> 48:54.290]  I just want to say one more thing, a matter of information.
[48:55.850 --> 49:04.110]  A number of years ago, I got catalogs from various lock companies, like lockmasters and security companies.
[49:06.190 --> 49:06.730]  Okay.
[49:07.250 --> 49:07.830]  Are you there?
[49:08.030 --> 49:08.210]  Yeah.
[49:08.650 --> 49:15.310]  Yeah, so what happened was, they had a table of contents for the course in mechanical safe lock manipulation.
[49:16.150 --> 49:23.930]  And it just so happened that I found out a dumpster a mechanical safe lock, you know, an ordinary group to mechanical safe lock.
[49:24.870 --> 49:24.970]  Okay.
[49:25.110 --> 49:27.810]  And I, I, I, I, it's like a long story short.
[49:27.930 --> 49:32.130]  With the table of contents and the lock, I can manipulate a mechanical safe lock.
[49:32.690 --> 49:33.570]  Oh, that's great.
[49:33.690 --> 49:34.510]  That's a skill, man.
[49:34.510 --> 49:41.670]  And, uh, that's like proper safe cracking, um, uh, and, uh, uh, an entirely, I guess, keyless lock or sort of lock.
[49:42.010 --> 49:45.530]  Um, that's probably, uh, really interesting stuff and, and good for you.
[49:46.130 --> 49:46.490]  Yeah.
[49:46.570 --> 49:57.870]  I would just make one more, uh, one more suggestion about your phone is, um, if this is a phone that's provided to you by, by Verizon, if you went to a Verizon store and got this, um, you might be able to bring it back and say, give me one without GPS.
[49:58.250 --> 50:01.550]  Um, that's, uh, that's usually your, your final option with these things.
[50:01.550 --> 50:07.770]  And if you, if you keep, uh, if you stand your ground, um, they, they might, uh, they might have something else for you there.
[50:08.090 --> 50:08.250]  Yeah.
[50:08.370 --> 50:09.930]  That may be a concern.
[50:10.050 --> 50:14.190]  That's a great idea is, is asking in stores just saying, you know, this isn't going to work for me.
[50:14.350 --> 50:15.350]  I really would prefer this.
[50:15.450 --> 50:16.790]  They probably get that a lot.
[50:16.950 --> 50:31.270]  Um, on the flip side, uh, one other thing just to add, it's not necessarily, I mean, some newer phones have the ability to turn these things off and, and so on, but it is often the case, older phones, they don't necessarily have, um, the component for GPS or they have,
[50:31.390 --> 50:32.450]  um, you know, the newer features.
[50:32.570 --> 50:48.990]  So you kind of have a, uh, a double-edged sword there with, um, you know, you could get a newer, uh, more capable handset, but, uh, um, you know, it's, it's, um, often in both scenarios, you have the flexibility either because it's a legacy system and those components and features aren't available.
[50:49.170 --> 50:53.350]  So the older phone is better or a newer phone actually accommodates the ability to turn that off.
[50:53.350 --> 51:05.870]  But maybe with other trade-offs like being able to physically remove the battery and, and other such things that would disable, um, uh, communications and, and telemetry that, that is going on, um, without your consent or knowledge.
[51:05.990 --> 51:06.930]  It is getting harder.
[51:07.190 --> 51:08.310]  There's, there's no question about that.
[51:08.410 --> 51:19.270]  What I would suggest though is, is plugging the exact name and model of your phone into Google and saying, turn off GPS and see what other people are saying about this, because that's how you find out how, uh, how to really turn it off.
[51:19.270 --> 51:20.410]  Thanks very much for that phone call.
[51:20.590 --> 51:24.090]  Our phone number again, three, four, seven, three, three, five, zero, eight, one, eight.
[51:24.170 --> 51:25.350]  I like fooling my phone.
[51:25.630 --> 51:32.130]  Uh, half the time my phone thinks I'm in Connecticut, uh, or it's, uh, giving me, uh, uh, weird information.
[51:32.490 --> 51:37.270]  It thinks it knows where I live and says, yeah, you can go home and, and I, I follow it.
[51:37.370 --> 51:38.290]  Where are you taking me?
[51:38.430 --> 51:41.570]  And it's taking me to some place that I've gone to a few times, but I don't live there.
[51:42.150 --> 51:48.330]  And, uh, it's, you know, there are other ways you can, you can trick your phones and, and hence whatever surveillance is, uh, in place.
[51:48.330 --> 51:49.630]  You live there now.
[51:50.030 --> 51:54.510]  Well, yeah, I guess, you know, as far as my phone is concerned, I do, but I like confusing it.
[51:54.650 --> 51:54.950]  It's fun.
[51:55.230 --> 51:55.370]  Yeah.
[51:55.470 --> 51:59.510]  These, um, these sort of mess ups, I'll use the, um, appropriate word.
[51:59.690 --> 52:03.770]  Um, these are, are great things to sort of just let them go to the logical extent.
[52:04.010 --> 52:19.790]  What on earth is this, uh, a handset or, um, uh, communications provider, what is it thinking, you know, um, in, in either an automated sense or, or, um, just from, from what they hand you as a part of, you know, your new plan or whatever it's, um, you know,
[52:19.970 --> 52:29.650]  often there are, uh, little things, little things that come through the cracks and, um, you can enjoy that stuff as well, even if it's completely wrong and not working the way it's supposed to.
[52:29.650 --> 52:32.190]  Sometimes that ends up, uh, sort of in your benefit.
[52:32.630 --> 52:33.070]  All right.
[52:33.290 --> 52:35.210]  Let's, uh, let's take another, uh, phone call.
[52:36.690 --> 52:37.630]  Hello, you're on the air.
[52:37.850 --> 52:39.630]  Oh, they hung up.
[52:39.790 --> 52:39.930]  Okay.
[52:39.990 --> 52:42.690]  That means the phone line is open now for whoever wants to call now.
[52:43.290 --> 52:44.830]  347-335-0818.
[52:45.350 --> 52:47.310]  Uh, sorry if we didn't get to you quickly enough.
[52:47.810 --> 52:50.710]  Uh, I know there's a lot of competition to get to the single phone line we still have.
[52:50.770 --> 52:52.010]  We will be getting more phone lines soon.
[52:52.130 --> 52:54.650]  So we'll have all the phones lit up like we used to.
[52:55.630 --> 53:01.450]  347-335-0818, country code one, in case you're calling from out of the country and feel you have a chance to get through.
[53:01.750 --> 53:10.750]  Yeah, I did hear, uh, a while back during the whole Pokemon Go craze, uh, I heard of people using a GPS spoofing app that makes your phone think it's somewhere else and you can pick anywhere you want.
[53:11.290 --> 53:18.970]  Um, you know, so in something like Pokemon Go, you could be at a place where you needed to be to get a certain, uh, imaginary thingy and, uh, that could be fun to play with.
[53:19.050 --> 53:22.730]  Yeah, there are all sorts of things you can do to really, uh, uh, confuse people.
[53:22.730 --> 53:30.990]  Well, one thing I love doing, uh, is, uh, is, is opening up a, uh, a wifi hotspot, uh, near a company with that company's name.
[53:31.430 --> 53:44.830]  And you know that people in that company are going to be trying to connect to it, wondering what the password is, or, you know, a cafe, uh, you make another one with their name and people are constantly asking for the password, trying to connect and they can't because the password isn't correct.
[53:44.830 --> 53:47.970]  Uh, and, uh, you can do that for, for your neighbors.
[53:48.210 --> 53:54.390]  You can do that for, uh, any, any organization that, that has wifi or that, that wants to have wifi.
[53:54.690 --> 53:59.570]  Uh, maybe they don't have wifi and all of a sudden they, it looks like they do and they don't know how to get into their own wifi.
[54:00.850 --> 54:01.210]  Yeah.
[54:01.270 --> 54:02.250]  We have too much time on our hands.
[54:02.330 --> 54:02.610]  Good evening.
[54:02.730 --> 54:03.490]  You're on off the hook.
[54:03.590 --> 54:03.750]  Go ahead.
[54:04.750 --> 54:05.010]  Yeah.
[54:05.190 --> 54:10.350]  The, um, well, the, uh, instructions to shut that GPS are on Google here.
[54:10.590 --> 54:11.370]  That's what I thought.
[54:11.850 --> 54:12.690]  Yeah, sure.
[54:12.690 --> 54:14.230]  Um, well, you want to share them?
[54:14.970 --> 54:16.110]  Uh, you want me to read them?
[54:16.190 --> 54:17.650]  Well, if it's quick, go ahead.
[54:18.050 --> 54:19.390]  Yeah, it seems to be quick.
[54:19.830 --> 54:24.850]  Uh, choose menu settings, select, uh, select phone, press.
[54:24.990 --> 54:25.290]  Okay.
[54:25.570 --> 54:28.130]  Select location detection, then press.
[54:28.270 --> 54:28.550]  Okay.
[54:28.910 --> 54:29.690]  Select the setting.
[54:29.910 --> 54:30.090]  Press.
[54:30.230 --> 54:30.450]  Okay.
[54:30.570 --> 54:34.170]  To choose set on or emergency nine one one.
[54:34.530 --> 54:34.570]  Only.
[54:35.070 --> 54:36.330]  Those are the choices.
[54:37.170 --> 54:40.130]  Gusto, uh, two or Gusto three.
[54:40.690 --> 54:42.830]  Turn GPS location on and off.
[54:43.110 --> 54:47.890]  Uh, and it's on the Verizon, looks like it's on the Verizon site.
[54:48.170 --> 54:48.530]  Okay.
[54:48.570 --> 54:50.310]  Well, hopefully that'll work for that person's phone.
[54:50.470 --> 54:51.430]  I know every phone is different.
[54:51.770 --> 54:52.010]  Yeah.
[54:52.390 --> 54:53.010]  There you go.
[54:53.170 --> 54:54.590]  Well, it says Gusto three.
[54:54.870 --> 54:56.310]  So yeah, that's, I hope you're listening.
[54:56.610 --> 54:58.090]  That's no, that's the best case scenario.
[54:58.370 --> 54:59.830]  Um, and, uh, hopefully that works for them.
[54:59.950 --> 55:00.270]  Okay.
[55:00.310 --> 55:01.950]  Was there anything else on your, on your mind, sir?
[55:02.390 --> 55:03.330]  No, go for it.
[55:03.330 --> 55:03.630]  That's it.
[55:03.770 --> 55:04.110]  Thank you.
[55:04.270 --> 55:05.250]  Thank you for that information.
[55:05.290 --> 55:09.110]  And that's, uh, another indication of how BAI listeners are there to help each other.
[55:09.110 --> 55:10.770]  Thank you very much for that.
[55:10.970 --> 55:16.870]  Uh, and if you want to, uh, write to us with your, um, feedback info of any sort, uh, you can do that.
[55:17.090 --> 55:20.130]  O th at 2600.com is our email address.
[55:20.370 --> 55:23.690]  Uh, you can also tweet to us hacker radio show on Twitter.
[55:24.150 --> 55:27.030]  We, uh, we love to hear feedback in all its forms.
[55:27.590 --> 55:32.850]  And, um, right now our phone line is open three, four, seven, three, three, five, zero, eight, one, eight.
[55:33.130 --> 55:42.250]  If there's anybody out there in the last minute or two of the show, uh, that would like to call and have their voice go out over the airwaves from our, our new transmitting facility at four times square.
[55:42.510 --> 55:43.870]  Uh, this is your chance.
[55:45.990 --> 55:46.390]  Yeah.
[55:46.430 --> 55:47.770]  So you can tell us about anything.
[55:47.770 --> 55:55.790]  Tell us, uh, what your favorite hacking tools are or, you know, uh, what, uh, what kind of hack you would, um, you imagine is next.
[55:55.870 --> 55:57.390]  What are we going to be reporting on the future?
[55:57.490 --> 56:02.810]  We, we want to, we want to hear your, uh, ideas and, uh, the questions, suggestions, comments, whatever.
[56:03.030 --> 56:03.710]  We have a caller.
[56:03.830 --> 56:04.090]  Good evening.
[56:04.190 --> 56:04.890]  You're on off the hook.
[56:05.750 --> 56:06.390]  Oh, hi.
[56:06.490 --> 56:06.910]  Hi, you guys.
[56:07.010 --> 56:07.690]  I was just listening.
[56:07.930 --> 56:11.050]  You know, I saw a documentary today about Bitcoin.
[56:11.430 --> 56:13.230]  I don't really know that much about it.
[56:18.430 --> 56:22.270]  It's been a series, I think, or about corporate greed or something like that.
[56:22.390 --> 56:37.810]  Anyway, so I wanted to know your opinion on how, about how the hacking can occur with that virtual money, or I don't really know enough about it, but you guys seem to know that maybe there's a way they can hack into it.
[56:37.930 --> 56:43.990]  Um, I know people want to invest in it, or I was thinking maybe I would, but I just don't know enough about it.
[56:43.990 --> 56:49.410]  And it seems like something that the wrong people could, um, you know, get involved with.
[56:49.490 --> 56:51.670]  Well, I mean, you, you, you're wise to reach that conclusion.
[56:52.090 --> 56:56.130]  You, you, you, you're wise to reach that conclusion that, um, uh, the wrong people can get in.
[56:56.390 --> 57:03.590]  Anytime there's a password, anytime there's something that you access, uh, there's a possible point where somebody could compromise that.
[57:03.870 --> 57:06.290]  And certainly Bitcoin is, is, is no exception to that.
[57:06.370 --> 57:12.470]  There are a number of safeguards or a number of steps you can take if you, if you follow the instructions, but it can get very complicated.
[57:12.470 --> 57:16.590]  It can get very confusing, especially to people that don't do this kind of thing.
[57:16.970 --> 57:21.390]  And that's why it's important to talk with people who really know what they're talking about.
[57:21.550 --> 57:25.430]  I don't know if that's us, but it's definitely hackers.
[57:25.750 --> 57:29.290]  Yeah, there have been cases of Bitcoin being stolen because it's data.
[57:29.470 --> 57:30.790]  It's data on a hard drive somewhere.
[57:31.030 --> 57:37.130]  And people with access to that data can take it and do what they want with it, which in the case of Bitcoin is spend it.
[57:37.130 --> 57:37.130]  Right.
[57:37.550 --> 57:39.370]  So there are known cases of that.
[57:39.490 --> 57:43.510]  But really, Bitcoin security could fill up an entire show on its own and still only scratch the surface.
[57:43.990 --> 57:53.810]  Yeah, I would just add that it is true that there are private parts of this and stuff that you cannot share with publicly.
[57:54.570 --> 57:56.650]  And it is a technical thing.
[57:56.750 --> 57:58.270]  It's also an emerging thing.
[57:58.410 --> 57:59.150]  This is a frontier.
[57:59.330 --> 58:02.290]  This is new stuff that is being applied to all kinds of things.
[58:02.290 --> 58:04.690]  It is great to be critical.
[58:04.910 --> 58:05.410]  Be skeptical.
[58:06.270 --> 58:07.110]  Try it out.
[58:07.270 --> 58:09.010]  Try it out with a little bit.
[58:09.210 --> 58:10.450]  See how far you get.
[58:10.670 --> 58:12.730]  As E said, it is complex.
[58:12.970 --> 58:15.690]  It can get complex very quickly if you're trying to set this up yourself.
[58:16.250 --> 58:16.890]  Ask around.
[58:17.010 --> 58:17.430]  Get some help.
[58:17.650 --> 58:26.470]  See where maybe you can kind of take it on and where you start to become too lost in it.
[58:26.550 --> 58:31.110]  I mean, there have been entire markets that have gone under, you know, big crypto markets and so on.
[58:31.110 --> 58:37.930]  What I would suggest is that you experiment with very small amounts so that if you lose everything, it's not that big a deal.
[58:38.030 --> 58:39.470]  Same advice I give to people who go gambling.
[58:40.010 --> 58:42.130]  You know, bet 10 cents and 5 cents.
[58:42.190 --> 58:42.810]  Have fun with that.
[58:43.290 --> 58:44.630]  But you learn this way.
[58:44.750 --> 58:48.770]  And then if you do want to, you know, put more into it, at least you know the ropes.
[58:49.230 --> 58:55.670]  But definitely don't shy away from learning about it, experimenting, and, you know, taking risks with small amounts.
[58:56.410 --> 59:03.990]  Because I think most times people lose passwords and they lose access in that way more often than somebody getting in and taking it.
[59:04.150 --> 59:04.750]  Hey, we're out of time.
[59:04.810 --> 59:05.470]  We're going to have to leave it there.
[59:05.570 --> 59:06.290]  Thanks for that call.
[59:06.730 --> 59:09.170]  OTH at 2600.com is our email address.
[59:09.570 --> 59:10.610]  We'll see you next week.
[59:10.770 --> 59:11.030]  Good night.
[59:11.030 --> 59:11.150]  Good night.