[00:00.000 --> 00:06.860]  ...people who do that very thing, including Chris Cooper of New York City Audubon Society and Jody Jamison of Hackensack Riverkeeper.
[00:07.220 --> 00:09.940]  Tune in on Tuesday, August 28th at 8 p.m.
[00:10.120 --> 00:12.120]  to hear what they're doing and how they're doing it.
[00:12.280 --> 00:17.400]  Right here on WBAI New York, 99.5 FM and WBAI.org.
[00:33.540 --> 00:36.080]  And you're listening to radio station WBAI New York.
[00:36.260 --> 00:37.360]  The time is just about 8 o'clock.
[00:37.440 --> 00:39.920]  Time once again for another edition of Off the Hook.
[02:12.310 --> 02:14.350]  And a very good evening to a ride.
[02:14.470 --> 02:15.990]  The program is Off the Hook.
[02:16.230 --> 02:19.050]  Emmanuel Goldstein here with you on this Wednesday evening.
[02:19.450 --> 02:20.830]  Joined tonight by Rob T.
[02:20.930 --> 02:21.350]  Firefly.
[02:21.610 --> 02:22.090]  Good evening.
[02:23.410 --> 02:23.870]  Voltaire.
[02:24.250 --> 02:24.550]  Hey.
[02:24.870 --> 02:25.630]  And Kyle.
[02:25.950 --> 02:26.450]  Present.
[02:26.810 --> 02:29.070]  And you all have brand new microphones, I understand.
[02:29.350 --> 02:29.790]  We do.
[02:29.970 --> 02:31.030]  They're bright and shiny.
[02:31.030 --> 02:33.350]  And we have to thank our listeners for them.
[02:33.930 --> 02:34.310]  Yes.
[02:34.690 --> 02:36.390]  Yeah, well, that's good.
[02:36.510 --> 02:38.850]  Thank you very much, listeners, for getting us these microphones.
[02:39.710 --> 02:40.830]  They do sound good.
[02:41.390 --> 02:42.510]  I don't have a new microphone.
[02:42.610 --> 02:43.130]  You guys do.
[02:43.410 --> 02:45.310]  I'm using the same old one, but...
[02:45.310 --> 02:46.950]  Well, now ours are as good as yours.
[02:47.190 --> 02:51.070]  So, I mean, I didn't want to say anything, but you've had the nicer one this whole time.
[02:51.810 --> 02:53.130]  But now we've caught up.
[02:53.250 --> 02:53.530]  Wow.
[02:53.670 --> 02:55.990]  Okay, well, and I have the oldest one here.
[02:56.390 --> 02:57.290]  So that's...
[02:57.290 --> 02:58.930]  And we're getting a new studio built.
[02:58.930 --> 03:01.070]  We're doing all kinds of things here at the radio station, by the way.
[03:01.450 --> 03:03.750]  We're not just sitting around doing nothing.
[03:04.990 --> 03:07.470]  The place is moving forward.
[03:07.470 --> 03:11.350]  And we're going to be covering all kinds of interesting things in future shows.
[03:12.330 --> 03:13.450]  And tonight as well.
[03:13.590 --> 03:15.330]  And hopefully taking phone calls in addition.
[03:15.630 --> 03:19.410]  We're not raising funds tonight, but you can always contribute to the station.
[03:19.430 --> 03:20.470]  We could raise funds.
[03:20.530 --> 03:22.830]  I mean, people can always become a BAI buddy.
[03:23.110 --> 03:26.170]  And you've got to give to WBAI.org to get information on that.
[03:26.170 --> 03:26.890]  Easy to do.
[03:27.150 --> 03:28.470]  All the usual methods.
[03:29.750 --> 03:32.350]  More information, give to WBAI.org.
[03:32.410 --> 03:36.710]  Or text the letters WBAI to 41444 on your phone.
[03:37.630 --> 03:38.490]  Follow the link.
[03:38.610 --> 03:40.230]  Follow, yeah, all the instructions that follow.
[03:41.270 --> 03:47.650]  Yeah, so we're moving forward in many, many ways as things crash down around us.
[03:48.190 --> 03:53.390]  We'll be here to cover it and to provide a running commentary, I suppose.
[03:53.710 --> 03:53.950]  Well, okay.
[03:54.110 --> 03:59.650]  So let's dive right in because there are a number of things that are happening that I think we should be focusing attention on.
[04:00.610 --> 04:02.470]  Not all in this country, by the way.
[04:02.630 --> 04:04.890]  A lot of things happening in other parts of the world.
[04:04.970 --> 04:06.130]  For instance, Australia.
[04:06.390 --> 04:07.850]  I know we have listeners in Australia.
[04:07.950 --> 04:11.170]  And I'm sure they're concerned with what's going on.
[04:11.270 --> 04:14.030]  And they might have some insight to lend on this.
[04:14.030 --> 04:16.850]  And I know it's, what, about 8 o'clock in the morning over there?
[04:16.950 --> 04:19.430]  They could call us maybe later on and give us some insight.
[04:19.550 --> 04:31.090]  But, yeah, you could wind up going to jail for up to a decade if you refuse to unlock your phone for a cop or for law enforcement in general.
[04:31.650 --> 04:33.770]  That is where we are at over there.
[04:33.790 --> 04:36.910]  And don't think it can't happen over here because it probably can.
[04:37.050 --> 04:40.210]  And, in fact, it is happening on some levels.
[04:40.210 --> 04:47.490]  But the country's assistance and access bill was introduced recently for public consultation.
[04:47.710 --> 04:52.970]  What it does is it strengthens the penalties for people who refuse to unlock their phones for the cops.
[04:53.310 --> 04:59.590]  And under Australia's existing Crimes Act, a judge could jail a person for two years for not handing over their data.
[04:59.770 --> 05:02.330]  So, you know, it's not like this is something brand new.
[05:02.730 --> 05:07.810]  But this bill extends that for up to 10 years, arguing that the existing penalty wasn't enough.
[05:07.810 --> 05:08.290]  Yeah.
[05:09.590 --> 05:09.710]  Yeah.
[05:09.710 --> 05:18.650]  The bill also takes a multi-pronged approach to accessing a suspect's data by basically coercing third parties into helping out.
[05:18.930 --> 05:21.850]  And what that means is there are these new rules.
[05:22.010 --> 05:39.430]  They apply to communication service providers, which it's basically a term that encompasses telephone companies, device vendors, application publishers, anyone who has access to your personal data and can share it with the authorities.
[05:40.060 --> 05:52.050]  Now, basically, these companies would be subjected to two different kinds of rules that would compel them to help retrieve a suspect's information.
[05:52.050 --> 05:54.750]  First, technical assistance notice.
[05:54.750 --> 05:58.410]  That requires them to hand over any decryption keys they happen to have.
[05:59.110 --> 06:05.990]  And that notice would help the government in end-to-end encryption cases where the target lets a service provider hold their own encryption keys.
[06:06.310 --> 06:13.530]  So they'd be compelled to hand that over so that the suspect can have their communications eavesdropped upon.
[06:13.530 --> 06:23.450]  But if the suspect themselves stores the keys, well, the government would pull out the big guns with a second kind of order called a technical capability notice.
[06:23.630 --> 06:31.110]  And that forces communications providers to build new capabilities that would help the government access a target's information where possible.
[06:31.250 --> 06:42.470]  So basically, they're just trying to do everything they can to basically tear down encryption, privacy, the sort of things we take for granted.
[06:42.470 --> 06:59.370]  And whether it's compelling the individual themselves to unlock their phone or device, or whether it's the internet service provider or app developer that also might be able to get a hold of your private information, they are really putting the pressure on.
[06:59.510 --> 07:02.250]  Now, there are a few things that this bill does not allow.
[07:02.450 --> 07:06.130]  The government cannot force a company to build weaknesses into a product.
[07:06.130 --> 07:10.310]  And it can't stop them from fixing weaknesses that it finds.
[07:10.470 --> 07:13.070]  So they can't just put in a back door.
[07:13.310 --> 07:14.310]  That is forbidden.
[07:14.570 --> 07:18.590]  They also can't access information without a warrant.
[07:19.110 --> 07:21.950]  So, you know, a couple of things there.
[07:22.350 --> 07:31.630]  Now, this legislation also creates a new class of access warrant that lets cops get evidence from devices in secret before the device encrypts it.
[07:31.630 --> 07:37.610]  Including intercepting communications, using other computers to access the data.
[07:37.810 --> 07:44.630]  And it also amends existing search and seizure warrants, allowing cops to access data remotely, including online accounts.
[07:44.730 --> 07:48.550]  So, basically, anything they can get away with, they are trying to get away with.
[07:48.590 --> 07:51.090]  And that is something that we're seeing everywhere.
[07:51.090 --> 08:00.770]  Yeah, I want to take issue with this article and the tech press in general have taken the Australian government at their word that there's, quote-unquote, no backdoor requirement in it.
[08:00.890 --> 08:08.630]  When, in fact, the intercept requiring it, allowing an intercept built into it for law enforcement, that is a backdoor.
[08:08.630 --> 08:23.530]  We've seen in China, before Google left China previously, their intercept technology for Americans, for the American cops was, it was taken advantage of.
[08:23.650 --> 08:31.070]  But because it increases the, having an intercept increase to the attack service area, China was able to take advantage of that.
[08:31.070 --> 08:39.210]  Well, I mean, what this is saying is it's saying that they can't force you to have an inferior product that can be backdoored.
[08:39.390 --> 08:42.390]  They require access to everything you have access to.
[08:42.570 --> 08:49.310]  But the way I'm reading this, it seems that they can't force you not to be good at what it is you are doing.
[08:49.310 --> 09:05.270]  But having, but early in the article, they mentioned having it built in, for companies where they control the user's keys, so basically Facebook Messenger or iMessage, those will require an intercept capability built into it.
[09:05.830 --> 09:07.070]  Because they require that.
[09:07.290 --> 09:08.030]  Yeah, and that...
[09:08.030 --> 09:09.510]  But that's their decision to do that.
[09:09.770 --> 09:11.970]  And that in and of itself is a weakness.
[09:12.350 --> 09:12.530]  Uh-huh.
[09:12.630 --> 09:13.790]  Yeah, but they don't have to do it.
[09:13.870 --> 09:17.970]  They can redesign their product so they don't do that, and they can't be forced to do it.
[09:17.990 --> 09:19.230]  That's my understanding of this.
[09:19.310 --> 09:21.250]  And I'm not defending this bill by any means.
[09:21.670 --> 09:34.190]  But the way they're doing this with such a wide umbrella covering the service providers and the device manufacturers and the app programmers, anywhere along this chain, you know, you're going to find tons of weaknesses.
[09:34.490 --> 09:39.610]  And once they're found, they're found by everyone, not just the government.
[09:39.610 --> 09:52.090]  And we've seen a similar case some years ago where the powers that be in this country had an iPhone of a suspected terrorist, and they wanted Apple to let them into it, and Apple could not.
[09:52.150 --> 09:53.050]  And they demanded backdoors.
[09:53.190 --> 09:56.770]  And Apple, I think, successfully fought off that request.
[09:56.770 --> 09:59.970]  But they got the info anyway because they found a different way to get in.
[10:00.170 --> 10:00.470]  Absolutely.
[10:00.790 --> 10:05.010]  You know, they didn't coerce Apple into doing it, and it was a big deal for them fighting back.
[10:05.170 --> 10:20.010]  But then the minute that any of these entities along the chain, the manufacturers, the coders, the everyone, the minute they've put in some way for Australia to get your data, it's there for every government, it's there for anybody, it's not going to get the toothpaste back in the tube.
[10:20.130 --> 10:20.930]  No, definitely not.
[10:22.090 --> 10:37.990]  It's disturbing to see all this, you know, happening, because those of us who care about privacy are going to have a really, really tough time preserving it over the years ahead.
[10:37.990 --> 11:00.530]  Considering Australia is part of a Five Eyes alliance of surveillance from a government perspective, I wonder what this would occur if this was applied to a foreign national or someone from, like, the U.S., where they're not allowed necessarily to do this so brazenly,
[11:00.610 --> 11:02.110]  but Australia now can.
[11:02.310 --> 11:07.870]  I'm also curious why and why now is Australia doing this and what will happen with that data?
[11:07.990 --> 11:12.730]  Well, again, every government is doing this somehow, some way.
[11:12.910 --> 11:14.910]  So it's not like it's a particular crisis.
[11:15.170 --> 11:20.610]  It's just that anyone in authority, anyone in control wants more control.
[11:20.730 --> 11:22.150]  They want to be able to eavesdrop and listen.
[11:22.350 --> 11:28.030]  And keep in mind, you know, it didn't used to be as easy as it is now to get information on people.
[11:28.210 --> 11:29.630]  You always hear the opposite.
[11:29.810 --> 11:33.910]  You always hear how the poor authorities are locked out because of all the encryption.
[11:33.910 --> 11:36.430]  But, you know, we didn't have social media.
[11:36.430 --> 11:50.950]  We didn't have all these people advertising constantly their whereabouts and their likes and dislikes and basically keeping huge treasure troves of data about themselves on computers and devices of all sorts that get discarded.
[11:51.650 --> 11:55.490]  It has never been easier to be surveilled by the authorities.
[11:55.730 --> 11:57.570]  So don't believe that for a second.
[11:57.750 --> 12:02.130]  But on the subject of Facebook, here in the U.S., U.S.
[12:02.150 --> 12:07.190]  government is trying to force Facebook to break the encryption in its popular messenger app.
[12:07.730 --> 12:12.590]  So law enforcement can listen in on a suspect's voice conversations in a criminal probe.
[12:14.510 --> 12:19.550]  Basically, this resurrects the issue of whether companies can be compelled to alter their products to enable surveillance.
[12:19.550 --> 12:21.410]  So that's more like the backdoor thing.
[12:21.610 --> 12:27.590]  Now, the previously unreported case in a federal court in California is proceeding under seal.
[12:27.590 --> 12:30.810]  So no filings are publicly available.
[12:31.270 --> 12:35.730]  And there's just basically three people communicating with Reuters saying that Facebook is contesting the U.S.
[12:36.050 --> 12:36.870]  Department of Justice's demand.
[12:36.990 --> 12:43.850]  It's just amazing that this is the world we live in now where there's secret proceedings going on and we have to hear about it anonymously from people involved.
[12:44.150 --> 13:00.130]  Now, the judge basically says or heard arguments on Tuesday on a government motion to hold Facebook in contempt of court for refusing to carry out the surveillance request, according to the sources who spoke on condition of anonymity.
[13:00.310 --> 13:06.870]  Now, the impact of whatever, however this case goes, is kind of unclear.
[13:07.090 --> 13:20.810]  If the government prevails in the Facebook Messenger case, it could make similar arguments to force companies to rewrite other popular encrypted services, such as Signal and Facebook's billion-user WhatsApp, which include both voice and text functions,
[13:20.810 --> 13:36.290]  law enforcement agencies forcing technology providers to rewrite software to capture and hand over data that's no longer encrypted, would have major implications for the companies which see themselves as defenders of individual privacy while under pressure from police and lawmakers.
[13:36.790 --> 13:43.430]  But, you know, it makes me wonder, so Messenger and WhatsApp and Signal become compromised.
[13:44.310 --> 13:48.910]  What is it, legally, that stops somebody from just writing something better?
[13:49.070 --> 13:54.770]  Would you be imprisoned or fined or penalized in some way if you wrote a really good encryption app?
[13:55.250 --> 14:07.830]  Yeah, I feel like this doesn't really apply to Signal, because even though their non-profit organization is based in the U.S., they could just move their operations or have somebody fork the source code because it's free open-source software.
[14:07.990 --> 14:09.010]  Move their operations where?
[14:09.590 --> 14:10.770]  To a country not.
[14:10.770 --> 14:12.570]  And what country is that?
[14:13.070 --> 14:14.630]  The list is getting smaller and smaller.
[14:14.810 --> 14:18.410]  So where do you move to where, you know, privacy is still respected?
[14:18.710 --> 14:18.830]  Germany.
[14:19.070 --> 14:19.770]  I'm sorry, Germany?
[14:19.910 --> 14:20.170]  Germany.
[14:20.550 --> 14:21.090]  You think Germany?
[14:21.270 --> 14:21.550]  Maybe.
[14:21.730 --> 14:21.870]  Okay.
[14:22.150 --> 14:24.050]  German listeners, please let us know if that's true.
[14:24.230 --> 14:34.530]  Switzerland Anomaly has pretty good laws about this, but I think people overstate the case because, like, an advanced adversary can still, like, break into their systems.
[14:34.750 --> 14:35.150]  Uh-huh.
[14:35.350 --> 14:37.990]  Well, that's certainly true in almost anywhere.
[14:38.910 --> 14:40.130]  Don't do it in Egypt.
[14:40.470 --> 14:42.270]  That's the message that I'm getting here.
[14:42.850 --> 14:49.650]  Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi has signed a new law that tightens controls over the Internet.
[14:49.990 --> 14:57.750]  The legislation on cybercrime means websites can be blocked in Egypt if deemed to constitute a threat to national security or the economy.
[14:57.750 --> 15:10.430]  Now, keep in mind, yes, this is Egypt, but it will be here in the future because everything that is going on in other parts of the world is studied and watched, and if it works, it will be emulated.
[15:10.610 --> 15:12.090]  Do not doubt that for a second.
[15:12.650 --> 15:19.090]  Now, anyone found guilty of running or even visiting these websites could face prison or a fine.
[15:19.490 --> 15:24.730]  Now, authorities, of course, say the new measures are needed to tackle instability and terrorism.
[15:25.710 --> 15:31.150]  So that sounds pretty familiar, and that's probably something that we will have to deal with in many other places.
[15:31.370 --> 15:45.770]  Now, Egypt, isn't that where there was actually a revolution not too long ago in, you know, in historical terms, where it was enabled by people's ability to network and organize over the Internet to overthrow the previous regime?
[15:47.010 --> 16:02.090]  Yeah, it's important for organizing, and I think a lot of the different events that were occurring in the Mideast took place because of the ecosystem of applications and tools that you can use for secure communications.
[16:02.410 --> 16:11.910]  That's why I think, like, we see a lot of these names and different programs mentioned, but it's not necessarily the only stuff available on the market.
[16:11.910 --> 16:20.070]  There are plenty of alternatives, and it's kind of becomes whack-a-mole with tech and different types of encryption and communication methods.
[16:20.310 --> 16:21.430]  Well, how about some good news?
[16:22.170 --> 16:28.870]  It turns out the number of tracking cookies on EU news sites have gone down by 22%.
[16:28.870 --> 16:46.990]  That's according to a report by the Reuters Institute at the University of Oxford, who looks at cookie usage across EU news sites in two phases, one in April 2018 and one in July 2018, pre- and post-introduction of the new EU General Data Protection Regulation,
[16:47.090 --> 16:57.030]  known as GDPR, meant to give individuals more control over their privacy and cut down on tracking cookies and things like that.
[16:57.550 --> 17:06.130]  So basically, they looked at 200 news sites in total from seven countries, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Poland, Spain, and the UK.
[17:07.150 --> 17:09.550]  And they have some interesting results.
[17:09.670 --> 17:13.370]  Turns out that the average went down 22%.
[17:13.370 --> 17:17.610]  The United Kingdom went down the most, 45%.
[17:18.210 --> 17:19.910]  Germany only went down 6%.
[17:19.910 --> 17:23.510]  So, I don't know, Kyle, maybe Germany's not the best haven for...
[17:23.510 --> 17:25.690]  I don't think they had as many to begin with.
[17:25.750 --> 17:26.270]  Okay, all right.
[17:26.270 --> 17:27.150]  That was the way I read that.
[17:27.290 --> 17:28.650]  It went up in Poland 20%.
[17:28.650 --> 17:30.670]  I don't know why that happened.
[17:31.310 --> 17:32.710]  Spain down 33%.
[17:32.710 --> 17:34.090]  France down 32%.
[17:34.090 --> 17:34.830]  Same in Italy.
[17:36.670 --> 17:39.150]  So, I think that's, you know, cause and effect.
[17:39.330 --> 17:40.370]  That's something positive.
[17:40.370 --> 17:45.230]  You introduce some safeguards and maybe you'll actually see some results.
[17:45.230 --> 17:53.190]  Of course, it could also be this theory here that one expert said we may be observing a kind of house cleaning effect.
[17:53.770 --> 17:58.530]  Modern websites are highly complex and evolve over time in a path-dependent way.
[17:59.010 --> 18:13.770]  Sometimes accumulating out-of-date features and code and the introduction of GDPR may have provided news organizations with a chance to evaluate the utility of various features, including third-party services, and to remove code which is no longer of significant use or which compromises user privacy.
[18:13.910 --> 18:19.890]  So, they could have just been doing some cleaning up of this really wasteful code and that could have resulted in this.
[18:20.010 --> 18:22.410]  But it's the thought that counts.
[18:22.970 --> 18:37.670]  And it's the action as a result of coming to some kind of legislative conclusion and forming an alliance in the form of the EU and implementing it together in sort of a unified way.
[18:38.410 --> 18:55.990]  You then, as this being the functional aspect of it, you know, creating a moment when people can actually look at their sites, the things that they're hosting, and make determinations as a result and then announce it and all the other announcements that were going on surrounding that,
[18:56.110 --> 18:58.250]  the GDPR, that's what it's called.
[18:58.490 --> 18:58.710]  Yes.
[18:58.930 --> 18:59.030]  Yep.
[18:59.850 --> 19:00.390]  All right.
[19:00.450 --> 19:02.930]  Let's look at some radio news.
[19:02.930 --> 19:08.730]  Turns out there was an Austin pirate radio station that would air Alex Jones's program.
[19:08.870 --> 19:09.670]  They've been shut down.
[19:09.770 --> 19:13.210]  And now they're facing a $15,000 fine for operating in the first place.
[19:13.770 --> 19:15.590]  Well, you know, they are a pirate radio station.
[19:15.790 --> 19:18.590]  But it's interesting that this is happening now.
[19:18.850 --> 19:22.070]  They've been airing his shows for quite some time.
[19:24.110 --> 19:26.550]  And they're saying they're not going to pay this fine.
[19:26.710 --> 19:28.530]  They're being a bit self-righteous about that.
[19:28.530 --> 19:30.790]  A lawsuit filed this week in U.S.
[19:30.870 --> 19:36.690]  District Court in Austin accuses Liberty Radio of operating at 90.1 FM without federal consent since at least 2013.
[19:37.250 --> 19:42.250]  And now, if you'll tune in, it's religious programming on that frequency in place of Liberty Radio.
[19:42.350 --> 19:45.610]  I don't know who's operating that or if they're going to get fined as well.
[19:45.730 --> 19:55.290]  A check of the Liberty Radio website indicated the station stopped being transmitted over the air in December, but has been streaming online and via a call-in listen line.
[19:55.290 --> 19:56.770]  So, I don't know what the issue is then.
[19:57.170 --> 20:06.510]  According to court documents, FCC enforcement agents from Houston were called into the Austin area to investigate 90.1 FM after the agency received a complaint.
[20:06.990 --> 20:13.270]  Using high-tech equipment, those agents were able to trace the signal to the Orchid Plaza apartments in East Austin.
[20:13.970 --> 20:18.890]  Agents reported the Liberty Radio was being operated out of some sort of maintenance or utility room at the complex.
[20:19.790 --> 20:34.750]  And they basically say that up until late last year, the complex, which was a subject of numerous well-publicized city nuisance violations, had been owned by an entity linked to two of the defendants in the lawsuit over Liberty Radio.
[20:34.890 --> 20:36.890]  So, that's kind of an interesting thing.
[20:37.230 --> 20:39.630]  But, you know, I don't know why it's getting so much attention.
[20:40.050 --> 20:42.650]  It's another private radio station being shut down.
[20:42.830 --> 20:44.790]  And that kind of thing happens all the time.
[20:44.790 --> 20:45.830]  All it takes is a complaint.
[20:46.050 --> 20:51.750]  Somebody files a complaint, the FCC will investigate, and that is how these things progress.
[20:51.950 --> 20:53.610]  It's got nothing to do really with Alex Jones.
[20:53.730 --> 20:55.850]  It just happens to be a station he was broadcast on.
[20:56.850 --> 21:05.510]  Well, this is obviously all part of the conspiracy by Hillary Clinton and the FCC to engage with aliens and send waves to make the frogs in the swamp gay and like...
[21:05.510 --> 21:08.790]  Don't, don't, don't do that ever again.
[21:09.570 --> 21:11.310]  They have vaccinations for that now.
[21:11.310 --> 21:11.690]  Yeah.
[21:11.990 --> 21:21.050]  No, what's actually going on now is funny because you get Alex Jones's, I guess, fans, listeners posting everywhere, oh, this is, you know, censorship.
[21:21.290 --> 21:22.370]  This is the government coming down.
[21:22.530 --> 21:27.690]  No, this is the government enforcing the rules that all of us in the broadcast world have to abide by.
[21:27.790 --> 21:28.690]  You have to get your license.
[21:28.830 --> 21:29.850]  You have to pay for your license.
[21:30.170 --> 21:33.110]  You have to, you know, go about things the right way.
[21:33.250 --> 21:42.290]  And if you're going to be a big, powerful, you know, I guess wealthy individual who's going to be a broadcaster, you know, what's, what's your excuse?
[21:42.450 --> 21:45.670]  It is possible to operate a pirate radio station and not be shut down.
[21:45.910 --> 21:50.150]  I know pirate radio stations that have operated for years and not been shut down.
[21:50.490 --> 21:51.130]  Why is that?
[21:51.230 --> 21:54.050]  Because nobody complained because nobody reported them.
[21:54.170 --> 21:59.170]  In this particular case, you have someone like Alex Jones spouting the garbage that he spouts.
[21:59.430 --> 22:02.330]  I'm surprised people didn't complain earlier, but somebody finally did.
[22:02.710 --> 22:05.250]  And there was an investigation and that's what happens.
[22:05.270 --> 22:08.210]  As you can see, something else is broadcasting in its place.
[22:08.370 --> 22:12.390]  So there's no shortage of people willing to step up and operate a pirate radio station.
[22:13.110 --> 22:20.130]  You know, we had a great panel on pirate radio here in the city at Hope, which will be posted fairly soon.
[22:20.650 --> 22:22.750]  And there were just so many of them.
[22:22.930 --> 22:28.710]  Every single frequency that is not being used by a full power station seems to have a station.
[22:29.090 --> 22:32.750]  And I know, Kyle, are you listening to some of them on the way in here sometimes?
[22:33.130 --> 22:39.410]  Yeah, there's something like I think 30 or 34 active stations across the FM band just from Brooklyn.
[22:39.970 --> 22:47.970]  And there are plenty of other neighborhoods and stations originating in between and at lower and lower powers.
[22:48.250 --> 22:49.330]  It's fascinating.
[22:49.490 --> 22:52.070]  And yeah, we catch some adjacent to 99.5.
[22:52.210 --> 22:53.750]  So there's 99.9.
[22:53.950 --> 22:55.450]  Well, don't get people to go to those.
[22:55.530 --> 22:57.370]  But those ones, they're too close to us.
[22:57.490 --> 23:00.530]  They should move somewhere else because it could interfere with us.
[23:00.530 --> 23:00.990]  All right.
[23:01.070 --> 23:02.450]  The best one's 99.5.
[23:02.630 --> 23:03.290]  Let's put it that way.
[23:03.410 --> 23:03.690]  Yes.
[23:04.050 --> 23:04.410]  Yes.
[23:04.670 --> 23:05.710]  We're the true pirates.
[23:05.950 --> 23:06.550]  But they're a lot.
[23:06.690 --> 23:07.250]  They're all over.
[23:07.410 --> 23:11.190]  They're adjacent to different bands usually, just up or down a little bit.
[23:11.330 --> 23:12.130]  And you can find them.
[23:12.210 --> 23:13.090]  Yeah, you can find them real easy.
[23:13.150 --> 23:19.170]  But sometimes, you know, you won't know if you're listening to a pirate radio station or a non-commercial radio station.
[23:19.310 --> 23:21.730]  I actually can't even tell that anymore because some of these have commercials.
[23:21.970 --> 23:23.150]  They actually have commercials.
[23:23.550 --> 23:28.150]  I was also going to joke just after Rob was saying that like, you know, he should just step up.
[23:28.250 --> 23:34.490]  If he's such a wealthy, well-to-do, crazy broadcaster, there's plenty of those people who've done it the legitimate way.
[23:34.630 --> 23:39.310]  They own the station, they own the transmitter, whatever, and they get to spout their, you know, religion or whatever it is.
[23:39.670 --> 23:44.450]  So yeah, he should just grow with his own prestige, I guess.
[23:44.470 --> 23:44.890]  Wait, wait, wait.
[23:44.890 --> 23:46.390]  Stop trying to do it on the cheap, Alex.
[23:46.730 --> 23:50.550]  I just realized, is Alex Jones on any legitimate radio stations?
[23:50.630 --> 23:52.350]  No, it's all this cheap outlets.
[23:52.550 --> 23:54.190]  He's just doing it as...
[23:54.190 --> 23:58.390]  I mean, even we can get on the radio, on a legitimate radio station.
[23:58.610 --> 24:00.610]  You're saying he can't do that.
[24:00.690 --> 24:01.670]  He needs the internet.
[24:01.670 --> 24:02.950]  He needs social media.
[24:03.130 --> 24:04.110]  He needs pirate radio stations.
[24:04.310 --> 24:06.170]  That's the only way to get his message out?
[24:06.630 --> 24:09.350]  Apparently, he has yet to make those relationships.
[24:09.350 --> 24:12.270]  It's not like he doesn't make a lot of money doing what he does.
[24:12.410 --> 24:14.850]  So why wouldn't he just buy airtime someplace?
[24:15.150 --> 24:21.830]  I think he's just happy hucking the things he does and, you know, living off of that.
[24:21.950 --> 24:23.550]  I don't think he has... he aspires.
[24:23.670 --> 24:24.510]  I mean, I could be wrong.
[24:24.650 --> 24:30.130]  He could be on a station right here in New York, and I don't listen, so I don't know, but I don't think... I haven't heard of one.
[24:30.370 --> 24:30.970]  Yeah, Voltaire.
[24:31.070 --> 24:39.150]  Yeah, he's broadcast on Genesis Communication Network, which has over 830 legal radio stations.
[24:39.350 --> 24:40.910]  Okay, so he is broadcast on those.
[24:41.090 --> 24:41.330]  Yes.
[24:41.330 --> 24:41.710]  Wow.
[24:41.950 --> 24:45.810]  So what's with all this censorship claim, then?
[24:45.910 --> 24:47.530]  Why does he need to be on a pirate radio station?
[24:47.630 --> 24:52.650]  Pirate radio stations should have alternative things, not mainstream, and apparently he's mainstream.
[24:52.770 --> 24:58.530]  Yeah, it sounds like it was relaying it, then, just as, like, somebody, you know, redistributing our own show on another station.
[24:58.530 --> 24:59.630]  I'll bet he shut it down.
[24:59.630 --> 25:00.770]  How's that for a conspiracy?
[25:00.990 --> 25:01.250]  Yeah.
[25:01.410 --> 25:01.650]  Yeah.
[25:01.950 --> 25:02.250]  Okay.
[25:02.430 --> 25:02.770]  All right.
[25:02.810 --> 25:03.650]  I think you got something.
[25:03.870 --> 25:05.410]  Well, let's talk about other radio.
[25:05.690 --> 25:14.490]  There's another radio station that's in danger, and if you if you basically read government publications, you find out about these things.
[25:14.590 --> 25:25.310]  If you turn to page 25 of the 2019 budget proposal for the National Institute of Standards and Technology under the heading Fundamental Measurement, Quantum Science, and Measurement Dissemination...
[25:25.310 --> 25:27.050]  Do we have a copy in the studio?
[25:27.770 --> 25:28.210]  No?
[25:28.410 --> 25:29.190]  Oh, that's disappointing.
[25:29.730 --> 25:41.890]  Well, anyway, in there, there's a short entry that has caused plenty of debate and even a fair deal, a fair amount of anger amongst those in the amateur radio scene, and those are people you do not want to anger, believe me.
[25:42.910 --> 25:49.890]  NIST, as I mentioned, the National Institute of Standards and Technology, will discontinue the dissemination of the U.S.
[25:50.130 --> 25:57.130]  time and frequency via the NIST radio stations in Hawaii and Fort Collins, Colorado.
[25:57.490 --> 26:11.310]  These radio stations transmit signals that are used to synchronize consumer electronic products like wall clocks, clock radios, wrist watches, and may be used in other applications like appliances, cameras, and irrigation controllers.
[26:11.750 --> 26:20.850]  The NIST stations in Hawaii and Colorado are the home of WWV, WWVH, and WWVB.
[26:21.170 --> 26:23.690]  The oldest of these stations is WWV.
[26:23.850 --> 26:32.330]  They've been broadcasting in some form or another since 1920, making it the longest continually operating radio station in the United States.
[26:32.670 --> 26:40.990]  Yet, in order to save approximately $6.3 million, these time and frequency standard stations are potentially on the shopping block.
[26:41.170 --> 26:46.390]  I mean, I know that sounds like a lot of money, but in the broadcasting industry, that really isn't much at all.
[26:46.490 --> 26:50.230]  And I'm surprised somebody just doesn't come by and buy the thing up.
[26:50.750 --> 26:53.890]  So anyway, what does that mean for those who don't live and breathe radio?
[26:54.050 --> 26:59.790]  Well, the loss of WWV and WWVH is probably a non-event for anyone outside of the amateur radio world.
[27:00.090 --> 27:03.070]  In fact, most people probably don't even know they exist.
[27:03.190 --> 27:03.670]  Is that true?
[27:03.790 --> 27:04.970]  Most people don't know they exist?
[27:05.410 --> 27:06.690]  Don't know the frequencies exist?
[27:06.890 --> 27:08.270]  Well, the station... you know what?
[27:08.370 --> 27:09.730]  Okay, we're going to call one of these stations.
[27:10.370 --> 27:11.690]  WWV is the one in Colorado.
[27:12.530 --> 27:37.110]  I'm going to dial it right now and you can hear what it sounds like while you guys... I just want to add the interest group of manufacturers and people that use that frequency and products, they alone could form some kind of group to run it as a cooperative or some kind of other org just because of their interest in producing products that make use of the time coming across like that.
[27:37.250 --> 27:39.470]  I mean, there's plenty of devices and products.
[27:40.050 --> 27:40.830]  And what is it?
[27:40.910 --> 27:42.830]  Six million is... as you said, it's not that much.
[27:43.690 --> 27:45.450]  I'm calling WWV right now.
[27:45.590 --> 27:47.350]  I can hear what they sound like over the air.
[27:58.220 --> 27:59.300]  It gets better.
[28:06.730 --> 28:09.610]  Okay, that pause there, that's the 30 second mark.
[28:10.290 --> 28:12.430]  By listening to shortwave radio, I know that much.
[28:12.910 --> 28:13.210]  Interesting.
[28:14.170 --> 28:21.510]  And, you know, I think the frequencies on shortwave is 5,000 kilohertz, it's 10,000 kilohertz.
[28:21.750 --> 28:22.210]  Oh, shit.
[28:28.640 --> 28:34.320]  At the tone, zero hours, 28 minutes, coordinated universal time.
[28:38.440 --> 28:39.960]  And that's how it goes.
[28:41.080 --> 28:44.840]  Minute after minute, hour after hour, forever and ever and ever.
[28:45.340 --> 28:47.240]  Sometimes there are little announcements made.
[28:47.400 --> 28:50.040]  Sometimes there's an extra second inserted, which is very exciting.
[28:50.260 --> 28:52.080]  You know, on New Year's, they do things like that.
[28:52.080 --> 28:54.100]  But that's WWV.
[28:54.220 --> 28:58.780]  And I was giving frequencies, 15,000 kilohertz.
[28:59.600 --> 29:04.160]  And also, I think 2,500, I believe, is the frequency.
[29:05.040 --> 29:06.580]  So this is fascinating, isn't it?
[29:06.740 --> 29:08.540]  And that's the 30 second mark again, by the way, that pause.
[29:08.860 --> 29:10.980]  Do you know how old that recording is of the guy?
[29:11.160 --> 29:11.940]  That's a good question.
[29:11.940 --> 29:12.680]  Who's the guy?
[29:12.900 --> 29:13.940]  That's a good question.
[29:14.280 --> 29:17.680]  He has a type of accent that hasn't been around for like 50 years.
[29:17.680 --> 29:20.040]  What kind of accent has died out in this country?
[29:22.000 --> 29:26.840]  The chain smoker, brandy drinking accent.
[29:28.480 --> 29:34.320]  At the tone, zero hours, 29 minutes, coordinated universal time.
[29:39.800 --> 29:41.120]  You see, now it's quiet.
[29:41.460 --> 29:42.200]  Maybe he'll say something.
[29:43.080 --> 29:46.260]  But, yeah, I think this guy runs the air train.
[29:46.480 --> 29:47.820]  I think I've heard his voice there.
[29:48.840 --> 29:49.580]  Possibly, possibly.
[29:49.680 --> 29:50.480]  The doors are now closing.
[29:50.720 --> 29:51.280]  You know, that guy.
[29:51.620 --> 29:53.220]  The doors are now closing.
[29:54.020 --> 29:54.180]  Wow.
[29:54.800 --> 29:57.880]  But, yeah, so, anyway, you can still hear this.
[29:58.440 --> 30:00.920]  But I don't know what the point is of shutting it down.
[30:01.040 --> 30:03.320]  I mean, yeah, you save a certain amount.
[30:03.360 --> 30:05.640]  But this is history.
[30:06.260 --> 30:07.140]  I think it hung up.
[30:07.220 --> 30:08.340]  It hangs up after a while, too.
[30:08.480 --> 30:10.620]  So if you want to call it, I can give you the phone number.
[30:10.760 --> 30:11.880]  It's Erica 303.
[30:11.920 --> 30:12.520]  That's in Colorado.
[30:14.800 --> 30:15.520]  499-7111.
[30:16.100 --> 30:18.240]  And that is how you synchronize.
[30:18.320 --> 30:21.780]  Well, I mean, you don't actually synchronize things yourself unless you're really good at what you do.
[30:21.900 --> 30:33.400]  But devices out there are synchronized to either that station or similar stations, such as WWVB, I believe, is the one that's used most often.
[30:33.620 --> 30:38.140]  Yeah, and you can still get lots of clocks that use this, other devices, clock radios, whatever.
[30:38.760 --> 30:42.460]  If they update over radio technology, this is pretty much what they're using.
[30:42.740 --> 30:45.360]  And I think it would be a loss if this were to be shut down.
[30:45.360 --> 30:48.920]  And I don't know how much money this could actually cost to run.
[30:49.240 --> 30:55.840]  The article had a great line at the end talking about pirate time stations, which I think would be really funny.
[30:56.260 --> 30:57.160]  Pirate time stations?
[30:57.180 --> 30:58.320]  That's a great idea.
[30:58.540 --> 30:58.680]  Yeah.
[30:59.000 --> 31:00.100]  They just give out the wrong time?
[31:00.180 --> 31:05.000]  Well, you imagine this becomes defunct or not supported.
[31:05.200 --> 31:06.260]  Oh, we'd have to start pirate.
[31:06.260 --> 31:06.880]  Non-functional.
[31:06.880 --> 31:09.240]  You would have pirate time stations.
[31:09.460 --> 31:19.240]  The hurdle, I think, with that would be acquiring an atomic clock to synchronize with, but I'm not sure exactly the details of setting that up on your own.
[31:19.420 --> 31:19.920]  Well, okay.
[31:20.040 --> 31:31.880]  So they say that WWV and WWVH, that's the one in Hawaii, it's probably not going to be a big deal for most people who don't listen to shortwave radio or amateur radio.
[31:31.880 --> 31:44.560]  Most people, like we've mentioned, probably don't even know they exist, and they're used as frequency standards for calibration purposes, but they've been replaced largely by low-cost oscillators.
[31:44.900 --> 31:50.200]  But WWVB is a different story.
[31:51.080 --> 32:11.240]  That station is what is actually used by millions of Americans every day, and by the National Institute of Standards and Technology's own estimates, over 50 million timepieces of one form or another automatically synchronize their time using the digital signal that's been broadcast since 1963.
[32:13.180 --> 32:16.260]  And that's what's at the crux of this whole thing.
[32:16.380 --> 32:22.000]  Many don't believe that NIST is just going to shut down a service that's still actively being used by so many average Americans.
[32:23.440 --> 32:27.760]  But the statement that they gave in this publication is a bit vague.
[32:28.040 --> 32:29.520]  You know, are they going to shut down the entire thing?
[32:29.660 --> 32:34.860]  Are they just going to shut down WWV and WWVH and leave WWVB alone?
[32:35.700 --> 32:38.040]  That's the question that everybody's struggling with.
[32:38.320 --> 32:47.540]  Yeah, the operational costs are included, and it's sort of like an umbrella funding thing where you're not necessarily discerning between the different transmitter sites.
[32:47.540 --> 32:49.480]  It's all or nothing, I guess.
[32:50.400 --> 32:51.040]  I don't know.
[32:51.260 --> 32:54.180]  I'm going to start looking up plans on atomic clocks just in case.
[32:54.320 --> 32:57.700]  I mean, I do have that bunch of beryllium I've been meaning to use for something.
[32:58.000 --> 33:02.760]  It's probably a lot of online auctions and cobbling things together.
[33:03.380 --> 33:04.920]  It's not impossible.
[33:05.120 --> 33:06.180]  Pirate time interests me, though.
[33:06.240 --> 33:09.440]  Is it like, argh, the time would be 8.30 at the...
[33:09.440 --> 33:10.440]  Who knows?
[33:13.560 --> 33:20.300]  Okay, I've called WWVH in Hawaii, so apparently you can also listen to that station if you call a number there.
[33:21.080 --> 33:22.220]  This is slightly different.
[33:22.660 --> 33:27.540]  Zero hours, 33 minutes, coordinated universal time.
[33:35.530 --> 33:36.490]  Did I miss the tone?
[33:36.590 --> 33:36.970]  Oh, there it is.
[33:37.070 --> 33:37.210]  Okay.
[33:37.570 --> 33:39.110]  I was wondering where the tone was.
[33:39.450 --> 33:42.070]  It's a lot of build-up to that.
[33:43.650 --> 33:45.150]  And I know that lady.
[33:45.150 --> 33:47.570]  I've heard that lady give time recordings in the past.
[33:49.510 --> 33:55.390]  Yeah, what's interesting to note, though, that our studio clock, our official studio time here, seems to be seven seconds behind.
[33:55.590 --> 34:00.330]  Well, this is a perfect opportunity to reset it and to fix these things, because that's what this is for.
[34:00.630 --> 34:03.210]  And if people don't use these services, they disappear.
[34:03.490 --> 34:05.010]  So, Kyle, are you fixing it?
[34:05.090 --> 34:05.350]  Go ahead.
[34:05.510 --> 34:06.410]  Yeah, as usual.
[34:06.550 --> 34:08.170]  And we'll wait for the next minute to come up.
[34:09.010 --> 34:10.270]  Slow or fast?
[34:10.510 --> 34:11.710]  So I guess I press the...
[34:11.710 --> 34:11.950]  What is it?
[34:11.990 --> 34:12.690]  You said it was slow?
[34:12.690 --> 34:14.410]  It's seven seconds slow.
[34:14.650 --> 34:15.090]  Slow.
[34:16.510 --> 34:16.950]  Fast.
[34:21.470 --> 34:27.490]  At the tone, zero hours, 34 minutes, coordinated universal time.
[34:38.240 --> 34:39.320]  All right, that was a cool tone.
[34:39.460 --> 34:40.300]  That was kind of...
[34:40.300 --> 34:43.590]  So that's WWVH, and I can give you that phone number, too.
[34:43.670 --> 34:51.170]  That's in Hawaii, 808-335-4363, in case you get a kick out of listening to time stations.
[34:51.570 --> 34:53.550]  And I just discovered there's another one, too.
[34:54.720 --> 34:56.260]  Well, actually, it was shut down.
[34:56.400 --> 34:58.360]  It was called WWVL.
[34:59.040 --> 35:00.130]  I didn't know about that one.
[35:00.260 --> 35:02.260]  It was shut down in 1972.
[35:04.080 --> 35:05.740]  So, yeah, we used to have more.
[35:07.020 --> 35:09.570]  WWVB is also in Fort Collins, Colorado.
[35:09.940 --> 35:11.980]  And they've been operating, as we mentioned, since 1963.
[35:12.420 --> 35:14.590]  WWVH, the one we're listening to now, since 1948.
[35:14.590 --> 35:17.440]  And the original WWV, 1923.
[35:18.680 --> 35:20.130]  So, yeah, there's lots of history.
[35:20.340 --> 35:22.420]  Lots of history in the world of radio.
[35:22.420 --> 35:27.570]  0 hours, 35 minutes, Coordinated Universal Time.
[35:29.130 --> 35:34.170]  And, of course, Coordinated Universal Time is the same thing, I believe, as Greenwich Mean Time.
[35:34.380 --> 35:36.400]  And if I'm mistaken on that, we'll get a ton of letters.
[35:38.070 --> 35:41.020]  It all supports my theory that we just had more time in the past.
[35:41.550 --> 35:42.000]  Yeah.
[35:42.480 --> 35:46.700]  All right, well, that's been a fun little trip down memory lane into the radio spectrum.
[35:46.700 --> 35:57.440]  But we have other things to talk about as well, including net neutrality, which continues to be an issue, even after the FCC made a valiant attempt to destroy it.
[35:57.570 --> 35:59.000]  It still is popping up.
[35:59.050 --> 35:59.960]  You can't kill it.
[36:00.940 --> 36:01.800]  Yeah, we're going to keep it on.
[36:01.980 --> 36:03.570]  Until it hangs up, we're going to keep it on.
[36:04.590 --> 36:05.130]  That's nice.
[36:05.380 --> 36:05.520]  Yeah.
[36:05.940 --> 36:06.460]  Get used to it.
[36:06.460 --> 36:12.640]  So, the neutrality stuff you were talking about, it was a couple different cases, right?
[36:13.540 --> 36:14.140]  Well, yeah.
[36:15.690 --> 36:17.050]  Basically, here's what's happening.
[36:18.610 --> 36:19.260]  Attorneys General...
[36:19.260 --> 36:19.640]  Oh, they hung up.
[36:19.740 --> 36:20.400]  Attorneys General...
[36:20.400 --> 36:21.100]  And that's how you say it, too.
[36:21.120 --> 36:21.920]  You don't say Attorney General.
[36:21.960 --> 36:23.020]  You say Attorneys General.
[36:23.200 --> 36:24.980]  If Alex were here, he'd be able to explain why.
[36:25.160 --> 36:25.720]  Oh, I'm sure.
[36:25.720 --> 36:34.940]  From 22 states, and that's almost half of them, have filed a motion urging, or a brief rather, urging a U.S.
[36:35.340 --> 36:47.340]  appeals court to reinstate the 2015 Open Internet Order, which prohibited internet service providers from engaging in practices such as blocking, throttling, or paid prioritization.
[36:47.740 --> 36:55.020]  This is part of an ongoing lawsuit, initially filed in January following the FCC's vote to repeal net neutrality.
[36:56.480 --> 37:00.460]  I'm happy to say it was led by New York Attorney General Barbara Underwood.
[37:00.860 --> 37:12.550]  They include attorney generals representing states like California, Illinois, Massachusetts, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, District of Columbia, and a bunch of others, too.
[37:14.040 --> 37:18.140]  Our free and open internet is critical to New York and to our democracy, said Attorney General Underwood.
[37:18.140 --> 37:28.140]  By repealing net neutrality, the FCC is allowing internet service providers to put their profits before consumers while controlling what we see, do, and say online.
[37:29.100 --> 37:38.080]  Now, this is something that has also come up in a strange place that you wouldn't expect it to come up, in the middle of a forest fire.
[37:38.500 --> 37:50.700]  The Verizon Wireless is accused of throttling a fire department's data while it was trying to battle a blaze.
[37:50.700 --> 37:52.500]  It's really interesting.
[37:52.620 --> 38:05.040]  The internet has become an essential tool in providing fire and emergency response, particularly for events like large fires, which require the rapid deployment and organization of thousands of personnel and hundreds of fire engines, aircraft, and bulldozers.
[38:05.040 --> 38:13.900]  Santa Clara, California fire paid Verizon for unlimited data, but suffered from heavy throttling until the department paid Verizon more.
[38:14.440 --> 38:20.540]  That's according to their statement and emails between the fire department and Verizon that were submitted as evidence.
[38:20.540 --> 38:36.880]  The throttling affected OES-5262, a fire department vehicle that is deployed to large incidents as a command and control resource and is used to track, organize, and prioritize routing of resources from around the state and country to the sites where they are most needed.
[38:37.180 --> 38:48.140]  OES-5262 also coordinates all local government resources deployed to the Mendocino Complex fire, which is an ongoing wildfire that is the largest in California's history.
[38:48.720 --> 38:54.440]  So you have sort of the meeting of climate change and the killing of net neutrality.
[38:54.550 --> 38:56.660]  It's like a Trump grand slam there.
[38:57.020 --> 39:01.680]  The vehicle has a device that uses a Verizon SIM card for internet access.
[39:01.840 --> 39:18.660]  Now, according to the statement, in the midst of our response to the Mendocino Complex fire, county fire discovered the data connection for OES-5262 was being throttled by Verizon, and data rates had been reduced to one two hundredth or less than the previous speeds.
[39:18.840 --> 39:20.140]  One two hundredth.
[39:20.240 --> 39:23.260]  That's 0.05%, I believe, or 0.5%.
[39:24.560 --> 39:30.400]  These reduced speeds severely interfered with the OES-5262's ability to function effectively.
[39:30.960 --> 39:38.340]  The information technology staff communicated directly with Verizon via email about the throttling, requesting it be immediately lifted for public safety purposes.
[39:38.340 --> 39:42.000]  But Verizon did not immediately restore full speeds to the device.
[39:42.340 --> 40:00.240]  Verizon representatives confirmed the throttling, but rather than restoring us to an essential data transfer speed, they indicated that county fire would have to switch to a new data plan at more than twice the cost, and they would only remove throttling after we contacted the department that handles billing and switched to the new data plan.
[40:00.880 --> 40:06.420]  Now, Verizon, in a statement, said, we made a mistake in how we communicated with our customer about the terms of its plan.
[40:06.420 --> 40:11.040]  Like all customers, fire departments choose service plans that are best for them.
[40:11.320 --> 40:16.520]  This customer purchased a government contract plan for a high-speed wireless data allotment at a set monthly cost.
[40:16.800 --> 40:24.520]  Under this plan, users get an unlimited amount of data, but speeds are reduced when they exceed their allotment until the next billing cycle.
[40:24.700 --> 40:28.940]  Okay, I don't know what I just said there, but basically I said it's unlimited until you reach the limit.
[40:29.760 --> 40:40.400]  Anyway, the Santa Clara Fire Department just today, in fact, I believe, responded to Verizon's claim that the throttling was just a customer service error and has nothing to do with net neutrality.
[40:40.550 --> 40:45.440]  To the contrary, they said Verizon's throttling has everything to do with net neutrality.
[40:45.620 --> 40:49.920]  It's just amazing to see fire departments on the side of net neutrality.
[40:49.920 --> 40:56.020]  I mean, that is how this fight is being fought.
[40:56.360 --> 41:02.360]  Yeah, and now we're watching Verizon basically profiteer off a situation in which lives literally are at stake.
[41:02.640 --> 41:04.320]  And it's pretty disgusting.
[41:04.500 --> 41:11.800]  I mean, we've got a tradition of service providers having to provide, like, emergency service and 911 and things like that.
[41:11.900 --> 41:18.800]  But, you know, they like money, and I guess it doesn't matter that, you know, there's a damn fire going on.
[41:20.120 --> 41:37.000]  Yeah, to Rob's point, part of the reason why, as we discussed in the show a lot, that Verizon and all these companies are so eager to get rid of copper lines, not because copper lines are necessarily worse, it's because they have more heavy regulation than fiber and other technologies.
[41:37.240 --> 41:42.820]  So, it's not that they, yeah, so they want to get less regulated marketers so they can rip people off more.
[41:43.180 --> 41:49.340]  Yeah, I think it's worth mentioning that Verizon actually works with the force service a lot.
[41:49.340 --> 41:53.700]  I've been on wildfires as a journalist and covered this stuff and had experience.
[41:53.840 --> 41:58.180]  I've seen, really, how well they do set up infrastructure.
[41:58.500 --> 42:10.640]  One of the aspects of that is wherever the incident command system is, Verizon is there, or whomever, usually Verizon in the areas I was in, setting up landlines, like, usually at a school or whatever.
[42:10.640 --> 42:21.920]  But they'll add lines very, very quickly so that the incident command can control the situation and handle billing and everything for all the subcontractors, whether that's, you know, water, lavatories, everything.
[42:22.200 --> 42:24.340]  You know, everything you would need to create a small city.
[42:24.480 --> 42:25.700]  This fire is huge.
[42:25.860 --> 42:33.120]  So, what you have is a lot of other resources, as they would say, and assets being moved in.
[42:33.120 --> 42:59.960]  And it sounds like this command and control vehicle, though nice and new and flashy and can do all this stuff from the comfort of whatever kind of big vehicle it is, they equipped it with a commercial plan or they procured it as a government plan, but they weren't so careful as to budget or create a backup plan were they to exceed that in the plan that they ordered.
[42:59.960 --> 43:05.120]  So, it's kind of like the thing where they're experiencing what the average consumer gets now.
[43:05.660 --> 43:18.340]  But in their case, they had a peak in traffic, which is practical for the type of vehicle it is, being on the scene, having a massive amount of teams and people coordinating.
[43:18.400 --> 43:25.420]  Just for their small part of fighting this fire, it puts an enormous strain on this resource.
[43:25.420 --> 43:32.540]  So, they procured a plan through the government procedures, but it was a plan that any other consumer would have.
[43:32.740 --> 43:42.140]  But then they supported a huge team with this one plan that any ordinary consumer with a data plan wouldn't even broach.
[43:42.220 --> 43:44.600]  They wouldn't get close to that ordinarily.
[43:44.740 --> 43:51.580]  But it seems like they've supplied the hardware with only one SIM and a SIM of the type that is associated with this plan.
[43:51.740 --> 43:55.100]  And this is not unusual.
[43:55.320 --> 44:04.780]  It's totally fair for a fire department to go for the best practical thing to supply wireless for even a command vehicle like this.
[44:04.900 --> 44:16.500]  And it's very surprising to me that Verizon, for all of their participation in the incident command system that the Forest Service uses, did not respond through their wireless arm.
[44:16.660 --> 44:31.520]  And this is again, where the older landline service and other services that these telephone companies provide, perhaps have, I think, a little bit more sense of duty as a public utility.
[44:31.820 --> 44:40.620]  Whereas the wireless companies are really just a company and an obstinate, even when a first responder is in need.
[44:40.820 --> 44:44.360]  By the way, our phone number is 347-335-0818.
[44:44.360 --> 44:48.140]  If you'd like to join the conversation on this or any of the other topics that we've discussed.
[44:48.380 --> 45:02.080]  But my question here concerning this, I know the term throttling has been used before net neutrality was attacked by the FCC and crippled.
[45:03.120 --> 45:08.320]  Could this be something... could Verizon be right here in saying that they just had the wrong data plan?
[45:09.240 --> 45:11.760]  I don't think so, because I think their data plans are misleading.
[45:11.980 --> 45:18.860]  I mean, from a consumer perspective, we've run into the same thing, traveling and using various unlimited plans from a variety of carriers.
[45:19.060 --> 45:23.420]  And I don't think it's necessarily unique to them, but there might be other thoughts on this.
[45:23.660 --> 45:34.660]  But even if they did have the wrong data plan for their situation, there should have been some switch that Verizon could flip to say, OK, this is a major disaster going on, and maybe we should let them have their data for now, and we'll figure out the billing later.
[45:34.860 --> 45:36.160]  But is that a net neutrality issue?
[45:36.340 --> 45:38.140]  Or is that just a competence issue?
[45:39.160 --> 45:40.560]  It's not net neutrality, technically.
[45:40.980 --> 45:41.320]  It's what?
[45:41.460 --> 45:42.360]  It's not net neutrality.
[45:42.500 --> 45:48.420]  Net neutrality is about treating the websites that you browse differently, whereas this is about bandwidth.
[45:48.640 --> 45:51.400]  So basically, literally any website they visited would be throttled.
[45:51.560 --> 45:55.700]  Yeah, they would have all been equally throttled or limited in this way.
[45:55.860 --> 46:05.020]  Not that any one site would come faster versus another, like, you know, retail stores versus their interagency management systems or whatever.
[46:05.040 --> 46:06.420]  So we're saying fire department's wrong here.
[46:06.600 --> 46:08.100]  That it's really not a net neutrality issue.
[46:08.160 --> 46:14.180]  No, we're saying they're right, but it's not because of net neutrality, it's because of like...
[46:14.180 --> 46:16.020]  Well, they're saying it's because of net neutrality.
[46:16.140 --> 46:18.900]  Okay, on that point, they're wrong.
[46:19.020 --> 46:22.080]  But on the wider issue, they're obviously in the right.
[46:22.080 --> 46:23.180]  Oh, obviously, yeah.
[46:23.280 --> 46:27.080]  They should have gotten more bandwidth, clearly.
[46:27.300 --> 46:31.200]  But we have to get our terms right if this isn't a net neutrality issue.
[46:31.380 --> 46:34.160]  It's interesting that people are thinking along those lines, and I think that's good.
[46:34.280 --> 46:42.900]  People are realizing that this is what net neutrality, what the loss of net neutrality will bring us, our crippled routes to sites we need to get to.
[46:43.600 --> 46:46.040]  But in this particular case, it might not be completely accurate.
[46:46.220 --> 46:46.640]  Yeah, exactly.
[46:46.760 --> 46:56.960]  The problem is that they're able to... the horizon is not officially regulated the way they're able to sell a manipulative, a quote unquote unlimited package, which is in fact limited.
[46:57.200 --> 47:15.420]  Yeah, I think that by virtue of net neutrality, giving them the right to tier and package their plans as they do, it is an unintended consequence of the legislation that allowed these companies the breadth and power to change the structure of how they deliver service.
[47:15.420 --> 47:19.100]  Now, the packets themselves exactly for these firefighters.
[47:19.360 --> 47:27.720]  I think that's more of how come their plan was not associated in an incident or emergency classification.
[47:27.980 --> 47:37.040]  Some way, like if a police station lost service for some reason, they would probably be expedited in getting that repaired, or other, like a hospital.
[47:37.240 --> 47:43.460]  If they lost power, those guys would be out there probably trying to scratch their heads and fix the power pretty quick.
[47:43.720 --> 47:46.840]  And in this case, Verizon just was flat-footed in their response.
[47:47.060 --> 47:53.640]  It seems like they just ran into customer service at Verizon, which everybody else has to deal with, so now you've got a good taste of what that's all about.
[47:53.660 --> 47:54.700]  We know all about this.
[47:54.840 --> 47:55.040]  Uh-huh.
[47:55.320 --> 47:55.640]  Yes, Walter?
[47:55.680 --> 47:57.780]  Customer service and manipulative marketing.
[47:57.980 --> 48:06.320]  I don't think that only emergency responders should have the privilege of not getting a poorly worded advertisement with thinking they're getting unlimited.
[48:06.580 --> 48:06.800]  Absolutely.
[48:06.800 --> 48:08.700]  Well, I mean, they should jump to the front of the line.
[48:08.860 --> 48:10.020]  They're emergency responders after all.
[48:10.020 --> 48:11.260]  That meant everybody else.
[48:11.380 --> 48:21.080]  No, this is, again, this is the effect, the consumer being at the effect, and here we're hearing it from first responders who probably, yeah, okay, in this situation, have more of a right.
[48:21.160 --> 48:26.820]  But no, we ought not to say, you know, these types or classes of people are more valued.
[48:27.920 --> 48:36.080]  Again, that is the definition of the net neutrality laws, but in more of an organizational mode.
[48:36.080 --> 48:44.020]  So you could even say that the emergency responders are opting for something that is anti-net neutrality by wanting preferential treatment.
[48:44.740 --> 48:46.140]  That's an interesting perspective.
[48:46.460 --> 48:59.160]  A little, and it's like, well, you know, their procurement resources, you'd think they would have more options as an emergency responder to procure this.
[48:59.240 --> 49:03.400]  But again, it's a small department, and they're working on a big, massive event.
[49:03.580 --> 49:12.580]  It may have been for, you know, bringing this command and control truck around to, you know, events and festivals.
[49:12.580 --> 49:14.660]  Maybe that's enough data, and it worked.
[49:14.700 --> 49:22.800]  But for a massive event, an incident like this, where you're hosting many people for a really long duration, it really wasn't the plan.
[49:22.960 --> 49:27.780]  And at worst, you know, they could have, like, swapped the SIM quickly.
[49:28.140 --> 49:28.780]  I don't know.
[49:29.000 --> 49:34.440]  I mean, buy a, buy a prepaid SIM as a backup, put it in a little baggy.
[49:35.220 --> 49:35.780]  I don't know.
[49:36.100 --> 49:36.380]  All kinds of options.
[49:36.540 --> 49:37.540]  You just got to ask the hackers.
[49:37.780 --> 49:41.000]  Our phone number again, 347-335-0818.
[49:41.280 --> 49:43.480]  I still don't think we have all the phone lines installed.
[49:43.480 --> 49:47.160]  So you might be going to a phone line that's not showing up on our board.
[49:47.260 --> 49:47.780]  I don't know yet.
[49:47.900 --> 49:49.980]  But 347-335-0818.
[49:50.200 --> 49:54.900]  We are working on getting that installed along with the new studio that we're slowly putting together.
[49:54.900 --> 49:55.220]  Yeah.
[49:55.340 --> 49:58.580]  We saw incredible bits and pieces of it, framing.
[49:58.740 --> 49:59.680]  There's tools around.
[49:59.920 --> 50:01.800]  You know, stuff's happening here at WBAI.
[50:01.980 --> 50:03.640]  So be excited.
[50:03.940 --> 50:07.780]  And these microphones, it's really jarring for me.
[50:07.960 --> 50:12.160]  Every time I open my mouth, I can hear sound.
[50:12.300 --> 50:13.280]  It's almost too loud.
[50:13.620 --> 50:17.680]  In fact, I have to take my headphones off and just step back.
[50:17.900 --> 50:19.360]  I think it's getting even louder now.
[50:19.360 --> 50:20.580]  You can just step out in the hallway if you want.
[50:21.500 --> 50:26.720]  But you know, I can guarantee you'll be hearing sounds of construction over the air because we don't have soundproofing in this room.
[50:26.820 --> 50:29.100]  But when we move into the new studio, you won't hear anything.
[50:29.320 --> 50:31.720]  Well, you hear us, but you won't hear anything outside.
[50:31.920 --> 50:32.220]  Rob?
[50:32.280 --> 50:38.940]  I just wanted to add to the net neutrality story that we were talking about with the various states' attorneys general filing these briefs.
[50:39.520 --> 50:42.700]  I wanted to find a source to find out which states they were.
[50:42.780 --> 50:43.440]  And I found a list.
[50:43.840 --> 50:46.220]  So I know we have listeners all over the place.
[50:46.380 --> 50:49.340]  So if your state is on this list, thank your attorney general.
[50:49.480 --> 50:52.980]  And if your state isn't, contact your attorney general and ask why.
[50:53.080 --> 50:54.460]  I named a few of them, but I didn't name all of them.
[50:54.640 --> 50:55.820]  So here's all of them really quick.
[50:56.140 --> 50:58.420]  Unless, okay, wait, do we want to guess what they are?
[50:58.580 --> 50:59.820]  I mean, we know New York is one.
[50:59.980 --> 51:00.420]  Okay, yeah.
[51:01.060 --> 51:05.360]  I'm going to say, yeah, even though I just read the list or part of the list, I kind of forget.
[51:06.800 --> 51:07.820]  I'm going to say California.
[51:08.340 --> 51:08.620]  Correct.
[51:08.760 --> 51:09.660]  But we have 22 of them.
[51:09.780 --> 51:10.680]  So we have 20 left.
[51:11.020 --> 51:11.720]  Kyle, you want to give a guess?
[51:11.860 --> 51:12.180]  Oh, wow.
[51:12.220 --> 51:13.280]  I looked at it briefly.
[51:13.400 --> 51:14.220]  What state are you from?
[51:14.240 --> 51:15.380]  I know Illinois is on there.
[51:15.480 --> 51:16.200]  What state are you from?
[51:16.200 --> 51:16.520]  Yes.
[51:16.740 --> 51:17.900]  I know Washington's on there.
[51:17.900 --> 51:17.900]  Washington.
[51:18.100 --> 51:18.480]  So there you go.
[51:18.540 --> 51:18.940]  You got one.
[51:19.660 --> 51:20.020]  Voltaire?
[51:20.460 --> 51:21.180]  American Samoa.
[51:21.380 --> 51:23.380]  Okay, that's not a state and you don't get to guess again.
[51:23.600 --> 51:23.900]  Hawaii.
[51:24.220 --> 51:24.500]  Wow.
[51:24.800 --> 51:25.660]  Is Hawaii on there?
[51:25.740 --> 51:26.080]  Hawaii is on there.
[51:26.080 --> 51:27.080]  Good for Hawaii.
[51:27.200 --> 51:27.460]  Wow.
[51:27.760 --> 51:28.920]  Before they're destroyed by a hurricane.
[51:29.340 --> 51:30.500]  That's, no, I'm just kidding.
[51:31.080 --> 51:31.720]  You'll be fine.
[51:31.820 --> 51:32.040]  Oof.
[51:32.960 --> 51:33.280]  Yeah.
[51:33.480 --> 51:35.200]  Okay, I'll just shoot this list off really quick.
[51:35.380 --> 51:37.600]  No, no, no, let me keep going until I get one wrong.
[51:37.700 --> 51:37.980]  Oh, okay.
[51:38.080 --> 51:38.400]  Illinois.
[51:38.860 --> 51:39.940]  I said Illinois.
[51:40.260 --> 51:41.540]  Okay, I'm sorry, I didn't hear you.
[51:41.580 --> 51:41.820]  Illinois is on there.
[51:41.920 --> 51:42.660]  All right, New Jersey.
[51:43.860 --> 51:44.960]  New Jersey is on there.
[51:45.780 --> 51:46.440]  Okay, wow.
[51:46.540 --> 51:49.380]  Now it gets challenging because I...
[51:49.380 --> 51:50.480]  Okay, where are the other cool...
[51:50.480 --> 51:52.000]  Colorado, they're a cool state.
[51:52.600 --> 51:54.020]  Colorado is not on there.
[51:55.100 --> 51:56.800]  Wow, you let me down, Colorado.
[51:57.000 --> 51:58.220]  I thought, you know, you legalized pot.
[51:58.380 --> 52:00.780]  I thought you'd appreciate that neutrality, but apparently not.
[52:00.920 --> 52:03.440]  No, they have like big telecommunications headquartered there.
[52:03.440 --> 52:04.880]  All right, let's hear the rest of them.
[52:04.940 --> 52:06.540]  And we'll take this phone call that we have here.
[52:06.680 --> 52:06.940]  Okay.
[52:06.960 --> 52:08.380]  We'll get to this call in just a moment.
[52:08.540 --> 52:08.840]  Go ahead.
[52:08.880 --> 52:21.400]  So really quickly, California, Connecticut, Delaware, District of Columbia, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Mississippi, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island,
[52:21.600 --> 52:23.220]  Vermont, Virginia, and Washington.
[52:23.420 --> 52:25.560]  How is Kentucky on there and not Colorado?
[52:26.500 --> 52:28.360]  You'll have to ask the Attorney General of Colorado.
[52:28.980 --> 52:30.620]  Isn't level three headquartered in Colorado?
[52:30.920 --> 52:31.300]  It's a good thing.
[52:31.320 --> 52:31.940]  Quest is there too.
[52:32.080 --> 52:33.620]  They got telecommunications interests.
[52:34.700 --> 52:36.700]  They're going to keep the internet quiet.
[52:37.780 --> 52:38.100]  Interesting.
[52:38.240 --> 52:38.880]  Okay, let's take a phone call.
[52:38.920 --> 52:39.200]  Good evening.
[52:39.320 --> 52:39.920]  You're on off the hook.
[52:40.000 --> 52:40.200]  Go ahead.
[52:41.300 --> 52:43.160]  Hi, it's Kat from New Jersey.
[52:43.500 --> 52:43.840]  How are you doing?
[52:44.000 --> 52:45.460]  It was a great hope.
[52:46.060 --> 52:47.120]  Thank you very much.
[52:47.280 --> 52:47.600]  Oh, good.
[52:47.600 --> 52:48.620]  You were at the conference.
[52:49.560 --> 52:50.980]  Yeah, I couldn't make it.
[52:51.420 --> 52:52.420]  Oh, then you weren't at the conference.
[52:52.420 --> 52:56.400]  I was attending everyone from the beginning, but I was in Minnesota.
[52:56.940 --> 52:57.420]  I see.
[52:57.500 --> 52:58.140]  One question.
[52:59.400 --> 53:02.960]  When will you be able to download the audio files?
[53:03.280 --> 53:06.000]  Well, the audio files we are still working on.
[53:06.140 --> 53:11.780]  There's a lot of cleaning up that needs to be done, and plus we're in the middle of putting out an issue, so that kind of is getting in the way.
[53:12.440 --> 53:17.000]  But the plan is to have the audio available on our website.
[53:17.800 --> 53:24.500]  Then on the store, we'll have flash drives and DVDs and downloadable video at that point.
[53:25.120 --> 53:27.420]  And then down the road, we put the whole thing up on YouTube.
[53:28.120 --> 53:31.380]  Everything just takes a lot of time to get into the right format.
[53:31.640 --> 53:32.220]  Yeah, it's really important.
[53:32.280 --> 53:35.960]  The CPU can get the audio attached to the talk.
[53:36.200 --> 53:39.520]  Yeah, we hope we can do that in the next week or so.
[53:39.600 --> 53:40.680]  I can just shed some light.
[53:40.880 --> 53:46.180]  The audio is derived from the video that we get, and we want to go through and verify everything.
[53:46.180 --> 53:49.880]  And if there's any gaps or anything that needs to be repaired, we'll do that.
[53:49.900 --> 53:52.300]  And then we pull the audio from those repairs.
[53:52.640 --> 53:55.960]  So otherwise, there'd be gaps, there'd be inconsistencies.
[53:56.080 --> 54:01.360]  We want the audio to match exactly what we curate from the event.
[54:01.440 --> 54:06.120]  But the good news is we have all of it, and we're going through it rapidly, as quickly as we can.
[54:06.200 --> 54:09.220]  Yeah, thanks to our friends at the Internet Society for making all that possible.
[54:09.480 --> 54:12.380]  Let's talk about GPS secrets at the show.
[54:12.940 --> 54:14.800]  All right, well, thanks for your call.
[54:14.800 --> 54:16.040]  Yeah, thanks.
[54:16.400 --> 54:17.660]  Great, great show.
[54:17.820 --> 54:18.000]  Bye.
[54:18.180 --> 54:18.420]  Thank you.
[54:18.460 --> 54:18.760]  Take care.
[54:19.240 --> 54:19.720]  Go ahead, Voltaire.
[54:19.940 --> 54:28.020]  For our listeners that are technically minded on the Internet Society of New York page on Livestream, it already has the videos posted.
[54:28.020 --> 54:33.100]  So you can use a tool like youtube.dl to download that and extract the audio.
[54:33.420 --> 54:33.640]  Okay.
[54:34.580 --> 54:35.860]  Yeah, it won't be clean, though.
[54:36.180 --> 54:38.680]  We're trying to make it as professional as possible.
[54:38.860 --> 54:41.640]  And like Kyle said, there's a lot of repair work that needs to be done.
[54:43.270 --> 54:45.460]  But we're working on it, working on it as hard as we possibly can.
[54:45.540 --> 54:48.480]  We're also working on getting premiums out to people that have asked for them.
[54:48.520 --> 54:50.820]  I know we fell behind a bit on that.
[54:50.980 --> 54:51.760]  Some have gone out.
[54:52.000 --> 54:53.000]  Others are being worked on.
[54:54.200 --> 54:58.140]  So a lot of a lot of catching up to do that we're doing in all different forums.
[54:58.860 --> 55:01.440]  Once again, phone number three, four, seven, three, three, five, zero, eight, one, eight.
[55:01.540 --> 55:02.540]  We only have a couple of minutes left.
[55:02.680 --> 55:08.960]  I would like to give some more time to a listener, whether it's an over the air listener or an online listener.
[55:09.140 --> 55:12.860]  The same phone number works three, four, seven, three, three, five, zero, eight, one, eight.
[55:13.960 --> 55:18.980]  And I'd also like to encourage our Australian listeners, which I know we have some, to either get in touch.
[55:19.180 --> 55:23.060]  If you can't call in now, email us at OTH at 2600.com.
[55:23.240 --> 55:26.380]  And let us know your perspective on on the issues we were talking about earlier.
[55:26.580 --> 55:33.100]  Yeah, the problem is, if you're listening far away, it takes time for the for the stream to get the it's usually like a minute or two.
[55:33.660 --> 55:36.400]  So, you know, you might hear us say, oh, we got no phone calls.
[55:36.480 --> 55:37.360]  And then you're calling in.
[55:37.480 --> 55:39.700]  And well, there's a delay, but we do have a phone call now.
[55:39.700 --> 55:43.540]  So hopefully we're on the same, uh, same, uh, time here.
[55:43.880 --> 55:44.180]  Good evening.
[55:44.360 --> 55:45.160]  You're on off the hook.
[55:46.020 --> 55:47.560]  Hi, this is Jerry from NIAC.
[55:47.940 --> 55:49.420]  How are you doing Jerry from NIAC?
[55:50.260 --> 55:52.400]  Yeah, I'm talking about WWV.
[55:52.700 --> 55:52.920]  Yes.
[55:53.460 --> 55:59.440]  They operate on 2.5, 5, 10, 15, and 20 megahertz.
[56:00.380 --> 56:01.100]  That's correct.
[56:01.440 --> 56:05.640]  I said kilohertz before, but I, I add a thousand to that, but, uh, yeah.
[56:05.940 --> 56:08.600]  So, um, they're all still operation going online.
[56:08.600 --> 56:09.300]  I'm sorry?
[56:09.820 --> 56:13.420]  I heard they were going online instead of like over the air.
[56:13.620 --> 56:26.800]  Well, that, that was basically the story that we read is that, uh, they're, they're going to be, uh, discontinuing at least WWV and WWVH and maybe WWVB, which is the one that coordinates all the clocks, but, uh, everything else, I guess, yeah, it'll be online,
[56:26.800 --> 56:33.560]  but I'm not sure if that really serves much, uh, much purpose because, you know, your internet connection could be delayed, so it wouldn't be accurate.
[56:34.260 --> 56:35.280]  Right, right.
[56:35.460 --> 56:40.180]  Even over the radio, like with, uh, just now with you, because you were over the phone, right?
[56:40.180 --> 56:40.680]  Yeah, right.
[56:40.700 --> 56:45.660]  And I hope nobody calibrated their, their, their clocks or anything vital because of that, because it could have been delayed.
[56:45.660 --> 56:46.420]  It's not accurate.
[56:46.440 --> 56:47.560]  It's a rebroadcast.
[56:47.720 --> 56:48.540]  It's, it's not official.
[56:48.780 --> 56:53.240]  Yeah, you want to call yourself to, uh, to calibrate anything using those tones.
[56:53.240 --> 57:09.500]  Um, I think over the, over the network, I think what you, what you mean by that is that a lot of, um, the function is being supplanted by devices that are connected to a network because there are time protocols and so on, um, over IP and that, um, sort of replaced the function.
[57:10.240 --> 57:19.000]  I'm not sure that they're broadcasting, although they may, uh, NIST may be technically, um, the same group that does a lot of the, uh, internet time.
[57:19.000 --> 57:24.400]  And by the way, if you do call it and if you go through a satellite, it's going to be off as well because of the delay there.
[57:24.580 --> 57:25.840]  So that's something else to keep in mind.
[57:26.160 --> 57:32.620]  So really the only way over the radio is really the only way to know that you're getting it at the right synchronized time, right?
[57:32.880 --> 57:37.760]  It just seems that they want to digitize everything and, uh, totally destroy anything analog.
[57:38.180 --> 57:38.540]  Yeah.
[57:38.600 --> 57:40.600]  You know, I'm all, I'm all for digitization.
[57:40.780 --> 57:42.100]  It's great for archiving things.
[57:42.220 --> 57:44.800]  We do it all the time, but you never get rid of the analog.
[57:44.980 --> 57:48.440]  You always hold on to other things as well, have multiple formats.
[57:48.440 --> 57:49.600]  That's, that's very, very important.
[57:49.840 --> 57:51.340]  But, uh, listen, thanks for your call.
[57:51.440 --> 57:52.000]  Thanks for listening.
[57:52.540 --> 57:55.940]  Uh, write to us, OTH at 2600.com.
[57:56.040 --> 57:58.480]  It's our email address and stay tuned to WBAI.
[57:58.800 --> 58:02.260]  And we will be back next Wednesday night.
[58:02.520 --> 58:04.220]  Until then, have a good night.
[58:22.060 --> 58:23.780]  We are number one.
[58:26.840 --> 58:28.600]  Hey, we are number one.
[58:28.600 --> 58:28.900]  Hey!
[58:29.780 --> 58:30.880]  Ha, ha, ha!
[58:31.500 --> 58:32.700]  Now listen closely.
[58:33.520 --> 58:35.620]  Here's a little lesson in trickery.
[58:35.900 --> 58:37.900]  This is going down in history.
[58:38.320 --> 58:43.040]  If you want to be a villain number one, you have to chase a superhero on the run.
[58:43.240 --> 58:45.420]  But first you have to come up with a master plot.
[58:45.640 --> 58:47.860]  The only problem there, you have to think a lot.
[58:48.080 --> 58:50.360]  Just follow my moves and sneak at that.
[58:50.580 --> 58:52.460]  Be careful not to make a sound.
[58:52.460 --> 58:55.540]  Just leap about with curiousful skill.
[58:55.820 --> 58:56.320]  And now...
[58:58.120 --> 58:58.680]  Shhhhhh!
[58:58.740 --> 58:59.100]  Don't touch!
[58:59.180 --> 58:59.700]  No, no, no!
[59:06.330 --> 59:07.590]  We are number one!
[59:07.710 --> 59:07.870]  Hey!
[59:08.810 --> 59:10.270]  Ha, ha, ha, ha!
[59:11.210 --> 59:12.570]  We are number one!
[59:22.570 --> 59:23.130]  Hey!
[59:23.510 --> 59:23.690]  Hey!
[59:31.370 --> 59:33.030]  We are number one!
[59:33.190 --> 59:33.350]  Hey!
[59:37.850 --> 59:40.110]  Look at all the gadgets that I've designed.
[59:40.390 --> 59:42.570]  I think it's pretty clear that I'm the mastermind.
[59:42.790 --> 59:44.110]  Be very, very, very, very careful.
[59:44.230 --> 59:45.010]  Don't touch the thing.
[59:45.150 --> 59:47.330]  You'll never know the problems it could bring.
[59:47.570 --> 59:49.850]  Now look at this match that I just found.
[59:50.110 --> 59:52.170]  When I say go, be ready to throw.
[59:52.430 --> 59:52.910]  Go!
[59:53.310 --> 59:54.950]  Throw it at him, not me!
[59:55.310 --> 59:56.830]  Oh, let's try something else.
[59:56.830 --> 59:58.370]  Now watch and learn.
[59:58.530 --> 59:59.530]  Here's the deal.
[59:59.730 --> 01:00:01.930]  You slip and slide from this banana peel!
[01:00:02.230 --> 01:00:02.990]  Ha, ha, ha!
[01:00:03.850 --> 01:00:05.170]  What are you doing?
[01:00:13.880 --> 01:00:14.440]  Greetings.
[01:00:14.840 --> 01:00:19.820]  This is Savion Glover and you're listening to WBAI in New York.
[01:00:20.820 --> 01:00:21.380]  Enjoy.