[00:00.000 --> 00:03.700]  ...self-determination and member of the Black Alliance for Peace.
[00:03.880 --> 00:17.780]  All of the countries that the United States has attacked have been people-centered, people-oriented, whether you're talking about Iraq without getting into the internal politics, or you're talking about Libya, or you're talking about Venezuela.
[00:18.060 --> 00:25.060]  It is a way to defeat the emergence of socialism and a people-centered economy.
[00:25.260 --> 00:28.320]  This is listener-sponsored WBAI New York.
[00:33.080 --> 00:39.580]  Yes, it is WBAI New York, and it's just about 8 o'clock here on a Wednesday night.
[00:39.740 --> 00:43.180]  Time once again for another exciting edition of Off the Hook.
[01:07.300 --> 01:10.180]  I hope that's understood, but make me know!
[02:06.180 --> 02:08.220]  And a very good evening to everybody.
[02:08.300 --> 02:09.640]  The program is Off the Hook.
[02:09.740 --> 02:12.380]  Emmanuel Goldstein here with you, joined tonight by Rob T.
[02:12.680 --> 02:13.200]  Firefly.
[02:13.460 --> 02:14.180]  Good evening.
[02:14.640 --> 02:15.140]  Voltaire?
[02:15.720 --> 02:16.040]  Hello.
[02:16.420 --> 02:16.700]  Kyle?
[02:17.120 --> 02:17.660]  Yeah, what?
[02:17.880 --> 02:19.420]  And welcome back, Alex.
[02:19.820 --> 02:20.300]  Good evening.
[02:20.500 --> 02:21.000]  Thank you, sir.
[02:21.180 --> 02:22.180]  Packed house tonight.
[02:23.980 --> 02:29.160]  Wow, and that's a small studio, too, so we're kind of wedged in here, bumping up against each other.
[02:29.240 --> 02:32.120]  So we sound a little testy by the end of the hour, it's because we've had enough.
[02:32.960 --> 02:35.260]  Hopefully listeners will be wanting more.
[02:36.840 --> 02:41.940]  And on that subject, I'm not sure how much more they'll be getting, because next week are the Kavanaugh hearings.
[02:42.660 --> 02:47.440]  And that might go into overtime, and we might be preempted, but probably not.
[02:47.500 --> 02:52.340]  We should be on air picking up the pieces a week from tonight, so that'll be interesting.
[02:52.760 --> 02:56.860]  Well, let's hope that the heat holds up for that particular hearing.
[02:57.180 --> 02:58.520]  Temperatures are going up next week, I think.
[02:58.980 --> 03:02.720]  Well, you know, the way I figure, you just have to somehow keep it from happening.
[03:02.940 --> 03:07.820]  You know, it's kind of like one of those movies where you just have to delay it, you know, until after November.
[03:08.440 --> 03:14.700]  You know, I don't know, I can't make suggestions as to how to do it, but, you know, tell them to go to the wrong building.
[03:16.280 --> 03:20.080]  Put up a fence around it there, you know, just all kinds of hijinks.
[03:20.240 --> 03:23.160]  And you could kind of elevate them, you know, as it gets closer.
[03:23.320 --> 03:24.520]  You mean like a bomb threat?
[03:24.680 --> 03:25.660]  No, I didn't say that.
[03:25.720 --> 03:28.260]  You see, that's the elevation part that I was trying to avoid.
[03:28.400 --> 03:29.280]  No, nothing like that.
[03:29.300 --> 03:30.000]  No, no, no.
[03:30.140 --> 03:30.820]  Just to be clear.
[03:37.820 --> 03:39.520]  It is very easy to get lost in those movies.
[03:39.540 --> 03:42.280]  And it's very easy to confuse potential Supreme Court justices.
[03:42.400 --> 03:43.260]  I've learned this.
[03:43.480 --> 03:44.320]  This is very true.
[03:44.440 --> 03:54.640]  So, you know, there's a lot of us, and I think if we just use our imaginations, we can figure out a way to keep this from happening while maintaining our decorum.
[03:54.840 --> 03:55.820]  Well, let's hope so.
[03:56.020 --> 04:03.300]  I mean, everyone has a lot of questions for this man, especially on issues of presidential immunity and things like that.
[04:03.300 --> 04:06.180]  So that'll take a long time, even if he does make it to the right place.
[04:06.180 --> 04:11.880]  Yes, and hopefully people will keep asking these questions and won't let him leave until he answers.
[04:12.220 --> 04:14.220]  And that'll keep him there past November, for sure.
[04:14.240 --> 04:26.880]  Well, there's also this issue of, I think, these outstanding documents about his prior time in federal service that are outstanding, things that have not been yet provided, and I think there can be a lot of questions asked about that.
[04:26.880 --> 04:29.600]  That could take up a considerable amount of time.
[04:29.600 --> 04:37.340]  But I think that's reason enough to stall this so that you have an accurate and complete record upon which he can be questioned.
[04:37.340 --> 04:38.340]  Absolutely.
[04:38.620 --> 04:52.020]  And can I just say, at this point, you're talking about wanting to get documents, wanting to get all kinds of firsthand accounting of things that have not been released.
[04:53.460 --> 04:54.720]  Things can be released.
[04:54.860 --> 05:00.840]  There are people out there who have this information, who want to help, and they're nervous.
[05:01.040 --> 05:05.380]  They're a little bit scared of releasing this information and being caught.
[05:05.380 --> 05:12.100]  But, friends, you now have a way of getting us the information without us ever finding out who you are.
[05:12.200 --> 05:13.040]  You can even talk to us.
[05:14.280 --> 05:19.900]  We're having conversations with a myriad of people who have leaked information to us.
[05:19.980 --> 05:22.080]  We have no idea who they are.
[05:22.120 --> 05:32.860]  But thanks to the amazing SecureDrop application program, a project that we are now a part of, it's the most incredible thing I've seen.
[05:32.860 --> 05:36.380]  And it's all kinds of encryption and air gapping.
[05:36.620 --> 05:41.960]  And I know Kyle can get into all the, not all the details, obviously, because we're sworn to secrecy on some of them.
[05:42.300 --> 05:53.220]  Well, it's a really, really well-designed system that keeps the source anonymous, but also protects journalists from releasing the information.
[05:53.220 --> 06:07.140]  And really, it gives great instructions to people who are maybe unfamiliar with a lot of this stuff, as far as best practice and, you know, your operational security, as well as just the functional system itself.
[06:07.400 --> 06:14.040]  Big, big thanks to the Freedom of the Press Foundation and all the people who have worked on tour and those incredible projects.
[06:14.040 --> 06:29.860]  These are the kinds of tools and something we couldn't ignore as far as its sort of usability and what it offers for people interested in submitting not just leaks, but also articles, you know?
[06:29.980 --> 06:31.620]  We have gotten so much interesting stuff.
[06:31.780 --> 06:37.160]  Obviously, we're not talking about it right now because we're piecing it together, investigating things.
[06:37.160 --> 06:45.560]  But let's say somebody did have access to certain tax returns that have been the subject of much controversy over the past few years.
[06:46.060 --> 06:57.240]  This is the perfect way to simply click a few buttons and submit them without your identity being compromised, assuming that you're not saying to everybody, look what I'm doing right now.
[06:58.460 --> 06:59.500]  It's simple.
[06:59.580 --> 07:02.100]  We're going to basically outline how you can do something like this.
[07:02.280 --> 07:06.000]  You have to have a browser known as the Tor browser, T-O-R.
[07:06.000 --> 07:17.460]  And if you go to the Tor Project, actually, the exact website is T-O-R-P-R-O-J-E-C-T, torproject.org.
[07:17.600 --> 07:19.200]  And get the Tor browser.
[07:19.360 --> 07:19.940]  Download it.
[07:20.020 --> 07:21.360]  It'll run on your computer.
[07:21.800 --> 07:23.280]  Use this browser.
[07:23.540 --> 07:27.520]  It's a lot better than your normal run-of-the-mill browser.
[07:27.980 --> 07:34.440]  You're definitely protected a lot more than normal browsers would protect you.
[07:35.540 --> 07:40.180]  This is the only browser you can use if you're going to be submitting anything to us via SecureDrop.
[07:40.360 --> 07:44.320]  And then once you have that browser running, you can go to this address.
[07:44.500 --> 07:45.560]  I'm going to read this address to you.
[07:45.600 --> 07:50.000]  I don't expect you to memorize it, but just to give you an idea of what it is.
[07:51.920 --> 07:54.920]  Okay, first of all, I don't know if that's a 1 or an L at the beginning.
[07:55.040 --> 07:55.480]  Is that a 1?
[07:55.640 --> 07:56.340]  I think it's a 1.
[07:56.500 --> 07:56.940]  It's an L.
[07:57.080 --> 07:57.700]  It's an L?
[07:57.700 --> 07:58.260]  Oh, okay.
[07:58.480 --> 07:59.600]  It's hard to tell the difference.
[07:59.740 --> 08:00.240]  Okay, I'm sorry.
[08:00.880 --> 08:08.140]  L-X-A-4-R-H-3-X-Y-2-S-7-C-V-F-Y.onion.
[08:08.240 --> 08:10.920]  That's our special SecureDrop address.
[08:11.680 --> 08:13.560]  Now, you don't have to memorize it.
[08:13.600 --> 08:18.980]  You can go to our main 2600.com webpage, and you'll see a link there for SecureDrop.
[08:19.180 --> 08:22.840]  Or you can just go to 2600.com slash SecureDrop, and you'll see that address.
[08:22.840 --> 08:34.800]  Once you go to that address on the tour browser, and you have to be on the tour browser to get there, you'll see the instructions on how to simply drop documents, pictures, audio files, video files, whatever it is.
[08:35.100 --> 08:40.480]  You can just send that to us along with a message, totally encrypted, totally anonymous.
[08:40.540 --> 08:41.920]  We can respond to that message.
[08:41.980 --> 08:48.640]  We can look at your documents, and it's all done in a hidden location, away from the Internet.
[08:49.240 --> 08:53.480]  It does not get leaked, other than the leaking that you've already done.
[08:53.660 --> 09:07.940]  And we have a pretty good sense of how to keep things secure, and ourselves, just insofar as only our staff seeing these kinds of things, and the considerations involved.
[09:08.120 --> 09:16.920]  Just generally, both this project and tour in general give you a real leap ahead as far as the kinds of security that you would want to employ.
[09:16.920 --> 09:36.740]  And we know that people, for the longest time, we've accepted articles in plain text, usually because it's easier to manage and mess up, or less prone to being messed up because of cryptography nuances and keys expiring, these kinds of crazy things.
[09:37.000 --> 09:44.120]  Well, we know there's people out there that want to submit and do that, if there were a way to do it in a secure way.
[09:44.120 --> 09:53.600]  So this, we're hoping, and now that it's working, we know in every way that it works great.
[09:53.620 --> 09:58.820]  And if you haven't tried it out, give it a test run, so you familiarize it.
[09:58.940 --> 10:05.700]  And when you have an article or something that you'd love us to print, it'll be there for you, and you'll know exactly how to use it.
[10:05.700 --> 10:18.720]  You know, I just want to emphasize, though, if you are just sending us a run-of-the-mill article, it's still better to send it, just regular email, to articles at 2600.com, because otherwise, we just get inundated with, you know, having to enter keys and things like that,
[10:18.820 --> 10:19.720]  and all the security.
[10:20.940 --> 10:28.260]  That's, you know, a regular article you intend to get printed that you don't mind us knowing that you sent it from whatever email address you use.
[10:28.260 --> 10:30.340]  That's, you know, that's the way to do that.
[10:30.480 --> 10:35.820]  But for anything sensitive, the SecureDrop on the Tor browser is the way to go.
[10:35.940 --> 10:47.520]  Yeah, I'm just emphasizing it, because I know people, maybe perhaps someone has been holding back because they're concerned about this, and we want to make this as an option, make it available, make people aware of it.
[10:47.600 --> 10:48.220]  It really works.
[10:48.300 --> 10:48.740]  It works.
[10:48.840 --> 10:49.520]  It works great.
[10:49.740 --> 11:02.580]  And you spend enough time setting it up to, you know, along with the SecureDrop team, who are amazing people, the Freedom of the Press Foundation, they basically do all this and have done it for publications all around the world.
[11:02.720 --> 11:03.580]  It's not trivial.
[11:03.820 --> 11:11.300]  It took a fair amount of time, spare time and spare expertise, which are hard to come by for small organizations and so on.
[11:11.500 --> 11:16.520]  But we did a great job, and they worked with us to verify it and get it listed.
[11:16.580 --> 11:25.680]  A lot of the news that you're hearing today through other organizations comes from this, comes from leaks that go through this Secure system.
[11:25.680 --> 11:30.860]  So I'm very impressed, and I'm very gratified and hopeful because something like this exists.
[11:31.000 --> 11:39.600]  So if someone out there has some information about a certain Supreme Court justice nominee that, you know, is too hot to just hand over, this is something to consider.
[11:39.800 --> 11:39.920]  Rob?
[11:40.280 --> 11:51.620]  Also, if you're just writing a standard article that you'd like to submit, generally you want 2600 to be able to get back in touch with you to, like, work out the details for things like there are perks you get if you get your article published and so on.
[11:52.040 --> 11:54.300]  So it needs to be two-way communication to work best.
[11:54.440 --> 12:00.780]  But SecureDrop, the beauty of that is the recipient only knows as much about you as you want to tell them.
[12:00.780 --> 12:05.440]  So you could be completely and totally anonymous with what you send.
[12:05.900 --> 12:11.380]  You know, the recipient will not know where it's come from, you know, what part of the world.
[12:11.820 --> 12:14.940]  It's just, you know, it's just the data that you're sending that's all that gets sent.
[12:15.920 --> 12:17.640]  It's really incredible to see it in action.
[12:17.640 --> 12:20.980]  And every day now, we look forward to seeing what comes in.
[12:21.500 --> 12:24.500]  You know, I think this is really quite interesting.
[12:24.820 --> 12:34.300]  It's a huge development, I think, for 2600 as well to have this in place in no small part, thanks to Kyle and Freedom of the Press Foundation for putting all this time in this.
[12:34.380 --> 12:55.200]  And one thing I want to mention as well is if you're concerned about leaking documents and if you're concerned about pushing this information over and you have issues with perhaps legal liability, I feel like we can be a full service firm here in that you can always put them in touch with me and we can always have confidential discussions as well because with me,
[12:55.320 --> 12:56.300]  you'll be talking with a lawyer.
[12:56.480 --> 12:59.300]  We can discuss any liability, any particular issues you may have.
[12:59.440 --> 13:12.600]  And in fact, we made a public disclosure about which you and I were just talking before the show that we would represent pro bono anybody who engages in federal whistleblowing with respect to the Trump administration in particular with the border control policy.
[13:12.600 --> 13:17.240]  But I'll state right now that it would relate to anything relating to the Trump administration.
[13:17.760 --> 13:19.200]  So we are here to help.
[13:19.440 --> 13:26.060]  You can send your documents through SecureDrop to 2600, and if need be, and you want to talk to a lawyer, I'm here to help as well.
[13:26.600 --> 13:36.160]  You know, I don't want to discourage people who might want to engage in, you know, state leaks, you know, from any particular... in New York State, any state, county leaks.
[13:36.920 --> 13:40.560]  But what you say about the Trump administration, I think, is particularly urgent.
[13:41.000 --> 13:42.480]  Well, I think that's true, too.
[13:42.720 --> 13:46.780]  And look, if you have something important that you want to leak, we're here to help.
[13:46.960 --> 13:50.480]  We're not going to exclude you because it has to... it pertains to Governor Cuomo.
[13:50.620 --> 13:52.820]  It could also be, you know, the phone companies.
[13:52.820 --> 13:54.240]  It could be Google.
[13:54.420 --> 13:56.640]  It can be all kinds of... yeah, imagine that.
[13:56.780 --> 14:01.300]  Google won't know anything about it if you leak information about...
[14:01.300 --> 14:03.600]  You could be in Google and leaking us...
[14:03.600 --> 14:04.560]  I'm not saying people should do this.
[14:04.620 --> 14:15.240]  I'm just saying, theoretically, you could be in Google, leaking Google documents to us through the Tor browser, using SecureDrop, and the great overseers at Google will not know that you're doing it.
[14:15.260 --> 14:18.320]  Unless, of course, they're looking at their cameras that are focused on your desk.
[14:18.540 --> 14:19.060]  That's true.
[14:19.260 --> 14:19.360]  Yeah.
[14:19.400 --> 14:23.200]  I mean, I guess they would know that somebody was using the Tor browser, perhaps?
[14:23.420 --> 14:24.160]  They might know that.
[14:24.700 --> 14:27.360]  Well, if they're monitoring your workstation, I suppose.
[14:27.360 --> 14:32.140]  But they wouldn't know what you were doing unless they had keystroke monitoring, which I probably do.
[14:32.720 --> 14:34.000]  Or deep packing inspection.
[14:34.120 --> 14:34.300]  All right.
[14:34.380 --> 14:37.000]  So use your own damn laptop there if you're allowed to do that, are you?
[14:37.800 --> 14:38.140]  Probably.
[14:38.320 --> 14:38.960]  I would imagine.
[14:39.460 --> 14:40.540]  Or just go out to the park.
[14:40.620 --> 14:40.960]  I don't know.
[14:42.060 --> 14:45.320]  You've got to watch out for your own security, obviously, when you're doing something like this.
[14:45.320 --> 14:46.200]  Go to your local cafe.
[14:46.840 --> 14:50.500]  And on torproject.org, there's all the information.
[14:50.720 --> 14:57.020]  They not only give you the browser for download, and you can get it for Windows, Mac, Linux, smartphones, all kinds of stuff.
[14:57.020 --> 15:05.260]  But there are also really easy-to-follow documents on there on how to use it safely and everything you need to do to be truly safe and anonymous while using Tor.
[15:05.480 --> 15:21.360]  And I really have to shout out to the people who put together Tor Project and SecureDrop and things and made them so usable, because that was the hugest problem for a long time, is the encryption technology that existed out there was basically not usable if you weren't already a nerd.
[15:21.420 --> 15:22.220]  It's still a problem.
[15:22.560 --> 15:23.840]  We need to improve.
[15:24.040 --> 15:25.060]  But this is a big step.
[15:25.060 --> 15:29.100]  But yeah, it's come so far in just the past 10 years or so, I think.
[15:29.100 --> 15:33.180]  I don't want to give the impression that we're only interested in leaks from one particular corner of the spectrum.
[15:33.340 --> 15:34.960]  We're interested in leaks from everywhere.
[15:35.240 --> 15:36.600]  It doesn't matter the political sides.
[15:36.720 --> 15:37.660]  It doesn't matter the companies.
[15:39.020 --> 15:46.720]  We're looking at where the juiciest stuff is probably going to come from, and where the battles with truth are fought on a daily basis.
[15:46.720 --> 15:53.820]  So that's why I assume that we'll get more interesting reading from that particular corner.
[15:54.540 --> 15:54.980]  Voltaire.
[15:55.180 --> 15:59.060]  Yeah, a bittersweet piece of history about the origins of this here job.
[15:59.220 --> 16:06.860]  It was started by Aaron Schwartz, who, late Aaron Schwartz is one of the last projects he worked on.
[16:06.980 --> 16:10.700]  And it's really wonderful to see it finally come into fruition.
[16:10.700 --> 16:11.880]  Yes, absolutely.
[16:12.340 --> 16:20.840]  And what better tribute to pay to Aaron than to make use of this in the fight for democracy, in the fight for revealing what's actually going on.
[16:21.420 --> 16:24.020]  So I'm really happy and proud to be a part of that.
[16:24.120 --> 16:26.560]  Of course, a bunch of these people were at the whole conference recently.
[16:26.620 --> 16:34.440]  We're going to have the audio posted within the next week, and videos will be available shortly after that, if not by then.
[16:35.020 --> 16:38.940]  And we're basically moving full speed ahead and all that.
[16:39.920 --> 16:45.740]  Anyway, we have other things to talk about as well, including something that I thought was rather interesting.
[16:45.920 --> 16:50.780]  I know, Voltaire, you submitted this to our list concerning...
[16:51.440 --> 16:54.980]  And I just lost it on our screen here.
[16:55.520 --> 17:04.440]  But basically, this was about the net neutrality and how net neutrality is being fought...
[17:04.440 --> 17:09.180]  The battle for net neutrality is being fought in states.
[17:09.420 --> 17:10.860]  And California is one of them.
[17:10.940 --> 17:13.200]  Now, there's a campaign to stop it.
[17:13.500 --> 17:15.120]  Of course, there's a campaign to stop it.
[17:16.120 --> 17:19.380]  And they're targeting senior citizens with robocalls.
[17:20.080 --> 17:28.900]  And they're making claims that these rules are going to raise cell phone bills by $30 a month and slow down their data.
[17:28.900 --> 17:35.980]  Now, they cite absolutely no evidence supporting this claim that net neutrality rules will raise cell phone bills and slow down internet service.
[17:36.000 --> 17:43.780]  And the bill in question would impose net neutrality rules in California that are nearly identical to the ones that the FCC had on the books between 2015 and 2018.
[17:44.740 --> 17:51.920]  And the federal version of the rules didn't raise cell phone bills by $30 or slow down internet speed.
[17:51.920 --> 17:54.800]  So why would it happen in California?
[17:54.800 --> 17:55.680]  That's the question.
[17:55.680 --> 17:59.020]  We have a recording of what the robocall sounds like.
[17:59.140 --> 18:04.840]  So if you're a senior citizen in California, you may very well hear this on your phone.
[18:05.040 --> 18:13.400]  I'm calling on behalf of the Civil Justice Association of California and the Congress of California Seniors with information about your cell phone bill.
[18:13.700 --> 18:23.460]  Right now, your assembly member will be voting on a proposal by San Francisco politicians that could increase your cell phone bill by $30 a month and slow down your data.
[18:23.460 --> 18:25.700]  We can't afford higher cell phone bills.
[18:25.860 --> 18:27.360]  We can't afford slower data.
[18:27.760 --> 18:30.000]  We can't afford Senate Bill 822.
[18:30.380 --> 18:33.980]  Tell your assembly member we can't afford Senate Bill 822.
[18:34.300 --> 18:40.900]  Press 1 now to be transferred to your assembly member's office so you can tell them to vote no on Senate Bill 822.
[18:41.360 --> 18:49.080]  Again, please press 1 now to be transferred to your assembly member's office so you can tell them to vote no on Senate Bill 822.
[18:49.940 --> 18:50.760]  Wait, wait, wait.
[18:50.880 --> 18:51.920]  That's a neat feature.
[18:52.060 --> 18:53.260]  You press... they call you.
[18:53.480 --> 18:53.540]  Thank you for your time.
[18:53.860 --> 18:56.640]  Paid for by the Civil Justice Association of California.
[18:57.280 --> 19:00.000]  916-443-4900.
[19:00.300 --> 19:02.860]  Okay, well that's the number to call to complain to those people.
[19:03.060 --> 19:07.340]  But they call you, and you can press a button and be transferred to your representative.
[19:07.700 --> 19:09.920]  But I imagine you don't have to say no.
[19:09.920 --> 19:11.300]  You can say yes, right?
[19:11.720 --> 19:15.000]  They don't only transfer you depending on how you're thinking.
[19:15.420 --> 19:21.720]  Yeah, but even if you're a big net neutrality supporter, if you heard that message, you wouldn't know that they're talking about the net neutrality bill.
[19:22.160 --> 19:22.420]  Uh-huh.
[19:23.560 --> 19:24.420]  Wait, say that again?
[19:24.760 --> 19:31.000]  Like, you were saying that you could basically, like, hijack their message and call...
[19:32.700 --> 19:33.880]  With responses opposite.
[19:34.140 --> 19:37.100]  Yeah, and use that to, like, tell them to vote yes for it.
[19:37.200 --> 19:42.240]  But if I had heard that message, I wouldn't have known that they're talking about net neutrality.
[19:43.200 --> 19:43.780]  That's true.
[19:43.960 --> 19:45.800]  They didn't say the word net neutrality, did they?
[19:45.940 --> 19:46.620]  That's interesting.
[19:46.780 --> 19:47.580]  They did not actually...
[19:47.580 --> 19:50.400]  They just said that this bill is going to raise your rates by $30.
[19:50.680 --> 19:57.080]  And you're calling people that are, you know, possibly concerned about, you know, phone bills and money and things like that.
[19:57.420 --> 19:58.760]  And they hear something like this.
[19:58.760 --> 20:01.260]  Of course, you know, they'll say, oh, no, I don't want that.
[20:01.360 --> 20:01.900]  And they'll remember.
[20:02.180 --> 20:03.740]  They turned it into a chant, too.
[20:03.820 --> 20:04.520]  We can't afford.
[20:04.640 --> 20:05.260]  We can't afford.
[20:05.400 --> 20:07.020]  You know, like, repeating it over and over.
[20:07.640 --> 20:08.000]  Wow.
[20:08.000 --> 20:13.020]  And I like how they specify there's a San Francisco politician to, like, play into their assumed homophobia.
[20:13.200 --> 20:14.040]  Yeah, dog whistling.
[20:14.260 --> 20:15.480]  That's the thing these days.
[20:15.480 --> 20:16.140]  It's unbelievable.
[20:17.220 --> 20:19.060]  Well, it's good that the story got out.
[20:19.120 --> 20:21.420]  And that's, you know, that's the important thing.
[20:21.660 --> 20:25.560]  The truth, again, reveals what's actually going on.
[20:25.720 --> 20:30.460]  If this had just happened and people didn't spread the word about it, they might have gotten away with it.
[20:30.540 --> 20:31.960]  But I don't think they're getting away with it now.
[20:31.960 --> 20:36.320]  Well, it's also important to mention that they only mentioned SB 822.
[20:36.820 --> 20:49.040]  If they would have actually called the bill by its real name, I think that most people who listen to the particular message would have a completely different conception of what the bill actually entails.
[20:49.120 --> 20:50.000]  What's its actual name?
[20:50.000 --> 21:03.740]  Yeah, because if you look at SB 822 in the introduction in the Legislative Council's Digest here, it states that this bill would enact the California Internet Consumer Protection and Net Neutrality Act of 2018.
[21:03.740 --> 21:07.620]  Well, gee whiz, if you call it that, consumer protection, that sounds good.
[21:07.620 --> 21:08.840]  So you can't call it that.
[21:09.000 --> 21:09.300]  Right.
[21:09.300 --> 21:19.640]  So you have to make up some nonsense about $30 being added to your bill and scare a bunch of senior citizens who are on fixed incomes into pressing one and saying no to SB 822.
[21:20.000 --> 21:24.360]  When they really have... they're not informed at all about what the content of the bill is.
[21:24.700 --> 21:29.220]  The other bizarre thing here is that, you know, what's the remedy here?
[21:29.400 --> 21:34.920]  You know, you have this... the name of this coalition, I think it was the Civil Justice Association of California.
[21:35.200 --> 21:47.340]  They're calling around spreading misinformation, targeting senior citizens to contact their legislative representatives and make a political assertion or make a political statement about a particular law.
[21:47.880 --> 21:50.060]  They're not asking them to spend money.
[21:50.280 --> 21:52.040]  They're not asking them to spend a huge amount of time.
[21:52.300 --> 21:55.240]  And they've got this neat device that allows you to make phone calls after they call you.
[21:55.320 --> 21:55.660]  Exactly.
[21:55.800 --> 21:56.700]  I'm curious about that.
[21:56.740 --> 22:01.880]  I'm interested in seeing what the caller ID information would display when they're routed through their system.
[22:01.960 --> 22:02.460]  That would be interesting.
[22:02.480 --> 22:03.260]  That would be interesting, too.
[22:03.260 --> 22:11.480]  But my point here is that they... there's really no remedy here for them because of... for this lying.
[22:11.700 --> 22:12.280]  What do you do here?
[22:12.420 --> 22:14.320]  Do you sue them for telling you a lie?
[22:14.460 --> 22:18.240]  You can't bring a lawsuit and say, somebody called me up and told me a lie.
[22:18.400 --> 22:20.560]  No, but you can tell the world that they're telling lies.
[22:20.700 --> 22:26.280]  And that way, anything they say and any robocall that comes in the future will be met with, you know, some grains of salt.
[22:26.280 --> 22:26.580]  Right.
[22:26.720 --> 22:31.000]  I mean, I think the only place where you could complain about this, perhaps, is the FCC.
[22:32.040 --> 22:37.780]  Yeah, but, you know, isn't that kind of ironic to go to the FCC to complain about somebody misrepresenting net neutrality?
[22:37.780 --> 22:39.000]  That's exactly my point.
[22:39.100 --> 22:39.340]  Uh-huh.
[22:39.400 --> 22:40.360]  It's kind of crazy.
[22:40.620 --> 22:41.880]  It's very crazy.
[22:42.020 --> 22:45.680]  But let's hope that... I wonder why they came up with $30.
[22:45.980 --> 22:48.340]  You think they were sitting around saying, okay, what would be believable?
[22:48.580 --> 22:53.100]  Let's come up with a random number about how much, you know, senior citizen phone bills are going to be going up.
[22:53.400 --> 22:55.000]  And, yeah, $30 sounds believable.
[22:55.000 --> 22:56.480]  Well, $40 is too much, $20 is too little.
[22:57.520 --> 22:59.860]  So let's try that, see if that sticks.
[23:00.060 --> 23:00.280]  Voltaire.
[23:00.380 --> 23:10.140]  You know, now that you have the SecureDrop set up, maybe your next project at $20 should be getting one of the robocall systems to call people and transfer them to their representatives.
[23:10.440 --> 23:12.040]  But how do we get that on SecureDrop?
[23:12.160 --> 23:13.320]  Oh, you mean that's on our next project?
[23:13.680 --> 23:14.620]  Okay, yeah, absolutely.
[23:15.100 --> 23:20.400]  And the really insidious nature of these things is robocalls are really easy and cheap to do these days.
[23:20.420 --> 23:22.620]  I mean, we all still get crap calls on our phones.
[23:22.620 --> 23:25.260]  No matter how many do not call lists we're on.
[23:26.060 --> 23:29.020]  And there's really nothing limiting what people can do with them.
[23:29.100 --> 23:30.860]  I mean, we still see campaigns like today.
[23:31.740 --> 23:38.400]  People who have a stake in an election will send out robocalls to the other side saying, you know, don't forget to vote on and they'll give the wrong date.
[23:39.440 --> 23:39.560]  Oh, wow.
[23:39.560 --> 23:44.600]  You know, things like that still happen and they, you know, they can say what they, they can say what they want.
[23:44.780 --> 23:49.460]  And, you know, it's the vulnerable recipients of these calls that will just believe them.
[23:49.700 --> 23:52.080]  Remember, Republicans, election day is November 9th.
[23:52.320 --> 23:54.320]  So, yes, go to your polls then.
[23:54.980 --> 23:56.260]  And, yeah.
[23:56.720 --> 23:57.380]  I don't know.
[23:57.480 --> 24:01.800]  Is that, is that illegal to call people en masse and give the wrong information out?
[24:02.000 --> 24:03.600]  You could always say you just made a mistake.
[24:03.600 --> 24:16.020]  Whether it's legal or not, like there are so many easy ways to do this without ever being, you know, catchable, basically, any more than you can actually catch the people who, who spam your phone with, with trying to sell you whatever.
[24:16.240 --> 24:24.100]  We need a new feature on this show, Robocall of the Week, because we get so many of them between us and some of them are just so believable.
[24:24.240 --> 24:33.440]  They sound like real people trying to talk to you or there's some poor guy who's actually calling you 50 times trying to get your attention and never getting anywhere.
[24:34.280 --> 24:41.180]  But I think, you know, if we, if we, if we played recordings of some of those, we'd have a lot of, of common ground with a lot of people out there.
[24:41.500 --> 24:47.080]  A friend of the show, T Prophet, who has given hope talks and things on related subjects.
[24:47.300 --> 24:54.680]  He, he actually, recently on Twitter, had posted about a project he's got going where he wants to collect the numbers that come up in caller ID when you get Robocalled.
[24:54.940 --> 25:00.880]  And I don't recall the exact nature of that offhand, but if you find him on Twitter, T-P-R-O-P-H-E-T, I believe.
[25:00.880 --> 25:03.360]  Um, and, uh, and check it out there.
[25:03.620 --> 25:06.020]  I, I think, uh, I think you can help maybe battle this.
[25:06.180 --> 25:14.880]  Well, you know, I find that, um, uh, if you just simply type in the number, uh, on, on the net, type it, type into Google, a number that calls you don't recognize.
[25:15.460 --> 25:21.000]  If it is related in any way to, uh, uh, to spam, to robocalls, somebody is talking about it.
[25:21.080 --> 25:29.620]  And there are a bunch of sites that are dedicated to revealing these, saying, yeah, this person, uh, called and hung up, or is trying to offer me this, but doesn't really represent that.
[25:30.480 --> 25:35.620]  Um, it's a great way to find out quickly, while your phone is still ringing sometimes, uh, what it is that's calling you.
[25:35.620 --> 25:46.380]  Another thing I've noticed, Verizon has a service where, uh, they actually, uh, preface the word, uh, uh, spam with a question mark before the number when, when it's calling you.
[25:46.600 --> 25:48.700]  So, they actually are aware of this.
[25:48.800 --> 25:52.140]  And, in fact, that, that transfers to my, uh, cell phone when, when I have transfer on.
[25:52.360 --> 25:55.920]  Uh, and that says, uh, that, uh, this, this is potential spam.
[25:55.920 --> 26:04.500]  Uh, so, yeah, they're, the phone companies are actually providing services that, that can help you, um, uh, find out if, if you're getting a robocall.
[26:05.080 --> 26:10.360]  You, you brought up, uh, a really good point, Emmanuel, that, uh, you know, we should be doing a robocall of the week.
[26:10.480 --> 26:16.220]  It got me thinking, and then you brought up this other issue of these, these websites that have lists of phone numbers.
[26:16.400 --> 26:21.380]  The problem with those particular websites are they're more like a reverse lookup for these types of spam calls.
[26:21.380 --> 26:33.400]  What would be extraordinarily useful is for everybody who receives these types of phone calls, let's say, with misinformation about the date on which you're supposed to vote, or misinformation about a particular bill.
[26:33.400 --> 26:41.220]  If there was a central repository of that information, then I think there may, in fact, actually be a legal remedy.
[26:41.220 --> 26:46.040]  Because what they're trying to do is suppress voters and suppress the turnout.
[26:46.040 --> 26:54.060]  That could, if it's proven, uh, you know, with the requisite intent, that could amount to a civil rights violation under the 14th Amendment.
[26:54.460 --> 26:58.260]  Um, and that could carry with it very significant penalties as well.
[26:58.400 --> 27:02.220]  So, we should think about putting something like that together.
[27:02.620 --> 27:10.280]  You know, it really would be a community effort where if you receive one of these particular calls, you note the date and time, you note who said it, and the number from which it came.
[27:10.280 --> 27:17.160]  Because all of those numbers have to be paid for by somebody, and that's extraordinarily easy to find out with a subpoena.
[27:17.500 --> 27:18.900]  Yeah, but what if it's coming from a different country?
[27:19.920 --> 27:20.820]  Uh, if it's coming...
[27:20.820 --> 27:21.160]  A lot of them do.
[27:21.400 --> 27:24.000]  Well, at some point, they have to hit the U.S.
[27:24.080 --> 27:24.600]  phone system, right?
[27:24.600 --> 27:27.080]  If they do come from another country, then we can find that out as well.
[27:27.220 --> 27:28.480]  Then you will be...
[27:28.920 --> 27:31.080]  We will be able to trace that back eventually.
[27:31.260 --> 27:38.360]  It will take a longer period of time in order to do that, because we'll be dealing with issuing subpoenas pursuant to a U.S.
[27:38.480 --> 27:38.500]  legal proceeding.
[27:38.500 --> 27:42.940]  I do know you can spoof caller ID info and originating phone numbers.
[27:43.000 --> 27:44.380]  It can be very, very difficult.
[27:44.660 --> 27:50.420]  You can, but with this particular call that you played on the air, they mentioned that they were the Civil Justice Association of California.
[27:50.620 --> 27:52.760]  Well, they were actually a bona fide group.
[27:52.860 --> 27:53.940]  They had a phone number at the end.
[27:54.740 --> 27:59.720]  They're just misrepresenting things, but that's kind of the law of the land now, the misrepresenting things.
[28:00.120 --> 28:00.380]  Right, right.
[28:00.640 --> 28:09.480]  Look, it will be more difficult, but at least we'd have a handle on what the content is and who the targets are, and be able to hopefully protect against this in the future.
[28:09.740 --> 28:14.860]  I mean, if they're spoofing caller ID, they've got to be using some series of switches in order to do this.
[28:15.820 --> 28:20.960]  It's very easy, I guess, if you have a software-based telephone switch in order to spoof caller ID.
[28:21.400 --> 28:23.840]  Somebody's got to be providing them that particular service.
[28:23.880 --> 28:33.840]  If they are knowingly providing them that particular service in the United States to do this, then they are going to be facing some kind of contributory liability for voter suppression as well.
[28:34.560 --> 28:35.000]  Interesting.
[28:35.260 --> 28:35.420]  Rob?
[28:35.860 --> 28:39.140]  I dug out the information for that project T-Profit has going.
[28:39.600 --> 28:44.800]  He wants you to send phone numbers that have robocalled you, whatever comes up on your caller ID, no matter how obviously fake, I guess.
[28:45.260 --> 28:48.320]  He wants you to send that to robocalls at ShadyMart.
[28:48.320 --> 28:52.000]  That's S-H-A-D-Y-M-A-R-T dot com.
[28:52.300 --> 28:54.840]  Robocalls at ShadyMart dot com.
[28:55.040 --> 28:56.460]  So they can check them out.
[28:57.640 --> 28:57.980]  Interesting.
[28:58.220 --> 28:58.640]  Well, okay.
[28:59.060 --> 29:03.200]  We'll investigate the spammers even further and share the information.
[29:03.200 --> 29:06.780]  And we've also just retweeted that from our Twitter account at Hacker Radio Show.
[29:07.080 --> 29:07.380]  Wow.
[29:07.580 --> 29:09.000]  I'm blown away by all that.
[29:09.440 --> 29:23.580]  Now, speaking of misrepresentation and scams and things like that, President Trump is blaming Google for being biased with absolutely no evidence or supporting documentation of any sort.
[29:23.760 --> 29:30.160]  He's also saying that China is responsible for hacking Hillary Clinton's emails.
[29:30.160 --> 29:34.920]  He said Hillary Clinton's emails, many of which are classified information, got hacked by China.
[29:35.120 --> 29:45.780]  Next move better be by the FBI and DOJ or, after all of their other missteps, and he lists a whole bunch of people, their credibility will be forever gone.
[29:46.160 --> 29:49.680]  He earlier said China hacked Hillary Clinton's private email server.
[29:49.880 --> 29:51.840]  Are they sure it wasn't Russia?
[29:52.040 --> 29:52.480]  Just kidding.
[29:53.140 --> 29:56.160]  What are the odds that the FBI and DOJ are right on top of this?
[29:56.280 --> 29:59.460]  Actually, a very big story, much classified information.
[29:59.640 --> 30:00.660]  You know, I don't want to read this.
[30:00.760 --> 30:03.300]  I feel like I'm reading some idiot on IRC.
[30:03.460 --> 30:15.880]  No offense, IRC, but, you know, it's so immature, so based on nothing whatsoever, except the thoughts that are, you know, currently going through his skull.
[30:17.980 --> 30:23.220]  Has anyone heard anything about any of this that has any facts backing it up, Walter?
[30:23.480 --> 30:26.560]  I thought he said there's a 300-pound hacker in their mom's basement.
[30:26.960 --> 30:28.940]  That was two years ago, actually.
[30:29.120 --> 30:31.660]  Yeah, that's been, I think, disproven.
[30:31.940 --> 30:32.480]  Alex?
[30:32.820 --> 30:57.620]  Apparently, the factual basis for Trump's rants on Twitter perhaps were an article from, I think it was, The Daily Caller that had mentioned that there was a third-party Chinese company, a private entity, which, you know, private entities in China are always generally partly owned by the state at some point as well,
[30:57.720 --> 31:08.160]  and that this particular private entity was associated with Chinese military intelligence, and that they were then funneling this information that was exfiltrated from Hillary Clinton's email server over to the Chinese government.
[31:08.620 --> 31:15.460]  I mean, to be clear and to be fair about this, I don't agree with Trump's rant whatsoever.
[31:15.740 --> 31:32.000]  I do, however, take the position and have taken the position that what Hillary Clinton did with respect to her private email server was not only idiotic but illegal, and if I did that, if I forwarded my own classified emails when I worked at CIA to a private email server,
[31:32.160 --> 31:35.060]  I would probably be in prison for having done so.
[31:35.880 --> 31:37.560]  But this has been investigated.
[31:37.560 --> 31:39.440]  It has been looked into.
[31:40.140 --> 31:44.460]  She is not the president of the United States under investigation for collusion with Russia.
[31:44.660 --> 31:58.880]  This has been done and dusted, and in fact, the opening, or rather reopening, of this particular investigation weeks, or days, rather, before the election in 2016 was probably what was a major factor in getting Trump himself elected.
[31:58.880 --> 32:01.160]  So it's time for him to really shut up about this.
[32:01.300 --> 32:05.560]  We can all agree, I hope, that this was a bad idea for her to have done this.
[32:06.500 --> 32:19.840]  But reopening this can of worms now just seems like a really bad and poor attempt at sleight-of-hand tricks here, putting more pressure on Jeff Sessions, distracting us from what's really going on.
[32:19.940 --> 32:21.300]  Well, of course, it's a distraction.
[32:21.460 --> 32:24.180]  I mean, I think he pretty much is saying that almost.
[32:24.720 --> 32:27.920]  So we shouldn't be fooled in any event.
[32:28.000 --> 32:32.440]  But also, you know, I wonder, how many other people do the exact same thing with their emails?
[32:32.940 --> 32:35.580]  You know, I think it's quite a common practice.
[32:35.760 --> 32:36.920]  I think people are very sloppy.
[32:37.320 --> 32:40.620]  They aren't using the best security methods at all.
[32:40.840 --> 32:43.220]  This goes from low level to high level.
[32:44.400 --> 32:46.940]  I don't know if prison is the right solution to this.
[32:47.080 --> 32:52.200]  I think education and, you know, basically, you know, instilling common sense.
[32:52.360 --> 32:53.840]  That's what we need to be able to do.
[32:53.840 --> 32:55.040]  Well, I can tell you this.
[32:55.100 --> 32:58.300]  In the intelligence community, I would say almost nobody does this.
[32:58.480 --> 33:05.080]  Almost nobody forwards classified emails or emails that contain classified information over to a private server.
[33:05.280 --> 33:06.360]  I mean, I think the problem...
[33:06.360 --> 33:06.740]  How do you know?
[33:08.100 --> 33:13.320]  It's very difficult to do that from a technical perspective as well because the networks are segmented.
[33:13.460 --> 33:16.920]  Well, maybe that's the solution then, is to make it difficult to do this.
[33:17.000 --> 33:33.680]  Well, what Hillary did, though, was she never even really had her state.gov email address configured, which, frankly, if you're going to try to avoid Freedom of Information Act requests about your particular email inbox, you should use your inbox and have it configured for certain things.
[33:33.680 --> 33:40.020]  And then, you know, for the subjects that you don't want to be subject to FOIA, you would use your private email server.
[33:40.160 --> 33:43.740]  She made a really stupid mistake by never even using her state.gov account.
[33:43.740 --> 33:49.980]  So if there was a FOIA request asking for her emails, there was nothing there, which leads them to ask further questions.
[33:49.980 --> 33:53.980]  Now, is this because it was too difficult to set up the state.gov email address?
[33:53.980 --> 33:57.240]  Or was she actively, in your opinion, trying to hide something?
[33:57.420 --> 34:00.340]  I think it was just a really idiotic move on her part.
[34:00.340 --> 34:03.840]  I think she was trying to hide something, frankly, by using this private email server.
[34:04.640 --> 34:08.180]  That's unheard of in government, to have your own email server.
[34:08.460 --> 34:17.280]  Sometimes people will forward things to their Gmail, you know, on a lark or an offhand, or, you know, to keep something in their back pocket should they need it later on after they leave government.
[34:17.280 --> 34:20.160]  You know, that's arguably illegal, too.
[34:20.340 --> 34:23.580]  If it's classified information, you could be violating the Espionage Act.
[34:24.500 --> 34:27.740]  So, yeah, I think there's a lot wrong with what she did.
[34:27.920 --> 34:29.700]  But that's not what Trump is talking about.
[34:30.100 --> 34:35.300]  You know, we've already gone through this issue several years ago over and over and over again on the radio.
[34:36.260 --> 34:41.840]  But, you know, I think there's some merit to the idea that what she did was wrong and would have landed anybody else in prison.
[34:42.940 --> 34:43.480]  All right.
[34:44.340 --> 34:46.180]  I can't believe we're talking about Hillary's emails.
[34:46.740 --> 34:47.360]  Neither can I.
[34:47.500 --> 34:48.880]  But that's what happens here.
[34:49.000 --> 34:49.180]  Rob?
[34:49.360 --> 34:58.480]  Well, and that's the thing, too, because the reason that the president will not shut up about this is because it's an easy and cheap rallying cry that gets his base really, really head up and going.
[34:59.020 --> 35:05.700]  And, you know, it's like if you're a pro wrestler and you're chanting, USA, USA, you know, it's something that is guaranteed to get you a pop from the crowd.
[35:06.040 --> 35:07.600]  And that's what he's interested in.
[35:07.600 --> 35:09.000]  He's not interested in the facts of the case.
[35:09.040 --> 35:11.740]  He's not interested in who really hacked these emails.
[35:11.900 --> 35:12.500]  Was it China?
[35:12.580 --> 35:12.960]  Was it Russia?
[35:12.960 --> 35:19.160]  He's interested in saying things that will pump him up in the eyes of his supporters and, you know, make noise.
[35:19.460 --> 35:25.780]  And it's just really fascinating watching the president of the United States being this at odds with his own FBI and DOJ.
[35:26.420 --> 35:35.420]  I don't know when the last time was in recent memory that we had this situation with a president that was really hostile to the justice arm of things.
[35:35.420 --> 35:39.520]  It's also pretty, like, sexist and misogynistic.
[35:39.700 --> 35:45.620]  It kind of plays into his angle there with, like, treatment of women.
[35:45.620 --> 35:56.580]  And he can just kind of keep dragging her up, you know, as a trope and, you know, denigrating her public service and making it controversial when it isn't.
[35:56.960 --> 35:57.860]  So I think...
[35:57.860 --> 36:21.060]  And that was partly what you were saying that struck me, Alex, is that, yeah, not only is it going to raise questions, it's going to raise further subpoenas to the personal account by not separating those things and really would have probably behooved her to set it up in the first place such that when people do want to see your official communications,
[36:21.060 --> 36:31.620]  it doesn't turn into a dragnet and a personal indictment or an indictment of your personal life and communications as well as those official communications.
[36:32.200 --> 36:32.600]  All right.
[36:32.720 --> 36:52.400]  Well, speaking of emails and politicians and incompetence and all that, the DNC, Democratic National Committee official, is now saying what appeared to be a thwarted attempt to break into its massive voter database was actually an unauthorized test.
[36:52.840 --> 37:10.580]  Bob Lord, the DNC's chief security officer, said late Wednesday in a statement that the test mimicked several attributes of actual attacks attacks on the Democratic Party's voter file and that it was not authorized by the DNC, the company that houses the file containing information on tens of millions of voters or its vendors.
[37:10.860 --> 37:18.900]  A web security firm using artificial intelligence had uncovered what was believed to be an attack and the DNC was notified on Tuesday.
[37:21.300 --> 37:29.460]  Hackers appeared to have created a fake login page to gather usernames and passwords in an effort to gain access to the Democratic Party's voter file.
[37:29.460 --> 37:31.640]  That's what a party official had said.
[37:31.740 --> 37:37.740]  The attempt was quickly thwarted by suspending the attacker's account and no information was compromised according to the official.
[37:37.840 --> 37:38.840]  The FBI was notified.
[37:39.380 --> 37:42.860]  It declined to comment to the Associated Press where we got this story from.
[37:43.240 --> 37:49.020]  The official wasn't authorized to speak about sensitive security information and spoke to the Associated Press on condition of anonymity.
[37:49.360 --> 37:59.540]  The test was organized by the Michigan Democratic Party which did not notify the DNC according to a person familiar with the incident who told the Washington Post.
[37:59.940 --> 38:10.040]  That apparent false alarm comes two years after Russian operatives sent the party into disarray by hacking into its computers and facilitating the release of tens of thousands of emails amid the presidential election.
[38:10.200 --> 38:11.840]  You know, I think this is the way to do it though.
[38:12.600 --> 38:19.340]  You know, getting permission to try to break into something kind of goes against the whole idea of uncovering security holes in the first place.
[38:19.480 --> 38:21.200]  You have to hit them by surprise.
[38:21.200 --> 38:23.420]  You have to do it when they're not expecting it.
[38:23.700 --> 38:30.040]  And I think, you know, this kind of a test is exactly the way a test should be organized.
[38:30.340 --> 38:33.560]  That's kind of how the whole idea of penetration testing works.
[38:33.700 --> 38:45.340]  This is a trade that exists in the world where the higher-ups somewhere will hire hackers and experts to attempt to break into their company systems without telling anyone closer to the ground.
[38:45.980 --> 38:49.680]  And then the results will come back as made famous in the 1992 film Sneakers.
[38:49.860 --> 38:50.660]  That's a thing that exists.
[38:50.800 --> 38:52.700]  It sounds like it worked this time.
[38:52.760 --> 38:58.680]  It sounds like If they detected the intrusion attempt and no information was given out, they should be happy about that.
[38:58.880 --> 38:59.100]  Walter?
[38:59.280 --> 39:08.420]  Well, the difference is that in a penetration test, the people, as Rob said, the people at the top or at least like Bob Lord, the head of their security, would know that there's a penetration test going on.
[39:08.480 --> 39:12.160]  So he would tell them, like, oh, don't put out a PR statement saying we've been hacked.
[39:12.920 --> 39:14.000]  That didn't happen here.
[39:14.160 --> 39:18.000]  The problem here is that political parties in the U.S.
[39:18.080 --> 39:20.100]  are very, they basically run like franchises.
[39:20.100 --> 39:23.480]  So the states and the national don't really coordinate.
[39:23.920 --> 39:26.280]  No, it sure doesn't seem like they do coordinate.
[39:26.520 --> 39:31.240]  But, you know, I do think that this is how penetration testing should work.
[39:31.380 --> 39:34.700]  You shouldn't even have to be affiliated with the organization.
[39:34.960 --> 39:42.380]  But that goes to my belief about where hackers fit in in the first place where we should always be trying to see the security holes and things.
[39:42.460 --> 39:44.880]  And when you find something, you let people know about it.
[39:44.880 --> 39:47.920]  and we all become more secure as a result.
[39:48.320 --> 39:49.960]  I agree with that point.
[39:50.300 --> 40:04.780]  I do think that the reporting on this was really lacking, however, because as soon as the stories came out, if you looked at any website that was carrying this particular story, you would see pictures of St. Basil's Cathedral in Moscow right off Red Square.
[40:05.080 --> 40:08.740]  People making implicit associations with Russia.
[40:08.840 --> 40:09.360]  No, it's China.
[40:09.500 --> 40:10.200]  China did it.
[40:10.440 --> 40:10.740]  Or China.
[40:11.000 --> 40:11.840]  Trump says that now.
[40:11.960 --> 40:13.620]  Our enemy has always been China.
[40:13.620 --> 40:23.500]  Right, but all these sort of implicit attributions of the actor behind this, when anybody could set this up in any number of minutes, it's not very difficult to do.
[40:23.640 --> 40:25.440]  We detect these kinds of things all the time.
[40:25.440 --> 40:37.460]  This reminds me of what I talked about at Hope, which at the end of my Hope talk I had mentioned that there was a lot of DNC, I'm sorry, political campaign related information that would be coming out in the media.
[40:37.560 --> 40:48.900]  And what we had detected based on these servers that we set up to monitor the DNS for misinformation campaigns was a massive amount of domain name registrations in the dot for sale top level domain.
[40:49.340 --> 40:58.400]  And it was a weird thing because they were targeting Democrats, they were targeting Republicans, it was made all at the same time by the same actor on the same day within seconds of each other.
[40:58.400 --> 41:07.760]  So we had disclosed this to the Senate's sergeant-at-arms and his cyber security team was working on this.
[41:08.360 --> 41:34.000]  We had disclosed this to various campaigns that were targeted and it turns out that the AP was able to piece this together and instead of this being a nefarious actor, it was an actual DNC-related campaign for the re-election of senators that made all of these preemptive registrations registrations in the dot-for-sale TLD and never even told the actual candidates whom they were protecting by these
[41:34.000 --> 41:34.900]  particular registrations.
[41:35.120 --> 41:48.060]  So when this was detected, it set off all these alarm bells, people started running around with their heads on fire wondering what's happening, was this a foreign actor coordinating these particular attacks, and it turned out to actually be the Democrats themselves.
[41:48.360 --> 42:05.240]  So I understand your point about penetration testing needing to happen in a realistic environment, but I really think that we owe it to each other to have a greater measure of cooperation and collaboration when we're doing things that impact other political races and other political candidates.
[42:05.940 --> 42:08.920]  Well, you know, that sounds nice.
[42:08.920 --> 42:11.780]  I just don't know how realistic it is because we're not all on the same side.
[42:11.900 --> 42:16.400]  People aren't going to always be sharing information and cooperating.
[42:17.080 --> 42:24.100]  I think we just need to be aware of when something is not right and forthcoming when we notice that.
[42:25.420 --> 42:27.540]  And we're going to be seeing a lot more of that.
[42:28.300 --> 42:32.020]  I was flipping out about the fact that attacks are coming from overseas.
[42:32.680 --> 42:34.220]  We should be expecting that.
[42:34.360 --> 42:55.640]  We should be expecting attacks to be coming from everywhere and simply working with each other to figure out how to fix it when it happens and being honest about it when it happens to us, when it happens to particular organizations, and not being let around by the nose by people spreading false information because I think that's what the real problem is.
[42:55.740 --> 43:00.040]  The problem isn't that Russians are hacking in or Chinese are hacking in or Bulgarians or anybody.
[43:00.400 --> 43:07.140]  It's the fact that there are able to control people by spreading misinformation and having people believe it.
[43:07.580 --> 43:13.760]  Now, the same threat comes from people in this country spreading false information and having people believe it.
[43:13.900 --> 43:15.280]  We don't ask enough questions.
[43:15.280 --> 43:16.600]  We don't doubt enough.
[43:16.780 --> 43:18.740]  We don't say, show me the proof.
[43:18.860 --> 43:21.360]  We just say, oh, you know, somebody forwarded that to me on Facebook.
[43:21.360 --> 43:22.240]  It has to be true.
[43:22.840 --> 43:30.860]  And I think, you know, if we're learning anything, and I'm not sure if we are, but if we are learning anything, it's that you can't believe everything you read.
[43:31.960 --> 43:34.240]  You have to actually look for the facts.
[43:34.620 --> 43:39.840]  And, you know, the theme of where we are today is that people don't do that nearly enough.
[43:41.080 --> 43:42.360]  I'm in agreement with you.
[43:42.480 --> 43:54.340]  You seem to be making the argument, you know, that I was making a couple of weeks ago when it came to the Alex Jones affair, which is people need to learn how to discern for themselves the truth versus reality.
[43:54.340 --> 44:11.060]  And, you know, my point here is that I think education is really the key here, that we are not confrontational enough with each other anymore, that we need to find the truth through a dialogue, through a dialectic, you know, and through questions like you mentioned.
[44:11.240 --> 44:19.480]  You know, in law school, we're taught through the Socratic method, which is one question leads to an answer, which leads to another question, which leads to an answer, which leads to another question.
[44:19.760 --> 44:22.540]  This is the kind of thing I feel like is not being taught enough.
[44:22.540 --> 44:32.800]  Let me just, as long as you brought up Alex Jones, you know, when you conclude that somebody is a big fat liar, you don't let him play in your playground anymore.
[44:33.060 --> 44:34.280]  I know, I want to re-head.
[44:34.300 --> 44:42.700]  That is what is happening with that guy, the fact that people realize he's spouting all kinds of nonsense and causing harm to people.
[44:42.920 --> 44:46.380]  You don't have to let him onto the grounds.
[44:46.380 --> 44:52.960]  He can do whatever he wants, you know, on his own time, with his own equipment, but Facebook does not have to let him play.
[44:53.220 --> 44:54.080]  Twitter doesn't have to.
[44:54.840 --> 44:55.700]  We don't have to.
[44:55.780 --> 45:01.320]  Well, we should think of him as sort of a mental proving ground then, because if you can detect his nonsense and realize...
[45:01.320 --> 45:01.880]  But we did.
[45:01.880 --> 45:02.820]  We did detect it.
[45:02.920 --> 45:03.560]  Now he's gone.
[45:03.680 --> 45:03.840]  Sure.
[45:04.400 --> 45:04.800]  History.
[45:05.240 --> 45:20.560]  The presence of it may actually have a beneficial effect, because if you are taught to detect this kind of thing, the more pernicious stuff that you are discussing, that you're talking about right now, is the things that slip in, this misinformation that could be in what look like legitimate media ports,
[45:20.660 --> 45:25.820]  but nobody questions them, because we live in this society now where we even have an acronym for it, right?
[45:25.900 --> 45:26.620]  T-L-D-R.
[45:27.020 --> 45:28.020]  Too long, didn't read.
[45:28.180 --> 45:34.120]  You know, we skim the headlines, we get the little blurb from Facebook or Twitter, and we just assume that it's truth without asking any questions.
[45:34.340 --> 45:35.100]  That's a problem.
[45:35.440 --> 45:41.140]  Well, that's a problem with our attention span, and I think that's something we really need to work on.
[45:41.560 --> 45:48.000]  Get away from social media and read books and actually, you know, write essays and things like that.
[45:48.340 --> 45:50.120]  Anyway, we're running out of time.
[45:50.240 --> 45:57.540]  I wanted to ask you, Alex, particularly, because you're our resident lawyer here, the legalities of what's going on in Texas.
[45:57.540 --> 46:14.120]  It seems that the guy behind the 3D guns, Cody Wilson, has decided to simply say, you know what, I'm not going to pay attention to the ruling saying that I cannot make the blueprints for 3D-printed guns available.
[46:14.420 --> 46:17.460]  And he started selling them to anyone who wants one.
[46:17.740 --> 46:21.360]  That's, again, after a federal court order barred him from posting the plans online.
[46:21.720 --> 46:24.340]  He said at a news conference he started selling the plans.
[46:24.380 --> 46:27.420]  Yesterday morning, he'd already received nearly 400 orders.
[46:28.640 --> 46:32.360]  He's willing to sell the plans for as little as a penny to anyone in the U.S.
[46:32.400 --> 46:32.940]  who wants them.
[46:32.940 --> 46:36.320]  Anyone who wants these files is going to get them.
[46:36.660 --> 46:38.320]  But he's only going to sell to U.S.
[46:38.440 --> 46:38.800]  customers.
[46:39.060 --> 46:40.140]  I don't know why.
[46:40.620 --> 46:42.980]  They can name their own price.
[46:43.400 --> 46:54.220]  The blueprints purchased through the company's website, he said, could be downloaded on a thumb drive and shipped to buyers by standard mail, sent by email, or sent by some other secure download transfer.
[46:55.480 --> 46:57.240]  And he's taking cryptocurrency.
[46:58.080 --> 47:01.380]  Alex, how is this guy getting away with this?
[47:01.380 --> 47:10.480]  You know, this reminds me of a case, what was it, DM, I'm sorry, the MPAA versus Remy Yirdez that involved a certain Maverick publisher.
[47:10.680 --> 47:11.580]  Yeah, that was my case.
[47:11.680 --> 47:12.300]  Yeah, exactly.
[47:12.440 --> 47:14.520]  Of somebody flouting an injunction.
[47:14.520 --> 47:15.560]  I didn't flout anything.
[47:15.620 --> 47:17.560]  I simply did something different.
[47:17.800 --> 47:20.920]  They said, I'm not allowed to publish links, so I published a list.
[47:21.140 --> 47:24.200]  Now, okay, did he do something similar to this?
[47:24.280 --> 47:29.420]  Did he, they said you can't make it available, but he's making it available by selling it.
[47:29.420 --> 47:41.100]  Now, what's really fascinating here is, I think you push the limits much farther than this particular guy did, because the ruling actually gives him the right to do this.
[47:41.200 --> 47:49.020]  The judge was concerned about this information being out on the internet in a manner where it could be downloaded by any person, and it's untraceable and unregulated.
[47:49.020 --> 48:05.000]  So the ruling on the final page of this particular order that issued the injunction prohibiting him from posting this online for the world to download actually said, regulation under the law means that files cannot be uploaded to the internet, but they can be emailed,
[48:05.500 --> 48:11.280]  mailed securely, mailed securely transmitted, or otherwise published within the United States, the ruling said.
[48:11.280 --> 48:12.220]  The ruling says that?
[48:12.300 --> 48:13.780]  Yes, the ruling says that on his final page.
[48:13.780 --> 48:20.060]  So I don't understand how the state attorneys general are going to continue to try to oppose this.
[48:20.240 --> 48:22.960]  I mean, they can appeal it to, I guess...
[48:22.960 --> 48:25.060]  If it says that, you can't oppose it, because it says that.
[48:25.140 --> 48:25.960]  It says you can do it.
[48:26.080 --> 48:38.920]  It says that, but they could appeal the order issuing the injunction to, I think it's the Fifth Circuit in Texas, asking the Fifth Circuit to either vacate the order or push it back down to the lower court for a further hearing on the matter.
[48:38.920 --> 48:41.760]  But it gives him the right to do this.
[48:41.880 --> 48:53.980]  And I think what the judge was getting at was, we don't want to prohibit you wholesale from distributing this information because it's information, but we want you to have some kind of record that allows us to identify who downloaded it.
[48:54.100 --> 48:59.160]  So if you pay for it in one way or another, if you send him a check, you'll get the information.
[48:59.180 --> 49:04.480]  If he mails the USB drive to somebody, you're going to have a record of that particular address.
[49:04.480 --> 49:10.720]  And if I were he, I would be keeping very meticulous records about this because I don't think that this is unsettled.
[49:10.840 --> 49:14.360]  I'd like to know how he's verifying people's identities.
[49:14.780 --> 49:16.160]  How exactly does that work?
[49:16.380 --> 49:21.420]  Well, the order doesn't claim that he has to do that as far as I know, that he needs to keep some kind of record.
[49:21.600 --> 49:30.520]  And if he's accepting cryptocurrencies for these particular purchases, that could raise a host of other issues as well.
[49:30.520 --> 49:43.840]  Well, that's something perhaps that state attorneys general could argue in trying to have this order vacated that permits him arguably to do this, because at which point you may only get back to a cryptocurrency exchange, not to an actual wallet.
[49:44.860 --> 49:47.440]  So this whole thing, I think, is really fascinating.
[49:47.680 --> 49:58.040]  And we think that he's pushing the limit, but I actually think that you push the limit a lot farther when you are prohibited from posting a link to the DCSS source code at issue in your case.
[49:58.040 --> 50:04.160]  And instead, you just remove the hyperlink and still had it on the page that anybody could cut and paste and put into a browser bar.
[50:04.400 --> 50:12.260]  I would say, arguably, that puts you more in line for potential contempt of court than what this guy is doing.
[50:12.800 --> 50:20.580]  Well, I did have some contempt of the court, but it's long gone, so that bus has left the station.
[50:21.060 --> 50:22.880]  But it'll be interesting to see how this develops.
[50:23.060 --> 50:28.200]  You know, I happen to think that once the information is out, and the information is pretty much out, there's really not much you can do about it.
[50:28.220 --> 50:42.320]  I'm very interested in how this is going to be processed, and just what we are going to do as a society when we realize that these things are everywhere, and we live in a crazy world where we can't seem to keep ourselves safe.
[50:42.500 --> 51:01.980]  Well, the other thing here is, you know, imagine this crazy situation that somebody pays a penny for this, they get a USB drive in the mail, they put it onto their hard drive, they go to lx7whatever.onion site, secure, drop it to 2600, and 2600 decides to put it on their website for everybody to download.
[51:02.300 --> 51:06.740]  Well, you know, we do have standards as far as what is contemptible...
[51:06.740 --> 51:07.420]  I understand that.
[51:07.420 --> 51:11.320]  ...and what is something that will really be bad for people.
[51:11.440 --> 51:12.040]  But the point...
[51:12.040 --> 51:18.740]  But the information, when information is out, I certainly agree that when information is out, you can't take it back, it's there.
[51:18.960 --> 51:22.380]  And the court order, the injunction, only applies to this one particular person.
[51:22.520 --> 51:23.300]  It wouldn't apply to you.
[51:23.700 --> 51:24.100]  That's true.
[51:24.100 --> 51:26.840]  It would have no effect on you whatsoever or anybody around the world.
[51:27.060 --> 51:28.720]  So the question is, what are we going to do about it?
[51:28.800 --> 51:36.580]  How do we keep ourselves safe in this environment that is being created by crazy people that have to have all these weapons of death?
[51:36.700 --> 51:47.540]  I have no idea how to answer that question, but, you know, I think we have to be realistic that this is probably a very difficult thing to reproduce and not go, not engage in mass hysteria about this.
[51:47.740 --> 51:48.380]  All right, Rob.
[51:48.620 --> 51:57.340]  Talking of being realistic, I mean, this is really all academic because Cody Wilson released these files to the open internet, I want to say like five, six years ago.
[51:57.700 --> 51:59.280]  And they have been in circulation since then.
[51:59.380 --> 51:59.920]  Streisand effect.
[52:00.080 --> 52:00.660]  It's on the internet.
[52:00.800 --> 52:03.140]  So it can, you know, you can't get it off the internet.
[52:03.260 --> 52:04.620]  There's always going to be someone that has it up.
[52:05.180 --> 52:13.820]  And the enthusiasts of this sort of thing have been, you know, have had these files, have been, you know, building on them, working on them for all this time.
[52:13.820 --> 52:15.600]  It may even be overseas.
[52:15.920 --> 52:20.780]  Of course, we know American guns don't work overseas, but if they did, that might be something to worry about.
[52:20.920 --> 52:22.560]  Yeah, but the technology is out there.
[52:22.660 --> 52:23.800]  The blueprints are out there.
[52:23.900 --> 52:28.180]  And there's really no going back from where this is.
[52:28.240 --> 52:29.460]  It's the reality that we live in now.
[52:29.600 --> 52:40.440]  It reminds me of the old days of web browsers when they used to have a version with weaker encryption because you weren't allowed to export the strongest encryption that they could do at the time.
[52:40.440 --> 52:45.340]  So if you lived in another country, you were supposed to just, on our system, download the weaker one and have less protection.
[52:45.360 --> 52:46.160]  That worked really well.
[52:46.500 --> 52:50.400]  We have our phone number, 347-335-0818 if you want to join the discussion.
[52:50.540 --> 52:55.280]  In the few minutes we have left, we're sorry, we just got so enthused with all the things we're talking about and so many things we didn't get to.
[52:56.140 --> 52:57.500]  347-335-0818.
[52:57.640 --> 52:59.360]  For instance, I wanted to mention this.
[53:00.040 --> 53:03.360]  The speaking clock, the Irish speaking clock has been silenced.
[53:03.600 --> 53:04.240]  That's right.
[53:10.660 --> 53:11.060]  391.
[53:11.660 --> 53:17.420]  Telecom provider EIR, E-I-R, I guess that's how you pronounce it, stopped it on Monday, this Monday.
[53:17.880 --> 53:19.940]  And if they hadn't stopped it, we'd be calling it right now.
[53:20.060 --> 53:23.420]  During its peak, the service attracted close to 3 million calls annually.
[53:24.580 --> 53:25.540]  Technology has moved on.
[53:25.640 --> 53:33.480]  The proliferation of mobile phones and gadgets has caused a steady, predictable decline in the numbers of people using the service to find out what time it was.
[53:34.180 --> 53:40.020]  I think it was down to something like five calls a day or something like that, and most of them from people just curious what it sounded like.
[53:41.160 --> 53:44.340]  So, that's some sad news, the end of the speaking clock.
[53:44.560 --> 53:47.300]  I don't know, can you still dial the time here, the 976 number?
[53:48.000 --> 53:49.300]  Someone, I'm not going to call it.
[53:49.380 --> 53:51.340]  I don't want to pay premium rates, but somebody must know.
[53:51.520 --> 53:52.320]  Hey, we have a phone call.
[53:52.400 --> 53:52.700]  Good evening.
[53:52.820 --> 53:53.700]  You're on Off The Hook.
[53:55.200 --> 54:18.160]  Hi, I just wanted to make a comment about the Alex Jones being temporarily suspended on Twitter, and I haven't really heard anyone else say this, so I wanted to say it, but I really think that this is dangerous territory of banning people from these large websites that have become,
[54:18.480 --> 54:23.060]  unfortunately, part and parcel of everyday life.
[54:23.060 --> 54:31.900]  And I really think that it is akin to somebody saying something objectionable and then banned from having a phone line.
[54:32.180 --> 54:44.300]  I think anybody that can hear, I mean, anybody in your studio would say that that would be egregious if somebody committed a crime and then they were banned from having a phone line.
[54:44.320 --> 54:45.540]  Okay, but hold on a second.
[54:45.540 --> 54:47.680]  A phone line is a utility.
[54:47.680 --> 54:49.380]  It's an essential part of life.
[54:49.600 --> 54:52.180]  I hope you don't believe Twitter is.
[54:52.180 --> 54:52.840]  I believe that.
[54:53.540 --> 54:54.020]  Actually...
[54:54.020 --> 54:55.120]  You believe that, Voltero.
[54:55.120 --> 54:56.200]  I feel sorry for you.
[54:56.280 --> 54:56.540]  I really do.
[54:56.620 --> 55:02.300]  And I think the majority of the Americans don't want to hire people if they can't find them online.
[55:02.820 --> 55:10.200]  It's definitely something that people think you're strange if you're not on a social media website.
[55:10.460 --> 55:12.180]  I think that's the problem.
[55:12.420 --> 55:15.600]  I think you hit the nail on the head with that statement.
[55:15.840 --> 55:23.280]  We live in, to quote, you know, someone who spoke just a minute ago about this gun plan stuff being out on the internet.
[55:23.860 --> 55:30.660]  I mean, that's the situation, is that, like, people don't want to talk on, you know, it should be a utility.
[55:30.900 --> 55:34.060]  Like, this is a freedom of speech thing.
[55:34.300 --> 55:43.820]  And these guys are hiding behind the fact that it's their own private... they're a private company, but Verizon's a private company, but they can't just deny...
[55:43.820 --> 55:45.020]  No, they're a public utility.
[55:45.340 --> 55:47.020]  They're a public utility with landlines.
[55:47.420 --> 55:52.080]  You know, cell phones are something else, but everybody is entitled to have a landline.
[55:52.300 --> 55:53.480]  Hey, thanks for the call.
[55:53.760 --> 55:55.140]  Go ahead, Voltaire.
[55:55.320 --> 55:56.800]  Yeah, I certainly agree with that caller.
[55:57.380 --> 55:59.040]  Like, these companies that are...
[55:59.040 --> 56:03.980]  Wait, how do you agree with the caller that Alex Jones should be on Twitter when you want to ban people with MAGA hats?
[56:04.180 --> 56:05.200]  Explain that to me.
[56:05.200 --> 56:07.100]  No, my point is that...
[56:07.100 --> 56:08.320]  You can't have it both ways.
[56:08.600 --> 56:17.320]  No, my point is that Alex Jones probably should be banned from Twitter, but only after going through a legal process, like...
[56:17.320 --> 56:19.220]  A legal process for a private company?
[56:19.440 --> 56:21.360]  Yes, because they're a monopoly.
[56:21.800 --> 56:22.880]  They're not a monopoly.
[56:23.480 --> 56:24.520]  You don't have to use Twitter.
[56:24.700 --> 56:27.640]  You can use Instagram or a whole host of other things.
[56:27.820 --> 56:29.680]  Owned by Facebook, which are other monopolies.
[56:29.860 --> 56:30.860]  In China, nobody uses Twitter.
[56:30.880 --> 56:34.940]  These companies should be regulated like public utilities.
[56:35.200 --> 56:38.800]  and have their own special standards and due process for...
[56:38.800 --> 56:40.140]  How about community standards?
[56:40.360 --> 56:42.400]  I think that's a lot more apropos here.
[56:42.600 --> 56:43.560]  What does that even mean?
[56:43.740 --> 56:49.580]  It means that this guy has been lying and causing harm to people, and people are outraged by it.
[56:49.780 --> 56:50.960]  Their voices should mean something.
[56:51.100 --> 56:51.580]  Yeah, I agree.
[56:51.600 --> 56:57.420]  And he should be banned from Twitter, but only after going through a democratically legitimated process of...
[56:57.420 --> 57:00.180]  Like, in Germany, how there are laws about certain things.
[57:00.200 --> 57:02.080]  Well, I don't know how you're going to have that on Twitter, exactly.
[57:03.460 --> 57:04.120]  Go ahead, Rob.
[57:04.120 --> 57:09.480]  I think it's the internet itself that should be the public utility, but private entities are not public utilities.
[57:09.680 --> 57:20.720]  Anybody can go on the internet and put up their own page with whatever they want to say, but if you start a blog somewhere and people start arguing in the comments section, is it your job to then allow them that platform on your personal space?
[57:20.740 --> 57:21.320]  No, it isn't.
[57:21.400 --> 57:25.460]  Once you reach a certain size, you're a defector monopoly, and you're not going to be replaced anytime soon.
[57:26.280 --> 57:27.040]  Well, okay.
[57:27.180 --> 57:28.360]  I don't know if it's about size.
[57:28.360 --> 57:32.700]  I think it's just about what serves the community that you want to create.
[57:32.880 --> 57:35.260]  And I think Twitter has every right to decide this.
[57:35.660 --> 57:38.980]  And, you know, we have every right to insist on certain things.
[57:39.120 --> 57:40.840]  In other words, Facebook, Twitter...
[57:40.840 --> 57:42.380]  Facebook is where it got banned, actually.
[57:42.500 --> 57:44.520]  Twitter was a temporary sandbox type of a thing.
[57:45.060 --> 57:48.080]  I want to try to dig out of this rabbit hole and just stay...
[57:48.080 --> 57:48.880]  You're going to have to do it quickly.
[57:48.880 --> 57:58.100]  Yeah, that I appreciate that caller, and I appreciate the sentiment, and finally, somebody calling up and supporting the position that I took a couple of weeks ago.
[57:58.280 --> 58:02.780]  Well, believe me, BAI listeners, you'll get people supporting all kinds of positions.
[58:03.080 --> 58:04.400]  So, don't assume anything.
[58:04.820 --> 58:06.760]  I don't think Verizon's a private company, either.
[58:06.900 --> 58:07.820]  It's a public company.
[58:08.240 --> 58:10.560]  It's a publicly traded company, isn't it?
[58:10.640 --> 58:11.500]  That's totally different.
[58:11.640 --> 58:16.400]  And publicly traded, it means it's like on the stock market that anybody can buy there.
[58:16.420 --> 58:17.720]  You said it's a private...
[58:18.300 --> 58:19.200]  It's for profit.
[58:19.300 --> 58:22.280]  The point is, Verizon can't say you're not allowed to have a phone line.
[58:22.440 --> 58:24.480]  All right, that's the comparison being made here.
[58:24.560 --> 58:26.100]  And Twitter account is the new phone line.
[58:26.500 --> 58:27.360]  All right, you know what?
[58:27.360 --> 58:28.680]  And a Facebook account like this.
[58:28.680 --> 58:32.860]  It's just, we don't have enough time to get into this, but we'll try and pick it up next week.
[58:32.920 --> 58:34.840]  I'm sure we'll get all kinds of emails about this.
[58:35.640 --> 58:39.160]  OTH at 2600.com is our email address.
[58:39.180 --> 58:42.540]  We'd love to hear your opinions on all this and everything else as well.
[58:42.660 --> 58:43.220]  Send us stories.
[58:43.660 --> 58:47.700]  Don't forget to leak information to us if you have such information on our security.
[58:47.720 --> 58:53.260]  Or drop, which can be found on our main webpage, www.2600.com.
[58:53.440 --> 58:57.040]  Don't be afraid by the computer that's currently occupying that page.
[58:57.540 --> 59:00.180]  You can always click it to see what happens.
[59:00.600 --> 59:01.440]  We'll see you next week.
[59:01.440 --> 59:01.700]  Good night.