[00:00.000 --> 00:09.040]  ...en Ocho y Mas, Charanga Pachá, Anthony Carrillo, Amy Millán, and Yambawa, Lucito Quintero, Robert Quintero, and Salsa Project.
[00:09.320 --> 00:18.560]  We will also present Consabor Latino Lifetime Achievement Awards to Martin Cohen, Ray Santos, Jose Mangual Sr., and Johnny Dandy Rodriguez.
[00:18.880 --> 00:22.940]  Again, this is all happening Sunday, November 18th from 3 to 9 p.m.
[00:23.100 --> 00:25.940]  at SOB's 204 Barrick Street.
[00:25.940 --> 00:31.020]  For more information, 212-243-4940.
[00:33.300 --> 00:38.160]  And you are listening to radio station WBAI in Brooklyn, where the... it's not legal?
[00:38.660 --> 00:39.360]  Why not?
[00:39.440 --> 00:40.040]  Brooklyn's a city.
[00:40.480 --> 00:41.640]  All right, WBAI New York.
[00:41.780 --> 00:42.840]  That's what the transmitter is.
[00:42.920 --> 00:43.320]  That's legal.
[00:43.680 --> 00:46.420]  It's time, once again, for Off the Hook.
[00:46.980 --> 00:47.540]  There.
[00:51.870 --> 00:56.270]  The telephone keeps ringing, so I ripped it off the wall.
[00:57.250 --> 01:01.810]  I cut myself while shaving, now I can't make a call.
[01:02.430 --> 01:04.630]  We couldn't get much worse.
[01:07.530 --> 01:10.030]  Bum, did you bump for the best, it's back the worst.
[01:10.650 --> 01:13.530]  I hope that's understood, but did you move?
[02:36.310 --> 02:38.170]  And a very good evening to everybody.
[02:38.170 --> 02:40.290]  The program is Off the Hook.
[02:40.550 --> 02:43.790]  Emmanuel Goldstein here with you tonight, joined by Rob T.
[02:43.890 --> 02:44.350]  Firefly.
[02:44.550 --> 02:45.150]  Good evening.
[02:45.330 --> 02:45.730]  Alex.
[02:46.550 --> 02:47.450]  And Kyle.
[02:47.450 --> 02:47.530]  Kyle.
[02:47.950 --> 02:48.790]  Hello, hackers.
[02:49.930 --> 02:51.330]  It's been a while, hasn't it?
[02:51.370 --> 02:54.090]  We haven't been here in forever, it seems.
[02:54.910 --> 02:55.230]  Yes.
[02:55.490 --> 02:56.210]  It's been a few weeks.
[02:56.870 --> 02:58.110]  It's like we never left, though.
[02:58.430 --> 03:01.790]  Well, the good news is the fundraiser's over, so we don't have to worry about that.
[03:02.010 --> 03:04.250]  I think we're only on for one week of the fundraiser.
[03:05.610 --> 03:06.930]  But it was successful.
[03:06.930 --> 03:07.650]  We did well.
[03:07.650 --> 03:12.650]  And I want to thank the people who called in to pledge on the one week we were on.
[03:13.150 --> 03:16.790]  But, you know, we spent the time constructively.
[03:16.790 --> 03:19.530]  We did all kinds of other projects while we were off the air.
[03:19.590 --> 03:22.190]  But tonight we're on, day after election day.
[03:22.190 --> 03:23.910]  And just a word to people out there.
[03:24.110 --> 03:26.690]  You know, I know there's a mixture of feelings.
[03:26.890 --> 03:28.030]  People aren't sure what to feel.
[03:28.390 --> 03:31.250]  But the thing to remember, progress is slow.
[03:31.570 --> 03:32.650]  Progress is unpredictable.
[03:33.390 --> 03:35.110]  And it's not always what you want.
[03:36.270 --> 03:40.350]  And it doesn't always take you down the roads you expect to be going down.
[03:40.470 --> 03:42.050]  But it is inevitable.
[03:42.410 --> 03:44.030]  So try to remember that.
[03:44.350 --> 03:44.530]  All right.
[03:44.870 --> 03:45.230]  It's...
[03:45.770 --> 03:46.830]  There were some good results.
[03:47.050 --> 03:48.970]  And there were some not so good results.
[03:49.090 --> 03:53.210]  So many candidates that I was for just didn't make it.
[03:53.310 --> 03:53.890]  But you know what?
[03:54.650 --> 03:56.070]  They got a national stage.
[03:56.330 --> 03:58.530]  And that's going to serve them in a couple of years.
[04:00.130 --> 04:00.850]  This is true.
[04:00.850 --> 04:05.870]  And it's, as it always is, it's, you know, been something to watch.
[04:06.090 --> 04:08.190]  Something that affected us all.
[04:08.330 --> 04:15.550]  A lot of people were talking about this as though it was the most important midterm election in many of our lifetimes.
[04:15.630 --> 04:17.290]  And I think that's probably not hyperbole.
[04:17.410 --> 04:18.610]  It certainly felt like that.
[04:19.590 --> 04:23.050]  And yeah, we're mostly on the other side of it now.
[04:23.050 --> 04:25.750]  There are still hangers on, as there always are with these things.
[04:25.910 --> 04:27.450]  But it's...
[04:27.450 --> 04:29.590]  Things look considerably brighter, I think.
[04:29.590 --> 04:36.050]  You know, for now, just, I guess, sit back and relax.
[04:36.650 --> 04:38.950]  And try not to think about it for a while.
[04:39.150 --> 04:40.030]  Take some time off.
[04:40.510 --> 04:43.530]  Watch the president make a fool of himself at press conferences.
[04:43.750 --> 04:44.710]  What else can you do?
[04:44.970 --> 04:48.670]  Well, and people did vote, I would say.
[04:48.810 --> 04:52.830]  You know, that's a win in and of itself, is that it was cool.
[04:53.230 --> 04:55.830]  And people thought it was cool and cool enough to go and do.
[04:56.190 --> 04:56.470]  Yeah.
[04:56.570 --> 05:02.990]  And if you didn't get the result that you wanted, don't let that dissuade you from doing it again.
[05:03.490 --> 05:04.450]  Because that's how it works.
[05:05.150 --> 05:05.610]  All right.
[05:06.930 --> 05:07.250]  Sorry.
[05:07.330 --> 05:07.790]  Go ahead, Rob.
[05:07.870 --> 05:08.770]  This is true.
[05:08.930 --> 05:14.970]  And of course, as I think should be expected nowadays, there was a lot of technical difficulty, at least in this city.
[05:15.650 --> 05:22.350]  Um, a lot of people were reporting broken machines, things were backing up, um, where I voted, everything seemed to be going very smoothly.
[05:22.910 --> 05:33.870]  Um, but, uh, but yeah, there was, there was a picture going around on Twitter of, uh, of a voting machine with its USB stick exposed and a big button saying, uh, uh, close poll that, uh, was just within reach of the user.
[05:34.010 --> 05:36.710]  And they tweeted this, uh, saying, you know, should this be happening?
[05:36.930 --> 05:37.190]  Wow.
[05:37.410 --> 05:38.990]  But, um, you know, all kinds of interesting stuff.
[05:38.990 --> 05:43.110]  I think a big explanation going around, a technical explanation was that it was humid out.
[05:43.110 --> 05:49.270]  And so the ballots were slightly larger because the paper swells and the machines were not prepared for that.
[05:49.350 --> 05:55.950]  We would love to hear other people's, uh, um, experiences, reactions, uh, give us a call and just a little bit.
[05:56.030 --> 05:57.110]  Maybe we'll, uh, we'll hear some of them.
[05:57.130 --> 05:57.550]  Yes, Alex.
[05:59.570 --> 06:00.050]  Uh-huh.
[06:00.210 --> 06:00.310]  Yeah.
[06:01.010 --> 06:01.310]  Yeah.
[06:01.470 --> 06:02.470]  I, I saw that too.
[06:02.610 --> 06:03.350]  I noticed that.
[06:03.550 --> 06:05.430]  And, uh, I think that happened in a number of places.
[06:05.970 --> 06:09.450]  Um, but, uh, my experience was, was fairly smooth for the most part.
[06:09.550 --> 06:09.970]  What about you?
[06:10.070 --> 06:11.370]  I don't believe you just said that.
[06:11.590 --> 06:13.850]  Well, uh, Uh, no, it's true.
[06:14.010 --> 06:21.290]  Please tell us what, anything you notice technically or, uh, just, you know, the, the, uh, process itself, uh, or anything you heard.
[06:21.430 --> 06:21.570]  Right.
[06:21.650 --> 06:38.950]  We'd love to, um, get, uh, some ideas and maybe if you have ideas for, um, how we can vote in the future, that's always, uh, that's always something, uh, people come away with when, when they've done this thing and, uh, they aspire to, to, uh, rebuild it or recreate it or make it,
[06:38.970 --> 06:43.390]  make it, make it more advanced or, or, uh, uh, technologically, uh, updated.
[06:43.630 --> 06:46.990]  But, um, you know, it has to be a robust system.
[06:47.130 --> 06:49.830]  So maybe a fresh look at it will, will give people some ideas.
[06:50.130 --> 06:51.230]  But Kyle, you voted by mail.
[06:51.470 --> 06:54.690]  Uh, you vote in Washington state, but you voted here in New York.
[06:54.870 --> 06:58.910]  And that, that was extremely, um, um, smooth the way it, it, it, it worked.
[06:58.910 --> 07:00.490]  And I think that's the way it should work throughout the country.
[07:00.990 --> 07:01.310]  Yeah.
[07:01.550 --> 07:06.590]  Any of the states that have absentee systems, I don't know, Washington's had an absentee system for a really, really long time.
[07:06.590 --> 07:11.770]  As long as I can remember, I mean, my folks, my grandparents, you know, everybody was voting that way.
[07:11.950 --> 07:18.290]  So, um, yeah, you could still go to polling places, uh, but of course the, um, the absentee ballot gives you a lot of convenience.
[07:18.570 --> 07:22.170]  So if, um, if New York has a system like that, I'm not sure.
[07:22.210 --> 07:22.630]  I think they do.
[07:22.710 --> 07:25.090]  I think there's mail-in ballots and a variety of systems.
[07:25.170 --> 07:26.190]  They also have drop boxes.
[07:26.190 --> 07:30.370]  The other interesting thing about, uh, absentee this year was, uh, no postage.
[07:31.170 --> 07:31.570]  Really?
[07:31.790 --> 07:32.570]  Postage was paid.
[07:32.810 --> 07:32.930]  Wow.
[07:32.930 --> 07:38.390]  You did not have to buy a stamp this time, which was incredible and a, uh, new development, uh, for our absentee system.
[07:38.490 --> 07:39.350]  So I was pretty happy with that.
[07:39.390 --> 07:40.370]  That, that is awesome.
[07:40.390 --> 07:40.890]  No stamp.
[07:41.090 --> 07:42.730]  Sent it from New York and it was great.
[07:43.150 --> 07:43.550]  Interesting.
[07:43.790 --> 07:45.230]  And voting from home is cool too.
[07:45.450 --> 07:47.010]  And I, I really encourage people.
[07:47.130 --> 07:48.150]  I find voters guides.
[07:48.310 --> 07:52.750]  There's sort of the, you know, your parents voters guide, which the, uh, counties issue, but find a good one.
[07:52.750 --> 08:08.150]  And there's a lot of, um, people that, that, uh, write about the campaigns and talk to the different candidates and, you know, finding a good voters guide, talking to your friends and coming to a conclusion that way is, is I think really comfortable and you're not sort of on the spot in the polling station.
[08:08.370 --> 08:08.830]  Right, right.
[08:09.270 --> 08:10.910]  Now, Rob, uh, Alex, quickly.
[08:11.110 --> 08:11.210]  Yeah.
[08:12.750 --> 08:13.110]  Okay.
[08:13.210 --> 08:14.130]  Yeah, no, that's true.
[08:14.270 --> 08:15.290]  We'll probably get to that later.
[08:15.430 --> 08:22.230]  But Rob, you have something interesting, a story that, uh, uh, kind of, it's either a story or it's not a story, but it's breaking right now.
[08:22.330 --> 08:23.010]  What, what do you got?
[08:23.390 --> 08:32.370]  Well, um, there was something very interesting going around Twitter earlier this afternoon, um, regarding Georgia and, uh, Georgia's board of elections, because they also have absentee voting there.
[08:32.910 --> 08:46.010]  And, uh, someone had found on a government website, open to the, open to the public, open to any, for anyone to download was an Excel spreadsheet, which, uh, contained basically the entire database of their absentee voters.
[08:46.010 --> 08:59.770]  Um, it had their, their names, their addresses, um, their mailing addresses, if different than their physical, um, and, uh, their reasons for requesting an absentee ballot, uh, things like if you're elderly or disabled or military on duty somewhere or,
[08:59.770 --> 09:01.190]  um, things like that.
[09:01.430 --> 09:04.370]  And, uh, all this information was just open and available.
[09:04.750 --> 09:06.550]  Uh, how many people, it was, uh...
[09:06.550 --> 09:07.150]  Wait, wait, wait, hold on a second.
[09:07.230 --> 09:22.050]  This is absentee, it's not, there are a number of states, uh, New York is, is, is one of them where you can see, uh, the entire list of, of, uh, voters, uh, including address, including, uh, party registration, uh, but you're saying this is just absentee ballots.
[09:22.510 --> 09:28.830]  It's, uh, it seems to be the absentee voters, uh, 291,164 of them, um, apparently.
[09:29.190 --> 09:29.570]  And...
[09:29.570 --> 09:30.950]  And it has social security numbers?
[09:31.050 --> 09:32.270]  It did not have social security numbers.
[09:32.670 --> 09:32.970]  Okay.
[09:33.190 --> 09:33.990]  I heard that somewhere.
[09:34.110 --> 09:46.930]  No, that, that information was not there, but, uh, what it did have, and I have the list of columns here in the file was, uh, voter registration number, last name, first name, middle name, suffix to the name, uh, the full address, uh, the full, the full physical address,
[09:47.110 --> 09:58.890]  full mailing address, if different, application status, ballot status, uh, status reason, ballot issue date, ballot return date, ballot style, ballot assisted, uh, the designation reason issue, uh, challenged or provisional.
[09:59.050 --> 10:02.790]  Um, all this information was just out in one big Excel spreadsheet.
[10:02.810 --> 10:05.650]  And people were passing this around earlier going, is this a leak?
[10:05.750 --> 10:07.270]  Is this something that's not supposed to be out there?
[10:07.270 --> 10:11.030]  But they've just basically doxed 291,000 some odd voters.
[10:11.590 --> 10:13.410]  And the answer is, it's not a leak.
[10:13.610 --> 10:15.690]  Apparently, it's the way they do things there.
[10:16.090 --> 10:18.350]  Well, it's also the way they... I mean, they don't do it that way here.
[10:18.350 --> 10:19.710]  You have to ask for it.
[10:19.770 --> 10:20.530]  But there are other states.
[10:20.790 --> 10:22.870]  I think Vermont might be one of them, Rhode Island.
[10:23.510 --> 10:28.510]  There are some states where you can just FTP, literally, the voter registration list.
[10:29.150 --> 10:32.330]  Some states charge thousands of dollars for the same list.
[10:33.070 --> 10:34.970]  But it's different for every state.
[10:35.090 --> 10:36.110]  So this doesn't really surprise me.
[10:36.110 --> 10:41.490]  The only thing that surprises me is that they distinguish absentee ballots from everybody else.
[10:41.650 --> 10:44.650]  But there's probably a list of all the other people someplace as well.
[10:44.770 --> 10:45.690]  It seems to be.
[10:45.890 --> 10:50.370]  And, you know, I don't know the most... I don't know a whole lot about the law in Georgia.
[10:51.350 --> 10:53.530]  But this is very interesting.
[10:53.530 --> 11:01.610]  And because I don't think anyone... I don't think everyone who's on this list is available that... is aware that this information is freely available out there.
[11:01.610 --> 11:04.610]  And it kind of strikes me as a strange idea.
[11:04.830 --> 11:09.810]  I mean, this is basically the government publishing a list of, like, here's a bunch of people who are elderly and or disabled.
[11:09.810 --> 11:10.850]  And here are their addresses.
[11:11.150 --> 11:13.110]  And here's all this other information on that.
[11:13.190 --> 11:16.630]  This doesn't seem to be, like, I don't know, sensible information to be sharing.
[11:16.630 --> 11:17.810]  Or people that just aren't home.
[11:17.810 --> 11:19.050]  People who are traveling.
[11:19.310 --> 11:21.010]  And, you know, filed that way.
[11:21.470 --> 11:23.530]  It's... Yeah, it's definitely a security concern.
[11:23.530 --> 11:24.430]  It's a concern.
[11:25.290 --> 11:26.150]  It's unfortunate.
[11:26.410 --> 11:32.170]  I think that's kind of part of the evolution of how we handle these kinds of things.
[11:32.350 --> 11:39.530]  Like, to have computerized those people and organized them in such a way was one step sort of towards modernization.
[11:40.070 --> 11:52.910]  But I think the handling of this kinds of information... I mean, granted, some of it, and maybe Alex can add to that, but some of it is public record and ought to be available in a certain way.
[11:52.950 --> 12:00.770]  And I think there are probably state statutes that distinguish what exact information from that should remain public or not.
[12:00.870 --> 12:08.930]  But I think it's... I would liken it to medical records handling, which I think will probably be where a lot of security technology is...
[12:08.930 --> 12:19.790]  a lot of emphasis is in the future as we, you know, are reading people's thoughts and doing all kinds of other, you know, brilliant stuff with technology or their genes, you know, all these things.
[12:19.990 --> 12:22.810]  I think, you know, handling that data is going to become very important.
[12:22.950 --> 12:25.730]  You're seeing it already with, like, ancestry results and stuff.
[12:25.870 --> 12:26.230]  Right, right.
[12:26.230 --> 12:35.710]  You know, people just basically foisting their data, you know, their DNA to a company to basically do whatever they want with, you know, or within the confines of a contract.
[12:35.710 --> 12:51.010]  So I think, you know, data handling is an interesting area where, you know, voting information and verification could adopt some of those practices as it evolves from, you know, not being in a binder to now on a system, okay, now how are we going to handle it?
[12:51.050 --> 12:58.670]  How are we going to, you know, manipulate it and keep it updated and all that, you know, so on and so forth, operationally.
[12:58.690 --> 13:05.150]  I am curious, Alex's legal view on the availability of voter data by state.
[13:05.790 --> 13:06.750]  Any insight?
[13:10.970 --> 13:12.690]  Yeah, not really surprising, I guess.
[13:13.130 --> 13:13.730]  Yeah, that makes sense.
[13:13.890 --> 13:14.330]  Not does.
[13:14.510 --> 13:16.430]  But it's still rather shocking.
[13:16.650 --> 13:19.550]  It's still rather upsetting that that information is there.
[13:19.850 --> 13:22.110]  And I don't know.
[13:22.230 --> 13:24.510]  I just hope it doesn't dissuade people from voting.
[13:24.690 --> 13:25.650]  I mean, imagine...
[13:25.650 --> 13:25.870]  What's that?
[13:26.750 --> 13:27.970]  No, that's a good point.
[13:28.090 --> 13:32.410]  But, you know, if somebody knows their data is going to be in there...
[13:32.410 --> 13:36.610]  No, if somebody knows that, then they might say, I don't want to risk it.
[13:36.610 --> 13:43.210]  But, you know, there isn't any reason why people can't list a post office box as their address.
[13:43.210 --> 13:45.290]  I believe that still works.
[13:45.530 --> 13:57.490]  Well, and you see examples of roles being purged and so on because of inaccuracies and the alleged, you know, voter fraud, which, you know, maybe people are protecting themselves by not having entirely accurate information.
[13:57.630 --> 13:57.870]  Who knows?
[13:57.970 --> 14:08.750]  They realize it's public and thus take steps to obfuscate, you know, critical data, you know, where they're at or, you know, whatever it may be that they're protecting.
[14:09.030 --> 14:09.450]  Yes.
[14:10.610 --> 14:12.810]  Okay, we have other stories as well.
[14:13.330 --> 14:14.010]  Let's see.
[14:14.150 --> 14:16.530]  And a lot of these are kind of disturbing.
[14:16.810 --> 14:21.770]  A lot of them are, you know, either security-wise or creepy-wise.
[14:21.990 --> 14:29.510]  For instance, an AI lie detector is going to start questioning travelers in the European Union.
[14:29.690 --> 14:30.130]  That's right.
[14:30.190 --> 14:36.250]  A number of border-controlled checkpoints in the EU are about to get increasingly and unsettlingly futuristic.
[14:36.830 --> 14:45.870]  In Hungary, Latvia, and Greece, travelers will be given an automatic lie- or automated, rather, lie detection test by an animated AI border agent.
[14:46.070 --> 14:50.590]  The system is called iBorderControl and they spell control, C-T-R-L.
[14:50.770 --> 14:57.410]  It's part of a six-month pilot led by the Hungarian National Police at four different border-crossing points.
[14:57.510 --> 15:00.890]  And you know the Hungarian police take border-crossing seriously.
[15:00.890 --> 15:08.910]  We're employing existing and proven technologies, as well as novel ones, to empower border agents to increase the accuracy and efficiency of border checks.
[15:09.090 --> 15:14.390]  That's according to the project coordinator, George Baltadakis of European Dynamics in Luxembourg.
[15:15.430 --> 15:23.550]  iBorderControl's system will collect data that will move beyond biometrics and on to biomarkers of deceit.
[15:24.090 --> 15:24.550]  Weird.
[15:25.070 --> 15:30.270]  The virtual border control agent will ask travelers questions after they've passed through the checkpoint.
[15:30.970 --> 15:33.030]  Questions like, what's in your suitcase?
[15:33.310 --> 15:38.430]  And if you open the suitcase and show me what is inside, will it confirm that your answers were true?
[15:39.530 --> 15:41.290]  Well, I mean, who would answer no to that?
[15:42.770 --> 15:45.190]  Obviously, especially if it's a machine asking you.
[15:45.890 --> 15:48.990]  You know, I'm not about to cave under that kind of pressure.
[15:48.990 --> 15:51.810]  The system reportedly records travelers' faces.
[15:52.210 --> 15:53.090]  Oh.
[15:53.670 --> 15:58.670]  It records their faces using AI to analyze 38 micro gestures.
[15:59.250 --> 16:01.710]  I caught that micro gesture, Kyle.
[16:01.910 --> 16:02.990]  Caught that one.
[16:03.590 --> 16:05.190]  Scoring each response.
[16:05.410 --> 16:12.410]  The virtual agent is reportedly customized according to the traveler's gender, ethnicity, and language.
[16:13.330 --> 16:14.210]  Wow.
[16:14.210 --> 16:14.930]  So you're comfortable.
[16:15.750 --> 16:19.070]  For travelers who pass the test, they will receive...
[16:19.070 --> 16:20.870]  Okay, I'm going to let you guys guess.
[16:20.970 --> 16:21.550]  Alex, you first.
[16:23.230 --> 16:23.670]  Nope.
[16:23.990 --> 16:27.010]  Kyle, what will they receive if they pass the test?
[16:28.070 --> 16:33.970]  They'll receive a printed receipt verifying their correct response.
[16:34.090 --> 16:34.850]  And Rob, what's your guess?
[16:36.010 --> 16:37.630]  A gold medal for honesty.
[16:38.230 --> 16:39.130]  Okay, you're eliminated.
[16:39.330 --> 16:40.590]  Alex, that was a ridiculous answer.
[16:40.810 --> 16:42.610]  And Kyle, you're the closest.
[16:42.610 --> 16:46.870]  Not a receipt, but a QR code that lets them through the border.
[16:47.050 --> 16:47.770]  That's what you need.
[16:47.850 --> 16:50.470]  A QR code that lets you cross into another country.
[16:50.850 --> 16:58.110]  Now, if they don't pass, the virtual agent will reportedly get more serious.
[16:58.650 --> 17:04.930]  And the traveler will be handed off to a human agent who will be easily fooled by anything you say.
[17:04.930 --> 17:07.890]  No, they'll assess their report.
[17:08.030 --> 17:13.570]  According to new scientists, this pilot program won't, in its current state, prevent anyone's ability to cross the border.
[17:14.310 --> 17:16.910]  Okay, so that's, I guess, somewhat reassuring.
[17:17.270 --> 17:20.710]  That's because the program is pretty much still in the experimental phases.
[17:21.130 --> 17:28.570]  In fact, the automated lie detection system was modeled after another system created by some individuals from iBorderControl's team, but it was only tested on 30 people.
[17:28.790 --> 17:32.470]  And in that test, half of the people told the truth, while the other half lied to the virtual agent.
[17:32.730 --> 17:36.710]  It had about 76% accuracy rate, which is probably much better than the humans.
[17:37.170 --> 17:43.030]  That doesn't take into consideration the variances in being told to lie versus really lying.
[17:43.430 --> 17:48.070]  If you ask people to lie, they will do it differently and show very different behavioral cues.
[17:48.070 --> 17:52.370]  And if they truly lie, knowing that they may go to jail or face serious consequences if caught.
[17:52.510 --> 17:55.090]  It's fascinating, but it's also really scary.
[17:55.230 --> 17:55.450]  Rob?
[17:55.590 --> 18:02.010]  What really fascinates me about this is, as I understand it, and this is something that I follow with a bit of interest, though I am a layperson.
[18:02.170 --> 18:06.170]  I'd love to hear from any scientifically inclined listeners who know more on this issue.
[18:06.270 --> 18:10.170]  But as I understand it, lie detection technology is crap right now.
[18:10.630 --> 18:12.570]  I mean, polygraphs have never worked.
[18:12.790 --> 18:13.690]  They've always been a hoax.
[18:15.790 --> 18:18.630]  And there's no scientific basis for what's used there.
[18:18.770 --> 18:25.210]  It's just basically social engineering on the part of the operator of the test, trying to make the questioned person nervous.
[18:25.730 --> 18:35.150]  And with something like this, when basically it's a replicant showing up and giving you the Voight-Kampff test, that in itself is kind of intimidating if a machine is interrogating you.
[18:35.310 --> 18:42.730]  So I would really like to know more about what claims they're making about this technology and how proven any of it is.
[18:42.730 --> 18:45.730]  You know, I am so creeped out by this, but I want to play with it.
[18:45.830 --> 18:53.490]  And I've never taken a lie detector test, so I don't really know how to manipulate it or how to fool it or if I can even fool it.
[18:54.010 --> 19:04.330]  But I think this is something that hackers really need to get their hands dirty with somehow, you know, getting a hold of the hardware, the software, and simply trying all sorts of different things.
[19:04.470 --> 19:24.410]  But unfortunately, doing that also will help make it better, as is the case with any bit of technology that hackers play with, whether it's bank security or the latest operating system or a phone system, you know, experimentation and security holes and breaking things and fixing things inevitably makes for a better product.
[19:24.430 --> 19:27.370]  This is something that really worries me.
[19:27.430 --> 19:30.250]  And I don't think it's something that we can prevent.
[19:30.450 --> 19:36.910]  I think that you could argue the deployment of it at all is a step towards improving it to something that is widely deployed.
[19:36.910 --> 19:54.850]  They'll just use whatever kind of silly questions to maybe argue their borders are more efficient or faster or something like that, but then deploy it widely and start asking questions about your religious ideology or perhaps, you know, how you feel about certain laws or injustices.
[19:54.850 --> 19:59.470]  And, you know, that to me, I think, is a lot more subjective.
[19:59.790 --> 20:17.450]  And to throw algorithms at it and not really be open about how it's processing that, I think you're kind of getting a little ahead of things as far as what is appropriate for people who are, you know, have a legitimate reason to be traveling.
[20:17.450 --> 20:37.270]  And it's just, I think, a bad practice for the EU in preventing any kind of entry under these kinds of technological schemes instead of, you know, enjoying sort of the freedom of movement they have now.
[20:37.390 --> 20:42.410]  It just, it's kind of a scary precedent and I think will hinder things a little bit more than help.
[20:42.410 --> 20:52.210]  Where it is is irrelevant because if it's not the EU, it's going to be China or it's going to be the United States, it's going to be someplace, this technology is going to just keep marching towards us.
[20:52.390 --> 20:56.250]  And, you know, I don't want to be pessimistic, but I think there's precious little we can do about it.
[20:57.050 --> 20:59.050]  This is where we seem to be going.
[20:59.290 --> 21:06.430]  Yeah, the EU already has facial recognitions or does take a picture in some of the automated lanes.
[21:06.590 --> 21:07.930]  I think you've used some of those.
[21:08.550 --> 21:11.230]  There has been the global entry system in the US.
[21:11.230 --> 21:18.190]  We saw coming back into the US, they have kiosks now at customs and border protection at the various airports here in New York.
[21:18.190 --> 21:21.870]  And they said they weren't going to be taking pictures of American citizens and now they do.
[21:22.010 --> 21:25.590]  They don't fingerprint you and use the webcam at the counter.
[21:25.810 --> 21:28.550]  That's for people who are not citizens.
[21:28.550 --> 21:32.910]  But now citizens are required, again, for sort of speed and efficiency.
[21:33.270 --> 21:35.730]  You know, it's still slow as I'll get out.
[21:35.890 --> 21:40.750]  But you go to a kiosk, it prints out a receipt with things and that supposedly speeds up.
[21:40.870 --> 21:43.010]  You still go through and talk to the guy and have your stamp.
[21:43.010 --> 21:50.630]  The other thing is I've seen a lot of commercials and I saw this when I was in Colorado, but a thing called Clear or something, they're kind of rebranding it.
[21:50.810 --> 21:55.330]  So the global entry system was more of a homeland security offshoot.
[21:55.450 --> 21:59.930]  And now I think they've changed it to like ClearPoint or ClearCheck or whatever.
[22:00.070 --> 22:14.310]  And they're airing ads to kind of make it glossy and like a travel thing and just something we're really comfortable with, you know, mind you, it is, you know, machines and all of this capturing of imagery and so on.
[22:14.310 --> 22:16.390]  I enjoy waiting online to get into the damn country.
[22:16.570 --> 22:21.850]  You know, it gives me a chance to unwind and start acclimating to being back here.
[22:22.210 --> 22:25.270]  Some people breeze right through, but many don't.
[22:25.970 --> 22:26.310]  All right.
[22:27.890 --> 22:28.370]  Getting...
[22:29.670 --> 22:30.890]  People aren't hearing Alex.
[22:31.250 --> 22:33.430]  Alex, wait a minute.
[22:33.550 --> 22:34.490]  He's not even here.
[22:34.490 --> 22:36.150]  Is that why we're not hearing him?
[22:36.630 --> 22:37.030]  Oh.
[22:37.510 --> 22:38.650]  Oh, I didn't check the chair.
[22:38.770 --> 22:39.210]  Yeah, you're right.
[22:39.850 --> 22:40.250]  Yeah.
[22:40.590 --> 22:40.930]  He is...
[22:40.930 --> 22:41.870]  How did we miss that?
[22:41.950 --> 22:43.010]  No, I'm sorry, folks.
[22:43.110 --> 22:49.330]  Well, you see, we're scripted here and we were just handing it off to Alex and we really should wear headphones.
[22:49.450 --> 22:50.670]  That wouldn't we hear each other.
[22:51.010 --> 22:51.690]  I'm sorry.
[22:52.030 --> 22:53.170]  Alex apparently isn't here.
[22:53.230 --> 22:53.670]  Where is he?
[22:54.150 --> 22:54.610]  Does anybody know?
[22:54.890 --> 22:55.130]  Huh.
[22:55.450 --> 22:55.910]  All right.
[22:56.490 --> 23:02.990]  So just on your script, just scratch out the lines with Alex on them and we'll try to get...
[23:03.410 --> 23:03.770]  Okay.
[23:03.890 --> 23:06.170]  This next story was all about Alex stuff.
[23:06.310 --> 23:07.270]  I thought he was reading the story.
[23:07.550 --> 23:08.510]  Yeah, he was supposed to.
[23:08.650 --> 23:08.930]  All right.
[23:09.030 --> 23:09.650]  No, we'll move on.
[23:09.910 --> 23:10.050]  Okay.
[23:11.510 --> 23:11.870]  Headphones.
[23:12.030 --> 23:13.190]  We got to bring headphones next time.
[23:13.390 --> 23:13.490]  Okay.
[23:13.490 --> 23:16.650]  And, you know, read over the script before the show.
[23:17.190 --> 23:17.730]  I'm sorry.
[23:17.730 --> 23:24.750]  Um, we have, uh, another creepy thing, uh, this time from Facebook, which, uh, basically has all kinds of creepy things.
[23:25.310 --> 23:33.030]  Um, they have a system that, uh, suggests ready for this new friends based on who you have stood near to.
[23:33.310 --> 23:34.230]  I'm not kidding.
[23:34.390 --> 23:35.150]  I could not make this up.
[23:35.350 --> 23:43.950]  The social network could use the feature to match you up with people on the train in your office or at a nightclub, even after you've left.
[23:44.770 --> 23:47.430]  Yeah, it's, it's pretty terrifying.
[23:47.430 --> 23:54.470]  It was revealed in a patent that was won by Facebook in the USA and spotted by our friends at the mirror.
[23:54.470 --> 23:58.170]  The feature works by using existing technology inside, guess what?
[23:58.250 --> 23:58.850]  Your smartphone.
[23:59.170 --> 24:08.490]  Uh, this includes common features like Bluetooth or near, near field communication, NFC, the tech that powers contactless Apple pay or Android pay payments.
[24:08.650 --> 24:14.050]  Uh, it could also measure signal strength, allowing Facebook to pinpoint exactly how close you are to another person.
[24:14.230 --> 24:17.830]  Hey, it's great for stalkers or for tracking stalkers or all sorts of things like that.
[24:18.250 --> 24:25.870]  Um, Facebook has moved from cybersecurity blunder to cybersecurity blunder in 2018 and shows no sign of slowing.
[24:26.870 --> 24:30.010]  Uh, but I like how they just throw that into the story.
[24:30.130 --> 24:42.670]  Uh, the application, uh, however reads under conventional approaches, a first user who desires to connect with a second user usually knows the second user's name, contact information, or at least has some level of mutual connection with the second user.
[24:43.110 --> 24:49.210]  Facebook says that if a user forgets to obtain another person's contact info, then it can be challenging or inefficient to find that person on the app later.
[24:49.410 --> 24:55.350]  During their meeting, the first user and the second user forgot to obtain each other's full names and contact information.
[24:55.750 --> 25:02.290]  Facebook explained furthermore, the first user and second user do not have any mutual connections that are readily recognizable or apparent to each other.
[25:02.810 --> 25:07.350]  Thus, the opportunity for the first and second users to connect can be lost.
[25:07.750 --> 25:08.710]  Hey, you know what that is?
[25:08.770 --> 25:09.230]  That's life.
[25:09.370 --> 25:09.970]  That's what happens.
[25:10.110 --> 25:12.490]  And that's, that's what the back of the village voice was created for.
[25:12.550 --> 25:13.950]  So you can say, Hey, I saw you on the subway.
[25:14.050 --> 25:15.770]  You were wearing a red shirt.
[25:15.950 --> 25:16.510]  Contact me.
[25:16.850 --> 25:21.290]  Isn't this like a whole section of a Craigslist, like misconnections and stuff, you know?
[25:21.290 --> 25:21.630]  Yeah.
[25:21.830 --> 25:27.990]  And instead of like awkwardly asking someone for their phone number or contact info in whatever context.
[25:27.990 --> 25:28.790]  We don't need it.
[25:28.870 --> 25:29.930]  We have the back page of the village voice.
[25:30.110 --> 25:30.930]  We don't need this.
[25:31.130 --> 25:31.350]  Yeah.
[25:31.550 --> 25:32.870]  So that's...
[25:33.410 --> 25:34.070]  Oh, it did?
[25:34.930 --> 25:35.650]  I'm sorry.
[25:35.650 --> 25:36.450]  I didn't realize that.
[25:36.830 --> 25:42.950]  Another thing is it's enabling us to be more forgetful and less, use less of your brain so you can fit more ads.
[25:43.110 --> 25:43.310]  Yay.
[25:43.990 --> 25:44.390]  Yeah.
[25:44.650 --> 25:44.750]  Yeah.
[25:44.870 --> 25:46.210]  I'm sorry about the village voice.
[25:46.290 --> 25:47.230]  I didn't know they weren't around anymore.
[25:47.230 --> 25:48.450]  Uh, okay.
[25:48.570 --> 25:53.670]  Well, uh, yeah, I guess this is a way that Facebook can make sure that you meet the people that you might be trying to avoid.
[25:53.910 --> 25:58.910]  Uh, you know, if you walk away from somebody, uh, maybe there's a reason for that.
[25:59.090 --> 26:02.230]  Uh, they're going to try and, um, and, and, and connect you.
[26:02.390 --> 26:03.050]  I don't know.
[26:03.130 --> 26:05.290]  It's, uh, I'm not a Facebook fan.
[26:05.450 --> 26:11.190]  I'm not a fan of, uh, of, uh, smartphone apps that, um, invade your, your privacy.
[26:11.350 --> 26:15.310]  I'm not a fan of having voter registration displayed to people, uh, everywhere.
[26:15.970 --> 26:22.770]  I'm not a fan just about anything we're talking about cybernetic, uh, um, border agents, uh, interrogating you.
[26:23.210 --> 26:27.230]  I don't know that there are a lot of, um, really creepy, negative things going on.
[26:27.350 --> 26:27.630]  Rob.
[26:27.810 --> 26:30.030]  You know, I, I love the city's public transit system.
[26:30.130 --> 26:44.710]  I use it just about every day, but, uh, I, I'm not, I'm not a fan of the idea that, uh, Facebook is going to start, uh, building a profile on me based on which of my fellow rail enthusiasts I happen to be sitting next to because, you know, a lot of them smell like soup and I don't want to be friends with them.
[26:45.270 --> 26:45.390]  Yeah.
[26:45.530 --> 26:47.070]  And how is that practical?
[26:47.450 --> 26:57.310]  Like you are in many contexts standing next to someone, um, there should be some sort of exchange where there's a willingness to be associated with you.
[26:57.390 --> 27:07.170]  But even in the best of cases, I, I can just envision being connected with people that I really, truly don't want to be around at all.
[27:07.170 --> 27:24.050]  Like if you've ever used anything that sort of matches you up or, or kind of, uh, picks, uh, friends and, and, and sort of sorts information or, or does anything and maybe dating sites and, and, or, um, uh, other kinds of, um, uh, things that can kind of correlate you,
[27:24.190 --> 27:26.450]  uh, based on your interests and so on.
[27:26.650 --> 27:30.010]  It just, it's just, you know, it doesn't always work.
[27:30.130 --> 27:31.510]  In fact, most of the time it doesn't work.
[27:31.510 --> 27:37.710]  It's still sort of, uh, based on if humans can cooperate and, and, and get along.
[27:37.910 --> 27:38.750]  Does that, does that make sense?
[27:38.830 --> 27:40.710]  I mean, I could just see so many false positives.
[27:40.850 --> 27:46.230]  It would be, it would be annoying that you'd have people like maybe chasing you just because you've been out a lot.
[27:46.510 --> 27:47.690]  Yeah, yeah, exactly.
[27:47.930 --> 27:53.930]  And, uh, uh, just because someone's standing near you or has stood near you doesn't mean you want to have anything to do with them.
[27:54.050 --> 27:57.610]  I can think of so many instances of that, uh, that, uh, simply would not apply.
[27:58.090 --> 28:02.190]  Um, but you know, we, we have, we have these, uh, they're still fun toys.
[28:02.310 --> 28:03.430]  We have them, we can play with them.
[28:03.570 --> 28:11.850]  And I think, you know, as hackers, what we should be doing is figuring out ways of breaking them, ways of fooling them, ways of making them act in a manner they weren't intended.
[28:12.010 --> 28:12.950]  There's nothing wrong with that.
[28:13.030 --> 28:14.710]  You don't have to give Facebook your real info.
[28:15.010 --> 28:18.890]  You know, you, you don't have to, uh, um, tell your smartphone where you really are.
[28:19.010 --> 28:19.670]  You can lie.
[28:19.850 --> 28:21.170]  You can lie to these apps.
[28:21.330 --> 28:24.910]  You can lie to these things that are demanding all your information because that's what it's about.
[28:24.910 --> 28:29.090]  No matter what it is that you're signing into, they want your info.
[28:29.350 --> 28:30.950]  They want everything about you.
[28:31.010 --> 28:36.050]  They want to know what movies you watch, what newspapers you read, where you live, where you go, where work is.
[28:36.470 --> 28:38.210]  Don't tell Waze where you live.
[28:38.430 --> 28:43.770]  Tell Waze you live someplace else, you know, and have directions to the White House every time you say go home.
[28:43.910 --> 28:44.670]  You know how to get home.
[28:44.670 --> 28:46.150]  You don't need it to tell you that.
[28:46.510 --> 28:53.250]  And you can simply put in another destination if you want to know what the traffic is like that's beyond your home and simply turn it off before you get there.
[28:53.250 --> 28:54.830]  There are little ways like that.
[28:54.970 --> 28:59.950]  And every single app has a way that you can bypass it and yet still get the benefits of it.
[29:00.110 --> 29:01.050]  And that's just within the interface.
[29:01.230 --> 29:03.730]  I mean, you could reverse engineer... I'm not giving legal advice.
[29:03.870 --> 29:04.670]  Maybe Alex can comment.
[29:04.810 --> 29:06.270]  But, you know, it's about...
[29:06.270 --> 29:06.870]  Cross that out.
[29:06.870 --> 29:07.430]  He's not here.
[29:07.590 --> 29:08.030]  Oh, okay.
[29:08.930 --> 29:12.550]  But it's about, you know, taking it apart, seeing how it works.
[29:12.690 --> 29:18.830]  If they're not being transparent about what they're doing to you and with your information, take it apart and tell people.
[29:18.830 --> 29:20.570]  Tell people what they're doing.
[29:20.750 --> 29:23.610]  And also, you know, make something new.
[29:23.730 --> 29:24.450]  Make something better.
[29:24.750 --> 29:27.110]  I want to see people, you know, you say we have these toys.
[29:27.250 --> 29:31.590]  I want to see people using these things and actually building powerful stuff.
[29:31.730 --> 29:35.870]  Not just to create the killer app that's going to change your life.
[29:35.990 --> 29:39.830]  Why don't you just change your life with the technology?
[29:39.830 --> 29:44.930]  There's massively powerful computer chips inside these things.
[29:45.130 --> 29:53.850]  And people are just sort of, you know, okay with whatever Web 2.0 company just tossing an app at you and that's it.
[29:53.970 --> 29:55.650]  That's you using a computer.
[29:55.810 --> 29:57.390]  I mean, it just seems so stupid.
[29:57.570 --> 29:57.670]  Yeah.
[29:57.810 --> 30:01.190]  Things that bother me, people take these things way too seriously.
[30:01.190 --> 30:06.150]  They live in fear of being kicked off of Twitter for violating terms of service or something like that.
[30:06.150 --> 30:06.710]  So what?
[30:06.830 --> 30:09.610]  Violate their terms of service and come back as somebody else.
[30:09.950 --> 30:11.470]  They're not the police.
[30:11.570 --> 30:12.250]  They can't look over you.
[30:12.310 --> 30:13.150]  They can't figure it out.
[30:13.350 --> 30:17.530]  You know, it's a colossal waste of time, most of the time on that platform anyway.
[30:17.950 --> 30:22.070]  So if you lose one identity, you simply come back as another.
[30:22.230 --> 30:27.370]  If what you're saying has any relevance, then, you know, people will hear it.
[30:27.510 --> 30:27.770]  Maybe.
[30:28.010 --> 30:32.690]  Of course, the Twitter algorithm is something I don't even want to get into because it does filter a lot of people out.
[30:32.690 --> 30:35.270]  And if you're a celebrity, yeah, people listen to you.
[30:35.330 --> 30:38.850]  But if you're just a regular person, it kind of gets erased.
[30:38.850 --> 30:40.390]  And that's another issue.
[30:40.550 --> 30:41.690]  But it's an issue because...
[30:42.270 --> 30:43.670]  People give that power to them.
[30:43.770 --> 30:44.130]  Exactly.
[30:44.390 --> 30:44.570]  Yeah.
[30:44.730 --> 30:45.750]  And you don't have to.
[30:45.870 --> 30:46.750]  You don't have to at all.
[30:46.850 --> 30:47.950]  So let's break these things.
[30:48.090 --> 30:49.330]  Let's twist them.
[30:49.390 --> 30:50.530]  Make them work in different ways.
[30:50.730 --> 30:53.350]  Like, could you imagine BBS is having that much power back in the day?
[30:53.550 --> 30:53.770]  Oh, wow.
[30:53.910 --> 30:57.190]  You know, people just leave, you know, and if they got banned or whatever, they find another.
[30:57.390 --> 30:58.150]  They make their own BBS.
[30:58.330 --> 30:59.070]  They start their own BBS.
[30:59.270 --> 30:59.630]  Exactly.
[30:59.630 --> 31:00.870]  So start your own Twitter.
[31:01.010 --> 31:01.750]  Start your own Facebook.
[31:02.010 --> 31:02.570]  Doesn't matter.
[31:03.070 --> 31:07.570]  The thing that really bugs me is that people are using these platforms as their primary means of communication.
[31:07.890 --> 31:08.050]  Yeah.
[31:08.270 --> 31:10.690]  And abandoning something as neutral as email.
[31:10.950 --> 31:11.070]  Yeah.
[31:11.070 --> 31:11.310]  Email.
[31:11.370 --> 31:11.910]  For God's sake.
[31:12.030 --> 31:13.050]  It's so simple.
[31:13.230 --> 31:14.330]  Anybody can send email.
[31:14.690 --> 31:18.350]  But I'm knowing increasingly numbers of people that say, I don't read email.
[31:18.350 --> 31:19.330]  I only read Facebook.
[31:19.630 --> 31:20.390]  Well, guess what?
[31:20.450 --> 31:23.630]  You're not going to be reading anything from me because I don't go on Facebook.
[31:23.630 --> 31:30.010]  And it's, you know, there's a reason for that because they are a company that wants all of your information.
[31:30.330 --> 31:31.430]  Email is not a company.
[31:31.610 --> 31:33.510]  Email is a way of communicating.
[31:33.650 --> 31:36.750]  And it's something that you can access from almost any platform.
[31:36.750 --> 31:43.830]  So it's really disturbing to see people abandoning something like that in favor of a corporate platform.
[31:44.070 --> 31:44.450]  Yeah.
[31:44.490 --> 31:45.030]  I'll just add.
[31:45.130 --> 31:48.570]  I mean, it's the distinction between a platform and a protocol.
[31:48.930 --> 31:50.290]  Email is a protocol.
[31:50.650 --> 31:53.870]  It works on multiple platforms, across platforms.
[31:54.570 --> 32:03.130]  And these individual platforms are, yes, using communications features such as a chat or whatever unified crap they throw in there.
[32:03.310 --> 32:05.170]  But it's a closed system.
[32:05.270 --> 32:06.610]  It is not an open protocol.
[32:07.310 --> 32:07.550]  Exactly.
[32:07.710 --> 32:07.850]  Rob?
[32:08.110 --> 32:08.270]  Yeah.
[32:08.770 --> 32:10.330]  Like Mastodon is a protocol.
[32:10.670 --> 32:16.970]  It's sort of a clone of Twitter in some ways, but a decentralized protocol beyond that.
[32:17.110 --> 32:18.030]  And it's available everywhere.
[32:18.290 --> 32:22.050]  And you can find us on it at hackerradioshowatmastodon.social.
[32:23.310 --> 32:25.830]  Maintained by the same crack staff who does our Twittering.
[32:25.990 --> 32:28.190]  So yeah, it's out there.
[32:28.270 --> 32:28.790]  It exists.
[32:29.010 --> 32:30.190]  And it's gathering steam.
[32:30.410 --> 32:33.610]  Well, how would you describe it as different from, say, Twitter?
[32:34.250 --> 32:39.310]  Well, you've got more characters to play with, text-wise, not people-wise yet.
[32:40.150 --> 32:48.070]  And you basically have a lot more control over what you put up and who can see it, who can't see it, you know, things like that.
[32:48.190 --> 32:52.150]  And also, it's just not under the control of a for-profit company.
[32:52.330 --> 32:57.790]  It's under the control of whoever puts up that instance, whoever, you know, and if one instance goes down, you can put up another.
[32:58.130 --> 33:03.470]  It's like a more decentralized system instead of maintained by a company like Twitter.
[33:03.770 --> 33:06.690]  This would be maybe more like a peer-to-peer version.
[33:06.690 --> 33:07.710]  Pretty much, yeah.
[33:07.870 --> 33:08.130]  Essentially.
[33:08.490 --> 33:14.270]  People put up servers for it all over the place, and the servers interact with one another, and boom, you've got a network.
[33:14.510 --> 33:17.510]  And if you unplug something someplace, does it go away?
[33:17.650 --> 33:18.990]  Is there a central point anywhere?
[33:19.250 --> 33:19.470]  Nope.
[33:19.590 --> 33:24.350]  You can't flick any one switch and have Mastodon go down or ban someone from Mastodon.
[33:25.350 --> 33:26.710]  So it's out there.
[33:26.750 --> 33:27.330]  It's decentralized.
[33:27.530 --> 33:30.130]  And the users are the controllers, basically.
[33:30.530 --> 33:30.770]  All right.
[33:30.850 --> 33:31.330]  Give that a shot.
[33:31.390 --> 33:31.990]  What's the address again?
[33:31.990 --> 33:37.590]  It's at HackerRadioShow, at Mastodon, like the ancient elephant, .social.
[33:38.530 --> 33:38.990]  Okay.
[33:39.150 --> 33:42.290]  And you can get to that on any... .social is a top-level domain.
[33:42.510 --> 33:43.470]  It is, yes.
[33:43.470 --> 33:43.850]  Wow.
[33:44.010 --> 33:44.170]  How about that?
[33:44.170 --> 33:45.090]  I think I'm going to check that out.
[33:46.310 --> 33:46.770]  Okay.
[33:46.770 --> 33:49.870]  Here's one more creepy story, and then we'll move on to phone calls.
[33:50.290 --> 33:54.130]  347-335-0818 is our telephone number.
[33:55.710 --> 34:05.810]  And this reassuring story comes from China, where gate recognition is going to be used to ID people.
[34:05.950 --> 34:07.670]  They've begun deploying this new surveillance tool.
[34:08.310 --> 34:16.370]  It's software that uses people's body shapes and how they walk to identify them, even when their faces are hidden from cameras.
[34:16.370 --> 34:28.830]  So if you're thinking of doing all kinds of facial distortions and twitches to fool the AI robot at the Hungarian border, well, the gate recognition software will get you in short order.
[34:29.130 --> 34:31.830]  It's already used by police on the streets of Beijing and Shanghai.
[34:32.330 --> 34:37.510]  Gate recognition is part of a push across China to develop artificial intelligence and data-driven surveillance.
[34:37.510 --> 34:41.110]  That's raising concern about how far the technology will go.
[34:42.590 --> 34:48.390]  Huang Yongzen, the CEO of Waitrix, says that its system can identify people from up to 50 meters.
[34:48.390 --> 34:53.410]  That's 165 feet away, even with their back turned or face covered.
[34:54.310 --> 34:55.090]  Really, Huang?
[34:55.190 --> 34:56.450]  Even if they're standing still?
[34:57.170 --> 34:57.730]  Probably.
[34:58.030 --> 34:58.590]  Oh, boy.
[34:58.970 --> 35:04.450]  This can fill a gap in facial recognition, which needs close-up, high-resolution images of a person's face to work.
[35:04.450 --> 35:15.990]  So, you know, if you just go out with a paper bag over your head and get on a skateboard or something, maybe you can avoid being detected and monitored, but it's getting increasingly hard.
[35:16.470 --> 35:34.150]  I'm thinking maybe reprogram your robotic exoskeleton to have, like, sort of a theme so maybe one day it walks a certain way and then you can, like, reskin your personality of the suit to walk another way and obfuscate your actual gait.
[35:34.450 --> 35:36.890]  Well, this really creeps me out so much.
[35:36.990 --> 35:40.930]  You don't need people's cooperation for us to be able to recognize their identity, they say.
[35:41.570 --> 35:52.010]  Gait analysis can't be fooled by simply limping, walking with splayed feet, or hunching over because we're analyzing all the features of an entire body.
[35:54.010 --> 35:55.770]  And let's just leave it there.
[35:56.090 --> 35:57.250]  We have a phone call.
[35:57.330 --> 35:57.610]  Good evening.
[35:57.710 --> 35:58.210]  You're on Off the Hook.
[35:59.130 --> 35:59.610]  Hi, guys.
[35:59.670 --> 35:59.970]  How are you doing?
[36:00.010 --> 36:00.390]  Welcome back.
[36:00.390 --> 36:00.970]  Thanks.
[36:01.310 --> 36:02.130]  It's good to be back.
[36:02.310 --> 36:04.670]  I'm not so good to read these stories, but good to be back.
[36:05.950 --> 36:06.950]  Everything you're saying is true.
[36:07.330 --> 36:09.610]  Everything you're saying is true.
[36:09.710 --> 36:21.830]  I just don't understand all these apps that you download, like Skype and all these apps, whether it's for a prepaid debit card, they ought to ask you, oh, do you want us to access your photos, this, that, and the other.
[36:22.190 --> 36:24.990]  I'm like, is that necessary to access that?
[36:25.390 --> 36:26.870]  No, you don't need that.
[36:26.870 --> 36:27.910]  I understand exactly what you're saying.
[36:28.270 --> 36:30.710]  But you can't opt out of it if you want to use it.
[36:30.910 --> 36:31.430]  You know, that's...
[36:31.430 --> 36:32.050]  That's one thing.
[36:33.170 --> 36:35.310]  You can't use it on demand.
[36:35.510 --> 36:38.350]  Like, say, oh, I want to take a picture of a check with my banking app.
[36:38.470 --> 36:40.310]  You know, you can't give them permission once.
[36:40.310 --> 36:48.350]  You have to give them permission for the entirety of the use of the app, which I think is sort of annoying if you want to maybe be able to toggle that.
[36:48.450 --> 36:50.230]  So you de-install the app every single time you use it.
[36:50.230 --> 36:50.950]  That would be the other way.
[36:51.030 --> 36:51.190]  Yeah.
[36:53.050 --> 36:53.810]  Anything else, caller?
[36:54.990 --> 36:56.490]  Yeah, what do you think about...
[36:56.490 --> 36:58.910]  Well, they have this company based out in Ohio.
[36:59.690 --> 37:01.270]  It's called Samco.
[37:01.510 --> 37:04.730]  And they specialize in automated check cashing.
[37:04.910 --> 37:06.950]  They have them in parts of Ohio.
[37:06.990 --> 37:09.850]  They have these check cashing kiosks.
[37:10.130 --> 37:11.350]  What do you think about those?
[37:12.670 --> 37:14.010]  Do you know how they work?
[37:15.210 --> 37:25.350]  Well, you put the check in, actually your ID and fingerprint validates your identity, and then it validates the authenticity of the check.
[37:25.590 --> 37:27.010]  What's the commission?
[37:28.630 --> 37:29.930]  Probably pretty hefty, right?
[37:30.390 --> 37:31.010]  Even though it's not human.
[37:31.010 --> 37:34.230]  Yeah, they don't have that in the Northeast Corridor yet.
[37:34.570 --> 37:34.730]  Okay.
[37:34.930 --> 37:36.850]  Samco is, I think, a new company.
[37:37.350 --> 37:42.510]  And actually, they're expanding in a few states out in the Midwest, Ohio, and California.
[37:42.510 --> 37:45.430]  So it basically means you have to give your fingerprint over to them.
[37:45.710 --> 37:46.750]  So there's that.
[37:48.030 --> 37:48.510]  Yeah.
[37:49.710 --> 37:50.190]  Biometrics.
[37:50.570 --> 37:50.810]  Yeah.
[37:51.890 --> 37:56.670]  You're giving away all kinds of bits of your identity for the sake of convenience.
[37:56.970 --> 37:57.230]  Right.
[37:57.230 --> 37:59.310]  And I can't speak to this particular company.
[37:59.350 --> 38:00.030]  I haven't heard of them.
[38:00.130 --> 38:11.050]  But I know historically, the check cashing, the non-bank check cashing industry, has very, very much been prone to operation by, I guess, predatory sorts of organizations and businesses.
[38:11.050 --> 38:16.670]  Because the industry itself takes advantage of people who, for one reason or another, can't or won't have a bank account.
[38:17.050 --> 38:19.110]  And think of the data sets that creates.
[38:19.310 --> 38:19.590]  Absolutely.
[38:19.890 --> 38:20.950]  People who use...
[38:20.950 --> 38:24.990]  I'm not saying a class of people who have to check cash, but I kind of am.
[38:25.130 --> 38:27.070]  That is what the data would say.
[38:27.210 --> 38:32.590]  This is a block of people who use these types of systems and correlating all that verification stuff.
[38:33.030 --> 38:33.050]  Right.
[38:33.130 --> 38:37.170]  And automating more of it does not seem like a path towards safety, I think.
[38:38.610 --> 38:39.390]  Anything else, caller?
[38:39.770 --> 38:40.210]  All right.
[38:40.310 --> 38:40.830]  Thanks for your call.
[38:40.910 --> 38:41.450]  See you next week.
[38:41.750 --> 38:41.910]  All right.
[38:41.910 --> 38:42.270]  Take care.
[38:43.710 --> 38:45.230]  347-335-0818.
[38:45.410 --> 38:50.430]  If you have anything to say about technology, privacy, or the elections, feel free to sound off.
[38:50.750 --> 38:53.130]  347-335-0818.
[38:53.330 --> 38:56.050]  We still only have one phone line, so we have to wait for the call to come in.
[38:56.110 --> 38:57.090]  But we did not have to wait long.
[38:57.190 --> 38:57.570]  Here it is.
[38:57.650 --> 38:57.930]  Good evening.
[38:58.090 --> 38:58.910]  You're on Off the Hook.
[38:59.230 --> 39:00.170]  Thank you very much.
[39:00.190 --> 39:02.390]  I would just like to offer...
[39:03.430 --> 39:05.170]  I wanted to jog your memories.
[39:05.170 --> 39:13.170]  Do you remember the Michael Chertoff x-ray scanner in the airports?
[39:13.170 --> 39:15.610]  Are they still using that anywhere?
[39:15.930 --> 39:16.290]  No.
[39:16.430 --> 39:20.750]  They've mostly moved over to millimeter wave, although you can still opt out.
[39:20.750 --> 39:27.830]  And I still do that as much as I can and refuse to go through millimeter wave just on the premise.
[39:28.510 --> 39:29.550]  But I believe...
[39:29.550 --> 39:29.750]  You can't pat down.
[39:29.750 --> 39:30.730]  Yeah, yeah.
[39:30.830 --> 39:31.810]  It's kind of invasive.
[39:32.510 --> 39:45.450]  But sometimes they have them and you can just go through the metal detector, the old school style metal detectors, and they just basically, per their discretion, send you one way or the other.
[39:46.090 --> 39:50.830]  If I'm not directed that way, I try to opt out because I think it's a pain.
[39:50.830 --> 39:59.950]  And I just don't like the idea of, you know, like basically an x-ray image of your body floating around in their systems.
[40:00.130 --> 40:03.690]  As much as they try to, like, talk about how anonymous it is.
[40:03.730 --> 40:03.750]  Benign.
[40:04.110 --> 40:04.410]  Yeah.
[40:04.690 --> 40:12.230]  It's like, you know, I didn't create this security problem and you want me to jump into all this technology you're throwing at the problem.
[40:12.870 --> 40:14.550]  I'm not going to go willingly, thanks.
[40:14.550 --> 40:15.210]  Exactly.
[40:15.610 --> 40:25.290]  May I ask you, like, you know, do you realize that that Michael Chertoff x-ray scanner was actually a giveaway from W, like that?
[40:25.410 --> 40:27.830]  He was a friend of theirs and that was a huge contract.
[40:28.150 --> 40:30.590]  And those things weren't...
[40:30.590 --> 40:31.050]  Dangerous, right?
[40:31.050 --> 40:39.070]  They actually did a test and they brought plastic explosives in their pockets through that thing and it didn't detect anything, you know, so...
[40:39.070 --> 40:39.290]  Wow.
[40:39.590 --> 40:40.370]  The resolution...
[40:40.370 --> 40:43.010]  It worked to a point, but it didn't detect the plastic explosives.
[40:43.430 --> 40:59.650]  And also, I just wanted to mention that you realize that the nation of Holland, well, the Netherlands, whatever, they did a study and they proved that there is no tamper-proof or fraud-proof voting system other than paper ballots.
[41:00.170 --> 41:03.730]  And even that, you can probably figure out a way to fool people.
[41:03.830 --> 41:04.750]  But yes, that is true.
[41:04.990 --> 41:05.310]  What about the fingerprint?
[41:05.690 --> 41:07.890]  The fingerprint, but then they'll check it.
[41:08.030 --> 41:15.250]  But, I mean, why can't we have free and fair voting that's, you know, top-down fairness?
[41:15.290 --> 41:16.830]  I don't understand what...
[41:16.830 --> 41:17.870]  You have to have redundancy.
[41:17.870 --> 41:19.290]  You have to have a paper trail.
[41:19.550 --> 41:24.450]  And anything that doesn't have a paper trail is something that I think just would be eliminated right there and then.
[41:24.770 --> 41:24.970]  Yes.
[41:25.050 --> 41:28.390]  And unfortunately, we don't do that quickly enough.
[41:28.390 --> 41:33.490]  But someone told me it has to be legislated through the Congress, through the legislative body.
[41:33.490 --> 41:36.410]  They have to determine what the guidelines are going to be.
[41:36.590 --> 41:42.230]  And, in fact, someone said, I wasn't aware, that the Constitution doesn't even have...
[41:42.690 --> 41:47.430]  It's not even codified that we have the right to vote.
[41:48.230 --> 41:48.670]  Interesting.
[41:48.930 --> 41:49.350]  Is that true?
[41:49.350 --> 41:53.030]  Because when that document came out, not everybody did have the right to vote.
[41:53.030 --> 41:53.790]  Exactly.
[41:54.050 --> 42:00.230]  But we now need to enter that, and we need to enter Equal Rights Amendment, and we need to enter...
[42:00.230 --> 42:03.930]  Can you believe the Equal Rights Amendment never was ratified?
[42:03.930 --> 42:05.830]  Was it just one state away from being ratified?
[42:06.010 --> 42:08.650]  I don't know exactly, but it needs to be ratified.
[42:09.150 --> 42:10.650]  Yeah, there are so many things we need to...
[42:10.650 --> 42:11.350]  Don't get me started.
[42:11.570 --> 42:14.910]  Campaign finance is going to turn into the hacker politics show.
[42:14.910 --> 42:18.750]  The X-ray scanner was really a big political giveaway.
[42:19.150 --> 42:22.550]  And then that technology itself was proven to be a little bit dangerous.
[42:22.550 --> 42:24.790]  I think it was a little bit more powerful than the millimeter wave.
[42:24.930 --> 42:28.890]  And, as you said, the resolution was not as good visually compared to...
[42:28.890 --> 42:38.890]  But it's scary that these people get their political gifts satisfied with our tax base.
[42:38.970 --> 42:40.570]  Public, private, revolving doors.
[42:40.850 --> 42:41.230]  Absolutely.
[42:41.710 --> 42:41.970]  Yeah, yeah.
[42:42.430 --> 42:42.910]  Horrible.
[42:43.210 --> 42:44.110]  Thank you so much.
[42:44.110 --> 42:44.930]  Thanks for your call.
[42:45.010 --> 42:45.330]  Okay, bye.
[42:45.510 --> 42:45.830]  All right.
[42:45.950 --> 42:46.850]  Quick geography note.
[42:47.530 --> 42:49.250]  Holland is the Amsterdam area.
[42:49.550 --> 42:50.130]  It's that Dutch country.
[42:50.190 --> 42:51.510]  The country is the Netherlands.
[42:51.690 --> 42:52.590]  I've been corrected before.
[42:52.810 --> 42:53.890]  I just called it the Dutch country.
[42:54.090 --> 42:54.930]  Nobody objects to that.
[42:55.050 --> 42:58.670]  Some people say don't call it Holland because Holland is a part of the Netherlands.
[42:59.150 --> 43:01.270]  And other people, for some reason, don't like the word Netherlands.
[43:01.530 --> 43:03.270]  But you can't argue with Dutch.
[43:03.410 --> 43:05.030]  If you're in Holland, you're in the Netherlands.
[43:05.270 --> 43:08.330]  But just because you're in the Netherlands, you can't necessarily say you're in Holland.
[43:08.650 --> 43:11.350]  I appreciate the trip down memory lane, though, with Michael Chertoff.
[43:11.410 --> 43:12.690]  Do you not have a credit card in his name?
[43:13.470 --> 43:13.830]  Still?
[43:13.830 --> 43:14.910]  I guess I can say that.
[43:15.190 --> 43:19.370]  Yeah, back when he was a bigwig, you can do this.
[43:19.370 --> 43:20.530]  It's another thing you can do legally.
[43:20.750 --> 43:24.350]  If you have a credit card, you can simply say, give me another card under this person's name.
[43:24.490 --> 43:26.450]  You don't have to give a credit report for them.
[43:26.450 --> 43:27.330]  You don't have to do anything.
[43:27.510 --> 43:30.190]  Just say, I want this person's name.
[43:30.610 --> 43:33.670]  I've got all kinds of credit cards in different people's names.
[43:33.770 --> 43:37.690]  And it really freaks them out when you're with them and you slap it down on the table and say, you're paying.
[43:38.510 --> 43:39.390]  All right, let's take another phone call.
[43:39.450 --> 43:39.710]  Good evening.
[43:39.770 --> 43:40.190]  You're on the air.
[43:41.510 --> 43:42.030]  Go ahead.
[43:42.030 --> 43:44.350]  Yes, it's Tom from the Bronx.
[43:44.350 --> 43:46.170]  It's Tom from the Bronx in the flesh.
[43:46.170 --> 43:46.650]  Wow.
[43:46.970 --> 43:52.890]  All of these sciences have their roots in extreme paranoia.
[43:53.250 --> 43:57.790]  Where we're going to protect ourselves or they're going to protect us.
[43:58.430 --> 44:03.090]  And they say, well, when we're protecting them, we'll make a buck off it.
[44:03.990 --> 44:06.450]  And that's what's going on.
[44:06.450 --> 44:16.730]  Instead of stopping all these wars and everything, which is promoting all this paranoia, they have every other solution except stopping these wars.
[44:17.070 --> 44:24.070]  Well, wars and conflict and fear, that's what motivates all these things to be developed.
[44:24.410 --> 44:33.730]  This is very much like the conversation around geoengineering and that whole debacle with the climate, but to draw a parallel.
[44:34.130 --> 44:34.350]  Yes.
[44:34.590 --> 44:35.310]  Anything else, Tom?
[44:37.730 --> 44:39.590]  Well, I guess not.
[44:39.750 --> 44:41.110]  I guess that's all I had to say.
[44:41.110 --> 44:42.230]  Well, good hearing your voice again.
[44:43.230 --> 44:43.510]  Good week.
[44:43.670 --> 44:44.770]  We'll talk to you again soon.
[44:44.890 --> 44:46.030]  Thanks for your call.
[44:46.590 --> 44:49.110]  Our phone number is 347-335-0818.
[44:49.930 --> 44:54.070]  Sounds like we didn't lose all our listeners being away for three weeks.
[44:54.250 --> 44:56.230]  So it's good to hear their voices again.
[44:56.350 --> 44:58.730]  But if there's anything you want to get off your chest, give us a call.
[44:58.990 --> 45:01.250]  347-335-0818.
[45:01.450 --> 45:06.110]  Kyle, I wanted to ask you, you said you always opt out of going through that.
[45:06.310 --> 45:06.630]  Oh, man.
[45:06.730 --> 45:07.210]  Back to this.
[45:07.210 --> 45:08.790]  Yeah, well, you know, I am curious.
[45:09.310 --> 45:13.570]  You say you don't want, you know, images being passed around.
[45:13.930 --> 45:14.410]  I don't know.
[45:15.110 --> 45:19.190]  But, you know, do you think that is going to be an option for much longer?
[45:19.370 --> 45:21.730]  Do you think they'll just say, all right, you can't opt out anymore?
[45:21.850 --> 45:22.910]  Well, that's why I do it.
[45:22.990 --> 45:23.650]  I want to know.
[45:24.550 --> 45:25.310]  The day...
[45:25.310 --> 45:28.710]  Mainly now, TSA basically just takes their...
[45:28.710 --> 45:29.330]  Can I say damn?
[45:29.910 --> 45:30.930]  Of course you can say damn.
[45:31.010 --> 45:31.490]  They take their...
[45:37.270 --> 45:41.770]  And then they take their damn time, because they're so busy, and then you get...
[45:41.770 --> 45:42.550]  Damn, sweet-ass time.
[45:42.670 --> 45:46.110]  Yeah, and then, you know, at that time, your belt and your shoes are all over the place.
[45:46.110 --> 45:52.050]  Your luggage is halfway down the end of the cart, and, you know, then they want to pull your bag and swab everything.
[45:52.430 --> 45:53.210]  And it's...
[45:53.210 --> 45:56.130]  Oh, it is just the most fun you can have in an airport.
[45:56.890 --> 45:59.790]  But, yeah, you know, I just want to know it's still my right.
[45:59.790 --> 46:04.390]  And I'm pretty sure it is for the time being, although I'm sure after the show, it's going to change.
[46:04.490 --> 46:06.870]  That's, you know, as soon as we talk about it.
[46:06.970 --> 46:08.270]  But, yeah, I...
[46:08.710 --> 46:11.710]  That's my way of knowing that it's still an option.
[46:11.710 --> 46:15.910]  And I've ducked it in other ways, you know, going through the pilot security line.
[46:15.910 --> 46:16.850]  I think that was...
[46:16.850 --> 46:17.710]  Well, yeah.
[46:17.970 --> 46:20.170]  That was not in this country, so don't worry, but, you know...
[46:20.170 --> 46:21.090]  I didn't know you could do that.
[46:21.350 --> 46:21.690]  Yeah.
[46:21.910 --> 46:22.790]  But you had film.
[46:22.910 --> 46:23.530]  You had actual film.
[46:23.650 --> 46:24.510]  You didn't want it to be exposed to extras.
[46:24.510 --> 46:37.170]  I was traveling with film that I was push-processing, and push-processing can get, well, without getting into details, that you can fog your film very easily if it is being pushed-processed.
[46:37.270 --> 46:40.830]  So that's how I sort of negotiated that.
[46:40.870 --> 46:41.310]  You don't want to fog your film.
[46:41.410 --> 46:42.030]  We have another caller.
[46:42.090 --> 46:42.430]  Good evening.
[46:42.550 --> 46:43.450]  You're on Off the Hook.
[46:44.110 --> 46:46.570]  On Off the Hook or Off on the Hook?
[46:46.790 --> 46:47.230]  Okay.
[46:47.670 --> 46:49.330]  My name is Sir Edmund Green.
[46:49.330 --> 46:54.890]  I'm calling from the wilds of Ulster County, and I'm listening to you on Woodstock 104.
[46:55.330 --> 46:55.830]  Awesome.
[46:56.350 --> 46:58.990]  W-I-O-F-L-P, 104.1.
[46:59.130 --> 47:01.170]  And I'm calling about the recent election.
[47:02.130 --> 47:08.350]  I was reading that the machines in Texas were actually flipping votes.
[47:08.570 --> 47:12.730]  The people that voted for O'Rourke, it, like, flipped to Cruz.
[47:12.910 --> 47:13.130]  Really?
[47:13.370 --> 47:28.870]  And there were all these weird problems with machines not having the charger and whatnot in Georgia, where the Secretary of State happened to be in charge of running for election and in charge of supervising the election.
[47:29.070 --> 47:30.290]  Oh, nothing unusual there.
[47:30.710 --> 47:32.290]  No, it's business as usual.
[47:32.570 --> 47:33.370]  But no reporting.
[47:33.370 --> 47:40.870]  But what about the hacking of the vote machines and actually flipping the votes in Texas?
[47:41.190 --> 47:46.090]  Yeah, that's a fascinating subject, because, I mean, hacking voting machines is a subject unto itself.
[47:46.230 --> 47:51.970]  You can see so many presentations from our past HOPE conferences if you go to Channel 2600 on YouTube.
[47:52.510 --> 48:04.630]  But in this particular case, again, there were videos and images going around of people pressing one thing on a touchscreen, and the choice above the one they were pressing activates and checks a box.
[48:04.790 --> 48:13.890]  I don't know why you find that upsetting, because it's reading your facial mannerisms to detect what it is you really want to vote for, and it's simply making it easier for you.
[48:14.130 --> 48:15.150]  You should be thankful.
[48:15.350 --> 48:20.430]  And this is another danger in having voting machines that are just doing everything in software.
[48:20.430 --> 48:21.370]  There's no paper trail.
[48:21.490 --> 48:22.210]  There's no paper ballot.
[48:22.370 --> 48:25.530]  Here in New York, we fill in dots on a paper ballot, feed it into a scanner.
[48:25.650 --> 48:26.730]  The scanner scans the votes.
[48:27.370 --> 48:38.530]  There's a certain amount of, I think, faith that one can have in that, that when you can demonstrably not have your vote read correctly on a touchscreen, I think that's a little bit more...
[48:38.530 --> 48:43.070]  It is, but I still feel like I'm sending a damn fax, you know, whenever I put that into the machine.
[48:43.210 --> 48:47.870]  And I got writer's cramp yesterday, because there were so many judges running for office.
[48:47.870 --> 48:49.650]  I had to fill every single one of them out.
[48:49.870 --> 48:53.830]  And, you know, there's got to be a better way to do that and leave a paper trail.
[48:54.010 --> 48:54.230]  Kyle?
[48:54.470 --> 48:56.830]  I just wanted to comment on voting absentee.
[48:56.990 --> 49:04.130]  You also get a little stub you can rip off the top and track your ballot as it's processed through the board elections and so on.
[49:04.270 --> 49:11.090]  It's got like a code and everything that's unique to your ballot, which I think is important to know that, yeah, it didn't, you know, disappear in the mail system or something.
[49:11.390 --> 49:11.670]  All right.
[49:11.770 --> 49:13.130]  Caller, any other points?
[49:13.130 --> 49:14.530]  Well, that's pretty much it.
[49:15.350 --> 49:19.950]  You know, I have a question about pop-ups on my computer, but that's probably for another show.
[49:20.110 --> 49:20.490]  I don't know.
[49:20.590 --> 49:21.050]  Block them.
[49:21.210 --> 49:22.850]  Yeah, block them and close them whenever you can.
[49:22.930 --> 49:24.290]  But thanks for your call.
[49:24.850 --> 49:27.950]  We had a pop-up in the computer in front of me, actually, while we were talking.
[49:28.130 --> 49:28.650]  Be fierce.
[49:29.970 --> 49:32.070]  347-335-0818.
[49:32.110 --> 49:35.250]  That should be a national program.
[49:35.250 --> 49:36.730]  Not be best, be fierce.
[49:36.890 --> 49:37.370]  I like that.
[49:37.390 --> 49:37.470]  Be fierce.
[49:37.570 --> 49:38.750]  Yeah, let's do that instead.
[49:39.950 --> 49:41.530]  347-335-0818.
[49:41.530 --> 49:42.390]  This is Off the Hook.
[49:42.550 --> 49:47.750]  We're on for another 10 minutes or so with our comeback show after three weeks away.
[49:47.910 --> 49:48.270]  Good evening.
[49:48.490 --> 49:49.210]  You're on Off the Hook.
[49:50.870 --> 49:51.410]  Go ahead.
[49:51.470 --> 49:51.810]  Speak up.
[49:52.050 --> 49:52.270]  Yes.
[49:52.470 --> 49:53.030]  You're on.
[49:53.270 --> 49:53.630]  Yes.
[49:53.990 --> 49:55.850]  Am I on the radio right now?
[49:55.850 --> 49:56.750]  You're on the radio right now.
[49:56.890 --> 49:57.670]  We're in seven seconds.
[49:57.890 --> 49:58.310]  Very good.
[49:58.470 --> 49:58.630]  Yeah.
[49:58.810 --> 49:59.810]  Let me ask you a question.
[49:59.970 --> 50:01.050]  I guess it's not a question.
[50:01.190 --> 50:02.790]  I was listening to the conversation.
[50:03.370 --> 50:11.670]  And with all this technology that is out there, who is allowing a lot of this information?
[50:13.190 --> 50:28.350]  I think a lot of people fail to understand the biggest elephant in the room is what I've come to find out is a lot of it is rarely infiltrating a lot of our personal information.
[50:29.850 --> 50:44.010]  I recently sent some information regarding what they do in Palestine when it comes to faith recognition, certain, you know, information that they're able to retrieve from people.
[50:44.190 --> 50:55.350]  What you mentioned before, the facial imagery and a number of other aspects of collecting the data on how they can utilize it for their advantage, more so than for our advantage.
[50:55.550 --> 50:56.730]  What's your take on that?
[50:58.630 --> 51:01.610]  Israeli infiltration of our data here in the United States?
[51:02.210 --> 51:02.430]  No.
[51:05.460 --> 51:11.480]  The technology itself, that developing, you know, who owns this technology?
[51:11.740 --> 51:29.480]  Who's, you know, I heard of that guy, I forgot his name, I know him, correct me, Swoff or whatever his name used to be, one that played a big importance, a significant role as far as certain responsibilities he had during 9-11.
[51:29.480 --> 51:55.220]  And with all these deals that Israel, anytime you hear the Prime Minister going to these different countries, and you hear Netanyahu constantly brag about how their technologies are so far advanced and how Israel is such a technological country, and they talk about various software security systems that they personally have developed.
[51:55.840 --> 52:14.100]  And with all this software that the United States is incorporating with this relationship, this so-called unbreakable bond, how is Israel's technology, you know, basically infiltrated, not just the United States, but you mentioned previously, Hungary,
[52:14.840 --> 52:18.040]  and all these other countries that they want to test this software.
[52:18.340 --> 52:21.640]  That's why this record is, you know, a lie-detected test.
[52:22.180 --> 52:39.940]  Why are they wasting all of the humanity's time, other than taking all this data, to see how they can fight for, I don't know, a potential threat of any kind, or just knowing my personal information, which I find it's very, you know, really disgusting that,
[52:39.980 --> 52:42.300]  you know, the world is accepting this.
[52:42.600 --> 52:44.280]  Because I think it's very unacceptable.
[52:44.660 --> 52:45.700]  Yeah, I think you're not alone.
[52:45.800 --> 52:47.000]  You're not alone at all in that.
[52:47.140 --> 52:49.280]  And it's a really profitable industry.
[52:49.620 --> 53:00.240]  And just like we've talked about private companies collecting people's information for marketing purposes, there are a myriad, and I'm not going to say they're shell companies, but a lot of them have many shell companies.
[53:00.280 --> 53:15.860]  And they're basically private security companies that win these government contracts, and develop technology, either for our own military, or they help consult with militaries around the world, including those in that area, I'm sure.
[53:16.040 --> 53:27.260]  And no doubt, Israel itself has developed quite a large array of tools, and uses a lot of their own in-house technology and sophisticated stuff.
[53:27.420 --> 53:30.300]  But it easily can evolve and be implemented.
[53:30.440 --> 53:42.660]  Things like taking photos of large crowds, if you already have databases of individuals faces, you can then pick out, you know, who is at a crowd, even if you just take like one large resolution shot.
[53:42.780 --> 53:50.820]  I mean, just just your imagination can run wild thinking of scenarios where there would be dual uses of various data sets, and so on.
[53:50.960 --> 54:00.180]  And yeah, my bottom line is, is that the short answer is the bottom line, you know, there's there's a lot of money in fear and terror and has been for the last decade.
[54:00.520 --> 54:03.300]  Also, technology itself does not have a nationality.
[54:03.680 --> 54:11.760]  Anything that one side has of any sort of international conflict, the other side either also has or can develop themselves or can buy from the same supplier.
[54:12.360 --> 54:22.100]  So any anyone looking toward one, you know, country or another or one organization or another as having better or worse technology, I think it's all pretty much moot these days, because everybody has access to everything.
[54:22.260 --> 54:24.960]  And if not, they can make it because it's an arms race like anything else.
[54:24.960 --> 54:26.540]  And thanks very much for that call.
[54:26.700 --> 54:27.880]  We have time for one more.
[54:28.180 --> 54:30.100]  Three, four, seven, three, three, five, zero, eight, one, eight.
[54:30.340 --> 54:46.360]  It really it really illustrates a dichotomy of of power, you know, the individual versus state power or, you know, power, whether it be, you know, economic or otherwise, you know, that that these then are are what are wielded against the masses.
[54:46.920 --> 54:48.260]  Okay, let's take one more call.
[54:48.480 --> 54:48.920]  Good evening.
[54:49.060 --> 54:49.600]  You're on off the hook.
[54:50.660 --> 54:59.320]  Hey, I don't know if anybody else caught that last caller, but something he said, I'm just wondering, where's the country of Hungary?
[55:00.000 --> 55:01.200]  Okay, yeah, we caught that.
[55:01.200 --> 55:06.060]  But you know what, it was such such a challenge making out what he was saying on that phone, whatever phone he was using.
[55:06.300 --> 55:07.780]  Your phone sounds great, by the way.
[55:08.500 --> 55:09.680]  Okay, that's it.
[55:09.800 --> 55:10.320]  Bye, guys.
[55:11.240 --> 55:12.940]  I think that's a good note to end on.
[55:13.040 --> 55:14.600]  Nice old fashioned phone that more.
[55:14.680 --> 55:15.320]  Maybe it's a new phone.
[55:15.460 --> 55:15.880]  That sounds good.
[55:16.020 --> 55:17.100]  But I haven't heard very many of those.
[55:17.760 --> 55:19.060]  We are out of time.
[55:19.180 --> 55:20.820]  But it was good to hear voices again.
[55:20.960 --> 55:22.100]  Good to be back on the air.
[55:22.280 --> 55:23.860]  And hopefully we'll be back on the air for a while.
[55:24.260 --> 55:28.820]  You can write to us OTH at 2600.com.
[55:29.140 --> 55:30.540]  That is our email address.
[55:31.000 --> 55:32.060]  Please use email.
[55:32.360 --> 55:33.320]  It's it's neutral.
[55:33.660 --> 55:34.580]  It's flexible.
[55:34.980 --> 55:36.740]  It's it reaches the entire globe.
[55:37.260 --> 55:42.040]  But you can also tweet to us at Hacker Radio Show on Twitter.
[55:42.620 --> 55:45.660]  And the Mastodon presence.
[55:46.080 --> 55:47.140]  Rob is what again?
[55:47.340 --> 55:47.720]  Absolutely.
[55:47.960 --> 55:50.840]  It's at Hacker Radio Show at Mastodon.
[55:50.900 --> 55:53.940]  That's M-A-S-T-O-D-O-N dot social.
[55:54.560 --> 55:56.560]  All right, that sounds I think that covers about everything.
[55:56.800 --> 55:58.140]  We're probably in a few other places.
[55:58.140 --> 55:59.920]  But you know what, that's that'll do for now.
[56:00.120 --> 56:01.100]  We'll see you next week.
[56:01.240 --> 56:01.600]  Have a good night.
[56:08.080 --> 56:28.040]  I must have dreamed a thousand dreams Been lulled by a million screams But I can hear the marching feet You're moving into the street Did you read the news today?
[56:29.240 --> 56:55.360]  They say the danger's down our way But I can see the fire still light Burning into the night There's too many men Too many people Making too many problems And there's not much love to go around Can't you see this is a land of confusion
[56:58.680 --> 57:06.280]  This is the world we live in And these are the hands we're given.
[57:07.100 --> 57:10.260]  Use them and let's start trying.
[57:10.880 --> 57:15.360]  To make it a place worth living in.
[57:23.320 --> 57:26.580]  Oh, Superman, where are you now?
[57:28.740 --> 57:30.620]  Things go wrong somehow.
[57:32.100 --> 57:34.960]  The men of steel, these men of power.
[57:36.220 --> 57:38.920]  I'm losing control by the hour.
[57:38.920 --> 57:41.160]  This is the time.
[57:41.480 --> 57:43.200]  This is the place.
[57:43.540 --> 57:45.460]  Don't we look for the future?
[57:46.480 --> 57:49.480]  There's not much love to go around.
[57:50.420 --> 57:53.420]  Tell me why this is a land of the few.
[58:01.830 --> 58:04.390]  These are the hands we're given.
[58:05.610 --> 58:08.670]  Use them and let's start trying.
[58:09.290 --> 58:13.390]  To make it a place worth living in.
[58:35.900 --> 58:38.740]  I remember long ago.
[58:41.000 --> 58:43.780]  When the sun was shining.
[58:45.600 --> 58:47.940]  And now the stars were bright.
[58:48.380 --> 58:49.920]  All through the night.
[58:50.440 --> 58:50.560]  And
[58:53.580 --> 58:55.240]  I held you tight.
[58:57.140 --> 58:59.080]  So long ago.
[59:19.840 --> 59:23.140]  I won't be coming home tonight.
[59:23.980 --> 59:27.400]  My generation will put it right.
[59:28.340 --> 59:31.240]  We're not just making promises.
[59:32.400 --> 59:35.640]  That we know we'll never keep.
[59:35.640 --> 59:37.800]  There's too many men.
[59:38.020 --> 59:39.880]  There's too many people.
[59:40.220 --> 59:42.140]  Making too many problems.
[59:43.160 --> 59:45.420]  There's not much love to go
[59:53.380 --> 59:53.620]  around.
[59:53.620 --> 59:57.150]  Now this is the world we live in.
[59:57.900 --> 01:00:02.280]  And these are the hands we're given.
[01:00:02.560 --> 01:00:05.380]  Use them and let's start trying.
[01:00:06.040 --> 01:00:08.220]  To make it a place.
[01:00:14.440 --> 01:00:17.760]  And these are the names we're given.
[01:00:17.760 --> 01:00:18.600]  So long ago.
[01:00:18.600 --> 01:00:21.980]  Stand up and let's start showing.
[01:00:22.740 --> 01:00:26.860]  Just where our lives are going to.