[00:00.000 --> 00:08.200]  Zeppelin at the Temple, you'll understand why Rolling Stone magazine has called this pioneering rock band, the heaviest band of all time.
[00:08.560 --> 00:10.140]  So mark that date on your calendar.
[00:10.460 --> 00:14.260]  That's Friday, November 23rd, from 12 midnight to 4am.
[00:14.400 --> 00:20.900]  As we present Zeppelin at the Temple, only on WBAI in New York, 99.5 FM.
[00:21.200 --> 00:23.460]  You know, it'll be rave-alicious.
[00:23.920 --> 00:28.460]  The Midnight Ravers, where every show is a special.
[00:35.580 --> 00:38.080]  And you are listening to Radio Station WBAI New York.
[00:38.290 --> 00:39.840]  The time is 8 o'clock.
[00:40.080 --> 00:42.080]  Time once again for Off the Hook.
[02:32.790 --> 02:34.670]  And a very good evening to everybody.
[02:34.740 --> 02:35.730]  The program is Off the Hook.
[02:35.800 --> 02:37.930]  Emmanuel Goldstein here with you, joined tonight by Rob T.
[02:38.110 --> 02:38.490]  Firefly.
[02:38.490 --> 02:39.350]  Good evening.
[02:39.760 --> 02:40.050]  Alex.
[02:40.460 --> 02:40.790]  Good evening.
[02:40.990 --> 02:41.350]  And Kyle.
[02:41.610 --> 02:42.080]  Yes, I'm here.
[02:42.670 --> 02:46.460]  Well, we have some exciting developments here at the radio station.
[02:46.730 --> 02:50.300]  We've just been looking over what will soon be on U-Studio.
[02:50.920 --> 02:51.730]  What do you think, Kyle?
[02:52.360 --> 02:53.260]  It's impressive.
[02:53.620 --> 02:58.140]  It's like a bunch of new paint and finished soundproofing.
[02:58.400 --> 03:01.460]  I think it'll be the first time that there's a window.
[03:01.460 --> 03:19.560]  I think Rob pointed that out at first, or Alex mentioned it, that there would be a window for the first time as a part of the WBAI studios, which is pretty exciting to be able to see what's going on in the outside world while you're having conversations and doing good radio.
[03:19.560 --> 03:20.640]  Seeing the sky.
[03:20.940 --> 03:22.200]  That's something that we're not used to here.
[03:22.600 --> 03:24.180]  It's kind of like Vegas or a prison.
[03:24.360 --> 03:25.320]  It's a creature comfort.
[03:26.240 --> 03:26.600]  Absolutely.
[03:27.460 --> 03:28.000]  Yes, Alex?
[03:28.240 --> 03:29.360]  I mean, I love the colors.
[03:29.730 --> 03:33.200]  It's, as Kyle had mentioned, the WBAI blue.
[03:33.400 --> 03:34.920]  The baby blue over there is very calming.
[03:35.290 --> 03:41.040]  I think that the airwaves are going to be a lot more sane after that new studio opens up.
[03:41.170 --> 03:42.320]  Well, we'll see.
[03:42.420 --> 03:43.060]  We'll give it a shot.
[03:43.180 --> 03:43.730]  You know, see what happens.
[03:43.730 --> 03:46.970]  Also, more exciting news, our phone lines are back.
[03:47.500 --> 03:58.260]  Our phone lines are, well, I mean, they're not the same phone lines, but they're, I'm told we can fill a lot of these numbers on this telephone here.
[03:58.380 --> 04:02.080]  For the last year or so, it's been only one line that we've had.
[04:02.480 --> 04:11.080]  And that's resulted in a lot of waiting for the next caller to come through because the call's got to, you know, be switched into our system.
[04:11.520 --> 04:13.860]  But now, I think we can take a bunch.
[04:13.970 --> 04:23.790]  What I'd like to do, we're not going to pick these up yet, but I'd like for listeners out there, maybe you can help us out and I'll call in now so we can see how many phone lines we can light up.
[04:23.850 --> 04:25.060]  And we'll take phone calls later.
[04:25.060 --> 04:25.580]  How about that?
[04:25.920 --> 04:33.360]  So here's, it's a new number, new number, which is actually kind of a throwback to an old number because it's close to our old number, but it's not.
[04:33.820 --> 04:36.360]  2-1-2, yeah, we're back in 2-1-2.
[04:36.530 --> 04:37.180]  How about that?
[04:37.320 --> 04:37.860]  That's something.
[04:38.030 --> 04:41.620]  2-1-2-2-0-9-2-8-7-7.
[04:42.640 --> 04:53.420]  So if everybody calls that number now, 2-1-2-2-0-9, that's already lighting up, 2-0-9-2-8-7-7, we can see how many phone calls we can light up and make sure that the trip over is working properly.
[04:54.580 --> 04:56.200]  So far, okay, I see, I see.
[04:56.800 --> 04:57.060]  Wow.
[04:57.060 --> 04:59.320]  Well, for some reason, number 2 didn't light up.
[04:59.420 --> 05:00.560]  Maybe the 2-light is out.
[05:00.740 --> 05:01.820]  It's only up calls.
[05:01.820 --> 05:03.640]  Okay, we're up to about 5 now, 7.
[05:03.980 --> 05:05.040]  Okay, that's a lot.
[05:05.420 --> 05:07.260]  Okay, but some aren't lighting up.
[05:07.350 --> 05:11.800]  Keep calling in, folks, and let us know if you get a busy signal or something else.
[05:12.030 --> 05:13.470]  Okay, we're up to 9 now.
[05:13.680 --> 05:14.230]  That's good.
[05:14.560 --> 05:16.820]  But number 2 and number 6 don't light up.
[05:16.940 --> 05:17.740]  I wonder why that is.
[05:17.820 --> 05:20.680]  Okay, we're up to 11, and there's only one more after that, so...
[05:20.680 --> 05:23.470]  So maybe 2's ringing, but the light doesn't work.
[05:24.120 --> 05:24.800]  Maybe, maybe.
[05:27.100 --> 05:27.820]  Only, uh...
[05:27.820 --> 05:32.700]  Now, if you're calling in now, and you're getting something other than a ring, why don't you tweet at us?
[05:32.800 --> 05:37.580]  Hacker Radio Show on Twitter, and let us know what you're getting instead, or call us later.
[05:37.720 --> 05:40.220]  But, uh, but wow, a lot of listeners are out there.
[05:40.280 --> 05:41.680]  It's good to see that again.
[05:41.800 --> 05:42.620]  Oh, you're calling, Alex.
[05:42.780 --> 05:43.300]  I am.
[05:43.400 --> 05:44.040]  You're calling right now?
[05:44.140 --> 05:44.300]  Yep.
[05:44.580 --> 05:45.980]  Okay, and it's ringing.
[05:46.860 --> 05:48.060]  Okay, so you must have hopped on.
[05:48.140 --> 05:53.240]  Everybody, please stay on if you can, so that we can make sure we max it out and see how many...
[05:53.840 --> 05:54.890]  You're probably one of them.
[05:55.040 --> 05:56.980]  You're probably one, because number 2 is not lit.
[05:57.060 --> 06:00.180]  Everything else, 6 doesn't light up, and 2 doesn't light up.
[06:00.520 --> 06:00.830]  Huh.
[06:01.040 --> 06:04.270]  And whoever was calling in on 3 just hung up, so, uh...
[06:04.270 --> 06:06.540]  It's good to exercise the circuits.
[06:06.800 --> 06:08.360]  It gets the carbon dust off.
[06:08.420 --> 06:08.460]  It does.
[06:08.460 --> 06:10.720]  It's loosening it up now, so that it'll work fine.
[06:10.940 --> 06:17.600]  I'm just excited to see the rest of these numbers lighting up, because I don't think I've seen this many numbers light up on our phones since our old studios on Wall Street.
[06:17.600 --> 06:20.800]  The higher numbers have a brighter green, because it hasn't been lit up as much recently.
[06:20.960 --> 06:21.340]  But thank you.
[06:21.400 --> 06:22.620]  Thank you, callers, for calling in.
[06:22.680 --> 06:23.150]  Thank you, listeners.
[06:23.480 --> 06:26.460]  And we will be taking phone calls by probably about the half hour mark or so.
[06:26.540 --> 06:27.560]  I think that's good.
[06:27.580 --> 06:28.710]  So we're making progress here.
[06:28.840 --> 06:29.460]  It's amazing.
[06:29.580 --> 06:30.960]  We're actually getting things done.
[06:31.730 --> 06:32.960]  We always knew we could.
[06:33.100 --> 06:34.800]  We knew we could, but now we're actually doing it.
[06:34.900 --> 06:36.900]  So that's really amazing.
[06:37.080 --> 06:38.160]  Sort of leaps and bounds, too.
[06:38.280 --> 06:47.500]  I mean, it seems like almost every week there's some new stuff going on and exciting developments just in the infrastructure and facilities themselves.
[06:48.150 --> 06:49.980]  And it's your efforts, listeners.
[06:50.220 --> 06:50.560]  Thank you.
[06:50.660 --> 06:51.080]  Your support.
[06:51.210 --> 06:54.920]  If you contributed to the station or if you're thinking about it, that's what happens.
[06:54.940 --> 06:57.060]  That's how we stay on the air.
[06:57.060 --> 07:05.520]  If you're so moved now to actually call in and support or go to the website and support WBAI.org, you can do that right now.
[07:05.580 --> 07:09.780]  And you can also text WBAI to 41444.
[07:10.120 --> 07:10.920]  You can become a BAI buddy.
[07:11.040 --> 07:11.620]  There's all kinds of ways.
[07:11.710 --> 07:12.720]  You don't have to wait for a fun drive.
[07:12.860 --> 07:13.840]  There'll be one soon.
[07:13.840 --> 07:14.650]  Don't worry about that.
[07:14.650 --> 07:17.000]  But you can pledge your support at any time.
[07:17.080 --> 07:17.270]  Alex.
[07:17.360 --> 07:17.770]  Always welcome.
[07:18.060 --> 07:18.360]  Okay.
[07:18.440 --> 07:19.480]  So here's a weird thing.
[07:19.620 --> 07:19.830]  Yes.
[07:19.940 --> 07:22.080]  I kept my phone ringing for a while.
[07:22.210 --> 07:24.220]  And then ultimately it went to voicemail.
[07:24.360 --> 07:25.020]  Whose voicemail did it go to?
[07:25.020 --> 07:27.770]  It said you've reached the general manager of WBAI.
[07:27.900 --> 07:28.650]  Please leave a message.
[07:28.860 --> 07:31.780]  I think that's why everybody dropped off almost simultaneously.
[07:31.980 --> 07:33.440]  Are you saying every single...
[07:33.440 --> 07:33.600]  Okay.
[07:33.710 --> 07:35.420]  Now call back because the lines are empty now.
[07:35.620 --> 07:36.920]  That's because everybody went to voicemail.
[07:37.020 --> 07:37.780]  Can you call back?
[07:37.900 --> 07:38.560]  I can call back.
[07:38.680 --> 07:41.900]  And we'll see where you pop up on the line here.
[07:41.940 --> 07:42.720]  Let me know when it starts ringing.
[07:42.890 --> 07:44.220]  Well, somebody else is going to do it now.
[07:44.280 --> 07:44.560]  Yeah.
[07:44.560 --> 07:45.680]  That's why I'm asking you to do it fast.
[07:45.780 --> 07:46.460]  Did you do it fast enough?
[07:46.580 --> 07:46.650]  Yeah.
[07:46.650 --> 07:47.830]  Because someone else just got in here.
[07:48.180 --> 07:48.360]  Okay.
[07:48.520 --> 07:49.600]  I think...
[07:49.600 --> 07:50.210]  That might be three.
[07:50.210 --> 07:50.360]  Yeah.
[07:50.360 --> 07:51.220]  You didn't make it in time.
[07:51.600 --> 07:51.890]  Okay.
[07:52.740 --> 07:54.270]  Please don't leave voicemail.
[07:54.270 --> 07:56.240]  We know the general manager has enough.
[07:56.240 --> 07:57.650]  I think if you do leave voicemail...
[07:57.650 --> 07:57.890]  Yeah.
[07:57.980 --> 08:01.210]  But if you do leave voicemail, that will ensure that they fix that.
[08:02.010 --> 08:04.390]  I mean, I guess that's how you look at it.
[08:04.500 --> 08:06.020]  But we don't want to complicate things.
[08:06.400 --> 08:09.270]  You keep your phone going there and see if that also goes to voicemail.
[08:09.330 --> 08:11.560]  It might just be the last line goes to voicemail.
[08:11.940 --> 08:12.830]  I'm sorry, people.
[08:12.890 --> 08:14.390]  This is the only way we can test this out.
[08:14.780 --> 08:19.900]  Because how else are we going to get all these calls to come in at the same time and see what happens?
[08:20.900 --> 08:21.500]  It's new.
[08:21.500 --> 08:23.780]  But it's something that you're a part of.
[08:23.780 --> 08:24.560]  We love you made it happen.
[08:25.170 --> 08:28.360]  And we're going to keep growing and expanding and doing more things.
[08:28.440 --> 08:29.480]  We want to hear your ideas.
[08:29.770 --> 08:30.000]  Always.
[08:30.630 --> 08:31.840]  And I think...
[08:31.840 --> 08:35.100]  I don't know how many people actually know about this, that these are going on now.
[08:35.140 --> 08:41.260]  Because our production engineer here at the station, Reggie Johnson, was really excited, I think, to tell us about this.
[08:41.360 --> 08:46.900]  Knowing how we, in particular, would feel among the producers at the station about having our phones back again.
[08:46.900 --> 08:50.680]  And, yeah, it was like a little pre-holiday holiday gift, I think.
[08:51.300 --> 08:53.400]  What happens if you call the old on-air phone?
[08:53.500 --> 08:54.460]  It's still posted here.
[08:54.540 --> 08:56.300]  3-4-7-3-3-3-5-0-8-1-8.
[08:56.400 --> 08:57.300]  What did he get then?
[08:58.040 --> 08:59.040]  Why don't you try that, Ralph?
[08:59.060 --> 08:59.600]  I'll try that one.
[08:59.830 --> 09:00.640]  I'm already called.
[09:00.740 --> 09:01.980]  This is what hackers do.
[09:02.040 --> 09:04.020]  They experiment on the air with telephones.
[09:04.100 --> 09:05.710]  Because who else is going to do that?
[09:06.560 --> 09:07.210]  Here we go.
[09:07.720 --> 09:07.880]  Oh.
[09:08.260 --> 09:09.360]  The general manager...
[09:09.360 --> 09:15.280]  Okay, so every call that goes through eventually winds up going to the general manager's voicemail.
[09:15.580 --> 09:19.280]  That's going to be a problem, and hopefully we get that fixed ASAP.
[09:20.080 --> 09:21.120]  What should happen?
[09:21.210 --> 09:21.960]  It should time out.
[09:23.020 --> 09:24.380]  But that is just the kind of...
[09:24.380 --> 09:25.080]  This is the old number.
[09:25.330 --> 09:25.900]  Okay, what?
[09:25.900 --> 09:26.900]  This goes through a busy signal.
[09:26.980 --> 09:27.240]  Yes.
[09:27.500 --> 09:29.640]  That, folks, is what a busy signal sounds like.
[09:29.860 --> 09:31.540]  People used to get those all the time.
[09:32.580 --> 09:33.020]  Yes.
[09:33.480 --> 09:36.220]  But that's just the kind of management we have here at WPI.
[09:36.400 --> 09:37.280]  They're very hands-on.
[09:37.600 --> 09:38.260]  They're reachable.
[09:39.740 --> 09:40.720]  And, you know...
[09:40.720 --> 09:41.600]  Well, that's too reachable.
[09:41.760 --> 09:42.460]  Don't abuse it.
[09:42.640 --> 09:44.360]  Every single phone call is going to go there.
[09:44.760 --> 09:45.740]  Yeah, that's what I'm saying.
[09:45.830 --> 09:46.920]  You know, be considerate.
[09:47.040 --> 09:50.120]  But, you know, we're not in, like, these big ivory towers.
[09:50.420 --> 09:51.680]  This is Pacifica.
[09:51.830 --> 09:52.860]  This is WBAIs.
[09:53.020 --> 09:53.980]  This is how we roll.
[09:54.140 --> 09:56.740]  Yeah, I just wonder how many rings before it goes to the voicemail.
[09:56.860 --> 09:57.830]  But, you know what?
[09:58.020 --> 10:00.000]  If it goes to the voicemail, you've gone too far.
[10:00.000 --> 10:01.660]  You have to go back and call again.
[10:01.780 --> 10:03.240]  So we'll get that fixed.
[10:03.540 --> 10:06.500]  Or you could tell the voicemail, like, whatever you were going to tell us.
[10:06.580 --> 10:08.060]  But I don't know if the message will get to us.
[10:08.060 --> 10:09.980]  I think that voicemail will get full pretty fast.
[10:11.180 --> 10:13.000]  And that busy signal, by the way...
[10:13.000 --> 10:13.980]  This is a question for you, Emmanuel.
[10:14.140 --> 10:14.280]  Yes.
[10:14.600 --> 10:17.420]  That was an ordinary busy, or a slow busy, or a fast busy.
[10:17.460 --> 10:20.360]  You would think it would be a fast busy if the line's not in operation, right?
[10:20.360 --> 10:21.180]  You would think that.
[10:21.300 --> 10:23.360]  Unless other people were calling the line at the same time.
[10:23.580 --> 10:24.980]  So, Rob, I'm going to ask you to call it again.
[10:25.140 --> 10:26.240]  And I'm not going to give it out.
[10:26.320 --> 10:28.960]  Or maybe it's connected to a phone that is off the hook.
[10:29.080 --> 10:29.940]  It's possible as well.
[10:30.120 --> 10:31.080]  Yeah, definitely possible.
[10:32.060 --> 10:33.360]  But that's no longer the line.
[10:33.460 --> 10:35.420]  We should probably rip that piece of paper off the wall.
[10:35.420 --> 10:37.180]  So, it's perpetually busy.
[10:37.820 --> 10:38.180]  Yeah.
[10:38.300 --> 10:39.500]  And it doesn't ring first.
[10:39.560 --> 10:42.660]  So, it's not, I don't think, an auto-generated busy signal from our own system here.
[10:42.720 --> 10:43.340]  Well, it makes sense.
[10:43.520 --> 10:44.080]  I think that's a legit busy signal.
[10:44.080 --> 10:44.420]  It makes sense.
[10:45.160 --> 10:45.520]  Okay.
[10:45.840 --> 10:48.560]  Well, we're going to do some more things other than play with the phones.
[10:49.120 --> 10:51.260]  We're going to talk about future technology here.
[10:51.540 --> 10:54.420]  You know, we're all familiar with drones.
[10:54.560 --> 10:55.480]  We've all seen drones.
[10:55.660 --> 10:56.880]  Many of us have played with drones.
[10:56.880 --> 10:59.260]  And the military is no exception to that.
[11:01.170 --> 11:07.240]  They would like to start flying military drones over U.S.
[11:07.320 --> 11:07.600]  cities.
[11:07.640 --> 11:10.340]  And they'd like to start doing that as soon as 2019.
[11:10.840 --> 11:11.780]  That's next year.
[11:12.500 --> 11:16.300]  Now, they want to fly these drones along the border.
[11:16.520 --> 11:17.840]  Now, what constitutes the border?
[11:18.280 --> 11:21.480]  Anything that's 100 miles away from a border.
[11:21.640 --> 11:22.340]  And that includes us.
[11:22.340 --> 11:24.240]  Because the ocean is considered a border.
[11:24.240 --> 11:35.540]  So, basically, we're talking about military drones that patrol cities, that patrol border areas, and all of it starting up pretty soon.
[11:35.540 --> 11:39.080]  Because right now, it's not permitted.
[11:39.380 --> 11:45.200]  And the FAA is figuring out how to change the guidelines to allow unmanned planes and helicopters to fly over big cities.
[11:45.620 --> 11:47.420]  We are working with the FAA.
[11:47.420 --> 11:54.480]  FAA, our stated goal is 2030, I guess, for massive, for 100% deployment.
[11:54.780 --> 11:56.500]  It very much depends on rulemaking.
[11:56.500 --> 11:58.300]  We're certainly hoping for sooner.
[11:58.540 --> 11:59.700]  I'm sure they are.
[12:00.100 --> 12:07.940]  They say by 2025, enormous military-style drones, close relatives of the sort made famous by counterterrorism strikes in Afghanistan and Iraq.
[12:08.260 --> 12:10.140]  Yeah, with real friendly names like the Reaper.
[12:10.140 --> 12:12.880]  Yeah, the kind that can kill entire communities.
[12:13.540 --> 12:16.020]  They will be visible 2,000 feet above U.S.
[12:16.120 --> 12:19.460]  cities, streaming high-resolution video to police departments.
[12:20.520 --> 12:31.300]  That is the bet that multiple defense contractors are placing as they race to build unmanned aircraft that can pass evolving airworthiness certifications and replace police helicopters.
[12:31.420 --> 12:37.940]  And if that bet pays off, it'll radically transform the way cities, citizens, and law enforcement interact.
[12:37.940 --> 12:41.280]  And I'm sure people are listening to this show in the future saying, what's the big deal?
[12:41.380 --> 12:42.820]  These things are everywhere now.
[12:43.060 --> 12:46.640]  And the 100 miles within the border zone is a very interesting thing.
[12:46.740 --> 12:54.040]  The ACLU had posted a similar thing many years ago, I think during the W.
[12:54.040 --> 13:04.680]  Bush administration, because there were basically rulings that the Constitution didn't imply freedom from search and seizure and things like that within this 100-mile border zone.
[13:04.680 --> 13:10.540]  And what you might think hearing, you know, the border zone is that it's just coastal cities or towns or whatever.
[13:10.700 --> 13:13.440]  But the fact is that roughly two-thirds of the U.S.
[13:13.480 --> 13:15.660]  population lives within the 100-mile zone.
[13:15.820 --> 13:18.260]  That's within the 100 miles of any U.S.
[13:18.300 --> 13:19.080]  land or coastal border.
[13:19.200 --> 13:20.580]  So that's about 200 million people.
[13:20.700 --> 13:24.020]  I used to think it just meant if you were 100 miles away from Canada or Mexico.
[13:24.020 --> 13:28.920]  But no, it's the entire coastal part of the country too, which is a significant amount.
[13:28.920 --> 13:29.200]  Right.
[13:29.300 --> 13:32.220]  Most of the most populous cities are there.
[13:32.480 --> 13:47.500]  And, you know, it says on the ACLU site, and you can find this by searching for a 100-mile border zone, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Rhode Island, and Vermont lie entirely or almost entirely within this area,
[13:47.660 --> 13:48.800]  within this 100-mile border zone.
[13:49.080 --> 13:49.340]  Wow.
[13:49.540 --> 13:50.380]  All of New York?
[13:50.560 --> 13:51.240]  The entire state?
[13:51.240 --> 13:52.060]  Most of New York.
[13:52.080 --> 13:52.920]  Yeah, there should be some parts.
[13:53.100 --> 13:55.260]  There are some parts, but they're not the most populous parts.
[13:55.440 --> 13:55.480]  No.
[13:55.480 --> 13:57.100]  Nine of the ten largest U.S.
[13:57.400 --> 14:00.400]  metropolitan areas, as determined by the 2010 census, also fall within this zone.
[14:00.620 --> 14:05.880]  New York City, Los Angeles, Chicago, Houston, Philadelphia, Phoenix, San Antonio, San Diego, and San Jose.
[14:06.320 --> 14:11.340]  So there's a lot more to think about rather than just, you know, oh, coastal people, border people.
[14:11.460 --> 14:13.880]  It's weird, though, because we're not here in New York City.
[14:14.000 --> 14:15.840]  We're not 100 miles away from another country.
[14:16.020 --> 14:17.000]  We're next to the ocean.
[14:17.140 --> 14:23.020]  And the ocean isn't another country, but they use the border of the nation as the demarcation.
[14:23.220 --> 14:28.720]  And that means that you can be stopped by border patrol, even though you're nowhere near a border, an actual border.
[14:29.300 --> 14:32.960]  And it's disturbing, especially when you see the abuses that have been going on.
[14:33.100 --> 14:34.660]  Did they say why in the article?
[14:35.060 --> 14:35.420]  Why what?
[14:35.860 --> 14:36.660]  They want to fly drones?
[14:36.680 --> 14:37.280]  Why they're doing it?
[14:37.300 --> 14:38.820]  What is the alleged threat?
[14:39.500 --> 14:41.220]  Well, I mean, they're always going to find a threat.
[14:41.360 --> 14:41.780]  You know that.
[14:41.980 --> 14:44.140]  Yeah, I just want to know, like, what's on the menu today.
[14:44.200 --> 14:47.040]  This is going to be for law enforcement of various sorts.
[14:47.460 --> 14:47.820]  Surveillance.
[14:48.120 --> 14:48.740]  I mean...
[14:48.740 --> 14:50.180]  They're not dropping packages, right?
[14:50.360 --> 14:51.060]  Well, not yet.
[14:51.100 --> 14:52.680]  They might be dropping all sorts of things.
[14:52.780 --> 14:53.060]  Who knows?
[14:53.060 --> 14:54.680]  They don't drop those packages.
[14:54.680 --> 14:58.320]  Every instance you can think of where there's been a police helicopter, it will be a drone.
[14:58.500 --> 15:01.860]  It'll be a drone watching, and they can stay up for a long time.
[15:01.860 --> 15:04.580]  You don't have to hire people to do that.
[15:05.580 --> 15:12.060]  If they're looking for somebody, if they just want to get some statistics on citizens, they'll be able to do this.
[15:12.240 --> 15:13.340]  Oh, they're going to have surveillance?
[15:13.620 --> 15:14.280]  Oh, absolutely.
[15:14.560 --> 15:14.900]  No.
[15:15.200 --> 15:15.480]  Yeah.
[15:15.740 --> 15:16.400]  Get out.
[15:17.160 --> 15:18.160]  I wish I could.
[15:18.800 --> 15:23.700]  And, you know, a police helicopter is a thing that is actually much more tightly regulated than a drone would be.
[15:24.060 --> 15:31.980]  You still need, you know, all the standard sort of provisions for a human license to responsibly pilot one of these things and all that sort of good stuff.
[15:32.500 --> 15:39.780]  You know, this is basically granting that ability to a thing that's much smaller, much more numerous, much easier to work with on the part of the controllers.
[15:39.780 --> 16:01.880]  Now, this other story that I just saw from MIT News, since the first airplane took flight over 100 years ago, virtually every aircraft in the sky has flown with the help of moving parts, such as propellers, turbine blades, fans, all powered by the combustion of fossil fuels or by battery packs that produce a persistent whining buzz.
[16:01.880 --> 16:07.400]  But now, MIT engineers have built and flown the first ever plane with no moving parts.
[16:07.580 --> 16:22.680]  Instead of propellers or turbines, the light aircraft is powered by an ionic wind, a silent but mighty flow of ions that is produced aboard the plane and that generate enough thrust to propel the plane over a sustained, steady flight.
[16:22.680 --> 16:28.180]  And unlike turbine-powered planes, the aircraft does not depend on fossil fuels, as mentioned.
[16:28.400 --> 16:33.580]  Unlike propeller-driven drones, the new design is completely silent.
[16:34.520 --> 16:40.320]  Yeah, first ever sustained flight of a plane with no moving parts in the propulsion system.
[16:40.700 --> 16:48.420]  This has potentially opened up new and unexplored possibilities for aircraft which are quieter, mechanically simpler, and do not emit combustion emissions.
[16:48.420 --> 16:56.140]  Well, great about the, you know, the emissions, but this also means we're going to have drones up there that are completely quiet.
[16:56.280 --> 17:03.140]  You can always hear a drone, you always know when a drone is around, now, but in the future, they will be quiet, and they will be invisible.
[17:03.400 --> 17:04.220]  You won't be able to see them.
[17:04.540 --> 17:05.400]  They'll be there, though.
[17:06.420 --> 17:06.790]  Yeah.
[17:07.030 --> 17:08.440]  I mean, this is terrifying.
[17:08.640 --> 17:09.990]  I mean, you took the words out of my mouth.
[17:09.990 --> 17:13.460]  Combining these two stories together is really, really quite scary.
[17:15.080 --> 17:27.750]  You know, and just the idea of drones flying over various components of Manhattan continuously, 24 hours a day, dark or night, infrared, vision, watching everything happening.
[17:28.220 --> 17:35.640]  I mean, it's like a, you know, a nightmarish version of the Link NYC kiosks that we already have in place.
[17:35.640 --> 17:38.420]  It's similar to Skynet, like in Terminator.
[17:39.100 --> 17:39.420]  Yeah.
[17:39.660 --> 17:43.080]  But I wonder, how hard is it to disrupt an ion drive, you know?
[17:44.240 --> 17:47.720]  Like, is that really a reliable form of propulsion?
[17:47.900 --> 17:52.300]  Or if it fails because it's delicate in some way or susceptible to...
[17:52.300 --> 17:53.420]  Well, how would you disrupt an...
[17:53.420 --> 17:54.010]  Interference?
[17:54.180 --> 17:54.680]  I don't know.
[17:54.790 --> 17:56.360]  Okay, well, we'll explore this.
[17:56.400 --> 18:01.600]  I mean, it's worth talking about and seeing what the weaknesses are, if there are any.
[18:02.250 --> 18:06.510]  Yeah, and we'd love to hear from any listeners with more complete scientific knowledge of this subject.
[18:07.210 --> 18:10.490]  Give us a call later or get in touch with us, OTH at 2600.com.
[18:10.640 --> 18:22.030]  I mean, imagine like an electromagnetic event or something that disables all of these types of propulsion and they all drop from the sky at the same time, you know?
[18:22.180 --> 18:23.920]  That would kind of be lousy.
[18:24.250 --> 18:25.040]  Yeah, that would be.
[18:25.750 --> 18:31.060]  But one thing, you know, I don't know about that, but I do know that this is going to be something that is considered normal.
[18:31.600 --> 18:36.400]  Just like surveillance cameras everywhere now, something that would be unheard of 20 years ago, normal now.
[18:37.000 --> 18:49.820]  The smartphones we carry with us that rat us out every step we take, tell us all kinds of things or tell the world all kinds of things about us, completely normal now, unheard of a couple of decades ago and probably would have been met with great opposition.
[18:50.020 --> 18:52.680]  I remember when caller ID was viewed with suspicion.
[18:52.840 --> 18:55.980]  People didn't want to give out their private information when they called somebody.
[18:56.700 --> 18:58.360]  Who objects to that now?
[18:58.360 --> 18:59.760]  You know, it's become normal.
[19:00.220 --> 19:04.440]  And this is something that I'm afraid is going to become just as normal as anything else.
[19:04.440 --> 19:08.440]  And it will just change who we are and what our expectations of privacy are.
[19:08.800 --> 19:11.680]  You know, whatever remaining expectations of privacy there are.
[19:12.460 --> 19:13.240]  So, yeah.
[19:13.480 --> 19:19.620]  Yeah, I mean, that and, you know, huge chilling effect on our freedom of association, you know, which is enshrined in the First Amendment.
[19:19.620 --> 19:35.700]  You know, when people are afraid to congregate in certain places because they know they're going to be watched, because they know that their associations are going to be monitored, you know, this is going to have a very adverse effect on our ability to maintain a democracy.
[19:36.140 --> 19:48.340]  And I think it's part of a wider system that the military and authorities want to develop such that they can have active sensing of all aspects of our borders.
[19:48.340 --> 19:55.420]  And this maybe is a certain level of airspace from 500 feet or below that up to maybe 10,000 feet.
[19:55.420 --> 20:16.980]  And then basically use that in, like, a very comprehensive, like, battlefield management package where they can go to any one point and actively look live at any situation and or record any situation and go back and look at any of the borders at any altitude and any of the frequency ranges,
[20:17.280 --> 20:18.160]  et cetera, et cetera.
[20:18.540 --> 20:21.600]  Now, I was always freaked out when I lived down in Washington, D.C.
[20:21.600 --> 20:27.420]  And I used to drive down to Quantico in Virginia when I worked for the Department of Defense quite a bit.
[20:27.740 --> 20:34.260]  And there was these signs on the road that said, you know, warning, you know, speed here is monitored by aircraft.
[20:34.520 --> 20:39.640]  And it always freaked me out that there was a plane flying overhead monitoring, you know, the speed of my car.
[20:39.720 --> 20:41.120]  I always felt sorry for the guy in the plane.
[20:41.260 --> 20:41.960]  That's your job.
[20:42.020 --> 20:43.760]  You got to watch cars way down the ground.
[20:43.760 --> 20:44.480]  It's terrible.
[20:44.720 --> 20:48.460]  But, I mean, you could imagine drones doing this quite easily now.
[20:48.700 --> 20:50.880]  And that's really terrible as well.
[20:50.880 --> 20:56.220]  I mean, it's another, you know, kind of encroachment on our personal freedoms in that sense.
[20:56.360 --> 21:02.620]  If you want to see the potential of drones, watch the recently canceled show Colony, because boy, drones are evil in that program.
[21:02.800 --> 21:03.760]  And I'm sure there's other ones, too.
[21:04.020 --> 21:12.500]  But you realize just, you know, when they militarize these things, how efficient they get, how fast they are, how quiet they can be, and how deadly.
[21:12.960 --> 21:20.840]  And it may seem like science fiction now, but science fiction has a way of becoming science fact, and that's what I think is going to happen here.
[21:21.100 --> 21:22.200]  And we pay for it.
[21:22.800 --> 21:25.980]  It's our tax dollars that are going to the development of this stuff.
[21:26.790 --> 21:29.080]  We're also seeing, I think, a reduction of the human element.
[21:29.280 --> 21:44.880]  I mean, if a police officer, a human police officer, pulls you over for speeding, say, you know, it's still a person who's going to come up to your car, speak with you, assess the situation, possibly let you off with some kind of warning if they think it's warranted or whatever.
[21:45.100 --> 21:50.440]  But when these things are being done by just machines, there's none of that.
[21:50.540 --> 21:54.560]  And we have no human face to the authority that's being enacted on us.
[21:54.740 --> 21:54.980]  Yeah.
[21:55.140 --> 21:58.500]  You know, and that's really the case in most places in Europe nowadays.
[21:58.840 --> 22:05.940]  I remember one of the first times I was driving through Switzerland, I was wondering why everybody was really sort of on the rails when it came to the speed limit.
[22:05.940 --> 22:14.140]  And it's because there's so many of these cameras along the road that monitor, you know, the speed from which you get to point A to point B.
[22:14.220 --> 22:15.080]  Well, they're also Swiss.
[22:15.080 --> 22:15.900]  They're very exact.
[22:16.040 --> 22:17.520]  They are very, very much exact.
[22:17.700 --> 22:18.700]  They're very much on the rails.
[22:18.940 --> 22:22.180]  But there are these speed cameras constantly all around.
[22:22.200 --> 22:27.000]  And if you get from A to B too quickly, they know that you've been going over the speed limit and you get a ticket mailed to you.
[22:27.540 --> 22:40.380]  Well, my wife and I were just zipping around going from Grier to, you know, Lausanne and Geneva, and, you know, racking up tickets all throughout Switzerland, you know, while we were there.
[22:40.760 --> 22:43.900]  And I just thought, well, you know, I'm a great driver.
[22:44.100 --> 22:45.640]  I'm passing everybody here.
[22:45.840 --> 22:47.040]  But, you know, it really does.
[22:47.120 --> 22:53.540]  It has a real effect on what you do in your personal life, how you drive.
[22:54.380 --> 23:05.620]  You know, it's just, to me, it felt like such an encroachment on my personal liberty to be constantly monitored by these cameras all throughout a highway, in the middle of nowhere.
[23:05.780 --> 23:07.940]  You know, that somebody's watching your speed limit.
[23:08.480 --> 23:09.380]  You know, that's just...
[23:09.380 --> 23:10.160]  It's watching your car, though.
[23:10.260 --> 23:12.720]  It's not watching you as a person, right?
[23:12.880 --> 23:13.500]  That's true.
[23:13.720 --> 23:14.840]  It's watching the car.
[23:15.040 --> 23:15.260]  Yeah.
[23:15.680 --> 23:17.520]  However, there's a big...
[23:17.520 --> 23:29.940]  There's not really much of a distance to go between watching the car, knowing who's in the car, you know, knowing the fingerprint of the devices that are passing by in the car, associating it with a license plate, et cetera.
[23:30.740 --> 23:31.160]  Yeah.
[23:31.340 --> 23:35.640]  And not that I'm advocating irresponsible driving practices, because I'm not.
[23:35.780 --> 23:41.860]  But I also think it's very important that, yeah, it continues to be humans who are accountable.
[23:41.860 --> 23:46.900]  Because as we know, as we talk about so much on this program, machines are vulnerable.
[23:47.120 --> 23:51.020]  Systems are vulnerable to breaking down, to being interfered with.
[23:51.340 --> 23:55.780]  How much is it going to be trusted if a machine says you were doing something that you weren't?
[23:56.340 --> 23:58.700]  You know, where's the accountability in that?
[23:59.160 --> 23:59.580]  Yeah.
[23:59.840 --> 23:59.920]  Yeah.
[24:00.580 --> 24:15.480]  Well, we should have an Audubon built where you don't have a speed limit as like a concession in this, you know, so people can have some sort of new and limitless ability in light of all the control that there's in place.
[24:15.480 --> 24:16.960]  Yeah, I'm sure that'll work out well.
[24:17.140 --> 24:17.340]  Yeah.
[24:17.720 --> 24:18.140]  Yeah.
[24:19.140 --> 24:19.560]  Alex?
[24:19.700 --> 24:23.520]  I was just going to say, that's just, that's the BQE, but for all the traffic.
[24:23.660 --> 24:23.840]  Right.
[24:23.840 --> 24:24.340]  Right, essentially.
[24:24.560 --> 24:25.880]  When has anyone gone fast in the BQE?
[24:25.880 --> 24:26.400]  Well, that's what I mean.
[24:26.820 --> 24:29.160]  But for all the traffic, that's what it would be like.
[24:29.360 --> 24:29.860]  Oh, boy.
[24:30.460 --> 24:31.260]  Okay, moving on.
[24:31.420 --> 24:32.600]  This is an interesting story.
[24:32.760 --> 24:40.220]  Two New York lawmakers are working to draft a bill that would propose a social media check before a gun purchase.
[24:40.720 --> 24:41.100]  Yeah.
[24:41.340 --> 24:42.140]  How do you guys feel about that?
[24:42.240 --> 24:54.940]  Brooklyn Borough President Eric Adams and State Senator Kevin Palmer's proposal would allow authorities to review three years of social media history and one year of internet search history of any person seeking to purchase a firearm.
[24:55.140 --> 25:02.600]  A three-year review of a social media profile would give an easy profile of a person who is not suitable to hold and possess a firearm, Adams explains.
[25:02.880 --> 25:10.260]  The two are hoping to identify any hate speech on social media profiles, which are often revealed only after someone is arrested in a mass shooting.
[25:10.560 --> 25:17.540]  If the police department is reviewing a gang assault, a robbery, some type of shooting, they go out and do a social media profile investigation.
[25:18.960 --> 25:24.020]  You know how I feel about gun ownership and how lax it is in this country.
[25:24.180 --> 25:28.580]  This concerns me, though, because social media monitoring...
[25:28.580 --> 25:38.720]  First of all, I don't understand how somebody's social media accounts could be checked if, say, you don't have social media contacts.
[25:38.720 --> 25:48.140]  And what if you simply say you don't have social media accounts or you're not on particular services or you put something fake up that's designed to cover who you really are?
[25:48.260 --> 25:52.360]  How do they know when they're looking at your actual social media life?
[25:52.680 --> 25:53.960]  Alex, any ideas legally?
[25:54.680 --> 25:55.480]  Not really.
[25:55.780 --> 25:57.520]  I mean, that's obviously a problem.
[25:57.800 --> 25:59.500]  I mean, that's a really, really big problem.
[25:59.500 --> 26:08.660]  And not having an account on social media could be technically a red flag for these people to think that you're hiding something, that, you know, you're off kilter.
[26:08.740 --> 26:09.520]  We've arrived.
[26:09.520 --> 26:13.600]  Okay, so now if you don't have an account on social media, you're suspicious.
[26:14.040 --> 26:15.960]  It could quite possibly be that way.
[26:16.000 --> 26:19.580]  I mean, I'm not a huge fan of, you know, handgun ownership, especially...
[26:19.580 --> 26:20.340]  It's got nothing to do with guns.
[26:20.600 --> 26:21.780]  This is not a gun issue.
[26:21.940 --> 26:23.580]  The gun is simply the foot in the door.
[26:23.760 --> 26:24.140]  I agree.
[26:24.140 --> 26:25.960]  But it's the monitoring of the social media.
[26:26.100 --> 26:27.320]  That is the scary part.
[26:27.380 --> 26:35.540]  Well, it's also premised on, I think, an erroneous assumption here, too, that if you were one way three years ago, you're still going to be that way today.
[26:35.540 --> 26:38.880]  People can have an evolution of their ideas.
[26:39.040 --> 26:40.320]  They can progress as people.
[26:40.580 --> 26:44.100]  Yeah, many white supremacists are currently serving in government, you know?
[26:44.200 --> 26:45.760]  So, you know, transformation's incredible.
[26:45.920 --> 26:46.920]  That's one example.
[26:47.060 --> 26:47.840]  That is, yeah.
[26:47.960 --> 26:48.720]  That is one example.
[26:48.960 --> 26:53.260]  But, you know, you're not necessarily the person you were when you were three years ago.
[26:53.280 --> 26:56.360]  And that, I think, has a lot of relevance, especially to younger people.
[26:56.580 --> 27:04.880]  You know, the years between 18 and 21 or 21 and 24 or 25, you know, those are really, really big and formative years where your ideas can evolve.
[27:04.880 --> 27:09.700]  And you say a lot of stupid things that shouldn't necessarily restrict your constitutional rights.
[27:10.500 --> 27:11.140]  True, true.
[27:11.260 --> 27:14.060]  I'm sure Judge Kavanaugh would agree with that wholeheartedly.
[27:14.780 --> 27:25.300]  But, you know, it just disturbs me that we're expected to be judged based on what we say online and, you know, our contacts, our friends.
[27:25.500 --> 27:28.960]  There is so much that can be gotten from all of that.
[27:28.960 --> 27:34.300]  And I think just the existence of that alone, the uniformity of it, that is the really scary part here.
[27:35.080 --> 27:49.820]  And, you know, regardless of how you feel about gun ownership, that kind of surveillance, that kind of scrutiny based on what you do, what you say, who you talk to online, that is truly Orwellian and will go far beyond just the issue of gun ownership.
[27:50.000 --> 27:58.000]  Well, that too, and, you know, the failure to, let's say, identify all of your social media accounts or what constitutes a social media account.
[27:58.160 --> 28:08.480]  If you omit any of this, and then you're given, let's say, a permit to have it gone, and it turned out that you didn't disclose all of your social media profiles, that could be considered, you know, a false statement.
[28:08.620 --> 28:09.620]  But how do they find that out?
[28:09.780 --> 28:16.660]  I mean, I don't get how they know what social media... who uses their real name on Twitter, you know?
[28:16.660 --> 28:17.000]  You do.
[28:17.300 --> 28:17.980]  No, I don't.
[28:18.100 --> 28:18.280]  I know.
[28:18.460 --> 28:18.620]  I'm kidding.
[28:19.690 --> 28:21.380]  Nobody... I mean, people have handles.
[28:21.680 --> 28:23.160]  I don't use real names on Facebook.
[28:23.200 --> 28:24.940]  I don't use real names anywhere, all right?
[28:25.060 --> 28:26.600]  It's people think they know real names and they don't.
[28:26.700 --> 28:28.320]  But the point is, you don't have to.
[28:28.660 --> 28:30.080]  Technically, you don't have to.
[28:30.560 --> 28:32.220]  So how are they going to know?
[28:32.340 --> 28:33.440]  How are they going to enforce that?
[28:33.460 --> 28:37.720]  Unless they make it the law that you have to use your real name under certain situations.
[28:38.020 --> 28:39.280]  Well, perhaps they could do that.
[28:39.360 --> 28:41.960]  Well, you know, but there's other ways of tying you together.
[28:42.120 --> 28:50.180]  I mean, it's easy to find people on social media, even when they're using a handle by looking for photos in which they were tagged, you know, several years ago, or if they've changed their handle.
[28:50.260 --> 28:51.260]  There's ways they can do this.
[28:51.380 --> 28:52.840]  Open source intelligence methodologies.
[28:53.120 --> 28:54.180]  Well, that's what concerns me.
[28:54.320 --> 28:54.800]  Absolutely.
[28:54.980 --> 29:03.260]  I mean, we can talk to Rambam about this ad nauseum, you know, and he'll go through, you know, a litany of ways that you could discover aliases of people on social media.
[29:03.720 --> 29:09.260]  So it could be done, and a failure to disclose that could give rise to some kind of criminal liability.
[29:09.320 --> 29:18.900]  But what concerns me more is, you know, discriminating based on viewpoint, of somebody's viewpoint in the past about what they have a right to do right now.
[29:19.380 --> 29:25.840]  That, you know, I don't like to use the slippery slope argument word, but it certainly, I think, is justified in this particular situation.
[29:26.060 --> 29:33.020]  It seems like a good, well-intentioned idea, because a lot of these lunatics go on social media rants.
[29:33.940 --> 29:52.080]  But, you know, I think we should be focusing more on mental health, more in psychological profile, more in getting people, you know, medical treatment so that, you know, we don't have this problem with gun owners to begin with than having them disclose their social media identities and having government agents look into the history of whatever their posts were,
[29:52.260 --> 29:54.580]  making judgment calls on the basis of content.
[29:54.760 --> 29:56.380]  Yeah, that's not the right way to do it.
[29:56.440 --> 29:56.940]  I agree with that.
[29:57.120 --> 29:57.480]  Go ahead, Rob.
[29:57.660 --> 30:03.640]  And social media has grown into this beast it is today, sort of organically, based on how people were using it.
[30:03.720 --> 30:09.080]  But one thing it certainly is not, is it is not a legal-grade record of your life.
[30:09.080 --> 30:10.060]  It is not accountable.
[30:10.320 --> 30:11.940]  People are impersonated on social media.
[30:12.060 --> 30:17.600]  Public figures are, you know, constantly being impersonated on social media by fans and spam bots and everything else.
[30:18.200 --> 30:27.900]  You know, I went, maybe 15 years ago, I had a live journal in character as an alien that, you know, was a character in a story I was collaboratively writing with some friends.
[30:28.420 --> 30:35.720]  You know, there's all kinds of things going on with social media that has nothing to do with who you are as a person, whether or not you should be allowed to buy restricted things.
[30:35.920 --> 30:38.020]  You know, in my perfect world, nobody would have a gun.
[30:38.220 --> 30:42.960]  But, you know, there are systems in place and they have nothing to do with Facebook or Twitter.
[30:43.160 --> 30:46.240]  Also, this article mentioned search history.
[30:46.720 --> 30:55.700]  Now, that's an even, you know, arguably much worse thing to worry about people keeping records of than whatever you put on your Facebook.
[30:55.700 --> 31:01.140]  If you're dumb enough to be on Google all the time, logged in and searching, yeah, guess what?
[31:01.180 --> 31:04.380]  All of that is recordable and tied to you.
[31:04.660 --> 31:07.600]  You know, you don't have to be signed on to Google all the time.
[31:07.700 --> 31:08.720]  You can log out of Google.
[31:08.860 --> 31:10.640]  You can use tour browser.
[31:10.840 --> 31:12.200]  There's a number of things you can do.
[31:12.620 --> 31:13.560]  Nothing is 100%.
[31:13.560 --> 31:14.340]  Nothing is perfect.
[31:14.680 --> 31:19.380]  But you have to take some, you know, some stand to protect your own privacy.
[31:19.540 --> 31:24.060]  But I was also thinking, you know, we're talking about just for the purpose of getting guns.
[31:24.300 --> 31:35.460]  People who apply for jobs oftentimes have to give out their social contacts, social media contacts, or just, I guess, screen name.
[31:35.820 --> 31:38.020]  And they're scrutinizing that way.
[31:38.060 --> 31:38.780]  It's already happening.
[31:39.000 --> 31:42.940]  I've never encountered that myself, but I know it does happen.
[31:43.140 --> 31:43.620]  Oh, yeah.
[31:43.740 --> 31:58.200]  And employers will routinely look at this anyhow, even if they don't necessarily require you to disclose it, they're always going to try to find it to begin with, to see if, you know, you have a messy history of immature photos, things like that, crazy ransom posts.
[31:58.360 --> 32:01.560]  So, yeah, people are already making judgment calls on the basis of this content.
[32:01.840 --> 32:12.220]  And there's actually a cottage industry that has popped up with respect to high school students who need to sort of cover up their tracks when they're applying to colleges.
[32:12.360 --> 32:19.800]  Because colleges, you know, especially at elite universities are looking at the social media profiles of the potential students.
[32:19.980 --> 32:28.820]  And if they find them, you know, with photos of underage drinking and drug usage, etc., they may be disqualified from entering that particular university.
[32:28.820 --> 32:41.900]  So a lot of these students are trying to figure out innovative ways to keep their social media profiles, but hide them from, you know, their prospective colleges, the admissions officers at these particular colleges.
[32:41.900 --> 32:49.600]  So, I mean, what's interesting is if this law is passed, and I don't think it will be, I don't think it passes the smell test when it comes to the Fourth Amendment.
[32:50.660 --> 33:05.180]  But if it is passed, you could use the same methodologies that college students were using to hide their underage drinking and minor indiscretions to, you know, cover up social media profiles for purposes of gun applications.
[33:05.720 --> 33:08.720]  Like I said, the gun thing is just, it's a smoke screen.
[33:09.060 --> 33:13.120]  This is something that, you know, affects us in every part of our lives.
[33:13.380 --> 33:19.700]  And if we accept it, you know, that social media, real names are all tied together, then we will be completely controlled by it.
[33:19.820 --> 33:22.380]  Yeah, but, you know, I also think that Rob is right, though.
[33:22.540 --> 33:27.860]  I feel like the search history component of this is even more troubling than the social media content.
[33:28.260 --> 33:33.980]  I mean, there's just so many intimate details of somebody's life in an internet search history.
[33:34.120 --> 33:37.200]  And most people don't know to log out of Google.
[33:37.360 --> 33:41.240]  Most people don't use DuckDuckGo or the Tor browser or VPN.
[33:41.300 --> 33:55.700]  And now that the Trump administration has rolled back the Obama-era rules with respect to ISPs collecting data about their users and monetizing that data, there's even more of it to be mined by the authorities for these particular purposes.
[33:55.700 --> 34:02.780]  So, folks, if you're concerned about this, there is a way that you can protect yourself, and that's listening to hackers.
[34:03.240 --> 34:08.180]  Going to hacker conferences, reading hacker magazines, listening to hacker radio shows, talking to hackers at meetings.
[34:09.080 --> 34:09.520]  Listen.
[34:09.850 --> 34:11.680]  There are all kinds of things you can learn.
[34:11.810 --> 34:13.720]  You're not going to be taught this by the authorities.
[34:14.060 --> 34:15.390]  They want you to submit.
[34:15.390 --> 34:24.140]  They want you to reveal all your information and be completely under their control, whether it's by drones, whether it's by social media, whether it's by good old-fashioned wiretapping.
[34:25.060 --> 34:29.700]  They want to know everything that you're up to, all your thoughts, all your feelings, all your potential.
[34:29.950 --> 34:44.680]  I think the spirit of this is maybe in the right place, like that authorities would do everything possible, including checking these types of things to prevent the kind of heinous stuff we've seen in the last couple of years or decades.
[34:45.700 --> 34:53.560]  But in practice, it's the impracticality and the high failure rate of something like this were it to be implemented.
[34:54.330 --> 34:58.600]  And my first question was like, who is actually checking this?
[34:58.720 --> 35:11.850]  And I know that's sort of rhetorical and funny and probably a dumb question, because it sounds like from what you've read that it's authorities or police as a part of a federal background check or other kind of local check.
[35:11.850 --> 35:18.160]  And if it was a gun shop owner, what if their views are sort of aligned with all your posts?
[35:18.370 --> 35:27.310]  I mean, they're not going to flag you if they're posting as much crazy gun stuff or nationalist rhetoric or whatever it is.
[35:27.560 --> 35:37.220]  And also, to Alex's point, the idea of something changing in the last three years, I think that I could see a lot of failure over misinterpretations.
[35:37.350 --> 35:51.260]  Maybe you were robbed or something and your views have changed politically because of something that, yeah, you maybe aren't sharing that particular event, but it drastically changed your point of view and your concept of a threat model.
[35:51.400 --> 35:54.060]  I'm not saying that's my response to that.
[35:54.180 --> 36:05.360]  But people do have events in their lives that make them a lot crazier or a lot more paranoid or a lot, you know, anyway, that can influence how they change or how they act online and stuff.
[36:05.520 --> 36:08.580]  The other thing that you mentioned was fake versus not having an account.
[36:08.740 --> 36:16.640]  I wonder which is weighted as scarier, somebody who does not have an account or somebody who has a fake account and, you know, which is more of a threat?
[36:16.740 --> 36:18.660]  They're hiding something or they're really hiding something.
[36:18.740 --> 36:19.880]  Which one is hiding more?
[36:20.080 --> 36:23.360]  And then lastly, people that just have a normal account.
[36:23.560 --> 36:25.020]  Yeah, they have crazy beliefs.
[36:25.180 --> 36:36.460]  They've got the, you know, the old, you know, crazy memorabilia from bygone eras, whatever, you know, things they keep in their closets, the skeletons and all that never gets posted.
[36:36.640 --> 36:36.960]  Okay.
[36:37.140 --> 36:41.340]  The authorities or whomever checks the box and boy, we did our best effort.
[36:41.800 --> 36:49.660]  We had no idea all these, you know, crazy proclivities that this person had and all these other forums they were on through tour or whatever.
[36:49.950 --> 36:54.600]  It just, I could just see this high failure that that was the theme in what I was hearing.
[36:54.780 --> 36:55.040]  Yeah.
[36:55.100 --> 36:59.100]  You know, you, you bring up another really interesting point, I mean, who's doing the checking here, right?
[36:59.200 --> 36:59.950]  I mean, think about that.
[37:00.100 --> 37:10.820]  In all likelihood, this will probably be farmed out to some government contractor, some third party, probably some private entity that'll be getting paid, you know, oodles of money in order to perform these particular searches.
[37:11.000 --> 37:18.680]  And then they become a repository of personal information on anybody who's ever gone through this permitting process, whatever the application is for.
[37:18.800 --> 37:26.360]  Like you said, and I agree, gun ownership bit is probably just a red herring, but then they are going to be the stewards of this massive amount of data.
[37:26.500 --> 37:39.080]  And you think about what happened with OPM, the Office of Personnel Management, and all of the SF-86 information, the national security questionnaires that anybody who has a security clearance with the US government has to fill out all of these intimate details.
[37:39.580 --> 37:44.980]  And I don't believe that in the SF-86, by the way, you have to disclose your social media contacts.
[37:45.140 --> 37:46.520]  I haven't filled out one of those in a while.
[37:46.680 --> 37:48.280]  But OPM was breached.
[37:48.280 --> 37:53.780]  OPM was breached in a pretty simple way using a spoof domain name, opmlearning.com.
[37:53.780 --> 37:53.930]  Right, right.
[37:54.280 --> 37:59.640]  And all of this information was exfiltrated quite likely over to China.
[37:59.640 --> 38:07.160]  I actually got two data breach notification letters from that because I had an intelligence community clearance and a Department of Defense clearance.
[38:07.800 --> 38:10.280]  So I got breached essentially twice.
[38:10.500 --> 38:12.740]  My SF-86 information is in some foreign country.
[38:12.780 --> 38:13.900]  And through no fault of your own.
[38:13.960 --> 38:15.120]  No fault of my own whatsoever.
[38:15.120 --> 38:27.080]  You can guarantee that there will be some disaster like this with respect to this information, which could be even more relevant to, let's say, a foreign government or a hostile power than the SF-86.
[38:27.080 --> 38:35.930]  Not even a breach, but somebody, an employee within this organization that will abuse it for personal reasons or because they're being blackmailed or who knows why.
[38:36.080 --> 38:36.680]  Oh, no doubt.
[38:37.160 --> 38:37.640]  Absolutely.
[38:38.060 --> 38:40.320]  Any kind of insider threat is a big problem there, too.
[38:40.740 --> 38:49.700]  And just to reiterate, I just think that this spirit, yeah, okay, we'll want to do everything we can, but it's placing it all on innocent people.
[38:50.020 --> 39:07.400]  And really, you know, if you support gun rights and all of that, I think steering a little bit clearer of the manufacturers, the only way this is going to actually work is if those advocates are allied with people who want better rules, they want better handling,
[39:07.580 --> 39:08.620]  they want safety.
[39:09.320 --> 39:17.160]  Yeah, you know, you can advocate and be, you know, into guns and all that, but the manufacturers would have you believe that it's mutually exclusive.
[39:17.360 --> 39:18.720]  And that just is wrong.
[39:18.740 --> 39:20.980]  It's not how we get things done politically in this country.
[39:21.180 --> 39:34.360]  And I just feel like those efforts would go a lot further than trying to implement something that, as Alex said, could be done as a batch in some warehouse of data that then is susceptible in its own right.
[39:34.400 --> 39:35.760]  Yeah, I don't give the wrong impression.
[39:35.980 --> 39:38.980]  I mean, it's the normalization of this that bothers me.
[39:39.120 --> 39:42.040]  It's not the looking into people that want to get a firearm.
[39:42.140 --> 39:43.080]  Yeah, you should look into them.
[39:43.140 --> 39:44.380]  You should know their history.
[39:44.480 --> 39:52.680]  There are legitimate ways of doing this that don't involve simply turning over your Google searches and all your social profiles, social network profiles.
[39:53.220 --> 40:00.960]  And, you know, if you have some kind of inkling that somebody is up to something nefarious, by all means, check out whatever they have online.
[40:01.220 --> 40:11.660]  But to make this something that's normal, to make this something that we're all expected to hand over our Twitter info, our Facebook info, Instagram, whatever, that is where the real danger is.
[40:11.800 --> 40:21.220]  Because then everything we say ever, everything we think and communicate and talk, the people we talk to, that becomes something that is under scrutiny for all time.
[40:21.220 --> 40:26.860]  And that's a major, major part of our private lives that suddenly is compromised, Rob.
[40:26.980 --> 40:27.100]  Right.
[40:27.100 --> 40:38.020]  And for at least the past couple of decades, so many of the absolute worst wounds to civil liberties, to personal freedoms have been done in the name of things that ostensibly we could all get behind.
[40:38.200 --> 40:42.980]  Like, oh, this will, you know, protect you from the terrorists or the child abusers or, you know, this or that.
[40:43.140 --> 40:52.240]  And, and it's just used as some, like, some carrot to dangle in front of people to get them to give up civil liberties that will, that they'll never in, you know, reasonably get back.
[40:52.360 --> 40:53.380]  It's protect you from the gun owners.
[40:53.520 --> 40:54.820]  It's a different version of that.
[40:55.000 --> 40:56.660]  But it's, it's just as dangerous.
[40:56.880 --> 41:07.000]  Or maybe you post about how rotten kids are, and that escalates your lottery for being sterilized or something, because you do not belong in any kind of family context.
[41:07.000 --> 41:08.120]  You think kids are rotten.
[41:08.280 --> 41:09.950]  Okay, wait, no, we've talked about this.
[41:10.080 --> 41:12.720]  We write the ideas down, we send them the blackmailer first.
[41:12.720 --> 41:14.900]  If they reject them, we talk about them on the show.
[41:15.300 --> 41:18.900]  Otherwise, you know, we're losing out on a lot of potential payment here.
[41:19.080 --> 41:20.080]  Kids could be rotten.
[41:20.540 --> 41:20.950]  Yeah.
[41:21.480 --> 41:23.660]  Hey, I said I want to take phone calls.
[41:23.820 --> 41:27.020]  I also want to read these letters, but I don't think we're going to have time, because I want to take phone calls.
[41:27.140 --> 41:29.060]  212-209-2877.
[41:29.430 --> 41:31.700]  We have all these new phone lines that we want to break in.
[41:32.080 --> 41:33.720]  And we know there's a lot of people out there.
[41:33.860 --> 41:35.060]  So give a call now.
[41:35.180 --> 41:36.500]  212-209-2877.
[41:37.100 --> 41:40.760]  It's not necessarily first come, first serve, because we have so many to choose from.
[41:40.840 --> 41:46.700]  So I'm going to pick a button at random, and we'll see how it sounds over the air.
[41:47.860 --> 41:49.100]  212-209-2877.
[41:49.340 --> 41:50.450]  Now they're not lighting up.
[41:50.580 --> 41:53.430]  They lit up when people were just calling to see how many lights they could light up.
[41:53.520 --> 41:54.720]  But now people are shy.
[41:55.520 --> 41:58.540]  You have to dial with determination.
[41:58.700 --> 42:01.000]  You have to be deliberate when you punch the buttons.
[42:01.140 --> 42:02.700]  Otherwise, the phone company will ignore you.
[42:02.780 --> 42:04.340]  Yeah, I think there's a delay of some sort.
[42:04.520 --> 42:06.930]  Maybe a phone company delay, maybe internet delay.
[42:07.020 --> 42:07.280]  Who knows?
[42:07.340 --> 42:10.680]  But I'm going to pick this one over here and say good evening.
[42:10.800 --> 42:11.900]  You're on the radio.
[42:12.640 --> 42:13.040]  Hi.
[42:13.240 --> 42:13.520]  Hi.
[42:14.460 --> 42:29.660]  When you were talking about our being at the edge of the country when we're on the coast, I've been aware for a long time that we're global warming, that we're close to the water.
[42:30.520 --> 42:31.340]  Oh, yeah.
[42:31.340 --> 42:32.960]  I think we were aware we're close to the water.
[42:33.180 --> 42:35.930]  We just weren't aware that was considered, you know, a border.
[42:36.120 --> 42:39.060]  Do you consider that an international border, like when you go to the beach?
[42:40.300 --> 42:48.520]  Well, I think 200 miles out is the border for fishing and stuff like that.
[42:48.520 --> 42:49.020]  Yeah.
[42:49.020 --> 42:49.430]  Okay, yes.
[42:49.580 --> 42:50.580]  International waters and all that.
[42:50.580 --> 42:53.580]  Yeah, that'd be like resources or fishing rights.
[42:54.000 --> 42:59.280]  That I could see, but not the actual shoreline, which I think is how they're doing this.
[43:01.460 --> 43:02.880]  I'm not seeing the difference.
[43:03.200 --> 43:05.960]  Well, one is 200 miles out and one is right there on the shore.
[43:06.020 --> 43:07.500]  One is 100 inland, right?
[43:07.620 --> 43:08.320]  Ah, gotcha.
[43:08.500 --> 43:08.680]  Yeah.
[43:08.840 --> 43:12.840]  Yeah, we're saying basically start at the water and go 100 miles in.
[43:12.840 --> 43:13.340]  Yeah.
[43:13.480 --> 43:16.060]  That is what they want to patrol, not 200 out.
[43:16.140 --> 43:17.340]  That's what they do patrol now.
[43:17.600 --> 43:18.320]  Or do patrol, yeah.
[43:18.430 --> 43:18.600]  Yeah.
[43:18.980 --> 43:23.860]  And that's what is considered border, you know, the border with the rest of the world.
[43:24.560 --> 43:44.780]  That is a little odd, because if somebody, ha, ha, ha, were going to invade us by ocean, ocean, and, you know, we all know how plausible that is, it would, they would have to come by right by the border before they could get 100 miles in, right?
[43:44.940 --> 43:45.080]  Yeah.
[43:45.140 --> 43:47.700]  I mean, they'd be detected well before they got anywhere near there.
[43:47.700 --> 43:55.040]  And I think that's kind of our point, is that this would mostly be useful for people who are already here.
[43:55.360 --> 43:55.520]  Yeah.
[43:56.380 --> 44:05.520]  Another thing I wanted to mention, you were talking about our Twitter and Facebook and other social media things.
[44:05.920 --> 44:11.560]  When I tweet something on Twitter, I don't expect privacy.
[44:11.760 --> 44:16.540]  I mean, I'm tweeting to, you know, to the world at large.
[44:16.980 --> 44:23.620]  Are you, are you tweeting as, as your real name and, and somebody who lives at your address and with all your personal information?
[44:26.020 --> 44:31.920]  Well, that's not attached to the tweet, but it's attached to the account, I guess.
[44:32.100 --> 44:33.260]  Okay, but that's your choice.
[44:33.520 --> 44:38.980]  And I guess my name, my, my, my picture is, it's, it's really me.
[44:39.300 --> 44:40.240]  True, but, but...
[44:40.240 --> 44:41.240]  They may not know my name, but...
[44:41.240 --> 44:50.860]  You made the choice to do it that way, and the way it's set up, you can, you can, you know, be anonymous, you can be, you know, a completely different name if you choose to.
[44:51.020 --> 44:55.000]  And I, I think what we're seeing with things like this is that beginning to erode.
[44:56.380 --> 45:11.380]  Well, don't, don't employers often do a similar sort of thing when they're, they're looking for potential employees that they, they check off sorts of social media posts.
[45:11.620 --> 45:21.560]  Yes, that is something that we, we've mentioned as well that, uh, is happening frequently, but they don't have the weight of the law behind them where you have to, uh, give out this information.
[45:21.680 --> 45:26.220]  You might not get the job, but, uh, we're talking about something that, uh, you know, it's changing the rules a little bit.
[45:26.560 --> 45:41.020]  Yeah, I guess, um, something that comes to mind, maybe Alex, um, could clarify this, but would you, and I don't know if this might be a bad, uh, parallel or, or, uh, correlation or example, but would you consider a social media post, uh, akin to like a signed letter or,
[45:41.100 --> 45:46.980]  or a document of some sort that is, you know, um, uh, intrinsically tied to your identity?
[45:48.680 --> 45:49.040]  Maybe.
[45:49.640 --> 45:50.000]  Yeah.
[45:50.160 --> 45:52.340]  I mean, it, uh, I think it could be.
[45:52.500 --> 45:52.800]  Yeah.
[45:52.960 --> 45:54.300]  I, I, I don't see why not.
[45:54.400 --> 45:54.480]  Right.
[45:54.620 --> 46:00.700]  I mean, I think of the Trump example, which I hate to say, but, uh, that's intrinsically tied to a particular person.
[46:01.120 --> 46:01.240]  Yeah.
[46:01.460 --> 46:12.300]  I mean, you, you have plenty of, you know, celebrities claiming that, you know, oh, my account must have been hacked two or three years ago when I went on that, you know, tirade, that homophobic tirade or something like that.
[46:12.380 --> 46:12.520]  Right.
[46:12.660 --> 46:14.740]  I mean, there's plenty of that happening.
[46:14.940 --> 46:18.900]  Or like, or like it is if you're verified on whatever platform or something.
[46:19.060 --> 46:20.220]  Oh, don't get me started on that.
[46:20.480 --> 46:23.020]  I know that's a, what a scam that is.
[46:23.100 --> 46:24.080]  These are all important questions.
[46:24.140 --> 46:24.680]  I'm not even going to get started.
[46:24.900 --> 46:26.260]  Uh, we're going to take more phone calls.
[46:26.340 --> 46:27.740]  212-209-2877.
[46:28.100 --> 46:28.340]  Good evening.
[46:28.500 --> 46:29.100]  You're on Off the Hook.
[46:29.220 --> 46:29.420]  Go ahead.
[46:31.060 --> 46:31.680]  Speak up.
[46:32.480 --> 46:32.840]  Hello.
[46:33.100 --> 46:33.340]  Hi.
[46:33.460 --> 46:33.900]  You're on the air.
[46:33.960 --> 46:34.200]  Go ahead.
[46:34.340 --> 46:34.440]  Hi.
[46:34.520 --> 46:37.200]  I didn't, I was waiting for the voicemail to come back on.
[46:37.520 --> 46:38.740]  Oh, did you reach the voicemail?
[46:38.860 --> 46:39.020]  Wow.
[46:39.640 --> 46:41.660]  I think everybody's getting transferred to that now.
[46:42.340 --> 46:42.780]  Yeah, twice.
[46:42.940 --> 46:44.120]  This is, I'm a first time caller.
[46:44.240 --> 46:45.780]  My name is Barbara from Long Island.
[46:46.080 --> 46:46.440]  Hello.
[46:46.680 --> 46:56.580]  Uh, I just, hi, I just wanted, I just heard on the news this morning that, uh, the New York Police Department has an eye on the sky about the drones flying over the Thanksgiving Day parade.
[46:56.780 --> 46:57.100]  Oh, boy.
[46:58.020 --> 47:05.740]  Yeah, they said they're going to, uh, keep an eye and you're gonna, you risk losing it or you can, you can get a ticket if they, they find you.
[47:06.260 --> 47:09.960]  Wait, you, say that, you, you risk losing what now if you do?
[47:09.960 --> 47:18.740]  The drone and the police department will be using extra, uh, extra technology to find out where they're being flown from.
[47:19.920 --> 47:20.520]  Okay.
[47:20.800 --> 47:25.860]  And if they catch you, uh, driving over a big crowd, it constitutes reckless endangerment.
[47:26.000 --> 47:33.560]  Oh, this is like people using drones to capture images or otherwise monitor the parade privately.
[47:34.360 --> 47:34.940]  I see.
[47:35.160 --> 47:35.500]  I see.
[47:35.500 --> 47:35.700]  Yes.
[47:35.900 --> 47:36.520]  Over the Thanksgiving Day parade.
[47:36.640 --> 47:39.560]  I never even thought that they would do that, but I guess now they might try.
[47:39.560 --> 47:41.200]  There's an, there's a huge prevalence.
[47:41.200 --> 47:44.800]  We've had at least three Christmases with a lot of drones given as gifts.
[47:44.900 --> 47:48.260]  So that's perhaps something they're trying to do in conjunction with the FAA.
[47:48.760 --> 47:49.100]  Yeah.
[47:49.180 --> 47:50.940]  Well, you know, they, they want to play with these toys.
[47:51.060 --> 47:52.340]  They don't want us to play with these toys.
[47:52.460 --> 47:53.220]  That's, that's for sure.
[47:53.360 --> 47:56.040]  And, you know, there's some good reason for that because they can be dangerous.
[47:56.040 --> 47:57.960]  Uh, but, uh, that's interesting.
[47:58.080 --> 47:59.780]  I hadn't heard that before about the, the parade.
[48:00.380 --> 48:01.100]  Uh, but, uh...
[48:01.100 --> 48:01.700]  Yeah, I heard that.
[48:01.880 --> 48:07.020]  I wanted to know how can they, uh, they, uh, locate who's flying the drone?
[48:07.200 --> 48:09.400]  They said they have the intelligence, but...
[48:09.400 --> 48:10.460]  So, so...
[48:10.460 --> 48:13.180]  I mean, you could be at Central Park and be flying it over the parade.
[48:13.220 --> 48:13.540]  Right.
[48:13.700 --> 48:15.040]  And there could be many of them.
[48:15.240 --> 48:25.920]  But, uh, as it stands, the, uh, rules for being a drone operator require you to register with the FAA and, um, also download their app, the Know Before You Fly app.
[48:26.040 --> 48:28.840]  I believe, although it's probably changed forms in one way or another.
[48:29.060 --> 48:37.580]  Anyway, uh, there's a license number that you're supposed to, um, uh, attach to your drone that uniquely identifies your drone.
[48:37.760 --> 48:42.120]  I'm not saying that whatever they're monitoring with could, um, uh, could see it.
[48:42.160 --> 48:43.020]  It potentially could.
[48:43.040 --> 48:45.000]  Well, eventually, that's the idea.
[48:45.240 --> 48:45.600]  That's right.
[48:45.760 --> 48:52.620]  But your, your individual drone is, is to have a license number just like any other aircraft and that, um, is tied to you.
[48:52.620 --> 49:04.640]  The wireless signature, uh, in other words, your ability to control it and whatever data is going back, GPS location could potentially be associated with the Mac address or other parts of your phone or whatever is controlling the drone.
[49:04.640 --> 49:13.300]  That, in conjunction with any kind of app, uh, back end in the app that we don't know about or the license itself, all of that could be used in, in, uh, building some kind of case.
[49:13.500 --> 49:13.640]  All right.
[49:13.740 --> 49:14.560]  Thank you very much for your call.
[49:15.400 --> 49:17.680]  Is this for any drone or like a toy?
[49:17.860 --> 49:20.300]  I mean, you know, cause they sell different varieties of drones.
[49:20.460 --> 49:23.740]  Anything, anything over 16 ounces, I believe, or at about a pound.
[49:24.020 --> 49:28.000]  So anything smaller like you'd have in your office, I think that's what the current weight restriction is.
[49:28.000 --> 49:29.360]  Or it's just under a pound.
[49:29.480 --> 49:37.920]  It's like 14 ounces and above or something, which is any drone, like an old parrot or whatever kind you have is pretty much over about 14 or 16 ounces.
[49:38.460 --> 49:38.740]  All right.
[49:38.800 --> 49:39.160]  Thank you.
[49:39.300 --> 49:40.140]  Thank you for that call.
[49:40.300 --> 49:44.520]  And for the, uh, interesting topic, our phone lines are open 2 1 2 2 0 9 2 8 7 7.
[49:44.560 --> 49:48.140]  Again, sorry for everybody winding up in, uh, our general manager's voicemail box.
[49:48.280 --> 49:50.980]  We're going to fix that, but, uh, we're asking people to be patient.
[49:51.520 --> 49:53.660]  Um, I, I use line four both times.
[49:53.660 --> 49:55.500]  You hear that, that kind of clicking sound.
[49:55.500 --> 49:57.380]  I'm going to see if that's also on line three.
[49:57.620 --> 49:58.080]  Let's try that.
[49:58.160 --> 49:58.440]  Good evening.
[49:58.460 --> 49:59.540]  You're on off the hook.
[50:01.000 --> 50:02.540]  Hi, uh, I have a question.
[50:02.700 --> 50:03.140]  Yeah, I hear it.
[50:03.220 --> 50:03.440]  I hear it.
[50:04.240 --> 50:04.860]  Can you hear me?
[50:04.980 --> 50:05.440]  Yes, go ahead.
[50:05.940 --> 50:11.840]  So I have a question concerning like, um, devices like, um, Roombas or the vacuuming devices.
[50:12.060 --> 50:20.980]  Have you done any reports on like whether they're sending data out, um, like IOT, internet of things, um, I can take your answer off there.
[50:20.980 --> 50:29.540]  But basically what I want to know is how can I tell if somebody's installed some spyware or, or transmitting data or information to that device?
[50:29.680 --> 50:29.920]  Thank you.
[50:31.160 --> 50:31.600]  Yeah.
[50:31.820 --> 50:39.300]  You know, if the Roomba's working, um, and it's actually picking up the dirt and things like that, not getting stuck, you probably have malware or spyware on it.
[50:39.300 --> 50:53.680]  But more seriously, there actually were reports of, um, Roombas that were being designed or new versions of Roombas that were being designed to create maps of, uh, rooms and, you know, and spaces and whatnot.
[50:53.880 --> 51:01.800]  And these were essentially virtual maps that the Roomba would follow, but would then be uploaded to a central server, you know, operated by iRobot or whoever it was.
[51:01.920 --> 51:08.380]  And, and there's obviously some privacy concerns with, you know, the third parties knowing the architecture of where you live.
[51:08.380 --> 51:10.800]  So yeah, that, that, that, that is a problem.
[51:11.040 --> 51:11.880]  Take it apart.
[51:12.220 --> 51:13.020]  That's one idea.
[51:13.200 --> 51:15.020]  And also sniff your traffic, people.
[51:15.880 --> 51:17.520]  Wireshark, you know, Airshark.
[51:17.640 --> 51:21.500]  We used to use snort back in the day, you know, packet sniffing.
[51:21.680 --> 51:22.940]  Look at your traffic.
[51:23.180 --> 51:29.520]  Do the deep packet inspection yourself on your local network or have a friend or have an enemy do it and then get the data.
[51:29.980 --> 51:30.400]  All right.
[51:30.440 --> 51:31.200]  Let's take another phone call.
[51:31.240 --> 51:33.020]  I'm going to go down to a line seven now.
[51:33.120 --> 51:33.420]  Good evening.
[51:33.540 --> 51:34.280]  You're on off the hook.
[51:34.760 --> 51:35.580]  Hey, how are you?
[51:35.760 --> 51:35.920]  Good.
[51:38.720 --> 51:41.660]  Did you guys see Frontline last night on PBS?
[51:42.460 --> 51:43.540]  I don't believe so.
[51:43.800 --> 51:45.200]  Has anyone here seen Frontline?
[51:45.440 --> 51:45.900]  No.
[51:46.520 --> 51:47.460]  What did we miss?
[51:48.200 --> 51:48.460]  Okay.
[51:48.660 --> 51:52.580]  I only caught the last one, but it was, I'm on a bus, so there'll be some background.
[51:52.580 --> 52:17.140]  Anyway, they were showing you how a reporter who did a documentary in 2017 about Charlottesville and all of that, and he was able to use camera footage of the big crowd and zero in on all areas and then use faces and use it to see if these people were in,
[52:17.200 --> 52:19.560]  let's say, across the country in another rally.
[52:19.840 --> 52:30.920]  And then once they got them at several rallies, they went on social media and then found them on social media just by doing that.
[52:31.140 --> 52:44.920]  And this is like akin to the movie Jason Bourne, which was out a few years ago where, in one of the scenes, they're having a big riot in Greece and the technology, you know, to show me this kind of stuff in the movie and facial recognition.
[52:44.920 --> 52:46.620]  So what do you guys think of that?
[52:47.780 --> 52:59.380]  I mean, so they found one guy and they tracked him down to looking for a big company and then they exposed him and then the company fired him.
[52:59.780 --> 53:08.200]  Now, these were ruffians, you know, they're doing bad stuff, but there's that technology like, you know, you're in a crowd or you're across the street, you don't know.
[53:08.200 --> 53:19.280]  And then, um, yeah, I remember going down to Zuccotti Park and I went to the main table to give suggestions to some of the organizers about protesting a certain other way.
[53:19.480 --> 53:25.360]  And then one of the news guys, like, for some of you, he like heard me talking and like sticks the camera towards me.
[53:25.620 --> 53:29.980]  I turned around and so it was like, you know, yeah, catch it.
[53:30.060 --> 53:32.540]  See if you could see it on the archives, their archives.
[53:32.880 --> 53:36.680]  They did two shows in a row about all that stuff.
[53:36.680 --> 53:43.120]  But the second one shows you this guy, the one who made the documentary, it's got his name.
[53:43.420 --> 53:46.180]  So what do you guys think of that stuff that's like really happening?
[53:46.200 --> 53:47.360]  Yeah, you're absolutely right.
[53:47.360 --> 53:49.100]  I mean, and it happens all the time.
[53:49.260 --> 53:54.560]  Commercial off-the-shelf photography equipment today is so powerful.
[53:55.100 --> 54:05.000]  And the zooms, and we're not talking about digital zooms, like real optical zooms, commercial off-the-shelf photography equipment that you can get at B&H or Adorama.
[54:05.000 --> 54:09.900]  Adorama, I don't know what bus you're on, but you could take a bus right over to Adorama, pick up a camera.
[54:10.160 --> 54:11.000]  They wouldn't be open this way.
[54:11.040 --> 54:11.540]  Oh, that's true.
[54:11.660 --> 54:12.300]  Yes, that's true.
[54:12.700 --> 54:24.160]  But for less than $1,000, less than $1,000, you can get an optical zoom, a real zoom that will take you, you know, a half a mile away and allow you to do facial recognition on a crowd of people.
[54:24.280 --> 54:30.940]  I mean, it's incredible the resolution that we have now when it comes to photography equipment that is available to the public.
[54:31.160 --> 54:33.020]  This is the reality that we're living in now.
[54:33.020 --> 54:39.260]  That bus you're on right now, it's got a camera, and that camera can see your face and file it away for future use.
[54:39.400 --> 54:40.620]  Maybe not now, but soon.
[54:40.900 --> 54:41.280]  Yeah.
[54:43.320 --> 54:48.860]  The same prevalence of cameras, and as Alex said, it's not that it is a device anymore.
[54:48.860 --> 54:49.760]  It is a component.
[54:49.920 --> 54:52.900]  It's an electrical component now that is added.
[54:53.140 --> 55:01.460]  And the prevalence of it in all of our phones has made the economies of scale and everything has lowered significantly the cost for that particular component.
[55:01.460 --> 55:07.200]  And another interesting type of photography that people might might want to check out is is called giga panning.
[55:07.380 --> 55:10.860]  It's basically taking very, very large tiled photographs.
[55:11.120 --> 55:18.900]  So several 50 meg megabyte megapixel photographs would be tiled together into a large mosaic.
[55:18.900 --> 55:21.940]  And then that itself could be mined and so on and so forth.
[55:22.140 --> 55:25.800]  But the resolutions are so high now that maybe even that isn't necessary.
[55:25.800 --> 55:34.420]  You just take one photo with one lens, as Alex said, and good optics and and the computers can sort of reassemble it and figure out any kind of errors.
[55:34.600 --> 55:35.160]  Line one.
[55:35.280 --> 55:35.760]  Last call.
[55:35.860 --> 55:36.160]  Good evening.
[55:36.280 --> 55:36.820]  You're on off the hook.
[55:36.960 --> 55:37.280]  Hi.
[55:37.720 --> 55:38.160]  All right.
[55:38.320 --> 55:39.580]  A few quick things.
[55:39.900 --> 55:41.160]  I'll go really fast.
[55:41.380 --> 55:41.800]  Really fast.
[55:42.020 --> 55:42.480]  Number one.
[55:42.900 --> 55:43.460]  Three miles.
[55:43.620 --> 55:45.460]  Not 200 miles for the fishing boats.
[55:45.580 --> 55:49.720]  I saw a helicopter chase a boat to get a picture of him so he could mail him the ticket.
[55:50.040 --> 55:50.240]  Wow.
[55:50.240 --> 55:50.680]  Second thing.
[55:51.600 --> 55:51.960]  Okay.
[55:52.240 --> 55:52.480]  One time.
[55:52.640 --> 55:56.820]  Then on the calls now, most of the time it does go to a Bartle's voicemail.
[55:56.980 --> 56:01.880]  But one time I got a message saying, the subscriber, you have called blah, blah, blah.
[56:02.320 --> 56:02.680]  Okay.
[56:02.920 --> 56:03.120]  Okay.
[56:03.240 --> 56:08.100]  Also, the ring before the last ring is a little shorter.
[56:08.120 --> 56:09.940]  So you know when it's going to do that.
[56:10.440 --> 56:12.900]  That's another time I can have a half ring notice.
[56:13.100 --> 56:13.440]  Okay, good.
[56:13.680 --> 56:14.040]  Half ring.
[56:14.120 --> 56:14.620]  No, that's right.
[56:14.700 --> 56:15.680]  You have a half ring notice.
[56:16.000 --> 56:21.020]  Now, going to your social media thing, which you had said in the beginning, I use no social media.
[56:21.220 --> 56:24.360]  The closest thing I use to social media is IRC.
[56:24.720 --> 56:25.320]  That's it.
[56:25.600 --> 56:25.820]  Wow.
[56:26.260 --> 56:26.460]  Okay.
[56:26.740 --> 56:26.920]  Right.
[56:27.300 --> 56:27.660]  Okay.
[56:27.840 --> 56:30.520]  Imagine being judged on what you say on IRC.
[56:30.660 --> 56:32.020]  That should bring it home to a lot of people.
[56:32.380 --> 56:34.160]  Well, that's why you use a VPN.
[56:34.160 --> 56:36.460]  You don't use your real name and all that other stuff.
[56:36.640 --> 56:40.960]  You guys don't monitor the off the hook channel while you're on.
[56:41.060 --> 56:42.440]  You might want to do that in the future.
[56:42.480 --> 56:43.780]  I don't know if that's a good idea.
[56:44.400 --> 56:45.720]  Distracted enough as it is.
[56:46.200 --> 56:46.460]  Okay.
[56:46.460 --> 56:57.780]  And then the last thing on social media is that you were saying that if you're not on social media, it could be, you know, why isn't that guy on social media?
[56:57.900 --> 56:59.380]  That girl, she might be hiding something.
[56:59.600 --> 57:02.400]  Now, let's take it a step further, 20 years down the road.
[57:02.540 --> 57:07.120]  Could they ever make it if it really became a fascist country, which I believe fascism is on the way?
[57:07.400 --> 57:11.360]  You have to have a social media account somewhere by law.
[57:11.520 --> 57:12.760]  Do you think that could happen?
[57:12.760 --> 57:14.840]  So those are the few things I wanted to say.
[57:14.860 --> 57:16.340]  Thank you so much for those points.
[57:16.340 --> 57:19.140]  Very well articulated and a good list of things there.
[57:19.220 --> 57:20.420]  And yeah, I do think it's very possible.
[57:20.440 --> 57:26.520]  And if you look in China right now, you'll see all kinds of mandatory social media things that you have to maintain.
[57:27.260 --> 57:29.260]  That's going to pretty much do it for us tonight, though.
[57:29.480 --> 57:32.100]  Good discussion and good conversation.
[57:33.060 --> 57:36.380]  We'll be back again next week with more exciting things to talk about.
[57:36.760 --> 57:38.960]  Write to us, OTH at 2600.com.
[57:39.080 --> 57:40.560]  Great to see everybody back on the phone lines.
[57:40.740 --> 57:41.560]  We'll see you next week.
[57:41.700 --> 57:41.920]  Good night.
[58:09.950 --> 58:16.090]  When I was a younger man, people say don't dream too tall.
[58:16.810 --> 58:22.710]  Because if you live your life that way, you'll set yourself up for big falls.
[58:23.370 --> 58:26.470]  I still blinked in my room at night.
[58:26.810 --> 58:29.370]  Play my heroes on that timetable.
[58:30.870 --> 58:32.850]  Opened me, purified.
[58:33.490 --> 58:36.790]  Help my soul break down that wall.
[58:36.790 --> 58:42.790]  I thank you, I thank you, I thank you for all that music that you've shown to me.
[58:43.170 --> 58:44.450]  I thank you.
[58:44.450 --> 58:46.610]  I thank you for you to set me free.
[58:47.350 --> 58:49.430]  Free to seem to just be me.
[58:49.770 --> 58:50.630]  I thank you.
[58:51.310 --> 58:57.150]  You don't know all the influence, so the positive that you had on me.
[58:57.150 --> 59:04.810]  You came about like a renaissance, like a little happy dance got into my feet.
[59:04.970 --> 59:10.030]  Within your times, the road you chose led you to your hard love blues.
[59:10.430 --> 59:11.130]  Hard love blues.
[59:11.530 --> 59:17.510]  I always been what it was like to live inside your big old shoes.
[59:17.510 --> 59:23.630]  I thank you, I thank you, I thank you for all that music that you've shown to me.
[59:24.890 --> 59:27.470]  I thank you for you to set me free.
[59:28.370 --> 59:30.230]  Free to seem to just be me.
[59:31.550 --> 59:32.790]  Do you love music?
[59:33.010 --> 59:34.110]  Say, I do.
[59:34.990 --> 59:37.910]  If you love music, say, thank you.
[59:38.130 --> 59:39.570]  Do you love music?
[59:39.870 --> 59:40.970]  Say, I do.
[59:41.550 --> 59:44.670]  If you love music, say, thank you.
[59:44.670 --> 59:48.110]  Thank you, thank you.
[59:48.390 --> 59:53.970]  I thank you, I thank you for all that music that you've shown me.
[59:55.650 --> 59:58.210]  I thank you for you to set me free.
[59:58.970 --> 01:00:00.550]  You're simply just me.
[01:00:00.550 --> 01:00:07.770]  You know, I thank you, I thank you for all that music that you've shown me.
[01:00:09.030 --> 01:00:11.830]  I thank you for you to set me free.
[01:00:12.670 --> 01:00:14.430]  You're simply just me.
[01:00:15.690 --> 01:00:16.410]  Baseline.
[01:00:27.660 --> 01:00:29.680]  Can I get a little keyboard now?
[01:00:40.610 --> 01:00:42.670]  Mr. Guitar Man, come on.
[01:00:58.560 --> 01:01:00.700]  I love you.
[01:01:01.680 --> 01:01:07.300]  I thank you, I thank you for all that music that you've shown me.
[01:01:08.560 --> 01:01:11.400]  I thank you for you to set me free.
[01:01:12.340 --> 01:01:13.740]  You're simply just me.
[01:01:14.560 --> 01:01:20.860]  You know, I thank you, I thank you for all that music that you've shown me.
[01:01:22.160 --> 01:01:24.840]  I thank you for you to set me free.
[01:01:25.360 --> 01:01:26.300]  You're simply just me.
[01:01:51.560 --> 01:01:54.580]  This is the first sentence.
[01:01:57.360 --> 01:02:13.620]  This is the first sentence.