[00:00.000 --> 00:06.600]  Your community and the struggle for peace and justice, and you can't have peace if you don't have justice.
[00:34.200 --> 00:40.680]  And you are listening to radio station WBAI 99.5 FM here in New York.
[00:41.440 --> 00:43.720]  WBAI.org, all over the place.
[00:44.160 --> 00:45.700]  The time is just about 8 p.m.
[00:45.820 --> 00:46.800]  on this Wednesday evening.
[00:47.100 --> 00:50.500]  That means it's time for another exciting edition of Off the Hook.
[01:04.020 --> 01:05.920]  Now I can't make a call.
[01:06.600 --> 01:08.660]  We couldn't get much worse.
[01:11.480 --> 01:14.120]  One diddley-bump, but the best is back from worst.
[01:14.900 --> 01:16.640]  I hope that's understood.
[01:16.840 --> 01:17.700]  One diddley-bump!
[01:41.340 --> 01:44.360]  On the first day, this is my true love gave to me.
[01:51.030 --> 01:53.870]  On the first day, this is my true love gave to me.
[01:54.070 --> 01:57.330]  Fun, fun, fun, natural sense.
[01:57.810 --> 01:59.690]  Fun, fun, fun, natural sense.
[02:26.270 --> 02:28.830]  A very, very good evening.
[02:29.690 --> 02:34.790]  Good evening to you all on this, the, I guess, pre-Christmas edition of Off the Hook.
[02:36.070 --> 02:36.810]  Rob T.
[02:36.950 --> 02:39.810]  Firefly here with you, among the power tools.
[02:41.710 --> 02:45.110]  And, I am joined on the phone by Alex.
[02:45.710 --> 02:47.010]  Good evening, everyone.
[02:47.310 --> 02:47.810]  There you are.
[02:48.130 --> 02:50.770]  And by a couple of special guests in the studio.
[02:50.990 --> 02:51.750]  Gila is here.
[02:52.010 --> 02:52.270]  Hello!
[02:53.110 --> 02:55.290]  And Nina Ali is joining us.
[02:55.430 --> 02:55.710]  Hi.
[02:58.650 --> 03:00.190]  Very, very nice of you to join us.
[03:00.190 --> 03:08.090]  Yeah, this is the final Off the Hook edition before what is generally recognized as Christmas among people into that sort of thing.
[03:08.530 --> 03:10.610]  And I thought I'd throw in a little...
[03:10.610 --> 03:12.130]  That track was Information Society.
[03:12.130 --> 03:15.130]  It's a rare track of theirs called Christmas in Our House.
[03:16.130 --> 03:17.410]  And I enjoyed it.
[03:17.630 --> 03:19.230]  So, everyone's here.
[03:19.430 --> 03:20.630]  Everyone's got stuff to talk about.
[03:20.750 --> 03:22.670]  There's so much to be getting on with.
[03:22.670 --> 03:28.490]  With, right at the top, I will mention that this is still a fundraising episode of Off the Hook.
[03:31.270 --> 03:47.170]  And, as we are doing this, as we are continuing to do this, as is the only thing that keeps us on the air here at WBAI, we are asking you, the listeners, to contribute what you can, what you're comfortable with, and do what you can to keep us doing what we do.
[03:47.170 --> 03:51.070]  And we've got a special premium that we're still making available.
[03:51.570 --> 03:56.830]  We have full sets of all the talks from our most recent HOPE conference.
[03:56.990 --> 04:17.670]  The HOPE conference being our biennial hacker conference every two years that we do here in New York, with dozens and dozens and dozens, over 100 talks on a variety of subjects from people all over the hacker world, all over the real world, as well, and just talking about all sorts of interesting subjects,
[04:18.590 --> 04:23.230]  speaking on things, theorizing, teaching, and it is a real experience.
[04:23.230 --> 04:25.610]  Even if you were there at the conference, you did not see every talk.
[04:25.750 --> 04:26.430]  That is impossible.
[04:26.590 --> 04:27.790]  To attempt to do so would be silly.
[04:27.810 --> 04:34.850]  But you can do that with the full set of 100 DVDs of the Circle of Hope conference.
[04:34.850 --> 04:49.650]  Or if you're not into that hard media action, you can get this on a flash drive, a single USB stick, a large USB stick, with very high capacity, because we threw a bunch of very high-resolution videos on there.
[04:49.830 --> 04:50.710]  Everything's in HD.
[04:50.990 --> 04:55.350]  There's also audios of the talks as well available on the USB drive.
[04:55.350 --> 05:00.370]  And you can find all of that at GiveToWBAI.org.
[05:00.910 --> 05:05.350]  Or you could call our pledge line at 516-620-3602.
[05:05.730 --> 05:12.850]  Or you could call that number, 516-626-3602, or go to GiveToWBAI.org.
[05:12.910 --> 05:26.410]  And if you're not into those premiums, just give whatever amount it is, however small, however large, whatever you're comfortable with, just so we can keep doing what we do here at WBAI and at Off The Hook.
[05:26.630 --> 05:28.550]  And I'll talk a little more about that later.
[05:28.730 --> 05:36.550]  But there is a lot going on this week in our sort of normal wheelhouse as a hacker show.
[05:36.810 --> 05:39.110]  As you can hear, Emmanuel and Kyle are not here.
[05:39.270 --> 05:40.210]  They are in parts unknown.
[05:40.510 --> 05:42.450]  They are running around doing all sorts of things.
[05:42.650 --> 05:45.350]  And they will be returning to these airwaves next week.
[05:45.850 --> 05:56.030]  And speaking of these airwaves, another thing I need to mention is that these airwaves, these particular airwaves at this time coordinate that we are on now, will be changing.
[05:57.070 --> 06:03.250]  Some of you who have been listening to the program for a longer time might remember back when we were on at 7 p.m.
[06:03.370 --> 06:08.550]  on Wednesday evenings, Eastern Time, U.S., rather than our current slot of 8 p.m.
[06:09.210 --> 06:12.910]  And we will be returning to that the second week of January.
[06:14.270 --> 06:16.250]  Our schedule will be reshuffled.
[06:16.590 --> 06:18.170]  Things are happening all over the schedule.
[06:18.310 --> 06:22.270]  One of the things that's happening, we will still be with you on a weekly basis as we have been.
[06:22.510 --> 06:23.910]  We'll just be an hour earlier.
[06:24.170 --> 06:25.770]  We'll be in our old slot of 7 p.m.
[06:25.910 --> 06:28.430]  beginning January 9th, 2019.
[06:28.970 --> 06:29.810]  Do you know what that means?
[06:30.010 --> 06:30.630]  What does that mean, Gila?
[06:30.710 --> 06:31.250]  I'll tell you what that means.
[06:32.010 --> 06:37.150]  So you have a t-shirt that was a premium for another fun drive, if I'm not mistaken.
[06:37.150 --> 06:37.770]  Oh, yes.
[06:37.870 --> 06:38.590]  Many, many years ago.
[06:38.790 --> 06:40.310]  That's a very old, very out-of-print t-shirt.
[06:40.730 --> 06:43.010]  But it says 7 p.m.
[06:43.370 --> 06:45.030]  Wednesdays on WBAI.
[06:45.410 --> 06:52.150]  So if I could quote Harry Shearer from A Mighty Wind, it's now-tro, if you will.
[06:52.210 --> 06:54.750]  It was retro, and now it's now-tro.
[06:54.990 --> 06:57.350]  Because you had it, and you said, oh, my goodness, this is out of date.
[06:57.350 --> 06:59.070]  But it has come back into date.
[06:59.090 --> 07:00.450]  It's very exciting.
[07:01.230 --> 07:01.770]  It is.
[07:01.850 --> 07:05.670]  And I've kept hold of the t-shirt stubbornly, thinking, you know, I'm not getting rid of this.
[07:05.670 --> 07:08.530]  This will, one day again, be accurate.
[07:08.530 --> 07:09.210]  And it will be.
[07:09.310 --> 07:10.450]  We'll be on at 8 p.m.
[07:11.070 --> 07:11.550]  next week.
[07:11.690 --> 07:12.570]  We'll be on at 8 p.m.
[07:12.590 --> 07:13.230]  the week after that.
[07:13.350 --> 07:14.490]  We'll be on at 8 p.m.
[07:14.630 --> 07:16.050]  on January 2nd, 2019.
[07:16.330 --> 07:18.150]  But we will be on at 7 p.m.
[07:18.370 --> 07:21.110]  beginning January 9th, 2019.
[07:21.530 --> 07:22.730]  That is terribly exciting.
[07:23.130 --> 07:24.550]  Alex, you remember when the show was on earlier?
[07:25.170 --> 07:25.930]  I do indeed.
[07:26.310 --> 07:26.530]  Yep.
[07:26.530 --> 07:31.730]  I remember it back at 505 8th Avenue, back in the 90s, actually.
[07:31.950 --> 07:35.810]  And, you know, you got me reminiscent about this, those days.
[07:36.430 --> 07:39.350]  And also jealous, because I don't have one of those t-shirts.
[07:39.370 --> 07:42.530]  And I've been doing off the hook for God knows how many years now.
[07:43.570 --> 07:44.790]  We've got to find one of them.
[07:44.910 --> 07:46.270]  I definitely want one of those.
[07:46.370 --> 07:47.610]  Or we should bring them back.
[07:48.430 --> 07:50.670]  Perhaps by popular demand of one.
[07:51.370 --> 07:51.730]  Perhaps.
[07:51.970 --> 07:54.630]  I mean, I happen to know the designer because it is me.
[07:55.470 --> 07:58.750]  And we'll see if we ever bring those back into the mix.
[07:59.030 --> 07:59.750]  But right now it's a very...
[07:59.750 --> 08:00.410]  You want another color.
[08:00.630 --> 08:04.610]  You know, I think you can maybe find one on eBay for an insane markup.
[08:04.730 --> 08:06.290]  But we don't want to do that around here.
[08:06.350 --> 08:10.070]  We want to reward our listeners directly for supporting us.
[08:10.350 --> 08:11.130]  Well, I agree.
[08:11.290 --> 08:12.810]  But, you know, I like this change, too.
[08:12.890 --> 08:20.110]  It makes it easier for people in places like London and Europe to kind of tune in without it being 1 or 2 o'clock in the morning.
[08:20.110 --> 08:22.770]  It will only be midnight in the U.K.
[08:23.070 --> 08:29.750]  And so, you know, our friends in the London 2600 meetings will have an easier time tuning in and getting up for work the next day.
[08:30.150 --> 08:31.910]  Yeah, and so will all of us, actually.
[08:32.090 --> 08:33.570]  We can all go to bed an hour earlier.
[08:33.830 --> 08:34.370]  That is true.
[08:34.370 --> 08:34.870]  It's true.
[08:35.130 --> 08:39.150]  You know, and, you know, so the pubs generally close around 11, sometimes 12.
[08:39.650 --> 08:48.090]  So, you know, if your pub closes at 11, you can get home in London and turn on off the hook at midnight and, you know, be in bed by 1.
[08:48.090 --> 08:52.150]  And it sounds like a perfect Wednesday evening, Thursday morning for anybody.
[08:52.470 --> 08:53.690]  I love all this forward thinking.
[08:55.450 --> 08:56.630]  We do our best.
[08:56.790 --> 09:07.630]  I should note, I don't think I mentioned when I was talking about these flash drives and DVDs of the Circle of Hope Conference the levels at which you must pledge to receive these premiums.
[09:07.870 --> 09:11.210]  Now, of course, again, we're not selling these to you for this price.
[09:11.210 --> 09:18.110]  We are donating them to the station, and the station is sending them to you as a thank you for this contribution to the station.
[09:19.070 --> 09:32.470]  For the flash drive, for a USB flash drive containing the entirety of the Circle of Hope Conference, three tracks, over 100 talks in HD, along with high-quality MP3 audio files of the entire thing as well.
[09:33.050 --> 09:35.350]  That comes at a pledge level of $100.
[09:35.970 --> 09:41.470]  The full set of 100 DVDs, which, for some people, that's more than their entire DVD collection.
[09:41.890 --> 09:47.870]  But 100, at least 100 DVDs, because we actually have slightly more than 100, I think, in the set to accommodate every talk.
[09:48.730 --> 09:49.450]  100 physical DVDs.
[09:49.450 --> 09:50.770]  You may have to explain what a DVD is.
[09:50.930 --> 09:55.470]  Yes, for those unfamiliar, for those of you younger Rapscallions out there who...
[09:56.070 --> 09:57.290]  Did you say Rapscallion?
[09:57.290 --> 09:58.650]  I did say Rapscallion.
[09:58.770 --> 09:59.890]  You can say that on the radio now.
[10:00.070 --> 10:00.710]  I checked.
[10:02.650 --> 10:07.870]  But for 100 physical DVDs, we are asking for a contribution of at least $200.
[10:08.070 --> 10:09.810]  That is $2 per talk.
[10:10.070 --> 10:13.710]  That is less than $2 per talk, because, as I said, there's over 100.
[10:13.710 --> 10:14.770]  I don't know the exact number.
[10:14.850 --> 10:16.930]  I think it's 105 or something like that.
[10:17.070 --> 10:20.750]  But it's at least 100 DVDs for a contribution of $200.
[10:20.750 --> 10:28.270]  And that is basically an instant DVD collection, an instant educational resource that you will then own.
[10:28.530 --> 10:29.870]  It's region-free.
[10:30.150 --> 10:31.630]  None of that insulting DRM crap.
[10:32.210 --> 10:37.150]  Everything is freely reusable in the fashion that all good video files are.
[10:37.450 --> 10:39.290]  And you can have this.
[10:39.370 --> 10:41.870]  You can own this for a contribution of at least $200.
[10:41.870 --> 10:46.590]  Or $100 for the flash drives.
[10:46.830 --> 10:57.610]  Or just any amount you can for not necessarily these premiums, but just the chance to help us keep doing what we do here on this station.
[10:57.870 --> 10:58.430]  And...
[10:58.430 --> 11:01.910]  Can I ask you a quick question about the DVD set, too?
[11:02.850 --> 11:04.490]  I find that really interesting.
[11:06.810 --> 11:11.670]  Especially given how much it would have actually cost to get them live at the conference.
[11:12.410 --> 11:12.810]  Absolutely.
[11:13.110 --> 11:16.810]  You know, it would have been, I think, at least around five times as much, right?
[11:16.950 --> 11:20.630]  So it probably would have been close to $1,000 for that DVD collection.
[11:21.390 --> 11:27.270]  And then you would have had difficulty finding talks that were really popular, that were sort of out of print at the conference.
[11:27.570 --> 11:32.990]  And it would have been probably impossible to do that at the actual HOPE conference.
[11:33.150 --> 11:36.290]  So the ability for us to do that now, I think, is pretty astounding.
[11:36.730 --> 11:40.450]  That's a great deal for 100 DVDs of pretty awesome talks.
[11:40.450 --> 11:41.290]  It really is.
[11:41.390 --> 11:53.950]  And every one of these 100 DVDs has been gone over personally by us here on the HOPE staff, because we had to go through these manually and make sure that they started at the right time, they ended at the right time.
[11:54.030 --> 11:56.690]  All the content that was supposed to be on them was on them.
[11:57.230 --> 12:03.530]  Something that, with the instant streaming DVDs that were available at the conference, did not always happen entirely successfully.
[12:04.350 --> 12:09.510]  This is a complete record of all the talks you missed, all the talks you were at.
[12:09.590 --> 12:12.750]  Maybe you want to buy a talk that you were at, so you can look at the back of your own head in the audience.
[12:13.850 --> 12:14.170]  Yes.
[12:14.330 --> 12:16.650]  And you removed all the offensive content, I hope.
[12:17.350 --> 12:17.670]  No.
[12:17.810 --> 12:19.830]  We, in fact, added more offensive content.
[12:20.150 --> 12:20.350]  No.
[12:20.830 --> 12:21.470]  That's not true.
[12:21.610 --> 12:23.650]  We left everything just as it was.
[12:23.650 --> 12:31.710]  And, yeah, the talks, maybe you gave a talk, and you would like a professionally post-produced copy of that.
[12:31.850 --> 12:32.650]  Add it to your reel.
[12:32.850 --> 12:33.610]  Add it to your reel.
[12:33.850 --> 12:38.170]  And, again, this is nine days' worth of content.
[12:38.430 --> 12:41.350]  Three rooms, three tracks, three days each.
[12:41.830 --> 12:52.430]  So, again, okay, so I got an email today for a four-day, three-night hotel stay for $199, and you had to go to a timeshare presentation?
[12:52.970 --> 12:53.310]  Ouch.
[12:53.310 --> 12:54.010]  Yeah, I know.
[12:54.410 --> 13:02.710]  But this is like a nine-day event for the low, low cost of a minimum donation of $100 or $200.
[13:03.290 --> 13:07.430]  And, again, if you amortize that over the time, it's like nothing.
[13:08.270 --> 13:08.830]  Nothing.
[13:09.030 --> 13:14.670]  It's a wonderful staycation gift of nine days of content to give to yourself.
[13:15.330 --> 13:17.430]  You know, you put it so very well.
[13:18.890 --> 13:19.650]  I try.
[13:19.950 --> 13:20.530]  I try.
[13:21.230 --> 13:22.790]  That's really convincing, actually.
[13:23.210 --> 13:27.990]  I mean, you've made me kind of want to buy this, and I already have a copy, so I mean...
[13:27.990 --> 13:31.970]  I know, and I mean, I've also seen your DVD shelf, and I don't know where you would put them.
[13:32.390 --> 13:34.430]  Yeah, it's our DVD shelf.
[13:34.650 --> 13:35.490]  It is our DVD shelf.
[13:35.570 --> 13:37.170]  I was trying to maintain some anonymity, but yeah.
[13:37.630 --> 13:39.470]  That was all spoiled last week.
[13:39.630 --> 13:45.630]  I mean, the cat's out of the bag, the toothpaste is out of the tube, the train has left the station.
[13:45.630 --> 13:46.070]  I don't know.
[13:46.370 --> 13:57.330]  But moving on from that, I mean, we'll put a button on that for now, because it is important that you do what you can to go to give2wbai.org or 516-620-3602.
[13:57.870 --> 14:11.070]  Perhaps join our BAI Buddy program, which is not connected to these premiums, but it's its own thing, where you can set up an amount to... a small amount, or a large amount if you like, but any amount you like to be automatically charged to you on a monthly basis,
[14:11.070 --> 14:11.910]  like a subscription.
[14:12.250 --> 14:28.750]  And that basically alleviates a lot of pressure from us, because we can count on recurring donations, which is something that is very rare and very precious here in the non-profit community-supported, listener-supported radio sector, which is, you know,
[14:28.890 --> 14:40.390]  when you're running on donations, which is all we've done for over five decades, when you're surviving on donations, a predictable income is an amazing thing.
[14:41.290 --> 14:42.810]  It's really... it's a game changer.
[14:43.010 --> 14:44.190]  And we started this program up.
[14:44.250 --> 14:45.370]  It's been very successful.
[14:45.510 --> 14:46.490]  It's been a huge help to us.
[14:46.850 --> 14:50.970]  We still have construction going on here in the station.
[14:51.930 --> 14:55.410]  And it's really a big deal for us.
[14:55.410 --> 15:04.750]  So if you would like to go to give2wbai.org or call 516-620-3602 and be our buddy, that is also something you can do there.
[15:04.970 --> 15:06.370]  And we thank you very much.
[15:06.470 --> 15:14.510]  We thank everyone who's supported us so far in this drive, and who will support us in the future, and who are supporting us right now at this moment whilst listening.
[15:15.550 --> 15:15.990]  Okay.
[15:16.450 --> 15:18.650]  There are a bunch of things going on in the news.
[15:18.850 --> 15:25.370]  There was one little, like, I think, kind of a not fun, but still kind of fun story going on for reasons I'll talk about after.
[15:25.530 --> 15:42.190]  But there was a story that went out on a site called VentureBeat talking about how spam calls, you know, junk calls that you get on your mobile phone or even your house phone, if you still got one of those, the amount jumped over 300% in 2018.
[15:44.050 --> 15:56.050]  And this from VentureBeat, according to the yearly report published by Stockholm-based phone number identification service TrueCaller, spam calls grew by 300% year-over-year in 2018.
[15:56.050 --> 16:00.190]  The report also found that telecom operators themselves are much to blame.
[16:00.950 --> 16:06.490]  Between January and October of this year, users worldwide received about 17.7 billion spam calls.
[16:06.610 --> 16:09.950]  That's up from some 5.5 billion spam calls they received last year.
[16:10.130 --> 16:17.050]  Now, I know for me, I've been getting so many more spam calls, you know, over the past year than actual calls.
[16:17.050 --> 16:17.890]  No one calls me anymore.
[16:18.030 --> 16:22.650]  People text, people write, people email, people, you know, send pigeons and smoke signals.
[16:22.770 --> 16:25.130]  But people rarely call, at least me.
[16:25.330 --> 16:26.290]  And I don't know if that's just me.
[16:26.390 --> 16:33.190]  But, you know, quick show of hands and show of voice on the phone for those of us who are on the phone right now.
[16:34.030 --> 16:38.170]  How many of you get more junk calls than actual calls these days?
[16:39.370 --> 16:40.390]  I see one hand.
[16:41.570 --> 16:43.930]  I don't, but...
[16:43.930 --> 16:44.410]  But?
[16:45.430 --> 16:47.830]  Well, my mom and I talk on the phone all the time.
[16:48.130 --> 16:50.550]  I mean, I just talk to my mom a lot.
[16:50.750 --> 16:54.110]  If I didn't talk to my mom a lot, yes, I would get more spam calls than regular calls.
[16:54.490 --> 16:54.870]  Okay.
[16:55.670 --> 16:56.510]  How about you, Alex?
[16:56.970 --> 16:59.430]  Well, I'll tell you an interesting story.
[16:59.430 --> 17:03.870]  I just got a spam call about a half an hour ago.
[17:03.990 --> 17:05.570]  And it's not the first time.
[17:05.570 --> 17:08.170]  And it's a very persistent spam call.
[17:08.490 --> 17:11.750]  And it's coming ostensibly from the federal government.
[17:11.750 --> 17:17.230]  And I'm curious as to whether our listeners have gotten this particular spam call or anybody in the studio.
[17:17.750 --> 17:20.090]  And it's from the Center for Disease Control.
[17:20.770 --> 17:22.270]  Has anybody gotten this?
[17:22.410 --> 17:23.730]  It's very curious.
[17:23.930 --> 17:26.910]  And they are constantly calling me.
[17:27.010 --> 17:29.150]  And I tell them the same thing over and over again.
[17:29.430 --> 17:31.330]  I'm not going to discuss this with them.
[17:32.090 --> 17:37.570]  But they're asking me about whether my children are vaccinated over the telephone.
[17:37.770 --> 17:40.270]  They want information about the vaccinations that they've received.
[17:40.450 --> 17:43.310]  And then they're doing this kind of census and a survey.
[17:43.310 --> 17:47.270]  And you can validate it by going to cdc.gov slash whatever.
[17:47.350 --> 17:49.170]  I think it's slash survey or something.
[17:49.310 --> 18:00.410]  But I tell them all the time, you're really talking to the wrong person if you think I'm going to disclose my children's personal medical information to a stranger that calls me.
[18:01.350 --> 18:03.110]  And they understand that.
[18:03.230 --> 18:06.750]  And then they will call you back again a week or two later.
[18:06.750 --> 18:10.630]  And it's always from a 312 number, a Chicago number.
[18:11.450 --> 18:20.410]  And it's just sort of insane that they call up and ask for information about the vaccination status of your children.
[18:21.130 --> 18:24.390]  And I've gotten this call at least four or five times.
[18:24.390 --> 18:32.970]  So, yeah, I think that should be tallied up with the spam calls from the rest of the year of 2018 and added to it.
[18:33.050 --> 18:35.850]  And I'm definitely getting tons of more spam calls.
[18:35.990 --> 18:46.290]  And in addition to that, the spam calls are obviously spoofing your area code together with the exchange of your telephone number to make it seem more believable.
[18:46.290 --> 19:00.050]  But since my cell phone is an out-of-state line, it's, you know, anytime I see my area code plus the exchange, I can automatically assume pretty correctly that that's going to be a spam call.
[19:00.110 --> 19:02.030]  And I would say 99% of the time it is.
[19:02.030 --> 19:04.470]  So I'm getting a huge amount of spam calls.
[19:04.630 --> 19:08.310]  But like you, unfortunately, I'm on the phone a lot.
[19:08.310 --> 19:12.390]  So I don't know if it has overtaken the legitimate calls.
[19:13.270 --> 19:16.010]  Well, that's interesting because I could say the same thing.
[19:16.150 --> 19:19.370]  My telephone number is not local to where I live.
[19:19.470 --> 19:20.690]  It's local to where I used to live.
[19:21.130 --> 19:36.750]  And so when I get calls with that area code, as well as either that exchange or an exchange that's numerically close to it, like that starts with the same digit, but maybe is a little bit off, you know, lower or higher, those are the spam calls.
[19:36.990 --> 19:42.850]  And I noticed, I noticed that maybe, when was this, maybe seven, eight months ago, I started doing this.
[19:43.070 --> 19:43.430]  My goodness.
[19:43.550 --> 19:44.650]  Yeah, it was that long ago, wasn't it?
[19:44.830 --> 19:47.930]  I came up with a little thing to try and battle it a little.
[19:48.230 --> 19:54.630]  And, you know, because I'm at the controls here, and I can push this particular button, I'm going to call this our hack of the week.
[20:07.410 --> 20:10.970]  For those of you who haven't heard this in a while, this is our hack of the week theme.
[20:11.150 --> 20:15.830]  We have an official hack of the week theme that happens when you press the hack of the week button here at the control panel.
[20:17.650 --> 20:20.090]  And you have to do that when you talk about the hack of the week.
[20:20.210 --> 20:22.690]  It's just something you do as a radio producer.
[20:22.870 --> 20:25.290]  I'm sure the FCC would be on my case if I didn't.
[20:26.290 --> 20:41.830]  So what this is, is when you get a phone call, or when someone calls you, there is a bit of telephone company ephemera that those of you who maybe used to place a lot of voice calls might remember.
[20:42.290 --> 20:43.510]  And it's a noise.
[20:43.710 --> 20:45.350]  It's a little noise that sounds a bit like this.
[20:48.500 --> 20:50.740]  That is a special information tone.
[20:51.220 --> 21:00.440]  And that particular special information tone is put at the beginning of telephone company recordings, which tell you that, you know, this line is out of service, or this phone number is disconnected.
[21:00.440 --> 21:08.120]  This phone number has been changed and what, what a lot of systems that, that call out to various phone numbers do is they listen.
[21:08.340 --> 21:13.800]  And if they hear that tone, automatic systems hearing that tone will assume that, okay, this line is dead.
[21:13.900 --> 21:15.680]  There's some kind of telephone company recording here.
[21:16.140 --> 21:17.360]  I'll drop the call.
[21:17.560 --> 21:18.920]  I'll remove this number from my database.
[21:20.160 --> 21:28.080]  And what I've done is I've taken this cute little noise and I've put it at the beginning of my voicemail greeting.
[21:29.500 --> 21:49.370]  So when, uh, when people call my phone and say it's an unrecognized call, um, that I, that I choose not to answer, I sent a voicemail and, uh, and then they, they go to my voicemail and they hear, then they'll, uh, they'll hopefully theoretically remove my phone number from their databases.
[21:50.030 --> 21:55.890]  And I can say after seven, eight months of doing this, it's significantly cut down the amount of these calls that I've gotten.
[21:57.070 --> 22:03.590]  And it's, I think also cut down the number of calls you've gotten in general, because people who have tried to call you have been tripped up by that voicemail.
[22:04.670 --> 22:05.010]  Yeah.
[22:05.290 --> 22:06.210]  Well, and this is true too.
[22:06.790 --> 22:08.090]  That's exactly what I was thinking.
[22:08.430 --> 22:08.530]  Yeah.
[22:08.630 --> 22:12.210]  But, um, after, after the noise though, you immediately hear my voice saying, hi, this is Robin.
[22:12.330 --> 22:14.690]  Yes, you have reached my voicemail and, you know, so on and so on.
[22:15.430 --> 22:24.230]  So that, uh, you know, people who actually listen to what they're hearing will listen through and realize that it is actually my voicemail and leave a message in the normal manner.
[22:24.230 --> 22:25.310]  And some people have done that.
[22:25.630 --> 22:35.590]  Um, it, it confused, uh, it confused my mother the first time she called me, but, uh, after, after I did that, but, uh, you know, once I explained, um, yeah, it, it seems to work.
[22:35.710 --> 22:49.810]  So I'm going to throw that tone in here just one more time for our listeners who would maybe like to get this MP3 from 2600.com when it goes up, uh, sometime later this evening and, uh, maybe, maybe play that at the beginning of their own voicemail greetings and report back to us with,
[22:49.910 --> 22:50.350]  uh, what happens.
[22:50.350 --> 23:10.000]  So once again, here's the special information tone and Rob, is that the, the official tone or this is like a, an MP3, I guess, and some kind of, uh, esoteric phone freak website that, that, that holds onto these things or, so where did you get this?
[23:10.140 --> 23:11.340]  It's a really esoteric website.
[23:11.520 --> 23:12.560]  It's a, it's called Wikipedia.
[23:13.220 --> 23:20.340]  And, uh, what, what they have there is if you look up special information tone, there are actually several, several different tones under that banner.
[23:20.340 --> 23:28.000]  Um, most of them sound somewhat alike, but, uh, they, they, they, the beeps actually last for different amounts of time for different reasons.
[23:28.020 --> 23:33.700]  And that is, that is the particular special information tone that, uh, will play when the number has been disconnected.
[23:34.100 --> 23:41.640]  So, um, hopefully, uh, if you, if you do this hack, you're telling machinery that your phone has been disconnected, but you can tell humans that no, it hasn't.
[23:41.740 --> 23:42.260]  You're still there.
[23:42.660 --> 23:47.840]  Um, and willing to receive their voicemail if they just listen to what, uh, what the heck it is you're telling them.
[23:47.840 --> 23:50.400]  Um, so give it a try, um, let us know if it works.
[23:50.580 --> 23:54.280]  Uh, you can email us anytime, OTH at 2600.com.
[23:54.460 --> 23:58.220]  Um, you can, uh, you can find us on Twitter at Hacker Radio Show.
[23:58.360 --> 24:02.580]  You can find us on Mastodon, the, uh, hot up and coming decentralized social network.
[24:03.040 --> 24:06.480]  And, uh, we are Hacker Radio Show at Mastodon.social.
[24:07.040 --> 24:14.380]  Um, if you're, if you're interested in Mastodon and you don't know, uh, you don't know about it, uh, the site I believe is joinmastodon.org.
[24:14.380 --> 24:17.960]  I will just, uh, confirm that, uh, really quick.
[24:18.900 --> 24:24.780]  And, uh, there, it's a nice, uh, it's a nice user-friendly website that will, uh, tell you all, all that you need to know about, uh, getting started.
[24:24.780 --> 24:27.100]  And, uh, yes, joinmastodon.org.
[24:27.220 --> 24:30.240]  And that's Mastodon like the ancient, uh, elephant ancestor.
[24:30.480 --> 24:32.800]  M-A-S-T-O-D-O-N.
[24:32.960 --> 24:35.080]  That's joinmastodon.org.
[24:35.760 --> 24:43.840]  Um, so yeah, get involved and, uh, play tones at telemarketers and robocallers and spammers and see what happens.
[24:44.120 --> 24:44.540]  Let us know.
[24:45.260 --> 24:49.560]  Yeah, and, and just, uh, you know, one other point is, uh, obviously that, that's a U.S.
[24:49.860 --> 24:51.860]  centric, um, tone, right?
[24:51.960 --> 24:52.320]  Or U.S.
[24:52.320 --> 24:53.520]  Focused tone, I should say.
[24:53.780 --> 24:54.040]  That is.
[24:54.220 --> 25:02.340]  Uh, I would presume that there are kind of other special information tones that would work for similar purposes, you know, in Europe and other countries and elsewhere around the world.
[25:02.460 --> 25:05.380]  But that, that tone, I guess, would work just for our U.S.
[25:05.520 --> 25:05.820]  listeners.
[25:06.160 --> 25:15.540]  Um, but definitely write to us at OTH at 2600.com if you have other foreign tones and you've tried this out and, and determined that it actually works.
[25:15.580 --> 25:19.560]  Uh, I think it's a great experience, uh, experiment that you have going on there, Rob.
[25:20.240 --> 25:20.480]  Yeah.
[25:20.480 --> 25:26.640]  And, uh, it's, it's also a lot of fun because I just get to play old telephone company noises at people, which is something I, I deeply enjoy.
[25:27.160 --> 25:37.460]  Um, so yeah, I'd, uh, I'd like to move on to something that, uh, you know, and we'll talk about more news later if we have time, but, uh, I really want to talk with our guest, Nina.
[25:37.660 --> 25:37.860]  Hello.
[25:38.120 --> 25:38.340]  Hi.
[25:38.680 --> 25:39.720]  You're still, you're still here.
[25:39.900 --> 25:40.220]  I am.
[25:40.640 --> 25:44.440]  With all, with all that's been going on here today, you, you've stuck around and I appreciate that.
[25:44.440 --> 25:49.200]  Now, uh, uh, Nina Ali, you are, um, you are a, uh...
[25:49.200 --> 25:49.640]  The tour of things.
[25:49.980 --> 25:50.560]  Uh, a...
[25:50.560 --> 25:52.940]  Can I, can I intro you guys in a different sort of way?
[25:53.120 --> 25:53.840]  You can, yes.
[25:53.860 --> 25:54.940]  You guys are so awesome.
[25:55.220 --> 25:58.620]  Just, I've been here since, it's, it's about 8.25 current state.
[25:59.200 --> 26:11.780]  I've been here since about 6.30 and I don't think I've smiled this much in the past month or laugh so much and the, what I told both of these two before was, um, I love you two so much, you disgust me.
[26:12.880 --> 26:14.860]  And I just, I just want that to be...
[26:14.860 --> 26:16.140]  I wear that as a badge of honor, really.
[26:16.140 --> 26:18.020]  You should, because it's just outstanding.
[26:18.020 --> 26:18.680]  I love you two.
[26:18.840 --> 26:20.280]  Okay, let's, I'm sorry.
[26:20.500 --> 26:20.740]  Yes.
[26:21.500 --> 26:24.440]  So now, Nina Ali, we've, we've just met, uh, for the first time.
[26:24.860 --> 26:24.900]  Okay, hey.
[26:25.260 --> 26:36.720]  No, uh, we've, we've known each other for some time, but, uh, I, I brought you here today to talk about some of the projects you're involved with, so how about you, you intro you as, uh, to our, to our listeners, for those unfamiliar with, uh, the work of Nina Ali,
[26:36.960 --> 26:38.160]  what, what are you doing?
[26:38.300 --> 26:39.380]  It's a really broad question.
[26:39.640 --> 26:41.780]  Okay, so I guess...
[26:41.780 --> 26:45.040]  You may answer as broadly or as, as, uh, as narrowly as, as necessary.
[26:45.180 --> 26:54.640]  Okay, so I guess the one thing that is, uh, the main focus of what I do and what we're going to talk about the most is the biohacking village at DEF CON.
[26:54.860 --> 27:09.320]  So I've run that for about the last four years, I believe, and, um, I'm doing it again and it's going to be a lot, I don't know what FCC words are, are just not able to use, so I'm, I'm going to try and just keep this as clean as possible, so just, like...
[27:09.320 --> 27:09.820]  Family show.
[27:09.960 --> 27:10.960]  Yeah, okay, family show.
[27:11.400 --> 27:13.820]  So, um, do you want to talk about that a little bit?
[27:13.980 --> 27:15.640]  Well, actually, can I jump in here for a second?
[27:15.680 --> 27:15.740]  Yeah, absolutely.
[27:16.020 --> 27:20.980]  Because, um, I am the non-hacker here.
[27:21.260 --> 27:21.300]  Okay.
[27:21.360 --> 27:32.100]  So, could you explain for the folks at home who might not know, and also the me in the studio who does not know, what exactly the biohacking village is and what you guys do there?
[27:32.860 --> 27:34.000]  This is a great question.
[27:34.180 --> 27:34.280]  Thank you.
[27:34.280 --> 27:37.160]  This is something I constantly forget to do and I do apologize for that.
[27:37.880 --> 27:45.140]  Um, so, essentially the biohacking village does a lot of the biomedical, biotechnical, biosecurity, um, ecosystem.
[27:45.480 --> 27:48.940]  So think about your medical records, um, laboratories, things like that.
[27:48.940 --> 27:52.980]  So, just to kind of bring it back to the village itself.
[27:53.240 --> 27:56.940]  So, it's been going on for, um, I've owned it for, for about four years.
[27:57.040 --> 27:57.760]  It's been five years.
[27:57.900 --> 28:05.540]  And every year, one of the things I try to do is, is make the ecosystem, the actual medical ecosystem that we work within, a little more complete.
[28:06.240 --> 28:13.020]  So, last year we had three rooms where there were speakers and they did, um, the bioinformatics, biosecurity, biotech.
[28:13.380 --> 28:23.320]  And then in the middle room we had the medical device manufacturers where we had their devices in there and we had, um, some people hacking on them to see if there were any vulnerabilities and responsible disclosures and such.
[28:23.500 --> 28:34.460]  And then in the last room we had, um, chip implants as well as, um, I'm trying to think of it in, in non-scientific terms.
[28:35.060 --> 28:38.480]  We had a wet lab, which was...
[28:40.610 --> 28:41.310]  What is that?
[28:41.670 --> 28:42.670]  Okay, I'm keep talking.
[28:42.990 --> 28:44.350]  They just, my hands are up apparently.
[28:45.390 --> 28:46.130]  Oh, I'm sorry.
[28:46.350 --> 28:47.470]  We were getting a little rattling on the mic.
[28:47.470 --> 28:48.270]  I'm sorry, I do that.
[28:48.270 --> 28:48.990]  I talk with my hands.
[28:49.490 --> 29:01.070]  Um, so, we also did a wet lab, which was, um, Michael worked on, so the wet lab is like the laboratory when you send out your bloods, your, your other things.
[29:01.590 --> 29:13.590]  So, this year we're gonna move forward with that and make it so that we are having the talks, we are having the medical device manufacturers, we're gonna have a CTF involved in that, which is amazing.
[29:14.950 --> 29:15.390]  And...
[29:15.390 --> 29:15.950]  A what now?
[29:16.150 --> 29:17.350]  Yes, capture the flag.
[29:17.530 --> 29:17.790]  Thank you.
[29:17.790 --> 29:18.450]  Yeah, sorry.
[29:18.950 --> 29:25.450]  And we're also going to do another wet lab, um, where there will be cake involved.
[29:25.830 --> 29:26.630]  And, yeah.
[29:26.950 --> 29:33.310]  And, um, we're going to also do chipping and there's a new chip that's gonna come out.
[29:33.550 --> 29:41.210]  I don't have all the details, current state, but eventually they'll come out and then we'll be doing all of the magic at DEF CON.
[29:42.470 --> 29:42.890]  Excellent.
[29:43.190 --> 29:43.470]  Excellent.
[29:43.470 --> 29:45.390]  And how, how long have you been doing this for?
[29:45.930 --> 29:46.250]  Thank you.
[29:46.250 --> 29:47.090]  I don't remember anymore.
[29:47.370 --> 29:48.450]  I think it's been four years.
[29:48.550 --> 29:50.590]  I think this is my fourth or fifth year doing it.
[29:51.670 --> 29:51.990]  Excellent.
[29:52.110 --> 29:54.170]  And how, how did you, uh, how did you get into the field?
[29:54.270 --> 29:55.670]  Like what, what sparked your interest in this?
[29:55.670 --> 29:58.350]  Um, great question.
[29:58.350 --> 30:00.190]  So this is, this is where it's fun.
[30:00.470 --> 30:05.150]  I worked on the building and breaking of electronic medical records.
[30:05.150 --> 30:10.330]  And this was before a lot of the security measures were being put into the electronic medical records.
[30:10.490 --> 30:17.670]  And I don't remember how, but I ended up looking for someone because I needed to work on something within the medical record, medical record.
[30:17.830 --> 30:25.210]  And I found one of the board members and I could just get into his record and saw something and, and that, that bothered me.
[30:25.430 --> 30:31.450]  I put it all into a PowerPoint and made some time on their board meeting and pulled it up.
[30:31.870 --> 30:33.290]  And they said, what are you doing?
[30:33.410 --> 30:34.170]  How did you get into that?
[30:34.170 --> 30:35.250]  I said, nobody stopped me.
[30:35.450 --> 30:36.970]  There were no emails to my boss.
[30:37.210 --> 30:38.070]  What are you doing?
[30:38.350 --> 30:39.910]  You know, we need to take better care of this.
[30:40.030 --> 30:43.350]  And then we just started doing better to secure the, the system itself.
[30:44.290 --> 30:49.530]  So I've worked in this field for a long time.
[30:49.710 --> 30:52.710]  Um, it's about 13, 14 years.
[30:54.490 --> 30:54.810]  Wow.
[30:55.070 --> 30:57.270]  And, uh, where, was this something that- That makes me an old woman.
[30:57.370 --> 30:58.030]  Is that what you're going to say?
[30:58.050 --> 30:58.490]  Cause it does.
[30:58.670 --> 30:58.790]  Yeah.
[30:59.510 --> 31:03.390]  That is not, that is not precisely what I was going to say, but, uh, but no.
[31:03.390 --> 31:15.630]  So is, was this, was this a sort of, uh, a sort of angle that you had maybe thought of before, like where you're involved in any kind of, uh, hacker stuff before that or, or had any sort of leanings or, or was this something that just happened out of the blue?
[31:15.770 --> 31:16.890]  It just magically happened.
[31:17.350 --> 31:18.430]  I, yeah.
[31:18.430 --> 31:20.470]  Like, yeah, there's no real backstory except that.
[31:22.170 --> 31:22.530]  Excellent.
[31:22.710 --> 31:32.570]  So, so if, uh, if someone were to come to your, uh, biohacking village at a, at a conference, like speaking generally, um, what, uh, what sort of things would they, would they find someone new to all of this?
[31:34.530 --> 31:36.630]  There's a lot of bioinformatics going on.
[31:36.870 --> 31:54.950]  Um, there's, we're, we're doing a lot of looking for people doing DIY, um, anything with the sciences, with the bio, um, chemistry, just things that are a little bit out of the norm, things that people are trying to work on to either make themselves better,
[31:55.090 --> 31:56.790]  community better, medicine better.
[31:58.050 --> 31:58.310]  Excellent.
[31:58.510 --> 32:02.990]  And, uh, this is something that I know, I know you've spoken at Hope, uh, was, was it the most recent one or was it?
[32:03.170 --> 32:04.050]  No, it was the one before that.
[32:04.230 --> 32:05.090]  Yeah, the one before that.
[32:05.450 --> 32:07.450]  Um, where, uh, what did you present on?
[32:07.730 --> 32:08.610]  Something about DNA.
[32:09.310 --> 32:09.490]  Yes.
[32:09.790 --> 32:12.490]  Um, like how to, how to make sure you were okay via your DNA.
[32:13.510 --> 32:13.870]  Yes.
[32:13.870 --> 32:13.910]  Yes.
[32:14.410 --> 32:16.430]  And, uh, and yes, that's correct.
[32:16.430 --> 32:18.590]  I say, I can confirm to you.
[32:18.710 --> 32:18.830]  Yes.
[32:18.930 --> 32:19.810]  That's what you talk about.
[32:20.190 --> 32:22.110]  No, uh, but, but, uh, yeah.
[32:22.230 --> 32:33.710]  So, so you've presented, uh, at all sorts of places as well and just all sorts of events and, uh, you've been on, you've been on podcasts and you, you, you've, you're, you're basically running around out there, um, flying a flag for this stuff.
[32:33.970 --> 32:41.910]  And, you know, if, if somebody, if somebody comes to you and they're like, okay, biohacking, like, uh, is, is that, is that a thing?
[32:41.910 --> 32:44.870]  Is that, is that like a real thing, a field unto itself?
[32:45.370 --> 32:55.170]  Is this something that, uh, that we can talk about as its own sort of entity, um, versus, and you're, you're, you're making all kinds of faces at me and I'm starting to fear for myself.
[32:55.170 --> 32:57.030]  No, it's just such an excellent question.
[32:57.550 --> 33:05.230]  So one of the questions that came up this year at DEF CON was, you know, why do you, why do you have the, the, the medical device manufacturer, uh, devices over here?
[33:05.410 --> 33:06.670]  Shouldn't they be in other villages?
[33:06.970 --> 33:09.130]  Don't you feel like they fit, you know, more over here?
[33:09.350 --> 33:15.230]  And I, I, I, the answer that I gave them was not really because it's a piece of hardware, correct?
[33:15.770 --> 33:17.910]  But you have to think about how it works within your body.
[33:18.410 --> 33:27.230]  Um, you want it to be covered with some sort of biocompatible glass or plastic or, or whatever the case may be, because otherwise it will end up leaching inside you.
[33:27.670 --> 33:41.530]  Um, like just, it can electrocute you, whatever, whatever this thing, this, this hardware is designed for it, it could just go rogue because it's not doing its, its work the right way.
[33:41.530 --> 33:41.530]  Right.
[33:42.130 --> 33:47.170]  So to that, when people say that to me, I'm like, well, it kind of deserves, it does deserve to be here.
[33:47.410 --> 33:50.670]  There's, there's a lot of other pieces more than just hardware.
[33:50.830 --> 33:51.870]  It's not just a hardware engineer.
[33:52.110 --> 33:58.510]  These are biochemists and bio people trying to make sure that you're alive at the end of having this thing put inside you.
[33:58.670 --> 34:10.970]  So it's definitely this thing that you can, you can have a whole village about like its own sort of, uh, sort of world basically, because I know a lot of people who've gone to, uh, hacker conferences and learned about biohacking for the first time, you know,
[34:11.290 --> 34:22.230]  although they've been through hardware and software and, and what have you and tinkering, um, no one, no one had really thought about what would happen if you swallowed a raspberry pie rather than, uh, kept it on your workbench or, you know, so, so there's a,
[34:22.370 --> 34:35.850]  so when, when you're, when you're working with sort of IOT connected things that are also involved with, uh, say the human organism, um, what, what special concerns are, uh, are, are there in, in sort of the hacker end of things?
[34:35.850 --> 34:36.190]  Yeah.
[34:36.630 --> 34:39.290]  So like a pacemaker for instance, right?
[34:39.390 --> 34:40.530]  That's something that's pretty well known.
[34:40.530 --> 34:43.370]  We all know, we all tentatively know how it works.
[34:43.730 --> 34:48.270]  There's a lead inside and it, it shocks your heart into a normal rhythm again.
[34:48.470 --> 34:53.630]  So imagine it was just two pieces of, of wire inside you not covered correctly.
[34:53.630 --> 34:56.230]  It would, it would kill you, that sort of thing.
[34:57.150 --> 34:57.590]  So...
[34:57.590 --> 34:58.850]  Non-optimal, uh, outcome.
[34:59.050 --> 34:59.850]  Not, that's not, no.
[35:00.430 --> 35:01.590]  Um, not for most people.
[35:02.250 --> 35:16.670]  So, things like that need to be recognized, um, as being, it's, it's an integral part, yeah, but there needs to be further thinking about how to do, how to put the thing inside you, how to make it work.
[35:17.350 --> 35:21.010]  And if, okay, we're outside, right?
[35:23.070 --> 35:23.270]  Sure.
[35:23.630 --> 35:25.830]  I'm not, I'm trying to think it through, hypothetically.
[35:26.470 --> 35:30.410]  So water, the pH on water is seven, right?
[35:31.170 --> 35:32.270]  Blood is also seven.
[35:32.670 --> 35:39.270]  But if you think about the environment of blood, it's a liquid tissue, there's iron in it, there's all kinds of other things going on in it.
[35:39.410 --> 35:45.910]  So it's not just that you're submerging this pacemaker inside water, you're submerging it inside a volatile environment.
[35:45.990 --> 35:49.430]  And this piece of equipment has to last through that.
[35:49.910 --> 35:56.150]  These pieces of equipment have to last minimally between, or optimally, between five and seven years before you have to replace it.
[35:56.650 --> 36:06.530]  So there's a lot of considerations that need to have to be taken to ensure that, one, the patient is safe, and two, the piece of equipment can live and do what it's supposed to do inside the human.
[36:06.810 --> 36:20.190]  And, and taking the IoT angle on it, there's been a lot of, uh, talk, I know there were some talks about this at, at the most recent hope and also elsewhere that, that, uh, the security side of these things is very important and very undervalued.
[36:20.350 --> 36:34.010]  I think in, in among the manufacturers and other people, like there was a, there was someone who spoke at hope, um, about, uh, getting a pacemaker and wanting to, you know, get more information from the manufacturer about, uh, what, what, uh, security systems were in place.
[36:34.110 --> 36:35.910]  Cause this was something you could connect to from outside.
[36:36.470 --> 36:48.010]  And, uh, yeah, if you've got a pacemaker, uh, an artificial pacemaker in your heart, you want to maybe have some sort of control over who can connect to it and then what they can do once they're, once they're, uh, connected to your heart.
[36:48.470 --> 37:01.430]  Um, so just quickly inside that comment, one of the things I tell people is if you went, again, we're going with the pacemaker, when you go in with, for a pacemaker, they don't give you the pamphlets of the pacem, the various pacemakers that they have and say,
[37:01.510 --> 37:02.710]  okay, here are their contact numbers.
[37:03.010 --> 37:03.950]  It, you know, just call them.
[37:04.110 --> 37:05.690]  And when you're ready, let us know which one you want.
[37:05.690 --> 37:11.850]  You're in there and they're prepping you for surgery and they just give you the one that's available and there and fits your needs best for that moment.
[37:12.130 --> 37:14.090]  They don't tell you anything about how it's secured.
[37:14.290 --> 37:15.510]  They don't tell you if it's secured.
[37:15.790 --> 37:17.610]  They give you no background except you're going to live.
[37:17.690 --> 37:18.210]  It's going to be great.
[37:18.770 --> 37:18.910]  Yeah.
[37:19.150 --> 37:24.690]  So things like that, we need to start taking into consideration about is it, is it secured?
[37:24.830 --> 37:25.630]  Who's taking this data?
[37:25.690 --> 37:26.150]  Where's it going?
[37:26.250 --> 37:26.830]  How's it getting there?
[37:27.890 --> 37:33.250]  Well, while we're on the pacemaker subject, you know, I just want to say this is a totally fascinating conversation.
[37:33.490 --> 37:35.910]  It's something that is definitely offbeat for us.
[37:36.090 --> 37:37.850]  And, you know, glad to have you on tonight.
[37:38.530 --> 37:46.170]  But while we're on the subject of pacemakers, are you familiar with the St. Jude's pacemaker issue and the Muddy Waters case?
[37:46.370 --> 37:46.510]  Uh-huh.
[37:46.790 --> 37:47.050]  Yeah.
[37:47.230 --> 37:49.330]  I mean, that was a really fascinating case.
[37:49.330 --> 37:56.590]  And for our listeners that may not be familiar with that, and correct me if I'm wrong, because you may know the details of this better than I do.
[37:56.910 --> 38:12.550]  But I think there was a security company that got their hands on a St. Jude's pacemaker that idiotically connected to some IoT device that was in your home and would allow you to do things like monitor the battery level in the pacemaker, things like that.
[38:12.730 --> 38:19.850]  They weren't under contract with St. Jude's to do this particular type of security-related research on the pacemaker.
[38:19.970 --> 38:20.050]  Right.
[38:20.050 --> 38:36.450]  But nonetheless, they started tinkering around with that particular device and figured out that if, among other things, they sent a bunch of nonsense data or malformed packets over to the, I think it was the IoT device, then it would relay it over to the pacemaker.
[38:36.670 --> 38:45.470]  And all these malformed packets would do things like totally drain the battery much more quickly of the patient's pacemaker and actually cause things like patient death.
[38:45.470 --> 38:53.290]  And what was fascinating was that the security company, I can't remember their name, it might have been MedSec, was it MedSec?
[38:53.910 --> 38:53.930]  MedSec?
[38:53.930 --> 38:55.070]  Yeah, MedSec, right.
[38:56.250 --> 39:10.750]  What they decided to do with this information, since it wasn't technically insider information, like I said, they weren't under contract to do this, they decided to go to a finance firm that was known as Money Waters.
[39:10.990 --> 39:16.150]  And this finance firm, this company specialized in shorting stocks.
[39:16.230 --> 39:22.990]  And when they released the vulnerabilities in these pacemakers, they shorted the St. Jude stock and Money Waters made out like bandits.
[39:23.470 --> 39:30.310]  So, you know, this is incredibly important stuff these days, because it is the kind of information that can actually move markets.
[39:30.370 --> 39:31.590]  And we've seen this in the past.
[39:31.830 --> 39:35.190]  So I'm really curious as to your thoughts on that whole fiasco.
[39:36.930 --> 39:38.510]  It puts patients in danger.
[39:39.070 --> 39:40.550]  That's, that's my main issue.
[39:41.330 --> 39:47.770]  Um, I can't, there's, you know, you go to the, so I am the Calvary.
[39:48.050 --> 39:50.190]  That's, um, it's a not-for-profit organization.
[39:50.450 --> 39:55.410]  And they do a lot of work with responsible disclosures and the medical device manufacturers.
[39:55.570 --> 40:00.470]  And they have a Hippocratic oath for medical devices that they've put out.
[40:00.650 --> 40:11.350]  And they asked the medical device manufacturers to take this oath so that they can sort of guarantee that the patient is going to be good under their, um, under their care.
[40:11.690 --> 40:22.510]  And I have actually pushed it further than that, saying that maybe we need to also have the hospital systems and the, and the centers of care take that same Hippocratic oath because the, the doctors take it.
[40:22.630 --> 40:25.250]  So now we having the medical device manufacturers taking it.
[40:25.350 --> 40:27.030]  Why are the EMRs not taking it?
[40:27.130 --> 40:28.550]  Why isn't the hospital system taking it?
[40:28.870 --> 40:34.730]  And therefore becoming, um, I don't want to say liable, but you are now responsible.
[40:34.890 --> 40:36.190]  You literally are responsible anyway.
[40:36.390 --> 40:39.690]  So take the oath and do the right thing by the patient.
[40:40.130 --> 40:41.850]  You don't go in there because you're fine.
[40:41.850 --> 40:43.330]  You go in there because you're under duress.
[40:43.410 --> 40:44.170]  You don't feel good already.
[40:44.930 --> 40:46.670]  Why are you making this more difficult for the patient?
[40:47.570 --> 40:47.930]  Yeah.
[40:48.030 --> 40:57.290]  It's so bizarre to think that, uh, for, for those of us who have, you know, say tinker with hardware, you can walk into a store and buy any computer you want after looking at the specs and deciding if it meets your needs.
[40:57.410 --> 40:58.970]  You can build your own computer from scratch.
[40:58.970 --> 41:03.830]  If you want getting the parts that you definitely want to have in your machine, you can run the software on it.
[41:03.910 --> 41:05.310]  You want, you can run the operating system on it.
[41:05.410 --> 41:14.110]  You want, you can't, you can't do this for your pacemaker, your insulin pump, your, your, your medical devices that I mean, technically you can, but you'd be avoiding, avoiding the warranty.
[41:14.110 --> 41:14.570]  Right.
[41:14.690 --> 41:14.890]  Okay.
[41:15.330 --> 41:23.130]  But, uh, and, and also if you're, if you're there on the operating table and they need to shove something in your chest in order to you, for you to not die, um, there isn't time to comparison shop generally.
[41:23.370 --> 41:26.690]  But, uh, but this is something that a lot of people still don't think of.
[41:26.830 --> 41:29.830]  And, uh, this is something that I think it's really important to spread the word about.
[41:29.970 --> 41:31.350]  Um, what was that, uh, organization?
[41:31.710 --> 41:32.510]  I am the cavalry.
[41:32.770 --> 41:33.510]  I am the cavalry.
[41:33.730 --> 41:33.970]  Yes.
[41:34.250 --> 41:35.230]  Um, okay, great.
[41:35.350 --> 41:39.990]  And, uh, if, uh, if people do a web search for that, uh, they can, they can find all this info.
[41:40.310 --> 41:43.070]  Um, and yeah, amazing stuff going on.
[41:43.270 --> 41:45.610]  Uh, so can I just bring more?
[41:45.790 --> 41:46.550]  I'm just gonna keep talking.
[41:46.710 --> 41:46.730]  Please, please.
[41:46.870 --> 41:47.110]  Perfect.
[41:47.530 --> 42:08.630]  So there's also the legal implication implications, um, that there was, there was a gentleman, I believe he had, he also had a pacemaker and he's, he, the, the fire, there was a fire in his house and the, they ended up taking him to the cardiologist and finding his records from his pacemaker to smash his heartbeat.
[42:08.890 --> 42:12.990]  And they figured out that he was the arsonist due to these records.
[42:13.650 --> 42:16.010]  And they, they went after him legally.
[42:16.310 --> 42:18.150]  So now that's something else to come into.
[42:18.370 --> 42:21.850]  We talked about that case a while ago on, on the show, actually.
[42:21.970 --> 42:22.130]  Yeah.
[42:22.210 --> 42:23.290]  I remember that.
[42:23.370 --> 42:25.170]  It was really, really fascinating.
[42:25.170 --> 42:40.250]  And, and I think that led to a small discussion around the fact that, you know, our body just contains so much data, you know, that, you know, we don't think of it ordinarily like that, but yet it is, it's this huge repository of data about us.
[42:40.390 --> 42:50.290]  And I think they realized that this, this older man who was the arsonist, his pace had quickened likely because he was, he left through the window or something like that.
[42:50.470 --> 42:52.670]  He had overexerted himself, if I recall correctly.
[42:53.210 --> 42:55.690]  And, um, and that totally gave him away.
[42:56.130 --> 42:58.970]  It was, you know, really, really fascinating case.
[42:58.970 --> 42:59.750]  Yeah.
[42:59.970 --> 43:11.170]  And, uh, just, uh, just to, uh, note the site for I am the cavalry, uh, is I am the cavalry.org that's I a M T H E C A V A L R Y.org.
[43:11.610 --> 43:14.010]  And, uh, yeah, some, a lot of fascinating stuff here.
[43:14.150 --> 43:21.410]  Uh, we can only scratch the surface on this program, but, uh, yeah, definitely check that out if you're, if you're interested in the subject, interested in looking, uh, more deeply into this.
[43:22.430 --> 43:26.590]  So there is one more thing that just, it, it burns inside the back of my brain.
[43:27.090 --> 43:30.150]  So I'm fascinated by hearing aids.
[43:30.610 --> 43:31.650]  Nobody thinks about that.
[43:31.750 --> 43:33.390]  Um, they're wifi enabled.
[43:34.130 --> 43:36.970]  Um, there, there's a lot of magic going on in these things.
[43:37.330 --> 43:50.670]  And I had the, just thought that what if you were sitting, you know, if I had, um, hearing aids and I was sitting in my home and suddenly I hear someone talking to me and I know that there is no one here, but you know, I need the hearing aid to, to hear.
[43:50.990 --> 43:56.490]  I can't necessarily take it out, but what if now this hearing aid is telling me to do things.
[43:56.910 --> 43:57.230]  Right.
[43:57.450 --> 43:58.270]  And I'm right.
[43:58.390 --> 44:05.990]  We've seen, we've seen cases like that where people had, uh, broken in on the frequency of, uh, things like baby monitors and, uh, you know, just saying all sorts of things to the people in the houses.
[44:06.110 --> 44:07.950]  And, you know, on the one hand, it's a fun prank.
[44:08.030 --> 44:21.430]  On the other hand, if this is now, uh, taken to the, to the field of implanted medical devices, that's a, that's a whole new, and even, even, uh, considering the other end of that, uh, if your hearing aids are on the wifi, um, can anybody break into that and hear what you're hearing,
[44:21.690 --> 44:23.670]  um, and invade that, that side of your privacy?
[44:23.790 --> 44:23.890]  Yeah.
[44:24.430 --> 44:28.030]  So this is, uh, this, there's a lot of, uh, fascinating thought around this.
[44:28.210 --> 44:28.990]  I didn't even know that.
[44:29.450 --> 44:29.910]  Please.
[44:29.970 --> 44:30.930]  Can I ask you a quick question?
[44:31.170 --> 44:32.230]  Sorry to interject.
[44:32.710 --> 44:32.830]  Sure.
[44:32.930 --> 44:36.050]  But, um, why are hearing aids wifi enabled?
[44:36.210 --> 44:37.610]  Maybe that's a stupid question.
[44:37.830 --> 44:39.270]  It's not wifi enabled now.
[44:40.490 --> 44:41.390]  Oh, okay.
[44:41.790 --> 44:44.550]  I honestly don't have an answer for why they are.
[44:44.550 --> 44:45.470]  Oh, they are.
[44:45.470 --> 44:46.750]  So they are wifi enabled.
[44:46.910 --> 44:48.890]  I just don't really get that.
[44:49.030 --> 44:49.990]  That's so bizarre.
[44:50.170 --> 45:16.390]  I think it's partially like, and I'm just speculating here, so I could be completely wrong, but I think it might have something to do with, um, your cell phone, cell phones initially partially greater accessibility, like a, like a loop system that will enable you to plug in to other wifi enabled devices that will enable you to plug into a system that will connect to your hearing aid in a different
[45:16.390 --> 45:16.830]  way.
[45:17.390 --> 45:18.190]  Like the phone.
[45:18.410 --> 45:18.910]  Like the phone.
[45:18.910 --> 45:18.910]  Yeah.
[45:19.070 --> 45:19.070]  Yeah.
[45:19.210 --> 45:19.250]  Yeah.
[45:19.250 --> 45:19.310]  Yeah.
[45:19.310 --> 45:20.730]  Like the phone or music or things like that.
[45:21.050 --> 45:21.290]  Exactly.
[45:22.070 --> 45:24.990]  You know, like you could connect to...
[45:24.990 --> 45:32.890]  I know there is another company that, that has something that looks like a, uh, your, um, oh God, hearing aid.
[45:33.070 --> 45:38.770]  Um, and it does connect to your phone and it, it looks like a normal, um, ear pod sort of thing.
[45:38.910 --> 45:40.170]  So it doesn't look out of place.
[45:40.770 --> 45:43.170]  So yeah, it can, it can just be for greater accessibility.
[45:43.170 --> 45:44.110]  Like an induction loop.
[45:44.350 --> 45:46.130]  Induction loop was the word I was looking for.
[45:46.270 --> 45:47.390]  So like that kind of technology.
[45:48.010 --> 45:51.530]  But that's also stuff that should be disclosed when you do something with a patient.
[45:51.710 --> 45:52.170]  No question.
[45:52.430 --> 45:52.750]  Absolutely.
[45:53.110 --> 45:59.830]  I mean, I, I've known people with hearing aids in the past, but this is far enough in the past where I had no idea they were, uh, they were infusing them with wifi now.
[46:00.490 --> 46:01.390]  And, uh, these... Excuse me.
[46:01.470 --> 46:02.190]  I hope that didn't pick up.
[46:02.270 --> 46:02.530]  I'm sorry.
[46:02.890 --> 46:03.550]  It totally did.
[46:03.610 --> 46:03.850]  It did.
[46:04.330 --> 46:06.650]  And it's immortalized in, in, uh, in bits now.
[46:06.810 --> 46:15.370]  But, uh, yeah, it's, uh, it is fascinating to think, uh, like more and more things that you would never, that you would never imagine have the wifi, have the wifi.
[46:15.890 --> 46:23.430]  Um, you know, in an age where toasters are on the web and, uh, your washing machine is downloading heaven knows what in order to wash your clothes.
[46:23.950 --> 46:26.610]  Um, this is, uh, this is another thing to think about.
[46:26.790 --> 46:31.730]  And this is why we need, uh, organizations like I am the cavalry and other people.
[46:31.850 --> 46:37.710]  Like it's never going to be the companies who manufacture these things who are going to be keeping an eye on them and making sure things are done right and done safely.
[46:37.950 --> 46:38.050]  So they're trying.
[46:38.330 --> 46:39.410]  Honestly, they are trying.
[46:39.570 --> 46:51.170]  They're trying to get more, um, of the hackers involved for people, for us to, to learn and do the things because their main job is to literally protect the patient and make sure that they're alive and doing well.
[46:51.330 --> 46:51.590]  Right.
[46:51.690 --> 46:55.050]  And in the medical field, theoretically, there's, there's so much more protections for patient info.
[46:55.190 --> 47:02.290]  There are things like HIPAA and, uh, and, you know, just supposed to be, uh, things baked into the system to, um, guard that info.
[47:02.450 --> 47:06.410]  And of course we've seen, uh, info like that leak out where it shouldn't have been countless times.
[47:06.650 --> 47:16.070]  I mean, Alex, what, what, uh, what do you, what do you, what's your lawyerly take on, on sort of the legal end of, uh, this sort of thing, like your pacemaker keeping logs on you and, uh, you know, things of that sort?
[47:17.310 --> 47:31.030]  Well, I mean, I would be really curious to see, you know, what disclosures are being made to the, to the patients and whether that data is being collected in a consistent with those disclosures, whether they even have things like privacy policies.
[47:31.030 --> 47:41.890]  And then, you know, with which organizations they're sharing this type of information, um, you know, who, who's getting it, who's guarding it, you know, what's happening to this, you know, what's the retention period.
[47:42.370 --> 47:48.530]  Um, you know, if that information is going to third parties, I think there could be a, a very serious problem here.
[47:48.670 --> 48:02.830]  If those third parties don't have a medical need to know about that particular data, you know, that, that kind of really sensitive bio data, um, you know, I think we have a very real, uh, expectation of privacy.
[48:03.130 --> 48:20.830]  You know, even though we're not talking about necessarily governmental actors here, it still just would strike me and especially a jury and a judge really viscerally to find out that that really sensitive information that's coming from within our bodies could be commercialized in some respect.
[48:20.830 --> 48:35.770]  Um, so I think it's a really fascinating thing to sort of peel the layers back on the onion for and, um, something we should definitely keep an eye on and, and have Nina back on the show to talk further about, you know, perhaps at the next fundraiser.
[48:35.770 --> 48:36.370]  Definitely.
[48:36.550 --> 48:46.670]  Cause we, we've barely scratched the surface on this subject and that kind of ties into another big story in the news that happened, uh, very recently where this, there's a huge story in the times, a very, very in-depth story.
[48:46.770 --> 49:05.570]  And I recommend, uh, people check it out on the New York Times.
[49:05.570 --> 49:11.330]  Um, uh, they've been, uh, despite saying they were doing otherwise, they've been making that available to other tech companies.
[49:11.330 --> 49:15.250]  They've been sharing, uh, that info with Amazon, with, with Bing, with Yahoo.
[49:15.850 --> 49:22.630]  Um, uh, just, uh, just, uh, uh, uh, skimming this, uh, New York Times article, uh, to find that, here it is.
[49:22.950 --> 49:32.310]  Uh, Facebook allows, allowed Microsoft's Bing search engine to see the names of virtually all Facebook users' friends without consent, uh, gave Netflix and Spotify the ability to read Facebook users' private messages.
[49:32.830 --> 49:43.390]  Um, they permitted Amazon to obtain users' names and contact info through their friends, and it let Yahoo view streams of friends' posts as recently as this summer, despite public statements that it had stopped that type of sharing years earlier.
[49:44.190 --> 49:58.390]  Um, this has all been, uh, fascinating because we, we've seen the, the Mark, the Mark Zuckerberg, uh, sort of, uh, depositions and, uh, everything that was going on there with, uh, with him just looking very, very, uh, blankly at the cameras and telling the entire world,
[49:58.430 --> 50:04.070]  because this hit the mainstream media, that, uh, you know, okay, we messed up, we're gonna do better, and this comes after that.
[50:04.370 --> 50:19.970]  This is, this is them, uh, uh, supposedly doing better, uh, there, there were hundreds of pages of Facebook documents obtained by the New York Times, uh, the records which were generated in 2017 by the company's internal system for tracking partnerships provide the most complete picture yet of the social network's data sharing practices.
[50:20.290 --> 50:28.510]  They also underscore how personal data has become the most prized commodity of the digital age, traded on a vast scale by some of the most powerful companies in Silicon Valley and beyond.
[50:29.070 --> 50:33.190]  Um, Facebook insisted that an institute is strict to privacy protections long ago.
[50:33.450 --> 50:38.410]  Uh, Mark Zuckerberg assured lawmakers in April that people have complete control over everything they share on Facebook.
[50:38.590 --> 50:41.270]  And this then showing that that is actively not the case.
[50:41.390 --> 50:48.690]  It's something that they're, that they're, uh, that they're trading with the other, uh, tech companies and, uh, you know, to, to all of their enrichment and none of ours.
[50:48.690 --> 51:03.110]  And if this is happening with just the, the, uh, the data about us that we've, that we put out there on the social world or on the social media world, or, um, through the stuff that we shop for, um, if you, if you throw now biometric data into this mix,
[51:03.210 --> 51:13.090]  if you throw like your, your, your medical, your medical information and, uh, things like that, that are supposed to be extremely, very, most, most definitely private, um, into this whole mix.
[51:13.230 --> 51:15.510]  I mean, that's, that's valuable data to have on people.
[51:16.490 --> 51:30.870]  The idea that somebody is maybe sick and therefore should be disqualified from obtaining certain jobs or obtaining certain health care because paradoxically in this country you're not allowed to have health care so much if you're sick and if you need it.
[51:31.550 --> 51:37.610]  The whole system is really, really bizarrely formed and it's not at all working to our advantage.
[51:38.690 --> 51:43.110]  I mean, Alex, what do you think about where all this is going?
[51:43.110 --> 52:06.570]  Well, it's really fascinating and having read that New York Times story today, what really stuck out to me was that this was a massive amount of data that's being shared and quite frankly it seemed like a really reckless amount of data being shared by Facebook and you alluded to this briefly but what was also really clear from the article and it was really good reporting and I think they protect
[52:06.570 --> 52:12.950]  their sources really well in that particular article given the sparse details about where this information came from.
[52:13.110 --> 52:26.970]  essentially a data sharing repository but what's really clear and what's also a little bit frightening here is that these were definitely reciprocal arrangements and the one organization that you didn't mention, Rob, was Huawei and Facebook, it came out,
[52:26.990 --> 52:41.030]  was even sharing information with Huawei which is basically being considered a national security threat because of perhaps some security issues embedded into some of their devices you know, whether that's true or not.
[52:41.610 --> 52:52.130]  we don't know but even the scepter of that and the fact that Facebook was sharing information with Huawei and we know it was a reciprocal arrangement, very likely actually it was a reciprocal arrangement.
[52:52.130 --> 53:11.390]  yeah, I would really love to know what further, you know, more details about what was actually given specifically over to Huawei and then what was returned to Facebook in particular because this really just seems like it's sort of a potluck dinner of personal data,
[53:11.670 --> 53:26.110]  you know, with each tech giant bringing a little something different to the table and after which, you know, they just generally have a feast of personal information about us that they've obtained from various sources, you know, from one way or another.
[53:28.550 --> 53:35.850]  And this all happened, you know, way after 2011 when there was an FTC settlement with Facebook and they got in trouble the first time.
[53:36.710 --> 53:40.990]  And a lot of this was active, you know, until really recently.
[53:41.730 --> 53:52.610]  And about a week ago or so, I'm not sure if you saw it, Rob, but I actually published an article on CNN, another CNN opinion piece that was about Facebook squaring off a parliament.
[53:52.830 --> 53:59.310]  And parliament, the UK parliament, took some really unusual steps to get confidential information from Facebook.
[53:59.730 --> 54:15.110]  Namely, they were tracking a litigation in California, waited for the Facebook opponent to show up in London in unrelated business and then served him several orders from parliament demanding the production of documents.
[54:15.290 --> 54:26.730]  And even at one point, went so far as to have the sergeant at arms of parliament waiting in the hotel lobby for this guy to return from a business breakfast meeting and then serve him with an additional order.
[54:26.970 --> 54:37.610]  Eventually, the guy caved and handed over a USB drive with the confidential Facebook documents that he received as part of the discovery process in California.
[54:37.610 --> 54:43.010]  And then those documents were published and released by parliament about a week and a half ago.
[54:43.210 --> 54:53.910]  And that just adds to this cascade of information, internal information coming out about Facebook and its data sharing practices that is extraordinarily unsettling.
[54:53.910 --> 55:04.310]  And this is a company that's spending massive amounts of money on PR firms trying to increase their visibility, you know, let users know they want to do the right thing.
[55:04.310 --> 55:05.790]  This is about friends connecting.
[55:05.990 --> 55:08.290]  And when it works, it really is magical.
[55:08.670 --> 55:09.610]  It's all nonsense.
[55:09.930 --> 55:17.150]  You know, what we're seeing here is the commercialization on a massive scale between massive tech giants of our personal information.
[55:17.150 --> 55:25.910]  I mean, and thank God for these, you know, the leakers and the sources and the great reporting that we have and lawsuits.
[55:25.950 --> 55:29.290]  You know, not just because I'm a lawyer, but that's how this information gets out.
[55:29.290 --> 55:48.530]  And I think my prediction is that you're going to see additional, excuse me, governmental bodies taking these really strong tactics, strong arm tactics against companies like Facebook to get at that confidential information, because they can no longer be trusted to provide the truth.
[55:48.530 --> 56:04.070]  You know, whether you're sitting in front of a congressional panel or, you know, providing documents in court, you know, it seems like they are really going to stop at nothing in order to get the truth about what's been happening with our personal data.
[56:04.210 --> 56:06.510]  And I think that's that's an effort to be applauded.
[56:06.930 --> 56:07.090]  Indeed.
[56:07.350 --> 56:10.310]  And that's a note we'll have to end on as we've run out of time.
[56:10.470 --> 56:13.430]  I would very much like to thank Nina Ali very quickly.
[56:13.530 --> 56:17.230]  Where can people find more more from you or stuff that you're doing?
[56:17.230 --> 56:17.590]  The Twitters.
[56:17.930 --> 56:18.650]  The Twitters.
[56:18.770 --> 56:18.970]  Yes.
[56:19.030 --> 56:20.190]  And where are you on Twitter?
[56:20.390 --> 56:21.270]  At Headinthebooth.
[56:21.450 --> 56:22.750]  At Headinthebooth on Twitter.
[56:23.850 --> 56:24.810]  And thank you.
[56:24.850 --> 56:26.190]  Thank you, Giela, for stopping by again.
[56:26.350 --> 56:26.830]  My pleasure.
[56:27.010 --> 56:30.510]  Thank you, Alex, for letting us wrestle you in over the phone lines.
[56:30.750 --> 56:37.010]  And thank all of you listeners, whether you attach any particular significance to dates around this time on the calendar or not.
[56:37.650 --> 56:49.830]  We here at WBAI and here at Off The Hook wish for you the same thing that we generally wish you throughout the year is that we wish you can convene joyously with your communities and your families of choice.
[56:50.370 --> 57:01.370]  You always take pride in asking questions and using your answers as springboards toward the next questions and always have the joy of examining our world from every angle possible, learning all you can, sharing your knowledge, and expanding your journey.
[57:01.970 --> 57:03.590]  For Off The Hook, this has been Rob T.
[57:03.710 --> 57:04.070]  Firefly.
[57:04.350 --> 57:06.610]  Send us email, OTH at 2600.com.
[57:07.210 --> 57:08.810]  Find us on Twitter at HackerRadioShow.
[57:08.950 --> 57:12.410]  Find us at Mastodon at HackerRadioShow at Mastodon.social.
[57:13.310 --> 57:14.310]  Have a very good week.
[57:15.050 --> 57:16.190]  I just don't understand.
[57:16.510 --> 57:17.370]  What is it you want?
[57:17.550 --> 57:18.510]  What is it you want?
[57:18.630 --> 57:19.510]  What is it you want?
[57:19.630 --> 57:20.390]  I don't know.
[57:20.590 --> 57:21.590]  What is it you want?
[57:21.830 --> 57:22.850]  That's the problem.
[57:23.310 --> 57:24.250]  What is it mean?
[57:26.170 --> 57:27.210]  All right, now.
[57:27.430 --> 57:28.310]  All right.
[57:41.550 --> 57:43.270]  I love samples.
[57:43.510 --> 57:44.270]  I don't care.
[57:44.550 --> 57:47.530]  What kind of Christmas music is that?
[57:48.050 --> 57:49.210]  Listen, all of you.
[57:49.550 --> 57:50.770]  This is the music.
[57:51.110 --> 57:51.250]  Hey!
[57:51.510 --> 57:51.930]  You don't...
[57:51.930 --> 57:52.450]  You don't...
[57:52.450 --> 57:53.990]  You don't get it at all.
[57:54.190 --> 57:54.630]  You know...
[57:54.630 --> 57:55.090]  Okay.
[57:55.090 --> 57:55.510]  Hey!
[57:55.750 --> 57:57.130]  You know...
[57:57.130 --> 57:57.710]  Santa Claus.
[57:57.790 --> 57:58.470]  Santa Claus.
[57:58.570 --> 57:59.090]  Santa Claus.
[57:59.270 --> 57:59.350]  Hey!
[57:59.630 --> 58:01.010]  Santa Claus and ho, ho, ho.
[58:01.250 --> 58:02.510]  Guess what?
[58:02.870 --> 58:03.150]  What?
[58:03.870 --> 58:04.850]  Disaster time.
[58:05.070 --> 58:05.310]  All right.
[58:05.950 --> 58:07.290]  It's so wrong.
[58:07.670 --> 58:08.230]  It's...
[58:08.230 --> 58:08.550]  It's...
[58:08.550 --> 58:09.310]  It's so...
[58:09.310 --> 58:09.750]  Well...
[58:09.750 --> 58:11.770]  I don't see what all the fuss is about.
[58:12.070 --> 58:12.850]  It's not bad.
[58:13.390 --> 58:13.770]  Bad.
[58:14.130 --> 58:14.270]  Bad.
[58:14.590 --> 58:15.890]  Bad at all, really.
[58:16.650 --> 58:18.870]  You do that so well.
[58:19.850 --> 58:21.290]  What's going on here?
[58:21.290 --> 58:22.410]  That's it...
[58:22.410 --> 58:22.950]  That's it, Charlie Brown.
[58:25.050 --> 58:25.570]  All right.
[58:26.050 --> 58:27.830]  Let's take it from the top again.
[58:28.290 --> 58:29.410]  Here we go!
[58:30.610 --> 58:34.570]  Dad, do something right for a change, Charlie Brown...
[58:37.010 --> 58:39.090]  Well, I guess we better concentrate.
[58:39.730 --> 58:42.330]  Dad, yeah, yeah, yeah...
[58:42.330 --> 58:43.530]  She just played on words...
[58:43.530 --> 58:47.630]  see?watth end...
[58:47.630 --> 58:49.170]  It was beautiful.
[58:49.690 --> 58:50.570]  Lunch break.
[58:51.410 --> 58:51.970]  Break.
[58:52.230 --> 58:52.790]  Lunch break.
[58:52.990 --> 58:53.170]  Break.
[58:53.610 --> 58:53.790]  Break.
[58:54.130 --> 58:54.690]  It's fun.
[58:54.870 --> 58:55.030]  Break.
[58:55.530 --> 58:55.690]  Break.
[58:56.010 --> 58:56.510]  Don't worry.
[58:57.190 --> 58:58.090]  It's fun.
[58:58.690 --> 59:00.170]  Don't you think it's great?
[59:00.450 --> 59:05.530]  Everything I touch gets... Everything I do turns into a disaster.
[59:05.670 --> 59:07.050]  You drive me crazy.
[59:07.530 --> 59:07.810]  All right.
[59:08.070 --> 59:08.390]  All right.
[59:08.530 --> 59:12.750]  There's no... no... no... no... no... no...
[59:12.750 --> 59:14.290]  What do you want?
[59:14.590 --> 59:16.170]  The proper move.
[59:16.410 --> 59:17.550]  You got it.
[59:19.650 --> 59:20.610]  We're back.
[59:21.570 --> 59:27.650]  I never get what I really want.
[59:27.910 --> 59:29.110]  What do you want?
[59:30.510 --> 59:31.710]  Just 10 money.
[59:32.210 --> 59:34.610]  How about 10 and 20?
[59:34.870 --> 59:36.770]  10, 10, 10 and 20?
[59:37.130 --> 59:39.390]  All I want is what I have coming to me.
[59:39.490 --> 59:41.030]  All I want is my fair share.
[59:43.470 --> 59:44.190]  All right.
[59:44.450 --> 59:45.150]  Let's have a quiet.
[59:51.710 --> 59:54.210]  Merry Christmas, Charlie Brown!
[59:56.170 --> 59:58.630]  That's what Christmas is all about, Charlie Brown.