[00:00.000 --> 00:13.320]  We'll talk about her one-woman show on the life of Lena Baker, who was an African-American woman that was executed by electric chair in the state of Georgia for defending herself against her white employer.
[00:13.660 --> 00:15.580]  So please, join us.
[00:15.900 --> 00:21.400]  Again, that's Friday, March 29th, from 12 midnight to 2 a.m.
[00:21.820 --> 00:29.660]  on WBAI in New York, 99.5 FM, for another rave-alicious Women's History Month show.
[00:33.140 --> 00:36.000]  And you're listening to radio station WBAI New York.
[00:36.180 --> 00:38.020]  The time is 7 o'clock.
[00:38.240 --> 00:39.100]  Time for Off the Hook.
[02:24.120 --> 02:25.620]  And a very good evening to everybody.
[02:25.730 --> 02:27.760]  The program is Off the Hook.
[02:27.930 --> 02:31.620]  Emmanuel Goldstein here with you, joined tonight by Rob T.
[02:31.930 --> 02:32.290]  Firefly.
[02:32.500 --> 02:33.120]  Good evening.
[02:33.300 --> 02:33.610]  Alex.
[02:34.020 --> 02:34.460]  Well, hello.
[02:34.680 --> 02:35.060]  And Kyle.
[02:35.930 --> 02:36.290]  Howdy.
[02:37.050 --> 02:43.820]  Still here in the old studio, but we spent some time in the new studio, watching it get constructed, getting in the way, and it's looking good.
[02:43.980 --> 02:44.380]  It's looking good.
[02:44.440 --> 02:45.040]  One day we'll be there.
[02:45.170 --> 02:45.860]  I even helped out.
[02:45.980 --> 02:47.080]  I did some cable organization.
[02:47.080 --> 02:47.560]  Really?
[02:47.820 --> 02:48.260]  Wow.
[02:48.480 --> 02:48.900]  Good for you.
[02:49.520 --> 02:57.040]  Well, it's that time of year, that time of year where mischief abounds, as you may know, and Microsoft is having none of it.
[02:57.700 --> 02:58.730]  Have you seen this memo?
[02:59.180 --> 03:06.800]  This memo comes from Microsoft itself, the marketing chief who has sent this.
[03:06.940 --> 03:12.440]  His name is Chris Capacella, and he basically has sent this to all employees.
[03:12.440 --> 03:13.340]  Hey, everyone.
[03:13.600 --> 03:18.700]  It's that time of year when tech companies try to show their creativity with April Fool's Day stunts.
[03:19.350 --> 03:22.960]  Sometimes the outcomes are amusing, and sometimes they're not.
[03:23.680 --> 03:32.600]  Either way, data tells us these stunts have limited positive impact and can actually result in unwanted news cycles.
[03:33.470 --> 03:41.700]  Considering the headwinds the tech industry is facing today, I'm asking all teams at Microsoft to not do any public-facing April Fool's Day stunts.
[03:41.700 --> 03:54.040]  I appreciate that people may have devoted time and resources to these activities, but I believe we have more to lose than gain by attempting to be funny on this one day.
[03:54.440 --> 04:03.620]  Please forward to your teams and internal partners to ensure people are aware of the ask to stand down on external April Fool's Day activities.
[04:05.040 --> 04:08.180]  Well, Chris, I just have to say, well played.
[04:09.060 --> 04:15.410]  If you think a single person is going to fall for this, you guys must have something momentous planned.
[04:15.410 --> 04:23.470]  And I can hardly wait till Monday to see what Microsoft is saying to the public, because whatever it is, I'm not going to believe it.
[04:23.600 --> 04:24.300]  How about you guys?
[04:25.540 --> 04:27.640]  It's going to be hilarious, whatever it is.
[04:27.740 --> 04:29.560]  Whether or not they intend it to be that way, I'm sure.
[04:29.680 --> 04:36.970]  No, I mean, it's clear that they do, because who else would put something like this out and assume that people are going to follow it?
[04:37.120 --> 04:38.310]  I mean, corporate killjoys.
[04:39.040 --> 04:39.860]  What was it?
[04:39.980 --> 04:41.200]  The chief marketing officer?
[04:41.290 --> 04:41.740]  Is that what it is?
[04:41.790 --> 04:50.180]  This is somebody who's so desperately afraid of bad press that would reflect negatively on his organization and ultimately his budget that he's got to kill everybody's joy.
[04:50.180 --> 04:52.260]  No, you guys, you have it all wrong.
[04:52.540 --> 04:56.300]  This is a call, what I'm hearing, this is a call to be funny every day.
[04:57.240 --> 04:59.680]  Yeah, I like how they say, don't be funny on this one day.
[04:59.820 --> 05:01.520]  Something has to be funny on all the other days.
[05:01.700 --> 05:05.480]  Now, to be fair, though, this chief marketing officer, what was his name over there, Emmanuel?
[05:05.670 --> 05:05.910]  What was it?
[05:06.910 --> 05:09.200]  Chris, Chris, are you looking for a joke inside the name?
[05:09.260 --> 05:10.670]  Okay, Chris Capicella.
[05:11.000 --> 05:13.360]  So, Mr. Capicella, excuse me.
[05:13.420 --> 05:15.560]  You think there might be a joke in that name if you take every other letter?
[05:15.760 --> 05:15.860]  No.
[05:16.600 --> 05:18.440]  Capicella has something to do with a head.
[05:19.340 --> 05:20.860]  Can we look him up, get a file on him?
[05:21.020 --> 05:24.410]  No, I think Chris Capicella was actually the fraternity that my dad was in.
[05:24.580 --> 05:25.290]  Oh, okay.
[05:25.290 --> 05:26.240]  Oh, there's a good one.
[05:26.410 --> 05:27.120]  There's a good one.
[05:27.360 --> 05:28.280]  You're going to be here all week?
[05:28.440 --> 05:34.600]  So you could say, did you pull a Chris Capicella on that person or something if you want to be a killjoy?
[05:34.740 --> 05:35.800]  We could make a noun out of it.
[05:36.000 --> 05:40.600]  But he only is asking to regulate external faces.
[05:40.800 --> 05:41.140]  External, yeah.
[05:41.260 --> 05:43.860]  That means, can you imagine the fun that's going to happen inside?
[05:44.000 --> 05:44.740]  That's the point.
[05:45.080 --> 05:47.980]  Maybe it's going to be just a barrel of laughs over there.
[05:47.980 --> 05:48.700]  Internally.
[05:48.940 --> 05:52.300]  Well, Chris was looking to avoid bad press on April 1st.
[05:52.400 --> 05:57.100]  Instead, he got bad press four days earlier on the 27th of March.
[05:58.340 --> 06:00.400]  And yeah, how's that playing?
[06:01.260 --> 06:02.380]  Ironically, I would imagine.
[06:03.740 --> 06:05.080]  Have anything planned for April Fool's night?
[06:05.160 --> 06:06.600]  Did you tell us if you did?
[06:06.800 --> 06:08.380]  Well, we have that big thing that we're doing.
[06:08.620 --> 06:09.460]  Oh, yeah, that thing.
[06:09.640 --> 06:10.480]  Right, right, right.
[06:10.480 --> 06:11.960]  The one that...
[06:11.960 --> 06:12.160]  Okay.
[06:12.240 --> 06:13.480]  It's external as well.
[06:13.720 --> 06:14.920]  It sure is.
[06:15.300 --> 06:15.720]  Exactly.
[06:15.980 --> 06:17.180]  A lot of outdoor activity.
[06:17.900 --> 06:22.060]  All right, well, this, unfortunately, is not an April Fool's joke.
[06:24.070 --> 06:27.380]  The dreaded Article 13 has been passed in the European Parliament.
[06:27.900 --> 06:31.180]  Alex, I'm going to ask you, what in God's name is Article 13?
[06:31.740 --> 06:33.120]  And why is it so evil?
[06:33.200 --> 06:35.280]  And why are we so angry that it was passed?
[06:36.340 --> 06:36.740]  It's...
[06:36.740 --> 06:41.320]  Well, there's a lot of reasons why I think we should be angry about a passing.
[06:41.320 --> 06:48.680]  In particular, this sort of foul-up where people had voted to amend it and potentially take it off the docket for voting.
[06:49.580 --> 06:51.880]  But they got the vote wrong because that was switched up.
[06:51.980 --> 06:53.500]  So there's one reason to be...
[06:53.500 --> 06:54.540]  Wait, they got the vote wrong?
[06:54.780 --> 06:55.340]  Oh, yeah.
[06:55.440 --> 07:00.340]  There was this last-minute change, I believe, to the balloting regulations that the members of the European Parliament...
[07:00.340 --> 07:02.540]  Well, come on, Americans, we're the ones that get voting wrong.
[07:02.720 --> 07:03.880]  The Europeans are supposed to get it right.
[07:04.120 --> 07:04.500]  I know.
[07:04.600 --> 07:05.140]  Tell me about it.
[07:05.240 --> 07:18.460]  But substantively, not procedurally, we should be very angry with this particular article because it has to deal with filtering online content for any platform that allows users to upload user-generated content.
[07:18.820 --> 07:22.140]  And we've talked about this before on the radio, but I think it deserves a rehash.
[07:22.620 --> 07:26.260]  Yeah, for people that don't know what you just said, what does that mean?
[07:26.340 --> 07:28.780]  If you upload something that has what?
[07:28.780 --> 07:39.040]  Well, like a video file, something that has music in it, something that has images in it in particular, anything that is copyrighted has to be filtered to determine whether or not it contains copyrightable material.
[07:39.340 --> 07:40.560]  Doesn't that already happen with YouTube?
[07:40.780 --> 07:43.740]  It does indeed already happen with YouTube, and we all know how well that works.
[07:43.800 --> 07:49.260]  Is a way of describing this as not original works or not original content that you'd be uploading?
[07:49.420 --> 07:51.240]  Like, you are not the creator of it?
[07:51.420 --> 07:52.860]  Yeah, to an extent, yeah.
[07:52.860 --> 07:57.360]  Yeah, but sometimes original content is going to contain copyrighted content as well.
[07:57.560 --> 08:04.820]  Now, when you say it doesn't work that well on YouTube, I think what you mean is it works too well because it blocks so many things and it drives us crazy.
[08:05.020 --> 08:13.820]  Well, that's part of the issue here is that all of these content filtering mechanisms always overblock what they're not supposed to block and underblock that which they're supposed to block.
[08:13.940 --> 08:27.640]  I mean, we've been dealing with these issues as far back as the 90s with things like the Child Online Protection Act, remember that, that debacle that we had to deal with, but you know, all of this would apply to platforms within the European Union.
[08:28.000 --> 08:33.000]  So platforms may be leaving the European Union because of the passage of Article 13.
[08:33.000 --> 08:48.260]  It makes it very, very difficult from a regulatory framework for them to continue to exist because there are very likely going to be fines and the music industry may come down with a very heavy hammer on platforms that aren't necessarily enforcing copyrights of songs.
[08:48.380 --> 08:55.740]  But it creates this whole host of issues of, of, about regulating speech and content and fairness and competition.
[08:56.070 --> 09:04.660]  Does this give favoritism to the tech giants that can implement this particular technology in a manner that makes it economically feasible to do?
[09:04.740 --> 09:05.720]  What about the smaller guys?
[09:05.840 --> 09:07.830]  How are they going to have to implement this content filtering?
[09:07.830 --> 09:10.710]  But when you say platforms, what kind of platforms are you talking about?
[09:10.880 --> 09:15.520]  Anything that allows a user to upload content would arguably apply to this.
[09:15.520 --> 09:30.160]  I, I don't know if they're, they have carved out significant exceptions to platforms that have a limited user base, but it would certainly apply to contents, I'm sorry, to platforms like Facebook and, and, and Reddit and, you know, all kinds of forums,
[09:30.950 --> 09:33.550]  fora, if you want to use the Latin plural for it.
[09:33.550 --> 09:50.860]  Uh, but it, it, it, it's a big problem because it has the potential to chill speech, to prevent people from communicating, to, uh, force people off of platforms, to, to place the burden on the user, to demonstrate that this is not copyrighted material.
[09:50.860 --> 10:12.160]  Other issues that, that stem from this particular legislation, um, are, are somewhat procedural and, and legal in that these platforms are supposed to block content for which they do not have a negotiated license, which implies that they are only allowed to display content for which they have a negotiated license.
[10:12.160 --> 10:29.210]  So that means from content providers, let's say CNN, Fox News, anybody that generates news, music, media, all of these individual platforms in the EU would have to negotiate licensing agreements for the copyrighted material and then allow that material to be uploaded.
[10:29.560 --> 10:33.680]  So what about the situation where there's perhaps a mix?
[10:33.860 --> 10:50.160]  Let's say there's somebody to put together an article or a video that is analyzing some news from Fox, some news from CNN and providing commentary on it, and it might have some background music that was developed by Devo, I don't know, somebody else.
[10:51.060 --> 10:58.320]  How are you going to deal with this mix match of content for which you may have a license for one particular piece of it, but not have a license for another?
[10:58.620 --> 11:03.640]  How are you going to deal with the issue of copyright, copyrights expiring?
[11:03.840 --> 11:07.220]  Where is there going to be a centralized registry for all of this copyrighted material?
[11:07.400 --> 11:09.460]  How do we deal with fair use?
[11:10.370 --> 11:14.300]  So, you know, the default here is just going to be to block all of this content.
[11:14.580 --> 11:14.780]  Yeah.
[11:16.000 --> 11:41.960]  What is more, and I think is worth noting, is this coupled with a lot of the other attitudes like the filtering technologies, when you're putting them in place, this can creep very quickly into having a mechanism that does one thing that is protecting artists or copyright holders in one case,
[11:42.100 --> 11:56.980]  but very quickly could become a censorship tool for either companies or states or both, and basically squash any kind of speech that is disagreeable, either in society or on these platforms.
[11:57.160 --> 12:06.740]  Now, I'm not talking about hate speech, and that is a totally different argument, or at least it's a conversation in and of itself that I don't think we need to get into.
[12:06.740 --> 12:30.840]  But that coupled with net neutrality policies that disallow certain or deprioritize certain types of traffic, it basically all but creates sort of a pay-for and highly commercialized internet instead of what we might refer to and historically consider a public internet.
[12:30.840 --> 12:34.060]  It feels less and less and less public.
[12:35.300 --> 12:39.440]  Yeah, and there are so many possibilities for filters to go wrong.
[12:39.600 --> 12:44.980]  You know, Google is probably the biggest operator of any kind of content filter right now for YouTube.
[12:45.300 --> 12:48.440]  And as anyone who posts anything to YouTube knows, it works really badly.
[12:48.660 --> 12:50.360]  It's open to abuse in all sorts of ways.
[12:50.520 --> 12:51.980]  It's like a deliberate harassment tool.
[12:52.100 --> 12:59.160]  One thing trolls will do is send copyright takedown notices to stuff they don't own, but just to get it knocked off the net for a little while.
[12:59.780 --> 13:03.220]  And, you know, again, an automatic filter will never understand fair use.
[13:03.300 --> 13:07.820]  An automatic filter will never understand if you actually have a license or ownership of something.
[13:08.200 --> 13:18.220]  I know of a band that put their own music video from the 80s on their own YouTube channel and it got taken down and they got a takedown notice from their record label that they had at the time, even though it was their property.
[13:18.380 --> 13:19.380]  Like, all kinds of craziness.
[13:19.620 --> 13:25.520]  And yeah, the robots will never, I don't think, be that smart where they can understand the subtleties of this.
[13:25.600 --> 13:27.680]  You need some accountability to the process.
[13:28.120 --> 13:35.080]  Yeah, you know, I think what Kyle said a little while ago about the internet just becoming more and more commercialized.
[13:35.840 --> 13:37.040]  It really rings true.
[13:37.280 --> 13:45.140]  Because what you're saying about YouTube, how it does such a bad job, we've had such an issue uploading videos from our conference.
[13:46.280 --> 13:54.380]  We got stuck on one during the Hackers Got Talent panel, where somebody, we had to figure out where this was coming from.
[13:54.480 --> 13:56.960]  Somebody played a snippet of a song in the background.
[13:57.280 --> 13:59.900]  And that made the whole video get flagged.
[13:59.960 --> 14:01.500]  And we had to go in and edit.
[14:01.640 --> 14:03.780]  And then the editing didn't work on the YouTube platform.
[14:04.000 --> 14:07.100]  So basically, we're wasting all of this time to make them happy.
[14:07.240 --> 14:15.900]  Do you think anybody is going to pirate music based on hearing two notes in the distance when somebody wasn't talking?
[14:16.280 --> 14:23.340]  You know, this is very different from the issue of piracy, from ripping people off, from the things that we should be concerned about.
[14:23.460 --> 14:27.140]  This is about all kinds of content control that did not exist before.
[14:27.220 --> 14:30.200]  Now, you know, I tried to print out a story.
[14:30.420 --> 14:34.260]  I tried to access a story about this through Google News.
[14:34.360 --> 14:36.980]  But as soon as I clicked upon it, I was told I had to pay to read the article.
[14:36.980 --> 14:40.680]  So I wasn't able to see the article to share with people on the air.
[14:40.820 --> 14:41.280]  Okay, fine.
[14:41.360 --> 14:44.480]  I went to a different place to print out a different article.
[14:44.640 --> 14:49.900]  And that's when my printer decided to tell me that it needed toner, even though it didn't need toner.
[14:49.900 --> 14:53.440]  Uh, apparently there was something in the printer that said, okay, time to buy toner.
[14:53.600 --> 14:59.260]  And I had to go through all these hoops to get it to, uh, to, to say, okay, the toner works and I'm going to print it anyway.
[14:59.420 --> 15:14.840]  But it took 25 minutes to print something because the, the, the machine was programmed to tell me I had to buy something new, even though I didn't all this hassle to print out a story about, about content control and, and, and absurdities like this.
[15:15.060 --> 15:24.060]  So anyway, what I want to say, uh, echoes what Rob just said about, uh, about Google, because yeah, um, YouTube could end up doing quite well out of this, out of article 13.
[15:24.280 --> 15:28.120]  If all platforms need upload filters, Google is ideally placed to sell them.
[15:28.240 --> 15:37.640]  Its parent company, Alphabet has spent more than a hundred million dollars building a copyright detection system that's used by more than 9,000 broadcasters, movie studios, and record labels worldwide.
[15:38.440 --> 15:46.040]  And it's the bane of our existence because it's, uh, it, it, it keeps you from, uh, uh, from expressing yourself creatively.
[15:46.040 --> 15:47.440]  It's got nothing to do with piracy.
[15:47.560 --> 15:49.000]  It's got nothing to do with ripping people off.
[15:49.140 --> 15:53.960]  It has to do with, uh, occasionally having a snippet of, of something from a passing car.
[15:53.960 --> 15:57.240]  If you're making a film, uh, well, those notes, who's paying for those notes?
[15:57.380 --> 15:57.960]  Who's paying for that?
[15:58.240 --> 16:01.780]  The, the, the music that that person created, uh, many years ago.
[16:01.960 --> 16:07.800]  And, uh, you expect to just get away with hearing those two, uh, uh, uh, chords being played in a passing car.
[16:08.060 --> 16:11.140]  You know, ridiculous ways of thinking like that.
[16:11.320 --> 16:13.040]  That is what we are looking forward to, Alex.
[16:13.220 --> 16:19.340]  You know, to, to play the devil's advocate here with regard to Article 13, which is, which is somewhat difficult to have to say.
[16:19.940 --> 16:31.620]  What this is being billed as to, to its, you know, or by its proponents rather, is that this is some level of equalization that content providers are finally going to get paid for the work that they have created.
[16:32.180 --> 16:36.420]  But that's not necessarily the case if you think about the commercialization of, of the internet.
[16:36.580 --> 16:40.580]  For instance, you know, I, um, I've written a few articles for CNN Opinion.
[16:41.060 --> 16:45.240]  You know, you get a small fee for, for publishing on, uh, on CNN.
[16:45.400 --> 16:46.300]  It's nothing to write home about.
[16:46.400 --> 16:48.800]  It's more about the, the honor of being published by them.
[16:49.260 --> 16:52.620]  Uh, you see nothing for that being dispersed on other platforms.
[16:52.800 --> 17:02.960]  What these individual companies would have to do is negotiate a license agreement, let's say with CNN or Apple or another, or Yahoo, another news distributor, all those licenses cost money.
[17:03.580 --> 17:08.080]  And this is being billed as a, a win for competition.
[17:08.210 --> 17:13.770]  The, the competition officer in the European Parliament is saying, this is a great day for freedom and whatnot.
[17:13.770 --> 17:15.360]  I mean, and, and, and competition.
[17:15.640 --> 17:19.080]  But at the same time, it is so overtly anti-competitive.
[17:19.230 --> 17:21.820]  I mean, I, I know I'm not doing a great job of being the devil's advocate here.
[17:22.030 --> 17:40.320]  But then also, if you go back to the content control issue that you had mentioned, Emmanuel, if we are to have learned anything from abuses of content control in the United States, and in particular, the DMCA, the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, look at what the hell Rights Corp has been doing in this country for many,
[17:40.420 --> 17:40.880]  many years.
[17:41.300 --> 17:52.970]  Abusing internet service providers, abusing legal process, sending hundreds of thousands of violation notices to people for torrenting files that may or may not have copyrighted material in it.
[17:53.560 --> 18:02.270]  And abusing that, that safe harbor provision to the point where, you know, there was a case that was decided a couple of years ago that had to go all the way up to the Fourth Circuit, Cox v.
[18:02.380 --> 18:07.210]  BMG and Rights Corp, that is still causing reverberations through the ISP community.
[18:07.420 --> 18:16.040]  So I just feel as if Europe hasn't learned from the mistakes of the United States when it comes to the abuses of enforcing copyright.
[18:16.040 --> 18:20.660]  And they're just going to make it easier to control content and abuse this particular law.
[18:21.030 --> 18:33.320]  However, what I will say, though, is because of this foul-up with the votes, I think this passed by five votes, and there were, I think, I believe, over 10 members of the European Parliament that accidentally voted to not amend this particular issue.
[18:33.680 --> 18:35.640]  And they can't renege on their votes.
[18:35.790 --> 18:37.540]  They can voice their error.
[18:38.080 --> 18:41.300]  But now this has to go to the state level.
[18:41.460 --> 18:49.440]  And the next issue here is, because this is going to become a European directive, the states have to now transpose national legislation.
[18:49.580 --> 18:57.440]  What that means is that they now have an obligation to pass a law that would implement Article 13 in all EU member states.
[18:57.790 --> 19:01.740]  What if they just refuse to do this because they know the vote was wrong from the outset?
[19:01.960 --> 19:02.980]  I'd love to see that.
[19:03.100 --> 19:11.100]  I'd love to see some some countries that believe in digital rights, perhaps like the Netherlands or others.
[19:11.440 --> 19:17.480]  You know, I was going to say the UK, but they're in a bit of a pickle right now with Brexit and whatnot.
[19:17.480 --> 19:17.720]  Yeah, they're busy.
[19:17.900 --> 19:21.600]  But my point is countries can push back now.
[19:21.770 --> 19:22.940]  They can refuse to do this.
[19:23.040 --> 19:26.100]  They can exert some sovereignty, perhaps force a re-vote on this.
[19:26.200 --> 19:31.900]  They might get in some trouble, might cause some issues procedurally with the European Parliament.
[19:32.140 --> 19:36.440]  But I think it's damn worth doing because I don't think a lot of people are really in favor of this.
[19:36.600 --> 19:43.220]  And there were protests all around the EU, tens of thousands of people in so many different cities over the past week came out and opposed this.
[19:43.340 --> 19:53.200]  You know, this could be the best shot to convincing the UK to stay in the EU if all these countries stood up for themselves and said, no, we don't agree with this.
[19:53.290 --> 19:54.340]  Our people don't agree with this.
[19:54.560 --> 19:55.480]  We're not going to do it.
[19:55.560 --> 19:57.120]  And it was honored.
[19:57.620 --> 20:08.040]  Then it would be clear that individual countries do have a voice, that they're not being run by Brussels, that they can actually stand up in opposition occasionally and get their way.
[20:08.270 --> 20:13.900]  This is a great opportunity to do this, especially with the error in voting.
[20:14.000 --> 20:17.960]  Apparently, what they did was they changed the vote order, and that threw some people off.
[20:18.530 --> 20:19.560]  It was over 10.
[20:19.660 --> 20:22.100]  It was 13 MEPs who said they voted incorrectly.
[20:22.100 --> 20:29.100]  Now, 10 of them said they meant to vote for the amendments, and two of them said they wanted to vote against it, and one didn't want to vote at all, apparently.
[20:29.460 --> 20:30.700]  I don't know how you make that mistake.
[20:31.420 --> 20:37.080]  But yeah, I mean, that would have been enough to sway the vote in a different direction.
[20:37.270 --> 20:41.200]  So there are many issues here that need to be addressed.
[20:41.200 --> 20:50.420]  But I really do think if you're an elected official, if you're a citizen, and you don't agree with this, it's not too late to speak out and to say so.
[20:50.980 --> 20:58.790]  And we'll certainly follow what is happening in this particular controversial issue.
[20:58.980 --> 21:06.790]  Also, I'd like to thank the EU for buying off the Diebold voting machines that we were complaining about on this program in like 2008, that are impossible to use correctly.
[21:06.960 --> 21:08.940]  So, you know, I was wondering where those ended up.
[21:08.940 --> 21:09.380]  Wow.
[21:09.580 --> 21:09.840]  Okay.
[21:11.000 --> 21:18.500]  Speaking of following things that seem doomed, net neutrality, it's not dead yet.
[21:18.940 --> 21:33.240]  Last month, Democrats introduced a simple three-page bill that would do one thing, restore FCC net neutrality rules and the agency's authority over ISPs, both stripped away by a hugely controversial decision by the FCC back in 2017.
[21:33.880 --> 21:43.420]  On Tuesday morning, the Save the Internet Act passed through a key House committee vote and mark obsession, despite some last-minute efforts by big telecom to weaken the bill.
[21:44.420 --> 21:48.360]  Inside the Beltway, this is really about maybe five companies.
[21:48.580 --> 21:50.560]  That's according to Representative Ann Eshoo.
[21:51.300 --> 21:53.800]  Across the country, the American people really get this.
[21:53.880 --> 21:57.700]  National polling shows that Republicans, Democrats, Independents support net neutrality.
[21:57.740 --> 22:00.100]  We're still in the same old soup pot here.
[22:00.100 --> 22:03.920]  We need to take our lenses off and look across the country.
[22:04.160 --> 22:11.660]  Survey after survey have shown that the vast bipartisan majority of Americans supported the FCC's 2015 rules and opposed the repeal.
[22:11.860 --> 22:26.000]  But Trump's FCC was quick to bow to pressure to telecom giants like AT&T, Verizon, Comcast, despite their long history of using their role as natural monopolies to hamstring competitors and nickel and dime subscribers.
[22:27.340 --> 22:33.740]  So, I'm not sure where this goes from here, if it's something that is doomed to failure.
[22:34.280 --> 22:37.020]  But at least, at least it's not completely dead.
[22:37.840 --> 22:41.360]  I mean, it's been a bipartisan issue.
[22:41.720 --> 22:48.700]  And there's been, I think, continued, and from the outset of this issue, bipartisan support for net neutrality.
[22:48.840 --> 22:50.540]  And that's really the big issue here.
[22:50.860 --> 23:09.660]  And the fact that there are 22 state attorneys generals that have initiated a lawsuit, I think, together with Mozilla, I believe Mozilla might be part of that lawsuit, claiming that the FCC's implementation of this particular rollback of the net neutrality rules should be overruled because it's not in the public interest,
[23:09.780 --> 23:11.480]  that they ignored the public interest here.
[23:12.060 --> 23:19.920]  And I think that, you know, the bipartisan effort that we should hopefully see from the Senate next would be victorious.
[23:19.920 --> 23:29.420]  I see no reason why it shouldn't, frankly, unless, you know, the telecom lobby is so powerful that it gets the majority of the Republican senators.
[23:29.580 --> 23:32.760]  We've seen, I think, stalwart support from Democrats on this.
[23:32.960 --> 23:38.180]  And I think, I don't know if it's a majority support from the Republicans, but I know there is significant support there.
[23:38.500 --> 23:39.480]  Hopefully, that will carry that.
[23:39.560 --> 23:40.720]  Well, here's what we're facing.
[23:40.960 --> 23:45.560]  It should pass in the House, but it's going to be facing a much tougher uphill climb in the Senate.
[23:45.900 --> 23:52.280]  And after that, it's also likely to get vetoed by the right mayor Putin.
[23:53.600 --> 23:55.120]  Oh, did I say that again?
[23:55.240 --> 23:55.560]  I'm sorry.
[23:55.940 --> 24:03.340]  You know, I'm going to continue saying that only because I know it annoys them so much when you say that Trump is taking orders from Putin.
[24:03.540 --> 24:07.460]  Even if it's not true, I just like saying it if it annoys them, because I know that's the right thing to do.
[24:07.620 --> 24:08.940]  And he's probably listening.
[24:09.360 --> 24:10.300]  Well, at some point.
[24:11.280 --> 24:12.700]  We're right after Trump Lodge.
[24:12.840 --> 24:13.260]  That's true.
[24:13.400 --> 24:13.740]  That's true.
[24:13.920 --> 24:14.240]  Absolutely.
[24:14.520 --> 24:14.620]  Yeah.
[24:15.120 --> 24:15.400]  Yeah.
[24:15.460 --> 24:36.220]  But one thing we can do is keep hammering away at our Congress creatures and senators and make clear our support for this and the reasons they should be supporting it and maybe get enough support together to override a possible veto and follow up with organizations like Battle for the Net at battleforthenet.com to see what's going on in sort of the public sphere about this.
[24:36.220 --> 24:42.620]  I want to add the the companies, too, because the customer is still always right.
[24:42.860 --> 24:50.560]  And I think, you know, as consumers of this technology, the people carrying around these phones and using these networks have a say.
[24:50.600 --> 24:58.580]  So if you get in touch with maybe the the main switchboard at one of these companies, God help you.
[24:58.740 --> 24:59.940]  I don't think that's possible anymore.
[24:59.940 --> 25:09.580]  But if you try, if you try to contact these people, if you try to contact whatever lobbyists they're using, you need to get the message across.
[25:10.020 --> 25:23.840]  And I guess us, too, we collectively, we have a voice in this and and we can urge the corporate entities involved to also follow suit or to develop something that is more fair minded.
[25:24.600 --> 25:28.180]  Just as important as speaking with your representatives, I think.
[25:28.500 --> 25:29.820]  Let me ask you a question, Kyle.
[25:29.920 --> 25:31.900]  Do you think this would be a good use for robocalls?
[25:34.600 --> 25:40.460]  Well, I don't think people have leveraged robocalls in creative enough ways that they're all pretty boring right now.
[25:40.600 --> 25:41.180]  So, yeah, sure.
[25:41.380 --> 25:41.780]  Sure.
[25:41.780 --> 25:42.340]  I agree.
[25:42.760 --> 25:44.040]  We're going to get to robocalls.
[25:44.200 --> 25:45.500]  We've got a few things to say about those.
[25:45.600 --> 25:57.900]  But I just want to stick with the net and childhood thing for a second, because in a related development, you know, the FCC has had to cough up forty three thousand dollars for refusing to turn over the fake comment records that we talked about here.
[25:58.260 --> 26:08.480]  They didn't admit to doing anything wrong, but the FCC has settled a lawsuit for tens of thousands of dollars after unlawfully withholding records from a reporter under the Freedom of Information Act.
[26:09.160 --> 26:21.140]  They'll pay forty three thousand dollars in attorney's fees and costs to New York journalist Jason Prechtel over records he initially requested almost two years ago concerning its 2017 net neutrality proceeding.
[26:21.800 --> 26:27.560]  Representative by Chicago law firm Levy and Levy, Prechtel sued the FCC in a Washington, D.C.
[26:27.700 --> 26:32.300]  federal court after it failed to respond to his request in the time frame provided under the statute.
[26:32.440 --> 26:33.180]  And that's what you can do.
[26:33.260 --> 26:33.820]  You can sue them.
[26:34.120 --> 26:45.660]  The data Prechtel ultimately obtained through the case formed the basis of a Gizmodo report last month, which he co-authored, that revealed how investigators had linked various entities, including a prominent Washington, D.C.
[26:45.760 --> 26:52.540]  publication, to potentially millions of fraudulent comments submitted during the 2017 net neutrality rollback.
[26:52.980 --> 27:00.260]  That same data was previously withheld from law enforcement investigators by the FCC's top lawyer, citing jurisdictional and privacy concerns.
[27:00.700 --> 27:04.220]  Prechtel eventually obtained it under FOIA from a separate agency.
[27:04.740 --> 27:10.060]  It's just so corrupt and so evil that they would do this, that they would try to hide this.
[27:10.320 --> 27:13.960]  And I'm upset that they're only being fined $43,000.
[27:14.480 --> 27:15.760]  And that's our tax dollars.
[27:16.120 --> 27:18.380]  So, you know, what are they going to do?
[27:18.520 --> 27:21.760]  I mean, they're just going to be refunded $43,000 extra next year.
[27:21.860 --> 27:28.220]  I mean, it's not really an adequate remedy at law, I think, to fine a federal agency like this.
[27:28.300 --> 27:31.880]  And especially that small amount of $43,000.
[27:31.880 --> 27:35.840]  I think it would be more appropriate to sanction the individuals at issue.
[27:36.020 --> 27:43.300]  You know, this issue of transparency of government and access to information is becoming extraordinarily critical in the time that we live.
[27:43.300 --> 27:54.160]  And especially in these opaque times where, you know, things like important memoranda are being shielded from public view, that these minor battles really make a big difference.
[27:54.160 --> 28:07.200]  And I think we need to begin to rethink how we gauge and measure damages and what are the adequate remedies for the refusal to hand over this particular type of information because these inadequate remedies are just going to encourage this bad behavior.
[28:07.940 --> 28:08.640]  Well said.
[28:09.180 --> 28:13.540]  All right, now on to robocalls because, yes, robocalls are everywhere.
[28:13.620 --> 28:15.300]  We get them constantly.
[28:15.940 --> 28:18.880]  And they really do have an effect on people.
[28:19.280 --> 28:22.280]  You know, the latest thing, well, there's a bunch of latest things.
[28:22.520 --> 28:32.360]  There's a Chinese scam going on that targets Chinese citizens with all kinds of threats of tax payments and things like that and telling people they have to go.
[28:32.540 --> 28:42.940]  If you ever get a call that tells you you have to go to the bank and withdraw money to give it to them, odds are that's not legit, especially if it says it's coming from a governmental agency or the police department or anyone.
[28:43.300 --> 28:49.520]  So, you know, I know it's easy to say these things, but there are so many times that people believe it.
[28:49.640 --> 28:51.320]  They believe these things are possible.
[28:51.560 --> 28:55.620]  And there are so many people out there that are easily misled.
[28:55.620 --> 29:07.240]  They get an email from a suspicious source and they assume something is being intercepted or that all kinds of weird things that we would say, yeah, that's impossible to believe that.
[29:08.140 --> 29:11.620]  We underestimate the effect that these things have.
[29:11.920 --> 29:16.980]  And now there's a new bill that could make robocalls illegal in New York.
[29:17.120 --> 29:25.500]  They'd be effectively banned in the state under legislation proposed by lawmakers who say the irritating, relentless calls are a top complaint from constituents.
[29:25.980 --> 29:36.400]  The measure which passed the Senate committee yesterday would prohibit telemarketers from using automatic dialing technology to contact a New Yorker for commercial purposes if they don't have the person's prior consent.
[29:36.820 --> 29:37.340]  Yeah.
[29:37.480 --> 29:39.020]  So that's even legitimate calls.
[29:39.380 --> 29:43.120]  Companies that violate the rule would face fines of up to $2,000 per call.
[29:43.240 --> 29:45.400]  You know, but that money doesn't go to the person you're calling.
[29:45.600 --> 29:46.920]  It just goes into the state.
[29:47.040 --> 29:50.740]  It would be nice if, you know, you got something out of being harassed mercilessly.
[29:51.300 --> 29:57.500]  Additionally, telephone companies would be required to offer free services to consumers, allowing them to pre-screen and block robocalls.
[29:57.780 --> 30:05.240]  The bill would allow the state's attorney general to fine telemarketers who violate the restrictions, again, up to $2,000 per call.
[30:06.120 --> 30:12.400]  You know, I think there are all kinds of technical solutions that we can think of to these problems.
[30:12.740 --> 30:18.040]  The biggest issue right now is that caller ID is able to be spoofed very easily.
[30:18.240 --> 30:26.440]  How many times has this happened to you, where you see a call coming in and it's coming in from your local exchange, your area code, your exchange, you assume it's a neighbor?
[30:26.860 --> 30:30.080]  Sometimes, this happened to me, it comes from somebody you know.
[30:30.260 --> 30:31.440]  You know that person.
[30:31.720 --> 30:44.140]  It just so happens that the randomization program that they use that changes the caller ID just happened to hit upon that four-digit combination that was somebody that I knew.
[30:44.240 --> 30:45.740]  So the caller ID said their name and everything.
[30:45.840 --> 30:46.520]  It wasn't them.
[30:46.660 --> 30:47.720]  It was not them.
[30:47.760 --> 30:49.720]  It was completely fraudulent and fake.
[30:49.940 --> 31:06.960]  Of course, I don't pick up any calls, but if I did, I would have heard who knows what, some kind of threat, some kind of, you know, credit violation that I had to answer right away, a court date that I wasn't showing up for, all sorts of things like that that people are easily fooled by.
[31:07.560 --> 31:23.260]  I mean, to go back to your comment, though, about the $2,000 fine, I think it's unclear right now whether that would go to the state or perhaps, if the law creates a private right of action for people to sue for those damages, that could be really significant as well,
[31:23.300 --> 31:30.480]  because then you're not contingent upon a state agency taking action, using their resources, using our tax dollars to fund this particular enforcement.
[31:30.620 --> 31:47.440]  If you go back and think about the the spam issues that we had in the late 90s, early 2000s, I mean, even until today, that resulted in the passage of the Cannes Spam Act, federal law that made spam subject to certain statutory fines.
[31:47.480 --> 31:49.100]  And there was a private right of action.
[31:49.220 --> 31:58.880]  If you receive spam from people, and you looked at the mail headers, and you could identify from which the spam originated, you could actually sue them in federal court.
[31:59.280 --> 32:00.660]  And a lot of people did this.
[32:00.780 --> 32:05.140]  There were a lot of anti-spam vigilantes that went after the spammers for statutory damages.
[32:05.340 --> 32:09.020]  A lot of times they were overseas, or it was difficult to locate them, et cetera, et cetera.
[32:09.320 --> 32:21.600]  But for those that put in the effort, investigated this, used the subpoena process, used legal process to identify them, they wound up doing really, really well, because those statutory damages were pretty damn heavy.
[32:22.300 --> 32:26.640]  It didn't necessarily stop spam, but it was a good enforcement mechanism.
[32:26.700 --> 32:31.380]  And I think it would be great if this particular law included that private right of action.
[32:31.940 --> 32:42.180]  To go and build on your scam issue, you know, we recently had a call to our law firm a couple of weeks ago, where it was exactly this issue.
[32:42.580 --> 32:44.180]  I'm sorry, it was to my cell phone.
[32:44.300 --> 32:56.080]  And when I called back the number from my work phone, if I had caller ID blocked, it just, nobody would answer the telephone.
[32:56.240 --> 32:59.220]  You had to have your caller ID unblocked in order for somebody to answer.
[32:59.440 --> 33:05.880]  And it was this pre-canned message about how, you know, this was the IRS and there was a serious issue and you need to call back.
[33:06.020 --> 33:15.780]  So we went down the rabbit hole and we let them mislead us into, or rather, I'm sorry, we misled them into thinking that we were just taken by this entire scam.
[33:15.900 --> 33:18.740]  And it was crazy what they were saying to us.
[33:18.920 --> 33:20.520]  I gave them a bogus name.
[33:20.600 --> 33:25.160]  They told me that, well, as you know, Mr. Werner, there's a warrant out for your arrest.
[33:25.560 --> 33:27.200]  And it's in the federal court.
[33:27.480 --> 33:34.380]  If you hang up this phone, this call is going to be automatically downloaded into the federal court and marshals will come and arrest you.
[33:34.520 --> 33:35.900]  Wait, the call is going to be downloaded?
[33:35.980 --> 33:37.400]  That's literally what they said.
[33:37.540 --> 33:39.160]  We have this recorded as well.
[33:39.240 --> 33:45.200]  They said the call, even if you put them on hold, the call will be automatically downloaded to the federal court.
[33:45.500 --> 33:46.440]  Well, that sounds official.
[33:46.620 --> 33:49.040]  And the only way for you to deal with this...
[33:49.040 --> 33:49.920]  Is that like e-filing?
[33:50.180 --> 33:51.400]  I guess it might be.
[33:51.500 --> 33:52.880]  Yeah, which is hard enough, by the way.
[33:53.000 --> 33:53.420]  Yeah, I imagine.
[33:53.440 --> 33:54.140]  It's a real pain.
[33:55.160 --> 34:00.580]  And the only way that you can avoid execution of this particular warrant is to pay them.
[34:00.700 --> 34:01.600]  Don't they mean uploaded, though?
[34:01.680 --> 34:03.300]  I mean, I'm sorry, this bothers me.
[34:04.100 --> 34:07.880]  You would upload the call to some site somewhere that would take action.
[34:08.020 --> 34:09.450]  I actually brought that up with them.
[34:10.270 --> 34:11.580]  I did bring that up with them.
[34:11.660 --> 34:12.270]  And what did they say?
[34:12.460 --> 34:13.680]  They said it will be downloaded.
[34:13.930 --> 34:14.450]  It will be downloaded.
[34:14.520 --> 34:15.390]  Yes, it will be downloaded.
[34:15.540 --> 34:16.370]  No arguing that, I guess.
[34:16.430 --> 34:17.870]  Well, I guess, right?
[34:18.240 --> 34:19.600]  I guess it all depends on that.
[34:19.680 --> 34:21.460]  So you're all paid up, I hope.
[34:21.810 --> 34:30.080]  Well, it's such a ridiculous scam, too, that it's amazing to me that people will be taken by this because I said, okay, well, how much is my tax liability?
[34:30.310 --> 34:32.220]  They said, it's $8,000 you have to pay to me.
[34:32.390 --> 34:33.100]  $8,000, Alex.
[34:33.270 --> 34:33.410]  Wow.
[34:33.430 --> 34:33.960]  $8,000.
[34:33.960 --> 34:34.890]  How did you let this happen?
[34:34.890 --> 34:36.520]  I said to them, well, that's going to be tough for me.
[34:36.580 --> 34:40.000]  I can only pay, God, like around $4,500 today.
[34:40.080 --> 34:40.850]  Is that going to be okay?
[34:40.960 --> 34:42.660]  And you're Mr. Werner, too, on top of this, right?
[34:42.720 --> 34:43.350]  That was the name you used?
[34:43.370 --> 34:44.200]  That was Mr. Yeah, it was Samuel Werner.
[34:44.200 --> 34:46.270]  So now you owe one under that name as well.
[34:46.500 --> 34:47.350]  Yeah, no doubt.
[34:47.520 --> 34:49.330]  And they said $4,500 would be okay.
[34:49.680 --> 34:49.960]  Okay.
[34:49.960 --> 34:51.160]  Can I pay it by credit card?
[34:51.500 --> 34:54.240]  Unfortunately, credit cards only work during business hours.
[34:54.430 --> 34:55.180]  It's after 5 p.m.
[34:55.180 --> 34:56.430]  We can't process credit cards.
[34:56.580 --> 35:04.850]  But what you can do is go to your nearest Walmart or your nearest Best Buy or CVS or Duane Reade and buy Google Play cards.
[35:04.960 --> 35:11.310]  And then if you give us those numbers of the Google Play cards, $4,500 worth, we will remove this warrant for your arrest.
[35:11.500 --> 35:12.350]  Google Play cards.
[35:12.390 --> 35:13.620]  Can you believe it?
[35:13.620 --> 35:15.040]  First of all, I don't even know what that is.
[35:15.040 --> 35:15.660]  I can imagine.
[35:16.350 --> 35:16.770]  Okay.
[35:18.450 --> 35:31.690]  Every one of these entities you just named, Walmart, CVS, Google, they all should have big banner advertisements warning people not to make use of this because apparently a lot of people are doing it.
[35:31.870 --> 35:49.080]  And there was a story two, three weeks ago where somebody who worked at one of these places, I think it was a CVS or something, had someone come in and try and buy that much, you know, a large quantity of maybe it was Google Play cards or something equivalent and had themselves heard that scam and talked the customer out of it.
[35:49.810 --> 35:53.230]  But, you know, it's fine for us.
[35:53.330 --> 35:55.000]  I mean, we're reasonably savvy in this room.
[35:55.120 --> 35:59.620]  I think the vast majority of our listeners are probably also savvy and can look at a scam like this and say, well, that's hilarious.
[35:59.650 --> 36:01.520]  But not everyone is.
[36:01.770 --> 36:16.950]  And, you know, when you push a button to launch 100,000 robocalls and you only need the smallest fraction of a fraction of a percent, um, to, to fall for it, you'll find a couple of people who are just that easily fooled or intimidated or whatever, and who still don't deserve to be scammed by a robot.
[36:17.150 --> 36:20.710]  Just in the past week, um, uh, sometimes we help people out.
[36:20.830 --> 36:24.730]  If we don't, if we do it all the time, it would be a full-time job, but it'd be more than that.
[36:25.000 --> 36:33.150]  But, uh, helping somebody get their computer back online, uh, and just, just hearing the stories, how can you possibly believe this?
[36:33.250 --> 36:36.520]  How can you possibly believe that this person wants to help you?
[36:36.670 --> 36:43.290]  Somebody who calls you and offers to fix your computer for $250 calls you out of the blue and you believe them.
[36:43.430 --> 36:44.750]  How is, how is this possible?
[36:44.910 --> 36:45.810]  Well, it is possible.
[36:46.020 --> 36:50.000]  And, and we have to stop being incredulous because people do fall for this all the time.
[36:50.370 --> 36:53.950]  Uh, and, and it's, it's, it's something that, um, is a real problem.
[36:54.120 --> 36:54.650]  It works.
[36:55.040 --> 36:56.620]  They wouldn't do it if it didn't work.
[36:56.830 --> 37:02.190]  These calls wouldn't be made constantly if, if they weren't effective a fraction of the time, which is all they need.
[37:02.750 --> 37:09.040]  And not being able to trace where it's coming from, not being able to, um, um, uh, to see the actual originating number.
[37:09.210 --> 37:10.370]  We know it's technically possible.
[37:10.500 --> 37:11.000]  It can be done.
[37:11.100 --> 37:25.060]  In fact, the FCC is, um, um, pushing carriers to implement, um, uh, more, uh, more robust, uh, caller ID, uh, ID, caller ID authentication, I guess, is, is what they're referring to it as.
[37:25.390 --> 37:29.670]  There's no real indication as to how, uh, the carriers are supposed to do this.
[37:30.190 --> 37:36.290]  Uh, Azure pie is simply saying you better do this this year or else, uh, without any, any details.
[37:36.580 --> 37:41.150]  Uh, combating illegal robocalls is our top consumer priority at the FCC.
[37:41.430 --> 37:43.600]  That's why we need call authentication.
[37:43.650 --> 37:45.520]  That's what, what Azure pie is calling it.
[37:45.650 --> 37:47.690]  Call authentication to become a reality.
[37:48.520 --> 37:49.120]  It's not nice.
[37:49.210 --> 37:50.850]  You could just say, I want this to become a reality.
[37:51.170 --> 37:52.930]  And, uh, if you don't, we're going to find you.
[37:53.210 --> 37:57.980]  It's the best way to ensure that consumers can answer their phones with confidence by this time next year.
[37:58.390 --> 38:01.190]  I expect that consumers will begin to see this on their phones.
[38:02.120 --> 38:07.870]  I mean, this seems to be an issue of, uh, people running their own software based switching, right?
[38:07.890 --> 38:10.960]  If you run your own telephone switch, that's how you can spoof caller ID.
[38:11.690 --> 38:16.790]  So this would require some kind of data to go through the telephone line.
[38:16.870 --> 38:18.980]  That's not ordinarily passed through the telephone line.
[38:19.350 --> 38:27.580]  That would be sort of like, uh, some kind of certificate to authenticate that this came from a legitimate telephone switch, not a software based switch.
[38:27.670 --> 38:32.730]  How are you going to, how are you going to differentiate between actual hardware based switches and software based switches?
[38:32.730 --> 38:34.000]  Is there going to be discrimination?
[38:34.080 --> 38:38.410]  It's going to create a giant headache as, as I understand it, and I could be misunderstanding it.
[38:38.520 --> 38:41.450]  So be interested to hear from listeners about what they think from this as well.
[38:42.890 --> 38:45.170]  Um, yeah, I heard a report.
[38:45.170 --> 38:59.910]  I'm not sure if, if, uh, if we've touched on it yet, but, uh, in the vein of the authentication, I think, uh, AT&T and Comcast had some kind of agreement to establish a, uh, connection between their, um, customers, their, uh, phone customers on the, uh,
[39:00.000 --> 39:07.910]  AT&T and then also the, the broadband phone or whatever kind of phone Comcast offers in the, in the realm of authenticated calls.
[39:08.120 --> 39:27.790]  And, and this is, again, I think to, to ease, uh, point about, um, uh, them establishing something that has improvements and, and has, has built upon what, what we all know as caller ID, which for years and, and years has been broken, uh, fundamentally in that realm.
[39:27.960 --> 39:42.950]  Kind of like what Alex was talking about with being able to run your own, uh, switching system that really democratizes the ability, especially with the advent of broadband to, um, leverage one of these, uh, campaigns, uh, very, very easily and quickly,
[39:43.410 --> 39:45.190]  whether you're an actual business or not.
[39:45.850 --> 39:52.460]  Well, the thing is, um, it's, um, uh, critique of Ajit Pai aside, it is possible to do this.
[39:52.600 --> 40:02.870]  It might involve some, um, um, some tweaking of the technology, but, you know, when you consider, if you make a phone call, um, you can, you can spoof your caller ID, you can make it seem like it's coming from someplace else.
[40:03.000 --> 40:07.930]  But if you, if you make a billable call, they know who to bill that they're going to get that right.
[40:08.210 --> 40:09.250]  They usually do.
[40:09.410 --> 40:13.950]  Anyway, if you call nine one one and say something stupid, they're going to know where to go for the most part.
[40:14.350 --> 40:21.410]  So they do have the ability to do this and, uh, it needs to become a priority and not, not an additional service, not something they charge you for.
[40:21.620 --> 40:21.960]  Yeah.
[40:22.100 --> 40:31.690]  I I've talked about this a little bit and I think that their, their, um, business model prior has a, uh, select selects for call completion, right?
[40:31.850 --> 40:50.850]  So it's not discriminating as to what type of calls, but it, I almost want to say that this has, um, has roots in the languishing use of, of voice communication or actually the migration of it to platforms that people are already paying for a la voice over IP that in other words,
[40:51.330 --> 40:53.460]  yeah, let's loosen these regulations.
[40:53.460 --> 40:59.020]  We'll get more, more calls flowing through our networks to substantiate their existence.
[40:59.870 --> 41:07.790]  And, and meanwhile, we're going to squeeze every single penny out of those copper lines and whatever parts of the network that we really can't justify.
[41:07.960 --> 41:16.850]  And we just, we want to keep it loaded with, with call volume, uh, to, uh, keep shareholders from jumping ship or whatever it is.
[41:16.960 --> 41:17.150]  Right.
[41:17.430 --> 41:27.480]  And, uh, I, I just, I really think that selection for call completion is, um, is a real, uh, a huge part of this particular issue.
[41:28.390 --> 41:35.540]  I, I smell a FCC caller ID identification tax coming soon to a phone bill.
[41:35.710 --> 41:38.540]  That's exactly the kind of scam I'm afraid of that they're going to pull that.
[41:38.850 --> 41:39.290]  Yeah.
[41:39.370 --> 41:41.520]  And they are rolling out, uh, different apps.
[41:41.670 --> 41:45.910]  Again, AT&T's got, um, some kind of app that allows you to do call blocking.
[41:45.910 --> 41:57.150]  But, um, I know, uh, a couple of years prior to the app, and it only works on Apple and Android, which I have, uh, my own misgivings about, um, cause it just makes it difficult.
[41:57.170 --> 42:12.170]  And I think that, um, that ease of use for blocking calls, there should be, um, numeric codes, like, uh, you could send, um, like star codes or whatever, um, SMS codes, uh, you, or GSM codes you would use.
[42:12.520 --> 42:24.650]  Um, you should be able to do that as soon as you get a call, whether it's spoofed, whether you know it or not, if you know, it's not someone, um, that's actually, uh, displaying with a number or, you know, it's maybe a familiar number, but you know, it's spam.
[42:24.810 --> 42:45.290]  You should be able to hit like four keys, star, pound, whatever kind of GSM code you, you could, and then have that, um, be fed into a system for the carrier that is learning and using, um, their, their knowledge and their, their technical backend to identify the spammer through ANI,
[42:45.500 --> 42:50.730]  which is the, the actual and less spoofable part of this, uh, uh, system.
[42:50.930 --> 42:54.600]  But, uh, I just want to make one more point about AT&T's app.
[42:54.750 --> 42:55.520]  You know, they, they're okay.
[42:55.670 --> 43:01.020]  So now they're, they're, they're not doing what I just said necessarily, but they're just going to have an app that does allow you to block.
[43:01.150 --> 43:06.600]  But years ago, uh, to ease point, uh, they had a, uh, uh, service.
[43:06.810 --> 43:15.650]  I think it was called smart limits and it was really, I think for, um, parents, but it was the only way to block any number.
[43:15.770 --> 43:23.690]  And I think, um, I paid like, uh, $6 cause I was using this service and, um, I can only block like four calls or something.
[43:23.790 --> 43:24.310]  It was ridiculous.
[43:24.500 --> 43:27.690]  So they're making, they're making a business model out of this.
[43:27.790 --> 43:31.430]  And for customers of these carriers, you know, it should not be that hard.
[43:31.500 --> 43:46.250]  Like I said, if you can do GSM codes for all different kinds of forwarding and stuff like that, why can't I just immediately, um, after that call stops ringing, hit a couple of buttons and my account has a cache of every single number I've referred for blocking that should be legally,
[43:46.250 --> 43:48.580]  uh, a right as a consumer.
[43:48.790 --> 43:58.900]  And I really, I really hope they get on board with that and stop with this silly, like, Oh, get this other app and we'll just, we'll just, you know, have you add software to your phone.
[43:59.040 --> 44:01.020]  It does not need to be that complicated.
[44:01.020 --> 44:01.690]  No, not at all.
[44:01.840 --> 44:07.230]  And we know as hackers, we know what's technically possible and, and likely already in existence.
[44:07.580 --> 44:08.900]  We'd like to hear from listeners too.
[44:09.080 --> 44:10.080]  Uh, what's your wish list?
[44:10.170 --> 44:12.360]  What would you like to see, um, implemented?
[44:12.400 --> 44:14.710]  What, uh, features, what experiences have you had?
[44:14.820 --> 44:17.380]  Our phone number 212-209-2877.
[44:17.920 --> 44:33.230]  But, uh, to speak to Kyle's point, uh, if, if you get a harassing phone call or a call from a telemarketer, uh, it should be possible to hit a button on your landline or on your cell phone and say, never again, allow a call from this number to go to my phone,
[44:33.380 --> 44:33.600]  period.
[44:33.880 --> 44:36.730]  And I, I, I maintain it can go beyond that too.
[44:37.230 --> 44:51.250]  Uh, if, if a call is blocked to your number, you can still identify, you can identify it yourself as the end user, but you can tell the phone company don't allow anybody from the originating number to, uh, uh, to ever call my number again.
[44:51.400 --> 45:00.790]  You can also say anyone affiliated with that number that, uh, for instance, if, um, if we have, uh, line one, line two, line three, it all gets billed to the same number.
[45:01.190 --> 45:09.320]  You can say, don't let anybody calling from that office complex in any of the phone numbers they have call my, call my line ever again.
[45:09.460 --> 45:10.480]  This is all possible.
[45:10.600 --> 45:11.480]  It's not something they offer.
[45:11.560 --> 45:15.170]  It's not something that they, uh, will admit to, but it's certainly technically possible.
[45:15.580 --> 45:16.940]  And the same thing with email.
[45:17.080 --> 45:22.150]  If you get an email from somebody, you should be able to hit a button and say, don't ever allow email from this person again.
[45:22.150 --> 45:24.120]  Don't ever allow email with this subject again.
[45:24.300 --> 45:26.400]  Don't ever allow email with this content again.
[45:26.920 --> 45:29.860]  And I know that some commercial organizations have such features.
[45:29.980 --> 45:31.580]  It should be available everywhere.
[45:31.650 --> 45:32.940]  It should be easy to use.
[45:33.020 --> 45:36.600]  And if it is, if it becomes easy to use, these problems will start to go away.
[45:36.730 --> 45:38.000]  Kyle, you have something on your phone.
[45:38.080 --> 45:38.340]  What's this?
[45:38.520 --> 45:43.080]  Hey, it's, uh, Leonard again, uh, Leonard Skinner, uh, no relation to the musical group.
[45:43.620 --> 45:45.250]  Uh, listen, I was giving you a call back.
[45:45.340 --> 45:46.380]  I've been trying to reach out to you.
[45:46.540 --> 45:49.420]  Um, we still have you approved for the business term loan.
[45:49.650 --> 45:52.770]  It's over a five-year term, uh, with a monthly payment.
[45:53.100 --> 45:54.300]  Um, I've been trying to reach out to you.
[45:54.380 --> 45:55.520]  It is expiring tomorrow.
[45:55.750 --> 45:56.800]  Leonard, why are you calling me here?
[45:56.860 --> 45:57.300]  The rate is still the same.
[45:57.380 --> 45:58.320]  It's 4.9%.
[45:58.320 --> 46:00.980]  I was just looking to hear back from you as soon as possible.
[46:01.360 --> 46:07.270]  Um, my number here is 562-321-5974.
[46:07.750 --> 46:08.880]  Once again, this is Leonard.
[46:09.080 --> 46:09.960]  Make sure we block that out.
[46:10.080 --> 46:10.730]  We don't want that going on.
[46:10.730 --> 46:13.650]  3-2-1-5-9-7-4.
[46:13.880 --> 46:14.880]  And I look forward to speaking with you.
[46:15.080 --> 46:15.250]  Bye.
[46:16.620 --> 46:17.020]  Okay.
[46:17.020 --> 46:20.840]  Leonard, what, you want to tell us what, what that was, Kyle?
[46:21.580 --> 46:23.250]  Just one of many voicemails.
[46:23.400 --> 46:24.860]  I can just go through all of these.
[46:24.880 --> 46:25.060]  Okay.
[46:25.060 --> 46:26.040]  This was the voicemail you got.
[46:26.230 --> 46:26.500]  Yeah.
[46:26.600 --> 46:30.400]  It's a, one of them I've, I've got, um, a lot of loan stuff.
[46:30.790 --> 46:40.500]  I, I've consistently got Google business listing spam, which I, I, I think that is, uh, just fairly common.
[46:40.500 --> 46:45.480]  I, I don't consider that part of this new wave of spam, uh, phone calls that's coming in.
[46:45.650 --> 46:49.650]  I've got, um, Chinese, uh, speaking individuals.
[46:49.650 --> 46:50.940]  I don't know what they're saying.
[46:51.080 --> 46:53.790]  I don't know what they're trying to sell or scare me about.
[46:54.440 --> 46:57.460]  Um, but yeah, I mean, there, I could, I could go on.
[46:57.560 --> 47:00.670]  I could play more and more and more of this, um, uh, all night.
[47:00.820 --> 47:05.230]  I think I've got 15, uh, that I haven't even listened to.
[47:05.480 --> 47:08.900]  Um, so I just stopped listening to them for the entertainment value.
[47:09.170 --> 47:12.100]  I know a lot of them are word for word, the same thing.
[47:12.250 --> 47:19.080]  It sounds like the guy is, is just leaving you a message, but actually coming from many different phone numbers, same exact script, same exact recording.
[47:19.320 --> 47:24.060]  And the things that you mentioned as, as a Google business, I understand a lot of that is a scam as well.
[47:24.320 --> 47:27.840]  Uh, because what they do is they pretend to be affiliated with Google.
[47:27.980 --> 47:32.820]  Somehow people believe it because they say it and, um, and, and they wind up getting ripped off as a result.
[47:32.820 --> 47:33.750]  Hi, it's Kate.
[47:34.150 --> 47:34.860]  Um, don't want to bug.
[47:35.000 --> 47:37.650]  I know you're a busy business owner, just trying to catch you at the right time.
[47:37.960 --> 47:42.710]  Um, I did send over a couple of emails about that pending approval I have, uh, regarding funding for your business.
[47:43.000 --> 47:46.300]  Uh, again, just a reminder, I do have some rates as low as 3.9%.
[47:46.300 --> 47:48.170]  You can fund up to a million dollars.
[47:48.460 --> 47:51.800]  Uh, and we move pretty quickly can get you funded in as little as one to two days.
[47:52.020 --> 47:56.520]  Um, if you move at the same pace as I do, um, again, happy to go over some of the details.
[47:56.690 --> 47:58.920]  If you give me a call back, won't pick up too much of your time.
[47:59.580 --> 48:00.380]  Again, this is Kate.
[48:00.600 --> 48:01.710]  Thanks so much and have a great day.
[48:02.100 --> 48:02.820]  Thanks, Kate.
[48:03.210 --> 48:07.060]  I believe you're human once you were human, but you're not human anymore.
[48:07.880 --> 48:08.320]  Wow.
[48:08.670 --> 48:09.210]  Uh, okay.
[48:09.340 --> 48:11.580]  We can't go through your whole voice mailbox here.
[48:11.770 --> 48:14.940]  Your Google business listing is at risk of displaying incorrectly.
[48:15.290 --> 48:19.290]  We've tried numerous times to contact you by telephone so we can check the status of your listing.
[48:19.480 --> 48:21.400]  This will only take a few minutes of your time.
[48:21.650 --> 48:25.880]  Press one so we can quickly check the status of your Google listing to ensure it's active.
[48:26.040 --> 48:32.460]  If your Google listing is suspended or deleted, your business will not be shown, causing customers to think you're no longer open for business.
[48:32.690 --> 48:37.610]  Press one now to check this one now.
[48:37.890 --> 48:38.070]  Okay.
[48:38.210 --> 48:41.850]  So I guess the number of times you say Google, uh, will get people to take you seriously.
[48:42.410 --> 48:44.210]  Uh, it instills fear in you.
[48:44.290 --> 48:48.310]  It makes you think that your, your, your, your business is, uh, is going to hurt as a result.
[48:48.490 --> 48:50.390]  And people do react to this sort of thing.
[48:50.750 --> 48:52.770]  And I know Kyle, you get calls like this all the time.
[48:53.090 --> 48:53.390]  Yeah.
[48:53.550 --> 48:55.810]  Some of them are from, from my area code.
[48:55.970 --> 48:58.610]  Some are from very strange area codes.
[48:58.990 --> 49:05.150]  Uh, I have one from six, two, three, uh, let's see, uh, seven, one, seven.
[49:05.450 --> 49:10.310]  There's, there's some strange stuff, uh, going on and, uh, these aren't nearly as fun.
[49:10.390 --> 49:16.070]  I thought I had a bit more, um, interesting ones, but yeah, it's, uh, I'm sure somebody is collecting them too.
[49:16.190 --> 49:24.190]  There's gotta be like a, a nice, uh, a montage of every single kind of strange robocall that people have been getting.
[49:24.510 --> 49:34.050]  So if you have an interesting one, send us, uh, send us an audio file of it or tell us, uh, the weird area codes that you're getting, um, spoofed.
[49:34.130 --> 49:37.570]  You know, and again, our phone number is two one two two zero nine two eight seven seven.
[49:37.750 --> 49:42.770]  If you have a story you want to share with us or a question, but, uh, this also extends, uh, to the internet.
[49:42.790 --> 49:55.130]  In fact, I noticed this a lot, uh, since we own a lot of domains on, on, on the website, uh, names and things like that, we're constantly getting, uh, emails from what looked like legitimate, uh, renewal services.
[49:55.530 --> 50:02.130]  In other words, uh, you have to renew your domain name or, uh, uh, you know, it'll expire, but they're not talking about your domain name.
[50:02.230 --> 50:04.810]  They're talking about a search engine that they run.
[50:05.210 --> 50:16.090]  And if, uh, if, if you just read in two paragraphs in and it'll say, if you do not accept, uh, if you're not respond within a certain time, this offer may expire or something like that.
[50:16.210 --> 50:18.970]  And, uh, you know, you'll go, who cares about the offer?
[50:19.090 --> 50:27.970]  It's got nothing to do with the actual site itself, the actual domain name, but people are, are hoodwinked into paying for that when, uh, when they don't have to.
[50:28.030 --> 50:30.190]  We get those, uh, very frequently.
[50:30.190 --> 50:31.730]  And a lot of our clients get those as well.
[50:31.770 --> 50:34.790]  And they're very much made to look like those renewal notices.
[50:35.070 --> 50:40.370]  And a lot of people don't know how to check the renewal date of their particular domain names.
[50:40.470 --> 50:46.510]  You don't, they don't know how to drop to a command line type, who is space, the domain name, and then look at the creation date and the expiration date.
[50:46.690 --> 50:52.870]  So I, I, I feel a lot of people really fall prey to that particular scam and, um, and it's particularly pernicious.
[50:53.310 --> 50:59.750]  And I think some of that's related to, um, well, uh, some of the, um, information itself is public.
[50:59.750 --> 51:13.190]  So people can kind of time it based on, um, publicly available expiry of that domain and what's going on there is they're exploiting that, um, that angst, uh, anxiety that you might perk up and behave or be shook by them.
[51:13.190 --> 51:14.410]  Um, Hey, we have a caller.
[51:14.550 --> 51:14.830]  Go ahead.
[51:14.910 --> 51:15.370]  You're on the air.
[51:16.390 --> 51:21.930]  Hi, I've got a couple of questions and I'm calling about the pay phone a couple of weeks ago.
[51:21.930 --> 51:23.370]  You asked me to call back about.
[51:23.670 --> 51:24.150]  Okay.
[51:24.990 --> 51:28.730]  Um, there's a weird thing.
[51:28.910 --> 51:31.910]  It, it seems like a scam, but it can't be a scam.
[51:32.290 --> 51:43.330]  I get people calling back saying that, uh, they're returning a phone call I made when I hadn't made any phone call.
[51:43.550 --> 51:45.750]  And these are just random people.
[51:45.770 --> 51:50.750]  And I said, I didn't make any call and they're surprised, confused.
[51:51.130 --> 51:52.930]  No, I can tell you exactly what's happening there.
[51:53.090 --> 51:55.250]  They, they're, they got one of those phone calls.
[51:55.330 --> 51:58.750]  They got one of those phone calls, uh, that had your number in it.
[51:58.810 --> 52:03.650]  It was spoofed at random and they're calling back to see why you called them when you never called them.
[52:03.650 --> 52:04.730]  Okay.
[52:06.090 --> 52:17.530]  And you were talking about having this, um, that, that there should be this thing that tells you where the call is coming from or that it's authentic or whatever.
[52:17.690 --> 52:20.590]  I don't have a color ID box.
[52:20.930 --> 52:23.570]  So how would I get this authentication?
[52:24.470 --> 52:26.270]  That's a, that's a very good point.
[52:26.430 --> 52:32.230]  And you know, years ago we, uh, uh, we tackled the subject of caller ID when it wasn't the norm.
[52:32.470 --> 52:34.670]  Uh, it used to be that phones just rang.
[52:34.810 --> 52:35.970]  You didn't know who was on the other end.
[52:36.150 --> 52:37.370]  It's a different time now.
[52:37.390 --> 52:40.510]  So it's really hard to, um, uh, you know, to, to speak to that.
[52:40.670 --> 52:44.490]  Uh, despite the fact that you don't have call, you don't subscribe to call or ID.
[52:44.590 --> 52:47.270]  And I believe caller ID should be something that's just included.
[52:47.410 --> 52:53.810]  You don't have to pay extra for, um, in that world where a caller ID is, is, is delivered to every phone.
[52:54.250 --> 53:01.370]  Um, you should be able to, to still indicate, never have somebody from this number call again, even if you don't know what the number is.
[53:02.470 --> 53:17.090]  Yeah, but given that I don't have it and it's not universal, if they were giving this free service, but you have to have the box that you paid for and you have to subscribe to caller ID, then it's not a free service.
[53:17.230 --> 53:17.830]  No, that's true.
[53:17.830 --> 53:20.550]  And that's, that's part of the problem right now that we still have to fix.
[53:20.890 --> 53:33.530]  Yeah, there's a, there's loose, uh, there's a lot of, uh, things being thrown around and, and one is a bit of an older system and the box itself, which, we were describing as something that can be, um, uh, spoofed.
[53:33.610 --> 53:39.830]  And so, uh, you may rely on caller ID in the traditional sense, but it isn't necessarily to be trusted.
[53:39.830 --> 53:48.490]  And that's where these new schemes like authentication could be helpful and may or may not involve a box like that, that displays the information.
[53:48.550 --> 53:59.610]  But the crux of it is that you're getting calls that, um, are actual legitimate calls, not part of a mechanized or an automated scheme to, um, to prey on people.
[53:59.750 --> 54:06.530]  And, uh, one other quick point about, um, that familiarity you're talking about where people are saying that they're returning the call.
[54:06.630 --> 54:24.230]  If those are not people, you know, or not, not numbers like he described that could be, um, uh, used because they're in your circle, um, and, uh, and are just calling back because they're confused at, at people using their number, uh, or if it's an unfamiliar person that,
[54:24.330 --> 54:41.950]  that is saying that they're calling you back, I would, I would suspect that is more, um, a social engineering technique to be, um, exceedingly familiar to, uh, warm you to, uh, whatever it is they're doing to be very casual, kind of like the one I played earlier where the woman was saying,
[54:42.050 --> 54:43.010]  Oh, I know you're busy.
[54:43.190 --> 54:44.210]  I just wanted blah, blah, blah.
[54:44.370 --> 54:45.630]  They're being very conversational.
[54:45.770 --> 54:49.090]  They're trying to win you over a bit with how human they are.
[54:49.290 --> 55:00.010]  These are people that she talks to and, and they don't, they, they don't know why, uh, they, they, they're calling her back and, uh, they're not, they're not trying to sell her anything.
[55:00.190 --> 55:00.350]  Yeah.
[55:00.370 --> 55:03.550]  I wasn't exactly clear, uh, what she meant by them.
[55:04.390 --> 55:04.790]  Okay.
[55:05.010 --> 55:08.230]  These are people, you know, it's like the equivalent of a star six, nine.
[55:08.370 --> 55:09.330]  Why did you just call me?
[55:09.390 --> 55:10.030]  That kind of a thing.
[55:10.290 --> 55:10.510]  Oh, I see.
[55:10.610 --> 55:10.750]  Okay.
[55:10.750 --> 55:14.330]  They're, they're getting, they're getting caller ID that has her number on it.
[55:14.410 --> 55:16.810]  And that is part of the scam because I haven't heard that.
[55:16.950 --> 55:26.010]  That's, that's wild that it's so pervasive that now people are getting erroneous calls from people who have, who had thought a scammer or some weird call was actually from that.
[55:26.110 --> 55:31.370]  When my friend's number showed up and I, I, you know, it wasn't my friend calling me, but his caller ID showed up.
[55:31.430 --> 55:34.750]  Uh, if I had called him back and said, Hey, why'd you just call me?
[55:34.810 --> 55:34.950]  Right.
[55:35.010 --> 55:35.870]  It would have started a fight.
[55:35.970 --> 55:36.530]  That makes sense.
[55:36.610 --> 55:36.710]  Yeah.
[55:37.230 --> 55:37.590]  Yeah.
[55:37.710 --> 55:45.030]  I mean, for those unfamiliar, the standard procedure with these things now is becoming, um, they will spoof a number when they're calling you that, uh, seems like it's in your area.
[55:45.130 --> 55:49.590]  So like here at BAI, uh, our, our listener call in line is 212-209-2877.
[55:50.010 --> 55:59.810]  So if we were going to get, uh, spammed by one of these people, they might do 212-209 and then any other four numbers to make it seem like it's someone in our area, in our neighborhood, in our immediate, uh, sphere.
[55:59.990 --> 56:02.650]  So we'd be more likely to pick up the call on my, on my phone.
[56:02.750 --> 56:04.910]  My phone number is from somewhere I haven't lived for like 10 years.
[56:05.070 --> 56:11.730]  So like it's a, it's a sign for me that, uh, it's not anyone I want to talk to, but, uh, but yeah, that's, that's how that scam works.
[56:11.830 --> 56:13.730]  We're not likely to pick up the call now because we're out of time.
[56:13.790 --> 56:15.150]  The caller, did you have anything else to say?
[56:15.730 --> 56:17.750]  You wanted a pay phone report.
[56:17.790 --> 56:18.730]  Oh yes, go ahead.
[56:19.730 --> 56:30.190]  Uh, a day or so after we talked, I asked the guy who was standing in the phone booth to check because he didn't want to move.
[56:30.590 --> 56:33.070]  And he said that it just beeped at him.
[56:33.190 --> 56:36.350]  But after he did move, I tried it and I got a dial tone.
[56:36.610 --> 56:39.770]  But yesterday I tried it again and it was dead.
[56:40.470 --> 56:41.130]  I see.
[56:41.410 --> 56:41.830]  Wow.
[56:42.130 --> 56:44.650]  Uh, what, what company, uh, runs the pay phone?
[56:45.770 --> 56:46.950]  I have no idea.
[56:47.330 --> 56:50.550]  I didn't think to note anything like that.
[56:50.750 --> 56:53.870]  Well, if you get a dial tone again, dial zero and see what company answers.
[56:54.130 --> 57:00.130]  And, uh, that'll tell you at least who's, who's, uh, installing pay phones or maintaining pay phones or not maintaining pay phones in your neighborhood.
[57:01.190 --> 57:14.050]  But if it, if there is no dial tone, is there something going to be something pasted on the phone that I can, there, there might be, there should be, there used to be a rule that said there had to be, but these days no one seems to care.
[57:14.110 --> 57:24.130]  It's harder and harder because sometimes they're unrelated or it's a management company or it's a competitive carrier using another, uh, carriers, uh, uh, systems, but try your best.
[57:24.290 --> 57:26.350]  Like that zero trick is probably a good indication.
[57:26.630 --> 57:26.850]  All right.
[57:26.930 --> 57:27.630]  We're gonna have to leave it there.
[57:27.790 --> 57:28.970]  Thank you for, uh, that call.
[57:29.110 --> 57:29.650]  Thanks everybody else.
[57:29.750 --> 57:29.810]  Sorry.
[57:29.890 --> 57:33.270]  We didn't get to other calls, but, uh, we'll try in future weeks.
[57:33.290 --> 57:34.650]  You can always write to us.
[57:34.890 --> 57:36.830]  OTH at 2600.com.
[57:37.010 --> 57:44.070]  You can tweet to us hacker radio show on Twitter and, uh, all kinds of other social media things that I think we'll be doing as well.
[57:44.370 --> 57:45.310]  Uh, stay tuned for that.
[57:46.150 --> 57:50.630]  We'll see you next week here on WBI for another exciting edition of off the hook.
[57:50.730 --> 57:50.890]  Good night.
[01:00:07.450 --> 01:00:09.930]  John Kane here from WBI's.
[01:00:10.070 --> 01:00:12.350]  Let's talk Thursday, March 28th at 7 PM.
[01:00:12.530 --> 01:00:17.590]  I am happy to bring back Jeff Doreen to the Brooklyn Commons with his special guest, Laura Kluge.
[01:00:17.910 --> 01:00:23.130]  Join us for a unique music experience with Jeff Doreen performing Beatles hits in Mohawk.
[01:00:23.330 --> 01:00:25.090]  Jeff lends his music skills.