[00:00.000 --> 00:01.400]  Come on, here we go.
[00:02.560 --> 00:18.380]  And you're
[00:34.160 --> 00:37.240]  listening to radio station WBAI New York.
[00:37.520 --> 00:38.400]  It's 8 o'clock.
[00:38.560 --> 00:42.860]  Time for the new edition of Off The Hook.
[00:51.060 --> 00:52.500]  I ripped it off the wall.
[00:53.520 --> 00:55.460]  I cut myself while shaving.
[00:56.000 --> 00:57.980]  Now I can't make a call.
[00:58.700 --> 01:00.840]  We couldn't get much worse.
[01:03.660 --> 01:06.260]  Von Diddly Bump, but the best is back from worst.
[01:06.920 --> 01:08.780]  I hope that's understood.
[01:08.960 --> 01:09.860]  Von Diddly Bump!
[02:27.170 --> 02:28.690]  And a very good evening to everybody.
[02:28.770 --> 02:32.730]  The program is Off The Hook at our new time slot of 8 o'clock on Wednesday nights.
[02:33.170 --> 02:36.570]  And welcome to all those new listeners tuning in an hour later.
[02:36.570 --> 02:40.310]  And hopefully the ones that tuned in an hour earlier are still with us as well.
[02:40.690 --> 02:41.130]  This is Emmanuel.
[02:41.330 --> 02:42.430]  I'm joined tonight by Rob T.
[02:42.510 --> 02:42.930]  Firefly.
[02:43.250 --> 02:43.750]  Good evening.
[02:43.930 --> 02:44.230]  Alex.
[02:44.650 --> 02:44.990]  Good evening.
[02:45.090 --> 02:45.550]  And Kyle.
[02:45.810 --> 02:46.090]  Howdy.
[02:46.510 --> 02:49.610]  Well, we've had a busy week so far.
[02:49.610 --> 02:50.770]  It's still early.
[02:50.830 --> 02:51.510]  It's a holiday week.
[02:53.290 --> 02:57.190]  And we've been involved in some interesting projects.
[02:58.290 --> 03:00.750]  Yeah, it's kind of blown up on the internet too.
[03:00.750 --> 03:13.890]  Um, we, we thought it would be fun is the wrong word, I guess, but, um, a public service to compile a list of what are referred to as concentration camps in the United States.
[03:14.010 --> 03:16.030]  Now, some people don't like the phrase concentration camps.
[03:16.050 --> 03:17.850]  I think it's a little too, um, serious.
[03:18.490 --> 03:20.450]  Um, and for them, we have an option.
[03:20.630 --> 03:32.030]  You know, if you go to concentration camps.us and you're offended by the fact that they're called concentration camps, you simply click on, um, on, on the link and you go to internment camps.us.
[03:32.870 --> 03:34.810]  Much nicer, much, much friendlier sounding.
[03:35.190 --> 03:45.430]  Uh, but what you get when you go there, uh, you get a list that we have compiled through a combination of, um, submissions, uh, and research and a whole lot of formatting.
[03:45.430 --> 03:50.250]  Um, you'll get a list of every single Customs and Border Patrol station.
[03:50.370 --> 03:56.330]  Now, not every single Customs and Border Patrol station has a concentration camp.
[03:56.410 --> 03:57.570]  Can I say concentration camp?
[03:57.570 --> 04:00.510]  Or are people going to, uh, roll their eyes every time I say it?
[04:00.590 --> 04:02.710]  Or, uh, are we cool with that phrase?
[04:02.830 --> 04:03.830]  Or do you want me to say something else?
[04:04.030 --> 04:04.250]  Or...
[04:04.250 --> 04:06.350]  You're implying that we're rolling our eyes right now.
[04:06.350 --> 04:07.770]  No, I'm not, I'm not implying any.
[04:07.850 --> 04:08.930]  I'm implying you have eyes.
[04:09.010 --> 04:11.130]  For the record, nobody here is rolling their eyes.
[04:11.330 --> 04:12.470]  But I think it's perfectly fine.
[04:12.490 --> 04:13.210]  I think it's legitimate.
[04:13.210 --> 04:17.230]  If people are squeamish about it, they can, uh, be angry at us.
[04:17.350 --> 04:18.790]  Yeah, you should be rolling your eyes internally, too.
[04:18.930 --> 04:19.930]  You know, I have no way of knowing that.
[04:20.150 --> 04:22.690]  I don't really think, I don't really think that's a point.
[04:22.950 --> 04:23.170]  Uh-huh.
[04:23.350 --> 04:30.910]  Uh, it's really, uh, what you call it isn't as, uh, consequential as, uh, uh, really what it is.
[04:31.130 --> 04:38.370]  Um, it's a, a facility that's, uh, concentrating individuals, uh, and, uh, organizing them.
[04:38.370 --> 04:44.350]  Um, and, uh, what, what we've learned, I think, is that it's, um, it's really dehumanizing them as well.
[04:44.630 --> 04:47.850]  Um, they're, um, not staffed in the ways they need to be.
[04:47.970 --> 04:53.010]  They don't have the resources that they should, um, and so on and so forth.
[04:53.010 --> 04:53.790]  Yeah, I'm sorry.
[04:54.290 --> 04:55.510]  Somebody flipped the mics.
[04:55.770 --> 04:58.630]  Uh, you're at mic number two, but you're coming up as number three on the board.
[04:58.770 --> 05:02.330]  That's why I was fading you down when I meant to be fading you up.
[05:02.430 --> 05:03.910]  So that's actually three instead of two.
[05:04.470 --> 05:05.190]  Isn't that weird?
[05:05.690 --> 05:06.590]  It's very weird.
[05:07.110 --> 05:09.050]  So anyway, um, we can get past that.
[05:09.190 --> 05:09.370]  All right.
[05:09.430 --> 05:14.630]  I was just adding, uh, uh, that, uh, aspect that it's really, it's not the point of the list itself.
[05:14.830 --> 05:21.830]  The list is listing places where human beings are being, um, are being dehumanized and treated.
[05:21.830 --> 05:28.450]  Yeah, we have to turn our phones off because at the hands of the government, it's just going mad with Twitter and everything.
[05:28.590 --> 05:29.270]  Just put it out.
[05:29.470 --> 05:30.730]  Just open the door and go out.
[05:30.950 --> 05:33.790]  No, it's been, it's been like this since yesterday when we debuted this thing.
[05:33.930 --> 05:36.690]  Uh, it's, um, it's a public service, definitely a public service.
[05:36.750 --> 05:38.410]  And I'm surprised that it didn't exist before.
[05:38.690 --> 05:40.010]  Uh, but you know what?
[05:40.050 --> 05:42.170]  The obvious things sometimes just aren't out there.
[05:42.730 --> 05:45.270]  Nobody has ever put together a list of all these places.
[05:45.550 --> 05:50.930]  So, um, you, you may, you may say, oh, this is a customs and border patrol station, but there's no concentration camp here.
[05:50.930 --> 05:52.810]  And that might very well be the case.
[05:53.150 --> 06:01.450]  But if there were to be a camp, uh, set up in that region, the people in that building are the ones that would be setting it up.
[06:01.670 --> 06:03.710]  And go have a look in the backyard.
[06:03.710 --> 06:06.330]  You might have some people, uh, being detained there.
[06:06.470 --> 06:07.310]  You never know.
[06:07.530 --> 06:10.350]  This is how the things are, are, are, are being organized.
[06:10.510 --> 06:18.950]  And, and we know so little that, um, uh, it's, it's so important that we keep checking and, and, and updating people and spreading information.
[06:19.490 --> 06:23.250]  So my question to you, Emmanuel, is, you know, you've been putting this together for a while.
[06:23.370 --> 06:30.070]  And on, on the one hand, it shows that the compilation of data from all these various sources from which you pulled it, it can be a very powerful thing.
[06:30.070 --> 06:32.510]  And that's why I think it's taken off the way it has on the internet.
[06:33.070 --> 06:39.010]  But what is the, what is the idea that you had in your head for this list when you created it, when you compiled this data?
[06:39.150 --> 06:40.270]  What, what is the point?
[06:40.610 --> 06:43.750]  What were you hoping people were going to do with that information?
[06:43.870 --> 06:44.970]  First of all, don't give me all the credit.
[06:45.090 --> 06:46.690]  There's a bunch of people working on this.
[06:46.870 --> 06:56.110]  And, uh, if you look at the response that we've gotten so far on Twitter, so many people are contributing and, and, and, uh, adding to it and, and, and making necessary corrections and things like that.
[06:56.110 --> 07:02.050]  And I think, you know, what, what everybody has in common is that, um, uh, we need to know what's going on.
[07:02.170 --> 07:03.690]  We need to know where these places are.
[07:03.870 --> 07:05.250]  We need to hold them accountable.
[07:05.250 --> 07:06.750]  We need contact info.
[07:06.970 --> 07:07.550]  We need addresses.
[07:08.030 --> 07:11.350]  Every single one of these places has a phone number and a fax number.
[07:11.990 --> 07:13.170]  Who uses faxes?
[07:13.330 --> 07:15.230]  Every single one of these places uses faxes.
[07:15.350 --> 07:22.810]  Imagine all the money they're wasting on, on just having that phone line for a fax machine everywhere, uh, let alone the faxes themselves, whatever.
[07:23.010 --> 07:23.130]  Okay.
[07:23.190 --> 07:29.630]  They can have their damn fax machines, but they're just, it's just, it's just It's everywhere at these stations.
[07:29.750 --> 07:33.810]  And that's the information that we are spreading around, as well as other things.
[07:34.030 --> 07:54.870]  Yeah, I think it's important for people to understand the proximity that they have to these types of facilities and really to empower them to, if not personally, but maybe collectively, provide some kind of oversight, much in the way that a lot of the representatives who have been down there reporting back on the conditions,
[07:54.870 --> 08:03.810]  much in the way that they have been doing their job, I think citizens need to make sure that these facilities aren't left to their own devices.
[08:03.870 --> 08:15.790]  Because in that case, well, you see the result that we're getting, in large part, really only due to people monitoring the places and representatives going and visiting.
[08:16.030 --> 08:17.410]  And you mentioned faxes.
[08:17.670 --> 08:26.230]  I mean, faxes are a very interesting thing with respect to these particular CBP facilities, because they're going to receive whatever information is faxed over to them.
[08:26.790 --> 08:34.310]  I mean, having the fax numbers there and knowing there's a fax line on the other line that's going to receive a message from you can be really quite a powerful thing.
[08:34.510 --> 08:34.650]  True.
[08:35.010 --> 08:40.150]  I mean, you can send messages directly to these particular stations with those fax numbers.
[08:40.330 --> 08:41.510]  Yeah, and that is true.
[08:41.530 --> 08:46.550]  And they will certainly receive them and they will certainly see your message if you do decide to send a message to them.
[08:46.550 --> 08:49.990]  But let's take a look at New York as an example.
[08:50.290 --> 08:54.890]  Most of the camps that we've heard about are on the southern border, obviously.
[08:56.650 --> 09:03.610]  And anywhere you have a border, which is also including the north, you will have customs and border patrol stations.
[09:03.610 --> 09:13.090]  And that, you know, with those stations exists the possibility of having some kind of a facility where people are detained.
[09:13.370 --> 09:18.470]  So we have facilities in Buffalo, Tonawanda, New York.
[09:18.630 --> 09:30.710]  We have Burke, New York, Champlain, New York, Messina, wherever that is, Niagara Falls, Ogdensburg, Oswego, Rochester, and Wellesley Island.
[09:30.710 --> 09:33.210]  So those are all the places in New York.
[09:33.370 --> 09:34.510]  I didn't know there were so many.
[09:34.630 --> 09:36.470]  But it makes sense because there are border crossings.
[09:36.650 --> 09:44.910]  And I've been detained in a few of those places myself, not for days, but for hours at times being asked ridiculous questions.
[09:44.910 --> 09:48.750]  So I can certainly see people being detained for longer.
[09:48.770 --> 09:53.990]  I could certainly see facilities being constructed where people are held.
[09:54.590 --> 09:56.030]  Here we have some accountability.
[09:56.030 --> 09:57.650]  We know where they are.
[09:57.650 --> 10:03.110]  We know where, in this particular case, at least, where the Cousins and Border Patrol people are.
[10:04.150 --> 10:06.490]  So we can call them to account for that.
[10:06.710 --> 10:13.550]  Now, what we did earlier today, we added, a lot of people were requesting this and also people were contributing information.
[10:14.270 --> 10:18.230]  We added a list of ICE detention facilities as well.
[10:18.650 --> 10:20.330]  Now, that's very different.
[10:20.770 --> 10:22.350]  That's not the same thing as a camp.
[10:22.490 --> 10:25.490]  Those are actual, well, some of them are kind of like camps, I guess.
[10:25.490 --> 10:27.550]  But a lot of them are prison facilities.
[10:27.770 --> 10:30.730]  A lot of them are spaces within bigger prison facilities.
[10:32.370 --> 10:40.410]  And that gives us even more information on places where migrants, immigrants, refugees might be held.
[10:40.910 --> 10:47.690]  I don't think it's as likely that kids will be held in these facilities, although there are some that say family facilities.
[10:47.850 --> 10:49.270]  That's kind of spooky right there.
[10:49.270 --> 11:01.870]  But again, in New York, we have Albany, Belmont, Batavia, Mayville, Plattsburgh, Goshen, and Lyons, or Lyons.
[11:02.010 --> 11:02.570]  I'm not sure which.
[11:03.590 --> 11:07.070]  And again, that doesn't tell the whole story either because there are more facilities.
[11:07.070 --> 11:16.310]  For instance, in Brooklyn, people are held in Brooklyn, but that's a temporary holding facility that's worked out with cooperation from other agencies.
[11:16.830 --> 11:19.890]  There are sometimes military facilities where people are held.
[11:20.490 --> 11:22.170]  And of course, there are private facilities.
[11:22.310 --> 11:25.250]  And those are the ones we really want to get our hands on are the private facilities.
[11:25.570 --> 11:31.690]  So if we get more information from lists, we'll certainly add all those.
[11:32.990 --> 11:33.610]  What did I say?
[11:33.690 --> 11:34.310]  Customs and Border?
[11:35.190 --> 11:35.550]  Patrol.
[11:35.810 --> 11:35.990]  Okay.
[11:36.170 --> 11:36.830]  Well, protection.
[11:37.230 --> 11:37.570]  Protection.
[11:37.770 --> 11:37.970]  All right.
[11:38.050 --> 11:38.870]  You could have just told me that.
[11:38.930 --> 11:41.430]  You didn't have to write a note and pass it through three people to get it to me.
[11:41.430 --> 11:42.370]  I was trying to be discreet.
[11:42.370 --> 11:45.030]  You ruined the whole scheme, as always.
[11:45.250 --> 11:46.770]  You always ruined the scheme, Emanuel.
[11:46.830 --> 11:47.670]  Customs and Border Protection Patrol.
[11:47.670 --> 11:48.430]  Who cares?
[11:48.830 --> 11:55.550]  They're the people locking up innocents and ruining their 4th of July holiday, by the way, I should point out.
[11:55.730 --> 11:56.590]  Oh, no doubt.
[11:56.730 --> 11:59.770]  And, you know, remember when this whole fiasco started?
[11:59.830 --> 12:02.670]  I guess it was, you know, about a year ago or so.
[12:03.130 --> 12:10.150]  You know, our law firm, Blackstone Law Group, put out an offer to provide pro bono legal assistance to anybody or their families who are being detained.
[12:10.150 --> 12:12.550]  I mean, that still is, in fact, the case today.
[12:12.750 --> 12:15.650]  And I'd like to reiterate that, that this is, you know, part of the struggle.
[12:15.810 --> 12:17.070]  Are many people taking advantage of this?
[12:17.330 --> 12:19.230]  No, it's very hard to find clients.
[12:19.470 --> 12:21.410]  Well, now you have a list of places to get them.
[12:21.490 --> 12:22.310]  Well, it's true.
[12:22.430 --> 12:28.190]  I mean, even free clients, because it's difficult for people to get access to those who are actually detained.
[12:29.550 --> 12:33.090]  And it was another thing that went, you know, all over the Internet when we posted this.
[12:33.130 --> 12:35.530]  But it's extraordinarily difficult.
[12:35.830 --> 12:41.290]  And then you had people like Michael Avenatti on the news claiming that they were representing, you know, 60 families and whatnot.
[12:41.290 --> 12:44.350]  And that seems to have gone downhill.
[12:44.730 --> 12:47.470]  It sounds like you're doing the same thing, sort of trying to represent these people.
[12:47.670 --> 12:49.230]  Well, we are, yes, absolutely.
[12:49.330 --> 12:51.530]  But we don't even know if he actually was at the time.
[12:51.710 --> 12:54.210]  I mean, it was like a very strange thing to hear about all of this.
[12:54.210 --> 12:57.890]  And then it just sort of went, you know, literally nowhere with any of this.
[12:57.990 --> 13:01.850]  But we didn't have any clients that came to us from this plea.
[13:03.110 --> 13:06.360]  So, yeah, but it's still out there and it's still up on the board at WBAI.
[13:06.890 --> 13:21.090]  And our offer still remains the same that, you know, we will help to the best of our ability anybody who is detained or as a family member or as a child that is detained by Immigration and Customs Enforcement or Customs and Border Protection, or as a man who likes to call it patrol.
[13:22.790 --> 13:23.170]  CPB.
[13:23.730 --> 13:24.110]  CPB.
[13:24.210 --> 13:25.510]  CPB, whatever they're called, yeah.
[13:25.790 --> 13:26.370]  It's peanut butter.
[13:26.610 --> 13:34.410]  And I would encourage people to realize that these offers are fantastic and they are available.
[13:34.410 --> 13:58.470]  But it's not trivial, probably, the amount of misinformation and kind of fear that is associated with being a detained individual who was trying to seek asylum, trying to do things, you know, legitimately or as legitimately as you could, given the circumstances.
[13:59.010 --> 14:15.910]  But they may be being told all kinds of things, especially when this sort of stretched out detainment kind of just keeps you in this limbo, this sort of purgatory of being both in and out of a nation or not having a sense of home.
[14:16.070 --> 14:28.790]  You add to that individuals who aren't really capable of handling this kind of load, just saying all kinds of things while they're, you know, in a authority and control, you know, gatekeeper, literally locking them away.
[14:29.350 --> 14:30.830]  What kinds of information are they?
[14:30.890 --> 14:32.070]  Are they going to be real advocates?
[14:32.350 --> 14:33.030]  I don't think so.
[14:33.210 --> 14:37.130]  Are these individuals actually being approached by people that have their interests in mind?
[14:37.290 --> 14:37.930]  I don't think so.
[14:38.270 --> 14:40.690]  Your offer is great, but who's going to hear you?
[14:40.950 --> 14:46.690]  Without people being at these facilities, knowing they have resources and advocates, they're not going to be able to access it.
[14:46.690 --> 14:48.350]  They're not going to access it because they don't know.
[14:48.470 --> 14:57.590]  And they don't know that they have a right or that they should have a right to access it, which is, it's crucial getting that information and getting advocates on the scene.
[14:59.730 --> 15:15.510]  Well, that's what I'm saying, is that that's sort of related, is that, you know, that's where people power really comes into play, is that, you know, people can be on the ground there, they can report back, and these offers can get directed to the people that can actually affect it.
[15:15.590 --> 15:26.710]  And that's, I think, really what's missing, because we cannot look at DHS or CPD as entities that are actually going to advocate in the ways that Alex is describing and offering.
[15:26.710 --> 15:39.870]  Talking about semantics and addresses and names, I had posted concentrationcamps.us on Mastodon, and I heard back from someone that their employer was blocking the site as a security risk, quote-unquote.
[15:40.450 --> 15:42.270]  Blocking the concentration camps site?
[15:42.350 --> 15:44.070]  Blocking concentrationcamps.us.
[15:44.410 --> 15:45.710]  Wait, wait, wait, wait, hold on.
[15:45.810 --> 15:47.030]  It's a brand new site.
[15:47.150 --> 15:48.430]  How are they blocking it already?
[15:49.050 --> 15:51.110]  They just block concentration camps?
[15:51.490 --> 15:56.690]  It gets better, because I advise this person, well, try, you know, just for the heck of it, try internment camps.
[15:56.710 --> 15:58.090]  US, that one worked.
[15:58.750 --> 16:01.750]  So they're blocking one, but not the other of these two identical sites.
[16:02.170 --> 16:12.190]  And, you know, if I ever start really understanding the, how, you know, the logic behind automated censorship, you know, I'll probably need some kind of medical help at that point.
[16:13.530 --> 16:14.010]  Wow.
[16:14.010 --> 16:14.490]  Okay.
[16:15.530 --> 16:17.510]  So if you can't see one, try the other.
[16:18.250 --> 16:22.810]  I'm also hearing reports that YouTube is starting to block videos about hacking.
[16:23.190 --> 16:24.370]  So there's that.
[16:24.530 --> 16:26.610]  We don't know enough about it yet to really report on it.
[16:27.150 --> 16:30.670]  But, yeah, that's in the middle of all this, to have that to deal with as well.
[16:30.770 --> 16:35.070]  Yeah, all your videos might be inaccessible, because YouTube doesn't like hacking anymore.
[16:35.930 --> 16:43.370]  It's, yeah, automated and idiotic human intervention are two things that we are constantly fighting.
[16:43.890 --> 16:45.710]  But I was just looking over these addresses.
[16:45.710 --> 16:49.930]  I just found this creepy sounding one, the Berks Family Residential Center.
[16:49.930 --> 16:50.990]  That's an ICE facility.
[16:51.750 --> 16:56.390]  It's in Leesport, Pennsylvania, 1040 Berks Road, Leesport, Pennsylvania.
[16:56.690 --> 16:59.230]  Give them a call, 610-816-0743.
[16:59.230 --> 16:59.910]  See what they're up to.
[17:00.270 --> 17:04.530]  But a family residential center, it sounds, it sounds so pleasant, but it's a damn prison.
[17:04.710 --> 17:09.490]  And how, how, how are you the family, how would you like to be the family that that's named after?
[17:09.670 --> 17:11.670]  Like, what, how proud are you of that?
[17:11.850 --> 17:12.370]  I mean, it's just...
[17:12.370 --> 17:13.930]  Well, the road is named after Berks, too.
[17:13.970 --> 17:15.310]  I don't know who Berks is, but...
[17:15.310 --> 17:16.190]  They must not be aware.
[17:16.330 --> 17:16.790]  I mean, really.
[17:17.090 --> 17:21.310]  Is this something you seek as your legacy, is to have a detention facility named after you?
[17:21.450 --> 17:24.090]  Yeah, all these places are named after, after somebody, I guess.
[17:24.350 --> 17:27.290]  But that's, yeah, that's, that's really not our concern.
[17:28.110 --> 17:31.170]  Is this something that is overly political?
[17:31.350 --> 17:36.010]  Because a couple people have been saying, a couple people on Twitter have been saying that, and they've been roundly drowned out.
[17:36.150 --> 17:40.950]  But I'd like to, I'd like to ask you guys, how is this relevant to the hacker world?
[17:42.670 --> 17:44.350]  Well, I wasn't expecting a silence.
[17:44.350 --> 17:46.490]  Well, we all want to jump in.
[17:46.950 --> 17:48.090]  Is my mic on?
[17:48.210 --> 17:48.770]  Oh, there we go.
[17:48.890 --> 17:49.110]  Okay.
[17:49.530 --> 17:55.490]  We all want to jump in and talk about how it's relevant, but I think we all just looked around to each other to see who was going to go first.
[17:55.590 --> 17:57.130]  I mean, this is about information.
[17:57.230 --> 17:58.890]  This is about information wanting to be free.
[17:59.010 --> 18:02.670]  It's about governmental accountability and transparency, as you mentioned.
[18:03.110 --> 18:06.930]  And, you know, this is really about grassroots efforts here.
[18:07.390 --> 18:11.710]  If you don't know where these places exist, they could be hiding in plain sight in your backyard.
[18:11.710 --> 18:13.670]  And it's something that we shouldn't stand for.
[18:13.890 --> 18:21.170]  Collectively, I think our voices are going to be heard about this by putting the information out there, getting it in a public domain that these are in.
[18:21.290 --> 18:23.130]  Is it every state in the country, Emmanuel?
[18:23.370 --> 18:24.290]  Well, it's not Hawaii.
[18:24.510 --> 18:26.270]  Well, not Hawaii, but almost every state?
[18:26.270 --> 18:31.890]  Yeah, Puerto Rico even has a CBP center.
[18:32.490 --> 18:33.730]  But it's not every state, no.
[18:34.170 --> 18:34.710]  It's border states.
[18:35.190 --> 18:36.390]  It's mostly border states.
[18:36.490 --> 18:41.550]  Although there are some ice detention facilities in Nebraska, a place you wouldn't expect them.
[18:41.690 --> 18:42.030]  Well, right.
[18:42.110 --> 18:46.630]  And, of course, legally, a border can extend, you know, quite far into the United States as well.
[18:46.630 --> 18:51.010]  So these facilities don't necessarily have to be, you know, near or on the border.
[18:51.010 --> 18:52.670]  And the ocean is considered a border, too.
[18:52.670 --> 18:53.490]  Yes, it is.
[18:53.570 --> 18:53.930]  That's right.
[18:54.070 --> 18:58.170]  So it could be, you know, 100 miles in, you know, you can have a CBP facility.
[18:58.970 --> 19:07.470]  But getting this information out into the wild so that people can do what they want with it, compiling it itself must have been, you know, a Herculean task.
[19:07.750 --> 19:10.350]  And then, I mean, I heard you complaining about the formatting of it.
[19:10.830 --> 19:14.990]  Getting all this information out, putting it out onto the Internet, this is what hackers do.
[19:15.070 --> 19:15.930]  We share information.
[19:15.930 --> 19:21.710]  We don't hoard it and hide it and keep it secret so that only we know where all of the CBP facilities are.
[19:21.710 --> 19:28.310]  We put it out there, get the word out, and then others will do with it what they want and hopefully do good with it.
[19:28.390 --> 19:31.950]  That's pretty much it because we've printed data from the beginning.
[19:32.030 --> 19:37.510]  Our very first issue back in January 1984, we printed a list of internal White House phone numbers.
[19:37.730 --> 19:43.350]  And we got all kinds of help for that, the very first issue, because they didn't want us to print that, obviously.
[19:43.690 --> 19:47.550]  We've been threatened since then for printing lists of various sorts.
[19:47.670 --> 19:50.930]  I remember once we printed a list of AT&T offices around the country.
[19:51.710 --> 19:55.410]  I don't know why they were upset at that, but they threatened to sue us if we did that again.
[19:55.570 --> 19:59.630]  So we did that again and printed their letter, and they never said a word about it afterwards.
[19:59.630 --> 20:02.930]  Because we're printing lists of information that people have every right to know.
[20:03.010 --> 20:04.650]  And this is just another example of that.
[20:05.230 --> 20:07.490]  The information was not readily available.
[20:07.690 --> 20:08.550]  Now it is.
[20:08.710 --> 20:09.710]  Does that change things?
[20:09.830 --> 20:10.030]  Maybe.
[20:10.290 --> 20:13.430]  But our intent is simply to get the information out.
[20:13.550 --> 20:15.550]  What people do with it, that's up to them.
[20:15.550 --> 20:27.490]  Yeah, that's kind of a central piece of the hacker ethos, is like, information, even if you don't know necessarily what can be done with this information, if you see a piece of information, you feel it's important, you put it out there.
[20:27.550 --> 20:29.450]  Because somebody who needs it can find it.
[20:30.090 --> 20:33.690]  It's about making information available, because information is generally light.
[20:33.690 --> 20:37.930]  I think also we're advocates for people in like a humanist sense.
[20:38.170 --> 20:41.150]  But beyond that, altruism, I think it's a curiosity.
[20:41.150 --> 20:46.950]  I think that really gets also speaks to the ethos, as Rob was indicating.
[20:47.210 --> 20:55.570]  Because hackers are curious people, and we're not the only ones right now really curious about what is going on in these facilities.
[20:55.710 --> 21:02.790]  And I think what also is kind of aligning here, or a tone, or a theme, is technology.
[21:03.690 --> 21:07.230]  Do you understand the kind of technology they're deploying against these people?
[21:07.410 --> 21:20.110]  I mean, the biometrics, the, you know, you name it, DNA, facial recognition, oh, fingerprints, how quaint, how cute.
[21:20.290 --> 21:23.890]  But yeah, all of that stuff is going on at these facilities.
[21:24.330 --> 21:26.930]  Yeah, these people have no rights, so they can be experimented upon.
[21:26.930 --> 21:34.090]  Yeah, all of that stuff we fear, you know, in the three minutes crossing the border that, you know, the U.S.
[21:34.570 --> 21:38.070]  border agents might wield unless they want to get famous.
[21:38.350 --> 21:48.890]  You know, that kind of thing is being stretched such that people have to endure that purgatory, as I was talking about earlier, with no rights.
[21:48.890 --> 21:50.510]  And what do they get to do?
[21:50.590 --> 21:53.990]  They get to open the toy box, pull out all the gizmos.
[21:54.290 --> 21:57.170]  You know, we're talking phones, we're talking identities.
[21:57.230 --> 22:00.430]  They are tracking and cataloging all of this.
[22:00.510 --> 22:04.430]  I think that is a deep fascination of hackers.
[22:04.610 --> 22:22.670]  But for us, you know, we want certitude about the kinds of technology that's being wielded against people that are in this position, that are just trying to escape really dramatic situations in their home countries and seek a justified refuge.
[22:22.910 --> 22:32.110]  And to that end, yeah, I would just wanted to add that, the curiosity and the technological aspects of treating immigrants this way.
[22:32.110 --> 22:46.310]  Also, like us, you know, generally in the hacker community, but also I think a number of us in this room have experience with people we know basically being whisked away and held without regard for accountability or due process and things like that.
[22:46.390 --> 22:48.650]  And we're seeing that same thing happen on a grander scale now.
[22:48.810 --> 22:51.690]  And we remember that it sucks.
[22:51.690 --> 22:58.350]  And we see that as something that we want to generally enable people to work against in ways they can think of.
[22:58.350 --> 23:03.150]  The other thing that comes to mind is we've also seen how quickly things become normalized.
[23:03.690 --> 23:08.130]  Like, you know, technologies especially, you know, cameras everywhere.
[23:08.130 --> 23:10.850]  That was something that was unheard of a couple of decades ago.
[23:11.350 --> 23:16.030]  Caller ID, all these things that we now take for granted, at one point they were strange.
[23:16.030 --> 23:18.690]  At one point they were threats to our privacy.
[23:19.170 --> 23:24.270]  And now they are normal and we've adjusted our expectations for privacy.
[23:25.950 --> 23:28.290]  And a lot of people don't even know what they're missing.
[23:28.570 --> 23:34.150]  So we're seeing situations like this where you have these prison camps filled with people and kids.
[23:34.690 --> 23:42.370]  And I should point out people who haven't been charged with any crime, as long as crime is seeking refugee status or seeking asylum in a different nation.
[23:43.790 --> 23:45.990]  And I'm worried that's going to become normal.
[23:46.090 --> 23:52.050]  That's going to be something we just become used to or completely unemotional about.
[23:52.770 --> 24:01.630]  So I'm hoping that just by having this information in people's faces, that they realize this is not right and that something needs to be done about it.
[24:01.770 --> 24:08.690]  The other thing I wanted to appeal to the hacker community and people into technology in general, how can we improve this list?
[24:09.150 --> 24:12.610]  There are various things that I think can be done to make it more accurate.
[24:12.610 --> 24:17.710]  For instance, we should be able to make every five-digit zip code into a nine-digit zip code.
[24:17.910 --> 24:20.150]  You know, there must be something that can do that pretty easily.
[24:20.150 --> 24:27.570]  Also, how about we tie each of these to Google Maps so that we can actually see a picture of the place as well?
[24:28.210 --> 24:36.530]  There must be a way to run some kind of a script to do that, or maybe somebody feels like wasting a lot of time and going through every single one of these things.
[24:36.690 --> 24:43.170]  I don't know, but there are many ways we can improve the list and make it a lot more accurate and add to it and put more things in the list as well.
[24:43.270 --> 24:43.550]  Alex?
[24:43.670 --> 24:46.750]  Yeah, I'd like to make one point about the political commentary as well.
[24:46.750 --> 24:50.430]  Now, I saw a lot of that traction on Twitter about people criticizing this for being political.
[24:50.550 --> 24:54.150]  But we should remember here, what you published is a list.
[24:54.310 --> 24:55.030]  It's information.
[24:55.310 --> 24:55.810]  It's names.
[24:55.970 --> 24:56.970]  It's not even names.
[24:56.990 --> 24:57.370]  I'm sorry.
[24:57.570 --> 25:00.190]  It's addresses, telephone numbers, fax numbers.
[25:00.310 --> 25:01.830]  This is information itself.
[25:02.250 --> 25:05.210]  Information itself is not, by its nature, really political.
[25:05.210 --> 25:07.630]  Sometimes they had the wrong address and we corrected it for them.
[25:07.910 --> 25:08.630]  I'm not surprised.
[25:08.630 --> 25:09.830]  No, that happened a few times.
[25:09.950 --> 25:13.430]  There was one that was on 3rd Street or it was actually Main Street.
[25:13.590 --> 25:15.030]  Something ridiculous thing like that.
[25:15.150 --> 25:16.830]  It's like, don't you even know your own damn prison is?
[25:17.110 --> 25:20.790]  Well, I mean, don't ever be surprised by the idiocy of bureaucracy.
[25:21.670 --> 25:24.650]  But my point here is that information itself is neutral.
[25:24.790 --> 25:26.510]  What you do with that information may be political.
[25:26.510 --> 25:31.390]  But more to the point is that children are not a political issue.
[25:31.710 --> 25:34.690]  And the mistreatment of children should not be a political issue.
[25:34.690 --> 25:42.190]  And the abdication of our obligations under the Geneva Convention and asylum laws should not be a political issue either.
[25:42.350 --> 25:56.150]  I mean, if there's anything both political aisles of this country, Republicans and Democrats, should be able to get behind, it is rallying against the mistreatment of children and detaining them in facilities like this.
[25:56.510 --> 26:00.170]  So, number one, I think the information itself is apolitical.
[26:00.170 --> 26:02.770]  And the issue should be apolitical.
[26:03.090 --> 26:05.130]  And unfortunately, it is not.
[26:05.190 --> 26:16.010]  And that's a really horrific sign of the times that organizing and protesting against the mistreatment of children and the detention of children and separation of families has become a political issue.
[26:16.010 --> 26:18.810]  Or just simply printing a list has become a political issue.
[26:18.890 --> 26:28.290]  To be accused of taking sides, not that it really is a good other side for this, but simply printing a list, that is a subversive statement?
[26:28.330 --> 26:28.930]  I guess it is.
[26:29.050 --> 26:32.030]  So, call us subversives because we are going to print lists.
[26:32.150 --> 26:34.050]  We're going to print information and share data.
[26:34.290 --> 26:35.210]  That's what we do.
[26:35.330 --> 26:40.510]  But if simply doing that becomes the threat, we're in a bad place and we need to confront that.
[26:40.510 --> 26:45.550]  We're talking about the websites ConcentrationCamps.us and InternmentCamps.us.
[26:45.550 --> 26:54.930]  They both go to the same place, but they have information on detainment facilities, camps, all around the country.
[26:55.150 --> 26:56.950]  And it's a pretty concise list.
[26:57.030 --> 26:57.930]  It's not a complete list.
[26:58.150 --> 27:04.930]  And also, there are many places on these lists that may not have camps attached to them.
[27:05.050 --> 27:10.450]  But, as we mentioned, they are the places that would be coordinating this because they are the people running those camps.
[27:11.710 --> 27:15.490]  So, again, ConcentrationCamps.us and InternmentCamps.us.
[27:15.590 --> 27:16.950]  And we'd like to hear your thoughts on this.
[27:16.990 --> 27:19.890]  You can write to us at OffTheHook, OTH at 2600.com.
[27:19.890 --> 27:23.810]  Or give us a call a little bit later, 212-209-2877.
[27:23.810 --> 27:43.190]  Bringing this back to the hacker community as well, you know, another point behind this, and knowing the physical locations of places can actually be really powerful, especially if you're looking to gather information to go back to, you know, really old school hacker days and an effective tool today is to find the physical location of a place and do something like dumpster diving.
[27:43.190 --> 27:46.970]  Well, do you remember, way back in the days when Bernie S.
[27:47.130 --> 27:59.490]  was imprisoned, on this very radio show, he would call in from prison, and it got to the point where he was being physically assaulted, and he was actually talking to us with his mouth wired shut at one point.
[27:59.550 --> 28:00.050]  It was awful.
[28:00.630 --> 28:03.470]  We started giving out the information on the air.
[28:03.530 --> 28:04.330]  We started organizing.
[28:04.330 --> 28:06.630]  We got to the point of renting buses to go down there.
[28:06.630 --> 28:12.490]  And when we got that actual physical address publicized, that's when things started to change.
[28:12.650 --> 28:13.790]  That's when they said, you know what?
[28:14.490 --> 28:15.570]  You can have a furlough.
[28:15.670 --> 28:16.070]  Go away.
[28:16.190 --> 28:24.590]  And they released him, unprecedented, because they felt the eyes of the world were turning on them, and they were very, very uncomfortable with that.
[28:24.650 --> 28:27.070]  Well, I think we need the eyes of the world turning on this.
[28:27.390 --> 28:31.350]  Every single one of these addresses needs to be accountable for whatever it is they're doing.
[28:31.890 --> 28:32.250]  Absolutely.
[28:32.590 --> 28:37.030]  And one thing you can do is you can call up the telephone number and ask to speak to the duty officer.
[28:37.430 --> 28:38.390]  They'll answer the phone.
[28:38.710 --> 28:42.570]  They'll, you know, listen to you, you know, depending upon what you say.
[28:42.770 --> 28:43.510]  You know, they may hang up.
[28:43.590 --> 28:44.110]  They may not.
[28:44.290 --> 28:46.970]  But there's a telephone number, and there's a person on the other end.
[28:47.090 --> 28:48.270]  And that person has a conscience.
[28:48.450 --> 28:53.650]  That person, you know, is working for CBP and may or may not be involved in the detention of children.
[28:53.650 --> 28:58.330]  But, you know, there's somebody with an ear and a brain on the other side of the phone, and hopefully a heart.
[28:58.330 --> 29:04.690]  The other point I wanted to make, I think this is an attribute of chipping away at this thing.
[29:05.330 --> 29:09.270]  And, you know, it's something that we can do.
[29:09.510 --> 29:15.950]  We can talk about the facilities and begin to organize it and remove the facade.
[29:16.110 --> 29:21.570]  Because what's happening, I think, too, is that as we're talking about technology being employed, it's also being employed badly.
[29:22.150 --> 29:27.850]  You know, this is the same organization just losing kids in their own system because they're not keeping track of things.
[29:27.850 --> 29:34.490]  So there's a lot of technology that's being thrown at this, maybe even being diverted for whatever end.
[29:35.230 --> 29:46.130]  But I think the stronger point and something that I'm hearing in this, I just I can't let it go, is that we didn't politicize this.
[29:46.450 --> 29:48.050]  Let's be really clear.
[29:48.370 --> 29:57.590]  This, if anything, I think is a reaction or a response or a rebut and something that will maybe help the curious.
[29:57.850 --> 30:06.430]  And chip away, as I said at the haste with which people are being dehumanized in our country and we're footing the bill for it.
[30:06.530 --> 30:08.990]  But it was not politicized by us.
[30:08.990 --> 30:16.290]  We may be acting to disseminate information that could be used as a political response to this.
[30:16.290 --> 30:20.730]  But it is absolutely not an issue that we ourselves politicized.
[30:20.850 --> 30:29.890]  It was politicized before we developed the concept of releasing an organized listing of these institutions in our country.
[30:29.890 --> 30:38.610]  So I just I think that is a really important fact to remember that we're not we're not just pulling this out of out of the air.
[30:38.750 --> 30:39.890]  This is topical.
[30:40.070 --> 30:43.570]  This is going on immediately is right now in our country.
[30:43.830 --> 30:45.850]  And we are responding to it.
[30:45.850 --> 30:48.290]  OK, it has been politicized.
[30:48.410 --> 30:49.410]  It will be tomorrow.
[30:49.510 --> 30:52.290]  It was yesterday, but it was not us.
[30:52.490 --> 30:52.750]  Mm hmm.
[30:53.150 --> 30:54.210]  And it's the 4th of July.
[30:54.490 --> 31:07.610]  So people need to think about this kind of thing, do some reflection as to what our nation stands for and how we're treating people and what it means to be a citizen and how many people are really suffering in order to become citizens.
[31:07.610 --> 31:12.750]  And how much have we suffered and all sorts of things like that, that we need to consider.
[31:12.990 --> 31:15.430]  Let's think about another border, though, for a moment.
[31:16.070 --> 31:20.370]  This is the border in the Xinjiang region of China.
[31:21.070 --> 31:30.770]  You might be familiar with that because that's where the local Muslim population is being victimized in so many ways.
[31:30.970 --> 31:34.210]  There's a massive campaign of surveillance and oppression over there.
[31:34.210 --> 31:43.350]  They're basically instilling policies where foreigners who are crossing those borders have to install.
[31:43.490 --> 31:44.470]  And I'm not making this up.
[31:44.550 --> 31:52.030]  They have to install a piece of malware on their phones that gives all of their text messages as well as other pieces of data to the authorities.
[31:52.770 --> 32:02.610]  Now, this was discovered by a collaboration of Motherboard, Süddeutsche Zeitung, The Guardian, The New York Times, and the German public broadcaster NDR.
[32:03.070 --> 32:16.010]  The Android malware, which is installed by a border guard when they physically seize the phone, also scans a tourist or traveler's device for a specific set of files, according to multiple expert analyses of the software.
[32:16.010 --> 32:28.010]  The files authorities are looking for include Islamic extremist content, but also innocuous Islamic material, academic books on Islam by leading researchers, and even music from a Japanese metal band.
[32:28.010 --> 32:29.230]  I don't know why.
[32:29.810 --> 32:33.750]  But we need to find that Japanese metal band and start playing them on the radio.
[32:33.830 --> 32:38.750]  And I think it's also incumbent upon all of us to travel with Islamic material on us at all times, too.
[32:39.470 --> 32:41.630]  Just to slow it down a bit.
[32:41.930 --> 32:43.710]  Well, you always keep the Koran on.
[32:43.790 --> 32:44.170]  I try.
[32:44.330 --> 32:44.690]  I try.
[32:44.770 --> 32:46.230]  It's heavy, but it's...
[32:46.230 --> 32:49.930]  My reaction to this is, how did we not create this?
[32:50.110 --> 32:59.790]  I mean, look at the atmosphere of permissiveness that we created around Islamophobia, and specifically the Patriot Act, and anti-terror measures.
[32:59.930 --> 33:01.570]  It is all the rage.
[33:01.750 --> 33:05.250]  It is fashionable as heck all over the world.
[33:05.370 --> 33:07.410]  And China's like, oh yeah, we'll innovate.
[33:07.410 --> 33:08.890]  Let's just do this more.
[33:09.550 --> 33:11.150]  I mean, this is our doing.
[33:11.590 --> 33:13.070]  Am I missing something?
[33:13.490 --> 33:18.370]  I mean, look, it definitely seems like a segue here, right?
[33:18.470 --> 33:28.750]  But speaking of segues, another bridge between this and what was happening in the United States is what we just talked about with respect to normalization here.
[33:28.750 --> 33:43.130]  Now, the Chinese authorities at certain of these borders, they're taking people's phones, whether you're a Chinese Muslim, whether you're an American citizen, whoever's going into that border, they're giving them their phones, they're going away with them,
[33:43.210 --> 33:48.030]  and they're sideloading an Android app onto that phone that scours all of this data.
[33:48.030 --> 33:51.810]  And they're just doing it way out in the open, you know?
[33:51.930 --> 33:57.090]  And many times, as I've read from the reporting, the app is still there on the phone.
[33:57.210 --> 34:01.690]  I mean, they're supposed to extract the data and then be deleted by the border guards, but they don't really care.
[34:01.690 --> 34:07.910]  They're leaving it on there, and they're leaving it on there because they know there's not going to be any repercussions for scouring this data.
[34:08.230 --> 34:14.510]  They're doing it because they know they have absolute near impunity when it comes to this, that there will be no consequences.
[34:14.750 --> 34:24.950]  And this is part of that normalization process that we were discussing in our, you know, with respect to the detention facilities and how dangerous it is to have these kinds of activities.
[34:24.970 --> 34:27.750]  According to this report, though, the app doesn't even try to hide itself.
[34:27.930 --> 34:31.090]  It displays an icon on the app select screen.
[34:31.090 --> 34:31.450]  Exactly.
[34:31.830 --> 34:35.690]  It suggests that it's designed to be removed from the phone after use by the authorities.
[34:36.710 --> 34:37.610]  It's simply unbelievable.
[34:37.750 --> 34:38.870]  And they have a copy.
[34:38.970 --> 34:44.990]  I think if you go to vice.com, you'll find a copy of the Android file there that you can download and analyze for yourself.
[34:45.490 --> 34:56.770]  Yeah, I mean, but it just goes right to the point that I'm trying to make, which is that they are getting away with this because we have normalized the practice of extracting data and monetizing it, looking at all of this information.
[34:56.990 --> 35:00.730]  I mean, this is what Facebook and Google and all of these other apps are doing.
[35:00.730 --> 35:07.030]  They're scouring your contacts and data and utilizing it in ways that you didn't intend for them to actually utilize it.
[35:07.130 --> 35:10.010]  And they're just doing the same thing that these other apps are doing.
[35:10.090 --> 35:13.970]  They're doing it just in plain sight and in violation of your privacy.
[35:13.970 --> 35:20.870]  It's just way more in your face than what's happening in the background through processes that you don't have any visibility into.
[35:21.870 --> 35:22.890]  Yeah, indeed.
[35:23.170 --> 35:41.710]  Those social media companies and that sort of cultural phenomena, but I think also the security and private security industry, I think that sort of fascination with testing things and really hyping threats and being safe from everything and all of that.
[35:41.710 --> 35:46.670]  So now we have all of these tools out in the wild being used carelessly, as you as you described.
[35:47.610 --> 35:51.750]  But I think this is just another example of why we should there should be consequences.
[35:51.750 --> 36:00.450]  And I think people should have, you know, malware and things that load automatically when when you plug into your device and and other consequences.
[36:00.450 --> 36:14.930]  If anything, just to, like, have a little bit of a second thought as those kinds of tools are being employed upon us, because it's yeah, they're getting away with it.
[36:15.210 --> 36:16.870]  And that's I think it's unfair.
[36:16.870 --> 36:28.110]  It's, you know, it's it's crazy to think we're putting all of our emphasis into a device that now we can just hand over our life to anyone who wants it.
[36:28.110 --> 36:38.810]  By the way, last week, Vice News aired a really amazing documentary on the human rights abuses and the surveillance against the local Muslim population there.
[36:39.630 --> 36:50.870]  And I mean, this is nothing what we're talking about here is nothing compared to how they are treated every single day, where they live under facial recognition and physical searches constantly.
[36:50.870 --> 37:05.870]  But the malware news shows that the Chinese government's aggressive style of policing and surveillance in the Xinjiang region has extended to foreigners to this app provides yet another source of evidence showing how pervasive mass surveillance is being carried out in Xinjiang.
[37:05.870 --> 37:19.530]  We already knew that Xinjiang residents, particularly the Muslims are subject to round the clock and multidimensional surveillance in the region, said a China Chinese senior researcher at Human Rights Watch, Maya Wang.
[37:20.030 --> 37:23.930]  What you found has gone beyond that.
[37:24.070 --> 37:28.630]  It suggested even foreigners are subjected to such mass and unlawful surveillance.
[37:28.890 --> 37:32.770]  And yeah, it is unlawful for now, until it becomes normal.
[37:33.230 --> 37:34.870]  Yeah, and it's this whole normalization thing.
[37:34.970 --> 37:43.910]  I mean, we can look at this story and think, oh, that's the Islamophobic border guards in a specific region of China, but they only need to get away with it for so long before the places around them will start getting away with it.
[37:43.990 --> 37:45.910]  And the places a little further away will start getting rid of it.
[37:46.030 --> 37:48.570]  And then everyone's getting away with it, rather.
[37:48.750 --> 37:52.450]  And then everyone's getting away with it, because that's how things get normalized.
[37:52.470 --> 37:53.630]  It's a slow creep.
[37:54.550 --> 38:07.530]  Even at these concentration camps in this country, when a bunch of our Congress creatures were finally able to go and visit one of these, in the stories it told about how their own cell phones were confiscated.
[38:07.670 --> 38:08.090]  Exactly, yeah.
[38:08.090 --> 38:11.590]  They couldn't film what they were seeing, and they're our representatives.
[38:12.310 --> 38:14.650]  And one of them actually was able to smuggle the device in.
[38:14.970 --> 38:18.010]  Thank God they were able to do that, or have the guts to do that.
[38:18.010 --> 38:24.850]  But imagine not being allowed to take your own phones into an American facility as a congressperson.
[38:24.850 --> 38:26.250]  That is where we're living right now.
[38:26.390 --> 38:40.690]  And, you know, we look at the story in China, and don't think that people in this country that are running things aren't taking notes, that they're all not talking to each other at these summits and comparing strategies against their biggest enemy, which is the population.
[38:41.250 --> 38:46.770]  Look, and there are plenty of facilities in the United States where you're rightfully not allowed to bring a phone.
[38:46.770 --> 38:53.650]  When I worked in intelligence at CIA, there was, you know, you could not bring a cell phone into the headquarters building.
[38:53.690 --> 38:58.430]  I mean, or the NSA, you're just, you know, there's places where that makes sense.
[38:58.610 --> 39:04.850]  It doesn't make sense in a place that's not holding classified information, that's holding children in a detention facility.
[39:05.290 --> 39:07.010]  It's totally off the wall crazy.
[39:07.970 --> 39:23.430]  To bring it back to the China issue, too, I mean, and part of what I think we're seeing this in the United States, obviously, too, but all of this surveillance is designed to make this portion of the population in China, the Muslim population in China,
[39:23.590 --> 39:28.230]  feel as if they are being specifically targeted, specifically monitored.
[39:28.670 --> 39:38.650]  And what's very dangerous to me is that now they are extending this not only to one, not only to a minority of the population, but to foreigners coming in there.
[39:38.650 --> 39:46.010]  And it all seems to me to be very carefully crafted and calculated to have a chilling effect on the freedom of association.
[39:46.870 --> 40:00.890]  If China is downloading your contacts, downloading your text messages, and doing it in such an overt way that they're leaving the apps over there, allowing them to be analyzed and reverse engineered, it almost seems to me like they did that entirely on purpose.
[40:01.130 --> 40:07.690]  They want us to know, and they want the locals to know, that all your contacts are going to be mined, and you are going to be watched.
[40:07.690 --> 40:14.610]  And it doesn't matter if you're a foreigner or an American citizen, or you come from Kazakhstan and you're crossing the border.
[40:14.970 --> 40:19.010]  Everybody there is going to be subject to surveillance, and you need to watch your back.
[40:19.110 --> 40:20.910]  You shouldn't talk with any subversives.
[40:21.050 --> 40:24.510]  You shouldn't be bringing, you know, illicit literature into the country.
[40:24.890 --> 40:30.130]  That's so incredibly Orwellian and so just, you know, really depressing.
[40:30.530 --> 40:38.270]  Yeah, I've known people in the physical security industry who do things like set up surveillance cameras in retail stores to ward off shoplifters.
[40:38.710 --> 40:47.630]  And anyone in that industry will tell you, you put the big visible cameras out so people know they're being watched, but then you put the hidden cameras in places where they don't know they're being observed from.
[40:47.790 --> 40:56.050]  And this strikes me that, you know, this app that's openly being used on your phone, maybe left there, you know, that's the one that lets you know you're being watched.
[40:56.050 --> 40:59.890]  And now what else is going on behind the scenes that we don't know about That's even worse than this.
[41:00.010 --> 41:01.070]  Yeah, absolutely.
[41:01.310 --> 41:11.510]  Like self-censorship and the peer censoring, like, you know, the feeling that others will report on your activities as subversive.
[41:11.550 --> 41:20.330]  But it's really the confluence of all of these tactics and the combination that sets you up to have control over the populace.
[41:20.450 --> 41:21.050]  And that is it.
[41:21.150 --> 41:22.690]  That is what these institutions want.
[41:22.690 --> 41:23.210]  Mm-hmm.
[41:23.810 --> 41:24.870]  Hey, we want to hear from you.
[41:25.290 --> 41:31.050]  212-209-2877 in the time that we have left in our brand new time slot.
[41:31.210 --> 41:34.850]  That feels better, I think, to be on an hour later.
[41:35.110 --> 41:36.310]  Feels more sophisticated.
[41:36.530 --> 41:37.230]  I'm exhausted.
[41:37.870 --> 41:38.510]  Yeah, yeah.
[41:38.530 --> 41:40.990]  We get a little bit more tired because the day has gone on.
[41:41.090 --> 41:44.410]  But we have a whole different group of listeners, I think.
[41:44.990 --> 41:45.710]  I hope.
[41:45.710 --> 41:47.770]  212-209-2877.
[41:47.830 --> 41:56.790]  If you have thoughts about what we are doing, what we've been talking about, or anything else involving technology or the hacker world, this is the place to call and be heard.
[41:57.090 --> 42:01.330]  You know, you mentioned the Vice piece that, you know, they put out, which is really good.
[42:01.430 --> 42:10.550]  The New York Times, a few weeks ago, also on their podcast, known as The Daily, did a two-part series on the surveillance state targeting the Uyghurs, too, which we should direct some listeners to.
[42:10.610 --> 42:12.450]  Maybe we can tweet that after the show.
[42:12.450 --> 42:13.170]  Yeah, absolutely.
[42:13.910 --> 42:17.530]  A lot of good journalism out there, and so important in this day and age.
[42:17.770 --> 42:18.910]  Let's take a phone call.
[42:18.990 --> 42:19.330]  Good evening.
[42:19.490 --> 42:20.150]  You're on Off the Hook.
[42:20.230 --> 42:20.430]  Go ahead.
[42:20.430 --> 42:21.970]  Yes, please.
[42:22.330 --> 42:39.270]  I heard you mentioning about earlier about how the detainees, they have no rights and they're being imposed upon with fingerprinting and facial recognition and whatnot.
[42:40.690 --> 42:45.170]  How would you tie in the issue of vaccinations?
[42:45.730 --> 42:47.810]  These people are coming over here.
[42:48.070 --> 42:51.030]  It could be a disease scare.
[42:51.270 --> 42:56.770]  And yet, I know there are people who are...
[42:56.770 --> 43:04.670]  There is a movement in America to refuse vaccinations, that it's interfering with...
[43:04.670 --> 43:08.330]  Some people claim it's causing injury to the children and whatnot.
[43:08.730 --> 43:27.210]  But whatever the point of the matter is, how come the drug companies and the politicians and whatnot aren't taking advantage of the border situation to showcase that, yes, we're strong about public health.
[43:27.430 --> 43:29.570]  Everybody who comes in gets vaccinated.
[43:29.830 --> 43:31.110]  No exceptions.
[43:31.730 --> 43:34.250]  They're doing that with the native population.
[43:34.450 --> 43:37.090]  The people who are American citizens.
[43:37.290 --> 43:38.750]  But they're not doing it with the immigrants.
[43:39.230 --> 43:40.830]  What's the glitch there?
[43:41.310 --> 43:43.270]  That's an important political point.
[43:43.490 --> 43:44.350]  That's interesting.
[43:44.690 --> 43:48.450]  I don't see much pushback from immigrants coming into this country.
[43:48.450 --> 43:51.110]  I do see pushback from people in this country.
[43:51.110 --> 43:55.490]  And I'd be more worried that immigrants would get sick from the people already living here.
[43:55.590 --> 44:04.990]  Yeah, I don't see any danger of the authorities and people that are detaining individuals vaccinating anyone against their will.
[44:05.170 --> 44:06.830]  They're not providing anything.
[44:07.110 --> 44:08.370]  Band-Aids, you name it.
[44:08.450 --> 44:09.830]  I mean, any medical care.
[44:09.970 --> 44:12.210]  They're flat out saying they don't do that.
[44:12.450 --> 44:14.410]  Yeah, they're not giving them...
[44:14.410 --> 44:15.430]  Water is an issue.
[44:15.430 --> 44:21.230]  You know, when I heard one thing, I heard that they were being offered bologna sandwiches.
[44:21.510 --> 44:31.590]  And that just reawoke everything in me from 2004 when I was detained for a day by the NYPD during the RNC here in New York City.
[44:31.790 --> 44:34.250]  And that was such a traumatic experience.
[44:34.250 --> 44:35.770]  I still have nightmares about that.
[44:35.770 --> 44:45.150]  But one day, imagine being a kid, having to go through this for weeks, months, and being offered that same damn bologna sandwich.
[44:45.250 --> 44:46.690]  It's hell.
[44:47.030 --> 44:50.650]  And, you know, I think if you ask many of them, do you still want to live in this country?
[44:50.650 --> 44:56.290]  I think a lot of them would go back and take their chances with the street gangs, which is an awful thing to say.
[44:56.430 --> 44:58.790]  But the way they're being treated is unconscionable.
[44:59.050 --> 44:59.610]  Let's take another phone call.
[44:59.650 --> 44:59.910]  Good evening.
[45:00.030 --> 45:00.510]  You're on Off the Hook.
[45:01.750 --> 45:02.110]  Hello.
[45:05.770 --> 45:06.870]  I'm just going to vent for a second.
[45:07.110 --> 45:07.810]  Go right ahead.
[45:08.590 --> 45:11.050]  I can't stand this easy pass.
[45:11.670 --> 45:12.190]  Okay.
[45:13.050 --> 45:15.410]  I actually did not get an easy pass.
[45:15.950 --> 45:17.810]  I live in a tri-state area.
[45:17.810 --> 45:20.410]  I said, I'm not getting an easy pass, okay?
[45:20.850 --> 45:28.970]  But now I'm starting to see that I'm not getting an easy pass, but I'm getting these bills late from the Thruway Authority.
[45:29.270 --> 45:31.430]  They try to add fines onto it.
[45:32.210 --> 45:34.710]  You know, and the governor was even talking about it.
[45:34.710 --> 45:39.750]  He was going to give clemency to people because your bills were coming so late from the Thruway Authority.
[45:40.050 --> 45:41.770]  They add fines to it automatically.
[45:42.430 --> 45:47.890]  And the reason I don't like the easy pass, as you know, it tracks everywhere you go.
[45:49.170 --> 45:53.830]  The date, the time, I left at this time, I came back at that time.
[45:54.730 --> 45:56.850]  This whole country is just shot.
[45:56.970 --> 45:57.550]  They watch it.
[45:57.690 --> 45:59.510]  Every move is already on Whaling.
[45:59.790 --> 46:00.790]  It is.
[46:01.870 --> 46:02.750]  It already is.
[46:02.850 --> 46:03.650]  You're absolutely right.
[46:03.650 --> 46:04.230]  It is.
[46:04.450 --> 46:10.850]  And, you know, even if you don't get the easy pass, there are still so many license plate scanners out there that they're going to know where you are anyway.
[46:11.750 --> 46:12.350]  You're right.
[46:13.610 --> 46:14.510]  You can't win.
[46:14.890 --> 46:15.350]  What do you do?
[46:15.810 --> 46:17.130]  I'm trying to figure it out.
[46:17.130 --> 46:18.210]  Well, ride a bike.
[46:18.290 --> 46:18.890]  How about that?
[46:19.390 --> 46:20.090]  That's a start.
[46:20.090 --> 46:22.790]  Yeah, at your own peril.
[46:23.050 --> 46:23.410]  Well, yeah.
[46:23.750 --> 46:26.750]  I mean, you know how many people died this week on bikes here?
[46:26.910 --> 46:27.710]  Oh, it's crazy.
[46:27.950 --> 46:28.330]  It's, yeah.
[46:29.310 --> 46:29.730]  But...
[46:29.730 --> 46:32.350]  But, guys, thank you.
[46:32.490 --> 46:34.250]  Thank you for venting.
[46:34.390 --> 46:36.810]  The caller is absolutely right.
[46:36.830 --> 46:40.250]  I mean, those easy passes are an electronic tag.
[46:40.250 --> 46:52.870]  And you don't necessarily have to be at a crossing or at a bridge, you know, to have that tag be energized and part of a system that can tell or log where you've been.
[46:53.170 --> 46:56.150]  And, I mean, I'm not substantiating that with a bunch of research.
[46:56.330 --> 46:58.870]  I don't know if we've read stories on it in the past or something.
[46:58.930 --> 47:03.210]  But it seems to me that it's right there, easily set up.
[47:03.290 --> 47:08.930]  And then other systems augmenting it, like automatic license plate readers, pick up everybody else.
[47:08.930 --> 47:12.030]  The easy pass is going to be in the car when you buy the car, okay?
[47:12.050 --> 47:13.390]  That's just where we're heading.
[47:14.050 --> 47:22.650]  I don't want to sound fatalistic about this, but the surveillance that we're warning people about, it, you know, unless it's stopped, it becomes normal.
[47:22.690 --> 47:24.570]  And it becomes something you can't prevent.
[47:24.570 --> 47:26.890]  And I think that's where it is at this point.
[47:26.950 --> 47:27.750]  Yeah, there are conveniences.
[47:28.070 --> 47:29.910]  And I make use of the conveniences.
[47:30.230 --> 47:32.170]  But people should have a right to choose.
[47:32.210 --> 47:32.870]  Let's take another phone call.
[47:32.950 --> 47:33.250]  Good evening.
[47:33.350 --> 47:33.890]  You're on Off the Hook.
[47:34.870 --> 47:35.410]  Yes, hi.
[47:35.450 --> 47:35.830]  How are you doing?
[47:36.090 --> 47:36.310]  Good.
[47:36.330 --> 47:36.550]  How are you?
[47:38.050 --> 47:39.710]  Yes, I know it's a computer, sir.
[47:39.770 --> 47:43.170]  I know you were talking about the, you know, the detention crisis.
[47:43.450 --> 47:43.950]  It's wrong.
[47:44.430 --> 47:46.970]  And, you know, it's just plain wrong.
[47:46.990 --> 47:47.870]  And I hope things change.
[47:48.170 --> 47:58.250]  But on a technical note, the 5G thing, I know it has a lot of mixed opinions and stuff.
[47:58.250 --> 48:00.870]  But I personally feel that 4G is fast enough.
[48:01.030 --> 48:09.370]  Because you have to understand, when it started with 2G, and you have to realize, when you go, that G means a thousand, so you're going up in order of magnitude.
[48:09.710 --> 48:09.970]  Mm-hmm.
[48:12.450 --> 48:16.550]  5G, you can imagine how much faster that would be than 4G, and 4G is already fast.
[48:16.990 --> 48:17.150]  Yeah.
[48:17.750 --> 48:18.410]  Yeah, it's...
[48:18.410 --> 48:20.010]  They really don't need 5G.
[48:20.470 --> 48:24.610]  They could do that probably long after we're long and gone.
[48:24.610 --> 48:26.890]  And I think 4G could last another 50 years.
[48:28.470 --> 48:41.170]  It's about the applications that they want to develop for the handsets so that people continue to pay their bill and have different tiers and whatever service level that they're a customer for.
[48:41.850 --> 48:59.790]  And the real crux also, and stuff that I've read, is the antenna type in 5G phones is a phased array antenna, which is distinct from the antennas used in 4G handsets, which allow it to do different types of shaping, beam shaping, and whatnot with the antenna itself.
[49:00.350 --> 49:05.710]  And also, it runs at a higher wattage than traditional handsets.
[49:06.010 --> 49:08.750]  I think I heard that actually here on WBAI.
[49:08.910 --> 49:15.610]  And another quick issue with respect to 5G versus 4G is the issue of, you know, this race between the United States and China.
[49:15.810 --> 49:27.510]  That race is not really about the applications that want it, but it's about the standards that are going to be set with, you know, by whoever comes out with, you know, the right infrastructure and the right standards in the first instance.
[49:28.250 --> 49:43.350]  And if China comes out with the right infrastructure and the right standards, then all of the other phones and 5G networks and whatnot are going to be relying on Chinese technology, Chinese infrastructure, and to a large extent, you know, governmental communications,
[49:43.670 --> 49:45.530]  personal communications can rely on that.
[49:45.530 --> 49:46.890]  So that's where this race is.
[49:47.350 --> 49:48.370]  That's what it's partly about.
[49:49.230 --> 49:49.710]  Hey, let me go.
[49:49.770 --> 49:50.390]  I know you have another call.
[49:50.650 --> 49:50.950]  Okay.
[49:51.210 --> 49:52.390]  Thanks for that call.
[49:52.990 --> 49:53.690]  And good evening.
[49:53.910 --> 49:54.890]  You're on off the hook.
[49:54.970 --> 49:55.230]  Go ahead.
[49:56.450 --> 49:56.810]  Yeah, hi.
[49:56.890 --> 50:05.890]  First of all, I want to thank you all for connecting the two, the Border Patrol sensors and hacking, because I couldn't put it together.
[50:06.750 --> 50:07.070]  Cool.
[50:07.070 --> 50:09.110]  But now that you're explaining, I see the link.
[50:09.590 --> 50:10.250]  Well, that's great.
[50:10.550 --> 50:10.610]  The information.
[50:11.250 --> 50:16.010]  Second of all, the other caller that made, that I called about the E-ZPass, he's absolutely right.
[50:16.230 --> 50:17.350]  You're absolutely right.
[50:17.650 --> 50:19.010]  They're only there to make money.
[50:19.370 --> 50:26.370]  Even if you don't have your E-ZPass in a vehicle, it would still be charged.
[50:26.930 --> 50:28.070]  I've been charged twice.
[50:28.470 --> 50:29.410]  I fought with them.
[50:29.770 --> 50:31.130]  They wouldn't give me my money back.
[50:31.230 --> 50:32.190]  They wouldn't reimburse me.
[50:32.290 --> 50:33.870]  They wouldn't do anything other than such.
[50:34.150 --> 50:39.550]  I gave them back their E-ZPass, but now in New York, they're making it worse for you not to have an E-ZPass.
[50:39.670 --> 50:42.790]  When you say they charged you anyway, how did that come about?
[50:43.850 --> 50:51.710]  I had my E-ZPass in my bag, and I guess I was in a vehicle going to Pennsylvania.
[50:52.290 --> 51:00.070]  They charged it as if it was... and I was in a regular vehicle, but in like a commercial vehicle.
[51:00.770 --> 51:02.910]  And they charged me 10 times the amount.
[51:03.950 --> 51:04.350]  Wow.
[51:04.350 --> 51:18.290]  Then when I put it to the... when I brought it to their attention, they investigated and told me, no, they cannot reimburse me my money because... I said, even if I did, even if that was the case, why didn't you charge me like a passenger E-ZPass with what I have?
[51:18.730 --> 51:23.610]  But you charged me as a commercial vehicle, and they would not reimburse me.
[51:23.610 --> 51:30.530]  Then, when you don't have an E-ZPass and go through the toll, per se, it's not late.
[51:30.750 --> 51:31.990]  They charge you right off the back.
[51:32.170 --> 51:39.870]  If it's a $5 toll, they charge you with a court fee, a fee of $50.
[51:40.290 --> 51:41.790]  So it came out to $55.
[51:42.230 --> 51:47.290]  Wait, the fine was $5, or the fare was $5, and they charge you $50 on top of that?
[51:47.290 --> 51:56.750]  The fine was $5, but the fee, the tack-on, because you didn't have an E-ZPass, they charge $50.
[51:57.270 --> 51:58.010]  Oh, my God.
[51:58.710 --> 52:06.670]  So I had to go to the E-ZPass agency in Yonkers to get that cleared up.
[52:06.850 --> 52:09.410]  So they brought it down and charged me like $10.
[52:11.590 --> 52:19.390]  You know, part of this, too, and I was sort of biting my tongue before, but, you know, I'm dealing with the same issues with E-ZPass, to be honest with you, and it's a complete nightmare.
[52:19.610 --> 52:20.830]  I'm constantly getting these overcharges.
[52:20.830 --> 52:22.590]  Yeah, but part of that, too, I was sort of biting my...
[52:22.590 --> 52:23.690]  And, whoop, there you go.
[52:23.690 --> 52:24.290]  I don't know what that was.
[52:24.650 --> 52:26.130]  I think that was the delay, right?
[52:26.310 --> 52:26.470]  Okay.
[52:26.610 --> 52:30.810]  But, so, these charges, you know, I think the first caller is absolutely right.
[52:30.810 --> 52:43.030]  By the time you get the original bill, if your E-ZPass, you know, wasn't in view, or whatever the hell it was, you know, you get a late fee tacked on by the time the first thing comes over to you, and then two or three tolls can end up costing $250, $300.
[52:43.490 --> 52:47.950]  The issue here is, if you try to fight it, if you try to contest it, then it goes into collection.
[52:48.250 --> 52:50.190]  And then some collection...
[52:50.190 --> 52:50.730]  Then the men visit.
[52:50.990 --> 52:51.590]  Well, yeah.
[52:51.690 --> 52:52.350]  Yeah, I know about that.
[52:52.350 --> 53:00.710]  The men is the issue, because the collection agents are a separate private entity that have been contracted by the state government to collect these fees.
[53:00.710 --> 53:04.990]  They're going to be collecting probably 40, 50% of what these overcharged fees are.
[53:05.170 --> 53:19.630]  So, I think that it was a scam that was deliberately put in place, that people need to investigate this, perhaps through the freedom of information law, because I think what it amounts to is probably political kickbacks to whoever is behind these agencies that are running the collection agencies.
[53:19.630 --> 53:21.790]  We should find a lawyer to investigate this.
[53:21.970 --> 53:23.490]  Yeah, I can think of one.
[53:23.490 --> 53:40.130]  I would want to know from the caller if they had been told by the authorities, the issuer, I don't know who issues them precisely, but did they tell them that they ought to have had a protective sleeve or something to block?
[53:40.130 --> 53:41.490]  Well, he said it wasn't a sleeve, I think.
[53:41.590 --> 53:55.850]  He said it was in a backpack, but on the other side of that coin, I'm wondering, could he maybe say they inadvertently did not send him the protective sleeve, thus he was unable to protect his E-ZPass as per their instructions?
[53:56.250 --> 54:08.510]  If it's not, in other words, not installed in the vehicle that needs to be charged, but rather you're transporting an E-ZPass, maybe he didn't have that sleeve and they should send him a new sleeve and not charge him, you know, give him a little break there.
[54:08.810 --> 54:11.670]  We can do an hour of E-ZPass horror stories.
[54:11.750 --> 54:13.510]  In fact, that could be a weekly show here on BAI.
[54:13.590 --> 54:14.430]  But let's take another phone call.
[54:14.510 --> 54:14.790]  Good evening.
[54:14.930 --> 54:15.870]  You're on Off the Hook.
[54:17.290 --> 54:18.430]  Good evening, Emmanuel.
[54:18.830 --> 54:19.870]  It's Bobson from Bulgaria.
[54:19.870 --> 54:20.410]  How are you doing?
[54:20.490 --> 54:21.190]  You stayed up.
[54:22.910 --> 54:23.350]  Yep.
[54:23.630 --> 54:24.450]  Or you got up.
[54:24.450 --> 54:32.690]  I tried to listen to the new show, but it wasn't exactly as captivating as I was hoping for.
[54:32.990 --> 54:35.770]  Okay, well, you know, everything isn't for everybody.
[54:36.050 --> 54:41.590]  There are people now who are rolling their eyes at us, I'm sure, if maybe not in this room, but in other rooms.
[54:41.590 --> 54:48.030]  I wanted to congratulate you about it being the 4th of July around here already.
[54:48.550 --> 54:49.030]  Yes.
[54:49.110 --> 54:51.610]  How are you celebrating American Independence Day in Bulgaria?
[54:52.970 --> 54:54.710]  Well, I don't think I am.
[54:54.890 --> 54:56.830]  Well, that doesn't sound very patriotic to me.
[54:59.050 --> 55:09.170]  Also, congratulations on the team of, the football team of USA being at the finals on Sunday.
[55:09.330 --> 55:11.910]  Yes, the United States women's team is going to the finals.
[55:12.130 --> 55:14.510]  I don't cheer for national teams very often.
[55:14.510 --> 55:15.510]  I'm cheering for this team.
[55:15.610 --> 55:16.210]  They are cool.
[55:16.390 --> 55:17.010]  I like them.
[55:19.130 --> 55:21.190]  Well, yeah, there was...
[55:23.310 --> 55:29.230]  I was watching the other semi-final tonight, the Netherlands versus Sweet.
[55:29.610 --> 55:31.370]  Okay, does anybody not want to hear the story?
[55:31.530 --> 55:32.750]  Okay, no spoilers, Bobson.
[55:32.850 --> 55:34.170]  We haven't seen that game yet.
[55:34.810 --> 55:35.790]  We're time shifting here.
[55:35.790 --> 55:36.630]  But listen, we got to move on.
[55:36.690 --> 55:38.290]  What time is it over there in Bulgaria, Bobson?
[55:38.290 --> 55:39.230]  Yeah, how late is it?
[55:40.510 --> 55:41.930]  It's nearly 4 a.m.
[55:42.190 --> 55:44.750]  Okay, well, it kind of sounds like it's nearly 4 a.m.
[55:44.750 --> 55:46.730]  from your voice.
[55:46.990 --> 55:51.270]  So maybe get some sleep, and we'll see you next week.
[55:51.510 --> 55:52.970]  All right, thanks for calling, though.
[55:53.230 --> 55:53.850]  Great to hear you.
[55:53.990 --> 55:55.610]  Yes, look forward to seeing you again.
[55:56.530 --> 55:57.990]  Let's see if we can squeeze in one more.
[55:58.130 --> 55:59.710]  We get a lot more callers at this hour.
[55:59.770 --> 56:00.250]  I noticed that.
[56:00.370 --> 56:00.910]  That's pretty cool.
[56:01.070 --> 56:01.350]  Good evening.
[56:01.470 --> 56:02.170]  You're on Off the Hook.
[56:03.370 --> 56:06.110]  Hi, this is not a question really related to...
[56:06.110 --> 56:08.950]  I know this is a tech show, but I wanted to ask a general question.
[56:09.090 --> 56:12.470]  Do you have any idea why WBAI doesn't run commercials?
[56:13.010 --> 56:13.330]  Ah.
[56:13.990 --> 56:19.270]  I mean, like, why not run commercials in addition to asking for money?
[56:19.270 --> 56:20.830]  Are there legalities to it?
[56:20.950 --> 56:22.110]  I mean, do you know how this works?
[56:22.130 --> 56:23.550]  Well, okay, I can tell you several things.
[56:23.670 --> 56:30.110]  First of all, if we ran commercials just by logic, we wouldn't be able to say half the things...
[56:30.110 --> 56:33.990]  No, most of the things we say on these airways because the sponsors would object.
[56:34.410 --> 56:43.390]  Just us alone, the companies that we criticize and expose, it doesn't matter if they don't advertise during our show, they wouldn't advertise anywhere on the station.
[56:43.530 --> 56:49.490]  And then the station manager would come down on us and say, hey, guys, you got to go easy on T-Mobile or on Microsoft or whatever.
[56:49.790 --> 56:51.730]  So it would never work for that reason.
[56:51.830 --> 56:52.950]  But there's another reason, too.
[56:53.110 --> 56:56.450]  We're part of the Pacifica Foundation, and that is a non-commercial network.
[56:56.590 --> 57:01.150]  Now, we happen to be in the commercial band, which means we're above 92.
[57:01.150 --> 57:05.810]  Every station below 92 on the FM band is not allowed to have commercials.
[57:06.210 --> 57:11.210]  So technically, if we altered our license a bit, we could do that.
[57:11.210 --> 57:17.170]  But then we could no longer be part of the Pacifica Foundation because the Pacifica Foundation is non-commercial.
[57:17.550 --> 57:24.610]  And without the Pacifica Foundation, BAI would change dramatically and probably not be the same type of station.
[57:25.010 --> 57:25.910]  But technically...
[57:25.910 --> 57:26.730]  Well, interesting.
[57:27.270 --> 57:27.530]  All right.
[57:27.650 --> 57:27.970]  Thank you.
[57:27.970 --> 57:36.290]  Technically, the listener raises an interesting point insofar as alternative revenue streams for this particular station.
[57:36.290 --> 57:53.170]  And it is something we have considered because there is another way, and that is in the form of underwriting, which is basically perhaps the Commons Cafe or some local organizations, businesses that would like to have some visibility could participate.
[57:53.210 --> 57:57.750]  But it is distinct, and that would be something maybe on-air personalities would read.
[57:58.170 --> 58:03.630]  And not necessarily be something highly produced and broadcast out on the airwaves by an ad agency.
[58:03.830 --> 58:06.470]  But, you know, underwriting is abused by so many states.
[58:06.610 --> 58:07.590]  Just listen to NPR.
[58:07.850 --> 58:09.990]  Sorry, I don't mean to dis-NPR, but yeah, I do.
[58:10.530 --> 58:13.290]  It sounds like a damn commercial when they read underwriting announcements.
[58:13.470 --> 58:14.790]  And we don't want to go down that road.
[58:15.090 --> 58:22.930]  It makes me proud to say that BAI exists 100% because of its listeners and some strokes of luck as well.
[58:22.930 --> 58:27.470]  So, talking of things that exist, go to your local 2600 meeting everywhere this Friday.
[58:27.910 --> 58:31.950]  Go to 2600.com slash meetings to find your local one or start your local one.
[58:32.270 --> 58:32.770]  All right.
[58:33.050 --> 58:34.910]  We will be back next week.
[58:35.050 --> 58:35.690]  Same time.
[58:35.950 --> 58:37.210]  Same new time at 8 o'clock.
[58:38.490 --> 58:40.230]  Stay tuned to WBA on New York.
[58:40.370 --> 58:41.110]  We'll see you next week.
[58:41.210 --> 58:41.530]  Write to us.
[58:41.530 --> 58:43.330]  That's OTH at 2600.com.
[59:38.500 --> 59:40.140]  This year, let's go green.
[59:40.340 --> 59:44.300]  To save money and trees, the local station board election will use electronic ballots.
[59:44.680 --> 59:47.160]  Members in need of a paper ballot can leave a voicemail.