[00:00.000 --> 00:13.760]  ...feminist reads, including Feminism for the 99%, Birth Strike, which is about government control, High Voltage Women, a true story about women breaking into the male-dominated electrical field, and Such a Pretty Girl.
[00:13.940 --> 00:19.180]  That's a book by Nadina Laspina, a disability rights advocate who will also be a guest on our show.
[00:19.960 --> 00:22.980]  That's Joy of Resistance, Thursday at 7 p.m.
[00:23.000 --> 00:28.380]  for your summer feminist reading fix, right here on listener-sponsored WBAI in New York.
[00:33.550 --> 00:36.930]  And you're listening to radio station WBAI, New York.
[00:37.150 --> 00:39.230]  The time is just about 8 o'clock.
[00:39.830 --> 00:40.990]  Time for Off the Hook.
[00:46.200 --> 00:50.670]  The telephone keeps ringing, so I ripped it off the wall.
[00:51.640 --> 00:56.180]  I cut myself while shaving, now I can't make a call.
[00:56.920 --> 01:04.470]  We couldn't get much worse, but the best is back from worst.
[01:05.030 --> 01:07.990]  I hope that's understood, but let me know!
[02:21.880 --> 02:23.600]  And a very good evening to everybody.
[02:23.680 --> 02:24.680]  The program is Off the Hook.
[02:24.760 --> 02:29.660]  Emmanuel Goldstein here with you on this Wednesday evening, joined tonight by Rob T.
[02:29.800 --> 02:30.180]  Firefly.
[02:30.460 --> 02:31.000]  Good evening.
[02:31.360 --> 02:31.780]  And Kyle.
[02:32.200 --> 02:33.220]  Hello, hackers.
[02:33.860 --> 02:45.240]  Yes, hackers indeed, and non-hackers as well, because a lot of people stumble onto our show who have no idea what's going on and leave more confused than when they arrived.
[02:45.820 --> 02:55.600]  But it's our job to try and explain our world to you and to bring you into our fold and show you the cool things about the hacker world.
[02:55.660 --> 03:02.800]  I learned a lot about what's cool about the hacker world this week, because we've been in a bit of a crisis mode.
[03:02.800 --> 03:03.780]  It happens sometimes.
[03:04.000 --> 03:04.980]  It happens a lot, actually.
[03:05.560 --> 03:18.180]  The most recent one involving the future of our HOPE conferences due to the incredible, incredible increase in the cost of the venue that we've been having it in.
[03:18.680 --> 03:26.120]  And so we were basically... if you go to the hope.net website, you'll see the message there pretty much says, hopeless.
[03:27.820 --> 03:29.460]  But we don't really believe that.
[03:29.560 --> 03:33.640]  We don't really believe that we won't be able to do this.
[03:33.880 --> 03:35.200]  It's just... it's a challenge.
[03:35.200 --> 03:37.780]  It's a big challenge that we're facing right now.
[03:38.400 --> 03:44.840]  How are we going to pull this off in 2020, which is when the next conference is scheduled to be?
[03:44.960 --> 03:50.260]  Well, it's not scheduled yet, but that's when it should be in the summer of 2020, every two years.
[03:50.760 --> 03:50.900]  Yeah.
[03:51.080 --> 03:53.000]  And then scheduling is a big part of it.
[03:53.440 --> 04:06.340]  Basically, in the last week or two, given a year's time previously or in the future, we would have been unloading and getting ready to have a whole bunch of talks and really interesting interactions with people around the world.
[04:06.740 --> 04:10.580]  If it was next year or last year, this would be the time of year we'd be doing it.
[04:10.740 --> 04:10.860]  Yeah.
[04:10.940 --> 04:14.020]  And the genesis for this was a lot of questions.
[04:14.140 --> 04:18.200]  You know, we ask ourselves every year that we're planning this, you know, what's next?
[04:18.340 --> 04:19.400]  What's the theme?
[04:19.560 --> 04:20.580]  What are we going to be doing?
[04:21.040 --> 04:39.920]  And the questions we are asking ourselves this time is, you know, what venue, what kinds of budgets, all those kinds of nuts and bolts that often people aren't a part of when we're in the planning stages are coming, I guess, quite clearly as a surface matter,
[04:40.040 --> 04:45.460]  something that we want input because, you know, we don't want to answer all these questions ourselves as though we know.
[04:45.840 --> 04:50.540]  Well, yeah, it's one thing you have to remember about the community is that we tackle problems together.
[04:50.880 --> 04:53.300]  And sometimes we feel like we're carrying it all.
[04:53.500 --> 05:04.440]  But really, none of it would be possible without the people that show up, the volunteers, the attendees, the community in general, lending us support from all around the world.
[05:04.840 --> 05:12.360]  So we're faced with this crisis, the price of the hotel has tripled, and got us kind of by surprise there.
[05:13.360 --> 05:20.600]  So the questions we're asking are, what would it take to be able to meet that?
[05:20.660 --> 05:21.540]  Is that even possible?
[05:21.800 --> 05:23.460]  What other alternatives are there?
[05:23.560 --> 05:26.480]  What other venues can we have hope in?
[05:26.580 --> 05:28.180]  Does it need to be in a hotel?
[05:28.380 --> 05:29.540]  Does it need to be in Manhattan?
[05:30.140 --> 05:43.860]  We've gotten a couple of hundred replies already from people with all kinds of ideas, every one of which has been very supportive, and really, really good ideas too.
[05:44.060 --> 05:46.860]  And I am convinced that we are going to figure this out.
[05:46.960 --> 05:49.800]  We're going to find a great location.
[05:50.440 --> 06:08.860]  And just like has happened so many times with what we've been doing over the past few decades, whenever we face a crisis that threatens to obliterate us, we wind up figuring it out with the help of others and coming back stronger and doing something even better as a result.
[06:09.120 --> 06:11.000]  So yeah, it's a challenge.
[06:11.340 --> 06:22.100]  It's something to really see the stupendousness of it all that we have to somehow figure this out.
[06:22.540 --> 06:26.180]  But I have every faith that we will, and that we will be better for it.
[06:26.680 --> 06:27.080]  Right.
[06:27.200 --> 06:33.740]  And the fact that we've gotten a lot of really great ideas so far is not in any way implying that we're not open to more ideas.
[06:33.980 --> 06:34.040]  Oh, no.
[06:34.140 --> 06:34.320]  Yeah.
[06:34.320 --> 06:44.440]  So those of you hearing this for the first time, or, you know, who just think of something new, you know, we're still totally open to whatever ideas you might have to contribute in any direction.
[06:44.660 --> 06:46.440]  People are asking me, does it still have to be at the hotel?
[06:46.560 --> 06:51.420]  Does it have to be, you know, all kinds of all kinds of what sort of ideas do you want?
[06:51.480 --> 06:52.360]  We just want ideas.
[06:53.240 --> 06:57.360]  Because that's one thing that the hacker community on Moss is really good at is ideas.
[06:57.640 --> 06:57.780]  Yeah.
[06:58.300 --> 07:02.600]  And as uncertain as it might be, I think it's important to us to get right.
[07:03.620 --> 07:15.660]  And based on that input, I mean, that gives us a much better chance, because we're responding, we're responding to what people are interested in, what they want to be doing, and what they believe they're a part of.
[07:15.840 --> 07:21.120]  And that's, that's the stuff we want to make happen and put energy into, because we want to be a part of that, too.
[07:21.320 --> 07:29.280]  So it's been an interesting bit of feedback, but it's really important to us to get right, because this is a big part of what we do.
[07:29.540 --> 07:34.520]  And, and, and it's a labor of love, but it is a lot of work.
[07:34.640 --> 07:49.700]  But, you know, if we have to have the, like, sort of foundational aspects of it, and people have been really, really forthcoming in what, what it means to them, and what, what the event, how important it is, and what the essence of it is.
[07:49.820 --> 07:55.060]  I guess I should explain for those, some of those people who did stumble onto our show tonight for the first time, I have no idea what we're talking about.
[07:55.120 --> 07:58.640]  We're talking about HOPE conferences, hackers on planet earth is what HOPE stands for.
[07:59.220 --> 08:15.420]  And basically, it's, it's a bi-annual, I think is the right word, every two years in New York City, massive hacker gathering of about 2,500, 3,000 people in that range, who come together at a Midtown hotel, currently the Hotel Pennsylvania.
[08:16.340 --> 08:21.800]  And it's just grown since 1994, it has grown into this incredible event.
[08:22.380 --> 08:37.520]  We've had people, the likes of Jello Biafra, and Steve Wozniak, and Kevin Mitnick, et cetera, et cetera, Edward Snowden, Chelsea Manning, all kinds of people speaking, and, and, and hundreds and hundreds more, giving all kinds of tutorials, and lectures,
[08:37.900 --> 08:44.620]  and, and seminars on various topics of interest in the hacker world.
[08:45.120 --> 08:57.760]  And I, you know, one thing I've learned from all of this is how much HOPE has meant to people over the years, how important it is to them, and how they will basically go wherever HOPE happens to be.
[08:57.860 --> 09:00.400]  We've had so many suggestions on, on different places to go.
[09:00.600 --> 09:08.200]  A lot of people are suggesting that we move to a different city, and nine times out of ten, that city happens to be where the person suggesting it is.
[09:08.360 --> 09:14.240]  So I think, I think maybe it's a bit more of a convenience thing in that particular, but there are some really, really good ideas.
[09:14.240 --> 09:15.660]  I, I would side with that.
[09:15.720 --> 09:17.480]  I think people are very proud of where they're from.
[09:17.780 --> 09:25.820]  And I think I can, I can empathize to a degree, but at a certain point you have to say, okay, every single person that's suggesting go somewhere else is actually in that somewhere else.
[09:25.820 --> 09:32.680]  And they're frankly, they're not thinking, I guess, of how many other people would have to come to them as a result of us choosing that specific city.
[09:32.720 --> 09:39.300]  We're considering everything, but, uh, you know, we, we want, we want to stay in New York, obviously we want to stay in, in the metropolitan area.
[09:39.800 --> 09:44.600]  Um, but you know, if that becomes impossible, anything else is possible.
[09:44.800 --> 09:46.000]  We're certainly open.
[09:46.000 --> 10:03.920]  And I think it's interesting to hear about different cities and what, uh, those, uh, tourists or, or, um, uh, local industries, what they would be in, what their interests would be in, what they, um, might be willing to offer as far as resources outside of the city.
[10:04.020 --> 10:14.420]  But also, you know, we have to take into account what the, uh, attendees experience, you know, logistics of travel, what, where they're, the transportation hubs are and, and accommodations, et cetera, et cetera.
[10:14.700 --> 10:19.320]  Cause all of those dynamics change where we could shift and, and go to a different venue.
[10:20.780 --> 10:20.960]  Hi.
[10:21.300 --> 10:23.300]  Hey, is that Marina from Italy?
[10:23.500 --> 10:23.940]  Exactly.
[10:24.120 --> 10:24.340]  It's me.
[10:25.140 --> 10:25.820]  How are you doing?
[10:26.200 --> 10:26.560]  I'm okay.
[10:26.740 --> 10:27.940]  Thank you to have me here.
[10:28.120 --> 10:38.520]  So first of all, so sorry for my strong Italian accent, but what I want to say is I'm not an hacker, but without hope, I can't really function for two years.
[10:38.920 --> 10:39.020]  Wow.
[10:39.320 --> 10:42.420]  Like, hope, hope in my, highs in my mind every two years.
[10:42.540 --> 10:43.780]  It's like a drug, isn't it?
[10:43.920 --> 10:44.320]  It's kind of...
[10:44.320 --> 10:45.280]  Absolutely, I'm addicted.
[10:45.600 --> 10:51.100]  So what I want to say is like to the listener, um, over the sea, because I was one of them.
[10:51.340 --> 11:00.080]  I know how many people, they listen off the hook outside in New York, outside the United States, that you can give idea even from over there.
[11:00.180 --> 11:00.540]  Of course.
[11:00.540 --> 11:10.880]  Because the hack meeting that I talk for Italy now, all, every single year have some problem where to go, how to find space, how to find the money, et cetera, et cetera.
[11:11.000 --> 11:16.320]  So maybe you can share this, this background without the hook and with the Hope Conference.
[11:16.480 --> 11:17.480]  I think that's not a bad idea.
[11:17.620 --> 11:17.700]  No, not at all.
[11:17.700 --> 11:27.000]  So just don't be shy, because usually if you're the other side of the world, you think that you cannot really, um, not knowing the situation over there, you cannot collaborate.
[11:27.140 --> 11:27.720]  No, you can.
[11:27.920 --> 11:29.240]  You must in this moment.
[11:29.860 --> 11:30.340]  Yeah.
[11:30.460 --> 11:30.980]  Well said.
[11:31.320 --> 11:31.800]  Yeah.
[11:31.800 --> 11:31.800]  Totally.
[11:31.980 --> 11:32.080]  Yeah.
[11:32.240 --> 11:39.820]  And the only thing is, uh, sometimes things don't translate, you know, the, the way things work aren't, aren't identical, but the fundamentals, I think are there.
[11:40.060 --> 11:40.620]  And absolutely.
[11:40.840 --> 11:53.440]  Like that insight is invaluable to like, cause the outside perspective and things that, um, people have tried and that work, um, that we may not be thinking of like that input is, is so crucial.
[11:53.440 --> 11:55.980]  Maybe it will not be the same thing, but something similar.
[11:56.240 --> 11:58.180]  So just maybe, just do it.
[11:58.280 --> 12:01.400]  Well, the worst thing is for it to be the same thing all the time.
[12:01.580 --> 12:04.540]  We, we, we want to be changing and, and trying new things as well.
[12:04.700 --> 12:08.600]  Uh, but also encapsulating what people have come to know and love over the years.
[12:08.920 --> 12:09.320]  Absolutely.
[12:09.480 --> 12:16.780]  And Hope, uh, if I, if I, if I remember correctly, has its roots in a lot of, uh, events that were happening overseas at the time.
[12:17.160 --> 12:21.680]  And a desire to translate that and bring that, uh, and adapt that to something we could do here in New York.
[12:21.900 --> 12:32.600]  And yeah, it's, it's really, it's really always been at the core of the conference that it's evolving and changing and meeting the needs of the people who are Hope basically, um, the attendees and everyone.
[12:32.660 --> 12:49.960]  Were it not for the Dutch hacker conferences, uh, I don't think we ever would have put together hackers on planet earth in New York because, uh, you know, speaking personally, going over there in 1989, 1993, um, to, uh, one conference and one camp and realizing,
[12:50.200 --> 12:51.580]  wow, this is the coolest thing ever.
[12:51.720 --> 13:00.960]  There's nothing like this in the United States because back then there, there wasn't, there were small conferences of maybe 50 people, uh, in, in a bar or in, in one room.
[13:01.180 --> 13:05.320]  Uh, but there wasn't anything involving hundreds, thousands of people.
[13:05.780 --> 13:12.160]  And, um, we, we, we, we made it our mission to figure out a way to do that because everyone was telling us it's not possible.
[13:12.580 --> 13:15.400]  And we've heard that so many times over the years, what's not possible.
[13:15.500 --> 13:16.800]  It's not possible to put out a magazine.
[13:16.980 --> 13:19.880]  It's not possible to, uh, uh, have a radio show in New York city.
[13:20.000 --> 13:22.340]  It's not possible to have a radio station like this in New York city.
[13:22.740 --> 13:25.640]  Uh, it's certainly not possible to have a conference in the middle of Manhattan.
[13:26.240 --> 13:28.180]  And, uh, that's the inspiration for us.
[13:28.300 --> 13:34.360]  When people tell us something is impossible in the hacker world, that's, you want something to happen, tell somebody it's impossible.
[13:34.940 --> 13:36.280]  That's, that's, that's how you get there.
[13:37.040 --> 13:41.540]  Yeah, I could think of like half a dozen things just off the top of my head, specifically for the event.
[13:41.780 --> 13:42.380]  I'm thinking of more.
[13:43.840 --> 13:46.220]  But hope.net is the email address.
[13:46.220 --> 13:55.820]  If you have ideas or experiences or suggestions on how we can overcome this particular challenge, because that's what it is right now.
[13:55.820 --> 13:56.520]  It's a challenge.
[13:56.860 --> 13:59.360]  And it's, you know, it's still July of 2019.
[13:59.980 --> 14:01.140]  It's the last day of July.
[14:01.180 --> 14:03.740]  But still, we have time to figure this out.
[14:03.960 --> 14:05.240]  And we will figure this out.
[14:05.240 --> 14:07.300]  As a community, we will come together.
[14:07.500 --> 14:11.560]  The full story is at 2600.com website.
[14:11.560 --> 14:13.440]  You can read all the details there.
[14:13.740 --> 14:21.540]  And if you want to see our cool graphic that has our rather negative statement right now, go to hope.net.
[14:21.960 --> 14:23.280]  But we'll have updates.
[14:23.460 --> 14:26.280]  We'll have many, many updates as this progresses.
[14:26.840 --> 14:28.080]  Yeah, absolutely.
[14:28.080 --> 14:31.140]  And we're entertaining all of people's suggestions.
[14:32.020 --> 14:39.160]  And I think we'll find an organized way to respond and take people up on some of their offers.
[14:39.300 --> 14:48.280]  But what I think is key is that it fits the needs and that it isn't like something that causes a skyrocketing ticket cost.
[14:48.380 --> 14:52.040]  Because that's, again, the accessibility is really what the event has been about.
[14:52.860 --> 15:03.000]  But yeah, we're open to any kind of network and relationships that people might have in property in general.
[15:03.000 --> 15:14.370]  If you have an abandoned central office, we would be very interested in the possibility of a very short lease in that telephone facility.
[15:14.370 --> 15:18.570]  So any of those kinds of really wacky ideas.
[15:18.570 --> 15:19.970]  People have suggested factories.
[15:20.210 --> 15:30.110]  They've suggested just a really wide array of things, which we can definitely go there in an imaginative sense.
[15:30.250 --> 15:35.610]  But it is, again, as I said earlier, about accessibility and logistics for people.
[15:35.790 --> 15:42.830]  They shouldn't have to go to the bottom of the subway or a missile silo just to see a talk.
[15:42.830 --> 15:47.410]  Well, we met at a hacker conference at an abandoned missile silo in Washington State.
[15:47.610 --> 15:51.850]  So, you know, anything is possible as far as location.
[15:51.850 --> 15:57.050]  But we do strive to make it in a nice, comfortable place that's easily reachable.
[15:57.250 --> 15:57.510]  Yeah.
[15:57.650 --> 16:03.350]  An example, I think, would be, you know, we've talked about air conditioning and having outdoor events.
[16:03.350 --> 16:06.130]  And it's kind of hard to do that in the middle of July.
[16:07.090 --> 16:08.550]  We'd love to have an outdoor event.
[16:08.550 --> 16:18.470]  We'd love to be, you know, in a tent somewhere or, you know, but the practicality in Manhattan, in an urban environment, we really do have to have kind of climate control to a degree.
[16:18.470 --> 16:20.330]  But, again, does it have to be in the middle of July?
[16:20.550 --> 16:21.770]  You know, we're thinking everything.
[16:22.050 --> 16:23.290]  We're rethinking all of it.
[16:23.310 --> 16:25.110]  And anything is possible.
[16:25.310 --> 16:26.730]  We welcome your ideas.
[16:26.870 --> 16:28.810]  Again, hope at hope.net.
[16:29.610 --> 16:30.370]  All right.
[16:31.530 --> 16:34.430]  Well, that's pretty much that.
[16:34.630 --> 16:37.810]  This is actually a fundraising edition of the show.
[16:38.610 --> 16:41.510]  And we are encouraging people to call in and pledge.
[16:43.270 --> 16:48.150]  There is 516-620-3602, our summer fundraiser.
[16:48.610 --> 16:51.250]  There's all kinds of premiums that are available.
[16:51.430 --> 16:54.070]  You can go to give2wbai.org.
[16:54.930 --> 16:55.490]  And...
[16:55.490 --> 16:56.270]  Is it .org?
[16:56.730 --> 16:57.610]  Or .org.
[16:57.610 --> 16:59.470]  Okay, for a second, I thought it might be .net.
[17:00.130 --> 17:00.850]  Give2wbai.org.
[17:01.010 --> 17:03.130]  Yeah, and pledge whatever you can afford.
[17:03.250 --> 17:07.890]  If you pledged in the past, you should have gotten your premiums by now or they are on the way.
[17:08.050 --> 17:08.770]  Yeah, we're caught up.
[17:08.890 --> 17:09.710]  Yeah, we...
[17:09.710 --> 17:11.190]  Well, except for the EFF premiums.
[17:11.250 --> 17:13.210]  We have not gotten those yet, but we are getting them.
[17:13.910 --> 17:20.510]  But the Circle of Hope flash drives, those have been sent out.
[17:20.770 --> 17:21.490]  It helps.
[17:21.710 --> 17:23.170]  Please tell us that you got it.
[17:23.310 --> 17:27.050]  You know, we'll get that message so we can verify.
[17:27.910 --> 17:32.550]  And we won't be as concerned that you're missing something in the mail.
[17:32.690 --> 17:36.270]  So please look out for those in your post.
[17:36.650 --> 17:36.950]  Yes.
[17:37.610 --> 17:44.310]  We have some stories that we're going to get to today because that's what we do here at this show.
[17:46.030 --> 17:49.410]  Well, the big story, of course, is the Capital One breach.
[17:49.630 --> 17:50.910]  Everyone is talking about that.
[17:52.570 --> 17:53.610]  Were they breached?
[17:53.870 --> 17:54.350]  Were they hacked?
[17:55.310 --> 17:56.950]  What exactly is the story here?
[17:58.070 --> 18:05.370]  About 106 million people in the United States and Canada woke up to the realization that their personal details were hijacked.
[18:05.370 --> 18:10.430]  And basically brings a bunch of questions to the forefront.
[18:10.870 --> 18:12.170]  Someone is responsible.
[18:12.430 --> 18:13.590]  But who is responsible?
[18:13.730 --> 18:16.670]  Well, the person who was arrested, I guess.
[18:16.830 --> 18:27.170]  The 23-year-old software engineer named Paige Thompson was arrested for having these files, downloading all these files.
[18:27.850 --> 18:37.070]  Faces charges of computer fraud and abuse after being caught red-handed in possession of the bank's records and allegedly discussing plans to distribute the data.
[18:38.750 --> 18:47.830]  Basically, what she did was apparently get through a firewall and use a couple of security holes to download the data.
[18:48.830 --> 18:53.150]  She has been arrested and charged with violation of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act.
[18:53.650 --> 19:03.910]  And it's kind of interesting because she was caught because she was discussing, having, possessing these files, possessing this information.
[19:05.270 --> 19:09.770]  I'm not seeing evidence that she was doing something with them, i.e.
[19:09.850 --> 19:13.890]  using them, doing anything other than discussing having them.
[19:15.210 --> 19:18.130]  They were found on GitHub, if I understand correctly.
[19:18.370 --> 19:18.890]  Now, I don't know.
[19:18.930 --> 19:20.990]  Does that mean that other people were able to look at them on GitHub?
[19:21.230 --> 19:23.130]  Or was it in a private directory?
[19:23.450 --> 19:24.490]  I'm not clear on that.
[19:24.650 --> 19:29.630]  I think that it was the boasting of what could be done with them.
[19:29.750 --> 19:40.130]  But it was carelessly hosted on an account that was something that was traced back to her specifically, I think.
[19:40.130 --> 19:50.530]  And, yeah, it was a misconfigured instance of a server for the bank that was hosted on Amazon's web service platform.
[19:50.810 --> 19:52.510]  You could say carelessly hosted there as well.
[19:52.830 --> 19:55.210]  Carelessly hosted, yes, there as well.
[19:55.370 --> 19:55.990]  And there was...
[19:55.990 --> 19:58.150]  I don't know if there was some connection to Jira.
[19:58.230 --> 19:58.950]  I'm looking that up.
[19:59.050 --> 20:00.810]  But there was some other details of it.
[20:00.810 --> 20:06.670]  But the data was from credit card applications, I think, specifically.
[20:07.050 --> 20:13.010]  So, Social Security numbers and other personally identifiable info.
[20:13.150 --> 20:19.610]  You know, it's interesting because everyone's talking about what to charge this person with and the various crimes that were committed.
[20:19.850 --> 20:21.190]  I look at it this way.
[20:21.190 --> 20:30.090]  You know, I see somebody who was able to defeat security and grab all this information that she shouldn't have had access to.
[20:30.530 --> 20:38.910]  That information should not have been easy to... or even possible to obtain without the proper authorization.
[20:40.310 --> 20:45.970]  So, yeah, guilty of downloading that and figuring out the security.
[20:45.970 --> 20:54.710]  But I'm not seeing evidence of it being used in a bad way.
[20:55.090 --> 21:00.830]  There's people that they're confused because they don't see how she was benefiting monetarily.
[21:00.950 --> 21:05.490]  And I think that's the whole point is that she wasn't benefiting monetarily from this.
[21:06.590 --> 21:08.650]  She didn't post the information.
[21:08.650 --> 21:10.490]  She didn't use the information.
[21:11.110 --> 21:15.490]  She simply stored it someplace and started talking about it.
[21:16.070 --> 21:19.730]  To various people because apparently she didn't know what to do about it.
[21:20.490 --> 21:23.290]  And that's really what we're talking about here.
[21:23.470 --> 21:38.530]  Yeah, she wanted to get it out of her network or office system that it was being stored on because it was something that was gotten through this vulnerability in the place it was being stored.
[21:39.670 --> 22:06.110]  But I think the coverage and the way to what you're saying about it being characterized, I think it's being treated as though they're credit card numbers and that they were being brokered in a way that they could be used to commit some kind of fraud and thus have an equivalent monetary payday associated with it.
[22:06.110 --> 22:12.930]  But it isn't necessarily something that someone's going to buy even like on a dark net site or something.
[22:12.930 --> 22:16.090]  I'm not sure what the market is for that kind of data.
[22:16.270 --> 22:22.610]  But as I said, it's mostly just people's info that we're applying for credit cards.
[22:22.610 --> 22:29.910]  There's not a huge amount of credit card numbers that could then be tied to some real dangerous fraudulent activity.
[22:30.050 --> 22:39.530]  There'd be a lot of other steps that someone would have to take to use this information and exploit it in a sense that would have real quantifiable damages.
[22:39.770 --> 22:40.630]  That's my opinion.
[22:41.070 --> 22:47.990]  Yeah, I mean, make no mistake, there are active, you know, and vivid black markets out there for things like credit card numbers.
[22:48.230 --> 22:58.430]  And there is no information that has come to light that suggests that the information she had was anything that would be worth anything on those sites or anything like that.
[22:58.530 --> 23:07.110]  But the response to it, as you were saying, there was a spectacular video that I think you posted to social media about the troops that basically were sent in.
[23:07.110 --> 23:07.670]  Oh, did you see that?
[23:07.730 --> 23:08.570]  That was unbelievable.
[23:08.570 --> 23:08.690]  Unbelievable.
[23:08.950 --> 23:12.310]  And it was... how would you describe this for someone who hadn't seen it?
[23:12.310 --> 23:13.150]  It was a full-on SWAT team.
[23:13.290 --> 23:16.630]  But apparently her roommate had an arsenal of weapons.
[23:16.830 --> 23:18.350]  But, you know, it's Washington State.
[23:18.470 --> 23:26.290]  No offense, Kyle, but it's... I don't know if there were legal weapons or what, but was there any threat that was issued to anybody?
[23:26.290 --> 23:27.470]  It just seemed like overkill.
[23:27.610 --> 23:31.290]  But maybe that's the world we're living in right now where everybody has arsenals.
[23:31.290 --> 23:33.030]  That's what you have to do when you knock on the door.
[23:33.630 --> 23:38.470]  Everybody who's a bank, you know, people with means.
[23:38.570 --> 23:41.790]  Get to deploy this kind of response.
[23:42.190 --> 23:46.770]  That's what the wealthy do to people who are aggravating that system.
[23:47.010 --> 23:48.910]  I mean, you know, I'm naive, I know.
[23:49.030 --> 23:51.350]  But you have the files.
[23:51.450 --> 23:52.150]  You know where the files are.
[23:52.230 --> 23:52.690]  They're on GitHub.
[23:52.950 --> 23:55.430]  Okay, so you don't need to storm the house to get the files.
[23:55.590 --> 23:56.930]  You just need to arrest the person.
[23:57.210 --> 23:58.830]  Wait for her to go outside to get a cup of coffee.
[23:58.950 --> 24:04.910]  You don't have to, you know, have an artillery of, you know, a whole regiment of troops invading a neighborhood.
[24:04.910 --> 24:05.330]  Right.
[24:05.450 --> 24:15.590]  Like if this were someone who had gotten a weapon, walked into a bank with pantyhose over their face and robbed the place in the traditional manner, I don't feel like they would have gotten anywhere near this response.
[24:15.590 --> 24:17.570]  And that's if they walked away with a pile of money.
[24:18.090 --> 24:19.290]  They were in fatigues.
[24:19.390 --> 24:21.950]  I mean, they were not like police officers or even SWAT.
[24:21.950 --> 24:25.190]  They looked like National Guard troops from the video I saw.
[24:25.310 --> 24:25.410]  Right.
[24:25.410 --> 24:30.590]  It was that it was that beige camouflage that that does the job in the desert, but not really in Seattle, I don't think.
[24:30.810 --> 24:40.350]  Yeah, it makes no sense in like an urban environment and even like a SWAT team of some kind that would deal with, you know, someone with weapons and that kind of thing.
[24:40.430 --> 24:41.650]  It just didn't seem right.
[24:42.150 --> 24:42.350]  Okay.
[24:42.510 --> 24:45.330]  So she she had this information.
[24:45.330 --> 24:51.550]  She had 100 million applications for credit, which means people's personal information.
[24:52.150 --> 25:00.670]  And she stored it on GitHub and she was telling people about it on GitHub, not sharing it, but just talking about the the existence.
[25:00.670 --> 25:07.070]  And she was easily findable through that GitHub account because her real name address were on there.
[25:07.730 --> 25:13.910]  So it didn't seem like crime was either on her mind or in her skill set.
[25:15.350 --> 25:19.910]  Basically, the only crime I can see right now is accessing the information and downloading it.
[25:21.090 --> 25:34.990]  But when you look at how how the information wasn't being secured properly, how else we have found out that this was the case, that Capital One was not doing a good job keeping people's private information secure.
[25:34.990 --> 25:44.670]  So, you know, if somebody is is is benefiting in some way, if they sell something, if they're ripping people off, if they're committing identity theft, you have crimes there.
[25:44.750 --> 25:48.010]  Those are specific crimes that you can point to here.
[25:48.270 --> 25:52.050]  The crime you can point to is somebody bypassing security.
[25:52.810 --> 25:55.890]  And I guess, you know, not sharing information.
[25:56.170 --> 25:59.130]  That's that's the thing I would charge her with not telling people about it.
[25:59.130 --> 26:08.970]  Not not, you know, I don't know, boasting is the right word, but at least not not making the community better by by showing how insecure this is showing what you did.
[26:09.370 --> 26:10.130]  That's important.
[26:10.290 --> 26:11.870]  That's that's how we get better.
[26:12.050 --> 26:14.670]  So her motives are kind of kind of murky right now.
[26:14.670 --> 26:17.950]  But I don't think it warrants years in prison.
[26:18.070 --> 26:21.150]  I don't think it warrants having an army show up at your house.
[26:21.810 --> 26:24.130]  And I don't think it warrants having having your life destroyed.
[26:25.010 --> 26:33.750]  There was a responsible disclosure site that the person who tipped off the bank used to tell the bank about her activities.
[26:33.750 --> 26:40.430]  But that probably would have been the address that she would have used to tell them about the mistake in their their configurations.
[26:40.870 --> 26:45.970]  Well, keep in mind, you know, lots of times when you reveal security problems, you're blamed for them.
[26:46.090 --> 26:54.530]  Yeah, it's I mean, she easily could have been scared about or, you know, concerned about legal repercussions or a backlash from the company.
[26:54.650 --> 26:54.950]  Absolutely.
[26:55.350 --> 27:00.290]  Like the way whistleblowers or people that find these things are treated think time and time again.
[27:00.470 --> 27:24.690]  We've talked about over the years or it doesn't go well in a lot of cases even with the best of intentions and and communication and the other thing I know that this isn't always asked, but I think it should be whenever there's evidence of a crime who is the victim who is hurt by this and don't say capital one capital one basically had bad security practices for allowing this to happen in the
[27:24.690 --> 27:25.090]  first place.
[27:25.310 --> 27:33.010]  Are any of the people whose information was was compromised, have they been harmed by this other than having information there in the first place?
[27:33.310 --> 27:35.510]  These are questions we need to be to be asking.
[27:37.810 --> 27:38.790]  Yeah, pretty much.
[27:38.930 --> 27:39.150]  All right.
[27:39.590 --> 27:41.570]  I guess that's everything we have to say on that subject.
[27:42.730 --> 27:49.570]  Marcus Hutchins, the malware researcher, became known as an accidental hero for stopping the WannaCry ransomware attack.
[27:49.870 --> 27:50.690]  In 2017.
[27:50.690 --> 27:51.330]  Remember that?
[27:51.850 --> 27:58.650]  He has been sentenced to supervised release for one year on charges of making and selling the Kronos banking malware.
[27:59.450 --> 28:06.550]  Yeah, the judge said Hutchins time has been served and that he will face no additional time in jail.
[28:06.930 --> 28:17.870]  It's going to take the people like Hutchins with your skills to come up with solutions because that's the only way we're going to eliminate this entire subject of the woefully inadequate security protocols.
[28:39.810 --> 28:47.250]  Now, he took into account his age at the time of the offenses, Hutchins's age, not the judge's age, and gave him credit for turning a corner in his life.
[28:47.250 --> 28:48.690]  Before charges were brought.
[28:50.790 --> 29:03.730]  And the sentence, however, is likely to keep him from being able to re-enter the United States because we only want law-abiding people in this country and we're all pure and haven't committed any sins.
[29:04.030 --> 29:06.570]  Hutchins told the court he made some bad decisions as a teenager.
[29:06.730 --> 29:09.070]  I deeply regret my conduct and the harm that was caused.
[29:10.970 --> 29:14.990]  And I guess that's the end of this particular saga.
[29:15.830 --> 29:16.810]  I'm happy to hear that.
[29:16.950 --> 29:19.570]  I mean, that was definitely a deserved outcome.
[29:19.810 --> 29:25.850]  Well, it may not have been deserved along the way, but for it to come to this end.
[29:25.870 --> 29:26.990]  He faced 10 years in jail.
[29:27.170 --> 29:32.090]  Yeah, he had a lot, a lot that was being thrown into the mix with these charges.
[29:32.830 --> 29:36.610]  Anyway, the ransomware attack was later blamed on North Korean hackers.
[29:36.610 --> 29:42.510]  It spread across Ukraine, Europe, and the UK, encrypting systems, knocking businesses and government departments offline.
[29:42.890 --> 29:50.410]  The UK's National Health Service was one of the biggest organizations hit, forcing doctors to turn patients away and emergency rooms to close.
[29:50.950 --> 29:53.110]  Now, this isn't what Hutchins is accused of doing.
[29:53.110 --> 29:54.110]  This is what he fixed.
[29:54.470 --> 29:57.890]  At the time, he worked for Los Angeles-based CryptosLogic.
[29:58.170 --> 30:07.150]  And from his home in the south of England, what he did was he registered the domain in an effort to understand why the ransomware was spreading.
[30:08.190 --> 30:17.090]  And registering that domain later acted as a kill switch because the person who wrote wanted to cry and never bothered to register the domain, apparently, that things were forwarding to.
[30:17.090 --> 30:19.490]  So that stopped it dead in its tracks.
[30:21.090 --> 30:23.270]  And, yeah, he was a hero in that particular...
[30:23.270 --> 30:27.270]  Yeah, I think the things kind of even themselves out or cancel each other out.
[30:27.390 --> 30:35.350]  So you do something and save people's asses, I think we can overlook some of the bad decisions you might have made.
[30:35.350 --> 30:39.390]  Yeah, one thing he posted to his malware tech blog on Twitter.
[30:39.630 --> 30:45.730]  And he tweeted yesterday that the headlines that say the hacker who killed WannaCry spared jail.
[30:45.890 --> 30:46.930]  Headlines are super unfortunate.
[30:47.150 --> 30:52.450]  For readers who don't know what WannaCry is, it sounds like I murdered some rapper, which I enjoyed.
[30:52.930 --> 30:53.690]  But, yeah.
[30:53.950 --> 30:59.170]  And if you're interested in this person and the work he does, follow him on Twitter, malware tech blog.
[31:00.250 --> 31:00.750]  Okay.
[31:01.030 --> 31:03.230]  So that's, I think, a bit of progress.
[31:04.270 --> 31:09.590]  You know, the way of solving problems in this country seems to always be sending people to prison.
[31:09.790 --> 31:13.490]  And I think we need to ask, is that really solving anything?
[31:13.710 --> 31:17.170]  Can we learn something from what people are demonstrating?
[31:19.290 --> 31:21.330]  If there are crimes they're committing, fine.
[31:22.130 --> 31:28.610]  But maybe we can actually benefit from this as well, instead of locking people away, locking intelligent people away.
[31:28.610 --> 31:31.110]  We seem to think that's always the answer.
[31:31.390 --> 31:33.670]  Yeah, it's a complete waste of opportunity.
[31:34.050 --> 31:36.730]  Especially locking people away out of their own country.
[31:36.910 --> 31:42.330]  He's a British person who has been held in the United States in Los Angeles for however long it's been now.
[31:42.390 --> 31:43.310]  It's been a very long time.
[31:43.410 --> 31:43.910]  That's right, yeah.
[31:44.090 --> 31:48.650]  And now he gets to go back home to Britain, I think, where everything's okay and there's nothing at all to worry about.
[31:48.930 --> 31:50.970]  Yeah, he's got some surprises ahead of him.
[31:51.510 --> 31:56.870]  Okay, here's an interesting story that I'm just finding very amusing.
[31:56.870 --> 32:11.030]  Apple contractors regularly hear confidential medical information, drug deals, recordings of couples having sex as part of their job, providing quality control or grading the company's Siri voice assistant.
[32:11.170 --> 32:13.350]  That's according to The Guardian.
[32:13.570 --> 32:24.910]  Although Apple does not explicitly disclose it in its consumer facing privacy documentation, a small proportion of Siri recordings are passed on to contractors working for the company around the world.
[32:24.910 --> 32:41.130]  They are tasked with grading the responses on a variety of factors, including whether the activation of the voice assistant was deliberate or accidental, whether the query was something Siri could be expected to help with, and whether Siri's response was appropriate.
[32:41.130 --> 32:48.430]  Apple says the data is used to help Siri and dictation understand you better and recognize what you say.
[32:48.690 --> 33:00.810]  Now, a whistleblower working for the firm, thank God for whistleblowers, also considered criminals in many cases, they asked to remain anonymous due to fears over their job.
[33:00.810 --> 33:11.330]  This whistleblower expressed concerns about the lack of disclosure, particularly given the frequency with which accidental activations pick up extremely sensitive personal information.
[33:12.070 --> 33:18.610]  Siri can be accidentally activated when it mistakenly hears its wake word, the phrase, hey Siri.
[33:18.610 --> 33:25.750]  And, you know, comparing this to other personal assistants, such as Alexa, probably triggered a bunch of them just now.
[33:26.650 --> 33:30.830]  You can have Alexa be named Amazon, you can have Alexa be named computer.
[33:31.290 --> 33:39.130]  All of those things, every time it hears those words, whether it's from your TV set or you muttering to somebody, it's going to wake up.
[33:39.250 --> 33:43.670]  It's going to start listening, and it might even act upon something that you say, or it might get into an argument with you.
[33:43.670 --> 33:45.070]  All kinds of things are possible.
[33:45.430 --> 33:48.170]  Anyway, those mistakes can be understandable.
[33:48.390 --> 33:53.950]  BBC interview about Syria was interrupted by the assistant last year because of Siri.
[33:54.150 --> 33:54.650]  Yeah, okay.
[33:56.710 --> 33:59.230]  The service can also be activated in other ways.
[33:59.250 --> 34:03.750]  For instance, if an Apple watch detects it has been raised and then hears speech.
[34:04.310 --> 34:07.210]  Yeah, Siri is automatically activated when that happens.
[34:07.670 --> 34:10.010]  Not a hell of mine.
[34:10.010 --> 34:16.790]  I don't have an Apple watch, but wow, it's incredible to think about things that are possible these days.
[34:16.930 --> 34:30.170]  Now, the whistleblower said there have been countless instances of recordings featuring private discussions between doctors and patients, business deals, seemingly criminal dealings, sexual encounters, and so on.
[34:30.650 --> 34:36.070]  These recordings are accompanied by user data showing location, contact details, and app data.
[34:36.070 --> 34:38.150]  It's about as big a nightmare as I can imagine.
[34:38.310 --> 34:39.430]  But, intriguing.
[34:39.590 --> 34:41.310]  Does Trump have an Apple watch?
[34:41.430 --> 34:42.570]  Just out of curiosity, you know?
[34:42.770 --> 34:43.150]  I wonder.
[34:43.910 --> 34:44.310]  No?
[34:44.570 --> 34:45.470]  I don't think so.
[34:45.590 --> 34:45.790]  No?
[34:45.890 --> 34:46.570]  I think he's an Android guy.
[34:47.810 --> 34:48.470]  What a shame.
[34:48.810 --> 34:49.010]  All right.
[34:49.070 --> 34:52.230]  Well, it's quite a revelation.
[34:52.610 --> 34:58.730]  And why people would want to have this kind of technology following them around quite literally is beyond me.
[34:58.730 --> 35:06.470]  Yeah, it's something we've spoken about before on this program with other smart devices, other cloud-based smart devices, especially like Alexa.
[35:07.590 --> 35:17.830]  You know, there was a story about people hearing other people's Alexa material on their own Alexa devices and things, you know, wires getting crossed in that fashion.
[35:17.830 --> 35:26.930]  And the fact is, with Alexa, which I have, you can open up the app at any time and play the clips of you asking it to do things.
[35:27.330 --> 35:37.510]  Just now I have the app open on my phone and I can see that someone in my home, most likely the one to whom I married, asked it to play WBAI so they could listen to this program.
[35:38.050 --> 35:38.350]  Wow.
[35:38.610 --> 35:44.350]  Wait, you can actually spy on your house and see what people are saying to your Alexa device.
[35:44.470 --> 35:45.010]  Yes, exactly.
[35:45.010 --> 35:46.610]  Good thing it was this station.
[35:46.630 --> 35:47.710]  What if it was another station?
[35:47.870 --> 35:48.850]  That could have been really bad.
[35:48.990 --> 35:49.790]  Oh, that would have been awkward.
[35:50.150 --> 35:52.710]  I'd have come home and had to get some things explained to me.
[35:52.710 --> 35:53.390]  Scratching your head.
[35:53.970 --> 35:56.750]  Can you override that and make it do other things?
[35:57.310 --> 36:00.990]  Well, I could say the wake word and then order it to do a bunch of stuff.
[36:01.110 --> 36:01.470]  From here?
[36:01.750 --> 36:02.910]  From here, yeah.
[36:03.030 --> 36:08.270]  I think things we say through the device can still affect that device.
[36:08.710 --> 36:13.610]  So if I were to say something like echo play never going to give you up, then I might be in trouble.
[36:13.750 --> 36:14.850]  Wait, your wake word is echo?
[36:15.010 --> 36:15.550]  Yeah.
[36:15.970 --> 36:16.190]  Okay.
[36:16.310 --> 36:18.210]  That's one of them for the Amazon devices.
[36:18.470 --> 36:18.630]  Wow.
[36:18.630 --> 36:19.590]  But it's true.
[36:19.650 --> 36:22.150]  It's interesting, too, that they're contractors.
[36:22.150 --> 36:33.430]  They're basically on a mission to improve this technology and no doubt get it to a point where they can unleash a whole set of new features.
[36:33.430 --> 36:40.910]  Yeah, but think about what we're revealing here is they can hear the recordings and they know who the recordings are from.
[36:41.010 --> 36:41.990]  They have their information.
[36:42.230 --> 36:45.990]  And we're going to trust all these contractors to just do the right thing and ignore it?
[36:45.990 --> 36:46.310]  Right.
[36:46.470 --> 36:48.190]  I mean, just knowing this information exists.
[36:48.350 --> 36:55.530]  I mean, you can accept that they need to use it to tweak whatever and refine whatever, but this information exists and it's on computers that you don't control.
[36:55.530 --> 37:01.770]  And yeah, when you've given up information to a computer you don't control, it's not just the cloud.
[37:01.890 --> 37:02.650]  It's not just convenience.
[37:02.730 --> 37:06.710]  It's a surrender of authority over whatever it is that material is.
[37:06.710 --> 37:11.630]  And in my case, it's, you know, what songs I ask it to play or whatever.
[37:11.890 --> 37:15.370]  But, you know, it's something that people aren't really cognizant of.
[37:15.490 --> 37:16.650]  I mean, we've all got that in our pocket.
[37:16.770 --> 37:20.250]  We've all got that in our watches or, you know, many of us have that in our watches now.
[37:20.430 --> 37:21.570]  And a lot of us have it.
[37:21.650 --> 37:22.950]  I don't even have a watch.
[37:23.410 --> 37:24.930]  I won't ever get a watch again.
[37:25.090 --> 37:25.690]  I'm scared of them.
[37:26.470 --> 37:26.790]  Wow.
[37:26.910 --> 37:33.170]  OK, so now this is interesting because presumably your wife is listening to the show right now.
[37:33.830 --> 37:40.170]  You can tell because you see that she has asked Alexa to listen to WBAI.
[37:40.290 --> 37:46.810]  I'm wondering, can you two, since you're on the radio and she's saying things to Alexa, can you communicate this way?
[37:46.890 --> 37:48.670]  Can she send you a message right now?
[37:48.970 --> 37:52.650]  Let's just, you know, assume there's some kind of hostage crisis or something going on.
[37:52.730 --> 37:53.150]  All right.
[37:53.250 --> 37:55.570]  And you happen to be on the radio at the time it's happening.
[37:55.970 --> 37:59.170]  Can she convey a message to you simply by speaking to Alexa?
[37:59.170 --> 38:03.690]  Well, she did convey a message to me by texting me saying, I can't believe you ratted me out, but...
[38:03.690 --> 38:04.550]  Well, that doesn't count.
[38:04.690 --> 38:05.670]  She has to say it to Alexa.
[38:06.070 --> 38:08.470]  She has to say, Alexa, tell Rob to shut up.
[38:08.610 --> 38:08.750]  Yeah.
[38:08.850 --> 38:12.650]  Will it record things that aren't valid commands, even though that's a perfectly valid command?
[38:12.690 --> 38:17.550]  I think it records only things that it interprets as valid commands.
[38:17.550 --> 38:25.090]  But as anyone who uses these devices on a regular basis knows, it often takes words that have nothing to do with it and misinterprets that as its command word.
[38:25.090 --> 38:28.930]  Well, you live in a hacker-based household, I think.
[38:29.090 --> 38:30.010]  Yeah, I think that's safe to say.
[38:30.010 --> 38:37.090]  So I think you're both capable of experimenting with this and maybe showing the world what is possible and what is not possible.
[38:37.690 --> 38:39.770]  As long as your stuff isn't on the street when you get home.
[38:40.330 --> 38:41.190]  Very well might be.
[38:41.290 --> 38:43.490]  If it is, I'm crashing on one of your couches tonight.
[38:43.510 --> 38:44.030]  Okay, all right.
[38:44.030 --> 38:49.310]  But let us know if a message comes in and we'll experiment with these devices some more.
[38:50.230 --> 38:53.150]  Speaking of which, though, there are other devices out there.
[38:53.150 --> 38:54.830]  There's this one called Ring.
[38:55.070 --> 38:57.430]  That's Amazon's home security company.
[38:57.630 --> 39:04.150]  They've gotten a lot of control over the ways in which law enforcement partners are allowed to portray its products.
[39:04.470 --> 39:05.410]  Yeah, I didn't know this.
[39:05.910 --> 39:11.530]  Going as far as to review and even author statements that are attributed to police in the press.
[39:12.130 --> 39:13.150]  Yeah, I'm not kidding.
[39:13.310 --> 39:20.810]  Amazon is approving what the police say to the press when involved with their product known as Ring.
[39:20.810 --> 39:25.970]  Now, Ring declined to reveal how many police departments it's currently serving.
[39:26.130 --> 39:37.790]  But according to one police memo dated April 22nd, over 225 law enforcement agencies are engaged in partnerships with Ring, which was snatched up by Amazon in April of last year.
[39:37.790 --> 39:50.010]  Now, through these contractual relationships, Ring grants police access to an online platform or portal, which can be used to acquire video footage captured by Ring's doorbell surveillance cameras.
[39:50.570 --> 39:52.190]  Yeah, it's not just for you.
[39:52.290 --> 39:53.270]  It's for the police as well.
[39:53.550 --> 39:58.770]  The footage, however, can only be obtained with the permission of the device's owner.
[39:58.770 --> 40:05.130]  And that owner must also be a user of the company's neighborhood watch app called Neighbors.
[40:05.970 --> 40:06.770]  Pretty scary.
[40:07.750 --> 40:08.710]  It is.
[40:08.890 --> 40:17.570]  And it's interesting to note that this is something else that sold to people as a convenience, as something that will just do things that will improve their everyday life.
[40:17.570 --> 40:25.150]  But I don't know if I don't know if this is just limited to people who decide to volunteer access to their device to their local police department.
[40:25.350 --> 40:29.810]  And even if that's the case now, who's to say that will remain the case in terms of conditions to change on the daily.
[40:30.350 --> 40:35.850]  Also, my Echo device, my Alexa device just seems to have been told, I love you, which is very sweet.
[40:36.090 --> 40:38.550]  Oh, you can say that to Alexa and she will respond.
[40:39.170 --> 40:42.130]  Unless, unless, unless she's telling the device that she loves it.
[40:42.430 --> 40:43.390]  So, well, that's what I assumed.
[40:43.530 --> 40:43.690]  Yeah.
[40:44.350 --> 40:46.150]  Many people do, you know, that's true.
[40:47.350 --> 40:48.670]  That's a good development though.
[40:48.790 --> 40:55.790]  I mean, either for, you know, the relationship with the device in your home or, or your relationship.
[40:56.110 --> 40:56.470]  So...
[40:56.470 --> 40:58.930]  Well, let's get back to the police spying on your doorbell.
[40:59.090 --> 41:01.190]  Well, I think, now I'm curious about the scripting.
[41:01.290 --> 41:05.510]  Is that to downplay the influence the police have?
[41:05.570 --> 41:23.630]  In other words, if they talk about a crime and they say, you know, this technology was used, are, are, are, is Amazon basically trying to get them to not characterize the device as being the re, the thing that led to something or is some outcome or, or what,
[41:23.710 --> 41:24.250]  what is going on?
[41:24.250 --> 41:26.470]  This is, this is, this is what, uh, Gizmodo found out.
[41:26.970 --> 41:29.930]  Um, that is that there's, there's language in an agreement.
[41:30.050 --> 41:35.270]  The parties shall agree to a joint press release to be mutually agreed upon by the parties.
[41:35.290 --> 41:37.610]  That's, that's included in all ring documents.
[41:37.610 --> 41:42.910]  They're signed by multiple police departments, uh, Fort Lauderdale, Florida, Frisco, Texas, all over the country.
[41:43.130 --> 41:53.830]  Now motherboard reported that the Lakeland contract required police to encourage adoption of the platform slash app and stipulated that police keep the terms of this program confidential.
[41:54.610 --> 41:59.650]  Um, and two different agreements reviewed by Gizmodo contained the exact same language.
[41:59.650 --> 42:13.350]  So this sounds like the police are plugging this product with neighborhoods that might consider the technology because of the ability for the platform to be, um, advantageous to the police department.
[42:13.490 --> 42:18.750]  In other words, they're saying, it's like the fire department saying you should get this smoke detector.
[42:18.810 --> 42:22.830]  This is, you know, the one we really like, you know, or whatever.
[42:22.830 --> 42:43.330]  Um, it seems like that's the language that they're creating statements to, um, to that, that, as, as it says, like mutually, um, both from a business perspective for Amazon as the provider of this technology and the departments as sort of the local consumer of it,
[42:43.330 --> 42:48.830]  were you to engage in this particular feature, which is the smart neighborhoods or whatever they're calling it.
[42:48.830 --> 42:53.030]  It's, it's, it's, it's kind of a weird thing to say, but they really want people to download neighbors.
[42:53.410 --> 42:54.870]  That's, that's what the police want.
[42:54.890 --> 42:55.270]  I see.
[42:55.410 --> 43:01.510]  So it's like, okay, you've got this hardware now, now unleash the, or not unleash, I keep saying that, but...
[43:01.510 --> 43:01.990]  No, say it.
[43:02.050 --> 43:03.190]  It's, it's probably right.
[43:03.470 --> 43:09.190]  Take advantage of, of, of X, Y, Z that, oh, by the way, allows us basically in your front door.
[43:09.770 --> 43:11.010]  Pretty much, pretty much.
[43:11.230 --> 43:17.750]  Now, some police officials seem conscious of the fact that their officers shouldn't be seen as advertising on behalf of ring.
[43:17.750 --> 43:20.770]  Um, though they're effectively doing so anyway.
[43:21.010 --> 43:30.550]  Uh, one Florida officer wrote in an email to his subordinates last year, officers are not sales reps for ring and need to be careful not to suggest this company over other competitors.
[43:30.870 --> 43:34.910]  He then openly admits, we want to encourage downloads of the app.
[43:35.090 --> 43:43.470]  Uh, one way Fort Lauderdale encouraged its citizens to use the neighbors apps was, was by handing out free ring devices at neighborhood watch meetings.
[43:43.730 --> 43:44.670]  How can you resist?
[43:44.670 --> 43:50.310]  First, police officers attended the meetings and held free raffles where they pulled residents' names from a hat.
[43:50.390 --> 43:54.730]  But the officers were instructed not to let the winners simply walk away with their new device.
[43:54.870 --> 44:07.270]  Instead, they were ordered to ensure that the recipient, that the police officers ordered, not the residents ordered, the recipient had downloaded ring's app as far as practicable and then installed the devices themselves.
[44:07.630 --> 44:12.830]  Uh, but accepting a police department's offer of a free surveillance device apparently does have its drawbacks.
[44:12.830 --> 44:13.990]  Who would have known?
[44:14.170 --> 44:22.690]  For instance, it seems unlikely that the winners were warned that the personal information they gave to police would consequently be exposed by police.
[44:23.010 --> 44:36.610]  Uh, in response to Gizmodo's request, the Fort Lauderdale police department recently handed over a list of dozens of the city's new ring doorbell owners, along with where they live, the Mac addresses of each of their devices and how to reach them by email or phone.
[44:37.370 --> 44:37.850]  Yeah.
[44:38.230 --> 44:41.750]  Ring was quick to dismiss the incident as not a result of its police partnership.
[44:42.190 --> 44:46.370]  Customers choose what information, if any, they share with law enforcement.
[44:46.590 --> 44:51.030]  In this instance, residents chose to provide their information directly to Fort Lauderdale police department.
[44:51.290 --> 44:54.450]  Yeah, but they didn't choose for the police department to share that with the media.
[44:54.450 --> 44:56.970]  Um, I'm sure that's something they will discuss with them.
[44:56.970 --> 45:10.670]  But wow, yeah, this, it's, it's, you know, I knew as soon as they started networking these, um, uh, these, these devices together that it would be, um, a security risk for individuals and it would be abused in one way or another.
[45:10.850 --> 45:13.530]  It's one thing to have a device where you can see who's at your front door.
[45:13.850 --> 45:14.510]  That's great.
[45:14.650 --> 45:18.750]  But when other people can see that same information, it's not great.
[45:18.750 --> 45:20.110]  It's going to be used against you.
[45:20.270 --> 45:21.510]  It's going to violate your privacy.
[45:21.850 --> 45:26.470]  Uh, and, um, it's something you really have to be very careful about.
[45:27.070 --> 45:37.090]  And again, there are tons of devices like this available that are not under the Amazon umbrella of a 900 pound gorilla, um, juggernaut that, uh, that it is.
[45:37.250 --> 45:42.990]  And, um, you know, maybe, maybe it's worth if you, if you want to get a device like this, considering who has the information.
[45:43.310 --> 45:47.950]  Yeah, but you know, Rob, uh, you could say the same thing about a company called ring over a year ago.
[45:48.090 --> 45:50.330]  They weren't under the Amazon umbrella and guess what?
[45:50.450 --> 45:51.190]  Amazon bought them.
[45:51.430 --> 45:52.370]  Yeah, this is very true.
[45:53.910 --> 45:54.470]  All right.
[45:54.670 --> 45:56.070]  Well, uh, technology is great.
[45:56.070 --> 45:57.510]  We love to play with technology.
[45:57.570 --> 46:03.090]  We like to experiment with it, but we have to also recognize the risks and, uh, the potential abuses.
[46:03.570 --> 46:06.930]  And we have to expose those abuses when, when, when they, uh, when they happen.
[46:07.070 --> 46:11.470]  Even if it's just in theory, we need to be able to, uh, see what the problems are.
[46:11.470 --> 46:30.270]  I think also there should be a, uh, I think a sense, um, on the part of the consumer that these companies making these big, huge, broad, broad based decisions on behalf of their consumers, weighing the, um, impact of privacy or, or if at all.
[46:30.270 --> 46:48.450]  And, and, and basically coming to a conclusion that the, the, um, whatever violation of, um, anyone's inherent privacy, whatever that cost, um, the, the greater good would rather them violate, um, any sense of that, that you might, um, be deluded into accepting.
[46:48.450 --> 46:57.950]  But the, the point is that, that we, as, uh, uh, people that are buying this stuff that, that is, is being wielded upon us, we have a say too.
[46:58.130 --> 47:05.150]  So when you're, you're speaking out about this, the company needs to listen because, uh, you know, people can just unplug these on mass.
[47:05.230 --> 47:15.610]  And, you know, if you anger people enough about the, the, the, the convenience starts diminishing and disintegrating from, uh, the conception that people have of the device.
[47:15.610 --> 47:28.050]  So, um, there's only so far, I think that they can go and we, we need to at least, uh, you know, have some kind of protection or if they're going to feign that they're concerned about that, that they need to back that up and actually follow through.
[47:28.290 --> 47:33.430]  I agree with that in theory, but I also am aware that we change.
[47:33.430 --> 47:35.630]  We change over the course of years.
[47:36.070 --> 47:41.810]  Um, a couple of decades ago, the idea of having surveillance in our streets would be unthinkable.
[47:41.810 --> 47:47.910]  And now people are demanding it because they think that is how you keep your neighborhood safe is by having cameras everywhere.
[47:48.470 --> 47:56.230]  And, uh, you know, if, if, if you argue, let's take away all the cameras, people are going to oppose that because people are different than they were a couple of decades ago.
[47:56.690 --> 47:58.030]  Same thing with caller ID.
[47:58.270 --> 48:00.990]  Remember we used to say caller ID is going to violate people's privacy.
[48:01.110 --> 48:02.090]  Well, now everyone uses it.
[48:02.150 --> 48:04.450]  It's, it's, it's become a normal part of our lives.
[48:04.450 --> 48:15.010]  I just think that, uh, these are steps that we take in a particular direction and, um, it doesn't always result, uh, in people realizing when they're giving up their privacy, they get used to it.
[48:15.270 --> 48:18.390]  Well, and the construction of our spaces, right?
[48:18.470 --> 48:22.130]  Our public spaces and how we police, right?
[48:22.130 --> 48:29.910]  Are we doing, um, the kind of community policing that, that is, um, a lot more interactive and, and familiar and visible?
[48:29.990 --> 48:37.930]  Or are we going to just lean on these kinds of things that, um, are so pervasive and catch so much other information in the process?
[48:38.130 --> 48:45.390]  Um, you know, are these strategies, uh, actual considerations that we're, um, weighing and, and, um, grappling with?
[48:45.390 --> 48:47.590]  Um, so I, I don't know.
[48:47.670 --> 48:57.210]  I mean, it's, it's, it seems like, uh, a little bit of a lazy, uh, way of, of handling safety, uh, in, in the community itself.
[48:57.550 --> 49:06.410]  Speaking of safety and speaking of technology, we had some fun with, uh, emergency alert tones over the past, uh, couple of weeks because we had all these, uh, thunderstorms rolling through and, and severe weather.
[49:06.990 --> 49:12.090]  And, uh, we were actually in a, in a theater with, um, hundreds, hundreds of people.
[49:12.090 --> 49:17.910]  It was a film festival, actually, and everybody's phones started to go off with emergency alert tones.
[49:18.070 --> 49:18.790]  We've all heard them.
[49:18.910 --> 49:25.570]  We, we had the, uh, the, the, the fun, uh, day of emergency alert tones last year, uh, on this radio station.
[49:26.250 --> 49:34.030]  Uh, and I, I, I realized there is a real problem with the way this technology has been rolled out.
[49:34.590 --> 49:38.190]  And, uh, these are the things that, that we need to be able to recognize.
[49:38.190 --> 49:39.510]  We need to be able to experiment with.
[49:39.630 --> 49:40.830]  Basically, the idea is simple.
[49:40.830 --> 49:47.750]  You know, your phone will tell you, hey, there's a flash flood, there's a tornado, there's something bad coming your way, uh, you know, take cover.
[49:48.170 --> 49:55.750]  Uh, and, um, and, and, and you get to choose, do you want that sound to be audible or not?
[49:56.410 --> 50:00.030]  Well, it turns out it's not that simple because you can turn your phone off.
[50:00.150 --> 50:02.410]  You can, uh, or turn your ringer down.
[50:02.590 --> 50:05.610]  Uh, you can go into vibrate mode, you can go into silent mode.
[50:05.610 --> 50:17.190]  But when you do that, as many people in this theater discovered, you're not turning off the emergency alert tone because that emergency alert tone kept blaring for like a half hour from all different places.
[50:17.190 --> 50:21.270]  And people were, were perplexed to how it was happening to them when they turned their ringer off.
[50:21.710 --> 50:27.250]  Uh, well, turns out there's another setting and it's, it's really hard to get to, uh, depending on what phone you're using.
[50:27.370 --> 50:34.730]  Uh, but eventually you'll arrive there and you'll see, uh, there is a setting to, um, uh, to mute the emergency alert tone.
[50:34.730 --> 50:35.250]  Okay.
[50:35.550 --> 50:36.190]  Problem solved.
[50:36.350 --> 50:47.630]  But here's the thing that is not attached to your phone ringer so that when you turn your phone ringer back on, you're not unmuting the emergency alert tone.
[50:47.630 --> 50:50.250]  So that's going to remain muted because it's a different setting.
[50:50.430 --> 50:58.250]  How many people are going to remember to go into that setting, which is behind several menus to turn that back on as well?
[50:58.390 --> 51:01.590]  Why not have it simply be a part of the ringer volume?
[51:01.590 --> 51:05.970]  If you want to mute the ringer volume, you probably want to mute the emergency alert thing too.
[51:06.070 --> 51:06.610]  Maybe you don't.
[51:06.710 --> 51:07.030]  I don't know.
[51:07.130 --> 51:11.850]  Maybe it could be another option where, okay, mute the ring tone, but not the emergency alert tone.
[51:12.470 --> 51:15.370]  But whatever it is, it should be easy to turn it back on.
[51:15.450 --> 51:21.570]  You shouldn't have to remember to go all the way back into that sub menu to, um, uh, to, to basically make the thing audible.
[51:22.010 --> 51:32.210]  I just think that's badly engineered and something, you know, I, I've been asking people and nobody seems to know about it, uh, because no one has actually experimented with it.
[51:32.310 --> 51:39.690]  It's hard to experiment with because you need an emergency to be happening to see what goes on when, when the tone is, uh, is, is, um, being broadcast.
[51:40.730 --> 51:45.910]  Uh, so this is something that I think as hackers, we can, we can focus on and say, yeah, do a better job.
[51:47.530 --> 51:47.890]  Yeah.
[51:48.050 --> 51:59.510]  Again, the hacker community, uh, if, if, if there's one thing you could say about the entire hacker community to a person, it's that they've got ideas and sometimes they're, they're the obvious ideas.
[51:59.670 --> 52:01.670]  Like to me, this is just common sense.
[52:01.790 --> 52:03.470]  Like, of course you would want it to work this way.
[52:03.870 --> 52:09.290]  Uh, but lots of times, lots of times, the thing that's common sense is not what actually happens.
[52:09.370 --> 52:10.290]  There are so many cases.
[52:10.290 --> 52:19.410]  I remember I used to have, um, uh, a series of phones where basically your password was always displayed and it would stay on the screen after you entered it.
[52:19.410 --> 52:21.170]  It, and that was just the default setting.
[52:21.350 --> 52:23.790]  It, it, it, it should not have ever been that way.
[52:24.250 --> 52:28.390]  Uh, and someone eventually fixed it, but someone had to notice it for someone to fix it.
[52:28.590 --> 52:42.610]  This is also a common deal in the, uh, in the software world where people who are in charge of, um, how things work and people who are in charge of the user experience end of things, um, and are sometimes not the same people, not with the same goals and,
[52:42.610 --> 52:44.470]  uh, have complete disconnects.
[52:44.570 --> 52:48.390]  And, uh, and really it's, uh, UX is important.
[52:48.390 --> 53:03.210]  Yeah, you know, I, I love engineers, but sometimes they really annoy me because they, they put their solution into, um, uh, the mainstream and assume that everyone's just going to adapt everything from, from TV remotes.
[53:03.690 --> 53:06.070]  Why in God's name, the DVD remotes have so many buttons.
[53:06.230 --> 53:06.610]  I don't know.
[53:06.990 --> 53:14.310]  Uh, the pause button when, when, when you're playing back something on, uh, I remember old VCR, I hit the pause button and what would happen?
[53:14.790 --> 53:18.050]  Gigantic pause icon in the middle of the screen would stay there forever.
[53:18.750 --> 53:27.310]  Somebody thought that was a good idea to have a giant pause button there, uh, an icon there, and you couldn't see what you were pausing because, you know, you want to see what's on the screen.
[53:27.450 --> 53:28.870]  That's why you paused it in the first place.
[53:29.550 --> 53:34.790]  Things like that, you know, you have to be, um, uh, conscious of and, and, and speak out and be listened to.
[53:35.250 --> 53:36.030]  Uh, okay.
[53:36.170 --> 53:37.990]  More, uh, technology news here.
[53:38.250 --> 53:44.470]  Um, dramatic advances in satellite imaging technology in the last 10 years have privacy advocates worried about 24 hour surveillance.
[53:44.470 --> 53:46.290]  Right now, U.S.
[53:46.570 --> 53:55.690]  federal regulations help keep things in check so that while commercial satellite imagery is powerful enough, for instance, to see a car, it's not detailed enough to identify the make and model.
[53:55.850 --> 53:58.750]  That's according to a report from MIT Technology Review.
[53:59.190 --> 54:03.510]  Now, satellite companies say they keep a person's data separate from any identifying characteristics.
[54:03.510 --> 54:07.650]  But Peter Martinez of the Secure World Foundation said, that doesn't matter.
[54:07.830 --> 54:15.210]  The risks arise not only from the satellite images themselves, but the fusion of Earth observation data with other sources of data.
[54:15.990 --> 54:16.450]  Yeah.
[54:16.790 --> 54:19.690]  Uh, then there's the sheer volume of satellites overhead.
[54:20.030 --> 54:25.630]  Imaging company Planet Labs confirmed that it has 140 imaging satellites currently in orbit.
[54:25.830 --> 54:30.690]  Uh, the report says this is enough to pass over every place on Earth once a day.
[54:30.690 --> 54:40.110]  Even with planet's highest resolution imagery, one, one meter resolution, it remains impossible to distinguish individual people, car number plates, or otherwise identifying information.
[54:40.490 --> 54:44.830]  Our imagery is ideal for monitoring large scale change on a daily basis.
[54:44.910 --> 54:50.610]  This includes seeing daily change across buildings and roads, forests, and agriculture, bodies of water, and more.
[54:51.170 --> 55:01.290]  Uh, meanwhile, though, satellite imagery is getting closer to a level that investors and businesses will want to exploit, um, making something known as a living map of Earth.
[55:01.690 --> 55:06.730]  Um, basically, they're pointing out that the observational satellites can do good, obviously.
[55:06.950 --> 55:09.830]  Uh, they can help farmers monitor a crop's growth cycle.
[55:10.010 --> 55:14.570]  Geologists better examine rock textures and human rights organizations track refugee movements.
[55:14.850 --> 55:21.050]  And, of course, other satellites do things like helping meteorologists predict the weather and making our phones and televisions work.
[55:21.850 --> 55:26.590]  But, um, obviously, there is so much more, so much more negative that can be done as well.
[55:26.770 --> 55:34.170]  And, like everything else we've been talking about, this surveillance remains and becomes a part of our lives, something that we're used to.
[55:34.790 --> 55:37.630]  And it's something we need to be, um, focused on.
[55:38.030 --> 55:38.450]  All right.
[55:38.450 --> 55:44.890]  If you can't tell the make and model of that car now, uh, you can maybe on the next generation of satellites or with, uh, tweaks to the current generation.
[55:45.050 --> 55:50.370]  I mean, NASA is improving the imagery they get from their existing satellites all the time and, and spacecraft and so on.
[55:50.550 --> 55:58.490]  So, you know, it's not worth saying, well, the tech isn't there yet because eventually the tech will be there and we need to consider the place of that in our world.
[55:58.750 --> 55:59.090]  Yeah.
[55:59.230 --> 56:10.430]  And if you develop something and then sell it, like this ring, like, you know, think of the implications for how the cool thing you made and you used it in, like, an altruistic, good, um, nice way.
[56:10.430 --> 56:21.350]  But how perhaps might that system be, uh, used in other ways when you make your nice payday and sell it, you know, and buy your, like, tech bro sports car?
[56:21.850 --> 56:22.410]  Absolutely.
[56:22.790 --> 56:29.590]  Hey, uh, we need to remind people one more time, give a call to the pledge line, 516-620-3602.
[56:29.690 --> 56:31.070]  It's what makes WBI possible.
[56:31.190 --> 56:35.430]  It's what makes our voices heard over the radio and over the internet.
[56:35.710 --> 56:37.890]  Please pledge whatever you can afford.
[56:37.890 --> 56:40.490]  There's all kinds of amazing premiums that are being offered.
[56:40.690 --> 56:43.950]  You can go to give2wbai.org.
[56:43.950 --> 56:46.150]  That's give, the number 2wbai.org.
[56:46.150 --> 56:47.910]  And, and pledge that way.
[56:48.330 --> 56:54.910]  Uh, you can, uh, uh, pledge with the, uh, BAI buddy by, by basically, uh, paying a certain amount every month.
[56:55.150 --> 57:00.710]  You can text 41444, text WBI to 41444, all kinds of ways that you can pledge.
[57:00.850 --> 57:05.170]  The important thing is that you do pledge and that you keep WBI on the air.
[57:05.290 --> 57:07.570]  We've been on the air since 1960 without a single commercial.
[57:08.310 --> 57:12.710]  And this is something that, uh, I think, uh, is, is one of the most worthwhile things that we do.
[57:13.110 --> 57:17.810]  Also check out your local 2600 meetings this week, uh, 2600.com slash meetings.
[57:18.630 --> 57:19.230]  That's right.
[57:19.670 --> 57:22.090]  They take place all around the world.
[57:22.270 --> 57:23.990]  We will see you again next week.
[57:24.150 --> 57:29.790]  And, um, don't forget to, uh, send in your suggestions for, um, uh, what we can do about hope.
[57:29.850 --> 57:31.990]  Hope at hope.net is our email address for that.
[57:32.110 --> 57:35.170]  For the radio show, OTH at 2600.com.
[57:35.730 --> 57:36.110]  Have a good night.
[57:36.110 --> 57:37.450]  That is always hope.
[57:38.110 --> 57:41.430]  Only because it's the one thing that no one has figured out how to kill yet.
[57:41.710 --> 57:42.370]  I wonder whether
[57:46.530 --> 57:48.010]  I could stop my head.
[57:48.350 --> 57:49.350]  The future it looks.
[57:49.850 --> 57:49.970]  Yeah.
[57:51.130 --> 57:53.510]  I see my life.
[57:53.770 --> 57:54.870]  A lot from yesterday.
[57:59.020 --> 58:00.920]  It's time to feel like a failure.
[58:01.360 --> 58:02.820]  Or am I just better?
[58:03.740 --> 58:05.340]  Sometimes if this seems useless.
[58:05.920 --> 58:07.700]  Or am I that f***ed up?
[58:59.240 --> 59:01.080]  It's time to feel like a failure.
[59:01.080 --> 59:03.000]  Or am I just better?
[59:03.800 --> 59:04.480]  Or am I just better?
[59:04.480 --> 59:05.720]  Sometimes it just seems useless.
[59:06.200 --> 59:07.900]  Or am I that f***ed up?
[59:08.460 --> 59:13.320]  I feel hopeless.
[59:13.960 --> 59:17.800]  I saw it down.
[59:18.040 --> 59:19.700]  No, I'm not a failure.
[59:20.280 --> 59:21.660]  Maybe just better.
[59:40.750 --> 59:47.670]  To the young people, please, start reading.
[59:48.290 --> 59:56.070]  Get away from the YouTube and the Facebook and the WhatsApp and start reading your history.
[59:56.070 --> 59:56.090]  From your favorite yeah it's happening to us dot with Facebook.
[59:56.090 --> 59:56.290]  Let me explain your reference at the Facebook page.
[59:56.290 --> 59:56.470]  I repeat that you can check out the Facebook page.
[59:56.470 --> 59:56.590]  I repeat that I had the podcast.