[00:09.490 --> 00:10.370]  And this is
[00:13.750 --> 00:18.170]  Wayne Kramer from the MC5.
[00:19.130 --> 00:23.910]  Nobody kicks out the jams like WBAI New York.
[00:31.490 --> 00:32.810]  Are we done?
[00:32.970 --> 00:35.210]  Okay, this is WBAI New York.
[00:35.370 --> 00:38.010]  It's 8 o'clock time once again for Off the Hook.
[00:44.510 --> 00:47.670]  It's ringing, so I ripped it off the wall.
[00:48.650 --> 00:50.630]  I cut myself while shaving.
[00:51.230 --> 00:53.190]  Now I can't make a cough.
[00:53.970 --> 00:55.990]  We couldn't get much worse.
[00:58.760 --> 01:01.420]  Bum-dilly-bum for the best, expect the worst.
[01:02.040 --> 01:03.920]  I hope that's understood.
[01:04.220 --> 01:04.900]  Bum-dilly-bum!
[02:24.670 --> 02:26.370]  And a very good evening to everybody.
[02:26.450 --> 02:27.490]  The program is Off the Hook.
[02:27.550 --> 02:29.870]  Emmanuel Goldstein here with you on this Wednesday evening.
[02:29.870 --> 02:31.250]  We're being joined tonight by Rob T.
[02:31.530 --> 02:31.910]  Firefly.
[02:32.230 --> 02:32.790]  Good evening.
[02:33.170 --> 02:35.190]  And then your microphone is not working for some reason.
[02:35.270 --> 02:36.870]  Because someone pressed this button.
[02:37.030 --> 02:37.690]  For no reason.
[02:37.750 --> 02:38.210]  Try that again.
[02:38.450 --> 02:39.030]  Good evening.
[02:39.290 --> 02:40.290]  Why would someone press that button?
[02:40.370 --> 02:40.530]  What's the point?
[02:40.530 --> 02:42.970]  It's a very popular button on the console is the Rob shut up button.
[02:43.090 --> 02:46.090]  No, if you press that button, then this switch doesn't do anything.
[02:46.270 --> 02:47.110]  Why do you press that button?
[02:47.210 --> 02:47.970]  Who does that?
[02:48.830 --> 02:49.430]  And Kyle.
[02:50.590 --> 02:52.430]  Yeah, I'm here and loud.
[02:52.650 --> 02:53.290]  Your button is fine.
[02:53.330 --> 02:53.910]  Loud and clear?
[02:54.070 --> 02:54.610]  No, you're fine.
[02:54.730 --> 02:54.930]  Okay.
[02:55.170 --> 02:55.310]  Yeah.
[02:55.970 --> 02:56.290]  All right.
[02:56.370 --> 03:00.850]  Well, it's another snafu-filled edition of Off the Hook.
[03:01.310 --> 03:03.350]  I'll try not to smack the microphone this week.
[03:03.410 --> 03:03.770]  But we'll see.
[03:03.850 --> 03:04.370]  We'll see what happens.
[03:04.730 --> 03:07.030]  We all just remember that Alex isn't here this week.
[03:07.430 --> 03:09.930]  So, yeah, there'll be a bit of a gap.
[03:10.850 --> 03:12.790]  But we'll fill that gap with listeners.
[03:12.790 --> 03:17.250]  Of course, listeners can call in to our phone number, 212-209-2877.
[03:17.530 --> 03:20.210]  We'd like to hear from the people out there.
[03:20.230 --> 03:25.670]  I know we only had a couple of minutes last week, so we'll have more time this week for all sorts of things like that.
[03:25.810 --> 03:43.910]  We've been very busy, busy working on all sorts of projects, digitizing the Hope videos, making that project all finished, working on the Hacker Digest, finishing that up so all of the 2,600 back issues will be digitized by the end of this month, working on a brand-new issue,
[03:44.330 --> 03:46.310]  working to try to save the Hope Conference.
[03:46.510 --> 03:49.250]  We have so many things going on at once.
[03:49.290 --> 03:51.090]  It's really incredible.
[03:51.130 --> 03:56.030]  And of course, we find time to come in here and do radio as well, because we're out of our minds.
[03:57.450 --> 04:01.970]  But the world of technology marches on, or sometimes stumbles on, as it were.
[04:02.370 --> 04:07.410]  Here's an interesting story I just happened to see a little bit earlier.
[04:08.450 --> 04:16.990]  Do you know that it's possible to tell what people are typing on keyboards by listening to the sounds that the keys make?
[04:17.090 --> 04:18.770]  Now, there's a number of ways you can do this.
[04:18.930 --> 04:21.550]  Obviously, the easiest way is a touch-tone phone.
[04:21.550 --> 04:23.130]  You hear different tones.
[04:23.310 --> 04:27.670]  You can decode them by ear or with an app or a program or something like that.
[04:27.670 --> 04:35.710]  And then there are some badly designed ATMs where different keys make different beeps, different tones.
[04:35.930 --> 04:37.970]  And you could actually tell somebody's password that way.
[04:38.110 --> 04:39.710]  They make it very easy.
[04:40.210 --> 04:48.530]  But a recent study by the Southern Methodist University found that researchers were able to predict what people were typing on their keyboards.
[04:48.910 --> 04:50.070]  You know, these things.
[04:50.950 --> 04:52.310]  Yeah, they don't make little beeps.
[04:52.310 --> 04:59.230]  Yes, you shouldn't be able to tell, but you can tell what people are typing on their keyboards just by listening to the sound those keys are making.
[04:59.570 --> 05:12.170]  Now, according to the Mail Online, researchers recreated a real-life office environment with ambient noise and all the distractions that come with it and asked some of the volunteers to type a few words on their computers.
[05:12.170 --> 05:22.590]  Now, by using the microphones of smartphones placed on the same table, researchers were able to analyze and predict what the volunteers were typing with 41% accuracy.
[05:23.030 --> 05:24.450]  I find that really interesting.
[05:24.550 --> 05:32.270]  But, you know, what this particular publication decided was the headline to this story.
[05:32.710 --> 05:35.750]  Hackers can detect what you're typing by listening to you type.
[05:37.070 --> 05:37.630]  Yeah.
[05:38.650 --> 05:39.770]  Why only them?
[05:40.710 --> 05:46.870]  The thing is, all throughout the story, it basically says researchers are figuring out ways to do this.
[05:48.290 --> 05:51.730]  And then the takeaway is that hackers can do this.
[05:51.990 --> 05:52.130]  Right.
[05:52.250 --> 05:53.630]  Except that they haven't done this.
[05:53.750 --> 05:55.470]  The researchers are the ones figuring it out.
[05:55.870 --> 06:01.530]  And it's just, you're blaming hackers for something that someone else is figuring out.
[06:01.750 --> 06:03.130]  I think the word is attacker.
[06:03.750 --> 06:03.970]  Uh-huh.
[06:03.970 --> 06:11.310]  Yeah, I mean, it is true that this came from the Daily Mail, which is not known as the most subtle source of news.
[06:11.690 --> 06:13.890]  They're very into sensationalizing things.
[06:14.070 --> 06:20.290]  And, of course, flying the H-word when it even remotely involves anything computer-like.
[06:20.530 --> 06:21.790]  Well, I got this.
[06:22.010 --> 06:23.270]  They refer to the mail.
[06:23.410 --> 06:25.970]  But I got this from a site called thequint.com.
[06:25.970 --> 06:29.030]  I don't know what that is, but they're pretty sensationalist.
[06:29.130 --> 06:31.070]  And that's the headline they decided to go with.
[06:31.250 --> 06:32.290]  Let me read a little more of the story, though.
[06:32.370 --> 06:36.890]  Some of the challenges for a hacker, because now we're into the illegal stuff, apparently.
[06:37.230 --> 06:42.510]  Some of the challenges for a hacker would be to know the material of the surface the user is typing on.
[06:42.650 --> 06:45.530]  Because the acoustics from a wooden table would be different from that of a metal one.
[06:46.410 --> 06:51.690]  So, hackers, when you want to steal someone's password, call the office first and ask what kind of table they have.
[06:51.790 --> 06:52.450]  Do you have a wooden table?
[06:52.510 --> 06:53.090]  Do you have a metal table?
[06:53.090 --> 06:53.830]  Well, thank you very much.
[06:53.990 --> 06:55.010]  No, no, we're just curious.
[06:55.010 --> 06:55.790]  Just taking a survey.
[06:56.470 --> 06:58.590]  I'm sure you can find a pretense that'll work.
[06:59.230 --> 07:04.730]  The hacker would also have to know the location of the phone on the table and if there are multiple sources recording the sound.
[07:04.930 --> 07:06.230]  So, it's me again.
[07:06.390 --> 07:09.970]  Can you tell me how many inches onto the table the telephone is?
[07:10.450 --> 07:10.990]  Thank you.
[07:11.170 --> 07:13.630]  Okay, no, this is just for health and safety.
[07:13.630 --> 07:15.190]  We like to keep track of these things.
[07:16.150 --> 07:18.430]  According to a report in Forbes, researchers...
[07:18.430 --> 07:19.810]  Back to researchers now.
[07:19.930 --> 07:21.870]  Because the hackers are the ones doing it illegally.
[07:21.870 --> 07:24.170]  The researchers are the ones, apparently, that figure it all out.
[07:24.350 --> 07:26.370]  Are these, like, hackers dressed up as researchers?
[07:26.470 --> 07:26.870]  You know...
[07:26.870 --> 07:28.650]  It seems like they've found a way to...
[07:28.650 --> 07:30.830]  You know that the people figuring this out are the hackers.
[07:31.090 --> 07:35.830]  They're the ones that are thinking this way and saying, hey, this is a security risk and telling people about it.
[07:35.910 --> 07:36.990]  That's what hacking is all about.
[07:36.990 --> 07:52.750]  Anyway, according to this report in Forbes, researchers have developed a tool that can hack Skype and then, because hacking Skype is the easy part, but then after you hack Skype, you use the microphone to listen to the sound of the keyboard when the user is typing.
[07:52.750 --> 07:54.790]  And it's called Skype and type.
[07:55.050 --> 08:02.210]  It's a program that has the ability to detect specific frequencies that match each of the keys on the keyboard.
[08:03.250 --> 08:05.250]  Yeah, you can't make this up.
[08:05.930 --> 08:06.510]  That's...
[08:06.510 --> 08:15.830]  So, now, under a subsection called the anti-hack, a hack like this is not easy to detect, which is why it is even more difficult to counter.
[08:15.830 --> 08:23.710]  However, researchers believe that something as simple as a tablecloth can help block vibrations that get relayed back to the smartphone.
[08:24.310 --> 08:26.950]  Remember, when we were growing up, everyone used tablecloths.
[08:27.050 --> 08:28.370]  For some reason, we stopped.
[08:28.650 --> 08:29.930]  And this is the result.
[08:30.130 --> 08:36.050]  Well, maybe, maybe we can get back into the habit of using tablecloths and then our passwords won't be stolen.
[08:36.750 --> 08:44.910]  That's according to a spokesman from the tablecloth industry who believes that we have lost our way and that this might actually make for a more secure America.
[08:44.910 --> 08:53.010]  This is a wake-up call for smartphone makers to bolster smartphone security and ensure that sensors and microphones don't get hacked easily.
[08:53.390 --> 09:03.330]  And as for smartphone users, it's advised that they turn the keypad sound option off in settings, which will stop the clicking sound when you type on the phone.
[09:03.490 --> 09:05.130]  I'm not sure what setting that is.
[09:05.430 --> 09:07.930]  The keypad sound option...
[09:07.930 --> 09:12.030]  Oh, the thing that actually makes little beeps when you're typing a password.
[09:12.030 --> 09:17.490]  Well, that's a different device than the keyboards that need tablecloths.
[09:18.050 --> 09:20.610]  Exactly, yeah, because those are actual keyboard keyboards.
[09:20.610 --> 09:22.310]  I think they're trying to give comprehensive advice here.
[09:22.390 --> 09:27.230]  But they're confusing people because you're calling on a phone and you're not typing a password while you're talking to somebody on the phone.
[09:27.330 --> 09:32.970]  I think they're talking about calling on a landline and hearing the passwords being typed on the keyboards.
[09:33.030 --> 09:33.150]  Right.
[09:33.250 --> 09:37.310]  Can you get to the part about covering up the sounds my mouse makes?
[09:37.310 --> 09:40.970]  No, but I can get to last but not least, which is the best paragraph of this article.
[09:41.190 --> 09:46.810]  Be aware of your surroundings when you are using electronic devices that have sensitive information on them.
[09:47.490 --> 09:51.350]  You know how they say even the walls have ears.
[09:52.430 --> 09:52.870]  Wait.
[09:53.130 --> 09:55.730]  It shouldn't be, you know, what they say even the walls have.
[09:55.810 --> 09:56.690]  You know, I'm not going to quibble.
[09:56.950 --> 09:58.370]  I'm just glad I made it through this.
[09:59.070 --> 10:03.110]  And that was an article from thequint.com, whatever that is.
[10:03.110 --> 10:04.750]  I have a theory about this.
[10:04.870 --> 10:14.370]  I think someone came up with the phrase Skype and type and then thought we've got to come up with some sort of exploit that uses that this would make sense because, like, that's an awesome name and it would be a shame to let it go to waste.
[10:14.570 --> 10:26.470]  But also, I think this might lend some illumination to why so many computer enthusiasts and hackers, like myself, seem to enjoy keyboards with mechanical switches, Model M's, your cherry switches, things like that.
[10:26.630 --> 10:31.290]  Because that must be all kinds of extra obnoxious to try and listen to and decode.
[10:32.210 --> 10:44.250]  It's interesting the distinction they're making with the ambient sound of the clicking itself and the correlation between that and proximity to a solid surface like a table.
[10:44.550 --> 10:54.230]  I mean, it seems like they're saying that if it was sort of not directly contacting that hard surface, ambient sound is out of the picture.
[10:54.230 --> 11:00.310]  But I think the crux of the whole vulnerability is that the microphones are picking up clicking sounds.
[11:00.310 --> 11:10.350]  So I'm not quite sure that... is it the dynamics that it's so loud when it's directly contacting that table when you click that it registers high enough for the phones?
[11:10.410 --> 11:21.530]  Because, I mean, if it's in even close proximity and it's on something like a tablecloth, even like a carpet sample that's much thicker, right, I still think there's going to be clicking.
[11:21.530 --> 11:25.070]  And that's part of what's being decoded from the article.
[11:25.230 --> 11:32.410]  So I'm left a little unsatisfied with exactly where the threshold of vulnerability begins and ends.
[11:32.510 --> 11:44.850]  Well, I think the key is if... no pun intended, if keys sound different, you know, if one end of the keyboard sounds different than the other end, if the top sounds different than the bottom, everything's going to be unique as long as you know the system.
[11:45.390 --> 11:51.010]  And maybe, you know, the way to find out is you just listen for a while and certain keys are typed more than other keys.
[11:51.010 --> 11:52.550]  So you'll be able to figure it out.
[11:52.690 --> 11:55.070]  Like which side of the keyboard the phone is on.
[11:55.150 --> 11:55.890]  You have to know.
[11:56.070 --> 11:56.210]  Yeah.
[11:56.310 --> 11:57.550]  I think that was in the preamble of what you were reading.
[11:57.550 --> 12:05.230]  And if you tell somebody to type something and then you register that, I mean, you might not even have to develop the skill yourself.
[12:05.230 --> 12:09.310]  There's probably a way that an app can be designed to do just that.
[12:12.630 --> 12:16.810]  Interesting vulnerability or a way to eavesdrop.
[12:17.210 --> 12:17.470]  Yeah.
[12:17.950 --> 12:18.710]  Always more.
[12:18.850 --> 12:20.910]  There's definitely sensors all around, so...
[12:21.010 --> 12:23.010]  Developed by researchers, exploited by hackers.
[12:23.150 --> 12:23.790]  That's what I learned.
[12:24.510 --> 12:26.210]  Researcher tested, hacker approved.
[12:26.470 --> 12:27.290]  Well, okay.
[12:27.470 --> 12:31.770]  So back into the corporate world where we're never surprised by what happens.
[12:31.930 --> 12:40.790]  But did you know, this is according to an article in TechCrunch, there's a movie ticket subscription service known as MoviePass.
[12:40.790 --> 12:42.530]  And guess what?
[12:42.610 --> 12:50.630]  They've exposed tens of thousands of customer card numbers and personal credit cards because a critical server was not protected with a password.
[12:50.890 --> 12:52.790]  Yes, it's true.
[12:53.510 --> 13:02.330]  Mossab Hussein, a security researcher at Dubai-based cybersecurity firm SpiderSilk, found an exposed database on one of the company's many subdomains.
[13:02.330 --> 13:10.050]  The database was massive, containing 161 million records at the time of writing and growing in real time.
[13:10.310 --> 13:16.410]  Many of the records were normal, computer-generated logging messages used to ensure the running of the service.
[13:16.610 --> 13:21.910]  But many also included sensitive user information, such as MoviePass customer card numbers.
[13:22.270 --> 13:25.330]  These MoviePass customer cards are like normal debit cards.
[13:25.330 --> 13:26.930]  They're issued by MasterCard.
[13:27.250 --> 13:34.350]  They store a cash balance, which users who sign up for the subscription service can use to pay to watch a catalog of movies.
[13:34.630 --> 13:44.210]  Now, for a monthly subscription fee, MoviePass uses the debit card to load the full cost of the movie, which the customer then uses to pay for the movie at the cinema.
[13:44.250 --> 13:46.730]  Why can't people just pay with money that they used to?
[13:46.810 --> 13:48.350]  It seems so complex.
[13:48.350 --> 13:49.830]  And you're giving out all this information.
[13:50.770 --> 13:55.630]  The people at TechCrunch reviewed a sample of 1,000 records and removed the duplicates.
[13:55.790 --> 13:58.830]  A little over half contained unique MoviePass debit card numbers.
[13:59.070 --> 14:05.130]  Each customer card record had the MoviePass debit card number and its expiry date, the card's balance, and when it was activated.
[14:05.370 --> 14:12.570]  That database had more than 58,000 records containing card data and was growing by the minute.
[14:14.050 --> 14:24.330]  They also found records containing customers' personal credit card numbers and their expiry date, which included billing information, including names, postal addresses, all kinds of things here.
[14:24.530 --> 14:30.370]  And among the records reviewed, we found records, they say, with enough information to make fraudulent card purchases.
[14:30.930 --> 14:31.850]  It's not hard.
[14:32.610 --> 14:39.110]  Some records, however, credit where credit is due, contain card numbers that had been masked except for the last four digits.
[14:39.770 --> 14:41.130]  Okay, well, that's something at least.
[14:41.130 --> 14:46.690]  The database also contained email addresses, some password data related to failed login attempts.
[14:47.130 --> 14:53.750]  They found hundreds of records containing users' email addresses, presumably incorrectly typed passwords, which was logged in the database.
[14:54.570 --> 15:01.190]  And this was verified by attempting to log into the app with an email address and password that didn't exist, but was only known through this method.
[15:01.330 --> 15:06.510]  And our dummy email address and password appeared in the database almost immediately, they say.
[15:07.230 --> 15:09.670]  None of the records in the database were encrypted.
[15:09.670 --> 15:11.510]  Let me say that again.
[15:11.770 --> 15:14.410]  None of the records in the database were encrypted.
[15:15.190 --> 15:20.970]  All right, we haven't got to the point yet where hackers could actually use this system to do bad things.
[15:21.470 --> 15:23.350]  Maybe they don't get to that point, which is good.
[15:24.050 --> 15:26.390]  But MoviePass did issue a statement.
[15:26.750 --> 15:29.310]  MoviePass recently discovered... No, you didn't.
[15:29.390 --> 15:30.930]  You didn't discover anything.
[15:31.170 --> 15:33.770]  A security researcher discovered it and told you.
[15:33.910 --> 15:34.670]  That's what happened.
[15:35.070 --> 15:39.350]  MoviePass recently discovered a security vulnerability that may have exposed customer records.
[15:39.670 --> 15:39.970]  All right.
[15:41.730 --> 15:45.390]  Rarely does a non-Trump person say a sentence that I have so much trouble with.
[15:45.910 --> 15:47.950]  But okay, MoviePass, yeah, you got your name right.
[15:48.070 --> 15:49.410]  But you didn't discover anything.
[15:50.170 --> 15:51.130]  Security vulnerability.
[15:51.550 --> 15:52.810]  All right, that's probably true.
[15:52.970 --> 15:54.670]  But may have exposed customer records.
[15:54.750 --> 15:56.290]  No, it did expose customer records.
[15:56.670 --> 15:57.610]  The proof is right here.
[15:58.590 --> 15:59.330]  Let's continue.
[15:59.430 --> 16:07.710]  After discovering the vulnerability, we immediately secured our systems to prevent further exposure and to mitigate the potential impact of this incident.
[16:08.290 --> 16:09.450]  MoviePass takes this incident.
[16:09.450 --> 16:14.950]  We are working diligently.
[16:16.430 --> 16:19.010]  The only time you hear the word diligently is when something like this happens.
[16:19.370 --> 16:25.330]  To investigate the scope of this incident and its potential impact on our profit margin.
[16:25.870 --> 16:26.950]  No, no, on our customers.
[16:27.450 --> 16:28.230]  But come on.
[16:28.370 --> 16:32.570]  Once we gain a full understanding of the incident, i.e.
[16:32.650 --> 16:39.030]  never, we will promptly notify any affected subscribers and the appropriate regulators or law enforcement.
[16:39.330 --> 16:39.870]  Wow.
[16:40.190 --> 16:41.930]  We want to bet the security researcher gets in trouble.
[16:42.250 --> 16:44.690]  Because that's what happens in the hacker world.
[16:44.910 --> 16:46.590]  You know, he discovered this.
[16:46.810 --> 16:52.790]  He discovered that security vulnerability in one of the company's many subdomains.
[16:53.310 --> 16:54.810]  Any one of you can do the same thing?
[16:54.810 --> 16:58.850]  You know, you should always be exploring these systems, looking for vulnerabilities.
[16:59.130 --> 17:04.410]  And I think people should make it known when they find something.
[17:04.510 --> 17:05.590]  Make it known to the company, certainly.
[17:05.750 --> 17:09.130]  Make it known also if there's poor security choices.
[17:09.130 --> 17:11.290]  If people's private information is being exposed.
[17:11.510 --> 17:12.690]  They deserve to know that.
[17:12.750 --> 17:14.010]  The world deserves to know that.
[17:14.450 --> 17:19.730]  We need to expose companies, organizations that don't take security seriously.
[17:19.730 --> 17:24.390]  That use your information and don't safeguard it.
[17:24.390 --> 17:25.970]  They need to be exposed.
[17:26.290 --> 17:30.190]  And too often, we're afraid to share that information.
[17:30.390 --> 17:32.810]  Well, there's people that will listen.
[17:33.030 --> 17:33.990]  We will certainly listen.
[17:34.370 --> 17:37.950]  A lot of these organizations that we're reading stories from, they will listen.
[17:38.670 --> 17:44.310]  It's important to keep exploring, to keep exposing this information and sharing it when you find it.
[17:44.310 --> 17:45.190]  Yeah.
[17:45.310 --> 18:01.790]  And that helps with people, ultimately, in their own personal security, because their understanding and the tips and news regarding some of this stuff, it just helps build a stronger sense of where technology can go wrong in society.
[18:01.790 --> 18:17.190]  And it becomes a common part of discourse instead of something that's relegated to only researchers that might think or imagine something as having those kinds of problems and so forth.
[18:17.330 --> 18:18.010]  So, yeah, I don't know.
[18:18.310 --> 18:18.910]  Yeah.
[18:19.050 --> 18:25.710]  And it's pretty amazing that in cases like this, it's not anyone really cracking their way into something.
[18:25.710 --> 18:36.450]  It's the company left something very private out on the open web, basically, a working database that they managed to get a new email address into just by fiddling with it, like described in the article.
[18:36.450 --> 18:38.610]  And it was out there on the open net.
[18:38.810 --> 18:45.530]  And who knows who had eyes on this before this researcher came up and made a public issue of it.
[18:45.690 --> 18:48.510]  And, you know, this sort of thing goes on all the time.
[18:48.770 --> 18:58.170]  And companies really don't seem to suffer any ill effects from leaving their customers vulnerable to having their info just leaked out there like this.
[18:58.170 --> 18:59.690]  You know, it just, it happens.
[18:59.870 --> 19:07.990]  But if a person were to go and get this info, they would be such a criminal and be just, you know, have the whole armada sent after them.
[19:08.470 --> 19:09.270]  I don't know.
[19:09.430 --> 19:11.450]  Plus, MoviePass is kind of a hot mess of a company anyway.
[19:11.610 --> 19:15.310]  I mean, they still haven't figured out how to get a sustainable business model together.
[19:15.450 --> 19:17.590]  Is that the same one that was having a little trouble last year?
[19:17.650 --> 19:17.950]  It is.
[19:18.070 --> 19:18.290]  Yeah.
[19:18.410 --> 19:19.510]  I didn't think they were still around.
[19:19.690 --> 19:20.310]  Yeah, they couldn't.
[19:20.430 --> 19:24.390]  They stopped doing a certain amount of movies per month because it just did not work on paper.
[19:24.610 --> 19:25.550]  And yeah, it's the same.
[19:27.090 --> 19:27.450]  Wow.
[19:27.450 --> 19:27.810]  Okay.
[19:27.810 --> 19:29.810]  The other thing is they're, you know, trying to work on that.
[19:29.970 --> 19:32.430]  And the security ends up being like kind of an afterthought.
[19:32.690 --> 19:51.170]  And I think it's really hard when companies are designing their systems that they're, you know, able to both have a production system that they're relying on all the time and also, you know, adjust it and add security as needed without breaking it in the process.
[19:51.170 --> 20:01.050]  I mean, that can also hamper development of whatever product you should be focused on while you're trying to create this kind of network that's going to protect all of that hard work.
[20:01.050 --> 20:17.830]  So it's a careful balance and it's a matter of building that kind of expertise into what you're planning on doing and if it isn't there, consciously making time and putting forth effort to adjust it without totally breaking all of the, you know, day-to-day that's going to keep you alive.
[20:18.190 --> 20:24.110]  Well, I think, Rob, you raised a very good point in saying that who knows how many other people had access to this beforehand.
[20:24.170 --> 20:25.010]  You don't know.
[20:25.170 --> 20:27.570]  And that's why it's so important to expose it when you find something.
[20:27.690 --> 20:32.410]  That's why it's important for us to be looking for these things actively.
[20:32.950 --> 20:41.030]  Just because you're not a, quote-unquote, security researcher does not mean you can't search for security vulnerabilities and let people know when you find them.
[20:41.230 --> 20:53.970]  Because there are all kinds of criminals out there, and yes, they're criminals, not hackers, criminals, that go steal things, use people's identity for fraudulent purposes, and all sorts of other things like that.
[20:53.990 --> 20:55.090]  They're not going to tell anybody.
[20:55.090 --> 21:05.430]  They're going to keep doing this, and if the vulnerability is there for 10 years, they will do it for 10 years until somebody comes along and says, hey, it left the front door wide open, and you better fix that.
[21:05.670 --> 21:12.810]  Yeah, I mean, it's kind of rule one in the security field that if you find a vulnerability, you never assume that you're the first one to find it.
[21:12.950 --> 21:14.690]  You're just the most recent one to find it.
[21:14.850 --> 21:20.390]  And, you know, assume that people have been taking advantage of it for long before you got there because it's very possible.
[21:20.790 --> 21:23.310]  Yeah, and that you're under attack all the time.
[21:23.310 --> 21:33.210]  I mean, there are interested and curious people out there, and so it is incumbent on you to take as much interest in your own stuff, especially if you're relying on it for a business or whatever.
[21:33.310 --> 21:39.670]  It's so much fun to turn on a system for the first time, connect it to the net, and see how long it takes for somebody to try to log in.
[21:39.790 --> 21:45.790]  It's usually within a few minutes, and it's usually from some other part of the world, far away, but somebody is trying something.
[21:45.790 --> 21:47.170]  I don't think it's a person.
[21:47.310 --> 21:52.670]  It's probably some kind of a script, but it's incredible how many attacks are going on out there.
[21:53.090 --> 21:55.650]  So it's vital to spread the information.
[21:55.790 --> 22:04.510]  I understand people are afraid to do this because every place from schools to businesses to governments, if you reveal a problem, you become the problem.
[22:04.990 --> 22:14.210]  That happens a lot, and people are needlessly punished, and the folks that actually have the knowledge are the ones that pay the penalty.
[22:14.830 --> 22:24.650]  So, you know, we have our SecureDrop address, 2600.com slash SecureDrop gives you all the information on how to securely submit something to us.
[22:24.770 --> 22:29.050]  We've had so many interesting things over the year or so that we've had this up.
[22:30.150 --> 22:38.770]  We've gotten all kinds of information, and we're able to talk to the people that send us the information without knowing who they are, and oftentimes we can do something with it.
[22:38.910 --> 22:50.930]  So we're not the only people that have this valuable way of leaking information or whistleblowing or what have you, just sending something that you're not comfortable being associated with.
[22:51.250 --> 22:56.490]  There are many news organizations that use this, and in this day and age, it's a vital tool.
[22:56.490 --> 23:04.970]  So 2600.com slash SecureDrop for information on that, and go to SecureDrop.org for information on the system in general.
[23:05.330 --> 23:07.110]  You spent a lot of time working on this, Kyle.
[23:07.850 --> 23:20.450]  Yeah, and just all the other projects and great work, the Freedom of the Press Foundation and other organizations like that, EFF, of course, also working on those things, Mozilla and so on.
[23:20.570 --> 23:34.730]  But yeah, it's incredible to be able to use this, and it's a great, great way to send us tips without, you know, necessarily giving us, like, you know, your whole backstory or anything really about you.
[23:34.810 --> 23:52.350]  That's less important than the story or the vulnerability, and it's, of course, just augments all the other ways you can submit articles, of course, the magazine, or, of course, find our PGP keys online and the myriad addresses that you can reach us.
[23:52.350 --> 24:01.070]  It's all about creating a way for you to express yourself and for us to share this kind of really crucial technological information.
[24:01.290 --> 24:05.310]  You use the Tor browser to send us stories.
[24:05.750 --> 24:20.010]  Now, the difference between sending an article, if you were, say, in Exxon or something, and you decide to send us an article using our articles at 2620.com email address, that's all fine and good, but now there's a record of you sending an email.
[24:20.010 --> 24:27.710]  Maybe they can't see what the email is, although in big corporations, oftentimes they do look at what you are actually writing in the email.
[24:27.910 --> 24:33.890]  So, okay, maybe you use PGP and you encrypt it, but if you do that, there's still a record that you sent email to that particular address.
[24:33.890 --> 24:35.690]  This goes for anything you send email to.
[24:36.110 --> 24:46.230]  With the Tor browser, not so easy to find out who you're communicating with, and that's the only way to connect to that SecureDrop address and start that process going.
[24:46.610 --> 24:48.650]  It really gives you a strong advantage.
[24:48.850 --> 25:04.050]  I mean, as with anything else, you'd want to take necessary things like, you know, don't advertise that you're doing this, don't tell a lot of people about these things, of course, take all of those sort of obvious steps you might do to be reasonably secure around doing something like that.
[25:04.050 --> 25:05.790]  But it is, it's really far and away.
[25:05.790 --> 25:10.650]  It gives you a large advantage over methods like you mentioned.
[25:10.790 --> 25:16.970]  In some places, people get punished for just installing the Tor browser.
[25:17.090 --> 25:20.750]  In some schools, some workplaces, that's considered suspicious right there.
[25:20.950 --> 25:25.350]  So, there's always something that will make you appear suspicious.
[25:25.350 --> 25:26.590]  Usually, it's just being intelligent.
[25:27.410 --> 25:36.550]  Yeah, it's like when BitTorrent became a big thing and people were getting punished just for having any sort of BitTorrent traffic whatsoever on their networks at work or school or whatever.
[25:36.790 --> 25:48.270]  But things like, you know, Linux distributions and things like that would often use BitTorrent as a more efficient way to distribute their perfectly, legitimately distributable files.
[25:48.550 --> 25:51.350]  And then other products started using the protocol.
[25:51.550 --> 25:55.170]  I think the Warcraft game used BitTorrent behind the scenes in some capacity.
[25:55.310 --> 25:56.690]  Don't we distribute our show on BitTorrent?
[25:56.930 --> 25:58.490]  Yeah, we've got that.
[25:58.650 --> 26:01.750]  And so, like, it's not the tech that's good or bad.
[26:01.750 --> 26:04.970]  It's the tech that's doing whatever the people behind it set it up to do.
[26:05.630 --> 26:06.030]  Exactly.
[26:06.210 --> 26:08.330]  Just like any technology can be used for good or for bad.
[26:08.330 --> 26:09.910]  It's up to us to decide which.
[26:10.230 --> 26:13.070]  And it's up to us not to blindly follow just because it's cool.
[26:13.210 --> 26:16.990]  We always have to have a critical eye towards these things and figure out ways to break them.
[26:17.310 --> 26:18.130]  That's what we're good at.
[26:18.430 --> 26:20.730]  Here's an interesting story about T-Mobile.
[26:20.730 --> 26:27.630]  Yeah, Ruth Johnson didn't know exactly who rang her phone and threatened her around 20 times in 2014.
[26:28.030 --> 26:31.050]  The person on the other end said he was John Edens from the U.S.
[26:31.210 --> 26:33.930]  Marshals with a warrant for her arrest for stealing a car.
[26:34.370 --> 26:36.250]  She was behind on her payments.
[26:36.650 --> 26:40.990]  Later turned out that this John Edens person didn't have a warrant, nor was he from law enforcement at all.
[26:41.110 --> 26:48.410]  Instead, he was a debt collector with a history of stalking and domestic violence who had managed to get a hold of Johnson's phone location data.
[26:48.410 --> 26:50.790]  He did this by pretending to be a U.S.
[26:50.930 --> 26:55.010]  Marshal with the Georgia Fugitive Task Force to T-Mobile.
[26:55.270 --> 26:59.650]  Yeah, he was able to social engineer T-Mobile, but he wasn't a hacker.
[26:59.830 --> 27:00.470]  He was a criminal.
[27:01.510 --> 27:04.370]  T-Mobile, they're definitely not hackers.
[27:04.670 --> 27:12.850]  They then provided Edens with the location of Johnson's phone in a handy Google Maps interface, pinging the phone in industry parlance.
[27:13.030 --> 27:14.750]  This story comes from Motherboard.
[27:14.930 --> 27:15.730]  It's really fascinating.
[27:15.730 --> 27:20.890]  And fearful is the word Johnson first used to explain the episode in the phone call with Motherboard.
[27:20.990 --> 27:22.070]  It was very fearful.
[27:22.870 --> 27:27.910]  Motherboard previously reported on Edens' case using court documents and sources in the bounty hunting industry.
[27:28.430 --> 27:31.330]  Edens was sentenced to one year in prison for impersonating a U.S.
[27:31.430 --> 27:31.690]  officer.
[27:31.850 --> 27:35.510]  And now Johnson explained in an interview what it was like to have her phone tracked.
[27:35.990 --> 27:41.730]  Her story demonstrates the very real human impact that the black market use and sale of phone location data can have.
[27:41.730 --> 27:48.930]  I was very upset with the phone company because I was under the impression that you had to get a court order in order to get information such as that out.
[27:49.630 --> 27:52.450]  And T-Mobile basically put my life in danger.
[27:52.770 --> 27:54.230]  The harassment was relentless.
[27:54.470 --> 27:57.090]  Edens turned up at Johnson's place of work.
[27:57.270 --> 28:00.970]  Someone banged on her home's door at 3 a.m.
[28:02.470 --> 28:04.590]  Edens turned up on her porch another day.
[28:05.050 --> 28:07.650]  Johnson said her husband had been recently killed.
[28:07.650 --> 28:10.490]  And Johnson didn't know if the harasser was somehow connected to his murder.
[28:10.810 --> 28:12.390]  Yeah, compounding her fear.
[28:12.530 --> 28:16.430]  Her teenage daughter moved 10 hours away to be with her grandmother just to feel safe.
[28:16.750 --> 28:18.630]  She says, you cost me my family.
[28:18.750 --> 28:19.710]  She says that to T-Mobile.
[28:20.610 --> 28:32.770]  Now, asked to respond to Johnson's case, a T-Mobile spokesperson said to Motherboard, T-Mobile has a specialized legal team that reviews each emergency request from law enforcement for customer information.
[28:33.210 --> 28:36.170]  In rare cases, we receive unlawful requests.
[28:36.170 --> 28:40.390]  When this happens, we immediately investigate and introduce additional safeguards where needed.
[28:40.730 --> 28:48.890]  We also always cooperate with legitimate law enforcement inquiries, and sometimes illegitimate ones, and investigations into these cases of fraud.
[28:49.050 --> 28:54.070]  We are completely open about our work in this area in our yearly transparency report.
[28:54.190 --> 28:56.190]  Well, that ought to be a good one when it comes out at the end of the year.
[28:56.730 --> 29:03.150]  But yeah, not only you're dialing information, how you talk to, your location, where you are right now.
[29:03.690 --> 29:07.730]  The wrong person getting their hands on that, even the right person getting their hands on that.
[29:07.730 --> 29:08.510]  It's scary.
[29:08.710 --> 29:09.630]  It really is scary.
[29:10.150 --> 29:13.430]  And it's information about all of us that we willingly put out there.
[29:13.570 --> 29:14.290]  And there are safeguards.
[29:14.570 --> 29:16.050]  You can turn your phone off, you know.
[29:16.230 --> 29:16.990]  There is an off switch.
[29:17.850 --> 29:22.730]  Yeah, but this is also an example of, again, a very, very, very old technique.
[29:22.970 --> 29:24.570]  Social engineering is nothing new.
[29:24.790 --> 29:30.530]  Social engineering is stuff that companies, especially, you know, phone companies, have been dealing with for decades and decades.
[29:30.830 --> 29:34.950]  It's something that I know a couple of guys who present a panel on that every couple of years at Hope.
[29:35.490 --> 29:39.230]  And, you know, the techniques do not get more complicated.
[29:39.290 --> 29:43.870]  They just involve lying to people and having them give you what you want.
[29:44.230 --> 29:51.350]  It also speaks to, you know, the idea of having privacy at all and the importance of it.
[29:51.570 --> 30:00.130]  And that, you know, surveillance itself can then be flipped around as, and wielded as something that, you know, does matter.
[30:00.290 --> 30:13.770]  And you hear a lot, very often, people saying, well, I don't care, you know, I don't care if the government has these mechanisms or does this surveillance or, you know, has an arrangement through the phone company or something because it doesn't affect me or I'm not doing anything wrong.
[30:13.910 --> 30:17.210]  Well, what if someone else is doing something wrong and they abuse that system?
[30:17.210 --> 30:21.370]  All of a sudden, your sense of privacy is really just that.
[30:21.370 --> 30:23.410]  It's only a mere sense of that.
[30:23.950 --> 30:24.070]  Yeah.
[30:24.210 --> 30:28.690]  And as just mentioned, if a tool exists, the tool is not good or bad.
[30:28.790 --> 30:30.210]  The people using it are good or bad.
[30:30.310 --> 30:32.370]  And we're doing things that are good or bad.
[30:32.570 --> 30:40.850]  And the thing with something like this is if, like we talked about this years ago with the Apple iPhone thing, where the government was demanding a backdoor into the Apple software.
[30:41.310 --> 30:47.530]  And if such a backdoor exists, there's no guarantee that only the quote unquote good guys are going to be the ones using it.
[30:47.710 --> 30:49.990]  We can see plainly that that is not the case.
[30:50.390 --> 30:55.350]  And oftentimes you won't even find out about it until somebody does something so egregious that they're caught.
[30:55.690 --> 30:57.050]  But it can go on for years.
[30:57.230 --> 31:00.230]  You can have these systems abused for a long, long time.
[31:00.410 --> 31:06.850]  Wasn't Pompeo talking recently about how he wanted backdoors and things or that he wanted to reopen that issue?
[31:06.970 --> 31:08.090]  That was, I think, last week.
[31:08.370 --> 31:12.810]  I don't think we have a story about it, but obviously the conversation has come around to that.
[31:12.970 --> 31:14.030]  And so, yes, our...
[31:14.030 --> 31:15.930]  Well, we do have a story.
[31:16.090 --> 31:20.230]  We do have a story about the Manhattan DA looking at innocent people's Google phone data.
[31:20.410 --> 31:21.510]  That's close enough.
[31:21.950 --> 31:32.650]  Law enforcement authorities in New York are joining a nationwide trend to push Google to share phone data on anyone using its location tracking services near the time and scene of a crime.
[31:32.650 --> 31:33.950]  This story comes from Gothamist.
[31:34.090 --> 31:47.790]  The technique uses a type of search warrant known as a reverse location or geofence warrant, which gives authorities location information on Google users who have Android phones or use apps such as Google Maps.
[31:48.590 --> 31:48.910]  Yeah.
[31:49.110 --> 31:50.710]  You notice it's not saying people.
[31:50.890 --> 31:51.830]  It's saying Google users.
[31:52.090 --> 31:57.730]  I mean, obviously they're people, but you have to be a Google user to be victimized like this.
[31:57.910 --> 32:05.150]  Now, from this bucket of data, law enforcement then tries to figure out which phones may be tied to suspects or possible witnesses.
[32:05.450 --> 32:09.970]  The use of this surveillance technique has not been confirmed in New York City until now.
[32:10.430 --> 32:18.690]  An investigator for the Manhattan DA revealed it during testimony last week in a case involving a politically charged assault from last year.
[32:18.890 --> 32:19.930]  You might remember this.
[32:20.090 --> 32:25.130]  Defendants are members of the Proud Boys, a group of pro-Trump right-wing extremists.
[32:25.270 --> 32:36.350]  I'm going to use a few more adjectives, but whatever, who allegedly beat up for leftist protesters believed to be associated with Antifa outside an Upper East Side event last October.
[32:36.530 --> 32:40.550]  The four protesters refused to cooperate with police and authorities were unable to identify them.
[32:41.250 --> 32:46.290]  As part of their attempt, prosecutors sent Google a warrant for phone records near the conflict.
[32:46.910 --> 32:48.710]  That's according to the New York Times.
[32:48.870 --> 32:54.490]  Now, in further testimony, the investigator confirmed that the warrant was a reverse location search warrant.
[32:54.590 --> 32:56.850]  That's according to a transcript provided to WNYC.
[32:56.930 --> 32:58.250]  Everyone's getting involved in this story here.
[32:58.250 --> 33:10.070]  The court records show that this dragnet data request captured the location data of multiple people who were put under law enforcement scrutiny, even though they had nothing to do with the crimes under investigation.
[33:10.450 --> 33:21.350]  According to the investigator's testimony, authorities were looking for location records from, quote, Google's Android platform and Google-based apps, such as Google Maps, that utilize location services.
[33:21.850 --> 33:31.550]  The warrant requested records from multiple sites, including where the conflict broke out on 82nd Street and other locations where participants in the clash may have been that evening.
[33:31.770 --> 33:37.230]  The tech company forwarded an anonymized list of Google device IDs based on their request.
[33:37.370 --> 33:46.070]  Investigators then cross-referenced spreadsheets of Google users at various locations, attempting to find multiple appearances of those same anonymous numbers.
[33:46.670 --> 33:47.810]  Anonymous numbers.
[33:48.190 --> 33:53.330]  Authorities said they eventually learned enough about several of the accounts to determine the individuals were innocent.
[33:54.070 --> 34:01.010]  But wow, they had to go through and survey them and figure all that out without them even knowing.
[34:01.230 --> 34:06.270]  We received approximately two or three records back from them that met our specific search criteria.
[34:06.870 --> 34:16.710]  Said an investigator, through follow-up investigation, we were able to determine that we did not believe that the individuals who were the account holders here were involved in this incident in any way.
[34:17.170 --> 34:20.650]  And the Manhattan DA's office declined to comment on how the data was used.
[34:20.650 --> 34:33.650]  In Minnesota, though, police have said that after selecting anonymous users of interest from Google's bulk records, they then get another warrant to make the company hand over the name of the cell phone user.
[34:34.110 --> 34:39.390]  Now, Google has declined to comment on the case or how it responds to such law enforcement requests.
[34:39.630 --> 34:50.750]  In an email, Apple told WNYC that it does not track the geolocation of devices and thus does not have the ability to identify all Apple devices near a given location and time.
[35:02.890 --> 35:04.510]  So I guess issue with one bit of that.
[35:04.730 --> 35:07.670]  If you're using a landline, they've pretty much got a good idea where you are.
[35:07.770 --> 35:09.150]  Yeah, that's very true.
[35:09.390 --> 35:09.970]  That's very true.
[35:10.050 --> 35:10.570]  Yeah, that's the point.
[35:10.670 --> 35:11.370]  But it's distinct.
[35:11.510 --> 35:12.690]  It's not the exact same thing.
[35:12.790 --> 35:14.010]  It's not the exact location.
[35:14.170 --> 35:19.770]  Well, it's the exact location, but it's not the exact location as it changes as you're mobile, right?
[35:19.890 --> 35:35.150]  It's like you're there, but you don't necessarily... I mean, it's always known that that's where that phone is, but you aren't necessarily Yeah, Apple just negated everything positive I just said about them, because the story just popped up online from The Verge.
[35:35.590 --> 35:36.710]  I'm just going to read you the headline.
[35:36.870 --> 35:40.930]  Apple warns you may permanently discolor your Apple card if it's stored in leather.
[35:43.710 --> 35:46.410]  That's... I mean, why is that even a news story?
[35:47.810 --> 35:51.390]  This is the... it's a metal card made out of titanium, I think.
[35:51.450 --> 35:51.630]  Okay, fine.
[35:51.670 --> 35:53.370]  So get another card if you discolor your card.
[35:53.370 --> 35:56.910]  They're treating it like it's some kind of thing that... it's like a car or something.
[35:57.450 --> 36:00.930]  They're warning you, you might discolor your... who cares?
[36:01.230 --> 36:02.990]  Who cares about discoloring a damn card?
[36:03.010 --> 36:04.150]  Where are you supposed to keep it?
[36:04.330 --> 36:05.190]  I don't know.
[36:05.450 --> 36:21.590]  Well, the whole Apple aesthetic is like shiny white things and shiny silver things, and everything's all bright and shiny, and you're the fool who has to go and use the thing that you have from them, therefore discoloring it and getting your fingerprints all over it and just being all grubby.
[36:21.690 --> 36:23.250]  And that's your problem as an Apple customer.
[36:23.370 --> 36:29.430]  You know, I would think... if I don't like the way my American Express card looks, I can call them and they'll send me another one.
[36:29.590 --> 36:38.030]  If Apple gives you attitude and tries to blame you, you know, with one of their geniuses or whatever, saying you didn't use the card properly, yeah, I'm moving back towards Google now.
[36:38.150 --> 36:41.830]  It's a ping pong game here on what company annoys me the most.
[36:42.750 --> 36:46.310]  That's the kind of headline that I get from Apple all the time, you know?
[36:47.090 --> 36:47.730]  So annoying.
[36:47.870 --> 36:49.810]  It's probably really important to some people, though.
[36:49.950 --> 36:50.610]  I know it is.
[36:50.610 --> 36:52.130]  That is probably earth-shattering news.
[36:52.330 --> 36:53.670]  Like, they're just losing it.
[36:54.510 --> 36:55.950]  And you had to rub it in.
[36:56.130 --> 36:56.490]  Wow.
[36:56.490 --> 36:57.490]  We did, collectively.
[36:57.750 --> 36:58.470]  How about the leather?
[36:58.690 --> 37:00.550]  Who takes care of the leather, you know?
[37:00.790 --> 37:01.150]  Well, yeah.
[37:01.670 --> 37:03.390]  Maybe it doesn't react well to the Apple card.
[37:03.470 --> 37:04.030]  You ever think of that?
[37:04.270 --> 37:04.630]  Mm-hmm.
[37:05.070 --> 37:05.350]  All right.
[37:05.410 --> 37:08.990]  Hey, we're going to take phone calls, 212-209-2877.
[37:08.990 --> 37:15.090]  I'd like to read a listener letter, because listeners do write to us.
[37:15.210 --> 37:16.310]  And you can do that, too.
[37:16.410 --> 37:19.170]  You can join the few people who write these days.
[37:19.350 --> 37:21.470]  O-T-H at 2600.com.
[37:21.590 --> 37:22.590]  That's our email address.
[37:23.130 --> 37:25.030]  Yeah, the few people who use email these days.
[37:25.190 --> 37:26.070]  It's crazy.
[37:26.250 --> 37:28.490]  People communicate in bizarre ways.
[37:28.710 --> 37:31.310]  And email is such an easy way to do it.
[37:31.330 --> 37:32.870]  And so many people don't use it anymore.
[37:32.970 --> 37:34.750]  Yeah, they don't even use the alphabet anymore, really, right?
[37:34.750 --> 37:35.910]  I don't know how to communicate.
[37:36.190 --> 37:36.890]  I really don't.
[37:36.970 --> 37:38.330]  It's all emoji.
[37:38.630 --> 37:39.430]  I think that's...
[37:39.430 --> 37:43.130]  Well, hopefully, you can call a phone, 212-209-2877.
[37:43.450 --> 37:46.930]  Anyway, dear Emanuel, Kyle, interested telecom historians.
[37:47.170 --> 37:49.550]  My first time writing, so I apologize for the length.
[37:49.750 --> 37:51.390]  Oh, please, don't apologize for the length.
[37:51.410 --> 37:53.590]  It's great to see long letters occasionally.
[37:53.870 --> 38:00.670]  I was driving through Leslie, Georgia, on my way back to my hotel, and I saw a sign for the Georgia Rural Telephone Museum.
[38:01.430 --> 38:02.470]  I didn't know about this.
[38:02.470 --> 38:04.890]  I felt I should stop, as I find your shows interesting.
[38:05.210 --> 38:07.510]  And I'm glad that's a reason to stop at a phone museum.
[38:07.710 --> 38:08.690]  It was 4 p.m.
[38:08.690 --> 38:11.410]  The museum closed at 5 p.m., so I only had an hour to explore.
[38:12.590 --> 38:14.450]  I'm a listener to both Off the Hook and Off the Wall.
[38:14.570 --> 38:21.030]  Discovered your show quite some time back on the iTunes podcast list, back around the Kevin Mitnick arrest and the horrors of Bernie S.
[38:21.190 --> 38:21.690]  in prison.
[38:22.090 --> 38:29.750]  I've seen an issue of 2600 Magazine on a newsstand in North Carolina and was tangentially familiar with you from that.
[38:30.150 --> 38:36.010]  And from the first show of Off the Hook, I've listened to your coverage of tech and hacking news avidly and anticipate your next episode.
[38:36.510 --> 38:44.010]  Off the Wall fascinates me with Emmanuel's adventures abroad, the traveling by shipping containers, ship, and visiting Cuba and North Korea were beyond belief.
[38:44.410 --> 38:47.090]  I look forward to more forthcoming.
[38:47.210 --> 38:53.090]  I also enjoy hearing Emmanuel and Kyle sharing their opinions of the current state of the world, which we've been known to do for many, many hours.
[38:53.630 --> 38:54.970]  Anyway, back to my purpose for writing.
[38:54.970 --> 39:00.530]  I was awestruck by the number of old handsets at the Georgia Rural Telephone Museum.
[39:01.090 --> 39:05.410]  And then I walked into the next section, which had old operator stations and more handsets.
[39:05.570 --> 39:11.510]  Then I passed by the first solar panel installed on a telephone system, still mounted to the top of a pole within the museum.
[39:11.710 --> 39:14.450]  The next section showed a small switching group.
[39:14.630 --> 39:18.010]  Everywhere I turned, I saw a different handset or candlestick phone.
[39:18.490 --> 39:26.150]  They have displays of how wiring on poles has changed through the years with the tops of poles strung with the different types of wiring used.
[39:26.250 --> 39:27.990]  That's fascinating alone right there.
[39:28.730 --> 39:30.190]  I believe that's called open wire.
[39:30.590 --> 39:31.510]  That's called open wire.
[39:31.630 --> 39:31.790]  Yes.
[39:31.790 --> 39:35.070]  I think we're having a conversation about that on a train in Europe with some people.
[39:35.210 --> 39:36.270]  I don't know why.
[39:36.390 --> 39:37.530]  Or maybe that was in the States.
[39:37.790 --> 39:37.990]  Yes.
[39:38.130 --> 39:41.490]  And they eventually multiplexed it so they could fit a lot of calls on it.
[39:41.590 --> 39:41.810]  Uh-huh.
[39:41.910 --> 39:43.010]  It's very fascinating.
[39:43.230 --> 39:46.830]  I'd be shocked if you or one of your listeners hasn't brought this place to your attention.
[39:46.830 --> 39:49.210]  Well, be shocked because this is the first I'm hearing of it.
[39:49.670 --> 39:51.770]  I know some of you have a true love for this equipment.
[39:51.890 --> 39:55.350]  I took over 100 photos on, of all things, an iPhone.
[39:57.110 --> 39:59.330]  So many of historical precursors.
[39:59.390 --> 40:01.790]  I'd like to share them with you if you haven't had a chance to visit it.
[40:02.630 --> 40:05.410]  I know these won't be the best quality.
[40:05.710 --> 40:06.590]  Love to see them, though.
[40:06.690 --> 40:08.710]  Send them to othat2600.com.
[40:09.370 --> 40:12.270]  I'd expect some harsh yet helpful criticisms from Kyle.
[40:12.470 --> 40:13.970]  Well, you're a photographer, Kyle, so...
[40:13.970 --> 40:14.930]  Oh, over the photography.
[40:14.930 --> 40:16.490]  Well, I'll do my best.
[40:17.690 --> 40:19.510]  So, yeah, definitely send us those photos.
[40:19.510 --> 40:20.810]  Unless they were contained in this email.
[40:20.990 --> 40:23.470]  You know, I have a printout here, so I don't know if photos were attached.
[40:23.610 --> 40:25.650]  If they were attached, then our apologies.
[40:25.890 --> 40:27.870]  Send them again or we'll track them down.
[40:30.390 --> 40:37.970]  Anyway, he talked to one of the employees, spent the last 15 minutes or so showing the full extent of the collection, turned on a couple of switchboards.
[40:37.970 --> 40:41.890]  He assured me the second telephone created in the collection was genuine.
[40:43.110 --> 40:43.830]  We chatted.
[40:43.970 --> 40:45.850]  I explained my fascination was due to your show.
[40:45.990 --> 40:48.950]  I intend to pass along your website and podcast info on my return.
[40:49.530 --> 40:51.070]  And hopefully that won't shock them too much.
[40:51.370 --> 40:56.150]  He told me I shouldn't pay for a second admission, but it won't bother me one bit to pay again to see this place continue.
[40:56.350 --> 40:57.230]  And that's the spirit.
[40:57.890 --> 41:00.430]  Their website should not be a reflection of the quality of the museum.
[41:00.790 --> 41:01.910]  I'm familiar with that.
[41:01.910 --> 41:10.510]  Uh, grtm.org, grtm, georgiaruraltelephonemuseum.org.
[41:10.670 --> 41:13.830]  Their Facebook page is a bit better, but still not a proper reflection.
[41:14.130 --> 41:20.470]  Uh, that's because, you know, they put all their energy into the collection, just like we put all our energy into the magazine.
[41:20.470 --> 41:24.570]  So our website sometimes has things to be desired.
[41:24.910 --> 41:34.590]  Uh, they have some equipment that was working in the past, but need some parts and a good bit of love and care, uh, to get functioning again, which I'm sure some of the guests you've had on might be able to provide.
[41:34.690 --> 41:39.810]  And when I get back to North Carolina, I'll scan their brochure, which is much better than a website and send it to you.
[41:40.170 --> 41:45.010]  Um, and I hope if you have the opportunity to travel to Southwest Georgia, that you will visit this unexpected pearl.
[41:45.450 --> 41:49.750]  I'm sure if you visited or do visit, that it'll be a story to share with your fans.
[41:50.050 --> 41:53.330]  Thank you, Wayne, for that amazing letter and for that experience.
[41:53.330 --> 41:57.130]  And I hope that turns people on to go to Southwest Georgia and visit this museum.
[41:57.470 --> 42:07.050]  Um, yeah, I just want to add, if you're at all interested in learning about, uh, telecommunications, um, oftentimes these places are looking for volunteers and will allow you to help out.
[42:07.170 --> 42:10.370]  It's a great way to meet other people that are also interested in this stuff.
[42:10.550 --> 42:12.550]  It's a great, great way to learn about some of the systems.
[42:12.950 --> 42:29.270]  Very often the, um, curators of these types of spaces are, um, members of the telephone pioneers of America, or they're, um, uh, retired or otherwise affiliated with, um, one or the other local or national or, um, other telephone companies in, in the vicinity.
[42:29.270 --> 42:43.010]  And they may have, um, a lot of advice for you on, on perhaps a career path, if that's your interest or just other, uh, general, uh, sort of associated, uh, hobbies and arts, often, uh, radio and, and other things too.
[42:43.170 --> 42:49.870]  So it's, it's really a cool way to get involved and to learn about the older telecommunication systems.
[42:49.870 --> 42:55.490]  And, and I find at least for me personally, that is very instructive about imagining what's going on.
[42:55.650 --> 43:07.590]  I know I've said this a lot of times, but imagining what's going on in software, imagining what's going on in central offices and data centers and places that you, you really can't get into and, and look under the hood that often.
[43:08.130 --> 43:21.170]  Um, uh, but, uh, if you get a sense of it and you, you talk to enough people, you can start to, um, start to imagine like the inner workings of how all of that works and, and why it has progressed and evolved in the way it has, from those older systems.
[43:21.430 --> 43:22.130]  Yeah, absolutely.
[43:22.370 --> 43:27.510]  It's, it's the best way, uh, to get your, your actual hands on the old technology.
[43:27.630 --> 43:28.350]  It's so fascinating.
[43:28.610 --> 43:40.890]  Uh, we've experienced that at the, um, uh, the maker fairs when, when they were occurring here in New York, having kids come up to the phone van and, and play with the rotary dial phones, figure out how to use them, go to the phone booth and see what a 1950s phone booth is like.
[43:41.170 --> 43:42.650]  There was such fascination with that.
[43:42.730 --> 43:54.290]  It's so important to preserve the technology, whether it's old computers, old telephones, and learn from it because very often you can design something better by looking at the old technology, seeing how it works, seeing how it all came together, and,
[43:54.310 --> 43:56.330]  uh, just letting your imagination go wild.
[43:56.950 --> 44:05.950]  Yeah, and I, I know as, uh, as I was learning about the old analog phone system as a 90s phone freak, it, it was very intertwined with my learning about computer science itself.
[44:06.110 --> 44:11.290]  I mean, the analog phone system was basically the biggest computer in the world, and everyone had a terminal, and it was glorious.
[44:11.550 --> 44:12.430]  It was, yes.
[44:12.770 --> 44:18.450]  So, uh, yes, definitely visit that, uh, that phone museum, and if you have another one, uh, that you know of, let us know about that.
[44:18.570 --> 44:19.630]  We're going to take some phone calls.
[44:19.750 --> 44:21.250]  212-209-2877.
[44:21.590 --> 44:21.790]  Good evening.
[44:21.950 --> 44:22.690]  You're on off the hook.
[44:24.030 --> 44:24.670]  Speak up.
[44:26.110 --> 44:27.350]  Okay, well, you can't be shy.
[44:27.510 --> 44:28.210]  You're going to say something.
[44:28.430 --> 44:28.730]  Good evening.
[44:28.830 --> 44:29.430]  You're on off the hook.
[44:31.370 --> 44:32.030]  Go ahead.
[44:33.030 --> 44:33.430]  Hello.
[44:33.710 --> 44:34.570]  Yes, what's on your mind?
[44:35.150 --> 44:39.610]  Hi, my name is Ron, and I'm, uh, I'm a long time listening to your show.
[44:39.810 --> 44:40.950]  I, I enjoy it a lot.
[44:41.690 --> 44:49.130]  Um, I'm, I'm coming to an inevitable time in my phone service, uh, being kind of a Luddite.
[44:49.570 --> 44:57.410]  I never got a cell phone until 2012, and now they're moving into a new, I guess, the next generation.
[44:57.830 --> 44:59.570]  And they're cutting off your copper.
[45:00.070 --> 45:01.750]  The, no, no, no, no.
[45:01.850 --> 45:02.250]  Oh, okay.
[45:03.490 --> 45:05.430]  Oh, so you're getting a cell phone for the first time.
[45:05.770 --> 45:08.250]  I have, I have, that's all, you know, that's all I have.
[45:08.810 --> 45:12.390]  And, and it's, uh, it's an, I hate, it was a hand-me-down phone.
[45:12.510 --> 45:12.790]  Oh, I see.
[45:12.850 --> 45:13.010]  Okay.
[45:13.010 --> 45:14.970]  I, I hooked up with Verizon.
[45:15.510 --> 45:21.610]  I know, I live with a woman who's, you know, a retiree from Verizon, so I, you know, I support it.
[45:21.770 --> 45:22.850]  They're the phone company.
[45:23.270 --> 45:26.250]  But, um, they told me that I'm going to have to get a new phone.
[45:27.310 --> 45:32.530]  I don't want a phone that can tell me, tell the world more about me than I know.
[45:33.190 --> 45:39.950]  I just want the same old simple type of phone, but I don't know if it's available anymore.
[45:40.270 --> 45:40.450]  Okay.
[45:40.550 --> 45:41.710]  So let me, let me say this straight.
[45:41.830 --> 45:46.370]  You're using a cell phone company, uh, which I imagine is Verizon wireless.
[45:46.370 --> 45:50.510]  And they're saying that the phone you're using on their network won't work.
[45:50.990 --> 45:56.710]  They're going to, they're going to change their system and it won't be able to be used anymore.
[45:57.010 --> 45:59.270]  They have more, it's a flip phone.
[46:00.110 --> 46:02.410]  What kind of alternatives are they suggesting?
[46:02.530 --> 46:05.910]  And are there offerings that are also flip phones?
[46:06.550 --> 46:06.730]  Yes.
[46:07.050 --> 46:09.010]  They do have some, just three models.
[46:09.210 --> 46:12.230]  I mean, it's not as cute as the one I got.
[46:12.490 --> 46:12.710]  Sure.
[46:12.850 --> 46:13.010]  Sure.
[46:13.270 --> 46:13.470]  Yeah.
[46:13.810 --> 46:16.890]  Especially if you've had it for a while and, you know, it works for you.
[46:17.330 --> 46:17.430]  Yeah.
[46:17.890 --> 46:24.050]  Well, I mean, if they're changing frequencies that, that would explain it, but otherwise there's no reason that phone shouldn't continue to work.
[46:25.690 --> 46:27.650]  Well, I imagine it'll get 9-1-1.
[46:28.130 --> 46:28.570]  Yeah.
[46:28.870 --> 46:33.790]  Well, what kind of, what kind of, um, correspondence did you have regarding this or where did you hear about it?
[46:33.890 --> 46:35.610]  Was this sort of a sales thing?
[46:35.910 --> 46:37.110]  Like, what's your gut feeling?
[46:37.230 --> 46:42.110]  Or this was like a, an official, um, kind of transition that you were alerted to?
[46:42.310 --> 46:42.910]  Was there formal?
[46:43.650 --> 46:46.890]  I go to their, uh, their office and pay my bill.
[46:47.130 --> 46:49.910]  It's a, uh, a prepaid phone.
[46:50.610 --> 46:52.350]  You know, I'll give them 50 pounds.
[46:52.530 --> 46:53.890]  It'll last me three months or so.
[46:54.070 --> 46:54.310]  Uh-huh.
[46:54.930 --> 47:02.170]  But, uh, I'm, I'm interested in, who can I go to now that will keep it simple like I had it?
[47:03.130 --> 47:03.530]  Yeah.
[47:03.530 --> 47:04.610]  I don't need a camera.
[47:04.930 --> 47:05.630]  I don't need a...
[47:05.630 --> 47:09.190]  What, what you want is, uh, is known nowadays as a feature phone.
[47:09.550 --> 47:18.110]  Um, back then it was just called a phone, but basically a feature phone now is, uh, what is, what is used to describe any phone that's not a smartphone as we know them today.
[47:18.810 --> 47:25.130]  And, uh, so any provider you go to, um, should still have a number of feature phones available because it is popular for...
[47:25.150 --> 47:25.270]  wait.
[47:25.450 --> 47:26.610]  It sounds like the opposite.
[47:26.830 --> 47:28.690]  Wouldn't the phone with all the features be the feature phone?
[47:28.830 --> 47:31.070]  You're saying the phone without all the features is the feature phone.
[47:31.130 --> 47:31.310]  Right.
[47:31.430 --> 47:32.390]  I, I didn't come up with it.
[47:32.410 --> 47:34.490]  The lack of features, that's the feature now.
[47:34.510 --> 47:35.750]  The lack of features is the feature.
[47:35.910 --> 47:36.130]  Wow.
[47:36.430 --> 47:38.050]  Um, but that's, that's what they call them nowadays.
[47:38.210 --> 47:45.390]  So like the old flip phones, the candy bar phones, the clamshell phones that we used to have before smartphones, those are now known as feature phones.
[47:45.410 --> 47:57.310]  And most of the providers Keep at least one or a few of them available for people specifically like yourself, like your self-caller, who are not interested in all the bells and whistles we have now.
[47:57.450 --> 48:03.130]  I just thought... I have an old Omnipoint phone from the 1990s that has been sitting in a desk.
[48:03.350 --> 48:05.430]  And I wonder if I can even get power to it.
[48:05.510 --> 48:06.710]  Would that even work today?
[48:06.890 --> 48:08.110]  Would that even get a signal?
[48:08.310 --> 48:09.350]  I'd love to find out.
[48:09.350 --> 48:16.850]  Yeah, I mean, there were things like the older networks, which were actually switched off at the service level.
[48:17.090 --> 48:18.630]  And you can't connect to anything anymore.
[48:18.630 --> 48:27.050]  Yeah, I bet your Omnipoint phone is like TDMA or some other legacy technology that is not backwards compatible with like 4G and LTE networks today.
[48:27.310 --> 48:30.550]  But that's... you'd have to look at the spec very specifically.
[48:30.550 --> 48:34.590]  I just want to see it turn on and have those three little clicks that it made when it turned on.
[48:34.670 --> 48:35.330]  I remember that part.
[48:35.330 --> 48:41.710]  Yeah, it might be CDMA or TDMA, like a legacy legacy, like really like pre-GSM-ish.
[48:41.710 --> 48:42.910]  Two little lines for text.
[48:42.990 --> 48:43.630]  That's all I got.
[48:43.850 --> 48:47.730]  But anyway, sir, I advise you hold on to that phone for as long as you can.
[48:47.730 --> 48:54.230]  Have a backup in mind, but don't ever throw it out and just see how long you can make it work for.
[48:55.410 --> 49:05.930]  Well, do you know of the companies that are more likely for me to go see about their phones that might be the simple type that I'm looking for?
[49:06.030 --> 49:06.930]  The feature phones.
[49:07.070 --> 49:08.370]  You know of any feature phone companies?
[49:08.370 --> 49:18.590]  I don't know of any particular ones, but generally, I think if you walk into any of the major phone companies these days, they will have some sort of thing for you because it is a thing that a significant amount of people still need.
[49:18.590 --> 49:21.070]  And it's a smart move, phone companies.
[49:21.210 --> 49:26.430]  There are so many people out here, like our caller, who want to hold on to their old devices, their old flip phones.
[49:26.490 --> 49:31.250]  They don't want all these newfangled features on the non-feature phones or whatever you call them.
[49:31.850 --> 49:33.570]  So you need to cater to them.
[49:33.570 --> 49:38.210]  You need to value them as customers because they're loyal customers.
[49:38.430 --> 49:45.810]  Yeah, I just want to say you could probably check all the usual suspects as far as carriers and use the term of art that Rob was indicating.
[49:45.810 --> 49:57.030]  And as long as I guess it's okay with your roommate that you're using a different carrier, I'm sure they would have at least some kind of offering as well.
[49:58.170 --> 50:00.830]  But I'm with you, E, and Rob.
[50:00.970 --> 50:08.150]  I think we should have a retro Western Electric or some really stripped-down phone that runs on the modern network.
[50:08.150 --> 50:14.050]  I would love to see some really durable stuff or really kind of innovative designs instead of kind of the same old slab of glass.
[50:14.050 --> 50:26.350]  Also, one thing you might want to do, caller, is if you're involved with any local senior citizen services or stuff at your local library, things like that, you know, maybe someone there has a better idea where you can directly go and find things like this.
[50:26.930 --> 50:27.150]  All right.
[50:27.250 --> 50:28.110]  Best of luck.
[50:28.670 --> 50:29.210]  Thank you.
[50:29.370 --> 50:29.610]  All right.
[50:29.670 --> 50:30.350]  Thanks for your call.
[50:30.650 --> 50:31.710]  Let's see if we can get another one in.
[50:31.770 --> 50:32.050]  Good evening.
[50:32.190 --> 50:32.750]  You're on Off the Hook.
[50:32.810 --> 50:33.090]  Go ahead.
[50:34.090 --> 50:34.730]  Oh, hi.
[50:34.810 --> 50:35.110]  Yes.
[50:35.210 --> 50:39.050]  I'm the person who was complaining about Verizon and then got immediately cut off.
[50:39.050 --> 50:42.390]  I'm not making any judgments here, any accusation.
[50:42.510 --> 50:43.390]  What happened on your end?
[50:43.410 --> 50:45.250]  I got a busy signal while we were talking.
[50:45.330 --> 50:47.590]  Well, we just had silence.
[50:48.550 --> 50:49.630]  You just had silence?
[50:49.810 --> 50:50.030]  Yes.
[50:50.310 --> 50:50.570]  Hello.
[50:50.690 --> 50:51.170]  Are you still there?
[50:51.350 --> 50:52.130]  We're still here.
[50:52.230 --> 50:52.930]  Do you hear us?
[50:53.190 --> 50:53.590]  Okay.
[50:53.790 --> 50:54.030]  Wow.
[50:54.290 --> 50:56.890]  Well, I'll try to go easy on Verizon.
[50:57.110 --> 50:58.050]  Maybe they'll let me talk.
[50:58.330 --> 50:58.590]  Okay.
[50:58.750 --> 50:59.390]  Here's the thing.
[50:59.830 --> 51:02.770]  There are 800 numbers that I have tried to call.
[51:03.050 --> 51:04.110]  Two of them, in fact.
[51:04.110 --> 51:06.190]  Both of them happen to be radio stations.
[51:06.490 --> 51:09.050]  One is in Canada and one is in America, I assume.
[51:09.390 --> 51:10.990]  And they will not let me through.
[51:11.210 --> 51:18.810]  Every time I call, I get this Verizon message that says, you cannot dial this number from your calling area.
[51:18.930 --> 51:19.070]  Wow.
[51:19.130 --> 51:20.590]  I haven't heard that recording in a long time.
[51:20.750 --> 51:27.550]  It used to be with toll-free numbers that you would have two numbers, one for the state that the number was in and one for the rest of the country.
[51:27.690 --> 51:29.810]  But I haven't heard that system used in decades.
[51:30.690 --> 51:30.770]  Right.
[51:30.970 --> 51:42.670]  I remember now that... I don't count my... While I was waiting to get on, I remembered I had that experience with a New York City agency, you know, what they call the blue pages where you look up city government agency.
[51:42.830 --> 51:47.170]  And they wanted, if you were calling from New York City, they gave you a 2-1-2 number.
[51:47.290 --> 51:48.750]  They wanted you to call a toll number.
[51:48.850 --> 51:52.310]  But if you were calling from outside the city, you could use the 800 number.
[51:52.470 --> 51:55.610]  And when I tried to use the 800 number, they gave me that message.
[51:55.770 --> 52:03.190]  But both of these, one is in Canada, you know, one is a Canadian radio station from Hamilton, Ontario.
[52:03.710 --> 52:09.150]  And I tried many times to call and I said, maybe they don't want calls from America, but that doesn't make sense.
[52:09.310 --> 52:11.950]  And then one night I heard somebody call in from Albany.
[52:12.190 --> 52:14.290]  So they obviously take calls from New York State.
[52:14.590 --> 52:25.170]  And the other one is our own Mishio Kaku, who has, I think he still has, a radio show, a commercial AM radio show on Saturday nights.
[52:25.370 --> 52:27.370]  And I got the number from the website.
[52:27.770 --> 52:29.090]  And it's an 800 number.
[52:29.270 --> 52:31.290]  And I've tried to call while the show was on.
[52:31.430 --> 52:32.710]  I've tried to call other times.
[52:32.890 --> 52:34.010]  And I get that message.
[52:34.210 --> 52:36.130]  Cannot call from your dialing area.
[52:36.650 --> 52:38.930]  May I ask, what is your dialing area?
[52:39.050 --> 52:39.910]  Where are you?
[52:39.910 --> 52:41.610]  I'm in 212 here.
[52:41.970 --> 52:43.490]  That is strange.
[52:43.990 --> 52:45.910]  But there are easy ways around this.
[52:46.010 --> 52:52.190]  If you know what the, what the restriction is, getting a Google voice number and, and, and dialing out of that is one way to do it.
[52:52.750 --> 52:56.910]  And, and there are other... Wait, no, no, you can't suggest a Google service.
[52:57.070 --> 52:58.370]  Let's try anything but that.
[52:58.470 --> 52:59.570]  Come on, the calling card.
[53:00.250 --> 53:01.590]  I'm not going to hold you to it.
[53:01.850 --> 53:04.090]  They're calling a radio station and not giving away their lives.
[53:04.310 --> 53:04.850]  I'm just kidding.
[53:05.010 --> 53:05.270]  I'm kidding.
[53:05.790 --> 53:06.670]  That's the thing is...
[53:06.670 --> 53:13.710]  Why would a radio station with an 800 number not allow you to call from a particular calling area?
[53:14.050 --> 53:14.830]  Now, I don't know.
[53:14.830 --> 53:17.110]  I know New Chicago lives in New York, you know.
[53:17.250 --> 53:20.850]  I don't know what, what city his show comes out of.
[53:20.850 --> 53:22.290]  I don't think it comes out of New York.
[53:22.350 --> 53:27.290]  They used to have it on WWRL, um, when that was a talk station.
[53:27.610 --> 53:30.690]  I was just listening to that station the other day at 1600 AM.
[53:30.690 --> 53:32.090]  They were playing all kinds of good music.
[53:32.930 --> 53:34.050]  Yeah, yeah, right.
[53:34.310 --> 53:35.050]  Indian music, I think.
[53:35.550 --> 53:41.410]  The thing about setting up an 800 number is this goes back to the days when long distance cost significant money.
[53:41.530 --> 53:41.610]  Right.
[53:41.790 --> 53:45.130]  Because when you set up an 800 number, you're paying the phone bill for the calls.
[53:45.350 --> 53:56.610]  And so you have the option to, if the call that's coming in is going to be too expensive because you're paying for it, you have the option not to accept long distance calls into your 800 number because otherwise you could go broke.
[53:57.230 --> 54:01.030]  Nowadays, I don't know quite how that applies because long distance is basically cheap.
[54:01.170 --> 54:01.950]  And you know what else?
[54:02.090 --> 54:04.010]  They charge a surcharge.
[54:04.010 --> 54:10.770]  If you call an 800 number from a pay phone, uh, they charge the people receiving the call an extra 25 cents, which is completely unfair.
[54:10.910 --> 54:12.190]  And apparently there's no way to block it.
[54:12.370 --> 54:12.810]  Wait.
[54:12.930 --> 54:28.410]  So I'm just hearing is if maybe it's only, it's not a long distance, technically a long distance call, maybe it's, it's creating a boundary saying it's denying the 800 call because it's better for the person in 212 to be calling the local version instead.
[54:28.510 --> 54:31.690]  That saves them on, on an unnecessary 800 charge, right?
[54:31.690 --> 54:32.690]  You touch upon a good point.
[54:32.830 --> 54:34.130]  That should be a local phone number.
[54:34.190 --> 54:35.630]  Have you tried looking for the local phone number?
[54:36.430 --> 54:37.910]  Uh, I haven't tried.
[54:37.910 --> 54:39.210]  I don't have the computer here.
[54:39.290 --> 54:42.310]  I had to ask someone to look it up for me on Misha Cocker's website.
[54:42.550 --> 54:42.750]  Uh huh.
[54:42.990 --> 54:47.030]  And they had the 800 number is the contact number for the radio show.
[54:47.170 --> 54:53.190]  And I can't imagine a radio show that gives out an 800 number that would not accept a call from anywhere.
[54:53.410 --> 55:08.730]  The, the other thing that this might involve is there's a, there's often been weirdness when trying to call something like an 800 number, uh, from a VoIP line instead of a landline or from a cell phone instead of a, uh, so this is, this is from a landline.
[55:09.070 --> 55:09.830]  That's very interesting.
[55:09.830 --> 55:09.990]  Yeah.
[55:10.290 --> 55:13.090]  It's, it's kind of ironic because Misha Cocker used to follow us.
[55:13.210 --> 55:15.650]  We could have just asked him and now we can't.
[55:15.690 --> 55:15.790]  He did.
[55:15.870 --> 55:20.890]  And I wish they'd put him back and they put, they just keep moving him around and he seems to have disappeared.
[55:21.370 --> 55:23.070]  Well, he's a, he's a theoretical physicist.
[55:23.250 --> 55:23.690]  They do that.
[55:23.910 --> 55:26.590]  Definitely, definitely try finding a local version.
[55:26.870 --> 55:29.730]  That's just a hunch and, uh, and it report back.
[55:29.870 --> 55:37.770]  We'd love to know, uh, how you got around this, but it may be something where they're trying to lower the amount of, of 800 calls if there's an alternate, but they're not promoting the alternate.
[55:37.770 --> 55:41.270]  And there's always a way, there's always a way to get a phone call through.
[55:41.410 --> 55:42.910]  Don't ever tell us you can't call.
[55:43.030 --> 55:48.650]  I remember, uh, when they used to tell me I couldn't call Albania when that country was cut off from the rest of the world.
[55:48.910 --> 55:51.410]  And, uh, I, well, I went up to Canada to call them, but I did it.
[55:51.450 --> 55:52.350]  You know, that's the important thing.
[55:52.830 --> 55:54.330]  I get another phone call really quick.
[55:54.410 --> 55:54.690]  Good evening.
[55:54.830 --> 55:55.590]  You're on off the hook.
[55:55.670 --> 55:55.890]  Go ahead.
[55:57.070 --> 55:57.670]  Speak up.
[55:58.990 --> 55:59.350]  Okay.
[55:59.490 --> 56:00.370]  That's that good evening.
[56:00.550 --> 56:01.110]  You're on off the hook.
[56:01.210 --> 56:01.430]  Go ahead.
[56:03.570 --> 56:04.170]  Anyone there?
[56:04.530 --> 56:04.890]  No.
[56:05.070 --> 56:05.270]  Okay.
[56:05.410 --> 56:06.530]  We have silent people tonight.
[56:06.670 --> 56:06.970]  Good evening.
[56:07.150 --> 56:07.770]  You're on off the hook.
[56:08.570 --> 56:10.010]  Hey, how are you?
[56:10.210 --> 56:10.430]  Good.
[56:11.050 --> 56:24.610]  Listen, I'm trying to solve a couple of problems, uh, from callers before the last one, it might have to do with the fact that some, you know, 800 is free for the caller, but it's a subscription service for the people who have the number.
[56:25.210 --> 56:40.930]  So it used to be that, um, um, uh, subscribers, meaning the people who had the number didn't accept calls from their local area because they figured, why should I pay for the call when whoever calls me can just make a local phone call?
[56:41.130 --> 56:41.410]  Exactly.
[56:41.570 --> 56:43.930]  But the phone number has to be known to the person to do that.
[56:44.450 --> 56:46.930]  Well, the, uh, the, uh, what do you call it?
[56:46.990 --> 56:52.690]  The 800 numbers do have all the lists of people who call them because they're built for every call.
[56:52.870 --> 56:53.150]  Uh-huh.
[56:53.910 --> 57:05.250]  And the other thing is for the caller before, um, through the existential network, uh, it could get, I, I didn't ask for this.
[57:05.510 --> 57:07.610]  I, I am on Obamacare.
[57:07.810 --> 57:19.290]  I essentially have Medicaid and my evil provider, uh, one day sent me a phone in the mail because they say that I needed, uh, a lifeline.
[57:19.470 --> 57:19.950]  They call it.
[57:20.050 --> 57:23.130]  I'm sure my evil provider is not the only one.
[57:23.550 --> 57:26.010]  Uh, others do this as well for Medicaid.
[57:26.590 --> 57:30.050]  I basically have, uh, now they send me a smartphone.
[57:30.230 --> 57:31.510]  It used to be a dumb phone.
[57:31.950 --> 57:33.790]  Um, but it's free.
[57:34.070 --> 57:34.750]  It's free.
[57:34.930 --> 57:38.030]  I even have into a free internet access if I want it.
[57:38.070 --> 57:47.430]  I don't, uh, because I don't want to give up my location, but you know, maybe you should look into his own Obamacare or slash Medicaid provider.
[57:47.430 --> 57:48.890]  It's, it's, uh, it's true.
[57:49.050 --> 58:05.690]  And, uh, the Obama phone, I, I know a couple of people that, um, uh, took advantage of that and, and, uh, enjoyed, uh, that, um, uh, benefit, but it is, uh, it's also true for telemetry, medical devices, all of these, um, uh, uh, monitors and things that people need perhaps for,
[58:05.690 --> 58:14.370]  um, uh, a pacemaker and so on, uh, often have, uh, a system to report back to a doctor over phones and that is part of, uh, the care.
[58:14.610 --> 58:16.770]  So, uh, also a very interesting thing to pursue.
[58:16.890 --> 58:17.590]  Thanks for that call.
[58:17.730 --> 58:18.990]  Thanks for helping out another caller.
[58:19.290 --> 58:20.730]  And please, uh, tune in next week.
[58:20.970 --> 58:23.690]  Write to us, O-T-H at 2600.com.
[58:23.870 --> 58:25.350]  And for Off the Hook, this is Emmanuel.
[58:25.410 --> 58:25.950]  Have a good night.
[58:26.110 --> 58:27.450]  Stay tuned to WBAI New York.
[59:01.900 --> 59:06.540]  When the thermometer goes way up and the weather is sizzling hot.
[59:07.000 --> 59:13.640]  Mr. Guy for his squad, a Marine for his queen, a G.I.
[59:14.020 --> 59:16.480]  for his cutie pie is not.
[59:16.800 --> 59:20.840]  Cause it's too, too, too dark hot.
[59:29.740 --> 59:33.740]  It's too dark hot.
[59:35.240 --> 59:40.140]  It's too dark hot.
[59:57.700 --> 01:00:00.560]  This is Wayne Kramer from the MC5.
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