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[00:08.920 --> 00:11.600]  Coming up, it's almost 7 p.m.
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[00:17.700 --> 00:19.700]  The time is 7 o'clock.
[00:20.020 --> 00:22.480]  Time once again for Off the Hook.
[02:13.710 --> 02:15.110]  And a very good evening to everybody.
[02:15.130 --> 02:17.170]  The program is Off the Hook.
[02:17.190 --> 02:18.330]  Emmanuel Goldstein here with you.
[02:18.390 --> 02:20.130]  Joined tonight by Kyle.
[02:20.530 --> 02:20.990]  Over here.
[02:21.630 --> 02:22.990]  And Alex over there.
[02:23.690 --> 02:24.230]  Good evening.
[02:24.710 --> 02:26.190]  And we don't have Robin Gill tonight.
[02:26.290 --> 02:29.030]  So it's going to be kind of a skeleton crew, which is okay.
[02:29.230 --> 02:30.590]  You know, we can do that.
[02:30.650 --> 02:34.170]  And we have overtime coming up at 8 o'clock on our YouTube channel.
[02:34.390 --> 02:40.390]  Go to Channel 2600 on YouTube to get the exact method of clicking.
[02:40.390 --> 02:43.570]  Or go to the 2600.com webpage and you'll see it up on top.
[02:44.030 --> 02:45.050]  And you can phone in.
[02:45.190 --> 02:47.750]  You can call us during that segment.
[02:47.930 --> 02:51.210]  Since you can't call us during this segment, that goes over the radio.
[02:51.210 --> 03:00.090]  So, while we weren't on last week, and a lot has happened, we want to talk about the colonial pipeline, certainly, because, boy, that was a story.
[03:00.650 --> 03:10.930]  But first, before we do that, I think it's important to emphasize for fear of people maybe losing track, thinking everything is okay again.
[03:10.930 --> 03:15.550]  And, yeah, you know, we're taking the first cautious steps into normalcy, and that's a good thing.
[03:15.970 --> 03:26.370]  Weird, though, how the very people who were fighting this tooth and nail all the way are now fighting normalcy tooth and nail all the way, saying there's got to be some kind of a conspiracy here.
[03:26.590 --> 03:28.890]  You can't be happy unless there's a conspiracy.
[03:28.890 --> 03:40.930]  So, yeah, us saying it's okay now to not wear masks in certain situations and to go about life as if you're vaccinated against a deadly disease, that's suspicious somehow.
[03:41.250 --> 03:42.570]  And I heard this.
[03:42.670 --> 03:52.750]  There's actually people who are putting on masks now because they are afraid of catching something from people who have been vaccinated.
[03:53.290 --> 03:55.250]  I couldn't make this up.
[03:55.810 --> 03:59.930]  So, vaccination apparently is the disease now in these people's minds.
[04:00.130 --> 04:04.610]  And if you don't want to catch the vaccine, you've got to wear a mask.
[04:04.710 --> 04:05.470]  You know, it works for me.
[04:05.810 --> 04:06.470]  That's fine.
[04:06.470 --> 04:09.710]  If that gets you wearing a mask and you're not vaccinated, okay, great.
[04:09.830 --> 04:13.550]  Maybe you should stay inside, too, and just, you know, let this play out.
[04:14.170 --> 04:17.230]  Alex, you're out there in Pennsylvania, it looks like?
[04:17.590 --> 04:18.170]  I am.
[04:18.230 --> 04:21.590]  I'm out there in beautiful Pennsylvania in the Pocono Mountains.
[04:21.590 --> 04:28.470]  But I will say, I mean, you guys haven't been to Manhattan or to New York City for, I think, quite a while.
[04:28.590 --> 04:32.990]  But the city right now feels like a wholly different place than it did last year.
[04:33.150 --> 04:35.990]  But I was chiming in not to talk about that.
[04:36.210 --> 04:37.650]  I think the city is bouncing back.
[04:37.650 --> 04:38.350]  It feels great.
[04:38.350 --> 04:40.510]  I feel like we're going to be in the studio before we know it.
[04:40.790 --> 04:48.130]  But I want to talk specifically about Long Island and the vaccine and something to which I was invited to.
[04:48.270 --> 04:49.830]  Why do I have the feelings it's going to be insulting?
[04:50.430 --> 04:51.050]  Go ahead.
[04:51.590 --> 04:53.610]  There's a lot that needs fixing out here, for sure.
[04:53.670 --> 05:00.270]  Most things that I say, I guess, are slightly insulting to Long Island, Queens, you know, various places, et cetera.
[05:00.470 --> 05:02.010]  So, you know, get used to it.
[05:02.090 --> 05:02.950]  Or you should be used to it.
[05:03.030 --> 05:15.970]  But in any event, on Facebook earlier this week, a friend of mine from high school had invited me to a special Facebook group that was called something like Show Your Face, Long Island.
[05:16.030 --> 05:16.490]  It's a trap.
[05:16.710 --> 05:17.450]  Don't fall for it.
[05:18.730 --> 05:19.090]  Well...
[05:19.090 --> 05:19.590]  I'm sorry.
[05:19.630 --> 05:22.590]  That's just my go-to reaction for anything involving Facebook.
[05:22.750 --> 05:23.470]  But, okay, continue.
[05:23.650 --> 05:24.030]  What happened?
[05:24.030 --> 05:24.810]  Yeah, absolutely.
[05:25.070 --> 05:26.690]  But I looked at it.
[05:26.790 --> 05:28.770]  You know, this is a person whom I respect.
[05:29.270 --> 05:32.610]  I, you know, I think very highly of her.
[05:33.150 --> 05:34.390]  She's an intelligent woman.
[05:34.730 --> 05:37.730]  But yet she keeps inviting me to the same Facebook group.
[05:37.730 --> 05:43.250]  And it's all about not wearing masks indoors at various stores or restaurants.
[05:43.710 --> 05:59.350]  And what people do is they post photos of themselves inside these stores, restaurants, whatever they are, hardware stores, Lowe's, Home Depot, and will record a video or some kind of statement about whether they were mistreated for not wearing a mask.
[05:59.470 --> 06:00.950]  So they're reporting on this.
[06:01.030 --> 06:07.250]  And there's lots of other people that have joined in, you know, what I guess the air-quoting fun here.
[06:07.730 --> 06:25.090]  And it's really scary to me because when you see these pictures of people who are not vaccinated, they're not wearing masks, they're indoors, they're flouting all these regulations, they are talking to each other, they're touting or they're fluffing each other up about this as well,
[06:25.190 --> 06:26.790]  giving each other increased confidence.
[06:27.150 --> 06:33.770]  But the argument that they're using, I would like to know where it's coming from because it goes like this.
[06:33.770 --> 06:41.390]  It says, well, why should I have to wear a mask because if the vaccine is so effective?
[06:41.690 --> 06:42.370]  Well, think about it.
[06:42.390 --> 06:43.770]  Actually, I missed the premise here.
[06:43.910 --> 06:45.170]  Why should I have to wear a mask?
[06:45.330 --> 06:47.470]  Because wearing a mask protects other people.
[06:47.610 --> 06:49.530]  It doesn't necessarily protect me.
[06:50.430 --> 06:55.410]  So if the vaccine is so effective, then why do I have to wear a mask?
[06:55.530 --> 06:58.070]  Because I'm an inconsiderate dumbass who doesn't care about anybody else.
[06:58.070 --> 07:00.450]  So you're pretty much wearing that, you know, as a banner.
[07:01.050 --> 07:02.210]  That's exactly right.
[07:02.350 --> 07:03.110]  I mean, that's exactly right.
[07:03.170 --> 07:07.710]  And what people don't really understand is that, you know, there are still people that are extremely vulnerable.
[07:07.910 --> 07:09.130]  Not everybody is vaccinated.
[07:09.130 --> 07:18.290]  There are some elderly people who may not be able to acquire the vaccine or have the vaccine injected in them because they might have some kind of adverse reaction to it.
[07:18.590 --> 07:20.850]  I know several people like that.
[07:21.050 --> 07:27.710]  And the fundamental flaw here, I think, is in two stages with this argument, is that it's not always about you.
[07:27.890 --> 07:29.270]  It's not always about yourself.
[07:29.550 --> 07:29.670]  Right.
[07:30.150 --> 07:31.570]  And not wearing a mask.
[07:31.710 --> 07:32.270]  We get it.
[07:32.370 --> 07:33.890]  OK, you're protecting third parties.
[07:34.050 --> 07:36.990]  But sometimes you have a duty to third party.
[07:37.130 --> 07:41.750]  Sometimes you have a duty to protect others who are more vulnerable than you.
[07:42.690 --> 07:45.430]  And it's I would doubt that with them.
[07:45.550 --> 07:47.930]  I don't think they ever consider themselves having that duty.
[07:48.510 --> 07:48.950]  No.
[07:49.130 --> 07:50.510]  Well, I'm sure I'm sure that they don't.
[07:50.610 --> 07:59.950]  And based on the commentary that I've been seeing in this particular group, and they said it certainly doesn't seem to have come under scrutiny or any kind of extended consideration.
[08:00.670 --> 08:05.710]  I will say, too, though, that I think it's just a fundamental lack of compassion.
[08:06.410 --> 08:06.870]  Yeah.
[08:06.950 --> 08:16.370]  And misplaced values, because, you know, I see the argument many, many times about, well, this is an issue of individual rights and privacy, and I shouldn't be told what to do.
[08:16.370 --> 08:20.950]  And I shouldn't have to prove that I got a vaccine because that's an invasion of my privacy.
[08:21.190 --> 08:24.070]  All, you know, great values to to hang on to.
[08:24.210 --> 08:41.590]  But when they're outweighed by by public safety and, you know, unless you don't believe that COVID-19 actually is a thing, then you have to sort of say, well, it's important that we stay as safe as possible and that I act like a responsible person.
[08:41.590 --> 08:52.150]  That's more important than clinging to some belief that if I if I show a card that says I got a vaccine, somehow that's the beginning of an Orwellian society.
[08:52.870 --> 08:56.690]  Believe me, we're well into it and you already have to show ID for other things.
[08:56.910 --> 09:05.630]  And there are so many examples that that exceed the concerns that people have right now about this.
[09:05.630 --> 09:06.610]  It's trivial.
[09:06.890 --> 09:07.290]  It's minor.
[09:07.910 --> 09:12.170]  And the far greater problem right now is, are we going to get through this?
[09:12.290 --> 09:19.410]  Because we need to be at around 70% of full vaccination for us to be in the safe zone.
[09:19.450 --> 09:23.290]  You know, when you have an ice cream cone, it's one of the, you know, soft kind.
[09:23.470 --> 09:29.150]  You have to get to the point where it's it's level so that it doesn't start dripping when it melts.
[09:29.390 --> 09:31.990]  OK, we're not anywhere near the level part.
[09:31.990 --> 09:34.650]  We still have an awful lot to go and it's melting.
[09:34.890 --> 09:40.590]  And when it starts dripping, that's when, you know, we go back to to dark days.
[09:41.010 --> 09:42.690]  Now, the CDC has changed things.
[09:42.850 --> 09:46.710]  They say you don't have to wear a mask in various situations right now.
[09:47.610 --> 09:52.330]  And I have mixed feelings about that because it's a lot of it is relying on the honor system.
[09:52.330 --> 09:54.210]  And many people have proven they are not honorable.
[09:55.350 --> 10:09.390]  So I don't know, Alex, how you feel about going into a store or something indoors without your mask, without other people not wearing masks and everybody just believing that everyone else got the vaccine.
[10:09.550 --> 10:14.330]  And that's pretty much what they are saying by not having a mask in a situation like that.
[10:15.630 --> 10:20.750]  Maybe I'm just not somebody who who trusts by by default.
[10:20.910 --> 10:35.570]  But I just think we've seen so much over the past year of people who behave like idiots and don't think of the common good and basically cast aside science, which is what this really is all about.
[10:36.370 --> 10:55.030]  And, you know, when you see somebody, whether it's, you know, on on the M 14 bus or whether it's on the floors of Congress or, you know, just wandering around in circles someplace, and they're they're making these arguments and all the people that they're arguing against are doctors and scientists,
[10:55.030 --> 10:57.970]  and they're all part of some kind of conspiracy and plot.
[10:58.170 --> 11:06.130]  You know, when you when you find yourself in that situation, I hope there is some part of you that can just step back a second and say, Oh, my God, what am I doing?
[11:06.550 --> 11:10.170]  You know, I'm I'm arguing against all the people that know what they're talking about.
[11:10.290 --> 11:12.910]  And I admittedly don't know what I'm talking about.
[11:13.050 --> 11:13.570]  I have an opinion.
[11:13.730 --> 11:14.230]  Everyone does.
[11:14.410 --> 11:15.970]  But I'm not a scientist.
[11:15.990 --> 11:16.810]  I'm not a doctor.
[11:17.010 --> 11:26.710]  You know, the people who know what they're talking about, who have spent the last year in emergency rooms and dealing with with victims of this horrible disease.
[11:27.430 --> 11:34.910]  Those are the people that we should be listening to far and above people with political agendas who don't have the slightest clue.
[11:34.910 --> 11:48.030]  It seems like a weirdly specific and stupid form of exhibitionism like pandemic scoff laws feeling unbridled and then documenting this kind of behavior.
[11:48.330 --> 11:51.090]  And in itself, is it is it helping?
[11:51.290 --> 11:51.610]  Is it hurt?
[11:51.690 --> 11:53.090]  It's definitely not helping.
[11:53.810 --> 11:59.170]  But, you know, you proving that you can break that specific rule.
[11:59.330 --> 11:59.910]  Is that true?
[12:00.110 --> 12:01.610]  I mean, is that saying very much?
[12:01.610 --> 12:02.490]  I don't know.
[12:02.690 --> 12:03.870]  I don't really think so.
[12:04.790 --> 12:12.950]  As like a first impression and the just the overall issue itself.
[12:12.950 --> 12:30.550]  I mean, it's about the benefit to a kind of greater societal good and that goal, given the circumstances, can be attained through this very kind of low cost measure in wearing a mask.
[12:30.550 --> 12:43.890]  And, uh, that, uh, uh, site seems kind of, it just, uh, you know, it, it, it's not very, uh, uh, it's not a lot there.
[12:44.050 --> 12:55.490]  I mean, you're not saying, as I said, not saying much, it, it can, um, backfire and, uh, be actually more hurtful because, yeah, you might not get something.
[12:55.490 --> 13:12.750]  You might not hurt somebody else given that, but it still is, uh, um, the, a behavior that, that is, that could impact someone in, and you're, you're doing a lot of this in some regards to set an example and to reassure people that you're conscious, uh,
[13:12.870 --> 13:15.230]  conscientious and of their space and so forth.
[13:15.230 --> 13:18.490]  So it has been effective, I think, uh, overall.
[13:18.830 --> 13:25.530]  And, and as I said, it's like sort of a lower cost, but you know, the, um, the decisions we make always affect other people.
[13:25.930 --> 13:28.650]  Um, so you're not just making a decision for yourself.
[13:29.130 --> 13:33.210]  Um, if, if, uh, you refuse to get the vaccine, you're putting other people at risk.
[13:33.290 --> 13:35.070]  If you refuse to wear a mask, you're putting other people at risk.
[13:35.250 --> 13:41.310]  It goes beyond that always has, you know, if, if, um, uh, you, you make a society where people are encouraged to act irresponsibly.
[13:41.310 --> 13:44.310]  And there's all kinds of examples we can point to in our current society.
[13:44.610 --> 13:52.690]  Uh, you're making things more dangerous and unpleasant for people in the future and, and sending us back, uh, for your own interest, for your own amusement.
[13:53.130 --> 14:03.630]  So we need to be able to, um, um, always look at the common good, the common good being, um, um, what is best for, for, you know, for most people.
[14:04.130 --> 14:11.410]  Uh, and you know, I, I, I hear the argument that, uh, the vaccine is, is, um, uh, I, I think what was the Kyle not approved.
[14:11.570 --> 14:12.970]  That's the, that's the, uh, the phrase.
[14:13.310 --> 14:21.850]  Oh, well, that's, uh, uh, a, the emergency use was, uh, it was authorized for emergency use and it was called the EUA.
[14:22.010 --> 14:24.950]  That's the acronym, but it is yet to be approved.
[14:24.950 --> 14:25.290]  Okay.
[14:25.290 --> 14:29.210]  So, so yeah, the, the whole, uh, argument there is that it's not approved.
[14:29.390 --> 14:30.070]  Therefore it's dangerous.
[14:30.310 --> 14:34.050]  No, what, what you said about the emergency use, it's an emergency.
[14:34.330 --> 14:36.050]  You know, what part of that don't you get?
[14:36.170 --> 14:36.830]  It's an emergency.
[14:37.090 --> 14:39.630]  So, uh, that's why it has this categorization.
[14:39.630 --> 14:41.350]  It's moving incredibly fast.
[14:41.490 --> 14:48.250]  It, as you said, it will be approved, but yeah, everything, everything carries a small degree of risk.
[14:48.350 --> 14:49.390]  There is no question about that.
[14:49.550 --> 14:50.130]  Everything does.
[14:50.570 --> 14:54.890]  Um, but this is something that we have to weigh ourselves.
[14:54.890 --> 15:00.030]  Survival as a species and, um, a society and say, is this the right thing to do?
[15:00.150 --> 15:05.370]  And if you can find, uh, um, scientists and doctors who are standing up and saying, no, this is wrong.
[15:06.250 --> 15:07.070]  Listen to them.
[15:07.190 --> 15:07.590]  Absolutely.
[15:07.950 --> 15:08.870]  I'm not hearing it.
[15:09.010 --> 15:10.150]  Not hearing very much of that.
[15:10.510 --> 15:14.410]  In fact, uh, you know, most, most of this is an interesting story that someone forwarded to us.
[15:14.550 --> 15:20.750]  Most anti-vaccine conspiracies online, they come from the same 12 people, 12 people.
[15:21.750 --> 15:23.770]  I mean, uh, this, this blew me away.
[15:24.030 --> 15:30.190]  Um, according to recent research, a large chunk of this very big problem actually has a very small starting point in a new study.
[15:30.550 --> 15:40.150]  Um, researchers found the majority of anti-vaccine conspiracy circulating on social media can be traced to a mere handful of individual accounts representing prominent anti-vaccine personalities.
[15:40.370 --> 15:54.810]  Uh, in all just 12 of these people and their organizations, the so-called disinformation dozen, and I did not name them that are responsible for initiating up to 65% of all false and misleading anti-vaccine propaganda shared on Facebook and Twitter.
[15:55.030 --> 16:01.750]  Not surprising when you think of how Facebook and Twitter work, that it's a small amount of people that actually do this kind of a thing.
[16:02.110 --> 16:05.130]  Um, per the research, oh, we get to name names.
[16:05.130 --> 16:12.290]  The disinformation dozen behind almost two thirds of anti-vaccine content shared in the study window includes, everybody ready?
[16:12.370 --> 16:12.790]  Got your pens?
[16:13.390 --> 16:17.290]  Um, Joseph, uh, Mercola, Robert F.
[16:17.370 --> 16:19.010]  Kennedy Jr. Yeah, he surprises me.
[16:19.510 --> 16:21.510]  Uh, Ty and Charlene Bollinger.
[16:21.710 --> 16:22.650]  They count as two, right?
[16:22.910 --> 16:24.770]  There's two people, Ty and Charlene.
[16:25.370 --> 16:27.210]  Uh, Sherry Tenpenny.
[16:28.150 --> 16:28.710]  Tenpenny.
[16:28.850 --> 16:29.830]  That's got to be a British name.
[16:30.530 --> 16:31.830]  Um, Reza Islam.
[16:32.830 --> 16:34.030]  Also an interesting name.
[16:34.510 --> 16:35.110]  Uh, Rajesh.
[16:35.130 --> 16:45.350]  Rashid Buttar, Aaron Elizabeth, Sayer Ji, Kelly Brogan, Christiane Northrup, Ben Tapper, and Kevin Jenkins.
[16:46.910 --> 16:48.690]  Okay, so there you go.
[16:49.030 --> 16:55.610]  If your source of information is one of those 12, uh, you're part of the 65% that, um, that is included in this study.
[16:55.870 --> 16:57.690]  Alex, I know you had something to contribute.
[16:58.270 --> 17:05.250]  Yeah, I was, um, I was checking out that particular Facebook, uh, group that I mentioned before.
[17:05.450 --> 17:05.610]  It's a trap.
[17:05.850 --> 17:06.110]  I'm sorry.
[17:06.350 --> 17:06.970]  Well, it is.
[17:07.010 --> 17:07.930]  It is certainly a trap.
[17:07.990 --> 17:12.810]  But I wanted to mention, I mean, this is, this is happening literally 42 minutes ago now.
[17:13.370 --> 17:16.730]  Somebody made a post about a particular diner on Long Island.
[17:16.730 --> 17:17.090]  Uh-oh.
[17:17.150 --> 17:17.770]  And it says this.
[17:18.070 --> 17:21.770]  We just went into the California diner in Patchogue.
[17:21.890 --> 17:23.210]  I had no mask on.
[17:23.330 --> 17:24.450]  They said I needed a mask.
[17:24.690 --> 17:28.070]  I said CDC and New York State lifted the mask mandate.
[17:28.270 --> 17:29.310]  The manager was nasty.
[17:29.310 --> 17:32.850]  So the California diner in Patchogue is making people wear masks.
[17:32.970 --> 17:35.190]  And then a bunch of people commented, guess where?
[17:35.290 --> 17:36.150]  I'm not going to eat.
[17:36.310 --> 17:37.870]  Let's make a list, et cetera, et cetera.
[17:38.390 --> 17:39.410]  Hang on, hang on.
[17:39.530 --> 17:52.470]  You're saying that if somebody in an establishment refuses entry to a bunch of dumbasses who don't want to follow the rules, then that establishment won't get visited by those dumbasses.
[17:52.870 --> 17:54.390]  Sounds like a good policy to me.
[17:55.330 --> 17:55.850]  Yeah.
[17:56.330 --> 18:02.510]  Well, that's actually quite, you know, the unintended consequence there, I guess, is absolutely true.
[18:02.710 --> 18:02.950]  Uh-huh.
[18:03.750 --> 18:15.790]  What this strikes me as is, I feel like, okay, there's certainly disinformation here, and there's certainly political components to it, anti-vax issues.
[18:15.990 --> 18:16.570]  There's a lot of it, too.
[18:16.570 --> 18:32.310]  But I think fundamentally, there's a psychological problem with a lot of these people in refusing to wear a mask, refusing the vaccine, or complaining about a diner that has been on Long Island for a very, very long time, California Diner.
[18:32.370 --> 18:34.310]  Back when we were in California, back in the early days.
[18:35.250 --> 18:39.410]  Yeah, I mean, it's a fantastic diner right on Sunrise Highway, right next to the...
[18:39.410 --> 18:39.830]  I don't know.
[18:39.950 --> 18:42.110]  I've never heard of it, and we're not promoting them.
[18:42.230 --> 18:42.850]  That could be terrible.
[18:42.850 --> 18:45.930]  We're not promoting them, but I would say, look, it's a good spot.
[18:46.150 --> 18:58.370]  But in any event, these people that get refused entry or are treated badly because they're not wearing a mask or not following the rules, I think that they like the opportunity to play the victim.
[18:58.410 --> 18:58.910]  Of course.
[18:59.490 --> 19:01.450]  Have you ever been on an IRC channel?
[19:01.470 --> 19:02.370]  It's the same thing.
[19:02.370 --> 19:03.370]  You want the attention.
[19:03.630 --> 19:07.390]  You want to act like an idiot because idiots get all the headlines.
[19:07.850 --> 19:09.990]  And look what all the headlines are about.
[19:09.990 --> 19:11.870]  Yeah, this is so tempting.
[19:12.230 --> 19:20.990]  This is an opportunity for people, you know, white middle class individuals, to act like idiots and to play the victim because they've never been the victim.
[19:21.390 --> 19:31.670]  Well, I would say, look, I won't say categorically they've never been the victim, but I think a good portion of them have not ever suffered a kind of persecution based on a characteristic like this.
[19:31.670 --> 19:33.990]  Well, this is the kind of process they want to die on.
[19:34.730 --> 19:37.190]  You know, I'll do the hammering.
[19:37.290 --> 19:40.870]  I mean, seriously, they this is this is ridiculous.
[19:41.430 --> 19:43.010]  We need to get through this together.
[19:43.150 --> 19:50.530]  And the fact that we are actually at a stage now where people can go to New York City and we're starting to see things get back to normal.
[19:50.530 --> 19:51.870]  That is incredible.
[19:52.170 --> 19:52.610]  That is incredible.
[19:52.610 --> 19:52.790]  That is great news.
[19:52.870 --> 19:56.290]  And the only reason that's happening is because people are getting vaccinated.
[19:56.870 --> 19:58.110]  Unfortunately, not enough.
[19:58.290 --> 20:19.650]  And I fear that in a few weeks or a couple of months, we might see numbers start spiking again, because if there are enough unvaccinated people walking around, it won't take much for another another spread or perhaps a variant might get through that doesn't respond well to the or gets passed the vaccine.
[20:20.070 --> 20:23.070]  And then we're all back in the boat again.
[20:23.110 --> 20:26.370]  So that's that's something rather disturbing.
[20:27.410 --> 20:39.590]  Yeah, and I think there's a distinction to be made here, too, is there are certain people that have been on the on the fence about the vaccine, and some of them have reasonable arguments for wanting to not get vaccinated immediately.
[20:40.030 --> 20:41.690]  And I think we have to acknowledge that.
[20:41.750 --> 20:41.890]  Sure.
[20:41.990 --> 20:42.470]  Absolutely.
[20:43.070 --> 20:43.710]  So about it.
[20:43.930 --> 20:45.730]  But there's and that's OK.
[20:45.970 --> 20:46.390]  It's OK.
[20:46.510 --> 20:51.410]  But now I think it's a time to to remove that hesitancy, to move forward, to go and get vaccinated.
[20:51.610 --> 20:53.590]  We've we've had millions and millions of people.
[20:53.710 --> 20:59.070]  If you're watching Tucker Carlson at night, you think it's a it's a health crisis being vaccinated.
[20:59.070 --> 21:00.730]  It's absolutely not the case.
[21:00.930 --> 21:07.370]  You need to to widen the the swath of information from which you're receiving data about this vaccine.
[21:07.590 --> 21:09.950]  But, OK, that's one thing.
[21:10.090 --> 21:11.050]  That's one issue here.
[21:11.410 --> 21:12.510]  Not being vaccinated.
[21:12.710 --> 21:19.930]  The other issue of not wearing a mask or thinking that you have an entitlement to not wear a mask in a private establishment that wants you to wear a mask.
[21:20.090 --> 21:21.290]  There's no excuse for that.
[21:21.390 --> 21:22.850]  That's just plain and simple idiocy.
[21:22.990 --> 21:25.690]  And I think that it's important to distinguish between those two issues.
[21:25.870 --> 21:26.350]  Absolutely.
[21:26.350 --> 21:26.690]  Kyle.
[21:26.930 --> 21:27.110]  Yeah.
[21:27.230 --> 21:41.930]  And there's already pressure on these small businesses and and venues and and transit and all of the different parts of society and this liability.
[21:42.170 --> 21:43.690]  You know, they know their foot traffic.
[21:43.890 --> 21:48.090]  They know the the scheme of of day to day operations better.
[21:48.090 --> 21:50.990]  So a lot of the responsibility is on them.
[21:51.670 --> 21:56.230]  But you don't need to put undue pressure just to agitate.
[21:58.850 --> 22:02.490]  OK, well, let's just to close this out.
[22:02.790 --> 22:07.510]  If you are interested in getting vaccinated and you're in the New York area, it's never been simple, simpler.
[22:07.610 --> 22:08.830]  It's never been simpler than now.
[22:09.370 --> 22:10.750]  You can get a vaccine today.
[22:10.750 --> 22:18.370]  Well, maybe it's a little late today, but it's it's certainly a lot easier than it was a few weeks ago or a couple of months ago.
[22:19.430 --> 22:21.750]  You can call 877-VAX-4NYC.
[22:22.330 --> 22:25.170]  That's 877-829-4692.
[22:25.890 --> 22:33.590]  And that will allow you to schedule an appointment or request free transportation to a vaccine site or get this.
[22:33.590 --> 22:38.330]  You can even request in-home vaccination if you're homebound and can't get out.
[22:38.670 --> 22:46.650]  Somebody will come to your house with a needle and it doesn't sound nearly as bad as it sounds, but but that can actually be arranged if that's what you want.
[22:47.290 --> 22:48.710]  But it's super simple.
[22:48.710 --> 22:50.730]  And that's just in New York City.
[22:50.910 --> 22:58.230]  Just go on the Web, look up COVID-19 vaccine near me, and you'll likely get a whole bunch of options.
[22:59.050 --> 23:02.330]  And you can get it done quickly and get back to normal quickly.
[23:02.330 --> 23:03.450]  Isn't that what we all want?
[23:03.550 --> 23:08.970]  It's it's just so funny to see us getting back to normal and the same people are now complaining about that.
[23:09.650 --> 23:10.350]  Oh, boy.
[23:11.030 --> 23:16.210]  OK, so I'm looking forward to coming back at some point.
[23:16.410 --> 23:19.710]  But again, you know, that's up to the station as to when they deem it safe.
[23:19.890 --> 23:21.870]  They are their own entity.
[23:21.870 --> 23:33.730]  And just like anyone, any business or a home or building, they have the right to determine when it's safe, when they believe it's safe for people to actually return.
[23:34.770 --> 23:39.610]  But for now, going to New York City, walking around, that's becoming normal again.
[23:39.750 --> 23:40.770]  And that's a good thing.
[23:40.870 --> 23:41.650]  And yes, Alex, you're right.
[23:41.710 --> 23:44.430]  We have not actually been to Manhattan in a while.
[23:44.650 --> 23:52.470]  And looking forward to seeing it again, seeing what's changed, kind of dreading seeing what's changed, all the businesses that might not be there anymore.
[23:52.470 --> 23:55.990]  And that's one of the real tragedies of this.
[23:56.650 --> 24:00.670]  If you know of businesses that are struggling, help them out.
[24:00.890 --> 24:03.090]  And there are so many ways you can do that.
[24:03.350 --> 24:09.310]  Just frequent their establishments or order something from them or just be there.
[24:09.530 --> 24:10.490]  You know, be present.
[24:10.710 --> 24:12.730]  That matters more than you can possibly imagine.
[24:13.310 --> 24:13.790]  Yes, Alex?
[24:14.250 --> 24:15.790]  You're going to be very surprised.
[24:15.790 --> 24:22.930]  And I think pleasantly surprised, in one sense, too, because the whole character of the city, I feel like, is starting to bounce back.
[24:23.090 --> 24:29.490]  What was lost, especially in Manhattan, was that buzz, that vibe that you felt whenever you would leave your apartment.
[24:29.590 --> 24:33.290]  You stepped out onto the street, wherever you were, and you felt like there was this energy.
[24:33.950 --> 24:39.070]  But that energy was really missing for, I would say, a little over a year.
[24:39.310 --> 24:41.670]  Maybe about 13, 14 months, it felt like it was gone.
[24:41.870 --> 24:43.130]  It feels like it's back now.
[24:43.270 --> 24:44.950]  It's becoming a fun place again.
[24:44.950 --> 24:48.870]  And you're starting to see a lot more people on the streets that aren't wearing masks.
[24:49.410 --> 24:52.290]  And that's a little bit scary, but a lot of people are vaccinated.
[24:52.290 --> 24:53.010]  They're outside.
[24:54.010 --> 25:05.890]  It's also a lot different because you're going to see now, Emmanuel, all of these outdoor dining kiosks that have cropped up on almost every single street.
[25:06.290 --> 25:11.410]  And I hope that they stay there for the foreseeable future because it's extra seating for these restaurants.
[25:11.410 --> 25:13.190]  It's fun to sit out there.
[25:14.270 --> 25:16.750]  And you're kind of part of the street scenery.
[25:16.950 --> 25:23.890]  It's become part of the city to see all of these almost pop-up-like structures that are outdoor dining.
[25:24.150 --> 25:26.190]  And the weather is ripe for it now.
[25:26.310 --> 25:28.930]  Now is the time to go out and support your local restaurants.
[25:29.090 --> 25:29.590]  Get out there.
[25:29.690 --> 25:30.490]  Have fun in Manhattan.
[25:31.450 --> 25:34.210]  Or any one of the five boroughs of New York City.
[25:34.950 --> 25:36.290]  It's a different place.
[25:36.410 --> 25:37.110]  It's bouncing back.
[25:37.310 --> 25:40.630]  And I want to be there when you guys first return.
[25:40.970 --> 25:41.650]  Promise me that.
[25:41.870 --> 25:42.430]  Yeah, absolutely.
[25:42.590 --> 25:43.610]  You'll be notified.
[25:43.770 --> 25:46.350]  But yes, the outdoor dining is a great thing.
[25:46.430 --> 25:50.590]  Probably one of the best things to come out of COVID-19, if there are any good things that came out of it.
[25:50.690 --> 25:52.350]  That change, making that permanent.
[25:52.570 --> 25:54.430]  But we need to make it safe as well.
[25:54.430 --> 25:57.610]  We can't have cars plowing into diners.
[25:57.710 --> 25:58.990]  It's happened a couple of times.
[25:59.530 --> 26:04.570]  We need to make those structures safe, just like we need to make bike lanes safe from cars.
[26:06.110 --> 26:11.310]  So these are things that, I guess, the next mayor, whoever that may be, will have a big say in it.
[26:11.370 --> 26:14.790]  But we as people have a voice as well, and we should exercise that.
[26:15.090 --> 26:16.670]  Okay, let's move on.
[26:17.350 --> 26:19.430]  We were talking about IRC a little bit.
[26:19.430 --> 26:23.090]  And boy, there is a bit of a war going on on IRC.
[26:23.090 --> 26:24.810]  But this time, we're not involved.
[26:25.170 --> 26:28.890]  It's the Freenode, IS-IRC network.
[26:29.750 --> 26:34.050]  They have experienced a massive resignation of staff.
[26:34.250 --> 26:46.650]  And that's after control of Freenode passed to what one of them described as, and this is a quote, a narcissistic, Trumpian, wannabe, Korean royalty, bitcoins millionaire.
[26:48.330 --> 26:49.430]  That's what they said.
[26:49.670 --> 26:58.210]  I don't know what most of that means, but it's not a positive characterization of the person taking over Freenode.
[26:59.350 --> 27:12.910]  So, basically, what has happened here is that the open source communications network was sold a couple of years ago, actually.
[27:14.710 --> 27:22.450]  And at the time, it appeared there would not be any radical changes and that everything would continue as normal.
[27:23.070 --> 27:27.210]  And apparently, that is no longer the case.
[27:27.310 --> 27:43.230]  According to this article here, during the past few months in general, and the last weeks in particular, it has become increasingly clear that the owners of the holding company, Freenode LTD, have been planning a hostile takeover of the Freenode network.
[27:43.230 --> 27:49.330]  That takeover is now about to happen, and I cannot, in good faith, volunteer for this new Freenode.
[27:49.410 --> 27:51.370]  I'm reading a quote from an ex-employee.
[27:52.170 --> 28:01.150]  Freenode LTD's current owner's values do not align with the values Freenode the network was founded on and operated up until now.
[28:03.050 --> 28:05.790]  And here's from another ex-employee.
[28:05.850 --> 28:14.430]  To make a long story short, the former Freenode head of staff secretly sold the network to this person, even if it was not hers to sell.
[28:14.730 --> 28:20.750]  And our lawyers have advised us that there is not much that we can do about it without some of us risking financial ruin.
[28:21.470 --> 28:25.350]  So, boy, there's some drama going on here.
[28:25.530 --> 28:30.610]  You thought you'd seen IRC drama before, but, boy, this is something unprecedented.
[28:30.970 --> 28:35.190]  Now, the new owner has a side to the story, as you might expect.
[28:36.670 --> 28:50.450]  And they say, given the millions I have injected into Freenode thus far, the fact I own it, and the fact that I protected the Freenode staff with professional legal work and funding when they needed help, and they could still lie in slander like this,
[28:50.610 --> 28:52.690]  says a lot about who they are.
[28:52.690 --> 29:01.830]  It saddens me that Christelle was forced out, and I wish she'd feel safe returning.
[29:02.670 --> 29:04.690]  I'm frustrated... I'm naming names here.
[29:04.750 --> 29:06.950]  I don't know exactly who they are, but they're obviously key players.
[29:07.130 --> 29:13.150]  I'm frustrated that Tamal's hostile takeover seems likely to succeed in spite of it all.
[29:13.410 --> 29:20.730]  I simply want Freenode to keep on being a great IRC network and to support it financially and legally, as I have for a long time now.
[29:20.830 --> 29:27.410]  That's from the new owner, who is saying that a hostile takeover is in progress, and apparently he's not involved in that.
[29:29.170 --> 29:40.350]  Andrew Lee is the name of the new owner, and he recently profiled in the South China Morning Post in an unflattering display, apparently.
[29:40.930 --> 29:45.210]  Founded 26 years ago, home to some 80,000 users, over 40,000 channels.
[29:45.210 --> 29:52.570]  The Freenode is reportedly the largest IRC network and has enjoyed something of a rollercoaster history.
[29:53.190 --> 29:57.430]  A number of those resigning have established a new IRC network.
[29:57.450 --> 29:58.530]  You knew they were going to do that.
[29:58.910 --> 30:04.530]  That new IRC network, get your pens ready, is libera.chat.
[30:04.530 --> 30:07.550]  That's L-I-B-E-R-A dot chat.
[30:09.010 --> 30:14.630]  Okay, and that's where you can go to follow the story and not be on Freenode.
[30:14.630 --> 30:16.070]  Or you can go to our IRC network.
[30:16.070 --> 30:19.570]  We've had that for a bunch of years, IRC.2600.net.
[30:19.870 --> 30:20.950]  You won't see any drama.
[30:21.110 --> 30:24.950]  No, you'll see plenty of drama there, but it's the nature of the beast.
[30:25.070 --> 30:26.830]  But boy, what do you think of this story, Alex?
[30:28.330 --> 30:33.730]  There's a lot, I think, that requires additional explanation here as well.
[30:34.570 --> 30:41.130]  Everyone's calling this a hostile takeover, but it seems like the company was willingly sold.
[30:42.130 --> 30:44.930]  Supposedly by somebody who didn't have the right to sell it, according to some?
[30:45.810 --> 30:54.690]  Perhaps, but if there's no legal recourse, then apparently whoever sold it did have the right to sell it, or the person is a bona fide purchaser of the company.
[30:54.850 --> 30:58.130]  It would take a hell of a lot to unwind that particular transaction.
[30:58.130 --> 31:00.150]  It might be a very costly battle.
[31:00.550 --> 31:10.570]  But it doesn't necessarily make a lot of sense to me have the sale of a company occur in 2017 really for no reason whatsoever.
[31:10.610 --> 31:26.970]  If everything was going to run based on the status quo of what Freenode was doing at that particular time, it doesn't necessarily make sense to have some Bitcoin millionaire from Korea with royal ties to take over the company.
[31:27.190 --> 31:37.170]  So what I would like to know, and I'm sure what a whole bunch of others were probably wondering too, is what else has been happening since 2017 with Freenode?
[31:37.310 --> 31:44.490]  Have there been any things going on, any undercurrents that could affect these open source projects?
[31:44.630 --> 31:52.050]  I mean, Freenode is used for a massive amount of open source project collaboration, and I think this is certainly going to affect those open source projects.
[31:52.430 --> 32:12.930]  But the other issue I have here too, is two other points, is that it seems like something was brewing in February, when this individual who apparently didn't have the right to sell the company, who didn't sold the company, put on the logo, put a Shells.com logo on Freenode,
[32:13.090 --> 32:27.930]  which apparently is a company that was co-founded by Andrew Lee, who bought Freenode, and this other individual by the name of Mark Coppola, who many of us will remember from Mt.
[32:28.050 --> 32:28.430]  Gox.
[32:29.210 --> 32:29.990]  And Mt.
[32:30.070 --> 32:37.670]  Gox was a massive Bitcoin exchange, one of the largest Bitcoin exchanges I think that the world has ever seen, operating out of Tokyo.
[32:38.330 --> 32:44.190]  And they lost, I think it was around 850,000 Bitcoin back in 2014.
[32:44.990 --> 32:58.450]  And according to multiple sources, and it's my opinion as well, a lot of that was on account of theft and mismanagement, and probably, in all likelihood, a bunch of fraud as well.
[32:58.550 --> 33:00.970]  A huge amount of those Bitcoins has been recovered.
[33:01.090 --> 33:06.770]  In fact, an entire cottage industry has popped up about recovery of Mt.
[33:06.850 --> 33:09.790]  Gox Bitcoins, which are obviously extremely valuable now.
[33:09.790 --> 33:23.570]  But having that individual associated with Freenode is certainly something I imagine a lot of these developers and people that have been with Freenode, possibly for decades, would just not want to have.
[33:24.070 --> 33:36.230]  Now, here's the other interesting thing that I picked up when reading this story as well, is that you mentioned Libra.Chat, Emmanuel, which is the new domain name.
[33:36.390 --> 33:42.430]  It's in the .Chat top-level domain, which is a new generic top-level domain that came out a few years ago.
[33:42.710 --> 33:50.230]  But if you look up Libra.Chat, it was actually created not within the last few days.
[33:50.230 --> 33:53.890]  It was created on the 23rd of April of 2021.
[33:54.650 --> 34:05.090]  So that also indicates to me that something was brewing here beneath the surface over at Freenode, and people a few weeks ago knew something was coming down.
[34:06.390 --> 34:14.210]  Who was the person mentioned in this story that was leaving or changing, that was aggrieved?
[34:14.350 --> 34:19.290]  There's a notice there from my connection logs.
[34:19.370 --> 34:33.650]  It just says, It feels like my moral responsibility to inform all users' administrative control of Freenode and its user data will soon change hands, and I'll be resigning from Freenode's staff.
[34:33.910 --> 34:34.790]  Effective immediately.
[34:35.210 --> 34:36.570]  It has been an honor to help you all.
[34:36.630 --> 34:40.430]  Well, it sounds like that's a message that's being echoed by many people at Freenode right now.
[34:40.550 --> 34:43.930]  Yeah, so this must be part of some of the exodus.
[34:44.230 --> 34:48.970]  And I noticed in IRC, which I occasionally checked, there was some other activity.
[34:50.390 --> 34:55.290]  It seemed like operational or like network stuff, but I haven't looked back at that either.
[34:55.390 --> 34:57.110]  But I was not aware of this.
[34:57.390 --> 34:59.070]  So should I disconnect?
[34:59.510 --> 35:01.370]  No, I'd stay connected and watch what happens.
[35:01.370 --> 35:05.710]  I guess maybe that's the thing is figure out where it goes from here.
[35:05.730 --> 35:07.190]  I'd still be connected to Parler right now.
[35:07.250 --> 35:08.010]  They didn't kick me off.
[35:08.190 --> 35:10.810]  You know, it's basically, you want to watch the entertainment.
[35:12.070 --> 35:12.510]  Fascinating.
[35:12.550 --> 35:14.830]  It is fascinating, and it's just weird to think.
[35:14.830 --> 35:19.330]  I can't find anywhere how much Freenode sold for back in 2017.
[35:19.730 --> 35:36.710]  But I imagine it was probably a hefty sum, and it's just weird to think of these networks attaining so much value, things that we kind of took for granted in the early days just as a gathering place, a place where people shared their passion for something like open source software.
[35:36.890 --> 35:37.290]  Alex?
[35:38.050 --> 35:40.130]  Well, you bring up a really good issue to me.
[35:40.250 --> 35:43.390]  I'm sure a lot of people are very curious about what the sale price was.
[35:43.390 --> 35:49.430]  But also, there should be something, some legal document that reflects the sale, that memorializes the sale.
[35:49.590 --> 35:56.310]  Usually, a purchase and sale agreement is something that would accompany a purchase of an asset like this.
[35:56.450 --> 36:05.050]  And that purchase and sale agreement may have certain obligations that the new owner is taking on to do or to not do.
[36:05.330 --> 36:08.170]  And I would love to be able to get my hands on that.
[36:08.170 --> 36:15.650]  But I think, you know, if somebody at Freenode has got access to it, I think that that's a very big missing piece of this jigsaw puzzle.
[36:15.850 --> 36:16.250]  Absolutely.
[36:16.530 --> 36:16.690]  Yeah.
[36:16.910 --> 36:18.730]  It's an interesting story.
[36:18.970 --> 36:19.590]  Interesting story.
[36:19.830 --> 36:22.190]  And, well, we'll see how that plays out.
[36:22.310 --> 36:25.710]  But IRC drama just on a massive scale.
[36:25.910 --> 36:27.490]  One that we've probably never seen before.
[36:27.690 --> 36:29.350]  But, Alex, you mentioned the...
[36:29.350 --> 36:32.650]  What was the Bitcoin hack...
[36:32.650 --> 36:33.030]  Bit...
[36:33.030 --> 36:33.670]  Bit...
[36:33.670 --> 36:33.970]  What now?
[36:34.310 --> 36:35.170]  Oh, it was Mt.
[36:35.290 --> 36:35.630]  Gox.
[36:35.810 --> 36:35.970]  Mt.
[36:36.090 --> 36:36.390]  Gox.
[36:36.590 --> 36:36.910]  Yeah.
[36:36.950 --> 36:39.810]  One of the largest Bitcoin exchanges in Tokyo.
[36:40.030 --> 36:45.330]  Well, there was also another hack called Bitfinex.
[36:45.530 --> 36:46.490]  I think I'm pronouncing it right.
[36:47.070 --> 36:48.030]  These aren't words.
[36:48.290 --> 36:48.630]  I'm sorry.
[36:48.710 --> 36:49.970]  I can pronounce it however I want.
[36:50.630 --> 36:51.070]  Bitfinex.
[36:51.210 --> 36:52.370]  That's how I'm choosing to pronounce this.
[36:52.850 --> 36:54.630]  And that was another crypto exchange.
[36:54.910 --> 36:57.470]  They had a hacking incident back in 2016.
[36:58.050 --> 37:05.870]  So, what's interesting about this is that they say the assets that were stolen are going to take over a century to get cashed out.
[37:06.010 --> 37:10.670]  That's according to the blockchain intelligence firm, Elliptic.
[37:11.010 --> 37:14.510]  And I just think it's cool that there's a blockchain intelligence firm out there.
[37:15.450 --> 37:15.970]  Yeah.
[37:18.790 --> 37:33.890]  Basically, remaining 21% of this hack has been moved around by the malicious cyber attackers but they've only managed to launder 4% of their total haul and that's $270 million.
[37:34.230 --> 37:41.730]  So, I don't know if I'm supposed to feel good about this but they've only gotten $270 million instead of the $7 billion that they stole.
[37:42.650 --> 37:58.170]  Elliptic pointed out that the reason for their particular conclusion is the evolution of crypto tracking tools, regulations, and law enforcement methodologies that make stolen or ill-gotten digital assets very challenging to cash out today.
[37:58.370 --> 37:58.750]  Yeah.
[37:58.910 --> 38:02.470]  It's no longer something simple that you can just get away with.
[38:02.730 --> 38:09.270]  The intelligence company explained that the hackers used something called peel chains to exchange the stolen funds.
[38:09.390 --> 38:20.350]  In this method, crypto tokens are moved around numerous times moving fast from wallet to wallet and only a small amount of the Bitcoin is peeled off to their actual destination along the way.
[38:21.190 --> 38:35.090]  Now, back then it was extremely hard to track crypto assets laundered using this method but today, the emergence of automatic tracing systems capable of determining the ultimate source or funds in an address makes the job a lot easier for the authorities.
[38:35.550 --> 38:35.870]  Yeah.
[38:36.070 --> 38:36.770]  The authorities.
[38:36.790 --> 38:37.890]  They're on top of this.
[38:37.890 --> 38:50.810]  After the successful attack on Bitfinex in 2016 the laundering process started in 2017 through the largest darknet market at that time which we all know is...
[38:51.670 --> 38:52.270]  No?
[38:52.410 --> 38:52.730]  No guesses?
[38:53.070 --> 38:54.070]  Alpha Bay.
[38:54.730 --> 38:55.970]  They teach this in schools.
[38:56.330 --> 38:56.790]  They're gone.
[38:57.050 --> 38:58.730]  Elementary school kids know this history.
[38:58.910 --> 38:58.950]  Sure.
[38:59.110 --> 38:59.690]  Yeah, they're gone.
[38:59.730 --> 39:00.110]  They're gone.
[39:00.250 --> 39:05.110]  But later that year it was shut down by law enforcement prompting the move to...
[39:05.110 --> 39:06.190]  Beta Bay.
[39:06.630 --> 39:06.930]  No.
[39:07.570 --> 39:09.990]  They're the biggest illegal marketplace today, kids.
[39:10.330 --> 39:10.930]  Come on.
[39:10.990 --> 39:11.650]  We all know the name.
[39:12.170 --> 39:12.670]  2600.
[39:12.910 --> 39:13.810]  Very funny, Alex.
[39:13.910 --> 39:14.270]  Very funny.
[39:16.110 --> 39:17.110]  Discuss this later.
[39:17.210 --> 39:17.870]  I don't remember.
[39:18.030 --> 39:18.550]  Hydra.
[39:18.830 --> 39:19.370]  Hydra.
[39:19.730 --> 39:20.390]  Oh, gosh.
[39:22.190 --> 39:22.730]  Cryptoslate.
[39:22.910 --> 39:39.190]  I don't know who Cryptoslate is but they are citing part of the report from Elliptic stating after a hiatus in 2019 the launders returned to Hydra in 2020 I feel like I'm reading a science fiction novel and are currently depositing $3 million of the stolen Bitcoin every month.
[39:39.390 --> 39:42.130]  So their income has been slashed to $3 million a month.
[39:42.250 --> 39:43.930]  So I guess that's success.
[39:44.090 --> 39:50.950]  But the thing is all that money that was stolen is still not accessible to the people that rightfully owned it.
[39:51.010 --> 39:53.710]  So it's not really a happy ending here.
[39:53.710 --> 39:55.050]  And it's...
[39:55.570 --> 40:00.610]  I just imagine the frustration of those people that bought Bitcoin early on and said, you know what?
[40:00.630 --> 40:01.790]  I'll take a thousand Bitcoin.
[40:01.790 --> 40:02.890]  What the hell?
[40:03.230 --> 40:08.290]  And then they lost access to it somehow whether it was stolen or they just forgot the password.
[40:08.490 --> 40:09.690]  And now...
[40:09.690 --> 40:21.130]  Well, of course, it's been plummeting lately but when it does get high up and even now it'd be worth an incredible amount if only they had held on to the password or not been hacked in one way or another.
[40:21.130 --> 40:23.350]  So there's all kinds of risks involved here.
[40:23.430 --> 40:35.990]  And I think as we've said many times, it's a fun project, you know, maybe not the most responsible project in the world but you should never put in more than you can afford to lose because likely you will lose it.
[40:36.610 --> 40:37.250]  Go ahead, Alex.
[40:37.430 --> 40:52.470]  And I will say there are many, many, many different types of scams that are targeting cryptocurrency exchanges and individuals that are known to have accounts on cryptocurrency exchanges and monitoring the DNS for all different types of phishing and credentials harvesting.
[40:52.870 --> 41:02.270]  We see, especially within the last year, cryptocurrency exchanges being one of the most highly targeted types of attacks on individuals as well.
[41:02.370 --> 41:12.810]  And the other thing I would mention too is that, you know, I actually do investigate and trace stolen Bitcoins as well and do have a...
[41:12.810 --> 41:13.730]  I didn't know you did this.
[41:14.070 --> 41:15.070]  Yeah, we do.
[41:15.150 --> 41:16.630]  We do it through my law firm.
[41:16.630 --> 41:23.810]  And we actually have an active case with respect to a large amount of stolen Bitcoin right now.
[41:24.290 --> 41:25.290]  And it is difficult.
[41:25.470 --> 41:34.830]  It's very difficult to track these things because the bad guys, obviously, they know that the more places, the more hops it takes, the more inputs and outputs that have to be traced, the more difficult it is.
[41:35.110 --> 41:37.070]  They use not necessarily...
[41:37.070 --> 41:43.690]  They use things called mixers, which you put in some Bitcoin and it goes and shoots out in all these different places algorithmically.
[41:43.830 --> 41:45.490]  It's very difficult to track and trace that.
[41:45.990 --> 41:56.270]  But they also use more or rather less sophisticated means of just regular coin swapping services that would have other legitimate reasons for existence aside from laundering money.
[41:56.850 --> 42:06.270]  But at the end of the day, it still is very difficult for these individuals to get the money out of the system of what's called edging out and going into fiat currency.
[42:06.690 --> 42:09.530]  And they'll use over-the-counter services.
[42:09.830 --> 42:12.070]  Let's say millions of Bitcoin are stolen.
[42:12.230 --> 42:28.950]  It becomes very difficult to actually turn that into cash because of all of these KYC requirements, because there is documentation, and because a lot of these exchanges want to cooperate with law enforcement these days because they want to be on larger exchanges.
[42:28.950 --> 42:30.270]  They want to be on Coinbase.
[42:30.410 --> 42:33.390]  They want to be on other bigger companies like Celsius as well.
[42:34.050 --> 42:40.850]  And in order to do that, you cannot countenance a large amount of fraud or money laundering happening on your network.
[42:40.850 --> 42:46.650]  So, on the one hand, cooperating with law enforcement, some people would see that as not such a great thing.
[42:46.810 --> 42:54.370]  I see it as a very good thing for cryptocurrencies because it makes it more predictable, it makes it more usable and more secure and stable.
[42:54.530 --> 42:59.430]  Well, it's different than ratting out people for what they're buying with cryptocurrencies.
[42:59.890 --> 43:00.330]  That's right.
[43:00.330 --> 43:04.330]  You're basically just trying to return stolen cryptocurrencies from the very people that use your services.
[43:05.130 --> 43:06.210]  That's exactly right.
[43:06.210 --> 43:07.050]  That's exactly right.
[43:07.050 --> 43:15.970]  But it is very dangerous and there is a lot of cybersecurity-related hygiene that goes into having money in cryptocurrency as well.
[43:16.170 --> 43:29.850]  And if you are not following very strict best practices for how you manage your cryptocurrency walls, you have a high likelihood, I think, of being scammed and possibly losing a lot of money.
[43:30.330 --> 43:37.470]  So, you know, giving some additional thought to cybersecurity best practices and handling wallets is certainly something to do.
[43:37.610 --> 43:42.050]  Well, my suggestion, if you're a crypto criminal, is that what they call them?
[43:42.530 --> 43:54.110]  Somebody who has stolen a great deal or know people who have done this and you find yourself in this rather awkward position where you're only getting a couple of million dollars a month now and you want to get it all.
[43:54.170 --> 43:54.930]  Well, you're not going to get it all.
[43:55.090 --> 43:56.930]  It's pretty obvious it's going to get worse.
[43:57.190 --> 43:59.250]  So maybe work out a deal.
[43:59.490 --> 44:02.590]  Maybe they get some kind of a reward for giving it back.
[44:02.930 --> 44:10.410]  And then the people who are taken from they get their money back and you don't go to jail and you get a little reward and you never do it again.
[44:11.170 --> 44:12.230]  Does that sound reasonable?
[44:13.030 --> 44:13.790]  Well, maybe.
[44:14.150 --> 44:14.290]  Yeah.
[44:14.490 --> 44:15.690]  I mean, look, there are...
[44:15.690 --> 44:24.050]  I believe there have been in the past some returns of stolen coins in exchange for non-prosecution arrangements.
[44:24.290 --> 44:26.230]  So there's also that to consider as well.
[44:26.350 --> 44:43.770]  So if my words can help convince somebody who is sitting on a couple of billion dollars worth of Bitcoin now to return it to the rightful owners and get a small reward for that, maybe those rightful owners can give me a little, you know, a moderate reward for making a suggestion in the first place and helping them get their fortune back.
[44:44.210 --> 44:46.710]  Or give it to a charity.
[44:46.870 --> 44:47.210]  Or that.
[44:47.930 --> 44:55.170]  give it to India, the health system there, which is strapped, accepting donations.
[44:55.170 --> 44:58.370]  Give it to the rainforest since you're destroying the rainforest by using it in the first place.
[44:58.410 --> 45:06.590]  I really, truly believe that how you actually spend and use this kind of currency is, it matters.
[45:08.230 --> 45:10.170]  And hopefully people are thoughtful.
[45:10.470 --> 45:13.830]  They use their crypto assets responsibly.
[45:13.830 --> 45:21.530]  There's been a lot of talk lately about the environmental impact of cryptocurrencies because of the huge amount of CPU power that needs to be used and the energy costs.
[45:22.010 --> 45:28.450]  And we, as a community, need to figure out a better way to do that so that it's not causing more problems than it's solving.
[45:29.330 --> 45:35.190]  That is number one and it's hard to believe that this wasn't thought out from the beginning.
[45:35.790 --> 45:37.250]  So that's a challenge.
[45:37.570 --> 45:41.570]  All right, we said we were going to talk about Colonial Pipeline and we're almost done with the show and we haven't even started yet.
[45:41.790 --> 45:52.890]  So as you all know, Columbia Pipeline was hit with ransomware and that slowed their supply of fuel to a crawl or to nothing.
[45:53.410 --> 45:55.030]  And what do you think happened?
[45:55.110 --> 46:04.590]  Of course, people in certain states, I won't name them, decided to panic and just basically buy all the gasoline they possibly could.
[46:04.770 --> 46:05.490]  And guess what?
[46:05.570 --> 46:07.850]  There was a gasoline shortage as a result of that.
[46:07.990 --> 46:13.230]  And then people in one particular part of the political spectrum decided to blame that on the current president.
[46:13.230 --> 46:15.350]  I don't know how you get there.
[46:15.530 --> 46:18.730]  I don't know how that is something that's in any way logical.
[46:19.350 --> 46:22.210]  But yeah, it's Biden's gasoline crisis.
[46:22.890 --> 46:23.250]  Yeah, sure.
[46:23.390 --> 46:23.810]  Okay, whatever.
[46:24.390 --> 46:29.010]  So Colonial Pipeline basically was hit with this ransomware that shut down their operations temporarily.
[46:29.970 --> 46:33.550]  And they made a statement saying that they were not going to pay.
[46:33.730 --> 46:34.050]  They're not going
[46:43.230 --> 46:44.070]  going to go that route.
[46:44.270 --> 46:48.090]  And it seemed like the right step to take because I happen to agree with that.
[46:48.190 --> 46:50.950]  I happen to think that you should never pay a ransom.
[46:51.110 --> 46:52.530]  You should have backups.
[46:52.850 --> 46:58.070]  You should have, you know, a means of restoring because there's all kinds of things that can happen.
[46:58.370 --> 47:01.370]  You know, a ransomware attack is only one crisis that can happen.
[47:02.970 --> 47:04.590]  Your provider can go out of business.
[47:04.970 --> 47:05.930]  A hurricane could hit.
[47:06.090 --> 47:10.050]  All sorts of things could happen that would make your data unattainable.
[47:10.490 --> 47:12.990]  And if you have a backup, at least you have something.
[47:13.130 --> 47:20.250]  Yeah, you'll lose however many days the backup is old, but you will at least have something.
[47:20.430 --> 47:27.710]  And it's, I think every computer user at some point has lost a significant amount of data and has learned a lesson from that.
[47:27.850 --> 47:30.790]  If only I had kept a backup, this wouldn't have happened.
[47:30.790 --> 47:37.290]  Or if I had printed something out instead of just having it in one location, you know, there's all sorts of ways that you can fix things.
[47:37.410 --> 47:40.690]  And obviously, the bigger the company, the more complex it gets.
[47:40.850 --> 47:42.270]  But the concept is simple.
[47:42.510 --> 47:43.410]  Keep a damn backup.
[47:43.650 --> 47:46.050]  It seemed like that's what Colonial Pipeline was doing.
[47:46.450 --> 47:53.510]  And then word got out that, in fact, they paid $5 million to the hackers to get the data back.
[47:53.670 --> 48:02.730]  But, apparently, it was taking so long to get the data back from the hackers that they wound up restoring from backup anyway.
[48:02.730 --> 48:10.610]  So they just basically donated $5 million and got their data back through a backup in the end anyway.
[48:11.530 --> 48:13.390]  Really, really crazy story.
[48:13.510 --> 48:18.910]  And it turns out the hacking group that was responsible for this was feeling somewhat guilty.
[48:18.910 --> 48:25.590]  They were basically saying they never meant to cause so much trouble and they disbanded right afterwards for whatever that's worth.
[48:27.030 --> 48:40.990]  The whole thing was just a carnival of weirdness, but not so atypical when you think about all the technological advancements and regressions that we've seen over the past few years and decades.
[48:41.230 --> 48:42.550]  Alex, what was your take on it?
[48:43.390 --> 49:08.050]  You know, I want to respond to one of your points as well, which is that the need for backups, absolutely backups are critical if you're experiencing a ransomware event, but with more people taking proper backups as a precaution against ransomware, what the more sophisticated cyber adversaries are doing now in addition to encrypting your data and charging you to decrypt it to get it back,
[49:08.190 --> 49:15.030]  that is, is they're telling you that if you do not pay the ransom, then they're going to release your information to the public.
[49:15.170 --> 49:16.190]  Which they can do anyway.
[49:16.710 --> 49:21.010]  Certainly, they can do that anyway, but it's not certain that they will do that.
[49:21.010 --> 49:30.310]  It wasn't certain that they would do that in the past, but that's a different type of threat that you cannot combat by a backup.
[49:30.550 --> 49:38.590]  A backup isn't going to prevent your private or confidential data from your company, your trade secrets perhaps, released out to the public.
[49:38.770 --> 49:42.490]  So, it's another vector of consideration here.
[49:42.650 --> 49:45.490]  But you're absolutely right, and there's no guarantee and you're dealing with these criminals.
[49:45.690 --> 49:55.170]  I tend to actually do, I do believe them when they said that they didn't intend to cause this much chaos, this much damage.
[49:56.950 --> 49:59.270]  Look, they're ransomware criminals.
[50:00.470 --> 50:01.350]  DarkSide is...
[50:01.350 --> 50:02.390]  But what does that mean, Alex?
[50:02.430 --> 50:03.550]  It could be 12-year-olds.
[50:03.750 --> 50:07.450]  You can get ransomware software for like 30 bucks.
[50:07.590 --> 50:08.610]  Anybody can do this.
[50:08.750 --> 50:08.990]  Sure.
[50:09.270 --> 50:10.950]  Sure, they can, absolutely.
[50:11.150 --> 50:21.050]  But, you know, it does take a certain amount of skill to get inside a network, to move around laterally, to figure out what's a critical place that you need to encrypt this data so that you can extract the maximum amount of money.
[50:21.170 --> 50:22.750]  You have to have some skills.
[50:22.930 --> 50:23.890]  You have to have some knowledge.
[50:24.310 --> 50:30.810]  I think you need more of a lack of security on the part of the victim than you do when they need skills on the part of the attacker.
[50:31.230 --> 50:34.190]  you know, look, there's so many weak links in any of these large organizations.
[50:34.250 --> 50:38.710]  I don't want to blame the victim for getting, you know, breached in this particular sense.
[50:38.830 --> 50:41.150]  But, of course, everybody needs to be doing better here.
[50:41.410 --> 50:45.070]  But I do think, you know, the payment of the ransomware was interesting.
[50:45.070 --> 50:47.730]  You're absolutely right because it wasn't efficacious.
[50:47.850 --> 50:48.610]  It didn't work.
[50:48.850 --> 50:54.770]  But, on the other hand, going back to what we just talked about, that's another avenue by which these guys can be traced.
[50:55.050 --> 51:01.790]  I think they're going to be extremely careful about trying to edge out any of that $5 million into actual fiat currency.
[51:02.190 --> 51:18.410]  But, you know, the other, I think, component of this colonial pipeline ransomware that hasn't been all that discussed was that they seem to have taken their systems down and stopped the supply of gas, you know, at least on the east coast of the United States,
[51:18.410 --> 51:20.230]  which affected gas prices everywhere.
[51:20.510 --> 51:24.770]  People were putting gasoline in plastic bags at gas stations.
[51:24.930 --> 51:27.170]  It was utter chaos and stupidity.
[51:27.230 --> 51:27.730]  For no reason.
[51:28.070 --> 51:36.830]  And I'm sure a lot of the people that were not wearing masks in diners as well were probably filling up gas tanks or gas, plastic bags or gas rather.
[51:36.830 --> 51:49.790]  but I think that the what's lost here is that colonial seems to have taken down that system primarily because they couldn't bill their customers Yes, exactly.
[51:50.130 --> 51:50.730]  that supply.
[51:50.970 --> 51:51.130]  Right.
[51:51.310 --> 51:53.590]  It's about them billing the proper amount.
[51:53.730 --> 51:58.910]  They could have kept the flow going and sorted it out later but as a business they chose not to do that.
[51:59.170 --> 52:05.370]  They chose not to do that or they could have negotiated some kind of agreement with the federal government that said, look, we're hit here.
[52:05.370 --> 52:09.250]  you need to at least agree to indemnify us and bail us out.
[52:09.330 --> 52:13.490]  I mean, the federal government has a habit of bailing out businesses in trouble.
[52:13.770 --> 52:17.850]  I mean, think about all the massive amount of money that went through to PPP loans.
[52:18.070 --> 52:19.950]  Think about the banks that were bailed out.
[52:20.070 --> 52:35.530]  I don't necessarily understand why colonial couldn't go to the federal government negotiate something even a letter of intent or a memorandum of understanding about some kind of compensation for continuing to run a critical infrastructure oil pipeline.
[52:36.670 --> 52:39.970]  And who got hit with the cost here?
[52:40.150 --> 52:45.510]  I mean, the individuals, the consumers, the people that had to go spend upwards of $4 a gallon of gas.
[52:46.110 --> 52:50.870]  And I think, frankly, some people were injured or lost their lives in accidents.
[52:51.530 --> 52:52.330]  That's not...
[52:52.330 --> 52:56.030]  None of that has anything to do with any of this.
[52:56.170 --> 52:58.290]  That's just people, again, being dumbasses.
[52:58.570 --> 53:02.890]  We've come back to where we started and we're going to have to end it there.
[53:03.010 --> 53:06.570]  But we're going to continue this conversation on overtime on our YouTube channel.
[53:06.730 --> 53:10.830]  You can get there by going to youtube.com and typing in channel 2600.
[53:10.830 --> 53:11.710]  That's one word.
[53:12.210 --> 53:16.430]  Or going to 2600.com looking at the top of the webpage and you'll see a link there.
[53:16.830 --> 53:18.170]  And you can join us.
[53:18.270 --> 53:19.510]  You can phone in.
[53:19.770 --> 53:22.850]  You can be a part of Off the Hook.
[53:22.970 --> 53:24.210]  And you can also write to us.
[53:24.350 --> 53:26.650]  O-T-H at 2600.com.
[53:26.790 --> 53:27.610]  We'd love to hear from you.
[53:28.050 --> 53:30.730]  We will be back next week on the air.
[53:30.950 --> 53:32.250]  Keep listening to WBAI.
[53:33.090 --> 53:36.830]  And please support WBAI however you can.
[53:38.870 --> 53:40.530]  Give to WBAI.org.
[53:41.290 --> 53:42.330]  We'll see you next week.
[53:42.430 --> 53:42.530]  Good night.
[53:47.820 --> 53:49.460]  I love my computer.
[53:49.740 --> 53:51.600]  You make me feel all right.
[53:51.900 --> 53:55.360]  Every waking hour and every lonely night.
[53:55.620 --> 53:59.020]  I love my computer for all you get to me.
[53:59.040 --> 54:06.180]  In predictable errors and no identity and it's never been quite so easy.
[54:06.740 --> 54:08.760]  I've never been quite
[54:13.050 --> 54:27.530]  as quick on you and we'll be joining the most so this way and we'll never ruin each other's day cause when I'm through I just click and you just go away.
[54:34.530 --> 54:58.390]  I love my computer you're always in the mood I get so turned on when I turn on you I love my computer you never ask for more you can be a princess or you can be my whore and it's never been quite so easy I've never been quite so wealthy on
[55:07.590 --> 55:09.650]  each other's day.
[55:09.670 --> 55:12.530]  Cause when I'm through, I just click.
[55:12.830 --> 55:14.550]  And you just go away.
[55:16.510 --> 55:18.410]  You just go away.
[55:20.650 --> 55:21.510]  Only
[55:55.990 --> 55:58.670]  cause I got security.
[55:59.330 --> 56:01.110]  Her password and the key.
[56:03.530 --> 56:04.990]  Go away.
[56:07.170 --> 56:08.870]  Go away.
[56:11.090 --> 56:12.830]  Go away.
[56:18.850 --> 56:20.550]  Go away.
[56:22.770 --> 56:24.470]  Go away.
[56:24.890 --> 56:25.810]  Go away.
[56:26.650 --> 56:28.390]  Go away.
[56:30.590 --> 56:32.330]  Go away.
[56:34.490 --> 56:36.210]  Go away.
[56:38.170 --> 56:42.070]  Hi, this is Hannah from WBAI's premiums department.
[56:42.430 --> 56:52.970]  As you may know, WBAI now has a new phone number to call to make donations or to pledge for premiums at 212-209-2950.
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[00:00.000 --> 00:01.660]  And welcome everybody.
[00:02.040 --> 00:04.600]  Here we are on Off the Hook Overtime.
[00:04.980 --> 00:08.420]  On YouTube, on the internet, not on the radio.
[00:09.320 --> 00:10.120]  We all make it.
[00:10.180 --> 00:10.620]  Alex, you there?
[00:11.480 --> 00:12.380]  I am here.
[00:12.560 --> 00:12.880]  Kyle?
[00:12.940 --> 00:13.160]  Hello.
[00:13.340 --> 00:13.660]  You there?
[00:13.940 --> 00:14.320]  Hello.
[00:14.620 --> 00:16.000]  Okay, and apparently I'm here as well.
[00:16.400 --> 00:21.860]  Okay, so let's continue this conversation about Colonial Pipeline because it really is an interesting story.
[00:21.860 --> 00:24.580]  And so much we can learn from it.
[00:25.900 --> 00:35.360]  I have this statement from the group called DarkSide, who apparently was the group behind the ransomware attack.
[00:36.380 --> 00:37.540]  DarkSide Hacker Gang.
[00:37.640 --> 00:39.160]  I'm not sure how accurate any of this is.
[00:39.260 --> 00:40.200]  It could be one person.
[00:40.780 --> 00:42.680]  It could be somebody from anywhere.
[00:42.840 --> 00:45.320]  It could be somebody employed at Colonial Fall, you know.
[00:45.800 --> 00:46.620]  Anything's possible.
[00:47.340 --> 01:05.380]  But according to Boston-based Cyber Reason, DarkSide is an organized group of hackers set up along the ransomware-as-a-service business model, which means that DarkSide hackers develop and market ransomware hacking tools and sell them to other criminals who then carry out attacks.
[01:05.420 --> 01:06.780]  That's a living, isn't it?
[01:07.520 --> 01:11.620]  Think of it as the evil twin of a Silicon Valley software startup.
[01:12.100 --> 01:12.880]  Well, come on.
[01:12.940 --> 01:13.560]  Most of them are evil.
[01:13.680 --> 01:14.360]  Let's start with anyway.
[01:14.620 --> 01:15.940]  So I don't know.
[01:17.600 --> 01:22.260]  Basically, what they said was, the statement they issued, we are apolitical.
[01:22.600 --> 01:24.820]  God forbid we get dragged into politics.
[01:25.120 --> 01:27.180]  Yeah, we'll steal millions of dollars.
[01:27.280 --> 01:28.000]  That's not a problem.
[01:28.180 --> 01:30.700]  But politics leave us out.
[01:31.020 --> 01:32.360]  Yeah, we are apolitical.
[01:32.480 --> 01:39.000]  We do not participate in geopolitics, do not need to tie us with a defined government and look for our motives.
[01:39.240 --> 01:42.760]  Our goal is to make money and not creating problems for society.
[01:43.140 --> 01:51.240]  From today, we introduce moderation and check each company that our partners want to encrypt to avoid social consequences in the future.
[01:51.380 --> 01:52.240]  What does that mean?
[01:52.520 --> 01:53.960]  They just don't want the publicity?
[01:54.420 --> 01:55.620]  Social consequences?
[01:56.000 --> 01:57.840]  There's always going to be social consequences.
[01:58.660 --> 02:05.080]  Well, when there's social consequences, they often are precursors to the involvement of law enforcement.
[02:05.580 --> 02:15.520]  What they ultimately want to avoid is law enforcement being chased down by the FBI and extradited to the United States.
[02:16.100 --> 02:21.500]  Well, according to this group, Cyber Reason, they're not the cyber attackers.
[02:21.500 --> 02:22.480]  They're the security people.
[02:23.380 --> 02:31.040]  They report that DarkSide has a perverse desire to appear ethical, even posting its own code of conduct for it.
[02:31.540 --> 02:32.300]  I'm sorry.
[02:32.620 --> 02:35.280]  Ransomware people have codes of conduct.
[02:36.320 --> 02:38.660]  That's... well, it's important to be inclusive, I guess, right?
[02:38.660 --> 02:43.360]  We include all organizations and businesses in our attacks.
[02:43.820 --> 02:44.900]  We don't discriminate.
[02:45.680 --> 02:51.140]  You know, the flip side of having a code of conduct, you have to think about it from the perspective of the victim as well.
[02:51.280 --> 02:55.400]  If you know that you've been targeted by DarkSide, they have a code of conduct.
[02:55.540 --> 02:56.920]  They may have reputation scores.
[02:56.920 --> 03:07.880]  Some of these ransomware gangs, especially on, you know, darknet forums and things, they get rated on how well their decryption tools work, whether you can trust them to decrypt the data.
[03:08.120 --> 03:09.040]  Hang on, hang on.
[03:09.120 --> 03:11.360]  They get, what, there's a Yelp review for these guys?
[03:11.620 --> 03:12.620]  Where are they rated?
[03:13.380 --> 03:15.520]  Similarly, you know, in that sense.
[03:15.640 --> 03:18.460]  But absolutely, there are all different types of forums that you can rate.
[03:18.740 --> 03:32.160]  Some of them, they're not necessarily all on the dark web, but you can you can get an assessment of, you know, which ransomware gang you can trust, which one, you know, has a reputation for just taking the money and running, but which ones are going to be It's not,
[03:32.220 --> 03:37.220]  it's not like you can just take your ransomware encrypted files elsewhere, right?
[03:37.360 --> 03:38.920]  They're the ones that chose you.
[03:39.360 --> 03:42.120]  If anything, you should have the rating for having bad security.
[03:42.380 --> 03:45.080]  But if they have a bad rating, what's your, what are your options?
[03:45.240 --> 03:46.840]  You can't just go to a different gang.
[03:47.240 --> 03:51.120]  The ratings are there to encourage people to pay, right?
[03:51.240 --> 03:52.700]  And the same thing with the code of conduct.
[03:52.860 --> 04:01.040]  If you have this code of conduct, you seem like, yeah, you've got some modicum of ethics, you know, you look, you're encrypting somebody else's files and demanding a ransom for it.
[04:01.080 --> 04:08.420]  So you don't have a large amount of scruples, but you do want to have a good reputation as a ransomware gang.
[04:08.720 --> 04:10.600]  But again, I'm having trouble with this.
[04:10.960 --> 04:13.520]  Who makes the reviews?
[04:14.300 --> 04:16.620]  We were targeted by dark side.
[04:16.760 --> 04:22.920]  And they were the most pleasant and easy to talk to people who guided us through every step of the way as we paid the millions of dollars.
[04:23.020 --> 04:29.160]  Who writes the reviews to give them the reputation that they're easy to work with and trustworthy?
[04:29.180 --> 04:30.180]  Who does that?
[04:30.860 --> 04:31.820]  Sometimes it's a victim.
[04:31.980 --> 04:32.760]  Sometimes it's lawyers.
[04:32.900 --> 04:35.740]  A lot of law firms get involved when there's ransomware payments as well.
[04:36.360 --> 04:46.320]  There's lots of, and also insurance companies as well, have an interest in this particular data because insurance companies are oftentimes the ones on the hook for paying the ransomware.
[04:46.420 --> 04:48.960]  Hang on, you're a lawyer, and you're kind of involved in this.
[04:49.100 --> 04:50.760]  Are you saying you've written reviews?
[04:51.640 --> 04:52.680]  Rating ransomware?
[04:52.720 --> 04:54.220]  I have written reviews of ransomware gangs.
[04:54.380 --> 04:55.600]  No, that I have not done.
[04:55.740 --> 04:59.060]  I've dealt with ransomware, but I've never written a review.
[04:59.400 --> 05:01.860]  But, you know, I've seen reviews of particular gangs.
[05:02.500 --> 05:19.660]  And look, and it is very similar, but the whole point here is to add an air of legitimacy to the operation so that the victim has some level of faith that when they pay that million dollars or $500,000 or $5 million, whatever the ransom is, that they are going to get what they're paying for,
[05:19.760 --> 05:22.740]  which is namely their data back and confidentiality these days.
[05:22.960 --> 05:28.500]  Because like I mentioned, you know, during the ordinary off the hook program, it's not just about restoring from a backup anymore.
[05:28.640 --> 05:33.580]  It's also trying to prevent the ransomware gang from releasing your data out to the public.
[05:34.440 --> 05:36.840]  Which is, again, something you can never be sure of.
[05:37.140 --> 05:39.540]  Yeah, they can unlock your data, you can get access to it again.
[05:39.680 --> 05:42.540]  But they have access to it, and they could keep a copy.
[05:42.780 --> 05:51.280]  And they could, they could do something, you know, ransomware with a monthly payment, kind of like the BAI buddy system, except, except really bad.
[05:51.900 --> 05:57.740]  And you know, that's, that's a that's a scary thought, because it's probably, you know, actually somewhat brilliant.
[05:58.020 --> 06:02.640]  And then to have a ransomware buddy system, ransom buddy is what you call it.
[06:02.740 --> 06:04.540]  And that's my phrase, you can't just use that.
[06:04.660 --> 06:04.840]  All right.
[06:04.980 --> 06:08.940]  So I'm sure RansomBuddy.com is going to be registered at any moment now.
[06:09.040 --> 06:13.200]  And if it is, there's going to be some negotiation taking place, believe me.
[06:13.300 --> 06:14.140]  Yeah, no doubt.
[06:14.160 --> 06:20.480]  But I want to make one other point, Hope, before we move on from this, too, which is that, okay, this is a colonial pipeline that was targeted.
[06:20.640 --> 06:23.820]  It was an infrastructure company, right?
[06:23.880 --> 06:25.680]  I mean, obviously, they deal with their pipeline.
[06:26.040 --> 06:27.520]  It's in the name, right?
[06:27.640 --> 06:36.280]  So for DarkSide to come out and say, we didn't really know the implications here, means that they're not doing their due diligence at all.
[06:36.480 --> 06:38.380]  I mean, you can go to their website and see what they do.
[06:38.600 --> 06:49.180]  But one thing that I want to mention, too, is I have been predicting for a long period of time now that these ransomware events are going to start targeting other infrastructure-related companies.
[06:49.640 --> 06:59.940]  And I'll tell you, a very good indication that this was forthcoming is I have been tracking a particular group of criminals since the end of 2018.
[06:59.940 --> 07:05.560]  And this is a group that they originally targeted a healthcare client of mine.
[07:05.740 --> 07:08.900]  And it was a very slick credentials harvesting attack.
[07:09.220 --> 07:14.560]  I went down the rabbit hole because I was sort of obsessed with this attack.
[07:14.720 --> 07:15.740]  It was really good.
[07:15.940 --> 07:19.500]  It used the DNS in a very fascinating way, very believable.
[07:19.760 --> 07:28.540]  And I started to make assumptions about where I could track and trace this particular group, scanned a massive amount of data to find other attacks that they had launched.
[07:28.540 --> 07:32.740]  And then I have... I've now traced them back six years.
[07:33.020 --> 07:34.720]  They started this in 2015.
[07:35.400 --> 07:42.900]  And I have data on over 1,700 attacks that this one particular group has launched.
[07:43.900 --> 07:46.180]  They were all credentials harvesting attacks.
[07:46.360 --> 07:50.740]  A massive amount of these companies are in critical infrastructure in the United States.
[07:50.920 --> 07:54.960]  Some of the other companies are in the United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia.
[07:55.660 --> 08:02.120]  But a huge amount... and by huge amount, I mean probably about 98, 99% of them were in the United States.
[08:02.280 --> 08:06.380]  And a good number of those related to oil and gas.
[08:06.520 --> 08:14.200]  And I would say we saw the targeting of probably between a half a dozen and a dozen other pipelines by this particular group.
[08:14.200 --> 08:22.240]  And what this means, though, is that these attacks that are happening now are not...
[08:22.240 --> 08:24.340]  Let's say credentials harvesting or a phishing attack.
[08:24.940 --> 08:31.920]  Those are attacks that may not be related to a ransomware event that happens next week.
[08:32.560 --> 08:44.820]  The attacks that happened in the past are arguably more important to know about and arguably more important to have been able to defend against than the ones that are happening at the moment.
[08:45.060 --> 08:53.500]  Because let's say even a small portion of these attacks that we had witnessed on a massive amount of infrastructure-related targets were effective.
[08:53.560 --> 08:57.220]  That means that there were aliens inside those networks.
[08:57.380 --> 08:58.760]  There are criminals inside those networks.
[08:58.960 --> 09:01.000]  They're probably... those credentials may have been passed around.
[09:01.000 --> 09:07.440]  They may have established persistence in all different segments of their particular network.
[09:07.640 --> 09:09.460]  They may be exploiting their network.
[09:09.540 --> 09:10.560]  They may be stealing data.
[09:10.720 --> 09:14.080]  They may be about to launch a ransomware event.
[09:14.200 --> 09:20.260]  But it's that access in the past that can be exploited for a present purpose that is really, really scary.
[09:20.740 --> 09:38.280]  Another really good example of this is last year when I detected, and it was a huge news story, the attack, a very highly sophisticated spear phishing attack that wound up being attributed to South Korea on the World Health Organization on March 13th,
[09:38.380 --> 09:38.740]  2020.
[09:38.960 --> 09:41.460]  You know, right at the height of the hysteria about the pandemic.
[09:41.620 --> 09:42.500]  Everything's kicking off.
[09:42.840 --> 09:49.540]  But the way in which I was able to detect that, and this was never reported in the media, despite me saying it many, many times.
[09:49.540 --> 10:03.620]  It never made it into any of the stories that reported on this, was that the reason why I was able to detect that attack was because I had seen that particular group target the World Health Organization about a half a dozen times in the past.
[10:04.620 --> 10:15.180]  And even though we're able to make the appropriate noises and that the World Health Organization attack was not successful, but what about those attacks in the past?
[10:15.180 --> 10:17.020]  Those are the ones that really, really worry me.
[10:17.160 --> 10:19.120]  Not when everybody is on high alert right now.
[10:19.280 --> 10:25.420]  But if there is persistence inside your network, it's very difficult to get sophisticated cyber adversaries out.
[10:26.540 --> 10:27.120]  Very true.
[10:27.280 --> 10:27.380]  I'll stop.
[10:27.580 --> 10:27.960]  Very true.
[10:28.000 --> 10:34.640]  It's a well-thought-out point and something that I think a lot of us need to learn.
[10:35.920 --> 10:40.200]  Let me continue with what we heard about DarkSide with their code of conduct.
[10:40.340 --> 10:45.720]  They've posted their own code of conduct for its customers, telling them who and what targets are acceptable to attack.
[10:45.840 --> 10:55.440]  Protected organizations not to be harmed include hospitals, hospices, schools, universities, nonprofit organizations, and government agencies.
[10:55.780 --> 10:59.800]  Also, apparently, protected are entities based in former Soviet countries.
[11:00.060 --> 11:05.660]  So I guess the ones to be worried are the for-profit companies in English-speaking countries.
[11:05.660 --> 11:11.520]  And that's certainly what this pipeline company was categorized as.
[11:11.520 --> 11:18.960]  I got to say, though, you know, with all the effort that activists have taken to shut down pipelines, these guys did it pretty efficiently and quickly.
[11:18.960 --> 11:19.880]  So I don't know.
[11:20.040 --> 11:21.000]  I'm kind of...
[11:21.000 --> 11:22.920]  I've got mixed feelings about this.
[11:23.020 --> 11:27.260]  I don't think they should be so quick to apologize for affecting this particular organization.
[11:27.260 --> 11:29.380]  Seems like, you know, a well-thought-out target.
[11:29.380 --> 11:36.900]  But there's certainly things that any company, any organization can do to protect itself against this sort of attack.
[11:37.260 --> 11:41.120]  And you have to have decent security.
[11:41.360 --> 11:42.820]  You have to have security, period.
[11:43.300 --> 11:45.540]  And you have to obviously keep backups.
[11:45.680 --> 11:54.200]  But again, that doesn't keep you from having people infiltrate your network and expose your private data.
[11:55.240 --> 11:58.320]  There are so many companies that just aren't getting this right.
[11:58.320 --> 12:07.740]  And I think that's something that we will never see the end of, as long as human beings are somehow responsible.
[12:07.960 --> 12:16.940]  Actually, you know, I saw a study about passwords and how the complex passwords actually aren't always the most secure passwords.
[12:17.300 --> 12:25.700]  They say passwords comprising complex strings of numbers and characters are hard to remember, but relatively easy to hack.
[12:25.700 --> 12:27.400]  That's according to research.
[12:28.600 --> 12:40.060]  For a long time, password strength was measured by how complex a password was, such as whether it included both upper and lowercase characters, numbers, special characters like ampersands, dollar signs.
[12:40.620 --> 12:51.380]  But security experts are increasingly moving away from these complex passwords to ones that seem more simple, but are actually harder for intruders to crack.
[12:52.380 --> 13:03.920]  Researchers from James Cook University found users were far more likely to engage in unsafe cybersecurity behavior if forced to keep creating complex passwords by overzealous IT managers.
[13:04.060 --> 13:07.020]  And I think we've all experienced this on some...
[13:07.020 --> 13:09.620]  For instance, logging into banks.
[13:09.780 --> 13:11.740]  I occasionally log into my bank account.
[13:11.920 --> 13:12.900]  Not often, but occasionally.
[13:13.100 --> 13:16.880]  And almost every time, they've changed their requirements for passwords.
[13:16.880 --> 13:21.700]  And they're scolding me for having an insecure password that they told me to implement last time.
[13:21.760 --> 13:24.260]  But now they've changed, and they added an extra character.
[13:24.860 --> 13:28.980]  And you can't use certain characters, and you have to have a certain number of numbers.
[13:29.040 --> 13:31.220]  And it's all very annoying.
[13:31.220 --> 13:34.120]  And I don't think it really adds much to security.
[13:34.900 --> 13:41.660]  Associate Professor Roberto Dillon conducted a survey in which users were asked to create increasingly complex passwords.
[13:41.920 --> 13:46.240]  Then, in a separate survey, they were asked about their usual password habits online.
[13:47.060 --> 13:55.740]  He said that in 75% of cases, users used various strategies to remember passwords, many of which compromised their data security.
[13:55.740 --> 14:02.160]  The most popular strategy, I think we can all guess what this is, using the same password from multiple sites.
[14:02.560 --> 14:09.120]  Our results confirm that the tougher the constraints on creating the passwords, the safer users feel with their information.
[14:09.340 --> 14:13.820]  However, the results show that a large number of restrictions can frustrate users.
[14:14.700 --> 14:19.520]  Professor Dillon said the research confirmed what was becoming mainstream theory among data security experts.
[14:19.660 --> 14:22.660]  When it comes to passwords, complex is not always better.
[14:22.660 --> 14:32.320]  One of the most common ways to crack a password is the brute force method, where a hacker sets up a computer program to rapidly guess as many character combinations as it can until it guesses the password.
[14:32.460 --> 14:40.040]  And as a result, many companies insist that their employees use complex passwords, because if they're still relatively short, they can be cracked.
[14:40.780 --> 14:44.760]  So instead of an extremely complex but relatively short password, for example...
[14:44.760 --> 14:45.880]  Oh boy, I got to read this.
[14:47.400 --> 14:54.120]  Capital T, lowercase v, uppercase u, four, uppercase e, pound sign, lowercase k, ampersand.
[14:55.400 --> 15:01.120]  Yeah, instead of using that, use something like sunlight autumn leaves, one word.
[15:01.460 --> 15:05.240]  This is easy to remember, but long enough to hinder brute force hacking attacks.
[15:05.820 --> 15:10.080]  Of course, a dictionary attack might get that if it knew where the word began and ended.
[15:11.020 --> 15:19.180]  At the same time, providers should avoid adding several restrictions, as it makes it more likely for users to resort to workarounds that compromise security.
[15:20.560 --> 15:21.860]  And that's what people will do.
[15:21.980 --> 15:31.120]  They'll write their password down somewhere so that they always have it, or they'll just cut and paste it from something, and as we said, use it in many, many places.
[15:31.460 --> 15:38.440]  So yeah, longer and more complex isn't always better, because we're humans and we make mistakes.
[15:39.080 --> 15:42.040]  I would say the law of unintended consequences here, right?
[15:42.140 --> 15:48.160]  A security policy that, in an unintended fashion, but in a foreseeable way, creates a security risk.
[15:48.460 --> 15:51.400]  Certainly not the first time that that has happened.
[15:51.740 --> 15:53.940]  But, you know, look, it is fascinating.
[15:54.140 --> 16:04.580]  I mean, the idea of using longer passwords that are easy to remember, all of these things, you know, I think can be avoided by using some kind of password vault system as well, right?
[16:04.580 --> 16:10.260]  You know, some kind of password locking system, you know, 1Password or LastPass, things like that, you know.
[16:10.320 --> 16:10.860]  Well, how does...
[16:10.860 --> 16:13.100]  I've never actually used something like that, but how does that work?
[16:13.180 --> 16:15.280]  You're storing all your passwords where?
[16:16.320 --> 16:18.000]  In a single vault, essentially.
[16:18.200 --> 16:19.500]  And what kind of vault is this?
[16:19.620 --> 16:21.420]  It's a virtual vault, I take it.
[16:21.820 --> 16:23.100]  Yeah, it's a virtual vault.
[16:23.200 --> 16:24.540]  And it has a password, right?
[16:25.160 --> 16:25.760]  That's correct.
[16:25.780 --> 16:27.700]  So what happens if somebody guesses that password?
[16:28.040 --> 16:32.280]  Well, they would have to have the vault in order to get access to the password.
[16:32.380 --> 16:33.240]  How do they get the vault?
[16:34.400 --> 16:37.560]  Uh, they'd probably have to compromise your device in order to do that.
[16:37.900 --> 16:42.440]  It sounds like if I have one password, I can get into the vault and then have access to all your passwords.
[16:43.860 --> 16:47.200]  Possibly, but all of those passwords are going to be unique going to all these other sites, right?
[16:47.360 --> 16:51.360]  So at least you have a greater amount of security on every one of those individual sites.
[16:51.540 --> 16:57.700]  Certainly, if your password vault is compromised, if your device is compromised, you've got problems and you've got big problems.
[16:57.820 --> 16:58.840]  You're absolutely right about that.
[16:58.840 --> 17:01.340]  Wouldn't that vault tell me where the passwords went to?
[17:01.460 --> 17:03.480]  What systems they matched up with?
[17:04.000 --> 17:04.880]  Yeah, it would.
[17:05.040 --> 17:05.340]  Absolutely.
[17:05.660 --> 17:06.840]  So I just, I don't know.
[17:06.940 --> 17:08.060]  You know, I have mixed feelings about this.
[17:08.180 --> 17:09.760]  Yeah, it seems like a good idea.
[17:09.760 --> 17:16.880]  But it also seems like if you make a mistake or if somebody guesses something, you could be a lot more screwed than if you just lost one password.
[17:17.700 --> 17:24.940]  Well, but it prevents the, you know, very common security vulnerabilities like reusing passwords from site to site to site.
[17:25.080 --> 17:29.220]  You're going to get out of that rut or using variations on a theme, right?
[17:29.360 --> 17:38.400]  Or, you know, you find that you've got so many passwords that were subject to, let's say, the LinkedIn breach, the Yahoo breach, the OPM, you know, whatever it was, right?
[17:38.420 --> 17:40.040]  There's so many of our passwords that are out there.
[17:40.840 --> 17:45.800]  This gets you out of using any variation of a theme on any of those passwords that were breached.
[17:45.880 --> 17:46.240]  So...
[17:46.240 --> 17:46.600]  I get that.
[17:46.600 --> 17:48.460]  But you have to access the vault at some point.
[17:48.480 --> 17:55.220]  And if somebody is eavesdropping on you doing that, then they have access to your vault, and then they have access to all your passwords, right?
[17:56.180 --> 18:01.140]  Yeah, but it's not that simple to access the vault itself, right?
[18:01.140 --> 18:09.360]  I mean, you would need to... it's not the kind of thing that is going to be accessible over the internet to get all of these particular passwords.
[18:09.480 --> 18:10.400]  You need to be on the device.
[18:10.560 --> 18:12.360]  Okay, so that's what I need to understand.
[18:12.680 --> 18:15.140]  So it's actually attached to a device.
[18:16.340 --> 18:17.340]  Yeah, that's correct.
[18:17.520 --> 18:17.660]  Okay.
[18:18.060 --> 18:20.100]  Yeah, that's my understanding of how it all works.
[18:20.200 --> 18:23.500]  I could be, you know, slightly, slightly different that, you know, I think...
[18:23.500 --> 18:26.920]  And this device, this device is not on your network, I take it?
[18:29.300 --> 18:30.500]  It could be on the network.
[18:30.500 --> 18:31.960]  Your expression tells me that it is on the network.
[18:32.080 --> 18:36.980]  So if somebody gains access to your network, could they then get access to your device, i.e.
[18:37.020 --> 18:37.380]  the vault?
[18:38.820 --> 18:39.180]  Possibly.
[18:39.300 --> 18:41.660]  But let's say your device is on... is your phone, right?
[18:41.660 --> 18:46.800]  It's going to be very difficult, especially if you're running an iPhone in order to compromise the security of that.
[18:46.920 --> 18:53.700]  Well, if I lose my phone, which many people do, or lend my phone to somebody for a second, and they do something bad, I don't know.
[18:53.860 --> 18:57.800]  You have to think, you know, in the worst possible terms.
[18:58.020 --> 18:59.960]  Yeah, Alex, what if they're good at micro-soldering?
[19:01.120 --> 19:02.340]  They could do that, too.
[19:02.420 --> 19:03.680]  And then take your phone apart.
[19:03.920 --> 19:04.240]  Wow.
[19:04.240 --> 19:05.160]  Did you think of that?
[19:06.780 --> 19:08.180]  There's all kinds of things.
[19:08.320 --> 19:13.720]  I mean, they could be monitoring, you know, for magnetic emissions, things like that.
[19:14.580 --> 19:15.020]  Sure.
[19:15.640 --> 19:19.840]  And there's been breaches of password vaults or password managers in the past as well.
[19:20.000 --> 19:23.460]  And what happens if you lose access to it somehow, which I think is probably more likely?
[19:24.020 --> 19:25.820]  Yeah, then you need to go back to Mt.
[19:25.920 --> 19:27.800]  Gox and ask for your Bitcoin.
[19:27.800 --> 19:33.620]  Yeah, what if I come into your office and steal your device off your network and you don't have it anymore?
[19:33.800 --> 19:34.860]  How do you get your passwords back?
[19:36.120 --> 19:36.240]  Ah.
[19:37.580 --> 19:40.260]  Yeah, then you're in a world of hurt, perhaps.
[19:41.740 --> 19:49.680]  But I mean, look, like any kind of situation where you forget your password, the password reset function is what you would rely on.
[19:50.060 --> 19:55.140]  But the, you know, those have their own security vulnerabilities as well.
[19:55.380 --> 20:01.240]  Have either of you used the browser password managers from any of the major web browsers?
[20:01.240 --> 20:02.740]  I don't trust my browsers, so no.
[20:03.060 --> 20:03.520]  You don't.
[20:04.120 --> 20:04.840]  No, I don't.
[20:04.960 --> 20:05.600]  Yeah, exactly.
[20:06.140 --> 20:23.560]  Have you ever used the... Well, if you have, and I suspect that's probably the closest thing to a password manager that our typical listener would interface with, because it behaves kind of like an independent password manager, but it's built into a lot of the browsers.
[20:23.560 --> 20:30.440]  I know Firefox has it, and works pretty well, and in fact, suggests making you a password.
[20:31.460 --> 20:36.460]  I think it generates, randomly generates a password for you.
[20:36.980 --> 20:41.060]  And those are long and varied.
[20:41.260 --> 20:48.500]  So kind of a combination of the two things the article mentioned, like really long and really crazy.
[20:49.100 --> 20:52.400]  So I wonder if some of those suggested passwords will change.
[20:52.540 --> 20:54.940]  Which means you're going to have to put it somewhere, if you want to remember it.
[20:54.960 --> 20:59.660]  You're going to have to put that password in a file or something, and it's, you know, that's the security hole.
[20:59.860 --> 21:01.900]  Well, that's the password generator.
[21:02.300 --> 21:02.480]  Okay.
[21:03.460 --> 21:04.560]  But you're right.
[21:04.560 --> 21:05.520]  It is stored.
[21:05.520 --> 21:12.960]  I think it's stored in a secure way within your user settings for the browser on your machine.
[21:13.280 --> 21:25.840]  And there's like a master control password so that you can't interface with any of the stored passwords without, which is exactly like how a wallet works.
[21:26.040 --> 21:28.880]  I'm just curious if any listeners use that.
[21:30.700 --> 21:33.720]  You obviously don't have to, it's not all or nothing.
[21:33.960 --> 21:39.080]  Like you can pick and choose how you do different things for different sites.
[21:39.360 --> 21:46.120]  Maybe the threat for one site is different and distinct from another or an application.
[21:46.640 --> 21:53.160]  Um, you're using needs really special security or whatever it is.
[21:53.480 --> 21:58.440]  You don't have to use it exactly the way it's sort of sold or marketed.
[21:58.620 --> 22:02.700]  And what I'm saying is like, maybe sites you don't really care that much about.
[22:02.900 --> 22:04.260]  You can keep track of them that way.
[22:04.560 --> 22:06.420]  It's a cool thing to learn how to use.
[22:06.640 --> 22:19.540]  Uh, even if you're not using it for like your bank or your personal stuff, which I would probably, I would be reluctant to use something like that for really, um, stuff that I, I want secured.
[22:20.340 --> 22:27.200]  We got, um, we got an email, uh, the other day, actually, I wanted to, uh, to read this, uh, to OTH at 2600.com.
[22:27.540 --> 22:30.080]  Uh, the subject, your response needed now.
[22:30.080 --> 22:32.120]  So it, it, it seemed pretty important.
[22:32.440 --> 22:34.680]  That's why, uh, I grabbed it immediately.
[22:34.980 --> 22:37.860]  Um, and it came, here's the weird part.
[22:38.400 --> 22:40.080]  Alex, this is important.
[22:40.820 --> 22:41.540]  This is important.
[22:41.700 --> 22:42.940]  I see you're distracted.
[22:43.080 --> 22:43.880]  You should pay attention to this.
[22:43.960 --> 22:44.540]  This is very important.
[22:45.400 --> 22:48.680]  Um, it came from OTH at 2600.com.
[22:48.840 --> 22:54.700]  So it was sent to OTH at 2600.com, but it came from OTH at 2600.com.
[22:54.740 --> 22:55.520]  How is that possible?
[22:56.380 --> 22:57.520]  It came from us.
[22:57.920 --> 23:00.440]  The reply to was probably different than the center.
[23:00.540 --> 23:03.180]  I know it's, it's from, it's from OTH, Alex.
[23:03.320 --> 23:04.060]  It came from us.
[23:04.220 --> 23:04.360]  All right.
[23:04.420 --> 23:06.440]  So listen carefully to what they say to us.
[23:06.700 --> 23:09.760]  Have you recently noticed that I've emailed you from your account?
[23:10.140 --> 23:10.560]  Yes.
[23:10.780 --> 23:14.940]  This simply means that I have total access to your device for the last couple of months.
[23:15.140 --> 23:18.580]  I've been watching you still wondering how is that possible?
[23:18.740 --> 23:19.180]  Yeah, I am.
[23:19.280 --> 23:19.500]  I am.
[23:19.940 --> 23:27.780]  Well, you have been infected with malware originating from an adult website that you visited and some movies streaming download site.
[23:29.420 --> 23:35.060]  You may not be familiar with this, but I'll try explaining it to you with help of the Trojan virus.
[23:35.280 --> 23:36.300]  I have complete access.
[23:36.560 --> 23:38.140]  Trojan virus is capitalized, by the way.
[23:38.340 --> 23:41.540]  I have complete access to a PC or any devices.
[23:41.560 --> 23:47.940]  This simply means I can see you at any time and shut down and restart your PC.
[23:49.120 --> 23:53.080]  And you know, my PC has been shutting down and restarting.
[23:53.160 --> 23:55.800]  I was told that was just Windows 10, but no, apparently it's this guy.
[23:57.280 --> 24:03.220]  I can easily turn on your screen by simply turning on your camera and microphone without you even noticing it.
[24:03.300 --> 24:04.760]  Again, I thought that was Windows 10, but it's not.
[24:05.060 --> 24:10.100]  In addition, I've also got access to your contacts list and all your correspondence.
[24:11.200 --> 24:14.400]  You may be asking yourself, but my PC has an active antivirus.
[24:14.560 --> 24:15.740]  How is this even possible?
[24:15.740 --> 24:16.580]  Again, Windows 10.
[24:17.220 --> 24:19.360]  Why didn't I receive any notification?
[24:20.540 --> 24:21.980]  Well, the answer is simple.
[24:22.460 --> 24:24.480]  My malware uses drivers.
[24:25.860 --> 24:28.260]  His malware uses drivers.
[24:28.520 --> 24:29.960]  Why didn't we think of this?
[24:30.460 --> 24:40.820]  When I update the signatures every four hours, making it undetectable and hence keeping your antivirus silent.
[24:41.460 --> 24:42.900]  I have a video of you.
[24:44.860 --> 24:53.380]  Well, any of us doing, but it involves a video and involves how we were reacting to the video and okay.
[24:53.480 --> 24:56.540]  Wondering how bad this could get with just a single click of my mouse.
[24:56.740 --> 25:00.680]  This video can be sent to all your social networks and email contacts.
[25:02.720 --> 25:04.320]  I said, nothing that can be done.
[25:05.280 --> 25:17.740]  Well, if you ever wish us to wipe out all your details that we have got, all you have to do to prevent this from happening is transfer Bitcoins worth $1,850.
[25:18.520 --> 25:23.640]  And smart, not to say how many Bitcoins, because the number has been dropping recently.
[25:23.880 --> 25:29.240]  But if you say $1,850, then I've got to do the calculation and figure it out.
[25:30.580 --> 25:32.300]  Send Bitcoin to the below address.
[25:32.920 --> 25:38.000]  And if you don't know this, search how to buy Bitcoin on Google or YouTube or packs full of Coinbase.
[25:39.760 --> 25:41.780]  They have a support desk that's open around the clock.
[25:42.120 --> 25:43.320]  And here's the Bitcoin address.
[25:43.640 --> 25:45.280]  I'm not going to read it on the air, but you know what?
[25:45.340 --> 25:49.720]  I did look it up because you can, you can see all the transactions that go to and from a Bitcoin address.
[25:49.720 --> 25:51.560]  And I saw there were four transactions.
[25:52.980 --> 25:55.280]  One, and this is in current date Bitcoin value.
[25:55.500 --> 26:02.660]  One was a deposit of about $7, followed by a withdrawal of that same amount.
[26:02.780 --> 26:07.560]  And then the next one was for about $12, again, followed by withdrawal of that exact amount.
[26:07.680 --> 26:13.200]  So it sounds like somebody was just testing it, but nothing, no $1,850 in deposits.
[26:13.360 --> 26:17.420]  So nobody else fell for this, but it concludes with this.
[26:17.740 --> 26:19.260]  Now you have 48 hours to make a payment.
[26:19.400 --> 26:25.460]  The moment we receive the transaction, I'm going to wipe out these movies and everything completely, and you will never hear from me anymore.
[26:25.700 --> 26:28.700]  You'll hear from somebody else or else.
[26:28.900 --> 26:35.260]  Please be sure that the evidence will be sent out to all your contacts, including relatives, coworkers, Facebook, and so forth.
[26:35.360 --> 26:37.340]  And your private information on your device will share public.
[26:38.820 --> 26:39.500]  Well said.
[26:39.660 --> 26:55.360]  This kind of thing, you know, I imagine many of our listeners have also received email like this and had the crap scared out of them thinking that because it came from their address, you know, it has to be proof that they have access to something they shouldn't have access to.
[26:55.420 --> 27:01.560]  And as you said, Alex, at the beginning, when you ruin the entire thing by saying what they actually did, the reply to address, yes, in fact, was changed.
[27:02.040 --> 27:09.960]  And if you look at the full headers, you'll see where it actually came from, which is probably some site from far away someplace, which is no doubt masked as well.
[27:10.520 --> 27:14.100]  So it's not the actual username that sent it.
[27:14.160 --> 27:16.540]  But the fact of the matter is, it's not real.
[27:16.960 --> 27:17.880]  It's not real.
[27:18.060 --> 27:19.820]  You should never fall for something like this.
[27:19.920 --> 27:22.040]  You should never click on any links that are included in this email.
[27:22.480 --> 27:24.740]  These things go out all the time.
[27:25.000 --> 27:27.660]  And fortunately, most people don't fall for them.
[27:27.740 --> 27:34.320]  But it's kind of like ransomware, except that your files aren't being encrypted and kept from you.
[27:34.380 --> 27:39.880]  You're just being scared into thinking that somebody has access, when in all likelihood, they don't.
[27:40.720 --> 27:45.780]  Well, it's an interesting psychological pivot point to receive an email from your own account.
[27:46.380 --> 27:54.420]  You know, most people think, oh, my God, you know, this proves, of course, that that they have access to my account, you know, how else could they possibly do this?
[27:54.520 --> 28:00.260]  But, you know, people have been spoofing emails, since the the SMTP protocol existed.
[28:00.420 --> 28:03.460]  I mean, it's just the way that email works, the way the protocols work.
[28:03.540 --> 28:05.560]  They weren't they were designed for interoperability.
[28:05.700 --> 28:14.380]  They weren't necessarily designed for security, which is why literally, every single day, there are billions and billions of spoofed emails.
[28:14.600 --> 28:16.040]  Thank you, Carl Sagan, for that.
[28:16.940 --> 28:18.000]  No doubt.
[28:18.180 --> 28:36.800]  But this becomes problematic in the context of something like a global health crisis, though, because it allows people to impersonate, let's say, politicians, the CDC, the World Health Organization, and then spread misinformation through email, or spread some kind of scam,
[28:37.000 --> 28:44.640]  you know, about, let's say, a vaccine, or, you know, clicking on the site for a vaccine appointment, whatever it is, you know, that can then deploy malware to a local system.
[28:45.140 --> 28:53.320]  There's all different... well, there's a lot of problems that arise from spoofed emails being used in really creative and malicious ways.
[28:53.420 --> 28:59.100]  And I think the one that you read, Emanuel, was a very creative and malicious use of a spoofed email.
[28:59.240 --> 29:05.760]  I mean, this is something I remember doing, spoofing emails with SMTP and false way back in the 90s.
[29:05.860 --> 29:07.260]  Tell netting to port 25.
[29:07.980 --> 29:08.480]  That's right.
[29:08.640 --> 29:09.400]  That's exactly right.
[29:09.520 --> 29:09.680]  Yep.
[29:09.760 --> 29:10.620]  You remember this.
[29:10.760 --> 29:11.180]  It was fun.
[29:11.260 --> 29:11.980]  And you can still do it.
[29:12.140 --> 29:17.500]  But there are things out there now that will help to prevent this from happening within your own organization.
[29:18.500 --> 29:31.320]  Namely, the SPF, something called the sender policy framework, when you combine that with something called DMARC, it drastically reduces the amount of spoofed email messages that one will receive.
[29:31.380 --> 29:38.360]  The problem, though, is that the vast majority of the internet doesn't have SPF and DMARC configured.
[29:38.640 --> 29:42.760]  And so it causes a lot of emails to bounce.
[29:42.940 --> 29:47.680]  If both parties don't have this configured, it can cause emails to... you can lose a lot of messages.
[29:48.200 --> 29:49.320]  And that's a big problem.
[29:49.420 --> 30:02.140]  And in fact, this is something specifically that one of our HOPE keynotes this past summer addressed, and that was Flavio Agio, the CISO of the World Health Organization that spoke at HOPE.
[30:02.240 --> 30:18.940]  And one of his upgrades that he's hoping that everybody does, because the World Health Organization was subject to a hell of a lot of email spoofing during the pandemic, is to deploy SPF, the sender policy framework, and DMARC to try to prevent spoofed emails like this from proliferating any further.
[30:19.400 --> 30:23.580]  Hey, it's half an hour into overtime, and we haven't even given out the phone number yet.
[30:24.260 --> 30:24.540]  Wow.
[30:24.920 --> 30:26.480]  Yeah, I was going to ask, are we going to take this call?
[30:26.620 --> 30:26.920]  Oh, yeah.
[30:27.120 --> 30:27.760]  We have a call?
[30:27.880 --> 30:29.360]  We've had a call for like a half hour.
[30:29.540 --> 30:30.960]  I'm sorry, I didn't know we had a call.
[30:31.200 --> 30:33.000]  Yeah, I hung up, and then they call back.
[30:33.320 --> 30:35.840]  Well, they're persistent, as any off-the-hook listener should be.
[30:35.960 --> 30:37.120]  You should probably see if they're still alive.
[30:37.260 --> 30:39.540]  Yeah, well, you know, you got to wave your arms a little bit more.
[30:39.620 --> 30:42.640]  I just thought, I thought you were just, it's hot, so I thought you were fanning yourself.
[30:42.800 --> 30:43.200]  I'm sorry.
[30:49.000 --> 30:49.740]  That's okay.
[30:49.940 --> 30:56.780]  I've been listening and patient, and everything that you've been discussing has been important and right on topic.
[30:58.160 --> 31:08.860]  I have some stuff to add on topic, and then if you're patient with me, I have something I want to ask you about off-topic.
[31:09.940 --> 31:39.900]  But with regard to the colonial pipeline situation and dark side and supposedly getting out of the ransomware business, Steve Gibson on his Security Now podcast, which is weekly, yesterday was the day of the podcast, touched on this and posted messages that were posted up on the two sites,
[31:39.920 --> 31:42.760]  which make very interesting reading.
[31:42.980 --> 31:46.760]  I'm not sure that anybody should take them at face value.
[31:47.800 --> 31:49.000]  I see no reason.
[31:49.400 --> 31:51.420]  Well, I shouldn't say it.
[31:51.700 --> 31:52.200]  Take no...
[31:52.200 --> 31:53.240]  See no reason.
[31:53.500 --> 31:54.700]  What was the gist of it?
[31:54.700 --> 32:16.620]  There's a lot of pressure that's probably been brought on these ransomware actors behind the scenes from the CIA and from the heavy-duty governmental entities, not just in the U.S., and they're probably feeling a lot of heat at this point.
[32:16.820 --> 32:20.920]  On the other hand, I don't think anybody can count on them going out of the business.
[32:20.920 --> 32:22.020]  Became a...
[32:22.020 --> 32:22.720]  Yeah, exactly.
[32:23.080 --> 32:30.880]  They became a fat target and in being made an example of, I think.
[32:30.940 --> 32:31.120]  Right.
[32:31.240 --> 32:37.060]  But I think at this point, whatever they're saying about getting out of the business is either temporary or lip service.
[32:37.780 --> 32:38.280]  Exactly.
[32:39.660 --> 32:44.360]  Now, with regard to the discussion you were having about...
[32:44.360 --> 32:45.480]  Do you have something to say about that first?
[32:46.060 --> 32:46.760]  Oh, yeah.
[32:46.920 --> 32:50.420]  Before you move on to that, caller, I think you're absolutely right.
[32:51.040 --> 32:51.880]  In that sense.
[32:52.080 --> 32:56.680]  And what a lot of these criminal gangs will do is they'll claim that they're disbanding.
[32:56.780 --> 32:59.280]  They hope that that gets the heat off of them, at least temporarily.
[32:59.860 --> 33:03.780]  They then resurrect themselves under a new name, in a new jurisdiction.
[33:04.160 --> 33:04.940]  But it's the same.
[33:05.040 --> 33:09.380]  It's basically the old band back together, but just under a new name.
[33:11.320 --> 33:11.760]  Exactly.
[33:12.720 --> 33:13.820]  Nobody's going anyplace.
[33:13.820 --> 33:20.700]  It's too profitable, which is something else I wanted to mention, which you kind of touched on.
[33:21.560 --> 33:33.860]  I suspect, and as you were talking about going back and looking at the history on this, I suspect that the ransomware is just another profit center in the operation.
[33:33.860 --> 33:41.860]  And as we know, anything that's Russian that's not government is related to the government.
[33:43.380 --> 33:49.380]  And I suspect that, I mean, you're talking about setting up backdoors.
[33:49.920 --> 33:55.920]  You're talking about access to complete networks and all kinds of data.
[33:57.940 --> 33:59.240]  Nobody's going to give that up.
[33:59.320 --> 34:06.920]  And I suspect that the ransomware is just kind of a dollar-plus cover for other activities that are going on.
[34:06.920 --> 34:21.680]  Well, that's the best pretense for the chaos of exploiting other vulnerabilities, that you have this messy, disruptive, chaotic environment where other stuff can go unnoticed.
[34:22.140 --> 34:22.940]  Exactly.
[34:23.460 --> 34:30.840]  Which kind of brings us to SolarWinds and what you were saying about persistence.
[34:30.840 --> 34:39.740]  And I have a question about SolarWinds, which you probably don't have an answer to, but I haven't heard anybody speaking to the issue.
[34:40.820 --> 34:43.200]  SolarWinds was a massive...
[34:44.000 --> 34:58.980]  I shouldn't say was, is a massive compromise of entire cyberstructures, not simply a system or a network.
[34:58.980 --> 35:05.260]  We're talking, you know, 15,000, 20,000 network systems.
[35:06.060 --> 35:07.320]  That's a lot of equipment.
[35:07.500 --> 35:10.880]  And once you have this kind of a threat, it does no good.
[35:11.760 --> 35:19.780]  Once it's been established, it does no good to patch the entry point, patching SolarWinds and the Oracle software.
[35:20.020 --> 35:20.800]  They're in.
[35:20.800 --> 35:26.880]  And this was a very sophisticated attack that basically was erasing its own trails.
[35:28.960 --> 35:35.240]  The question that I have is, what's being done to replace all that equipment?
[35:35.240 --> 35:40.400]  Because the only real alternative you have at that point is to trash your hardware and start over.
[35:40.400 --> 35:41.780]  Yeah, I agree.
[35:42.000 --> 35:47.620]  I think that there's going to be tons of e-waste, metric tons of e-waste as a result of this.
[35:47.760 --> 35:50.400]  And essentially, they'll either...
[35:51.280 --> 35:52.880]  But I don't hear anybody speaking to it.
[35:53.600 --> 35:54.080]  Right.
[35:54.280 --> 35:55.980]  Either use them in a...
[35:55.980 --> 35:56.620]  What I was going to...
[35:56.620 --> 35:57.740]  No, it's...
[35:57.740 --> 36:02.540]  That's the other aspect of this that we could go on and on about, it's the silence.
[36:02.700 --> 36:06.660]  You really do not get a lot of info at all about...
[36:07.500 --> 36:20.860]  And specifically with the international situation versus a private company having a security breach on the order of what Colonial Pipeline experienced.
[36:21.480 --> 36:30.280]  So, yeah, getting information about that and then geopolitical stuff, any kind of certainty in there is a little bit tough to get that definitive.
[36:31.940 --> 36:38.260]  Because a lot of the reports will remain classified or, in other words, not be public.
[36:39.220 --> 36:39.780]  And...
[36:39.780 --> 36:46.840]  I haven't even seen any writing being done suggesting that this is something that needs to happen.
[36:47.020 --> 36:47.680]  Well, yeah.
[36:47.840 --> 36:55.120]  I think what's the mitigation is equipment and building up new networks.
[36:56.000 --> 37:01.060]  Alongside that are separate and isolating those networks that were affected.
[37:01.300 --> 37:04.640]  Probably tearing out 10,000 of the computers, right?
[37:04.840 --> 37:06.380]  Leaving four or whatever.
[37:06.760 --> 37:10.740]  You know, basically paring them down and eliminating what is essential.
[37:10.940 --> 37:11.780]  Pulling off anything.
[37:12.080 --> 37:22.700]  And if you can still use or read the data, keeping it in an isolated sandbox, so to speak.
[37:22.920 --> 37:25.000]  And all of that, I think, is going to go on.
[37:25.000 --> 37:31.260]  It's going to take time, though, even to procure the equipment and change it out and prioritize, too.
[37:31.340 --> 37:33.960]  I think that's a big part of how it would then be budgeted.
[37:34.240 --> 37:34.800]  Alex, go ahead.
[37:37.000 --> 37:37.740]  Yeah, sure.
[37:37.940 --> 37:43.480]  And I think the other side of the coin, too, Kohler, is that, you know, on one hand, I think you're right.
[37:43.480 --> 37:45.680]  You know, these are devices that have been compromised.
[37:45.680 --> 37:55.700]  There's always going to be some uncertainty about whether, even after, let's say, formatting the hard drive, reinstalling the OS, perhaps maybe there was something malicious in the firmware.
[37:55.700 --> 38:00.180]  Or they made a lateral jump to another machine somewhere in the network.
[38:00.340 --> 38:01.700]  And it's very difficult.
[38:01.880 --> 38:05.900]  But, I mean, in any kind of incident, I think you're going to have a similar set of circumstances.
[38:05.900 --> 38:14.100]  But for businesses, it's about risk and mitigating certain risks and accepting other risks.
[38:14.280 --> 38:29.560]  And I think a lot of people were pulling their hair out in the first couple of weeks with the solar winds remediation and drips and drabs of data coming out and different IOCs or indicators of compromise that were changing and shifting.
[38:29.560 --> 38:34.340]  And then you would have to go back and begin the search again to determine whether or not you see any of these IOCs.
[38:34.420 --> 38:45.940]  But I think the calculus for many organizations was that if you didn't see these IOCs or any of these indicators of compromise in your system, you didn't notice any unusual activity, nothing bad happened.
[38:45.940 --> 39:02.840]  And then you'd couple that together with what you were hearing from DHS, that the actual number of systems that were exploited was relatively low compared to all of the systems on which SolarWinds was actually installed.
[39:03.480 --> 39:08.760]  And then you begin to think, like, okay, well, you know, all of that points to this being low risk.
[39:08.760 --> 39:22.800]  And then the fact that there wasn't this massive kind of breach also indicates that the other side on this, the attackers, were very sophisticated and very cautious and conscientious.
[39:23.080 --> 39:25.820]  And those aren't necessarily the hallmarks of criminal gangs.
[39:25.840 --> 39:29.980]  Those are the hallmarks of governments that don't want to get caught and want to keep a low footprint.
[39:29.980 --> 39:31.880]  So all of that, I think...
[39:31.880 --> 39:33.360]  If I can interrupt you for a second.
[39:33.720 --> 39:41.280]  The other side of that is that the attack was in place for many months.
[39:41.660 --> 39:45.700]  Some estimates I've seen suggest perhaps a year or better.
[39:46.800 --> 40:04.980]  And they were very careful about not allowing the attack to be seen, erasing their tracks, and erasing any evidence that there was any presence other than what should have been on the system.
[40:06.400 --> 40:22.200]  So if they're being that careful, and that's why everybody immediately said this is state-level hacking, this is not your script kiddies, but this was very carefully done.
[40:22.640 --> 40:24.520]  So how do you know if they're there or not?
[40:24.520 --> 40:27.260]  And at what point does it become national security?
[40:28.020 --> 40:28.360]  Yeah.
[40:28.600 --> 40:29.600]  And look, I think you're right.
[40:29.780 --> 40:31.040]  You know, they're good.
[40:31.160 --> 40:36.620]  And any sophisticated adversary is going to have great techniques for anti-forensics, right?
[40:36.680 --> 40:39.140]  To prevent their detection, their tracking and tracing.
[40:39.680 --> 40:42.680]  Yeah, generally everybody makes mistakes, but, you know, some are better than others.
[40:43.020 --> 40:45.140]  But, you know, look, you're right about that.
[40:45.240 --> 40:48.900]  But I think you have to look at all of the circumstances and come up with a risk rating.
[40:48.900 --> 40:56.380]  You know, what's the risk I'm bringing into my organization by keeping this machine on and within the network?
[40:56.540 --> 40:59.160]  And is it an acceptable risk or is it not?
[40:59.260 --> 41:04.200]  And a lot of organizations would have to accept the risk because it's just too costly not to.
[41:06.340 --> 41:08.220]  But you're absolutely right, though.
[41:08.320 --> 41:20.340]  I mean, and this is the problem, is that there has been so much uncertainty about who was exploited, whether you can trust the assessment of the government and DHS and finding that these were very low.
[41:20.500 --> 41:27.720]  I mean, maybe there'll be a further finding six months down the road that, in fact, you know, a larger number of companies were exploited through the SolarWinds attack.
[41:27.940 --> 41:28.880]  We just don't know.
[41:28.880 --> 41:35.320]  There are so many, as Rumsfeld would say, known unknowns about this particular incident.
[41:35.540 --> 41:37.980]  And I really think it's going to be...
[41:37.980 --> 41:42.120]  We're going to be peeling back the onion on this probably for at least another year or two.
[41:42.780 --> 41:44.460]  And I don't think that we...
[41:44.460 --> 41:47.720]  Are you suggesting that you trust DHS to make that judgment?
[41:49.720 --> 41:50.240]  Yeah.
[41:50.480 --> 41:53.820]  I think DHS acts in good faith.
[41:54.480 --> 42:02.160]  But look, you know, like any organization as well, this is not an investigation, I think, that can happen very, very quickly.
[42:02.160 --> 42:08.600]  And there's going to be pieces of the puzzle that are going to be appearing later on in time that can change the entire analysis.
[42:08.600 --> 42:10.820]  Well, there has to be a will for that to happen.
[42:11.860 --> 42:15.120]  And that's what worries me, is I'm not sure the will to do...
[42:15.120 --> 42:20.120]  Well, certainly the will to do that wasn't there prior to January 20th.
[42:20.120 --> 42:24.340]  But there seems to be some change going on.
[42:25.580 --> 42:32.700]  And hopefully the institutions within the government will be up to the task.
[42:32.740 --> 42:35.340]  But I am not confident, personally.
[42:36.320 --> 42:36.580]  All right.
[42:36.680 --> 42:38.000]  Well, listen, thanks for calling.
[42:38.100 --> 42:39.180]  Where are you calling from, by the way?
[42:39.940 --> 42:42.060]  Can I ask you a quick off-topic question?
[42:42.100 --> 42:43.460]  If you tell us where you're calling from.
[42:44.940 --> 42:46.580]  Let's just say the lower Hudson Valley.
[42:46.780 --> 42:47.560]  Okay, that's good enough.
[42:47.800 --> 42:48.340]  Go ahead.
[42:51.680 --> 42:53.060]  When the station...
[42:53.060 --> 43:00.340]  I won't ask you to discuss any of the politics that are currently going on with the voting and within the station.
[43:01.160 --> 43:04.180]  Although you're not on the air now, so I suppose you could.
[43:04.460 --> 43:04.780]  That's true.
[43:07.680 --> 43:14.660]  When the station was taken over by the idiot clique that took it over...
[43:14.660 --> 43:15.220]  Uh-huh, uh-huh.
[43:15.860 --> 43:17.260]  Yes, we know who you're talking about.
[43:17.640 --> 43:20.300]  Funds were appropriated.
[43:20.940 --> 43:22.440]  Accounts were appropriated.
[43:22.780 --> 43:30.160]  And the station was in the middle of a fund drive, just beginning a fund drive at the time.
[43:30.160 --> 43:34.040]  So there was lost opportunity and monies lost there as well.
[43:34.160 --> 43:40.120]  Plus a reputational cost for anybody who might have been leaning towards contributing.
[43:40.120 --> 43:50.000]  So the station lost real funds and potential ongoing income.
[43:52.220 --> 44:04.260]  What has been done in terms of trying to claw back the monies that were taken and any potential income that might have been lost through...
[44:05.660 --> 44:08.240]  Not just civil suits, but criminal suits.
[44:08.420 --> 44:11.380]  I mean, we're talking about felony here.
[44:13.680 --> 44:15.520]  We're talking large amounts of money.
[44:16.700 --> 44:19.920]  And I kind of have a comment about that.
[44:20.020 --> 44:26.700]  But I ask you because there's really nobody else that you can trust to get an answer from.
[44:26.700 --> 44:36.840]  Well, I don't think any of us are privy to the actual specifics as to how much money was involved and who got access and who lost access, etc.
[44:36.840 --> 44:43.460]  I do know that the people supporting WBAI, the local station, won in court.
[44:43.640 --> 44:48.140]  And that's how they're back on the air now is because of those court rulings.
[44:48.240 --> 44:57.900]  And the people who were behind the attempt to take it over or the successful attempt for a few weeks, at least, they were stripped of their power.
[44:58.040 --> 44:59.700]  They're no longer part of Pacifica.
[44:59.700 --> 45:08.600]  But that doesn't mean that there aren't still people in Pacifica that wish for this to succeed and are trying to make it succeed on other levels.
[45:09.760 --> 45:17.600]  I don't have details on if money was lost, how much was lost, if it was restored, if people are being held accountable.
[45:17.600 --> 45:18.780]  These are all good questions.
[45:22.160 --> 45:27.480]  My fundamental question is, were criminal charges brought against these people?
[45:27.500 --> 45:28.520]  And if not, why not?
[45:29.700 --> 45:30.500]  That's a good question.
[45:30.660 --> 45:33.200]  And I have a comment about the station asking for money.
[45:33.320 --> 45:34.680]  Kyle, did you have something to say?
[45:34.840 --> 45:45.360]  I was just going to add, I seem to recall very early on that getting access back to some of the accounts and management tools, that was very difficult.
[45:45.680 --> 45:48.840]  That was a very real consequence of what happened.
[45:49.560 --> 45:50.340]  That was my memory.
[45:50.340 --> 46:18.860]  And strong-arming volunteers to get into an online account for whatever it was, I'm alleging this, I don't know the details, but I do seem to recall that after it had been adjudicated in the station's favor, the local station's favor, it was weeks before the offending parties,
[46:18.920 --> 46:24.020]  I guess, relinquished control back or otherwise cooperated.
[46:24.160 --> 46:30.920]  Yeah, it was not easy, I know, for the station volunteers to fix what was done.
[46:30.920 --> 46:39.100]  The important thing is that a lot of people stood up and voiced their support and fought really hard on the legal front and getting word out.
[46:39.520 --> 46:45.040]  And I don't think we should minimize that tremendous accomplishment.
[46:45.280 --> 46:47.500]  Yeah, there are still things that need to be sorted out.
[46:47.600 --> 46:53.920]  We still need some answers, and it might take a while because that's how long it takes in the court system, and there are things I'm not privy to.
[46:53.920 --> 46:58.640]  But it was a victory for the people of New York in getting that station back.
[46:58.920 --> 47:15.620]  And the only thing I really regret, or the thing I regret most, is that while we were on all the media outlets that day, all the newspapers, all the TV stations, they all reported that this radio station's been on the air forever, WBAI, is going off the air.
[47:15.840 --> 47:18.620]  They didn't correct it when we came back on the air.
[47:18.740 --> 47:22.340]  They made it a fait accompli where we lost and it was over.
[47:22.340 --> 47:28.880]  But a lot of people might never have known that we came back if they didn't tune back to 99.5.
[47:30.200 --> 47:31.680]  Yeah, that's my memory as well.
[47:31.680 --> 47:34.240]  I had to hunt for the information.
[47:37.400 --> 47:45.240]  I would leave you with a comment, and we really don't need to take time talking about it, but it's something that I think needs to be said.
[47:47.620 --> 47:49.380]  I will try to say it on the air.
[47:49.580 --> 47:52.360]  I've said it once already with Hop Day.
[47:53.300 --> 48:01.460]  There are very few programs that I feel are of the kind of value that goes back many years.
[48:02.940 --> 48:07.860]  We have too many older people in the community and not enough younger people.
[48:07.860 --> 48:22.620]  But one of my concerns is that there seems to be a conventional wisdom within the station use days that you create programming by raising funds.
[48:23.820 --> 48:27.660]  In reality, the past has shown us it's exactly the opposite.
[48:27.940 --> 48:30.080]  You raise funds by creating programming.
[48:32.140 --> 48:35.180]  And I feel that that's been lost at the moment.
[48:35.440 --> 48:40.000]  And all of these infomercials, and there's a lot of garbage...
[48:40.000 --> 48:54.340]  Yeah, but if I could step in here, there is one major difference that has taken place over the past year, and I truly support this from the BAI management, where you may have noticed we're not on the air incessantly begging for money.
[48:54.340 --> 49:00.960]  Instead, we get preempted every few weeks for a program that will bring in something.
[49:01.240 --> 49:06.300]  And yeah, it might not be your cup of tea, but we do have to pay the bills.
[49:06.420 --> 49:17.600]  And incessantly, having Off the Hook and every other show begging for money and not covering the things that we cover, I think that's pretty detrimental to what we do and what the station sounds like.
[49:17.600 --> 49:29.720]  I agree, but there has to be another way, because the flooding of the air with these infomercials runs counter to everything that the station has been.
[49:29.840 --> 49:31.500]  I would love to know what the other way is.
[49:31.580 --> 49:32.620]  My idea is underwriting.
[49:32.760 --> 49:35.740]  I think, you know, BAI has always had a strong position against underwriting.
[49:35.920 --> 49:40.600]  I think it could be done in a way that is palatable, and that could raise a significant sum.
[49:40.780 --> 49:45.400]  And there are other ways, too, but it involves being savvy in the art of raising funds.
[49:45.400 --> 49:47.620]  But I agree, it's not the best sound.
[49:47.620 --> 49:48.500]  It could get better.
[49:48.540 --> 49:49.100]  That's where I'm going to go with that.
[49:49.300 --> 49:50.680]  I think you're right.
[49:50.840 --> 50:11.580]  And I think by creating excellent programming that will be a magnet to draw people in, people of creativity and intellect, and bringing with that the right public relations message, that's how you raise funds.
[50:12.060 --> 50:13.460]  Yeah, we're right there with you.
[50:13.460 --> 50:39.660]  And something that comes to mind in hearing your vision is that what I get from the station now in my experience with it is that we've stabilized in many ways, like having scheduling that is a little bit more predictable because of, as you mentioned, the regular fundraising cycles.
[50:39.660 --> 50:46.660]  I know maybe it feels like there are placeholders and spots that could have better programming.
[50:47.280 --> 50:58.780]  But many of the operational hurdles to foster that environment are actually in really good shape in comparison.
[50:58.780 --> 51:10.120]  And in light of over the many half a dozen years I know the station's been in various straits, having a venue like we have now...
[51:10.120 --> 51:11.080]  Half a dozen decades.
[51:11.420 --> 51:11.900]  Oh, yeah.
[51:12.420 --> 51:14.680]  I mean, it's chronic.
[51:15.420 --> 51:19.580]  It goes back to the church and even before that.
[51:19.900 --> 51:25.220]  You know, one of the worst things that the station ever did as an entity was getting rid of that church.
[51:25.220 --> 51:26.600]  Well, I don't think they got rid of it.
[51:26.700 --> 51:31.780]  I think Mayor Koch kicked them out of it by imposing a huge tax bill because he didn't like what they said.
[51:32.340 --> 51:33.920]  I think that's how the story went.
[51:34.020 --> 51:34.360]  Go ahead, Kyle.
[51:34.540 --> 51:39.320]  I just wanted to finish by saying that the circumstances are not...
[51:39.880 --> 51:44.640]  The circumstances are right for new programming to come in.
[51:44.640 --> 51:50.640]  And the venue we have now is a great community center in the studios.
[51:51.260 --> 51:52.960]  What it took to get there.
[51:53.160 --> 51:59.900]  What it took to, you know, whether it's staffing after this takeover or fulfillment issues.
[52:00.340 --> 52:08.180]  We've faced it all in as best a way we can, given the dynamics of the situation.
[52:08.440 --> 52:10.760]  You know, the station itself, yeah, it's moved.
[52:10.800 --> 52:11.480]  It's changed.
[52:11.560 --> 52:12.400]  It's morphed.
[52:12.400 --> 52:13.700]  We agree, though.
[52:13.940 --> 52:37.560]  Like, there is something missing in nurturing what kind of, I guess, development it takes on the program side to get someone that is starting to kind of figure out radio and move them along to being comfortable enough to trying new things or really, like,
[52:37.660 --> 52:39.960]  kind of finding comfort in the station itself.
[52:39.960 --> 52:40.960]  It's there.
[52:42.380 --> 52:44.480]  It's ready for people to join it.
[52:44.600 --> 52:45.700]  I guess that's what I want.
[52:45.760 --> 52:50.940]  We have to support the diversity of our staff and our audience and open up the doors.
[52:51.140 --> 52:59.180]  Even though we don't agree completely with what's being spouted on the air, we need to open it up to more young people because that's the future of having a vibrant schedule.
[52:59.620 --> 53:00.900]  Because we noticed the same...
[53:00.900 --> 53:01.100]  That's what I was saying before.
[53:01.280 --> 53:03.940]  About too many people who have been with the station for too long.
[53:03.940 --> 53:06.240]  You know, I'm in my mid-70s.
[53:06.660 --> 53:07.380]  I was...
[53:07.380 --> 53:19.740]  When the staff got locked out, I was on the streets demonstrating and at community meetings at Symphony Space and at the court hearings downtown.
[53:19.880 --> 53:22.540]  This goes back, you know, decades.
[53:22.820 --> 53:23.540]  Many decades.
[53:24.360 --> 53:24.820]  Yeah.
[53:24.820 --> 53:29.160]  And when you listen to people calling in, there are too many people with too much gray hair.
[53:30.180 --> 53:30.720]  It's true.
[53:30.860 --> 53:32.160]  Where are the 20 and 30-year-olds?
[53:32.640 --> 53:33.260]  It's true.
[53:33.480 --> 53:33.680]  Yeah.
[53:33.800 --> 53:42.780]  And I think there needs to be some dance there of keeping people around because you need those storytellers.
[53:43.040 --> 53:44.640]  I don't know if it's necessarily too many people with gray hair.
[53:44.720 --> 53:47.360]  I think it's not enough people with blue hair.
[53:47.540 --> 53:49.780]  You know, we need more of that.
[53:49.980 --> 53:51.240]  We need, you know, more of a mix.
[53:51.240 --> 53:55.460]  But I value every one of our listeners as far as, you know, their experience, their stories.
[53:55.720 --> 53:57.820]  But you have to be able to listen to others as well.
[53:57.940 --> 53:58.880]  It can't just be about you.
[53:59.600 --> 54:05.660]  And I wasn't discounting people who have the experience of being with the station all these years.
[54:06.200 --> 54:09.380]  I discovered the station probably in 63 or 64.
[54:09.680 --> 54:09.840]  Wow.
[54:10.020 --> 54:13.680]  But where are the younger people?
[54:13.820 --> 54:14.740]  There has to be, yeah.
[54:14.880 --> 54:15.540]  Getting drawn in.
[54:15.540 --> 54:21.220]  And some letting go and some leading them to taking on some of those roles.
[54:21.280 --> 54:22.980]  Hey, you don't have any tapes of those early years, do you?
[54:24.200 --> 54:25.660]  No, but I have some photographs.
[54:25.880 --> 54:27.500]  Okay, well, that's good.
[54:27.700 --> 54:32.100]  But saving all this, like listening to the old Bob Fast shows, that was amazing to me.
[54:32.120 --> 54:35.620]  Just, you know, after he passed, it was an incredible history lesson.
[54:35.620 --> 54:43.820]  I don't have tapes from years past, but about a year or two ago, I started taping Bob.
[54:44.020 --> 54:46.260]  He was down in North Carolina at that point.
[54:46.860 --> 54:52.680]  Not the height of, you know, all the juicy stuff from the archives.
[54:52.960 --> 54:54.720]  True, but he still made it special somehow.
[54:55.040 --> 54:55.420]  Yeah.
[54:56.000 --> 54:57.000]  Listen, thanks for this call.
[54:57.200 --> 54:58.100]  It was very, very enlightening.
[54:58.360 --> 54:59.960]  Well, thank you for being there to take it.
[55:00.060 --> 55:00.700]  You're very welcome.
[55:01.040 --> 55:02.180]  And we'll look forward to many more years.
[55:02.520 --> 55:02.800]  Take care.
[55:03.400 --> 55:05.560]  And our phone line is open.
[55:06.420 --> 55:06.780]  It's...
[55:06.780 --> 55:08.340]  I never gave out the phone number.
[55:09.460 --> 55:10.760]  802-321-HACK.
[55:11.360 --> 55:12.900]  802-321-4225.
[55:13.780 --> 55:16.980]  I can't believe we let that guy sit on hold for so long.
[55:17.120 --> 55:17.700]  Didn't know he was there.
[55:17.720 --> 55:18.000]  I'm sorry.
[55:18.280 --> 55:21.400]  So if anyone else wants to call in, we're almost at the end of this hour.
[55:21.440 --> 55:23.460]  And we're getting kind of tired and cranky ourselves.
[55:23.680 --> 55:27.980]  So if someone does want to call, please do it now so that we can get you on.
[55:28.300 --> 55:30.180]  And we can go about our business afterwards.
[55:30.400 --> 55:31.800]  802-321-4225.
[55:31.800 --> 55:32.360]  802-225.
[55:32.660 --> 55:38.540]  But interesting points brought up about the radio station and about all kinds of...
[55:38.540 --> 55:39.620]  See, I don't hear the phone ringing.
[55:39.780 --> 55:41.180]  That's why I don't know there's people on it, Kyle.
[55:41.240 --> 55:42.160]  You told me to turn the ringer off.
[55:42.160 --> 55:43.940]  Well, I told you to turn the ringer off during the other show.
[55:44.060 --> 55:44.380]  But okay.
[55:45.020 --> 55:45.840]  I'll turn the ringer off.
[55:45.840 --> 55:47.040]  How are you able to hear it?
[55:47.820 --> 55:50.640]  I'm just trying to keep the wheels on this wagon cart here.
[55:50.720 --> 55:52.780]  Some kind of like bat hearing that you can hear a phone ringing?
[55:52.780 --> 55:53.840]  I hear it in the other room.
[55:54.060 --> 55:54.380]  Okay.
[55:54.600 --> 55:54.920]  All right.
[55:55.320 --> 55:56.320]  Well, let's see who's on the air.
[55:56.360 --> 55:56.740]  Good evening.
[55:56.740 --> 55:58.100]  You're on Off The Oak Overtime.
[55:58.820 --> 55:59.400]  Hi.
[55:59.680 --> 56:00.120]  Hi.
[56:00.280 --> 56:06.820]  I wanted to mention something that you mentioned at the beginning of the program about masks.
[56:07.160 --> 56:07.420]  Okay.
[56:09.100 --> 56:32.460]  And the World Health Organization's suggestions to decision makers at the country level about masking does not mention at all the vaccination status of the people who are masked.
[56:32.460 --> 56:37.000]  It mentions whether there's community transmission or not.
[56:37.260 --> 56:53.440]  So with the CDC doing this and doing that and doing the other thing, I go with what the World Health Organization says, which if we were following their suggestions, everyone would still be masked.
[56:53.440 --> 56:59.700]  But I also have a second thing that I want to ask you about.
[57:00.060 --> 57:00.160]  Okay.
[57:00.240 --> 57:00.440]  Go ahead.
[57:01.900 --> 57:09.560]  A petition that I would like your support for and the listeners' support for.
[57:10.380 --> 57:14.640]  AIDS for the disabled should be vaccinated.
[57:16.260 --> 57:19.980]  And it runs as below.
[57:20.420 --> 57:26.820]  I am disabled and at high risk for severe consequences or death if I were to get COVID.
[57:27.080 --> 57:27.260]  Right.
[57:27.620 --> 57:33.160]  I need the help of a home health care aide who is fully vaccinated.
[57:33.780 --> 57:42.420]  Home health care agencies claim they can't ask their aides to be vaccinated or disclose their vaccination status to me.
[57:42.420 --> 57:44.520]  But this isn't so.
[57:44.940 --> 57:50.820]  Home health care agencies are allowed to insist that all employees be vaccinated.
[57:51.100 --> 57:58.680]  They can ask aides to sign a confidentiality waiver to let me know the vaccination status of an aide.
[57:58.760 --> 58:05.500]  As it is, I've not been able to get a home health care aide since January 3rd.
[58:05.620 --> 58:07.660]  And my need is dire.
[58:07.660 --> 58:16.600]  I'm only one of many vulnerable people who have the right to be assured that the help they need will, in fact, not endanger them.
[58:17.120 --> 58:27.400]  Although home health care agencies claim all of their aides are properly trained in how to wear masks, I've witnessed this is not so.
[58:27.400 --> 58:34.420]  So, for example, people climb the stairs and as soon as they get in the door, take off their mask, the pant.
[58:34.960 --> 58:40.300]  They also claim that having had their temperature taken earlier in the day means they're healthy.
[58:41.340 --> 58:49.400]  Anyone who's actually serious about their client's safety would be willing to be vaccinated and to say so.
[58:49.400 --> 58:55.080]  An agency that is serious about client's safety would require this of all employees.
[58:55.860 --> 59:00.320]  Please pass whatever legislation you can to help make this happen.
[59:00.540 --> 59:03.000]  Well, it's not necessarily... I mean, I support everything you're saying.
[59:03.200 --> 59:04.660]  I don't think we need legislation.
[59:04.660 --> 59:10.920]  I think we just need these companies to establish some kind of a rule, which they have the right to do.
[59:11.060 --> 59:17.520]  You have the right, by the way, to say, you know, to anyone entering your home, show me proof that you're vaccinated.
[59:17.520 --> 59:19.580]  They don't have to show you proof.
[59:19.680 --> 59:20.380]  They don't have to come in.
[59:20.680 --> 59:30.520]  But if you become known as somebody who will not let someone in unless they have that or are willing to show that to you, I think the company might wake up and say, we're only going to send people...
[59:31.080 --> 59:31.460]  Go ahead.
[59:31.780 --> 59:35.400]  The company instead refused to send an aid.
[59:35.920 --> 59:37.700]  Then they didn't get another company.
[59:37.880 --> 59:38.480]  It's not the way you said.
[59:38.620 --> 59:38.880]  Right.
[59:39.020 --> 59:39.580]  It is not.
[59:40.140 --> 59:48.260]  I'd like to give out the address of the petition so that people can sign it and can spread it.
[59:48.400 --> 59:49.040]  Go right ahead.
[59:50.860 --> 59:54.280]  Change.org slash...
[59:54.280 --> 59:56.260]  And this is one word.
[59:56.780 --> 59:59.940]  Disabled need vaccinated AIDS.
[01:00:00.920 --> 01:00:04.120]  AIDS is spelled A-I-D-E-S.
[01:00:05.060 --> 01:00:05.560]  Okay.
[01:00:05.940 --> 01:00:09.100]  I also suggest maybe find that...
[01:00:09.100 --> 01:00:09.480]  Let me just repeat that.
[01:00:09.640 --> 01:00:10.660]  Let me just repeat that.
[01:00:10.660 --> 01:00:10.860]  Okay.
[01:00:10.880 --> 01:00:11.220]  Go ahead.
[01:00:11.440 --> 01:00:11.620]  Go ahead.
[01:00:12.280 --> 01:00:14.540]  Now, everybody, grab a pen.
[01:00:16.240 --> 01:00:19.300]  Change.org slash...
[01:00:20.360 --> 01:00:24.260]  Disabled need vaccinated AIDS.
[01:00:24.620 --> 01:00:26.080]  A-I-D-E-S.
[01:00:26.540 --> 01:00:27.780]  All one word.
[01:00:28.000 --> 01:00:36.420]  So, if I can suggest, I think you should reach out to an elected official that you think might be sympathetic to this.
[01:00:36.440 --> 01:00:37.580]  I'm thinking someone like AOC.
[01:00:37.580 --> 01:00:42.420]  It might not represent you, but still, reach out to somebody that will make noise about this.
[01:00:42.440 --> 01:00:45.280]  Because what you're saying is so logical and reasonable.
[01:00:45.620 --> 01:00:53.800]  Of course, that's what anybody, you know, in your situation would want and should be able to get without this kind of stress.
[01:00:54.220 --> 01:00:58.260]  And I think most of us are just surprised to find out that's not the case.
[01:01:00.620 --> 01:01:01.300]  Thank you.
[01:01:01.520 --> 01:01:01.740]  All right.
[01:01:01.760 --> 01:01:02.160]  Well, good luck.
[01:01:02.180 --> 01:01:05.500]  Is there any chance you would mention this on the air?
[01:01:06.120 --> 01:01:06.740]  You know what?
[01:01:06.820 --> 01:01:07.540]  Send us an email.
[01:01:07.760 --> 01:01:10.140]  That way, OTH at 2600.com.
[01:01:10.260 --> 01:01:13.160]  And next week, we'll probably be able to read it that way.
[01:01:14.000 --> 01:01:14.620]  I shall.
[01:01:14.860 --> 01:01:15.120]  All right.
[01:01:15.320 --> 01:01:15.720]  Good luck.
[01:01:16.380 --> 01:01:16.960]  Thank you.
[01:01:18.160 --> 01:01:19.360]  That's pretty unbelievable.
[01:01:20.000 --> 01:01:20.980]  What do you think, Alex?
[01:01:23.420 --> 01:01:24.260]  Alex, are you there?
[01:01:24.680 --> 01:01:25.440]  Yeah, I'm sorry.
[01:01:25.600 --> 01:01:26.740]  I had to unmute myself there.
[01:01:27.700 --> 01:01:31.100]  I think she makes a good point about this, right?
[01:01:31.100 --> 01:01:32.700]  And, you know, she's spreading the good word.
[01:01:32.860 --> 01:01:40.540]  And I, yeah, I mean, look, it's, you know, I don't really know what else really to say.
[01:01:40.600 --> 01:01:41.340]  Well, I'm surprised.
[01:01:41.340 --> 01:01:42.600]  I didn't think that was the case.
[01:01:42.720 --> 01:01:47.460]  I just figured a home health aide would certainly be vaccinated and would be more than eager to show proof of that.
[01:01:47.560 --> 01:01:47.720]  Yeah.
[01:01:47.780 --> 01:01:50.660]  It shows you how complicated it is, like what different people are facing.
[01:01:51.000 --> 01:01:51.320]  Yeah.
[01:01:51.340 --> 01:01:53.240]  I mean, you get the person's name, right?
[01:01:54.040 --> 01:01:58.880]  And, you know, you want to know if they have an infectious disease or are likely to have an infectious disease.
[01:01:58.880 --> 01:02:12.500]  That's kind of important, you know, if you're a typhoid Mary and you want to help out somebody, you know, in some home someplace, it's of interest to them to know something about who you are and what you might be at risk of.
[01:02:13.820 --> 01:02:15.060]  See, it's a...
[01:02:15.060 --> 01:02:15.240]  Another call?
[01:02:15.360 --> 01:02:15.520]  Wow.
[01:02:15.900 --> 01:02:17.060]  How do you hear that, Kyle?
[01:02:17.100 --> 01:02:18.140]  I don't know how you hear that.
[01:02:19.580 --> 01:02:19.940]  Okay.
[01:02:20.440 --> 01:02:21.140]  Bat senses.
[01:02:21.380 --> 01:02:23.880]  This will be the last call because we are over the hour.
[01:02:23.940 --> 01:02:24.220]  Good evening.
[01:02:24.340 --> 01:02:24.780]  I think there's a call.
[01:02:25.000 --> 01:02:25.640]  You're on the air.
[01:02:25.720 --> 01:02:25.940]  Go ahead.
[01:02:27.460 --> 01:02:28.000]  Hi there.
[01:02:28.000 --> 01:02:31.400]  I just wanted to make mention on the pipeline hack.
[01:02:31.540 --> 01:02:31.800]  Uh-huh.
[01:02:32.160 --> 01:02:52.040]  A buddy of mine that builds data centers and data centers and consolidates them said one of the big problems with something like a ransomware attack is, whereas everybody says just go to the backups, when it's been in the system for months, it's a possibility that the backups are encrypted as well.
[01:02:52.180 --> 01:02:52.800]  That is true.
[01:02:52.800 --> 01:02:55.060]  And that's why you don't just keep one backup.
[01:02:55.200 --> 01:02:56.580]  You keep a backup from a year ago.
[01:02:56.580 --> 01:02:58.160]  You keep a backup from a month ago.
[01:02:58.320 --> 01:02:59.420]  You keep a backup from a week ago.
[01:03:00.200 --> 01:03:04.260]  And that's only going to put back your essential programs, not anything.
[01:03:05.380 --> 01:03:07.860]  An example, accounts payable, accounts receivable.
[01:03:08.180 --> 01:03:13.260]  You know, everybody will tell you what you owe them, but they won't tell you what they owe you.
[01:03:13.260 --> 01:03:13.680]  Yeah.
[01:03:13.920 --> 01:03:14.740]  No, good point.
[01:03:14.920 --> 01:03:15.540]  Very good point.
[01:03:15.840 --> 01:03:22.120]  There have to be other methods of redundancy, you know, of having some other form of protection.
[01:03:22.820 --> 01:03:27.880]  But, you know, the best one is having good security in the first place so that people aren't infesting your network.
[01:03:28.100 --> 01:03:29.260]  You know, that's the first step.
[01:03:30.580 --> 01:03:32.420]  The thumb drive, et cetera.
[01:03:32.660 --> 01:03:32.920]  Uh-huh.
[01:03:33.040 --> 01:03:35.320]  Anything like that that somebody can plug into your system.
[01:03:35.540 --> 01:03:35.720]  Yep.
[01:03:35.820 --> 01:03:37.080]  Clicking on links and email.
[01:03:37.440 --> 01:03:37.880]  All the possibility.
[01:03:38.020 --> 01:03:38.720]  The human element.
[01:03:38.920 --> 01:03:40.220]  All sorts of things like that.
[01:03:40.220 --> 01:03:40.500]  Yeah.
[01:03:40.500 --> 01:03:41.000]  Uh-huh.
[01:03:41.000 --> 01:03:41.180]  Okay.
[01:03:41.560 --> 01:03:41.960]  There's...
[01:03:41.960 --> 01:03:43.120]  I just wanted to put out that point.
[01:03:43.280 --> 01:03:44.000]  No, it was great.
[01:03:44.000 --> 01:03:44.460]  Have a good night.
[01:03:44.680 --> 01:03:45.120]  Thank you.
[01:03:45.300 --> 01:03:45.920]  Thank you for that call.
[01:03:46.020 --> 01:03:46.400]  Go ahead, Carl.
[01:03:47.940 --> 01:03:48.980]  That's a great point.
[01:03:49.280 --> 01:03:57.000]  I just thought of adding, those are some of the things you can design into your backup scheme.
[01:03:57.660 --> 01:04:09.960]  And, you know, scheduling, maybe you have a specific type of backup and data that is done at a certain time versus a nightly backup.
[01:04:10.420 --> 01:04:17.860]  You know, there's different schemes and a lot of ways to strategize to just set yourself up for the best possible outcome.
[01:04:18.340 --> 01:04:29.740]  And like you're saying, having a clone of a backup or having a really old backup or one mid-year, all of that is up to you.
[01:04:29.740 --> 01:04:56.380]  You can design it however you want, but like the caller mentioned, just making something a blanket type thing or have it be taking advantage of really fast services or stuff that seems alluring when you want it to operate one way, that could come back to haunt you if it's operating in another way.
[01:04:56.720 --> 01:04:58.000]  So, great point.
[01:04:58.500 --> 01:05:05.800]  In co-location and facilities that are highly capable, that can be a capability that's leveraged against your organization.
[01:05:06.040 --> 01:05:09.220]  You know, you should have, I think, at least two different methods of keeping backups.
[01:05:09.380 --> 01:05:16.760]  Maybe something in the cloud and maybe something that's local, like a DLT tape or something like that, that you have control of.
[01:05:16.840 --> 01:05:20.460]  Obviously, you don't keep it next to that same computer you're backing up.
[01:05:20.460 --> 01:05:28.580]  Uh, but that way, if, if one system is compromised and, and your, your site goes down as well, you have something else.
[01:05:28.740 --> 01:05:38.720]  And so your chances increase, you know, even, um, it's kind of weird to think this way, but, um, the person doing the, uh, the malware attack is actually making a backup for you.
[01:05:38.800 --> 01:05:44.500]  So that encrypted copy of your entire network or, or computer or whatever it is that they, they've attacked.
[01:05:44.940 --> 01:05:55.940]  Um, if you, if, if somebody that was on your side was doing that, it could actually be seen as a service, you know, if they, if they tucked it away someplace and if you needed access to it, here's the password, you have access to it.
[01:05:56.540 --> 01:06:06.880]  Maybe there's a, there's a cottage industry that can be formed and, uh, going out and doing friendly ransomware attacks and, uh, and notifying people, this is how we got in and this is where your data is.
[01:06:07.180 --> 01:06:08.040]  Don't let it happen again.
[01:06:09.540 --> 01:06:10.200]  Alex, go ahead.
[01:06:10.860 --> 01:06:11.220]  Yeah, sure.
[01:06:11.440 --> 01:06:24.580]  I mean, that, that's certainly one way of, uh, of referring to a breach, which is, would, would be something like, you know, an unscheduled backup to the cloud, you know, a euphemism for getting screwed.
[01:06:25.400 --> 01:06:50.000]  Well, and my question, I think with, um, a backup having been, uh, affected would be how functionally was that generated if the very system itself was disabled and taken over by, uh, some kind of, uh, shell or operating system that's, that's running in memory,
[01:06:50.580 --> 01:06:58.300]  encrypting everything, uh, presumably some functionality, uh, that would deteriorate.
[01:06:58.520 --> 01:07:10.540]  And, um, I don't know, like how that is, is highly specific to exactly what kind of attack your, uh, machines are being, uh, subject to.
[01:07:10.540 --> 01:07:26.620]  But one other trick too, is, uh, having different types of machines, having a little bit more diversity, um, if you can possibly swing that will also increase, I think, uh, your chances of having a good outcome, but there's a lot to consider.
[01:07:28.440 --> 01:07:30.880]  I think that's a good closing for us.
[01:07:31.020 --> 01:07:38.500]  And this might be the longest overtime ever because it's, it's now, uh, seven minutes after nine o'clock, wow, an hour and seven minutes.
[01:07:38.900 --> 01:07:41.620]  Um, so, uh, any, any last words, Alex?
[01:07:42.500 --> 01:07:44.200]  Uh, no, I'm pretty tired.
[01:07:44.340 --> 01:07:48.920]  I think it's been a, a fun, long show and, uh, we'll see everyone next week.
[01:07:49.060 --> 01:07:53.120]  Again, write to us, OTH at 2600.com, uh, contribute to BAI.
[01:07:53.260 --> 01:08:01.340]  If you can give to WBAI.org and, um, write to us, OTH, as I said, at 2600.com and we will see you next week.
[01:08:02.320 --> 01:08:02.900]  Good night.