[00:00.000 --> 00:05.940]  This is WBAI New York, 99.5 FM and WBAI.org online.
[00:06.320 --> 00:11.500]  The previous program was Economic Update with Richard Wolff, heard Wednesdays at 6.30 p.m.
[00:11.960 --> 00:13.240]  The time now is 7 p.m.
[00:13.300 --> 00:15.440]  Stay tuned for Off the Hook, coming up.
[00:16.700 --> 00:21.580]  And you're listening to radio station WBAI New York at 99.5 FM.
[00:21.940 --> 00:26.680]  It's 7 o'clock on a Wednesday, and that means it's time for Off the Hook.
[01:51.930 --> 01:53.070]  And a very good evening.
[01:53.170 --> 01:53.750]  Good evening to everybody.
[01:53.910 --> 01:55.770]  The program is Off the Hook.
[01:59.390 --> 02:03.210]  I'm Andrew Goldstein here with you on this Wednesday evening, joined tonight by Kyle.
[02:03.810 --> 02:04.210]  Present.
[02:05.490 --> 02:05.890]  Alex?
[02:07.770 --> 02:08.530]  Hello, Alex.
[02:09.330 --> 02:09.730]  Hello.
[02:09.870 --> 02:10.030]  How are you?
[02:10.170 --> 02:10.490]  How are you?
[02:10.890 --> 02:11.250]  Good.
[02:11.450 --> 02:11.850]  Good.
[02:11.970 --> 02:12.990]  Got a little delay going there.
[02:13.570 --> 02:14.150]  Rob T.
[02:14.370 --> 02:14.770]  Firefly.
[02:15.390 --> 02:16.190]  Good evening.
[02:16.750 --> 02:17.870]  You're dressed for the occasion.
[02:18.010 --> 02:18.170]  Wow.
[02:18.650 --> 02:20.170]  It's definitely a heat wave.
[02:20.850 --> 02:22.510]  And Gila is joining us as well.
[02:22.510 --> 02:23.570]  Good evening.
[02:24.130 --> 02:25.990]  Well, yeah, it is a heat wave.
[02:26.190 --> 02:26.970]  We're all surviving it.
[02:27.090 --> 02:29.390]  I think it's going to end tonight, so we can calm down.
[02:29.510 --> 02:32.090]  It's not 118 degrees like it is in some parts of the country.
[02:33.250 --> 02:40.310]  We have some exciting news coming up this Friday for the first time in well over a year.
[02:40.890 --> 02:42.850]  There will be 2,600 meetings.
[02:44.770 --> 02:48.410]  I just thought that might be spontaneous applause and cheering, but okay, that's fine.
[02:48.630 --> 02:49.270]  No, that's all right.
[02:49.330 --> 02:49.710]  That's all right.
[02:50.690 --> 02:51.510]  What am I thinking?
[02:52.370 --> 02:55.750]  So, yeah, it's basically, it's subdued.
[02:55.750 --> 03:04.570]  We're coming back slowly and cautiously because that's how we all have to act until we're finished with the hell we've been going through.
[03:04.570 --> 03:17.130]  So, basically, what it means is that you have to be in a location where the total vaccine percentage, meaning people who have been fully vaccinated, is 40% or above.
[03:17.650 --> 03:21.990]  Now, if that leaves out a good part of the world, that leaves out a good part of the United States, unfortunately.
[03:22.310 --> 03:30.730]  And it's particularly unfortunate because those parts of the United States had every opportunity to get well above 40% and chose not to, which is insane.
[03:30.730 --> 03:38.930]  When you think about it, the rest of the world is scrambling for the vaccine that will basically solve our problems.
[03:39.250 --> 03:43.110]  And some of us are opting just to abstain.
[03:44.210 --> 03:51.830]  But we do have a dozen places now, and they're all in the United States, where we're going to have meetings this Friday.
[03:52.190 --> 03:56.370]  And as per tradition, the meetings are at 5 p.m.
[03:56.390 --> 03:59.770]  unless otherwise designated, first Friday of every month.
[03:59.950 --> 04:05.230]  This being July the 2nd, that means it's the first Friday of the month.
[04:05.490 --> 04:09.950]  We've been having virtual meetings, and I believe some of these meetings will still have virtual meetings.
[04:09.950 --> 04:17.410]  So if you've been used to connecting with these people in that way, you can probably continue to do so.
[04:17.530 --> 04:21.670]  But let me just quickly outline where we will be having meetings on Friday.
[04:21.750 --> 04:23.990]  And by meetings, it's more a gathering.
[04:23.990 --> 04:36.550]  If you've never been to one before, it's kind of like just pulling up a chair in a food court or some public place and talking to people that also showed up, maybe with a copy of 2600 or a Hacker T-shirt or something like that.
[04:36.650 --> 04:38.490]  And you talk to the people you want to talk to.
[04:38.550 --> 04:40.370]  You don't talk to the people you don't want to talk to.
[04:40.510 --> 04:41.310]  There's no agenda.
[04:41.450 --> 04:42.390]  Nobody is in charge.
[04:43.550 --> 04:49.690]  And we all basically act responsibly, which is why we are asking people to only come if you're vaccinated.
[04:50.170 --> 04:53.930]  And we're asking people not to ask anyone to prove they're vaccinated.
[04:54.130 --> 04:58.190]  Let's trust each other and hope that responsibility wins out in the end.
[04:58.190 --> 05:01.710]  And so, Arizona, we're having a meeting in Phoenix.
[05:01.770 --> 05:04.270]  We're having one in Denver, Colorado.
[05:05.130 --> 05:06.370]  Farmington, Connecticut.
[05:06.970 --> 05:08.710]  Kansas City, Kansas.
[05:08.970 --> 05:09.790]  Not Kansas City, Missouri.
[05:10.010 --> 05:10.970]  Kansas City, Kansas.
[05:11.190 --> 05:13.050]  Technically, Overland Park.
[05:13.590 --> 05:14.630]  Boston, Massachusetts.
[05:14.950 --> 05:17.830]  And again, technically, it's Cambridge, Massachusetts.
[05:18.070 --> 05:19.450]  Also, I should go back to Phoenix.
[05:19.650 --> 05:21.010]  Technically, that's Mesa, Arizona.
[05:21.230 --> 05:23.730]  So there's a lot of technicalities here.
[05:23.810 --> 05:24.550]  But they're very close by.
[05:25.050 --> 05:25.850]  New Jersey.
[05:26.190 --> 05:27.330]  Somerville, New Jersey.
[05:28.190 --> 05:28.670]  How exotic.
[05:28.910 --> 05:29.390]  Wow.
[05:29.590 --> 05:32.530]  And we have three meetings in the state of New York.
[05:32.690 --> 05:34.250]  Albany, New York City.
[05:34.490 --> 05:35.510]  That's right around here.
[05:36.250 --> 05:37.210]  And Rochester.
[05:39.010 --> 05:40.510]  And Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.
[05:41.190 --> 05:42.070]  Houston, Texas.
[05:42.510 --> 05:43.630]  And Seattle, Washington.
[05:44.010 --> 05:49.250]  Now, you can get the details as to exactly where the meetings are by going to 2600.com slash meetings.
[05:50.210 --> 05:52.270]  And that will give you all the information.
[05:52.490 --> 05:58.170]  And again, meetings are at 5 o'clock unless they're designated otherwise this Friday coming up.
[05:58.190 --> 06:05.790]  And Rob, I know you've done a good amount of work getting the New York City meeting started back up again.
[06:06.610 --> 06:08.590]  Are you meeting with much enthusiasm?
[06:09.750 --> 06:11.070]  Yeah, a lot of enthusiasm.
[06:11.650 --> 06:16.890]  One thing you mentioned is that a lot of people did online meetings and a lot of people are continuing online meetings.
[06:17.110 --> 06:24.290]  And one thing I've had a lot of good feedback about is we've been doing online meetings, online meetings over Zoom during the lockdown.
[06:24.290 --> 06:35.650]  But now that we're returning to a physical meeting, we are still going to be doing the online meeting because I've heard from a lot of people who are interested but just not there yet in terms of going to an in-person event.
[06:35.990 --> 06:39.290]  So both types of meeting will be happening.
[06:39.650 --> 06:46.090]  We're going to try and have a device or two at the physical meeting connected to the virtual one so we can bring it all together somehow.
[06:46.710 --> 06:50.810]  But, yeah, we're figuring this all out as we go along and we look forward to the opportunity.
[06:51.630 --> 06:51.870]  Okay.
[06:53.030 --> 06:54.610]  Yeah, it's really something.
[06:54.870 --> 06:56.210]  I'm glad we're at this stage.
[06:56.350 --> 07:00.570]  Hopefully, things get much, much better and we add in more meetings.
[07:01.010 --> 07:10.950]  And, again, if you're just starting a meeting, if there wasn't a meeting in your location beforehand, or if you just want to start a new one in an old location, just contact us.
[07:11.190 --> 07:18.230]  We're on Twitter at 2600Meetings, or you can email meetings at 2600.com.
[07:18.230 --> 07:21.290]  That's meetings at 2600.com.
[07:22.710 --> 07:23.310]  Okay.
[07:23.570 --> 07:29.670]  Speaking of hacking groups, let's go to the dark side of hacking groups as they're defined.
[07:29.670 --> 07:47.250]  A hacking group believed to have links to the Chinese government penetrated the Metropolitan Transportation Authority's computer systems in April, and for some reason it's just being reported in June, exposing vulnerabilities in a vast transportation network that carries millions of people every day.
[07:47.630 --> 07:48.950]  We all know that part.
[07:49.450 --> 07:53.930]  The hackers did not gain access to systems that controlled train cars.
[07:54.170 --> 07:55.110]  Isn't that nice?
[07:55.350 --> 07:55.910]  Isn't that fortunate?
[07:56.430 --> 07:58.430]  And rider safety was not at risk.
[07:58.430 --> 08:00.770]  That's according to transit officials.
[08:01.430 --> 08:04.270]  The intrusion appeared to have done little, if any, damage.
[08:05.190 --> 08:19.370]  But a week after the agency learned of the attack, officials raised concerns that hackers could have entered those operational systems, what they could have done, or that they could continue to penetrate the agency's computer systems through a back door.
[08:19.670 --> 08:28.370]  Transit officials say a forensic analysis of the attack has not revealed evidence of either, and that hackers did not compromise customers' personal information.
[08:28.530 --> 08:30.130]  Not much happened here.
[08:30.250 --> 08:35.230]  So it's just, I guess it's good to be cautious and to be aware of these potential intrusions.
[08:35.410 --> 08:40.750]  The agency reported the attack to law enforcement and other state agencies, but has not disclosed it publicly.
[08:40.970 --> 08:45.270]  But it has been disclosed publicly now because the New York Times has reported it.
[08:45.450 --> 08:52.610]  The breach was the third and most significant cyber attack on the transit network, which, by the way, is North America's largest.
[08:52.610 --> 08:55.990]  We never lose an opportunity to mention that when we talk about the MTA.
[08:58.370 --> 09:06.010]  The basically most significant cyber attack by hackers thought to be connected to foreign governments in recent years.
[09:06.010 --> 09:08.590]  I guess that's the real concern.
[09:09.070 --> 09:22.450]  The MTA is one of a growing number of transit agencies across the country targeted by foreign hackers, and the breach comes during a surge in cyber attacks on critical American infrastructure from fuel pipelines to water supply systems.
[09:22.870 --> 09:35.390]  So I guess, you know, when you see a link to something overseas, something foreign, that really gets us to take it more seriously than if it was just a random intrusion of one sort or another.
[09:35.470 --> 09:38.210]  But in reality, you don't really know who is behind this.
[09:38.450 --> 09:41.210]  It may come from a Chinese IP, but it could be from Brooklyn.
[09:41.670 --> 09:43.090]  You just don't know.
[09:43.090 --> 09:47.950]  The important thing is to keep these systems locked up tight, secure.
[09:48.070 --> 09:51.530]  You shouldn't be able to access a train car from the Internet.
[09:51.530 --> 09:52.550]  It doesn't make any sense.
[09:52.690 --> 09:58.870]  Why would you have that functionality available to people who are not already inside the system physically?
[10:01.050 --> 10:17.610]  I've been singing this refrain now for decades, but it never seems to go anywhere because we just keep basically signing everything up into the network, connecting everybody together, and acting surprised when there are compromised systems.
[10:17.610 --> 10:19.950]  It happens over and over again.
[10:20.070 --> 10:21.290]  It doesn't matter how good your password is.
[10:21.370 --> 10:26.930]  If you have a system that is accessible in some way, there will be a backdoor.
[10:27.090 --> 10:30.690]  There will be some kind of an exploit that will be taken advantage of.
[10:30.690 --> 10:32.430]  So we can't be surprised when this happens.
[10:32.950 --> 10:34.430]  Am I being naive?
[10:34.630 --> 10:35.530]  Am I being too harsh?
[10:37.690 --> 10:42.330]  I don't think you're being naive about it or harsh.
[10:42.550 --> 10:48.610]  You know, I will say I think these attacks on transit systems happen pretty regularly.
[10:49.350 --> 10:57.270]  And, you know, there are ways that you can determine, especially if there's been a breach, the origin of the attacker.
[10:57.270 --> 11:03.970]  I mean, not with 100% certainty, and obviously there are a lot of false flags that can be thrown up with respect to attribution.
[11:04.310 --> 11:19.630]  But Chinese threat actors may use certain tactics, techniques, and procedures, or TTPs, as they're known in the information security community, that signal pretty clearly that, you know, the origin may be China.
[11:19.750 --> 11:20.530]  They may do certain things.
[11:20.650 --> 11:21.690]  They may leave certain tracks.
[11:22.190 --> 11:25.150]  But again, look, nothing can be 100% certain.
[11:25.710 --> 11:34.090]  The important thing, though, is knowing that the breach happened, remediating it, making sure that the movement of the threat actor is contained.
[11:34.650 --> 11:36.130]  And these happen all the time.
[11:36.130 --> 11:51.470]  With another overseas threat actor that I've been tracking for well over two years, we didn't see them target the MTA, but they did target a dozen different transit systems in the United States, as well as many other components of critical infrastructure.
[11:52.210 --> 12:02.750]  One of the targets that a very persistent threat actor that I've been tracking was, in fact, the Chicago transit, the Chicago version of the MTA.
[12:02.750 --> 12:03.630]  Okay.
[12:03.650 --> 12:08.250]  And look, so these things happen, and these systems will be breached.
[12:08.270 --> 12:18.910]  It's a matter of making sure that the attackers can't make lateral movements as easily and quickly as they could to do the maximum amount of damage.
[12:19.530 --> 12:25.670]  If I'm not mistaken, Chicago, I don't know if they still do, but they did use the same system as New York.
[12:28.130 --> 12:33.030]  Not MetroCard per se, but Cubic, I believe, was the name of the company that installed it.
[12:33.150 --> 12:36.730]  So it was a similar system, but I think they might have advanced into something else.
[12:36.950 --> 12:49.090]  In fact, we're going to talk about a new system the MTA is using, but I also wanted to talk about another cyber attack that's kind of similar because it involves foreign hackers and the concern that that causes.
[12:49.470 --> 13:02.410]  Details of about 280,000 students throughout Israel were leaked after a cyber attack targeted the Academy Company, and they spell it cleverly, A-C-A-D-E-M-E, capital M-E.
[13:02.750 --> 13:04.590]  So Academy, I guess is how you're supposed to say it.
[13:04.950 --> 13:06.350]  The Academy, I'm not going to say it that way.
[13:06.610 --> 13:10.910]  It services a number of colleges and universities throughout the country.
[13:11.410 --> 13:35.610]  A pro-Palestinian Malaysian hacker group known as Dragon Force claimed that it hacked into Academy, I did it again, Academy last week, saying, in all caps, they said this, the largest and most advanced student and graduate recruitment network in Israel hacked by Dragon Force Malaysia in a telegram message on June the 20th.
[13:35.890 --> 13:45.530]  The group claimed that they leaked emails, passwords, first and last names, addresses, and even phone numbers of students who were registered on Academy.
[13:45.530 --> 13:53.670]  Dragon Force attacked screenshots of code, server addresses, and a table including email addresses and names.
[13:53.910 --> 13:58.930]  The hackers leaked the details of about 280,000 students who used the server since 2014.
[14:00.890 --> 14:06.170]  The Academy site was taken offline and listed as unavailable as of Monday morning.
[14:06.410 --> 14:11.550]  A notice which appears when attempting to access the site said the site should be back soon.
[14:12.230 --> 14:20.810]  The message read, This is an urgent call for all hackers, human rights organizations, and activists all around the world to unite again and start a campaign against Israel.
[14:21.270 --> 14:21.870]  Oh, clever.
[14:22.310 --> 14:22.670]  Israel.
[14:23.690 --> 14:25.910]  Share what is really going on there.
[14:26.970 --> 14:29.810]  Expose their terrorist activity to the world.
[14:30.550 --> 14:34.810]  We will never remain silent against Israel war activity.
[14:34.810 --> 14:42.990]  The interesting thing about this is that all the media reports are basically saying pro-Palestinian hackers.
[14:43.610 --> 14:45.070]  And this came from Malaysia.
[14:45.310 --> 14:48.770]  It's great how the Palestinians are being blamed for this, even though they had nothing to do with it.
[14:48.930 --> 14:55.650]  It's basically people who are critical of Israel, but that makes them pro-Palestinian, and that puts Palestinian in the headline.
[14:55.650 --> 15:03.970]  And they probably don't even have the infrastructure to hack into something from where they are.
[15:04.530 --> 15:07.010]  Yet, this is how the story is reported.
[15:07.650 --> 15:12.450]  Later on the same day, the group claimed that it leaked a massive number of Israeli passports.
[15:12.630 --> 15:18.790]  The same group also launched DDoS attacks against Israeli banks on Friday, including Bank of Israel.
[15:19.670 --> 15:34.030]  And earlier this year, Israel National Cyber Directorate Chief Yigal Una warned that cyber attacks could disable Israeli academic institutions if proper action isn't taken to prepare for such situations.
[15:34.310 --> 15:36.150]  So, interesting story there.
[15:36.490 --> 15:42.770]  A little bit of international intrigue, nationalism, and exploits.
[15:44.010 --> 15:45.230]  What a wonderful world.
[15:46.610 --> 15:48.650]  All right, going back to the MTA.
[15:49.590 --> 15:55.190]  They are reviewing whether or not cash payments will be returning to token booths.
[15:56.310 --> 16:03.630]  When the pandemic struck, they stopped taking cash at those particular subway booths.
[16:04.770 --> 16:11.990]  Anyone looking to purchase or refill a MetroCard with cash will have to do so at a vending machine for the foreseeable future.
[16:13.230 --> 16:23.290]  Last Wednesday, MTA officials said the agency had no current plans to reinstate cash transactions or MetroCard replacements at subway token booths, even after the pandemic has finished.
[16:23.490 --> 16:24.230]  No plans.
[16:24.350 --> 16:25.290]  What do they do in there?
[16:25.410 --> 16:31.650]  If they don't take cash and they don't do things with MetroCards, they're in this barricaded booth.
[16:32.110 --> 16:34.650]  Do they just tell you, go use the machine?
[16:34.650 --> 16:35.950]  The train is over there.
[16:36.070 --> 16:37.490]  What do they do?
[16:37.830 --> 16:39.050]  I don't mean disrespect.
[16:39.050 --> 16:46.450]  I am honestly curious because the only times I ever would go up to the booth is if I needed to do one of those two things.
[16:47.490 --> 16:48.350]  Alex, do you have an idea?
[16:49.250 --> 16:58.730]  I mean, the only real interactions I've had with the people in the booth, which are generally pleasant people, are to open the service door.
[17:00.970 --> 17:05.610]  The door, you know, that's not a turnstile so that you can get in with a stroller.
[17:05.910 --> 17:10.650]  So, you know, if you're pushing a stroller down there, you know, you don't have to lift it over the turnstile, something like that.
[17:10.750 --> 17:11.890]  So they're quite helpful.
[17:12.050 --> 17:13.950]  It seems like a button could do that.
[17:13.950 --> 17:22.430]  Again, no offense, but it really doesn't seem like you need to have somebody in a booth eight hours a day, literally, to let somebody through a door.
[17:22.990 --> 17:27.650]  However, if a button could open that door, then there would be very few people paying for the subway.
[17:27.690 --> 17:30.150]  Well, a button does open it because the person inside is pushing the button.
[17:30.250 --> 17:38.330]  What I'm saying is, yeah, it would be a more sophisticated button where the button asks you a question, who are you, why do you want to do this, and you answer satisfactorily.
[17:38.510 --> 17:39.950]  We live in the 21st century.
[17:40.050 --> 17:43.190]  I know buttons are capable of doing this, or there are ways.
[17:44.010 --> 17:48.250]  Controlling all of those buttons, probably, for the entire MTA system.
[17:48.530 --> 17:49.350]  Just taking these...
[17:49.350 --> 17:52.730]  Okay, you could have a master button pusher somewhere who looks at...
[17:52.730 --> 17:54.390]  That would be a hell job, but sure.
[17:54.830 --> 17:55.410]  It would.
[17:55.550 --> 18:01.030]  And the other thing that I've seen these people do are help tourists with questions about, you know, do I take the express?
[18:01.310 --> 18:02.390]  You know, where does the 2-3 go?
[18:02.610 --> 18:04.070]  Does the one train go to Brooklyn?
[18:04.250 --> 18:07.650]  Things like that, that can be answered by looking at a map.
[18:07.650 --> 18:16.330]  I mean, it would be somewhat helpful for the MTA to put some subway maps, you know, in the lobby areas, you know, before you go through the turnstiles.
[18:16.550 --> 18:17.590]  Don't they do that?
[18:17.810 --> 18:18.050]  Don't...
[18:18.050 --> 18:18.750]  Isn't that...
[18:18.750 --> 18:19.730]  They used to do that.
[18:19.790 --> 18:20.790]  Why would they stop doing that?
[18:21.090 --> 18:21.890]  Every station.
[18:22.210 --> 18:25.890]  You know, it's sort of idiotic that they don't do that.
[18:26.010 --> 18:36.510]  You know, you have most of the maps are overtaken now, even in the subway stations themselves, when you get down to the tracks by these damn advertisements for this, that.
[18:36.510 --> 18:40.950]  Well, look, I understand advertisements are important, and I do need to see an ad, you know, every few feet.
[18:41.230 --> 18:46.150]  But, surely there's space on a wall to put the map of the damn system that I'm entering.
[18:46.450 --> 18:48.150]  That really shouldn't be difficult.
[18:48.630 --> 18:49.970]  That's difficult to argue with.
[18:49.970 --> 18:50.310]  I agree.
[18:50.530 --> 18:53.990]  So, you know, human interaction, I think you touched upon it right there.
[18:54.150 --> 18:57.370]  That is why we want to keep humans in those booths.
[18:57.430 --> 19:03.970]  We've always fought against whenever they close down subway booths and try to automate the whole thing.
[19:03.970 --> 19:15.590]  Well, it seems like they're trying to do that even more so by just eliminating the idea that you can use cash or you can talk to somebody about a problem with your MetroCard or ask a question.
[19:15.970 --> 19:17.410]  Hopefully, you can still do that.
[19:18.170 --> 19:21.290]  So, MTA really needs to rethink its priorities.
[19:21.630 --> 19:22.210]  Yes, go ahead, Rob.
[19:23.290 --> 19:37.250]  In addition to opening that door for people who have strollers or, like, you know, rolling luggage or things like that, just encumbrances, that's also the system in place for people with mobility issues, people who use wheelchairs and things like that.
[19:37.390 --> 19:46.830]  So, it's an accessibility necessity that you have a human there to at least do that bit and make the system accessible to people who need that extra bit of assistance.
[19:47.150 --> 19:50.470]  Well, again, that's something the MTA needs to be told because they're closing them.
[19:50.630 --> 19:51.790]  They're closing those stations.
[19:51.890 --> 19:54.310]  They're making the people inside do less and less.
[19:54.310 --> 20:00.170]  And then, eventually, they're just getting rid of them altogether and saying, yeah, use the handicapped entrance across the street or something.
[20:01.690 --> 20:10.190]  But there's also the issue of having a human in a booth is a comfort when there are things like security issues to worry about.
[20:10.350 --> 20:24.150]  If you're worried that, like, maybe there are creepy people in that subway or you see something going on and you can go get the human and tell them to get help or something, that also is a thing that requires an actual person around.
[20:24.750 --> 20:30.890]  Yeah, if somebody falls on the track or something like that, who are you going to contact to stop the train?
[20:31.050 --> 20:31.210]  Gila?
[20:31.690 --> 20:43.410]  I mean, the question that I have also is that as the city is looking to phase out the Metro card and phase into exclusively using Omni, is that what the system is called?
[20:43.410 --> 20:45.450]  Yeah, you're touching on my next story, but yes.
[20:45.690 --> 20:51.370]  So, yeah, I mean, that's my question is how is cash going to exist in that ecosystem anyway?
[20:51.910 --> 20:53.810]  Well, that is a very good question.
[20:53.970 --> 20:58.690]  And that's something that I was very concerned about because I've been looking into this Omni system.
[20:58.790 --> 21:12.810]  I haven't really used the MTA in a while, a couple of times, but I'm, you know, still holding on to my trusty Metro card, which is basically one of these autofill brands that basically refills itself using a credit card account.
[21:13.110 --> 21:19.790]  What they are replacing the Metro card with is the Omni system, O-M-N-Y, I believe is how it's spelled.
[21:20.850 --> 21:27.070]  First of all, we've all seen the glass, I guess it is, our readers.
[21:27.970 --> 21:29.570]  I think that's the dumbest thing ever.
[21:29.650 --> 21:34.010]  And sure enough, someone went on a crime spree and smashed a whole bunch of them someplace over the weekend.
[21:34.830 --> 21:36.210]  Yeah, you know, London, they don't do that.
[21:36.310 --> 21:37.170]  You can't smash them.
[21:37.270 --> 21:40.750]  They're basically plates and they can read the card just fine.
[21:41.210 --> 21:43.010]  You don't need to have them made out of glass.
[21:43.210 --> 21:43.770]  Bad idea.
[21:43.970 --> 21:45.550]  They really should ask us these questions.
[21:45.550 --> 21:53.090]  Um, so Omni is, is basically going to be, um, a, um, a contactless, um, um, uh, card.
[21:53.290 --> 21:54.290]  You can be a credit card.
[21:54.510 --> 21:58.590]  It can be a smartphone and eventually it'll be an Omni card.
[21:58.790 --> 21:59.190]  All right.
[21:59.190 --> 22:01.190]  And that's coming, I think later this year.
[22:01.590 --> 22:07.910]  Now, what I really want to stress and warn people about, first of all, have, have you guys used it?
[22:08.070 --> 22:08.490]  Three of you?
[22:09.770 --> 22:11.270]  Um, I have, um, use Omni.
[22:11.410 --> 22:17.910]  Yeah, I I've, I've used Omni yes on, on occasion and, uh, I've used it with a credit card and it functionally worked fine.
[22:18.050 --> 22:18.330]  Okay.
[22:18.470 --> 22:24.870]  And, uh, you know, I kept an eye on my, uh, on my statements, uh, afterward to see if anything else got picked up or, you know, anything like that.
[22:24.950 --> 22:34.250]  And it seemed to be working well and, uh, I didn't, but it did require me to take a credit card out of my wallet and, uh, wave it around near this thing, which I don't like to do in public.
[22:34.470 --> 22:34.670]  Right.
[22:34.710 --> 22:36.490]  And I wouldn't like to do that with my smartphone either.
[22:36.670 --> 22:37.810]  I don't, I don't feel great about that.
[22:37.910 --> 22:41.690]  Well, you can put your whole wallet on, on the, on the reader.
[22:41.890 --> 22:46.130]  The problem with that is which credit cards are going to read or will it read all your credit cards?
[22:46.670 --> 22:47.110]  Exactly.
[22:47.450 --> 22:47.590]  Yeah.
[22:47.750 --> 22:47.830]  Exactly.
[22:48.410 --> 22:49.530]  Um, Aguila, how about you?
[22:50.250 --> 22:53.430]  Um, I am still resolutely using my MetroCard.
[22:53.590 --> 23:04.270]  Um, and I have so many questions about how Omni is going to work, especially in New York where transit benefits are such a huge part of being employed in the city.
[23:04.570 --> 23:07.390]  You know, I can get a monthly MetroCard from my employer.
[23:08.010 --> 23:09.550]  How on earth is that going to work?
[23:09.850 --> 23:11.030]  Yeah, that's a very good question.
[23:11.350 --> 23:12.170]  Uh, Alex, how about you?
[23:12.210 --> 23:13.390]  Have you used the new system yet?
[23:14.130 --> 23:16.590]  I have not used the new system at all.
[23:16.730 --> 23:21.210]  I've been using my MetroCard as well and, and riding the subway quite a bit.
[23:21.370 --> 23:22.910]  I mean, it, it works fine for me.
[23:23.670 --> 23:25.030]  I see no reason to transition.
[23:25.030 --> 23:28.450]  Well, I mean, you have to, you have to swipe it more than once sometimes, right?
[23:28.490 --> 23:29.330]  That's a common complaint.
[23:30.090 --> 23:36.770]  You know, only if you're a novice at swipe it, you get better at it moving and you know, you don't really swipe.
[23:36.950 --> 23:42.510]  You just kind of keep it in the, you know, that little slot as you're moving through the turnstile.
[23:42.670 --> 23:46.590]  I think it is receptive to the natural motion of the human body.
[23:46.590 --> 23:48.830]  It's designed so ergonomically perfect.
[23:49.310 --> 23:53.570]  Oh, I wouldn't go that far, but you know, it's something that as New Yorkers, I think we've been trained.
[23:53.710 --> 24:00.510]  It's, it's fun to go to Times Square and just watch the tourists try because it takes, it takes a while to get used to it.
[24:00.750 --> 24:00.970]  Kyle.
[24:01.530 --> 24:06.670]  When you change modes of transportation, I always marvel at the transfer itself working.
[24:06.890 --> 24:12.690]  And I know that this newer system, the, well, I'm going to call it the Omni system.
[24:13.090 --> 24:13.230]  Omni.
[24:13.350 --> 24:13.550]  Okay.
[24:13.770 --> 24:13.890]  Yeah.
[24:13.890 --> 24:26.410]  It's a little more Zen, but, uh, I basically, I know the Oyster and other compatible systems have a lot more intelligent kind of, um, considerations for us.
[24:26.590 --> 24:36.810]  Of course, their zone systems are a bit different and distinct, but, uh, assuming with congestion zones and all kinds of, we'll have, uh, transit zones maybe at some point.
[24:36.810 --> 24:36.970]  I hope not.
[24:37.130 --> 24:40.450]  No, I hope we never have transit zones because basically within the context of the system.
[24:40.530 --> 24:42.650]  Well, the advantage of New York is that it's one zone.
[24:42.830 --> 24:44.250]  So you never pay to get off.
[24:44.350 --> 24:49.470]  You don't pay more to go to a certain part of the city than another part of the city by, by bus or by train.
[24:49.610 --> 24:49.730]  Okay.
[24:49.810 --> 25:02.810]  So I'm hopeful that we'll have a zoneless sort of intelligent, uh, uh, transferring and allowance of how much you actually, it's not to say the system can't be intelligent to, to give you the best fare that's possible.
[25:02.930 --> 25:03.850]  And that's what London does.
[25:03.990 --> 25:10.030]  Let's say you have a day pass and let's say you have a, um, just a regular pay per ride fare.
[25:10.230 --> 25:25.010]  Uh, if you use your, your card, say three times a day, the system at the end of the day will calculate what the best rate for you was, whether it should take advantage of your day pass or your monthly pass or your, your pay per ride pass.
[25:25.190 --> 25:26.290]  It figures that out.
[25:26.430 --> 25:28.930]  I don't see anything with the Omni system that will do that.
[25:29.070 --> 25:32.050]  And I, I hope that that's something that does happen in the future.
[25:32.190 --> 25:32.550]  Go ahead, Rob.
[25:33.350 --> 25:46.370]  Um, one issue with the Omni and with the move away from cash, um, is that, uh, well, first of all, it's a tax on the poor, um, because the, in speaking in general terms, the poorest people in the city are the ones who have to use cash for everything.
[25:46.810 --> 25:49.170]  Not everyone can get a credit card or even a debit card.
[25:49.450 --> 25:57.670]  And, uh, generally you could use cash to go to the booth and buy a MetroCard or even go to a bodega or something and buy a MetroCard, um, where they're sold.
[25:57.810 --> 26:01.430]  But there's also, and I think this might be of interest to people listening to this program.
[26:02.010 --> 26:13.670]  Um, there are the security, uh, implications of this because when you use a MetroCard vending machine, you are, um, first of all, you're getting a really close up picture taken of you from the security camera in the machine.
[26:13.990 --> 26:24.630]  You're also very likely paying with a credit card or a debit card, or in some way tying your transit, uh, card purchase to your real identity or the identity on, on your, you know, method of payment.
[26:24.950 --> 26:31.090]  Um, whereas paying with cash was the last way you could use this thing completely anonymously.
[26:31.330 --> 26:31.570]  Sure.
[26:31.630 --> 26:34.610]  There are still security cameras in the station, but, uh, there's not much to be done about that.
[26:34.750 --> 26:43.890]  But with, uh, with the move to, uh, to eliminate cash from the system, they're also making sure that they know exactly who every passenger on the system is.
[26:44.190 --> 26:49.190]  Well, and, uh, you know, there, there are implications there for people concerned about their, their privacy, their personal security.
[26:49.370 --> 26:53.090]  Let me just add a bit of info to that because they are not eliminating cash.
[26:53.490 --> 27:02.090]  In fact, I, I've been doing a bit of research on this and the Omni system, when they come up with the Omni card, you will be able to buy that with cash at a new Omni machine.
[27:02.390 --> 27:06.450]  Uh, so they are not eliminating cash as a means to do that.
[27:06.730 --> 27:18.190]  Uh, but part of, uh, what you're saying about a tax on, on the poor, um, you get discounts, you get, you get free rides occasionally with credit cards and, uh, and, and day passes and things like that.
[27:18.310 --> 27:20.370]  You don't get that when you buy with cash.
[27:20.390 --> 27:23.390]  So it's, it's more expensive for the people who can afford it the least.
[27:24.230 --> 27:32.330]  And, uh, the, the other, uh, uh, population of people who are being excluded by this are people who can't use the vending machines for various reasons.
[27:32.330 --> 27:39.630]  People who are reading disabled or in other, you know, in some other way, not able to make the purchase on a, on a vending machine, even with cash.
[27:39.830 --> 27:45.630]  Um, they could still go up to the booth, um, you know, put the right amount of dollars down and get their change back and get their card.
[27:45.850 --> 27:54.090]  Um, if, if they, if there is no longer a person in the booth who are, uh, people with, uh, with those considerations, you know, how are they going to use the system?
[27:54.330 --> 27:54.610]  Exactly.
[27:54.790 --> 27:54.970]  Yes.
[27:55.310 --> 28:01.550]  But one huge, um, uh, concern here that I don't think we're, we're thinking of enough.
[28:01.670 --> 28:04.310]  I, I, I know this is true of my immediate circle.
[28:04.810 --> 28:06.250]  People are using their phones.
[28:06.590 --> 28:08.810]  They're using digital wallets on their phones.
[28:08.950 --> 28:09.590]  It's cool.
[28:09.710 --> 28:09.910]  Yeah.
[28:10.070 --> 28:16.410]  Hold your phone up to the, uh, the Omni reader when you get on the train and, and, and being, you know, you're, you're on the train.
[28:16.710 --> 28:18.830]  Um, and same thing with buses.
[28:18.830 --> 28:29.570]  You can do that right now, but you think that, uh, the system can track your whereabouts now just by making an account with MTA and having a list of the places that you've gone.
[28:29.690 --> 28:34.590]  How about tying that into your phone where now your phone number is attached to this.
[28:35.070 --> 28:39.730]  And remember that MTA can give this information to law enforcement.
[28:39.830 --> 28:42.770]  In fact, they don't even require a warrant from what I've been hearing.
[28:43.090 --> 28:44.930]  They'll give it if they just ask politely.
[28:45.270 --> 28:55.450]  So you don't know what information they're able to glean from your phone if you decide to tie your MTA account in to your phone account.
[28:55.730 --> 28:57.530]  So that's a very dangerous thing to do.
[28:57.610 --> 29:06.630]  And I think, you know, um, I'm not, I'm not thrilled either with using a credit card or taking a credit card out and, and, um, and, and tapping it or, or close proximity to the, to the reader.
[29:06.810 --> 29:17.870]  Uh, another disadvantage is that it's a, it's a separate charge for every single time you ride the train or bus, which will result in a lot of little tiny charges, uh, going, uh, across pages.
[29:18.370 --> 29:23.890]  Um, I think the best thing to do is hold onto your Metro cards until they introduce the Omni card.
[29:24.350 --> 29:32.270]  And it's a similar type of billing system where you can attach that to a credit card or buy it with cash and simply stick to that.
[29:32.410 --> 29:33.590]  Do not tie it to your phone.
[29:33.730 --> 29:34.530]  It's a bad idea.
[29:35.710 --> 29:37.090]  Alex, did you, did you have something?
[29:38.430 --> 29:42.210]  No, I concur with you entirely on not tying it to your phone.
[29:42.310 --> 29:55.810]  And I believe, you know, Rob's concerns are exactly right about anonymity here and that, you know, we are every day with every advancement in this type of fair establishing technologies.
[29:55.810 --> 29:58.330]  We're, we're losing forms of anonymity.
[29:58.690 --> 30:05.570]  And you're, you're also right, Emmanuel, that, uh, all of this data is going to be stored in warehouse somewhere.
[30:05.750 --> 30:10.270]  We also do not know for how long, we don't know what their data retention policies are.
[30:10.530 --> 30:19.550]  So it may be possible for law enforcement, let's say, to figure out where you've been for the last several years, just by looking at your affairs.
[30:19.610 --> 30:30.230]  It's also possible for somebody to construct a pretty accurate view of what time you get up in the morning, when you go to the office, when you come home, establishing all these different types of patterns.
[30:30.410 --> 30:33.250]  I mean, and it's not just law enforcement that could get access to those.
[30:33.310 --> 30:39.210]  If those records exist, they may be subject to the ordinary subpoena power.
[30:39.390 --> 30:41.990]  Let's say there's a lawsuit, a civil lawsuit.
[30:42.290 --> 30:44.230]  I thought you were going to say Chinese hackers.
[30:45.870 --> 30:50.710]  Chinese hackers may also be able to, uh, to infiltrate that particular database.
[30:50.710 --> 31:07.510]  I mean, we use the, the a fortiori argument, or by necessary implication, if they could get the entirety of the OPM database, the office of personnel management database of all persons in the United States government holding security clearances, uh, even at the TS level,
[31:07.610 --> 31:15.610]  the top secret level, uh, it might be pretty easy for them to get hold or pretty easy for a foreign adversary to get hold of that information.
[31:15.610 --> 31:23.590]  So understanding who owns it, what's being done with it, what algorithms are being used to touch it or mine it is extraordinarily important.
[31:23.950 --> 31:27.070]  And none of this would happen if you were just paying with cash.
[31:27.270 --> 31:36.350]  So I see the demise of cash is, uh, also affecting disproportionately those who don't have access to credit cards, as, as Robin mentioned.
[31:36.490 --> 31:39.930]  Uh, and it's, it's a major blow for privacy and anonymity.
[31:40.350 --> 31:41.890]  Now, I, I agree with you.
[31:42.010 --> 31:55.050]  We need to use our, our creativity, our imagination to figure out ways around this, maybe using an anonymized credit card to buy an omni card or to, uh, to use some way of just obfuscating the system.
[31:55.210 --> 31:56.270]  Doesn't mean you're guilty of anything.
[31:56.450 --> 31:57.790]  Just means you value your privacy.
[31:57.950 --> 32:02.830]  You don't have to have your life on display for the next data leak because it will come.
[32:03.110 --> 32:03.570]  Yes, Alex.
[32:04.110 --> 32:23.730]  On the other hand, and, and to, to be the devil's advocate here, uh, if you look at, you know, the, the issues that really propelled people to go to the polls and vote for certain individuals in the mayor election last week, uh, you know, we're, we're looking at a city that people believe is a hell of a lot more dangerous.
[32:23.770 --> 32:37.130]  And I think these arguments about privacy and anonymity while riding the subway, when there is a massive uptick of crime and violence, uh, in the subway system over the last year, it will likely fall on deaf ears.
[32:37.310 --> 32:42.390]  Uh, and that's unfortunate because the, the privacy implications here, they're never rolled back.
[32:42.610 --> 32:43.850]  We never get these rights back.
[32:44.010 --> 32:45.450]  Once you give them away, they're gone.
[32:45.810 --> 32:47.450]  People generally forget about them.
[32:47.630 --> 32:51.550]  We forget that, you know, there were, there were coins that you could use to, to ride the subway.
[32:51.690 --> 32:56.110]  And in fact, in some cities like Philadelphia, I think you can still use coins.
[32:56.310 --> 32:56.610]  Yeah.
[32:56.650 --> 32:57.910]  I don't think they'll ever change.
[32:58.490 --> 33:00.270]  I think they still use tokens.
[33:00.890 --> 33:01.290]  Yeah.
[33:01.470 --> 33:02.670]  Which is, yeah, pretty amazing.
[33:03.370 --> 33:11.790]  But keep in mind, you know, the massive upswing in crime, I put that in, in air quotes, because that serves people who want that.
[33:11.930 --> 33:19.230]  Kind of like 9-11 has been, has been abused by so many people who wanted the Patriot Act and were just ready to go with that.
[33:19.390 --> 33:19.490]  Yeah.
[33:19.570 --> 33:20.350]  When will we learn?
[33:20.990 --> 33:21.970]  We don't learn.
[33:22.070 --> 33:22.570]  We don't learn.
[33:22.830 --> 33:23.430]  It's so convenient.
[33:23.770 --> 33:23.970]  Mm-hmm.
[33:24.410 --> 33:32.790]  So, um, just be, be very careful of, uh, of what agendas and, and what policies are being pushed after a crisis.
[33:32.790 --> 33:37.270]  Because very often that crisis is, um, is, is being, uh, is being used.
[33:37.490 --> 33:40.230]  It's, it's, it's, it's being used by people who have been waiting for it.
[33:40.650 --> 33:40.770]  Yeah.
[33:40.990 --> 33:45.090]  Completely exploited and, uh, uh, abused.
[33:46.170 --> 33:46.550]  Yep.
[33:46.850 --> 33:47.570]  To their ends.
[33:47.770 --> 33:51.150]  So Omni will be replacing the Metrocard completely by 2023.
[33:51.670 --> 33:54.730]  I have heard the Omni card will be out later this year.
[33:55.070 --> 33:57.810]  Uh, so we'll be keeping people up to date on that.
[33:57.810 --> 34:03.210]  And of course, any, uh, security issues, uh, we will certainly, um, report those with gusto.
[34:03.590 --> 34:05.970]  Uh, now, Alex, you mentioned the mayor's race.
[34:05.970 --> 34:07.950]  So we have to, we have to focus on this story.
[34:08.070 --> 34:09.750]  Oh my God, what the hell happened yesterday?
[34:10.130 --> 34:14.950]  They, um, uh, it's, it was a good, uh, a good election from what I heard.
[34:15.090 --> 34:17.530]  Uh, people, uh, were enthusiastic about it.
[34:17.970 --> 34:20.690]  Um, but, uh, they released numbers yesterday.
[34:20.910 --> 34:23.950]  First of all, they released numbers after, after last Tuesday.
[34:24.130 --> 34:26.050]  Uh, but those were preliminary numbers.
[34:26.290 --> 34:32.930]  Uh, they didn't, uh, release the rank choice, um, uh, calculations, but then they, they, they started to do that yesterday.
[34:33.130 --> 34:44.750]  However, they, uh, really fouled it up quite a bit because, um, they, for some reason included 135,000 test ballots.
[34:45.290 --> 34:47.670]  Not really sure what a, what a test ballot is.
[34:47.810 --> 34:49.810]  I guess somebody was just saying, does this button work?
[34:50.230 --> 34:58.650]  Uh, and, um, of course that made the whole, um, uh, estimation of who was in first place and second place completely invalid.
[34:59.010 --> 35:06.770]  Uh, now I understand they, uh, right before showtime, they released, um, those numbers again without the bad information.
[35:07.190 --> 35:10.170]  And surprisingly, it was very close to what they released yesterday.
[35:10.430 --> 35:15.710]  Uh, but they're still, um, they're still short, uh, uh, a lot of, um, absentee ballots.
[35:16.050 --> 35:20.210]  What's weird is I was looking at the total numbers and it's much less than I thought it was.
[35:20.230 --> 35:24.410]  It's about 350,000 for the top two candidates each.
[35:24.850 --> 35:28.930]  And then there's 150,000, uh, absentee ballots still outstanding.
[35:29.190 --> 35:35.530]  I, I just figured for, uh, a mayoral primary in New York city, there'd be a couple of million people at least voting.
[35:35.870 --> 35:37.350]  But, uh, what do I know?
[35:38.950 --> 35:44.590]  I was surprised as well at the, the low numbers when it came to, to voter turnout.
[35:44.870 --> 35:50.930]  I mean, I, I deliberately drove back to New York from Pennsylvania so I could vote in this race.
[35:51.090 --> 36:06.370]  I feel like it's a, it's an incredibly important race and, and the fate of the city, uh, you know, it was really determined by who's, who wins this particular primary, especially since, uh, the, on the Republican side, there really isn't very much of a serious contender with the,
[36:06.370 --> 36:10.390]  the founder of the, the guardian angels, Curtis Silva, I think was his name.
[36:11.470 --> 36:12.330]  Yeah, that's right.
[36:12.450 --> 36:13.890]  Who, who got the, the nomination?
[36:14.530 --> 36:23.870]  Uh, it, it really was, uh, you know, this, but going back to these errors that the board of elections made, you know, these are, you know, absolutely ludicrous.
[36:24.250 --> 36:26.430]  Um, I mean, let's, let's be clear though.
[36:26.570 --> 36:31.310]  This, this doesn't call into question the integrity of the voting process.
[36:31.530 --> 36:35.310]  We're not seeing anything that indicates that, uh, the votes aren't being counted properly.
[36:35.650 --> 36:38.030]  Somebody just released the wrong information.
[36:38.030 --> 36:44.330]  It's incompetence, but it's not, it's not critical incompetence that's going to, uh, throw the whole thing away.
[36:44.970 --> 36:45.330]  No.
[36:45.470 --> 37:00.250]  And in fact, the, the errors in the tabulation of the votes, but including this 150,000 or 135,000, whatever the actual number is of the test ballots has absolutely nothing to do with the rank choice voting, which seems to have gone actually pretty well.
[37:00.370 --> 37:05.150]  And we discussed that last week, if our, if our listeners want to go back in time and listen to that.
[37:05.270 --> 37:23.050]  But I think, uh, the fact that, that they were testing the, you know, the, the tabulation software and testing the ballots and testing the rank choice software, look, that's a very good thing, but you can't forget to clear those test ballots when you start tabulating the votes.
[37:23.210 --> 37:25.130]  Again, call us, you know, we're happy to help.
[37:25.770 --> 37:27.730]  It's all, these are basic things that everybody knows.
[37:28.290 --> 37:45.030]  You know, another crazy aspect of all of this is that it took a tweet from a candidate from, from Eric Adams, you know, to, to notice the inconsistency in the numbers, which then caused the board of elections to go back and take a look at what had happened.
[37:45.250 --> 37:47.090]  They removed certain data from their website.
[37:47.890 --> 37:51.990]  Uh, you know, all of it, I think really came as quite a surprise and quite a shock.
[37:52.270 --> 38:02.450]  Uh, they're probably pinning this on, you know, one or two individuals that perhaps should have cleared this data, but all of those systems should be going through a very rigorous audit before they are put into place.
[38:02.650 --> 38:21.650]  You know, back in, in 2016, believe it or not, uh, presciently, I actually debated on brick TV over in Brooklyn, the board of elections executive director for the city of New York, Michael Ryan, on election integrity and the ability to, to foul up voting systems.
[38:21.950 --> 38:24.770]  And, and we had quite a nice chat back in 2016.
[38:24.850 --> 38:28.630]  And this was, I think in September or October of 2016.
[38:28.630 --> 38:33.590]  So it was just ahead of what was a rather momentous election.
[38:33.830 --> 38:41.630]  Um, and hopefully we'll, we'll put a link to that later on tonight on, uh, our, our Twitter page on a hacker radio show.
[38:42.770 --> 38:43.170]  Okay.
[38:43.810 --> 38:48.730]  Uh, well, it'll be interesting to, um, uh, to see what happens, by the way, uh, an interesting side note to all this.
[38:48.770 --> 38:55.830]  I know, you know about this, Alex, but, um, I like to peruse the, um, uh, the, the voting records, uh, that are publicly available.
[38:56.090 --> 39:02.010]  Uh, and New York state board of elections has pretty much an extensive database of voters in New York.
[39:02.550 --> 39:17.270]  And, um, I noticed something weird, uh, that, um, I, I asked people in the media who are covering the story about this and nobody really seemed interested, but Eric Adams was listed as not voting in the last election, November of 2020, the big one.
[39:17.610 --> 39:21.430]  Uh, however, New York city board of elections apparently listed him as voting.
[39:21.530 --> 39:22.910]  I don't have access to those records.
[39:23.010 --> 39:28.710]  What I'm curious about, maybe a listener can help us with this is what is the difference between New York city board of elections and New York state board of elections.
[39:28.830 --> 39:30.670]  And do they share their information?
[39:30.670 --> 39:34.350]  Because it doesn't seem like they do in a timely manner.
[39:34.350 --> 39:42.590]  If what they are saying, as far as there being a record of him having voted in November, 2020 and the city database, if that is true.
[39:42.810 --> 39:45.310]  So I would just like some clarification on that.
[39:45.530 --> 39:48.730]  You know, it's, um, it's just a point of curiosity for me.
[39:48.830 --> 39:54.530]  You can write to us OTH at 2600.com OTH at 2600.com.
[39:54.670 --> 39:56.510]  Here are some people who did write to us.
[39:56.650 --> 39:59.450]  Uh, this is a letter from a PRD.
[39:59.650 --> 40:01.410]  I was unable to get through to tonight's show.
[40:01.590 --> 40:14.650]  And, um, but what they mean by that is, uh, we take phone calls in the off the hook overtime period that starts at eight o'clock on YouTube channel 2600 on YouTube or go to the link at the top of the 2600.com page.
[40:15.190 --> 40:29.350]  Um, I was unable to get through to tonight's show, but I had a very topical story to share the people's bank time and temperature service based in Bridgeport, Connecticut, previously available at two zero three, three, six, six, four, two, four, two was shut down about six weeks ago.
[40:29.930 --> 40:35.010]  I'm not sure if this was on any of your radars, but it was a staple of Connecticut culture for decades.
[40:35.310 --> 40:40.070]  In addition to being a useful service, it was a go-to number when testing outbound connectivity.
[40:40.430 --> 40:45.050]  I worked at sprint next tell in the early two thousands, and we used it for this purpose exclusively.
[40:45.970 --> 40:54.410]  Um, PS I've lost track of the number of comments I've received and conversations that have started as a result of me wearing my 2600 hat while out and about.
[40:54.710 --> 41:04.670]  Uh, people who get it always smile and share fond memories of, uh, reading the magazine and, uh, listening to off the hook or emceeing at, at hope, which is a great thing to do.
[41:04.990 --> 41:16.070]  Well, um, uh, uh, PRD, uh, if that is your name, we have, um, uh, I think a surprise for you, Kyle, could you please dial that the first number on that list on the telephone that we have, uh, here.
[41:16.610 --> 41:20.030]  Um, don't forget that one first because you have to do that.
[41:20.510 --> 41:26.990]  Let me know when it, um, when it starts, when you dial the last number so that we don't get a horrible tone on the air.
[41:27.810 --> 41:29.190]  Okay, he's dialing all the numbers.
[41:29.410 --> 41:29.750]  Got it?
[41:32.090 --> 41:32.490]  Okay.
[41:35.330 --> 41:36.030]  Good evening.
[41:36.470 --> 41:39.710]  Never forget to pay a bill again with our automatic bill payment.
[41:39.710 --> 41:42.590]  People's United Bank and a member FDIC.
[41:42.670 --> 41:43.890]  I don't mean to endorse that.
[41:44.010 --> 41:45.530]  Wednesday, June 30th.
[41:46.070 --> 41:47.730]  People's United Bank time.
[41:48.390 --> 41:48.910]  741.
[41:49.310 --> 41:51.750]  Current temperature 82 degrees.
[41:52.310 --> 41:53.190]  Sunny and hot.
[41:53.310 --> 41:55.090]  Chance of an afternoon shower and thunderstorm.
[41:55.370 --> 41:56.530]  High today, mid nineties.
[41:56.670 --> 41:57.750]  Heat index to 103.
[41:58.330 --> 41:59.410]  Mostly cloudy tonight.
[41:59.650 --> 42:00.910]  Chance of a shower and a thunderstorm.
[42:01.150 --> 42:02.290]  Lows in the low seventies.
[42:02.670 --> 42:04.530]  Thursday, partly to mostly cloudy.
[42:04.810 --> 42:06.510]  Showers mainly during the afternoon.
[42:06.830 --> 42:07.170]  Okay.
[42:07.250 --> 42:07.550]  You know what?
[42:07.770 --> 42:10.910]  Uh, tune to CBS if you want the weather, uh, but, uh, you're welcome.
[42:11.150 --> 42:12.510]  They, someone just kicked the cord out.
[42:12.590 --> 42:13.170]  That's all it was.
[42:13.270 --> 42:13.830]  They fixed it.
[42:14.050 --> 42:14.610]  It's back.
[42:14.950 --> 42:17.090]  Uh, yes.
[42:17.310 --> 42:23.370]  Um, so, um, here's another letter from Jack on the June 23rd edition of Off the Hook Overtime.
[42:23.450 --> 42:30.270]  You called the telephone line to WWVH in Hawaii at 808-335-4363.
[42:30.970 --> 42:35.030]  You're probably aware WWV Colorado is also available.
[42:35.790 --> 42:36.810]  Uh, okay.
[42:37.050 --> 42:40.990]  Uh, I guess, can you call the second number on that list there, Kyle?
[42:41.330 --> 42:42.090]  Uh, yeah.
[42:42.190 --> 42:49.350]  The 303 number 3-0-3-4-9-9-7-1-1-1.
[42:49.510 --> 42:49.910]  I'm sorry.
[42:50.070 --> 42:52.210]  Your call cannot be completed as dialed.
[42:52.250 --> 42:53.730]  But you have to dial it correctly, Kyle.
[42:54.010 --> 42:55.830]  I didn't remember to dial the right digits.
[42:56.310 --> 43:02.270]  3-0-3-4-9-9-7-1-1-1 is, uh, the telephone number.
[43:06.830 --> 43:08.170]  We have a touch-tone phone.
[43:08.310 --> 43:09.570]  We, we, we pay extra for that.
[43:22.740 --> 43:28.320]  Okay, these, these little taps are, are, are, are, are basically time checks.
[43:28.900 --> 43:30.500]  You'll hear an announcement in a few seconds.
[43:46.680 --> 43:52.520]  At the tone, 23 hours, 44 minutes, coordinated universal time.
[43:58.900 --> 44:03.880]  Yeah, and that's, uh, that's a bit of fun you can have by calling, uh, WWV.
[44:04.360 --> 44:07.740]  Um, uh, he also gives us, uh, a couple of other, uh, numbers here.
[44:08.340 --> 44:12.200]  Um, you can try the Naval Observatory Master Clock in Washington, D.C.
[44:12.200 --> 44:14.160]  We're not going to do that, because we can't call these clocks.
[44:14.420 --> 44:17.160]  Uh, 2-0-2-7-6-2-1-4-0-1.
[44:17.500 --> 44:24.180]  As far as local time announcements back in the phone company days, Grand Rapids, Michigan, had 6-1-6-4-5-9-1-2-1-2.
[44:24.800 --> 44:30.040]  Uh, with the format of a female voice at the tone, the time will be 10, 15, and 20 seconds.
[44:30.160 --> 44:30.320]  Beep.
[44:30.820 --> 44:32.260]  Um, a few years ago, I tried it.
[44:32.340 --> 44:33.440]  The number was no longer in service.
[44:33.560 --> 44:34.040]  Well, guess what?
[44:34.140 --> 44:35.120]  The number's back in service.
[44:35.560 --> 44:36.560]  We're not going to call it.
[44:37.560 --> 44:45.580]  But, uh, uh, and it's annoying, too, if you do call it, because you get this big, fat advertisement, along with a press 1, if you want more information about the advertisement.
[44:45.740 --> 44:48.420]  After about 30 seconds, you finally get around to the time.
[44:49.100 --> 44:51.580]  Um, so it's not like it was in the old days.
[44:52.620 --> 44:55.600]  But thanks, Jack, from Michigan, for, uh, writing in with that.
[44:55.980 --> 44:57.420]  Yes, Rob, you have something.
[44:58.040 --> 45:07.120]  Yeah, I just, uh, want to plug, there's a great website out there, uh, full of, uh, old telephone company recordings, but there's also a whole section for recordings like this, time and temperature announcements.
[45:07.340 --> 45:09.580]  There are some historical ones and modern ones.
[45:09.720 --> 45:16.940]  Uh, if you go to thisisarecording.com, um, there, there is a great amount of stuff, uh, wonderful rabbit holes to go down.
[45:16.940 --> 45:20.800]  Um, and obviously, if you listen to a recording, it won't be the correct time and temperature.
[45:21.000 --> 45:21.120]  No.
[45:21.320 --> 45:24.820]  But, uh, but it's a nice little listen to, uh, voices from long ago.
[45:25.300 --> 45:25.480]  Yeah.
[45:26.080 --> 45:41.260]  I'm just remembering, because I'm seeing a recording on the screen in front of me, and it looks like something, um, we were visiting my grandmother, and we were little kids, and we found out about the time and temperature phone number, uh-huh, and called it repeatedly for the better part of an hour,
[45:41.440 --> 45:44.660]  just to see if it would actually advance as the clock in the room where we worded it.
[45:44.660 --> 45:50.760]  And then my grandmother found us and said she had to pay for local phone calls, and we needed to stop calling immediately.
[45:51.040 --> 45:52.660]  And we got in a lot of trouble.
[45:52.780 --> 45:57.540]  Yeah, and not only that, Gila, just so you know, uh, not only is it a local call, it's a premium service.
[45:58.020 --> 46:01.080]  So, she had to pay extra in addition to the local charge.
[46:01.620 --> 46:02.040]  I know.
[46:02.180 --> 46:02.440]  It was...
[46:02.440 --> 46:03.220]  Oh, my goodness.
[46:03.340 --> 46:04.060]  I felt so guilty.
[46:05.000 --> 46:09.140]  But I did look it up, and apparently, that number, also still in service.
[46:09.140 --> 46:11.280]  I'm not going to suggest we call it right now.
[46:11.420 --> 46:13.340]  No, it's a cash cow for the phone company, you know?
[46:13.340 --> 46:16.320]  So, they love when people find these things.
[46:16.440 --> 46:22.820]  I used to call Santa Claus when I was a kid, and all these dial-it service numbers that I didn't know they cost more.
[46:23.780 --> 46:25.500]  So, yeah, I don't know.
[46:25.560 --> 46:26.060]  Are they still around?
[46:26.060 --> 46:28.420]  I'm not going to call them now, but they might still be there.
[46:28.520 --> 46:32.100]  If you have an interesting phone number, share it with us.
[46:32.100 --> 46:32.640]  Yes, yes.
[46:32.800 --> 46:36.260]  Write to us, O-T-H at 2600.com.
[46:36.260 --> 46:40.900]  And if you stick around later, you can call us, and we'll take your phone call.
[46:41.380 --> 46:42.220]  Go ahead, Alex.
[46:43.080 --> 46:48.500]  I entirely agree with Kyle, and I miss people sharing interesting phone numbers.
[46:48.640 --> 47:02.860]  This harkens back to what we would often talk about on the air with Jason Scott, which are the days of voicemail box hacking, when phone freaks would take over a voicemail box, and they would share on the outgoing message, interesting telephone numbers,
[47:03.320 --> 47:10.120]  numbers to the White House, numbers to the Kremlin, interesting carrier tones, all of that fun stuff I really, really miss.
[47:10.260 --> 47:19.800]  I mean, it's been a good 25, 27 years now, I guess, since voicemail box hacking and phone number trading was really popular.
[47:20.020 --> 47:27.560]  So I entirely would hope that people call in and share some of these more interesting numbers that we can explore on the air.
[47:27.620 --> 47:28.780]  You call that hacking, huh?
[47:29.480 --> 47:30.160]  Voicemail hacking?
[47:30.360 --> 47:30.520]  Really?
[47:30.680 --> 47:30.820]  No.
[47:30.940 --> 47:32.260]  How about answering machine hacking?
[47:32.600 --> 47:33.000]  Okay?
[47:33.180 --> 47:46.460]  Go back before then, there were four voicemail, and you would just basically find answer machines, and you'd hit the star, and you'd wait for a beep, and then you had like a two-digit or maybe a three-digit password, and then you could listen to messages or change somebody's outgoing recording,
[47:46.640 --> 47:48.580]  and that was always a lot of fun.
[47:49.000 --> 47:59.000]  Oh, I've got some great stories about hacking answering machines from way back in the day, and I don't know if you recall, specifically yourself, Emmanuel, I remember AT&T answering machines.
[47:59.540 --> 48:01.400]  Do you remember what their default code was?
[48:01.560 --> 48:03.280]  It was probably something like 1, 2, 3.
[48:03.440 --> 48:04.740]  No, it probably wasn't that complicated.
[48:04.900 --> 48:06.100]  It was probably something like 1, 2.
[48:06.960 --> 48:07.660]  1, 0.
[48:08.100 --> 48:08.500]  Okay, see?
[48:08.600 --> 48:09.580]  I wasn't that far off.
[48:10.220 --> 48:13.100]  After all this time, without even knowing their machine, I almost got it.
[48:13.240 --> 48:18.300]  But Panasonic, Panasonic was the one that I was, because I had Panasonic answering machines.
[48:18.540 --> 48:19.860]  In fact, 2,600 had them.
[48:19.900 --> 48:25.200]  We even got hacked once, because we couldn't change our password, because that was the extent of the technology then.
[48:25.340 --> 48:28.120]  But what we did was, we hacked back.
[48:28.120 --> 48:33.280]  We found out who had hacked our machine, because they had left a clue, and they were able to get to them.
[48:33.280 --> 48:37.600]  They had a similar machine, so we were able to do something similar, and they stopped.
[48:38.560 --> 48:38.960]  Wow.
[48:38.960 --> 48:40.080]  They understood that.
[48:40.480 --> 48:41.660]  Sparring with answering machines.
[48:41.680 --> 48:43.200]  We could have called the FBI, you know?
[48:43.280 --> 48:45.100]  Other people were doing that, but no, no.
[48:45.240 --> 48:53.080]  I feel like this network is both larger and heavily used, but also neglected and underexplored.
[48:53.100 --> 49:00.900]  I don't know if that paradox is real or not, but I'm getting the sense of that just in this conversation, and there's just so much out there with calls being so cheap.
[49:02.000 --> 49:02.980]  Make a few.
[49:03.260 --> 49:04.860]  See what happens, and explore.
[49:05.140 --> 49:12.320]  It's uncharted in so, so many ways, and yet right under our noses or at our fingertips.
[49:12.600 --> 49:16.360]  I want to close with a story about a hacker in Texas.
[49:16.860 --> 49:35.960]  You might recall power companies across Texas have refused to disclose which areas of the state were exempt from controlled blackouts after a devastating snowstorm crippled the power grid in February, but one hacker has found that smart meters, the electrical devices on the size of houses and businesses that monitor energy consumption,
[49:35.960 --> 49:41.200]  are quietly broadcasting data that could be used to determine what infrastructure may have been protected.
[49:41.400 --> 49:54.260]  In the days following the historic freeze, companies tied to the state's privately run grid were met with pressing questions from citizens and lawmakers alike over how it was decided who would and who would not be plunged into darkness.
[49:54.520 --> 50:07.260]  A Dallas-based hardware hacker and security researcher known as Hash first noticed one such refusal in early March from Austin Energy, which is a publicly owned utility provider in the Texas capital.
[50:07.660 --> 50:21.780]  Austin Energy has continually argued that disclosing what infrastructure it allowed to remain operational, such as hospitals and 911 call centers, could make the city and by extension its more than one million residents vulnerable to cyber attacks.
[50:22.020 --> 50:22.860]  Yeah, good excuse.
[50:23.140 --> 50:29.680]  We are not able to provide that information since it's protected critical infrastructure information, said a spokesperson.
[50:30.300 --> 50:38.540]  Well, Hash, who has been reverse engineering the inner workings of smart meters since 2016, says the argument contains one major flaw.
[50:38.940 --> 50:49.780]  Smart meters used by Austin Energy and other power companies throughout Texas quietly emit data that shows how long businesses and residences have gone since their last power outage.
[50:50.020 --> 50:54.880]  Such information could potentially reveal whose power was shut off and whose wasn't.
[50:55.160 --> 51:10.140]  So from his home workshop, complete with an array of smart meter components purchased from eBay, Hash spent weeks in the wake of the snowstorm collecting, analyzing, and deciphering the data streams that travel across the massive smart meter network that blankets Dallas.
[51:10.140 --> 51:17.500]  And Hash noticed a sudden change in the data values given off by the smart meters in his neighborhood as power was being restored following the snowstorm.
[51:17.860 --> 51:26.320]  Analyzing the data further, Hash determined that the readings represented the number of seconds each smart meter had been operating since coming back online.
[51:26.800 --> 51:40.460]  And in a technique known as war driving, Hash, complete with a laptop in the passenger seat and antennas on the hood of his vehicle, this is a true hacker, reproduced his findings on a larger scale in late May, driving along a 30-mile stretch of U.S.
[51:40.520 --> 51:43.500]  Route 75 from Dallas to the city of McKinney.
[51:44.080 --> 51:52.000]  Hash was able to siphon data off more than 7,000 smart meters operated by Encore, the largest energy delivery company in the state.
[51:52.320 --> 52:00.580]  Like Austin Energy, Encore, which has also declined to release outage data from the snowstorm, uses smart meters produced by Landis Gear.
[52:01.200 --> 52:10.780]  One smart meter highlighted by Hash, which appears to be connected to a Chase bank, had been running continuously for 1,783 days, or nearly five years, as of late May.
[52:11.060 --> 52:16.940]  The uptime listed by other smart meters clearly showed that they had regained power in the aftermath of the snowstorm.
[52:17.120 --> 52:18.340]  You've got to keep Chase Bank up.
[52:19.080 --> 52:31.340]  Hash's own experience during the catastrophic weather event, which may have killed four to five times more people than the 151 deaths acknowledged by the state, is what ultimately prompted him to bring his discovery forward.
[52:31.340 --> 52:38.600]  I seriously wondered if it was going to be Armageddon around here as we froze inside my house.
[52:38.900 --> 52:41.340]  Hash told the Daily Dot, which is where this story appeared.
[52:41.580 --> 52:47.320]  It definitely scared me and made me realize that no one cares more about my well-being than me.
[52:47.720 --> 52:51.560]  Well, Hash, congratulations on that, because that's one hell of a hack.
[52:51.660 --> 52:59.120]  It shows how hackers can help reveal the truth and get past all the crap that the public are fed by these companies.
[52:59.880 --> 53:03.920]  And there's more to learn about this, about this whole charade.
[53:04.360 --> 53:06.900]  We are out of time for this edition of Off the Hook.
[53:07.040 --> 53:09.820]  Again, write to us, OTH at 2600.com.
[53:10.300 --> 53:15.920]  Find out if there is a local 2600 meeting in your area by going to 2600.com slash meetings.
[53:16.660 --> 53:24.740]  And join us in a couple of minutes, 8 o'clock, on Overtime, which is available on YouTube, in channel 2600.
[53:24.920 --> 53:26.460]  That's one word, channel 2600.
[53:26.760 --> 53:32.380]  Or simply click on the link that appears on the top of the 2600.com webpage.
[53:32.960 --> 53:35.080]  In any event, keep listening to WBAI New York.
[53:35.100 --> 53:36.460]  We will see you next week.
[53:36.660 --> 53:36.980]  Good night.
[53:38.540 --> 53:39.280]  Good night.
[53:39.640 --> 53:40.400]  Good night.
[53:41.760 --> 53:42.640]  Good night.
[53:42.840 --> 53:43.740]  Good night.
[54:08.530 --> 54:09.350]  Good night.
[54:09.530 --> 54:12.110]  Good night.
[55:26.290 --> 55:29.510]  We will see you next week.
[56:09.540 --> 56:15.040]  This is Dr. James McIntosh, host of MindField, which comes to you every Wednesday at 2 p.m.
[56:15.160 --> 56:17.760]  on WBAI 99.5 FM.
[00:01.020 --> 00:12.580]  Okay, welcome to Off the Hook Overtime, where we are hopefully on YouTube, and we always have to talk for a few minutes to make sure we're on YouTube, because we never really know for sure.
[00:13.860 --> 00:17.280]  I guess it takes several seconds for the signal to get there, and to get to Rob T.
[00:17.460 --> 00:24.720]  Firefly's ears, when he gives us a thumbs up and tells us, in fact, we are on YouTube, and we're not just going to talk to ourselves like idiots.
[00:24.860 --> 00:25.680]  Okay, good, good.
[00:25.720 --> 00:28.860]  We are on YouTube, apparently, and hopefully we stay on YouTube this week.
[00:29.140 --> 00:29.700]  We'll see.
[00:30.340 --> 00:33.420]  Our phone number, 802-321-4225.
[00:33.660 --> 00:40.400]  But this note, before those dialing fingers get busy, if you called last week, save it for another week.
[00:40.480 --> 00:41.760]  Let someone else have a chance.
[00:42.060 --> 00:44.740]  We asked people to do that last week.
[00:44.980 --> 00:48.200]  Some people broke the rule, and they called in, but that's fine.
[00:48.200 --> 00:51.220]  But that was your week last week, now let's let other people call in.
[00:51.480 --> 00:56.480]  802-321-4225 is our phone number.
[00:56.480 --> 01:06.260]  If it's anything you want to share, questions, feedback on the last hour of broadcasting that we just did, or plans maybe for the 2600 meeting, et cetera, et cetera.
[01:07.080 --> 01:08.520]  How are you guys holding up with the heat?
[01:08.680 --> 01:10.060]  It's been pretty bad.
[01:10.180 --> 01:10.980]  We've had a fan going.
[01:11.100 --> 01:16.000]  I apologize if that noise has somehow distracted people from our voices.
[01:16.720 --> 01:18.260]  But I think it's ending.
[01:18.460 --> 01:22.300]  I think the heat wave is going to be over soon, and it wasn't too bad.
[01:22.460 --> 01:22.740]  Alex?
[01:24.360 --> 01:24.840]  Yeah.
[01:25.740 --> 01:28.540]  I'm just cracking open a cold one here right now.
[01:28.660 --> 01:29.960]  I'm here in Pennsylvania.
[01:29.960 --> 01:34.780]  It was quite hot today, and I had to mow the lawn.
[01:35.520 --> 01:36.460]  Wait, wait, why?
[01:36.580 --> 01:38.520]  Did you have to mow the lawn in that kind of heat?
[01:39.540 --> 01:46.080]  Well, because it's going to rain the next couple of days over here, so if I was going to mow the lawn before...
[01:46.080 --> 01:49.080]  We're actually having some people come over, believe it or not.
[01:49.160 --> 01:50.680]  What, people don't like lawn grass?
[01:50.980 --> 01:52.200]  What kind of people are these?
[01:52.800 --> 02:02.760]  Well, when it's mowed, and being the good Samaritan that I am, I also mowed the neighbor's lawn as well, primarily because my wife makes me do that.
[02:02.980 --> 02:08.620]  Wait, does your neighbor want you to do that, or are you just mowing lawns in your neighborhood until somebody tells you to stop?
[02:09.160 --> 02:13.240]  Yeah, well, that would be one way to win friends and influence people, I guess.
[02:13.600 --> 02:18.420]  But, no, my neighbors, they definitely appreciate it, and they're wonderful people.
[02:18.540 --> 02:23.700]  They've become like family to us, especially during the pandemic of the last year and a half.
[02:23.700 --> 02:30.640]  But, I have to say, here in the Pocono Mountains in Pennsylvania, it's a hell of a lot cooler than it was in the city.
[02:30.900 --> 02:37.520]  I was driving around Manhattan yesterday to have various lunches with clients and meetings and things like that.
[02:37.640 --> 02:38.460]  Various lunches?
[02:38.500 --> 02:39.860]  How many lunches did you have in one day?
[02:40.660 --> 02:41.660]  Actually, I had two.
[02:42.060 --> 02:42.480]  Wow.
[02:42.900 --> 02:44.760]  You're living the life, I've got to say.
[02:44.980 --> 02:47.280]  I know, yeah, and it shows, let me tell you.
[02:47.280 --> 02:56.020]  But, the temperature reading in my car, my Volkswagen, was reading 104 as I was driving through Midtown.
[02:56.140 --> 02:58.480]  Now, hopefully that wasn't the temperature reading in your car.
[02:58.540 --> 03:00.280]  That was the temperature reading outside your car.
[03:00.380 --> 03:01.060]  Yeah, thank God.
[03:01.300 --> 03:05.260]  It was the outside, but it also made the air conditioning feel like it was really ineffective.
[03:05.260 --> 03:08.580]  I was kind of worried about the air conditioning system in my car.
[03:08.620 --> 03:16.020]  And I think it was just because it was so insanely hot outside that, even with the air conditioning blasting, it was still pretty warm.
[03:16.020 --> 03:18.900]  I mean, it's been pretty brutal, I have to say.
[03:19.040 --> 03:30.100]  Well, Alex, if you want to take a trip over to Portland, Oregon, you know, and see what 118 degrees will do to you, especially places that don't have air conditioning as a rule, that would be an educational trip, I think.
[03:30.460 --> 03:31.280]  Oh, no doubt.
[03:31.560 --> 03:34.780]  I mean, you look at a lot of places that just aren't used to heat.
[03:34.780 --> 03:36.900]  When they get heat, it becomes a major problem.
[03:37.000 --> 03:43.700]  Even a lot of restaurants and flats in London don't necessarily have air conditioning because generally it doesn't get that hot, right?
[03:44.220 --> 03:53.360]  But I have been to other places, and obviously, you know, if you go to DEFCON in Las Vegas, you feel that dry heat, and it can get up to 110, you know, or higher at some times.
[03:53.560 --> 04:02.580]  But, you know, Dubai as well is a place where I've been, and it's insanely hot over there, especially in the summertime.
[04:03.380 --> 04:05.320]  So, but, you know, they're used to it.
[04:05.380 --> 04:11.040]  But when these things hit places like Portland, you know, I really do feel for these people because it's unexpectedly brutal.
[04:11.040 --> 04:14.000]  So, yeah, a special offer if you're in Portland.
[04:14.880 --> 04:17.720]  Actually, I don't know what the offer is, but please call us if you're in Portland.
[04:17.960 --> 04:18.760]  We'd like to hear from you.
[04:19.520 --> 04:24.860]  Yeah, just 802-321-HACK, 802-321-4225 is our telephone number.
[04:25.380 --> 04:29.620]  You don't have to be in Portland, but if you are, that would be cool.
[04:29.720 --> 04:31.260]  Well, I guess that's the wrong word to use.
[04:31.960 --> 04:32.780]  That would be neat.
[04:33.020 --> 04:35.080]  Yeah, that would be real swell.
[04:36.560 --> 04:41.740]  Yeah, so there were other stories that we didn't get to.
[04:41.800 --> 04:47.700]  We always manage to miss a bunch of stories because an hour just isn't a lot of time.
[04:48.000 --> 04:53.640]  And I wanted to talk about the Supreme Court ruling about the cheerleader.
[04:53.980 --> 04:59.380]  You know, the Pennsylvania school was trying to punish a cheerleader for swearing on Snapchat.
[04:59.380 --> 05:15.700]  And the Supreme Court ruled 8-1, 8-1, of course, being Clarence Thomas, so that's almost like 8-0, determined students' rights to free expression outweighed the school's interest in preventing potentially disruptive speech.
[05:15.940 --> 05:22.280]  In this case, a snap captioned, F-school, F-softball, F-cheer, F-everything, with F being what you think it is.
[05:22.740 --> 05:28.880]  Justice Stephen Breyer delivered the majority opinion, upholding an appeals court decision from the Third Circuit.
[05:28.880 --> 05:33.940]  He said that student Brandy Levy, identified as BL in court documents...
[05:33.940 --> 05:35.680]  Well, then why did I just dox her?
[05:35.820 --> 05:40.000]  I guess her name is out now, so I'm not going to feel guilty about that.
[05:40.480 --> 05:44.420]  ...shouldn't have been suspended from her cheerleading team for a vulgar post about school sports.
[05:44.580 --> 05:56.760]  While public schools may have a special interest in regulating some off-campus student speech, the special interests offered by the school are not sufficient to overcome BL's interest in free expression in this case.
[05:56.760 --> 06:01.060]  The student's pure speech wasn't harmful or harassing.
[06:01.620 --> 06:19.680]  She had unsuccessfully tried out for varsity cheerleading as well as a position on a private softball team and vented about the results on Snapchat, including a follow-up snap that said, I love how me and another student got told we need a year of junior varsity before we make varsity,
[06:19.680 --> 06:21.120]  but that doesn't matter to anyone else.
[06:22.020 --> 06:23.640]  Yeah, and I'm sorry not to care of myself.
[06:23.800 --> 06:32.420]  But another student complained about the SNAP and the school issued a one-year suspension because she used profanity in connection with the school extracurricular activity on social media.
[06:32.760 --> 06:35.940]  You know, to us, this just seems like it makes sense.
[06:35.940 --> 06:39.180]  You're not doing something at the school.
[06:39.640 --> 06:43.600]  You can say whatever you want, and it's got nothing to do with the school.
[06:43.700 --> 06:44.480]  Does that make sense, Alex?
[06:45.040 --> 06:59.460]  Oh, it absolutely does, and this is a case I've been tracking for some time, in particular because the free speech rights of students off-campus or, you know, off of...
[07:00.060 --> 07:07.700]  or not even off-campus, but, you know, not even proximate to the school should really be overwhelming.
[07:07.700 --> 07:11.920]  And I think that the Supreme Court decision, the 8-to-1 decision, you know, reflects that.
[07:11.920 --> 07:24.260]  Yet, on the other hand, to be fair here, I did, a while ago, listen to the oral arguments or some portion of the oral arguments that occurred before the Supreme Court in that particular case.
[07:25.160 --> 07:30.120]  And the school's interests, you know, were interesting.
[07:30.680 --> 07:33.680]  You know, the arguments weren't necessarily without merit.
[07:33.860 --> 07:37.280]  I mean, I think that the First Amendment interests certainly overpowered them.
[07:37.280 --> 07:43.940]  But the arguments that the school district were making had some force and power and had some good to them as well.
[07:44.120 --> 08:08.320]  So, for instance, if somebody says something on Snapchat or Facebook or any one of these social media platforms, let's say, encouraging another student to commit suicide, some form of cyberbullying, the school then should be able to have some kind of authority or some ability to discipline that student for bullying another student online.
[08:08.840 --> 08:09.620]  And...
[08:09.620 --> 08:11.040]  But why the school?
[08:11.240 --> 08:14.180]  Why not some other entity like society?
[08:14.540 --> 08:22.840]  Why does the school get the authority to discipline somebody for doing something heinous in their own life?
[08:23.500 --> 08:24.440]  Look, I agree.
[08:24.660 --> 08:30.580]  And the school wouldn't necessarily have jurisdiction over, let's say, a public playground if somebody was...
[08:30.580 --> 08:32.720]  if one child was bullying another child there.
[08:33.040 --> 08:36.640]  So, look, I mean, you're picking up on, I think, the right counterarguments here.
[08:36.820 --> 08:43.400]  But the school certainly has some interest in promoting and protecting the health and welfare and mental well-being of its students.
[08:43.840 --> 08:56.480]  But what this case really gets at, especially with respect to the school's interests and our civil liberties, is that our digital lives and our physical lives are really blurring here.
[08:56.800 --> 09:03.940]  And a lot of the interactions that we would have in person or, let's say, on school grounds happen online.
[09:04.680 --> 09:15.260]  And, you know, what if that post was made, let's say, you know, from an IP address that was associated with the school, you know, using the school's facilities or using the school's networks, would the outcome have changed?
[09:15.260 --> 09:20.600]  You know, these are, I think, difficult questions that other courts are probably going to have to grapple with.
[09:20.880 --> 09:32.500]  But this is a... I think the case came out in the right direction here in favor of the First Amendment, in favor of students' rights to speak out publicly, and especially their right to criticize policies of the school.
[09:33.100 --> 09:39.020]  You know, that's what I think is particularly telling in this case as well, is that, you know, she was saying, F, the school left cheerleading.
[09:39.340 --> 09:41.440]  Well, great, you know, she should be allowed to say that.
[09:41.440 --> 09:43.840]  She doesn't approve of their policies.
[09:44.060 --> 09:46.560]  Go out there and talk about them.
[09:47.080 --> 09:50.220]  So I think this one came out perfectly right.
[09:50.540 --> 10:03.500]  But there are still, I think, a lot of gray issues and gray areas where our physical and digital lives are going to continue to intersect and often collide when it comes to our rights and the rights of others.
[10:05.040 --> 10:16.500]  It's interesting to me that Snapchat is a platform where your messages are supposed to be somewhat temporal as far as I recollect in that they're not supposed to stick around.
[10:16.660 --> 10:26.720]  But because someone complained, it was, I guess, screenshot or something like that so that it could be entered in as some sort of evidence for the school.
[10:28.800 --> 10:30.920]  But I think, was it Breyer?
[10:31.020 --> 10:34.740]  I'm not sure who actually said it, but it was eloquent in saying...
[10:34.740 --> 10:35.300]  I think it was Breyer.
[10:35.660 --> 10:39.780]  ...the schools are the nursery of our democracy.
[10:40.280 --> 10:41.300]  I think that was...
[10:41.300 --> 10:43.880]  Yeah, that's a good quote, I think.
[10:43.880 --> 10:46.840]  ...part of how it was characterized in one of the arguments.
[10:46.840 --> 10:48.860]  And I thought that was apropos.
[10:48.860 --> 10:57.960]  And, yeah, she's stood up for herself and will be forever associated with this guy.
[10:58.120 --> 11:09.860]  I just applaud that, like, fighting for what is right, and even as a student, not backing down, you know, and taking it where it needed to go.
[11:10.180 --> 11:14.600]  Yeah, I mean, kudos to her for pushing it as far as she did.
[11:14.600 --> 11:31.880]  Yeah, she could have just been like, you know, this is what I, you know, am facing and been, like, you know, really burdened by it or so affected that she couldn't navigate a way around it or come out with an outcome that satisfied her.
[11:32.000 --> 11:33.740]  And I hope she's satisfied with this.
[11:33.840 --> 11:35.380]  She said, F school, F cheer, F everything.
[11:35.540 --> 11:40.840]  But she didn't mean F everything because, you know, she sure as hell cared enough to do something.
[11:40.840 --> 11:42.560]  And that's what we need more of.
[11:42.560 --> 11:45.940]  Of people willing to fight for what's right.
[11:46.140 --> 11:52.160]  I bet also she'll probably become a very interesting person as a result of this.
[11:52.420 --> 11:53.260]  Let me give the number out again.
[11:53.360 --> 11:55.040]  802-321-4225.
[11:55.060 --> 12:03.720]  I should say, if we don't hear from anybody, then we'll have to assume that we only have the people that call every week and nobody else, and we'll open it up to them later.
[12:03.960 --> 12:08.480]  But for now, we're asking people who have not called in the last couple of weeks, really.
[12:08.940 --> 12:12.140]  802-321-4225, 802-321-HACK.
[12:12.600 --> 12:13.460]  Is our phone number.
[12:13.700 --> 12:14.660]  And you can be on the air.
[12:14.840 --> 12:18.180]  Well, it's not really air, but it's something that will be archived forever.
[12:18.280 --> 12:18.760]  How about that?
[12:18.960 --> 12:19.340]  Go ahead, Rob.
[12:21.460 --> 12:21.820]  Yeah.
[12:23.000 --> 12:28.600]  I personally, I mean, I obviously went to high school about 100 years ago before social media was a thing.
[12:29.060 --> 12:32.600]  But, you know, I had a very negative experience throughout high school.
[12:32.780 --> 12:33.640]  I was bullied.
[12:33.860 --> 12:35.440]  You know, the system was failing me in all sorts of ways.
[12:35.580 --> 12:36.420]  Not worth getting into now.
[12:36.420 --> 12:48.560]  But to say that had I not been able to speak about what was going on with me in school, outside of school, had that been legislated away from me in some manner, like, that would have been so much worse.
[12:48.860 --> 12:51.180]  I don't know if I'd be here speaking with all of you right now.
[12:51.180 --> 12:58.840]  So, I mean, the fact that, you know, school is a very oppressive experience for very many people.
[12:59.180 --> 13:04.620]  And, you know, whether constantly or whether in certain cases like this just becomes that way.
[13:05.000 --> 13:08.380]  And it's important to be able to speak about that.
[13:08.520 --> 13:11.660]  And in the modern media environment, that includes social media.
[13:11.900 --> 13:13.180]  You've got to be able to speak your truth out there.
[13:13.380 --> 13:19.180]  You know, my particular hell was junior high school, which, for those not familiar, junior high school is grades 7 through 9.
[13:19.660 --> 13:21.780]  And in grade 9, I just...
[13:21.780 --> 13:23.500]  It was like the Olympics of bullying.
[13:23.720 --> 13:26.860]  Just everybody turned their attention in my direction.
[13:27.160 --> 13:28.520]  And there was no social media.
[13:28.620 --> 13:29.700]  There was no way to speak out.
[13:29.800 --> 13:33.420]  And pretty much the teachers joined in in whatever way they could.
[13:33.700 --> 13:38.580]  Had the same thing happen to me in fourth grade, when I was...
[13:39.580 --> 13:41.780]  Basically, I didn't take the bus many times.
[13:41.780 --> 13:42.800]  I took the bus once.
[13:43.020 --> 13:46.620]  And for some reason, I was already on bad terms with some of the kids.
[13:46.620 --> 13:49.220]  But I didn't realize those kids were friends with everybody on the bus.
[13:49.360 --> 13:51.940]  So everybody was basically hitting me with books and things like that.
[13:52.100 --> 13:57.720]  And what I did was, I wrote an expletive with my finger in the window, you know, in the fog.
[13:58.080 --> 13:59.600]  And someone told the bus driver.
[13:59.740 --> 14:00.620]  And I got in trouble.
[14:00.760 --> 14:07.100]  I got sent to the principal, who then basically lashed into me for ridiculous reasons.
[14:07.140 --> 14:08.780]  And the bullies were just let go.
[14:08.940 --> 14:11.440]  That was the reality back then, before social media.
[14:11.440 --> 14:16.600]  So, boy, if I had the opportunity to say F this and F that, believe me, I would have taken it.
[14:16.660 --> 14:17.620]  I guess I can say it now.
[14:18.900 --> 14:28.840]  But fortunately for me, after the ninth grade hell, I started high school, which is grades 10 through 12 for me, and met cool people.
[14:29.080 --> 14:32.240]  All of a sudden, I just found better people.
[14:32.240 --> 14:36.580]  And that made such a difference, realizing that, wow, there are people who aren't going to judge me.
[14:36.680 --> 14:39.160]  There are people who aren't going to be idiots.
[14:39.160 --> 14:41.860]  It's luck of the draw, because it could have easily gone the other way.
[14:42.200 --> 14:46.400]  But that is always possible, no matter what situation you're in.
[14:46.540 --> 14:53.240]  You can always just round the corner and find somebody awesome, or just find something new to get involved in.
[14:53.440 --> 14:57.300]  And I'm just glad that I didn't give up, back when things seemed so hopeless.
[14:57.900 --> 15:08.320]  And I realized that's what so many kids, so many people are going through constantly, in their schools, in their homes, at their places of employment, in their countries.
[15:09.160 --> 15:19.440]  You just have to hold out hope that you'll find other people, that things will get better, that you'll find a voice and really start to prosper.
[15:19.440 --> 15:25.840]  You know, we're not going to give up on anyone, so please don't give up on yourselves or your futures.
[15:26.040 --> 15:26.360]  Alex?
[15:27.760 --> 15:32.340]  Speaking of finding other people, I mean, you mentioned junior high as being particularly hellish.
[15:32.440 --> 15:33.400]  Mine was, too.
[15:34.420 --> 15:43.380]  You know, I was pretty active in the chess club, which, as you can imagine, was, you know, where all the cool kids used to hang out.
[15:44.540 --> 15:55.980]  And, you know, I have to say, though, in going back to the 2600 meetings, I started, I think, to really excel in school, realized that there were a lot of other people like me.
[15:56.080 --> 16:06.180]  When I started hanging out at 2600 meetings, I met some people, believe it or not, on BBSs, bulletin board systems, fellow hackers, that went to my school district.
[16:07.120 --> 16:08.900]  And we got together.
[16:09.040 --> 16:09.420]  We met up.
[16:09.500 --> 16:10.120]  I will never forget.
[16:10.240 --> 16:13.100]  I met a buddy of mine, a lifelong friend of mine now.
[16:14.140 --> 16:20.520]  In a hallway in our high school, I realized, wow, you know, we knew each other from bulletin board systems.
[16:20.740 --> 16:23.240]  And we made red boxes together.
[16:23.240 --> 16:23.920]  We got together.
[16:24.080 --> 16:43.100]  You know, we used to sneak into the city by taking the train from Long Island, you know, over to Penn Station, going to the 2600 meetings, meeting other people, really expanding my social circle, getting into all kinds of trouble in the city court building and elsewhere and doing all kinds of fun hacker things.
[16:43.320 --> 16:49.120]  But it also gave me the intellectual confidence to do well in school.
[16:49.240 --> 16:54.120]  Up until about 10th grade or so, I really didn't give a crap too much about my grades.
[16:54.120 --> 16:56.340]  I wasn't too concerned about it.
[16:56.340 --> 17:16.100]  I just sort of coasted by, but then I started to realize, well, look, if I can do all of these amazing things with computers, if I can program in and see if I can hack Unix systems and Linux systems, and I understand all these esoteric concepts that neither my math teacher nor social studies teacher nor biology teacher would have any clue about,
[17:16.380 --> 17:18.840]  nor most adults would have any knowledge about.
[17:19.960 --> 17:23.040]  Therefore, you know, I should be able to get an A in math.
[17:23.400 --> 17:24.920]  You know, calculus shouldn't be that difficult.
[17:25.080 --> 17:26.240]  Physics should be pretty easy.
[17:26.700 --> 17:36.840]  And so I deluded myself into thinking, you know, that by necessary implication, again, if I can do these very difficult things with computers, then everything else should be rather simple.
[17:37.640 --> 17:41.940]  And I kept that mentality throughout college, throughout law school.
[17:42.120 --> 17:44.020]  And I think, frankly, it served me pretty well.
[17:44.220 --> 17:57.300]  So hanging out and getting involved with all of the lunatics at 2600 meetings, I think, you know, was a real stepping stone for me and in my life, you know, personally, and frankly, professionally, too.
[17:57.520 --> 18:01.520]  Well, you know, in your case, you did well academically.
[18:01.940 --> 18:03.660]  Your grades improved.
[18:03.920 --> 18:05.480]  You excelled at these subjects.
[18:06.320 --> 18:10.960]  Me, the more I got involved, the less my grades went up.
[18:11.100 --> 18:14.400]  But I realized, at least to me, that didn't matter so much.
[18:14.600 --> 18:22.860]  I decided to take an extra year of college and just sort of, you know, take it a little bit easier and try to learn more and get more involved in other things.
[18:23.420 --> 18:26.020]  And that's really what propelled me forward.
[18:26.180 --> 18:39.880]  It wasn't so much trying to do well at something that I didn't really care that much about, but finding things that I did care about and finding people that I cared about and learning more about those and spending, you know, more time with the things that I valued.
[18:40.620 --> 18:42.920]  And that can be just as important.
[18:43.120 --> 18:46.760]  So even if you're not doing well grade wise, that's not the most important.
[18:46.880 --> 18:47.800]  Who remembers now?
[18:47.940 --> 18:50.360]  Who remembers now what grade you got, what your GPA was?
[18:51.120 --> 18:53.360]  Actually, I remember my GPA, but that's not the point.
[18:53.480 --> 18:56.420]  The point is it doesn't... nobody else cares at all.
[18:56.760 --> 19:01.900]  And good luck trying to prove, you know, where you got an A 30 years down the road or whatever.
[19:03.080 --> 19:08.580]  These things, they might seem to matter at the time, they might seem to be everything, but they're really not.
[19:08.600 --> 19:12.040]  And that goes for the things that you think matter so much now.
[19:12.660 --> 19:14.120]  They don't matter that much either.
[19:14.260 --> 19:26.140]  The things that really matter are the interpersonal relationships and the creativity and just doing the things that nobody else can do, that only you have a particular perspective.
[19:26.480 --> 19:33.460]  And whether or not anybody else values that or appreciates that or tells you how much, how awesome it is, it matters.
[19:33.800 --> 19:34.780]  Believe me, it matters.
[19:35.040 --> 19:37.140]  And you just got to keep doing these things.
[19:37.320 --> 19:41.400]  Believe me, as, as, as somebody in the hacker world, I'm used to people saying you're wasting your time.
[19:41.540 --> 19:42.840]  This is, nobody else cares about this.
[19:43.380 --> 19:46.940]  That's, that's kind of the theme of, of, of being a hacker.
[19:47.080 --> 19:51.000]  And I think that's why we, we value each other so much.
[19:51.780 --> 19:53.160]  Now, Kyle, I see you have the phone up.
[19:53.240 --> 19:54.060]  Does that mean we have a phone call?
[19:54.360 --> 19:55.700]  Are there, are there no listeners?
[19:55.840 --> 19:56.360]  Do we have nobody?
[19:56.520 --> 19:58.200]  See, now I'm trying to, I'm trying to feel it now.
[19:58.380 --> 19:59.080]  Why don't you turn it up?
[19:59.200 --> 19:59.560]  Just check.
[19:59.720 --> 20:00.280]  Nobody cares.
[20:00.800 --> 20:01.200]  Turn it up.
[20:01.380 --> 20:02.880]  I'll get the horrible noise if nobody's there.
[20:03.020 --> 20:03.260]  Okay.
[20:04.140 --> 20:05.120]  Is that, is anybody there?
[20:06.760 --> 20:08.180]  Is there a caller on the line?
[20:09.720 --> 20:10.200]  Hold on.
[20:10.400 --> 20:12.540]  Uh, there's no caller on the line, Kyle.
[20:13.740 --> 20:14.700]  What buttons are you hitting?
[20:15.960 --> 20:16.280]  Now?
[20:17.820 --> 20:18.900]  Oh, it's the dial tone.
[20:18.980 --> 20:19.960]  The dial tone has called us.
[20:20.140 --> 20:21.300]  Our old friend, the dial phone.
[20:21.300 --> 20:23.760]  Yeah, but you know, but as long as we're doing this, nobody can call in.
[20:23.880 --> 20:25.540]  So I have to, yeah, fade down.
[20:25.880 --> 20:30.000]  Uh, our number, uh, once again, and you're just going to make us sad if nobody calls.
[20:30.120 --> 20:32.140]  And I, I see there's people on, a lot of people on, actually.
[20:32.640 --> 20:39.520]  802-321-4225-802-321-HACK is our phone number, uh, which hopefully is working.
[20:39.820 --> 20:41.640]  Maybe, maybe they disconnected it.
[20:41.700 --> 20:43.000]  Maybe that's why nobody's calling.
[20:43.280 --> 20:53.080]  If there's a story, um, hacking related that, um, perhaps you feel, uh, you'd like to share, by all means.
[20:53.440 --> 20:53.800]  Yes.
[20:54.020 --> 20:55.180]  Oh, there's a phone number.
[20:55.480 --> 20:57.140]  Um, let me go ahead and answer this.
[20:57.240 --> 20:58.140]  Yeah, go ahead and answer that.
[20:58.460 --> 21:01.600]  Uh, and I can tell, um, this phone call is coming from Washington, D.C.
[21:01.800 --> 21:04.120]  I'm sorry for revealing that information, but go ahead, caller.
[21:06.380 --> 21:08.200]  Not actually in Washington, D.C.
[21:08.400 --> 21:09.280]  I went to school there.
[21:09.400 --> 21:11.380]  You went to school there, and that's where you got your phone?
[21:12.960 --> 21:13.320]  Yeah.
[21:13.540 --> 21:13.760]  Okay.
[21:14.440 --> 21:17.760]  And that's, that's all the, uh, the personal information that I'll, I'll reveal.
[21:17.960 --> 21:18.820]  Uh, what's, what's on your mind?
[21:20.280 --> 21:36.020]  Uh, well, you guys were begging, so I figured I'd call in and run an idea that I have had in the back of my head by you guys and see if you can either help me or, um, or pick out any flaws in it.
[21:36.180 --> 21:36.920]  Okay, go ahead.
[21:38.300 --> 21:42.240]  So I was in the Apple store when I got the idea.
[21:42.900 --> 21:47.180]  I was setting up a new iPhone, um, and it was seamless.
[21:47.500 --> 21:53.300]  I mean, I, I think it took five or ten minutes to transfer everything from my current phone onto the new iPhone.
[21:53.760 --> 21:59.360]  Um, and it got me thinking, um, could you do this with someone else's phone?
[21:59.540 --> 22:13.440]  So let's say I went into the Apple store, bought an iPhone, went over, I mean, of course you'd have to access their phone for a minute or two because I think you have to, uh, I don't know if you put the wifi on or if you put Bluetooth on or if you even have to do that,
[22:13.560 --> 22:20.760]  but you have to click some, you know, startup button, look for device, you find the device on that device, you, I guess, give it access.
[22:21.160 --> 22:27.780]  And then it totally like, um, models your entire phone onto the new iPhone within minutes.
[22:28.320 --> 22:37.180]  So I had the idea is, you know, I wanted to look at someone's phone to buy a new iPhone, borrow their phone.
[22:37.400 --> 22:38.220]  Can I borrow your phone?
[22:38.380 --> 22:38.780]  Click it.
[22:38.900 --> 22:45.420]  And then I guess, um, wipe the device and have it, um, put onto another one.
[22:45.620 --> 22:50.440]  Do you think it's a poor idea or you think it could work?
[22:50.540 --> 22:53.500]  Well, as far as ideas, you might not make friends.
[22:53.740 --> 22:56.300]  Um, Alex, I know you have an iPhone.
[22:56.500 --> 22:57.880]  I hope I'm not giving away too much by saying that.
[22:58.040 --> 22:59.840]  So have you gone through this process?
[22:59.960 --> 23:00.680]  Are you familiar with it?
[23:01.400 --> 23:02.220]  Yes, I am.
[23:02.220 --> 23:03.640]  I am familiar with the processes.
[23:04.640 --> 23:20.600]  Uh, and look, I think in theory, it's possible that it could work, but I think that you need to have the passcode of the device that you copy onto the new device, as well as the, uh, as well as access to the current device.
[23:20.800 --> 23:28.700]  And then they need to be, uh, in proximity with each other or to each other, uh, you know, for a certain period of time.
[23:28.880 --> 23:36.040]  And depending upon the, um, the capacity of the phone that's being copied, right?
[23:36.100 --> 23:41.700]  How much data is actually stored on that device, how much data is actually stored on that device.
[23:41.780 --> 23:51.100]  You know, let's say you've got a 256 gigabyte iPhone, uh, that might take it, take a considerable period of time to transfer over to the target phone.
[23:51.100 --> 24:01.040]  So I think, you know, in theory, if you have access to both of the devices and have them next to each other for a period of time, uh, you, it could happen.
[24:01.060 --> 24:11.780]  But to do it repetitiously without the target, uh, knowing or realizing that something is, is weird, that might, um, that might be more difficult.
[24:14.970 --> 24:16.130]  Does that answer you?
[24:16.670 --> 24:17.230]  Go ahead.
[24:18.750 --> 24:19.830]  Does that answer your question?
[24:21.290 --> 24:22.010]  It does.
[24:22.610 --> 24:26.390]  Um, I might test it out and see if it works.
[24:27.010 --> 24:39.350]  Well, I mean, I'm all for testing things out to see if they work, but I would suggest, uh, doing it with somebody that knows you're doing it and just see if, you know, and then be able to say, okay, so if you didn't know I was doing this, this would have worked,
[24:39.350 --> 24:39.690]  you know?
[24:40.710 --> 24:41.110]  Uh-huh.
[24:42.510 --> 24:43.210]  Uh, yeah.
[24:43.410 --> 24:44.970]  And I think one of the concerns...
[24:44.970 --> 24:51.870]  If you're using the phone and you answer a text message before they answer a text message, will it show on their device or whatnot?
[24:52.170 --> 24:52.390]  Yeah.
[24:52.450 --> 24:54.330]  Well, you could always erase it before they see it.
[24:54.410 --> 24:56.010]  If, if you have access to their device.
[24:56.490 --> 24:56.890]  Yeah.
[24:56.930 --> 24:58.430]  I don't think it would clone it necessarily.
[24:58.470 --> 25:02.690]  I think you'd have one or the other phone on that, uh, associated with that number.
[25:03.310 --> 25:06.590]  It's similar to the process of cloning, but I don't think it's the same thing.
[25:06.590 --> 25:09.070]  You're sort of transferring from one to the other.
[25:10.010 --> 25:26.550]  I'm not intimately familiar, but there's like the backing up of it, but the also one active phone and its baseband sort of info, the guts of it that the network would be concerned with would be, I guess, reassociated with the new hardware in that process.
[25:26.550 --> 25:28.690]  But I've never personally done it with an Apple product.
[25:28.870 --> 25:30.370]  So Alex, you might know more than I am.
[25:30.490 --> 25:33.570]  And you could bet like somebody will have tried this already, right?
[25:33.650 --> 25:36.990]  Because, uh, this kind of idea, I'm sure other people have had, right?
[25:38.290 --> 25:48.570]  Uh, maybe, you know, what, one, one thing that you like, Kyle, I think you're right too, but you know, also the thing to remember is that you wouldn't necessarily be copying over the SIM card either.
[25:48.570 --> 25:49.970]  You're just copying the data on the phone.
[25:50.090 --> 25:51.670]  So the phone itself wouldn't be replicated.
[25:51.670 --> 25:53.150]  You wouldn't have access to that.
[25:53.330 --> 26:00.050]  The cellular network, uh, you would be able to receive emails, uh, SMS messages, things like that.
[26:00.270 --> 26:11.230]  Uh, I believe without the SIM card in there because that's all just, you know, sent over the internet, sent over, you know, normal protocols, uh, without necessarily authenticating the SIM.
[26:11.510 --> 26:28.370]  I think, um, one other wrinkle in this could be that you may need access to the target phones, fake, uh, FaceTime, uh, iTunes account, uh, in, in addition to having the passcode of the phone.
[26:28.370 --> 26:33.370]  So in that sense, there, there, there's really a, uh, a two factor authentication.
[26:33.390 --> 26:45.290]  If that is the case, and I think it is the case that you would also need access to the iCloud account, um, uh, or iTunes account, whatever Apple's calling it, whatever the Apple account is, uh, that they're calling it these days.
[26:45.450 --> 26:47.210]  And so that might be difficult yet.
[26:47.410 --> 26:54.750]  On the other hand, though, what is interesting is that I did this recently when I migrated over to an iPhone 12.
[26:56.270 --> 27:04.950]  And I think the caller brings up a very interesting issue that this is possible to do if you have those two, uh, passcodes, let's say.
[27:05.650 --> 27:13.730]  And when I did this and I finished with my phone, I never received any kind of email or notification, something like that, that my phone had been cloned.
[27:14.230 --> 27:19.570]  And perhaps it's a good idea for Apple to begin doing something like that.
[27:19.730 --> 27:38.230]  So that if a phone is cloned using the, the phone to phone migration technology that they've developed so that it, it deters this kind of abuse, or at least if there is a target who unknowingly has had his or her phone cloned, they would at least receive some kind of notification from Apple that this technology was used on their phone.
[27:38.310 --> 27:39.950]  I'm surprised they don't do that already.
[27:40.130 --> 27:41.450]  That's, that seems shocking to me.
[27:42.030 --> 27:44.030]  Yeah, I didn't receive anything about it.
[27:44.050 --> 27:45.690]  I mean, you know, I could have missed it.
[27:45.870 --> 27:47.390]  I, I don't think that I did.
[27:47.450 --> 27:51.090]  I probably would have remembered it if I did receive something.
[27:51.350 --> 28:06.830]  But I think it's particularly troublesome in the context of something like domestic violence, where there's an abuser in the household who may have ready, ready access to, to passwords, uh, may be able to use the face ID to open up somebody's phone, uh,
[28:07.170 --> 28:16.710]  even when they're sleeping and, and begin to, to monitor and track and, and stalk, um, you know, their, their victim much more easily by having a clone of their phone.
[28:16.890 --> 28:17.170]  Yeah.
[28:17.290 --> 28:20.270]  It's not a, um, trivial thing to do.
[28:20.350 --> 28:26.630]  And it really depends on what your end goal, like your aim to, uh, what you're trying to achieve.
[28:26.810 --> 28:29.230]  Like, are you trying to get data from the phone necessarily?
[28:29.370 --> 28:36.710]  Are you trying to impersonate them in some way or just eavesdrop and be aware of their communications in real time in some way?
[28:37.130 --> 28:53.430]  But, um, this, this is a, uh, probably more complicated way of doing what is very common in digital forensics where copies and clones of things are made with right blocking, uh, devices to prevent the data from being corrupted.
[28:53.930 --> 29:00.750]  But, um, in this case, you may be doing more than you're actually trying to do in the end.
[29:01.010 --> 29:09.070]  If it's just to get some data off, like, uh, um, memory on the phone, or, um, maybe all you would need is just the iTunes account.
[29:09.170 --> 29:13.730]  You wouldn't necessarily need to have physical access, but it depends on what you're trying to get out of it.
[29:14.190 --> 29:14.810]  Rob, did you have something?
[29:17.410 --> 29:17.810]  Rob?
[29:19.570 --> 29:19.970]  Yes.
[29:20.070 --> 29:20.490]  Sorry about that.
[29:20.830 --> 29:30.770]  Um, this was also something that in the early days of smartphones, you could, uh, with some models of phone connected to a computer when it was locked and still access the files on it, like a USB drive.
[29:31.030 --> 29:41.430]  Um, it wasn't until later on, I want to say maybe 10, 15 years ago ish that, uh, they started actually locking the contents of the phone when, uh, when the phone itself was locked.
[29:41.730 --> 29:49.410]  So, uh, if, if your phone is really, really old, you might be able to just get in there, um, by, by, uh, by hooking it up.
[29:49.490 --> 29:52.350]  But, uh, that, that doesn't work with current generations of phones.
[29:53.230 --> 29:55.310]  Well, we wish you luck with, uh, your endeavors.
[29:55.450 --> 29:59.050]  Please, uh, keep us, uh, apprised of what happens because it sounds interesting.
[30:02.570 --> 30:03.010]  Yeah.
[30:03.290 --> 30:20.350]  And, and, and if other listeners have, uh, information or perhaps have tried to do this with, with a target phone, I'd be interested in figuring out what are the, uh, what are the, the, the challenges here and, and abusing this phone to phone migration technology in the way that the caller had suggested,
[30:20.410 --> 30:21.790]  I think it'd be an interesting discussion.
[30:22.070 --> 30:22.510]  Okay.
[30:22.610 --> 30:23.170]  Thanks for your call.
[30:24.170 --> 30:24.890]  Thank you.
[30:25.150 --> 30:26.370]  I think I'm going to try it out.
[30:26.670 --> 30:27.330]  So, okay.
[30:28.010 --> 30:28.290]  Absolutely.
[30:28.610 --> 30:29.190]  Keep exploring.
[30:29.330 --> 30:30.150]  Best, best of luck.
[30:30.270 --> 30:30.550]  Take care.
[30:31.710 --> 30:32.110]  Wow.
[30:32.270 --> 30:32.490]  Interesting.
[30:32.690 --> 30:33.990]  Interesting, uh, idea there.
[30:34.130 --> 30:35.730]  It, it makes me think of something.
[30:35.990 --> 30:41.570]  Uh, I, you know, I don't really, um, uh, know that much about the technology and haven't spent that much time really experimenting with it.
[30:41.990 --> 30:47.270]  Bluetooth, Bluetooth in it with car, uh, car phones, uh, car phones, a phone that's in the car.
[30:47.650 --> 30:49.470]  Um, you, uh, basically pair it.
[30:49.590 --> 30:50.610]  Uh, we've all done this.
[30:50.950 --> 31:03.430]  Uh, and, um, it means that you can use your, your phone and, um, uh, for various purposes in your car, you can use the speakerphone, you can, um, attach, uh, all kinds of audio sources and things like that.
[31:03.830 --> 31:05.850]  Uh, and, uh, Kyle, we, we did that.
[31:06.030 --> 31:07.070]  Um, we've done that.
[31:07.310 --> 31:21.430]  Uh, and a few weeks ago I was, um, uh, we had parked the car, you were in the car and, uh, basically, um, I was making a phone call and you, um, you basically, uh, turned the car on and you stole my call.
[31:21.750 --> 31:25.710]  The call suddenly went to the car and went away from my ear.
[31:26.230 --> 31:34.150]  And I figured that, you know, there's gotta be a way to have a lot of fun with that, but there's also probably a way to really, um, uh, do bad things with that as well.
[31:34.290 --> 31:36.210]  It just seems like that shouldn't happen.
[31:36.490 --> 31:38.030]  You know, I was on the phone.
[31:38.450 --> 31:42.890]  All you did was turn the car on and boom, it's, it's, it's, you have the call now.
[31:43.410 --> 31:44.850]  And the caller didn't know.
[31:45.070 --> 31:46.490]  It was relatively hostile, yeah.
[31:46.590 --> 31:50.830]  And I was frantically trying to turn the car off and then I guess hand it back to you.
[31:50.990 --> 31:51.230]  Uh-huh.
[31:51.230 --> 31:52.070]  It was funny.
[31:52.350 --> 31:53.370]  Yeah, it was, it was awkward.
[31:53.590 --> 31:54.970]  Speaking of calls, I think we have a call.
[31:55.170 --> 31:55.170]  We have a call?
[31:55.190 --> 31:55.530]  Okay.
[31:55.790 --> 31:56.230]  Good evening.
[31:56.430 --> 31:57.650]  You're on Off the Hook Overtime.
[32:00.070 --> 32:00.850]  Speak up, please.
[32:02.510 --> 32:03.430]  You sure we have a call?
[32:04.310 --> 32:05.250]  I don't think we have a call.
[32:07.590 --> 32:08.310]  Is anyone there?
[32:10.190 --> 32:15.590]  Well, somebody, uh, it's, it's, it's silent, but I don't think there's anybody there where they, where they can't hear us.
[32:15.770 --> 32:16.810]  But, uh, try calling back.
[32:16.970 --> 32:18.070]  Maybe they want to go get snacks.
[32:18.470 --> 32:22.390]  802-321-4225-802-321-HACK.
[32:22.670 --> 32:24.670]  You guys ever experiment on Bluetooth like that?
[32:24.810 --> 32:26.970]  You ever have, uh, weirdness happen?
[32:27.550 --> 32:27.950]  Alex?
[32:28.550 --> 32:31.170]  Yeah, uh, well, sort of, sort of, yeah.
[32:31.370 --> 32:37.530]  Like I said, you know, I did this, uh, I did this recently, this device-device, uh, migration thing.
[32:37.770 --> 32:48.270]  And in fact, I'm looking at the instructions for it right now from Apple, and I think I may have been wrong about needing the iCloud or iTunes account password.
[32:48.410 --> 32:49.130]  I don't think you do.
[32:49.630 --> 32:53.010]  I think you just need access to both devices.
[32:53.450 --> 32:56.630]  I mean, I have, I have the instructions here right now.
[32:56.890 --> 33:00.730]  It says, you know, how did you use device, device, uh, migration?
[33:01.010 --> 33:03.610]  Turn on your new device, place it near your current device.
[33:03.810 --> 33:06.270]  It's using iOS 12.4 or later.
[33:06.530 --> 33:13.850]  The quick start screen appears on your current device and offers the option of using your Apple ID to set up the new device.
[33:14.490 --> 33:17.550]  Make sure that it's the Apple ID you want to use, then tap continue.
[33:17.870 --> 33:20.070]  So the Apple ID is on the new device.
[33:20.630 --> 33:25.410]  If you don't see the option to continue on your current device, make sure the Bluetooth is turned on.
[33:25.750 --> 33:28.130]  Wait for an animation to appear on your new device.
[33:28.310 --> 33:31.250]  Hold your current device over the new device.
[33:31.450 --> 33:33.390]  So your old phone over the new phone.
[33:33.890 --> 33:35.850]  Then center the animation and viewfinder.
[33:35.850 --> 33:37.810]  Wait for a message that says finish on new device.
[33:37.970 --> 33:40.050]  If it can't find it, then follow these other steps.
[33:40.050 --> 33:41.470]  So this is using Bluetooth as well.
[33:41.590 --> 33:43.570]  Sounds like arranging crystals and stuff.
[33:43.750 --> 33:43.930]  Okay.
[33:43.950 --> 33:44.890]  I wasn't aware I was using Bluetooth.
[33:45.210 --> 33:49.890]  That seems to be, uh, seems to be something where you could do a bunch of shenanigans.
[33:50.310 --> 33:50.670]  Yeah.
[33:50.830 --> 33:51.190]  Well, yeah.
[33:51.390 --> 33:53.150]  But here's, here's an important step too.
[33:53.270 --> 33:57.190]  Then when asked, enter your current password on your new device.
[33:57.430 --> 33:57.910]  New device, yes.
[33:58.130 --> 34:02.550]  Helping instructions to set up Face ID or Touch ID on your new device.
[34:02.650 --> 34:02.850]  Mm-hmm.
[34:03.110 --> 34:09.810]  Tap transfer from old device to begin transferring your data from your previous iPhone to your new device.
[34:11.770 --> 34:13.190]  That's, you know...
[34:13.190 --> 34:17.790]  But you need physical access to the old device and you would need access to the password, right?
[34:18.490 --> 34:19.210]  That's correct.
[34:19.390 --> 34:21.290]  So if you had that, then you have the phone.
[34:21.430 --> 34:23.450]  You could do whatever you want with that info anyway.
[34:23.730 --> 34:24.910]  So what's the big deal?
[34:26.150 --> 34:28.530]  Well, not necessarily.
[34:28.610 --> 34:30.070]  Well, look, they're, they're short.
[34:30.210 --> 34:46.890]  If you have the, not necessarily though, if you have the passcode to the phone, uh, you know, then you have access to all of the data that's stored in the phone, the text messages, you know, even, you know, things that somebody would have assumed were protected because they were encrypted,
[34:47.290 --> 34:47.470]  right?
[34:47.630 --> 34:58.910]  You know, you have access to their signal messages, telegram messages, et cetera, things that were encrypted in transit that, you know, are generally Not necessarily protected on the device, but only by the passcode on the device.
[34:59.630 --> 35:04.690]  Every endpoint that receives those messages is going to be able to read them.
[35:05.350 --> 35:14.930]  So, the other thing that's concerning me is that it doesn't seem like there is an additional challenge form here.
[35:15.110 --> 35:22.250]  Some kind of password or something like having access to the target phone's iTunes account, that would be an additional factor of authentication.
[35:22.250 --> 35:24.950]  Some kind of multi-factor authentication for this.
[35:25.690 --> 35:27.990]  So, you know, the caller may be right.
[35:28.190 --> 35:38.350]  And the deterrent from doing this may just be the physical logistics of having to have the phone in your possession for such a long period of time.
[35:38.350 --> 35:41.250]  That would make doing it covertly rather difficult.
[35:42.010 --> 35:42.310]  Interesting.
[35:42.890 --> 35:44.170]  We have a caller on the line.
[35:44.290 --> 35:45.150]  We're going to get to it in just a moment.
[35:45.150 --> 35:53.790]  But I also... this makes me wonder about if you give your passcode to, say, a customs agent and they disappear with your phone for a little while.
[35:54.250 --> 35:55.990]  Well, what do you think they could be doing?
[35:56.390 --> 35:56.810]  You know?
[35:57.090 --> 35:59.290]  They could be cloning your phone as well.
[35:59.690 --> 36:00.570]  And think about that.
[36:01.150 --> 36:02.490]  That's a very good point.
[36:02.650 --> 36:02.810]  Yeah.
[36:03.170 --> 36:03.470]  All right.
[36:03.510 --> 36:04.270]  Let's take this call.
[36:04.350 --> 36:04.630]  Good evening.
[36:04.770 --> 36:05.790]  You're on Off The Hook Overtime.
[36:06.650 --> 36:07.410]  Can you hear me?
[36:07.590 --> 36:08.150]  We hear you.
[36:08.830 --> 36:09.270]  Okay.
[36:09.450 --> 36:09.930]  This is...
[36:09.930 --> 36:10.790]  My name is Philip.
[36:10.990 --> 36:11.630]  I'm from Missouri.
[36:12.230 --> 36:12.890]  How you doing?
[36:13.030 --> 36:20.530]  And I was wondering what you guys think about the Tucker Carlson thing about being, you know, bugged by the...
[36:21.050 --> 36:22.310]  Listened to by the...
[36:22.310 --> 36:22.670]  NSA.
[36:23.150 --> 36:23.330]  Yeah.
[36:23.530 --> 36:25.650]  I don't know anything about it, to be honest.
[36:25.890 --> 36:28.210]  I just heard Tucker Carlson and I kind of tuned out.
[36:28.350 --> 36:30.930]  But I'd like to know more.
[36:30.930 --> 36:43.710]  You know, the thing that bugs me about it is that they're making that into the number one issue when there are so many other issues that don't involve Tucker Carlson that are more important and urgent that they're ignoring.
[36:43.830 --> 36:48.750]  But that doesn't mean I'm not interested in finding out what, if anything, this is about.
[36:49.370 --> 36:59.790]  I mean, it's not unprecedented for the NSA not to listen to anybody because they did it in the Obama administration and, you know, any other administration you go with.
[37:00.550 --> 37:05.730]  But, you know, Carlson Tucker likes to, you know, some things up to get ratings anyway.
[37:05.950 --> 37:09.850]  So I'm just wondering if you think it's just legit or if it's just something to get ratings.
[37:10.430 --> 37:11.850]  I would go with the latter.
[37:12.190 --> 37:15.130]  I think most everything he does is to get ratings.
[37:15.550 --> 37:17.310]  That's not to say that he's the only one.
[37:17.670 --> 37:20.650]  But he's particularly egregious, I think, in his case.
[37:21.570 --> 37:24.010]  But that said, let it play out.
[37:24.790 --> 37:25.190]  Investigate.
[37:25.310 --> 37:25.430]  Sure.
[37:25.510 --> 37:26.070]  Look into it.
[37:26.130 --> 37:28.570]  See, you know, who's telling the truth and who isn't.
[37:28.570 --> 37:31.250]  And I think that, you know, the truth will prevail.
[37:31.530 --> 37:32.430]  Alex, did you have something on this?
[37:33.190 --> 37:34.330]  Yeah, I do.
[37:35.530 --> 37:35.890]  Yeah.
[37:36.110 --> 37:39.410]  Having worked briefly in the intelligence.
[37:40.230 --> 37:40.970]  Oh, I have.
[37:41.250 --> 37:42.450]  Yeah, you're breaking up a little bit.
[37:43.510 --> 37:44.730]  Oh, any better now?
[37:44.810 --> 37:45.290]  Yes, much better.
[37:45.930 --> 37:46.250]  Connection.
[37:46.250 --> 37:47.110]  Yeah.
[37:47.310 --> 38:00.810]  Having, having spent some time in the intelligence community myself and in a legal capacity, I've, you know, I can speak to the notion that monitoring an individual domestically, a U.S.
[38:00.930 --> 38:14.150]  person, a United States citizen to get authorization to do that is taken extremely seriously, would require a court order and require a showing that you are likely working as an agent of a foreign power.
[38:14.150 --> 38:18.030]  And that would have to go to the foreign intelligence surveillance court.
[38:18.030 --> 38:20.550]  And so there would be a record of this.
[38:20.670 --> 38:45.910]  And I think what Tucker Carlson is claiming is a little bit specious because, you know, he may have been picked up in some kind of domestic spying dragnet, let's say, where AT&T or Verizon business networks, you know, is sharing information with the intelligence community on a massive scale.
[38:45.910 --> 38:58.950]  I mean, that was the subject of the Snowden revelations, in which case there is a lot of communications of United States persons that are being hoovered up, so to speak, by these intelligence operations, but they're not necessarily being targeted individually.
[38:58.950 --> 39:04.330]  And what Tucker Carlson seems to be claiming is that he is targeted individually.
[39:04.590 --> 39:07.830]  I don't necessarily think that would be the case.
[39:09.010 --> 39:13.150]  You know, Kyle, you had a...
[39:13.150 --> 39:40.330]  No, I think you actually are answering it, though, in that, like, yeah, he may not necessarily be the target, but if his network, if he is affiliated or associated with people that are, and they are legitimately, because maybe they're working with government assets or some foreign actor that clearly wishes some kind of ill will in some way,
[39:40.330 --> 39:52.410]  and is already being pursued in some way, what's surprising about him, maybe, his communications with Matt Yates or whomever, you know, his pals are, who's...
[39:52.410 --> 40:04.610]  What's stopping him from being associated in, like you said, a larger database of calls made from very... from these... I mean, commentators.
[40:04.610 --> 40:07.010]  By his network, you mean Fox News or his network of people?
[40:07.110 --> 40:18.830]  I mean network like, like communications network, like your unified communications network, all the different ways you talk on every different channel, every different protocol, all the time, anywhere in the world, and to whom.
[40:19.010 --> 40:21.350]  I would love to ask this question of Edward Snowden.
[40:21.490 --> 40:30.490]  I think he would have the most definitive explanation of what's possible and what isn't, you know, whether or not this should be taken seriously.
[40:31.110 --> 40:33.090]  That's a voice I would believe.
[40:33.410 --> 40:33.890]  Alex?
[40:34.950 --> 40:35.910]  Yeah, absolutely.
[40:36.330 --> 40:47.270]  And, you know, I'm sure the caller is wondering how he would deal with Tucker Carlson's claim that there was a whistleblower that told him this that had specific information and access to his email.
[40:47.270 --> 40:56.050]  Well, to that, I would say there's two alternatives here, at least two alternatives I can think of just on the fly.
[40:56.470 --> 41:15.770]  Number one, perhaps some of those communications that you get hoovered up in this massive dragnet that, you know, applies to a certain network, as Kyle had mentioned, and we were discussing, in which case somebody might have access to those communications and abuse their privileges internally to then reveal that information to Tucker Carlson.
[41:15.770 --> 41:33.470]  The other option, more plausible infinitely, in my view, is that it wasn't the NSA that had access to his personal communications and proved this, and it's just some ordinary person who perhaps was able to compromise and breach Tucker Carlson's personal email account.
[41:33.470 --> 41:34.330]  Who knows?
[41:34.610 --> 41:45.810]  I mean, I have no idea how many accounts of Tucker Carlson, you know, are there, you know, have been part of other data breaches, what kind of passwords he uses, does he use multi-factor authentication, you know?
[41:46.270 --> 41:46.950]  Yeah, right.
[41:46.950 --> 41:52.350]  It's just his cyber hygiene, I think, in any material respect, on Fox News.
[41:52.570 --> 42:06.190]  So, simply having access to personal communications doesn't necessarily mean that, you know, it was the NSA that got them, you know, and it's a whistleblower that's sharing them honestly.
[42:06.190 --> 42:17.750]  You know, the other way to do this, without even compromising any of Tucker Carlson's communications, or any of his accounts, rather, would be to simply obtain those communications from several parties with whom he communicated.
[42:18.050 --> 42:26.470]  Get copies of those emails, and then you can show them these emails, and it looks like you might have breached his account in some covert manner, but you didn't.
[42:26.630 --> 42:30.370]  You just talked to a couple people in his network that, you know, to whom he sent emails.
[42:30.370 --> 42:31.370]  Oh, that's evil.
[42:31.370 --> 42:32.030]  I love it.
[42:32.110 --> 42:34.130]  That's really, really evil.
[42:34.330 --> 42:40.490]  But, you know, whatever this is, the conversation that's going on now, he's enjoying it.
[42:40.550 --> 42:41.270]  He's loving that.
[42:41.390 --> 42:44.870]  Look how many times we have said Tucker Carlson in the last few minutes.
[42:45.030 --> 42:47.850]  Okay, that is what it's all about, I think.
[42:48.430 --> 43:00.970]  Well, I think, to a large extent, it is, and I think that's why Trump in, you know, early, it was March 2017, something that made that outrageous claim that Obama was spying on his campaign.
[43:01.130 --> 43:10.830]  And it gets a huge amount of press when you make these very targeted accusations of malfeasance against a powerful organization like the National Security Agency.
[43:10.830 --> 43:34.090]  However, though, to be fair, and to play both sides of this, you know, we don't necessarily have the best history when it comes to domestic surveillance, you know, of the media or even, you know, of activists, anti-war activists in particular, like Martin Luther King and Muhammad Ali and Jane Fonda,
[43:34.090 --> 43:43.050]  all these anti-war activists during the Vietnam War era were, their communications were being monitored by something called Project Minaret.
[43:43.590 --> 43:45.570]  And, you know, this was a big problem.
[43:45.710 --> 44:03.510]  However, it was the exposure of Project Minaret and Project Shamrock and, you know, all of these infringements of our civil liberties for domestic persons, United States persons or United States citizens that gave rise to something called the Church Commission.
[44:04.410 --> 44:15.410]  And the Church Commission, with Senator Frank Church, in 1975, began to develop what is now known as the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act.
[44:15.830 --> 44:20.690]  And that created this system of judicial oversight for the monitoring of U.S.
[44:20.770 --> 44:21.070]  persons.
[44:21.150 --> 44:25.990]  And I can say, unequivocally, monitoring and spying on U.S.
[44:26.090 --> 44:32.670]  persons, especially individual persons, has to go through a series of several checks in order for that to happen.
[44:32.670 --> 44:32.670]  Yeah.
[44:33.290 --> 44:37.330]  So, you know, and it's not something that's taken lightly.
[44:37.550 --> 44:44.130]  So I don't necessarily think Tucker Carlson's claims hold a lot of water, in my view.
[44:44.530 --> 44:49.790]  And I do think that this is all to gin up ratings and mentions on social media.
[44:50.930 --> 44:57.090]  And especially, I think he really was angling for us to talk about this tonight on Off the Hook Overtime.
[44:57.090 --> 44:57.730]  Yeah.
[44:58.010 --> 45:02.350]  It's not about the concept, necessarily, of, like, mass surveillance and so on.
[45:02.370 --> 45:05.490]  It's all about, like, his personal situation.
[45:05.490 --> 45:06.950]  I think that's a huge tell, right?
[45:07.710 --> 45:08.950]  Does that answer your question?
[45:09.990 --> 45:10.510]  Yeah.
[45:11.450 --> 45:20.950]  Also, what do you guys think about Windows 11 requiring a TPM module on your board to be able to install it?
[45:21.790 --> 45:26.610]  And what about Bill Cosby, where he was released from prison today?
[45:26.830 --> 45:31.150]  Well, I don't know if Bill Cosby really falls into what we talk about very much.
[45:31.730 --> 45:36.590]  It does... I'll say it proves that if you have money, you can pretty much get anything.
[45:37.050 --> 45:38.210]  That's what I was thinking.
[45:38.390 --> 45:39.190]  Yeah, pretty much.
[45:39.290 --> 45:42.530]  As for Windows 11, I know it's been getting a lot of backlash.
[45:42.950 --> 45:44.490]  Do you know what the DPM stands for?
[45:44.590 --> 45:47.750]  What exactly that hardware you were referring to is?
[45:48.750 --> 45:50.190]  It's a security feature.
[45:52.010 --> 45:55.370]  I can't remember what it stands for right off the bat.
[45:55.590 --> 45:55.770]  Okay.
[45:55.970 --> 45:59.030]  But it's supposed to be working with SecureView, too, so...
[45:59.630 --> 46:01.750]  I just try to put on Dev...
[46:02.930 --> 46:06.870]  put on InsiderDev, like, last night, and it won't allow me to do it.
[46:07.110 --> 46:11.710]  I guess because I put my BIOS into Legacy, so I can install Linux and dual boot.
[46:11.970 --> 46:12.270]  Sure.
[46:12.270 --> 46:20.990]  But, yeah, it's supposed to involve a TPM 2.0 to install it.
[46:21.190 --> 46:23.530]  But it's supposed to be a free upgrade for personal.
[46:24.730 --> 46:25.250]  Interesting.
[46:25.570 --> 46:35.450]  Yeah, we're very interested in this, where they go with that, because Windows 10 is highly neglected, and I think they're just going to scrap it and go forward.
[46:35.630 --> 46:38.410]  From what I've read, Windows 11 is not that much of an improvement.
[46:38.410 --> 46:44.270]  But, yeah, it's a free upgrade, but there are a lot of conditions with the CPU architecture and all that.
[46:44.470 --> 46:48.110]  Well, there's a lot of people tapping their feet, like, okay, then what's the plan here?
[46:48.370 --> 46:48.570]  Yeah.
[46:49.210 --> 46:49.290]  Yeah.
[46:49.510 --> 46:49.590]  Yeah.
[46:50.650 --> 46:50.890]  Alex?
[46:51.110 --> 46:52.170]  Keep playing with it, though.
[46:52.350 --> 46:52.770]  That's great.
[46:52.850 --> 46:53.370]  You're working with it.
[46:53.450 --> 46:54.530]  Hang on, Carla, did you have something else?
[46:55.710 --> 47:08.930]  Well, yeah, you know, the two-factor identification thing, you know, where they keep asking me for my phone numbers, it's just like, well, they're just putting that phone number into the database, right, so they can fill my data?
[47:09.270 --> 47:10.870]  Well, yeah, they're going to do something with that.
[47:11.070 --> 47:13.030]  Sure, give them any information, they're going to keep it.
[47:13.530 --> 47:22.810]  Well, the thing is, if you do two-factor identification, like on an iPhone or an Android device that uses, like, a fingerprint, your fingerprint's on record, too.
[47:23.430 --> 47:24.470]  Yeah, I would imagine so.
[47:25.670 --> 47:26.950]  Your eye, everything.
[47:27.250 --> 47:28.230]  Everything you put in there.
[47:28.710 --> 47:35.970]  For the, for the phone OS, for the OS, or for other things, like, third-party things, because...
[47:35.970 --> 47:46.490]  Well, just like, you know, like, I got an old iPad, and it keeps complaining I need to enable two-factor, and I do it anyway, and it keeps complaining about it, like, a few days later.
[47:46.710 --> 47:46.950]  Uh-huh.
[47:47.130 --> 47:47.390]  Interesting.
[47:48.670 --> 47:57.630]  But it just seems like, you know, they just want an excuse to take my phone number and sell it to somebody, because I get a lot of funky phone calls during the day.
[47:57.630 --> 47:58.810]  Yeah, well, you know...
[47:58.810 --> 48:03.130]  Like, ask me to donate to this, that, and the other, or, you know...
[48:03.130 --> 48:09.750]  You can get a phone number that is only used for that purpose, that forwards to your actual phone, so they don't get your real phone number.
[48:09.910 --> 48:16.470]  Like, get a Google Voice number or something that is able to get texts or phone calls, and that way, if...
[48:16.470 --> 48:18.310]  And you only use it for these things.
[48:18.310 --> 48:21.550]  If it rings or you get another text, you know that it was...
[48:21.550 --> 48:25.710]  That information was given to them by whoever you gave that phone number to.
[48:26.470 --> 48:26.930]  Yeah.
[48:26.930 --> 48:28.290]  Alex, did you have something?
[48:29.550 --> 48:31.970]  Yeah, um, um, one last thing, though.
[48:32.190 --> 48:32.290]  Yeah.
[48:32.550 --> 48:35.790]  Have you guys thought about doing a follow-up to Freedom Downtime?
[48:36.190 --> 48:36.970]  Well, yeah.
[48:37.470 --> 48:38.810]  I mean, it's been 20, 25 years.
[48:39.090 --> 48:40.930]  Yeah, you know, I don't know what we do.
[48:41.090 --> 48:45.870]  Like, would we start from when Kevin got released, and...
[48:45.870 --> 48:47.170]  So much has happened.
[48:47.510 --> 48:47.550]  Yeah.
[48:48.090 --> 48:49.150]  I miss those days.
[48:49.270 --> 48:49.790]  Well, we...
[48:49.790 --> 48:50.930]  I miss you guys forever.
[48:51.150 --> 48:52.170]  Oh, well, that's good to know.
[48:52.290 --> 48:52.790]  That's good to know.
[48:52.970 --> 48:53.910]  We love the encouragement.
[48:53.910 --> 48:55.490]  Like, fiber optic.
[48:55.610 --> 48:56.510]  Whatever happened to him.
[48:56.690 --> 49:02.890]  He's living happily in California, doing security research and consulting and things like that.
[49:02.990 --> 49:05.630]  And, you know, I talk to him every now and then.
[49:05.730 --> 49:06.630]  He's doing great.
[49:07.650 --> 49:15.610]  Isn't it funny that after so many years, um, the same guys they try to put in jail, they're looking forward to pay a bunch of money to actually do his job.
[49:15.770 --> 49:23.570]  And that was really the only point that we were making when we made the film was, is this guy really the threat you're saying he is?
[49:23.570 --> 49:30.450]  Because they kept saying crazy things about him, could start World War III by whistling touch tones, which you can't do, because it's dual tone.
[49:30.990 --> 49:33.550]  But it's just insane things like that, just...
[49:33.550 --> 49:38.230]  And we still talk about that to this day, the assumption of what hackers can do.
[49:38.330 --> 49:38.870]  They can do everything.
[49:38.870 --> 49:50.830]  It's just fear of the unknown that basically lets your imagination run wild and demonizes people who are really just curious and messing around with technology and very much like you and me.
[49:50.830 --> 49:51.670]  You know?
[49:51.930 --> 50:01.550]  Well, you remember, like, John Oliver doing that expose on the nuclear system where they're using, like, six-inch, like, floppy drops.
[50:01.550 --> 50:03.170]  Oh, yeah, the eight-inch floppies.
[50:03.270 --> 50:04.130]  Absolutely, yes.
[50:04.130 --> 50:04.810]  I've seen those.
[50:05.890 --> 50:06.850]  That's classic.
[50:07.170 --> 50:12.710]  But, you know, in some ways, I kind of trust that system more because I know that's not connected to anything else.
[50:13.130 --> 50:14.950]  And I know you can't really hack into it.
[50:15.010 --> 50:16.650]  Alex, I think you had something to add?
[50:18.430 --> 50:18.910]  Alex?
[50:18.930 --> 50:19.370]  Yeah, sure.
[50:19.370 --> 50:35.130]  With the caller's question to revert to the issue of Windows 11, a friend and colleague of mine who is the CISO of a large healthcare organization wrote a great article about this.
[50:35.130 --> 50:52.490]  And I think he's not alone in surmising that one of the primary reasons why Windows 11 is going to require this newer generation of CPUs is because of the Spectre and Meltdown security flaws.
[50:52.790 --> 51:01.970]  These were vulnerabilities that had to deal with Intel's... basically the logic within Intel's CPUs.
[51:01.970 --> 51:03.430]  And they were all hardware-based.
[51:04.630 --> 51:05.970]  That's from sloppy coding.
[51:06.230 --> 51:10.330]  I mean, when you don't open source your software to find the bugs and everything, right?
[51:11.270 --> 51:13.890]  And you hide it until something bad happens.
[51:14.010 --> 51:15.370]  And you're like, oh, no, look what happened.
[51:16.430 --> 51:16.790]  Right.
[51:16.950 --> 51:17.670]  I mean, I remember...
[51:18.790 --> 51:20.850]  Spectre and Meltdown, you know, they were from...
[51:20.850 --> 51:23.490]  I think it was 2015, if I recall correctly.
[51:23.890 --> 51:31.430]  But Windows then basically had to mitigate this hardware vulnerability on the software side.
[51:31.550 --> 51:32.950]  And I think they're sick of doing that.
[51:33.150 --> 51:37.830]  It might cause a bunch of legacy issues or it might cause vulnerabilities elsewhere.
[51:37.830 --> 51:48.270]  But I think what they're trying to do is to ensure that those types of vulnerabilities that are processor-based are outside of their responsibility going forward from Windows 11.
[51:48.870 --> 51:54.270]  And that, you know, this was the manufacturer's problem, the chip maker's problem, and that they've solved it.
[51:54.350 --> 51:56.810]  And now Windows can finally move on.
[51:56.930 --> 52:02.590]  So I see that being perhaps a good reason for this migration.
[52:02.790 --> 52:09.410]  But, you know, it might be nice to hear from Microsoft on this particular issue as well.
[52:10.110 --> 52:15.070]  Well, good luck on that, cause the way they acted over, you know, Internet Explorer back in the day.
[52:15.890 --> 52:27.410]  And the whole thing with big corporations like IBM, SCO, you know, and the DEC, SS stuff like, with DVDs, cause...
[52:28.250 --> 52:30.650]  You know, all they're doing is shooting themselves in the foot.
[52:30.650 --> 52:40.210]  But I'll just stick with my Pop.OS install, um, until I can find a way to run, like, uh, you know, the stuff like, uh, my Adobe stuff and Linux and everything.
[52:40.210 --> 52:46.890]  I'll still have Windows, and for my games, but, um, besides that, Windows can just kiss it.
[52:47.190 --> 52:55.050]  I'll just, you know, Linux has such a small install base, that, you know, and it's pretty, it's pretty much updated.
[52:55.790 --> 52:57.710]  Every time I log in to it, it's updated.
[52:58.610 --> 53:02.890]  Um, plus it's open source, and plus I can change out the kernel whenever I want.
[53:04.270 --> 53:06.250]  You're preaching to the converted here, but yeah.
[53:06.470 --> 53:07.890]  More use of control over it.
[53:08.290 --> 53:08.810]  Uh-huh.
[53:08.930 --> 53:13.870]  No, we all, we all know the advantages of these things, and, uh, it definitely, it definitely stands out.
[53:13.990 --> 53:14.970]  Alex, I think you had one last point?
[53:15.870 --> 53:22.850]  Yeah, to, to the cold point about the, the 8-inch floppies, uh, it reminds me of something that happened to me last week.
[53:22.850 --> 53:28.630]  And this, this would be fun to replicate, perhaps, on the air, uh, if we could do it, since we have this dial-out capability.
[53:29.130 --> 53:46.810]  But I got a call from, uh, one of these scammers, one of these sort of tech support scam lines, basically telling me that I had, um, uh, it was actually, they were impersonating Microsoft and, and telling me that I was charged $399 for this extra subscription.
[53:46.810 --> 53:50.250]  And if I wanted to cancel it, I had to do so now, et cetera, et cetera, et cetera.
[53:50.330 --> 53:52.090]  It was just, you know, a convoluted scam.
[53:52.390 --> 53:54.870]  And it was obvious you're talking to a foreign call center.
[53:55.610 --> 53:56.730]  And I said, okay.
[53:56.850 --> 53:59.770]  I went along with it to see what, you know, what the hook was going to be.
[53:59.890 --> 54:01.290]  And, of course, it was the usual.
[54:01.450 --> 54:10.850]  They're going to use, uh, go to assist or log me in one of these remote connections to access your actual hardware, probably install malware, uh, maybe some ransomware, who knows.
[54:10.850 --> 54:15.590]  And, um, and then charge you a bunch of money, steal your data, et cetera, et cetera.
[54:16.130 --> 54:25.770]  But when he told me to do this and go to the particular link, I, I mentioned to the scammer that, um, it was giving me an error message.
[54:25.830 --> 54:26.830]  Oh, well, what's the error message?
[54:26.950 --> 54:36.370]  And I said, it was telling me that my operating system is not supported, you know, and that I, you know, I either have to be using iOS or Android or Windows.
[54:36.930 --> 54:38.450]  And he said, well, well, what are you using?
[54:38.530 --> 54:39.590]  Are you on Windows or Mac?
[54:39.690 --> 54:40.470]  And I said, neither.
[54:40.610 --> 54:42.930]  He said, oh, you're, you're on a, some kind of Linux system.
[54:43.250 --> 54:44.850]  And I said, no, I'm, I'm not.
[54:45.050 --> 54:47.430]  And he said, well, well, must be one of those.
[54:47.610 --> 54:48.770]  What, what else could you be using?
[54:49.290 --> 54:52.570]  And so I said to him, well, I'm running, I'm running OS 2 Warp.
[54:53.970 --> 54:58.390]  And I said, OS 2 Warp, you know, what, what, what the hell, what, what is that?
[54:58.470 --> 54:59.370]  What is OS 2 Warp?
[54:59.470 --> 55:00.730]  Is it, it's Linux, right?
[55:02.550 --> 55:04.570]  And I said, no, I'm running the latest version.
[55:04.570 --> 55:06.270]  And, you know, it's 4.5.2.
[55:06.430 --> 55:08.890]  And you can hear him putting it in, right?
[55:09.010 --> 55:13.010]  And then realizing this is an operating system that was discontinued 20 years ago.
[55:13.450 --> 55:21.470]  But then I really whet his appetite by telling him that, you know, well, the reason we run this is because we have a lot of sensitive data on this computer.
[55:21.470 --> 55:22.030]  Oh, wow.
[55:22.330 --> 55:29.330]  And in particular, you know, we're an investment firm, and we have all of the cryptocurrency wallets stored on this hard drive.
[55:29.810 --> 55:39.670]  And so you can imagine, this guy was highly motivated to figure out how he could get an OS2 machine to use LogMeIn or GoToAssist.
[55:39.850 --> 55:41.930]  There were a couple of different services that he went through.
[55:42.550 --> 55:50.490]  But it really stomped him when we brought this old ancient IBM developed OS, which...
[55:50.490 --> 55:56.530]  You should have given him a website to go to, where he would have to enter his information.
[55:57.370 --> 56:00.010]  I'm sorry to talk over you guys, but there are a lot of...
[56:00.010 --> 56:00.090]  No, it's a good idea.
[56:01.230 --> 56:01.830]  I'm sorry.
[56:02.330 --> 56:05.250]  There's a lot of YouTube channels out there that does that.
[56:05.330 --> 56:12.250]  They'll set up a VPN, and they will call into these services or, you know, sign up for a service on one of these sites.
[56:12.470 --> 56:17.750]  And they'll, like, scam these guys, and they'll get, like, hundreds of thousands of views out of it.
[56:18.550 --> 56:27.210]  And they'll pretend to be somebody and just to put a YouTube video up of them just, you know, pretty much just trolling these guys.
[56:27.390 --> 56:27.670]  Uh-huh.
[56:27.830 --> 56:28.250]  Uh-huh.
[56:28.370 --> 56:29.250]  It's great fun.
[56:29.950 --> 56:30.250]  Yeah.
[56:30.690 --> 56:31.870]  You've got to fight back sometimes.
[56:33.110 --> 56:34.170]  I forgot what I was going to say.
[56:34.290 --> 56:34.590]  Oh, yeah.
[56:35.050 --> 56:37.730]  Cryptocurrency, where China's, like, banned it.
[56:37.790 --> 56:38.810]  What do you guys think about that?
[56:39.310 --> 56:42.170]  Uh, well, um, I think they're scared.
[56:42.370 --> 56:43.730]  I think they don't understand it.
[56:43.890 --> 56:45.190]  They, uh, I'm talking about the government.
[56:45.330 --> 56:52.150]  I think all governments don't understand it because it pretty much, you know, throws fiat currency into a tizzy.
[56:52.350 --> 56:55.390]  And, yeah, we don't claim to understand it either.
[56:55.690 --> 56:58.930]  Um, but it is, it is something to be reckoned with.
[56:59.050 --> 57:01.750]  I mean, you turn on CNBC now, you always see what Bitcoin is worth.
[57:01.750 --> 57:04.130]  So, uh, it should be taken seriously.
[57:04.450 --> 57:10.490]  And, uh, um, I, I think you're better off working with it than, than, uh, working against it.
[57:10.630 --> 57:15.570]  Uh, and, um, I think in the end, it, it will survive, as will other cryptocurrencies.
[57:15.570 --> 57:23.850]  There's a limit to how many of these you can have, but, um, I don't think you can just erase what has been accomplished over all these years.
[57:23.990 --> 57:25.850]  I think the government's really putting the pressure on.
[57:25.950 --> 57:32.010]  I think that's clear with the contracts being taken away from SpaceX, given that they were accepting a lot of Bitcoin.
[57:32.310 --> 57:44.730]  And I think that kind of pressure is going to keep moving around at a weird time when as many investment and banking and financial institutions as you can count have gotten into this space.
[57:44.990 --> 57:54.270]  Now there, there's this, um, uh, pearl clutching over, um, how, whatever, the latest, uh, crime spree with Bitcoin.
[57:54.270 --> 58:01.430]  And, and that somehow, that somehow is the problem when in fact the problem is bad security and security practices.
[58:01.770 --> 58:03.950]  They have to solve the energy issue with Bitcoin.
[58:04.070 --> 58:05.070]  They absolutely have to solve that.
[58:05.150 --> 58:09.310]  But I, I believe they can solve that if they, if they devote attention and resources to it.
[58:09.530 --> 58:10.090]  I, yeah.
[58:10.150 --> 58:24.970]  And I think the energy thing is, um, it's a quandary to me because I think, you know, printing paper currency, I mean, the carbon involved in that, the carbon involved in having bank branches, um, you could go on and on.
[58:25.090 --> 58:26.350]  So I, I don't really know.
[58:26.510 --> 58:27.590]  I, I, I get there.
[58:27.590 --> 58:30.030]  And this doesn't have to happen like this though.
[58:30.150 --> 58:32.470]  This, I don't, I don't think it has to be this way.
[58:32.490 --> 58:36.190]  And also how, um, in fact, cryptocurrency is spent.
[58:36.190 --> 58:48.250]  And if you're spending it on things that are inherently, uh, carbon emitting, then, well, that's going to add to all the carbon that it took to, um, produce that cryptocurrency.
[58:48.470 --> 58:48.910]  So I don't know.
[58:48.970 --> 58:57.530]  I think there's just a lot of, um, finger pointing that, that seems awful convenient for, uh, people who, who seem a bit mad on the sidelines of it.
[58:57.890 --> 59:00.530]  Uh, Carla, we have to go because, uh, our, our night is almost done.
[59:00.610 --> 59:01.510]  But thanks so much for calling.
[59:01.510 --> 59:02.250]  Okay, I'm sorry.
[59:02.530 --> 59:02.830]  No problem.
[59:02.830 --> 59:06.250]  And, um, could you guys put out a Blu-ray version of, uh, Freedom Downtown?
[59:06.730 --> 59:07.250]  Oh, yeah.
[59:07.390 --> 59:07.690]  I want to...
[59:07.690 --> 59:08.370]  I don't know.
[59:08.530 --> 59:09.250]  Can we do that?
[59:09.470 --> 59:13.950]  I wanted to say, yeah, we, I mean, we, we are still doing stuff with video.
[59:14.110 --> 59:22.610]  We, um, we film a lot and we have on, uh, some of the important events in the last 10, 20 years, dare I say.
[59:22.730 --> 59:23.710]  We need to be cloned.
[59:23.830 --> 59:24.970]  That's the only way we have time for these.
[59:24.970 --> 59:30.250]  We have a lot of the original, um, uh, materials for that documentary.
[59:30.250 --> 59:35.050]  And it's certainly within the realm of possibility that we revisit it in some way.
[59:35.270 --> 59:35.770]  Or that we...
[59:35.770 --> 59:36.730]  Alternate, alternate endings.
[59:37.050 --> 59:37.550]  Expand on it.
[59:37.690 --> 59:39.190]  Where Kevin doesn't get out of prison, you know?
[59:39.210 --> 59:43.230]  And, and of course, even remastering it in some way would be tedious.
[59:43.490 --> 59:55.090]  We'd probably have to find, I think we have giant master, um, uh, uh, long playing beta tapes on, on the mantle of a, of a fireplace deep in the woods somewhere.
[59:55.090 --> 59:55.710]  I don't know.
[59:56.150 --> 01:00:04.450]  We'll have to dig up the archives and, and, uh, look in the, the tombs of the pyramids and, and find the relics that it would take to make a Blu-ray.
[01:00:04.610 --> 01:00:04.890]  But...
[01:00:04.890 --> 01:00:06.250]  Honestly, I'd like to do something new.
[01:00:06.410 --> 01:00:07.710]  We want to do fresh stuff.
[01:00:07.970 --> 01:00:08.890]  Not just redoing the old things.
[01:00:09.050 --> 01:00:09.370]  I got you.
[01:00:09.410 --> 01:00:10.310]  A follow-up would be great.
[01:00:10.450 --> 01:00:10.630]  Yeah.
[01:00:10.930 --> 01:00:13.910]  Well, maybe somebody else can get themselves arrested and we'll do another documentary about them.
[01:00:14.030 --> 01:00:14.230]  How about that?
[01:00:14.230 --> 01:00:15.990]  Write us at, at OTH.
[01:00:16.450 --> 01:00:16.870]  No, don't do that.
[01:00:16.870 --> 01:00:27.510]  But, uh, OTH at 2600.com, if you have, um, ideas for stories that aren't being covered, that, uh, might be, uh, worthy of a documentary, we'd love your, your ideas.
[01:00:27.650 --> 01:00:28.170]  Yeah, absolutely.
[01:00:28.410 --> 01:00:29.750]  And where, where people's interests are.
[01:00:30.970 --> 01:00:31.330]  Okay.
[01:00:32.050 --> 01:00:33.470]  Well, thanks for listening to me.
[01:00:33.550 --> 01:00:34.470]  I'm sorry I rambled on.
[01:00:34.510 --> 01:00:35.050]  No, that's okay.
[01:00:35.150 --> 01:00:36.550]  It wasn't, it wasn't, uh, it was great.
[01:00:36.770 --> 01:00:37.790]  Call of the night, actually.
[01:00:37.890 --> 01:00:38.590]  Yeah, great conversation.
[01:00:38.730 --> 01:00:40.230]  And, uh, you're from, what, Missouri?
[01:00:41.350 --> 01:00:41.710]  Yeah.
[01:00:46.870 --> 01:00:47.630]  Back to Virginia.
[01:00:48.370 --> 01:00:48.650]  Oh, well.
[01:00:48.950 --> 01:00:54.210]  Um, it's gonna be a happier time come tomorrow because they just legalized, please, for recreational use.
[01:00:54.410 --> 01:00:54.970]  Oh, neat.
[01:00:55.130 --> 01:00:55.710]  Start tomorrow.
[01:00:56.030 --> 01:00:56.250]  Wow.
[01:00:56.250 --> 01:00:57.650]  Wow, okay, that's cool.
[01:00:57.930 --> 01:00:58.950]  We'll definitely celebrate.
[01:00:59.850 --> 01:01:00.690]  All right, then.
[01:01:01.230 --> 01:01:02.130]  Well, you have a good night.
[01:01:02.290 --> 01:01:03.470]  We'll, uh, we'll talk to you again soon.
[01:01:04.110 --> 01:01:04.770]  Okay, thanks.
[01:01:04.910 --> 01:01:05.050]  Bye.
[01:01:05.050 --> 01:01:05.170]  Take care.
[01:01:05.550 --> 01:01:05.910]  Have fun.
[01:01:06.750 --> 01:01:08.010]  Uh, Rob, I think you had something to say.
[01:01:08.590 --> 01:01:16.850]  Well, just, just, uh, if this, uh, puts you over the, uh, edge and finally sells you on this Blu-ray thing, there's a lot more room on those things for, like, even more special features.
[01:01:16.850 --> 01:01:18.930]  And Easter eggs and commentary tracks.
[01:01:19.210 --> 01:01:19.730]  Yeah, you know what?
[01:01:19.730 --> 01:01:20.630]  I think we had enough.
[01:01:21.170 --> 01:01:22.150]  We had so many.
[01:01:22.230 --> 01:01:23.350]  It will never be enough.
[01:01:23.490 --> 01:01:24.090]  Oh, yeah.
[01:01:24.290 --> 01:01:25.430]  We had more languages.
[01:01:25.730 --> 01:01:29.770]  And at the time, we had more Easter eggs, I think, than any other DVD that ever come out.
[01:01:29.910 --> 01:01:32.550]  I think it's one of the best authored DVD menus.
[01:01:33.010 --> 01:01:33.190]  Yeah.
[01:01:33.370 --> 01:01:39.950]  And, um, you know, you don't, that entire genre, DVD menus, I think that's gonna become, like, a, a lost art form.
[01:01:40.550 --> 01:01:53.750]  Um, because often Blu-rays have even worse menus and, um, features, the way they're displayed, and they're often thrown together by a production company as an afterthought and look pretty awful.
[01:01:53.990 --> 01:01:58.590]  So, and, and then that goes away with streaming and just, uh, files, I guess, now.
[01:01:58.830 --> 01:01:59.750]  Um, but...
[01:01:59.750 --> 01:01:59.890]  Oh, wow.
[01:01:59.950 --> 01:02:00.410]  Check this out.
[01:02:00.610 --> 01:02:01.510]  Freedomdowntime.com.
[01:02:01.630 --> 01:02:02.450]  We still have that domain.
[01:02:02.450 --> 01:02:03.930]  I mean, I didn't realize that.
[01:02:04.070 --> 01:02:09.350]  But you can, um, you can click, uh, on the button that says here on that site.
[01:02:09.690 --> 01:02:10.830]  Um, don't pick that up.
[01:02:11.450 --> 01:02:12.630]  Although it looks like it's from England.
[01:02:12.910 --> 01:02:14.270]  And that looks like it's from North Carolina.
[01:02:14.590 --> 01:02:15.830]  It's two calls at the same time.
[01:02:15.930 --> 01:02:16.590]  How is that possible?
[01:02:16.850 --> 01:02:17.730]  But we're done.
[01:02:17.890 --> 01:02:18.690]  We're done for the night, folks.
[01:02:18.950 --> 01:02:19.990]  Why didn't you call earlier?
[01:02:21.130 --> 01:02:24.550]  We were begging for so long, but we got, we got, we got good calls tonight.
[01:02:24.950 --> 01:02:32.290]  New people, or people that haven't called, uh, recently, but on freedomdowntime.com, if you click on the here button, you'll get a whole listing of all the Easter eggs.
[01:02:32.450 --> 01:02:37.590]  And how you can access them on your DVD player with your copy of, uh, of freedomdowntime.
[01:02:38.070 --> 01:02:39.110]  Uh, Alex, go ahead.
[01:02:40.130 --> 01:02:45.570]  Yeah, I was just going to chime in perhaps too late now, but I was going to, I was going to suggest we take the call.
[01:02:45.570 --> 01:02:51.570]  So I think we could break the, the off the hook overtime record with, I think, another eight or nine minutes here.
[01:02:51.710 --> 01:02:53.810]  It's, you know, we've been on the air for over two hours now.
[01:02:54.310 --> 01:02:55.030]  I'm tired.
[01:02:55.190 --> 01:02:55.910]  It's warm.
[01:02:56.130 --> 01:02:59.150]  I, I, I, I don't have the energy I used to have.
[01:02:59.210 --> 01:03:00.790]  I don't know if the equipment can take it.
[01:03:00.790 --> 01:03:01.790]  Equipment is burning up.
[01:03:01.950 --> 01:03:03.270]  It's 150 degrees in here.
[01:03:03.410 --> 01:03:04.390]  What if we have a meltdown?
[01:03:04.590 --> 01:03:05.190]  There could be some...
[01:03:05.190 --> 01:03:05.490]  God's sake, man.
[01:03:05.710 --> 01:03:06.270]  We're going to break it.
[01:03:06.270 --> 01:03:12.730]  I got, I got emergency alerts on my phone telling me to use less electricity if, if possible, because, you know, the system is being strained.
[01:03:13.290 --> 01:03:16.430]  You're sitting on a deck, Alex, with an umbrella and a pina colada.
[01:03:16.930 --> 01:03:23.670]  Uh, you know, I don't, I don't think it's fair to expect us here in a sweatshop of the studio to, uh, uh, to have to do more.
[01:03:24.350 --> 01:03:26.530]  Well, you know, if you can't take the heat, get out of the kitchen.
[01:03:26.670 --> 01:03:27.830]  I want to get out of the kitchen.
[01:03:27.830 --> 01:03:29.010]  Why are we in a kitchen?
[01:03:29.150 --> 01:03:30.130]  That doesn't make any sense.
[01:03:30.990 --> 01:03:32.030]  I don't know either.
[01:03:32.290 --> 01:03:33.090]  I have enjoyed this.
[01:03:33.310 --> 01:03:33.590]  Yes.
[01:03:33.710 --> 01:03:34.250]  This has been fun.
[01:03:34.770 --> 01:03:39.790]  And we want to thank, uh, thank people who have called in and, uh, written in OTH at 2600.com.
[01:03:39.970 --> 01:03:41.910]  Uh, now, Rob, are you waving or do you have something to say?
[01:03:42.590 --> 01:03:45.610]  Uh, yeah, just really quickly before we go, I mean, tomorrow's Canada day.
[01:03:45.610 --> 01:03:49.510]  So I wanted to wish all our Canadian friends and listeners a very happy one of those.
[01:03:49.690 --> 01:03:52.970]  Stay true North, uh, strong and fierce and, uh, enjoy yourselves.
[01:03:53.550 --> 01:03:57.790]  Especially those of you in the Pacific Northwest and Yukon and places like that that are burning up.
[01:03:57.870 --> 01:03:59.970]  It'll be over one way or another.
[01:04:00.170 --> 01:04:02.990]  It'll be over, but hopefully it'll be cooler too.
[01:04:03.470 --> 01:04:06.470]  And, um, uh, we'll, we'll see you in happier times.
[01:04:06.750 --> 01:04:07.550]  Wait till next year.
[01:04:07.810 --> 01:04:08.650]  Don't say that.
[01:04:09.110 --> 01:04:09.890]  Don't say that.
[01:04:10.030 --> 01:04:11.070]  Unless you're the Montreal Canadiens.
[01:04:11.170 --> 01:04:15.150]  No, no, I don't mean that either because, uh, they're going to bring the Stanley Cup back.
[01:04:15.150 --> 01:04:15.470]  I hope.
[01:04:15.970 --> 01:04:17.950]  Okay, guys, uh, good talking to you all.
[01:04:18.090 --> 01:04:20.230]  Uh, we'll see you again next week.
[01:04:20.730 --> 01:04:25.670]  And, um, yeah, have fun at the 2600 meetings if you go to one in your area.
[01:04:25.890 --> 01:04:26.490]  Good night.