[00:00.000 --> 00:06.200]  And it applies to our situation in capitalism in the United States right now.
[00:06.520 --> 00:08.020]  Thank you for your attention.
[00:08.260 --> 00:11.300]  Thank you for watching and listening to this program.
[00:11.320 --> 00:14.780]  And I look forward to speaking with you again next week.
[00:16.960 --> 00:20.580]  The time now is 7 p.m., almost one minute past 7 p.m.
[00:20.640 --> 00:22.300]  Stay tuned for Off the Hook.
[00:22.460 --> 00:27.780]  This is WBAI New York 99.5 FM and WBAI.org online.
[00:29.980 --> 00:35.240]  And you're listening to radio station WBAI in New York.
[00:35.420 --> 00:36.680]  It's 7 o'clock.
[00:37.200 --> 00:38.260]  Actually, 7.01.
[00:38.600 --> 00:41.560]  It's time for another edition of Off the Hook.
[02:12.290 --> 02:14.570]  And a very good evening to everybody.
[02:14.690 --> 02:16.270]  The program is Off the Hook.
[02:16.490 --> 02:19.290]  Emmanuel Goldstein here with you tonight, joined by Kyle.
[02:19.570 --> 02:20.530]  Yes, present.
[02:20.810 --> 02:21.330]  Rob T.
[02:21.550 --> 02:22.090]  Firefly.
[02:22.690 --> 02:23.690]  Good evening.
[02:23.970 --> 02:24.290]  Gila.
[02:25.070 --> 02:26.630]  Greetings and salutations.
[02:26.910 --> 02:27.470]  And Alex.
[02:28.290 --> 02:29.050]  Good evening.
[02:30.290 --> 02:32.310]  Well, who wants to have some fun?
[02:34.130 --> 02:36.410]  Okay, they can't see you raising your hand, all right?
[02:36.510 --> 02:37.830]  So you've got to answer audibly.
[02:37.830 --> 02:38.370]  It's radio.
[02:39.350 --> 02:40.250]  I'm outing out.
[02:41.590 --> 02:45.150]  Okay, so those of you who really want to have fun, say so.
[02:45.230 --> 02:48.150]  Those of you who are just saying you want to have fun, say so as well.
[02:48.150 --> 02:49.070]  So we know the difference.
[02:49.290 --> 02:49.590]  So.
[02:50.030 --> 02:50.630]  Okay, good.
[02:51.090 --> 02:52.210]  Some of us want to have fun.
[02:52.490 --> 02:56.570]  And if you're a listener and you want to have fun as well, this is what we suggest.
[02:56.570 --> 03:05.930]  Go on over to a site called governmentaddict.org and read along with us some of the comments that we're just finding out about that have been released.
[03:07.170 --> 03:09.810]  FCC complaints from Trump fans.
[03:10.470 --> 03:12.090]  Come on, that's a whole night of entertainment.
[03:12.310 --> 03:13.630]  We're only going to spend a couple of minutes on it.
[03:13.630 --> 03:18.770]  But basically, these are the same people who have been raging against cancel culture.
[03:19.370 --> 03:30.230]  And they have basically been spending the last four years, according to Vice News, demanding that the federal government cancel Saturday Night Live for being mean to Donald Trump.
[03:31.150 --> 03:33.790]  This has been obtained via the Freedom of Information Act.
[03:33.810 --> 03:38.850]  And it's hosted on Government Addict, which is found at governmentaddict.org.
[03:39.330 --> 03:40.770]  And we're going to read a few of them.
[03:41.150 --> 03:42.670]  Gila, did you have something you wanted to add?
[03:42.670 --> 03:43.010]  I did.
[03:43.030 --> 03:48.570]  I just wanted to confirm if it was Government Addict, like the roof, or Government Addict, like...
[03:48.570 --> 03:48.850]  Oh.
[03:49.050 --> 03:49.310]  ...poked on.
[03:49.430 --> 03:49.670]  I just...
[03:49.670 --> 03:54.130]  Well, you just gave me an idea for a great site for confused people to land on.
[03:54.510 --> 03:55.090]  But it's Addict.
[03:55.470 --> 03:58.210]  It's like the room in your house that you don't talk about.
[03:58.910 --> 03:59.630]  Thank you for the clarification.
[03:59.810 --> 03:59.950]  Yeah.
[04:00.290 --> 04:01.830]  So, here are some quotes.
[04:01.930 --> 04:12.310]  Cancel culture has to be stopped, but you cannot allow on any broadcast a depiction slash insinuation slash outright demonstration of a leader of the United States being assassinated.
[04:12.670 --> 04:18.690]  Wrote one viewer in 2019 after Michael Che delivered a John Wilkes Booth joke during Weekend Update.
[04:18.990 --> 04:20.090]  I remember that joke.
[04:20.270 --> 04:20.930]  It was funny.
[04:21.810 --> 04:24.090]  The, I'm personally all for freedom of speech.
[04:24.470 --> 04:25.070]  Here we go.
[04:25.250 --> 04:32.190]  And if a 33-year-old woman feels that making fun of a 10-year-old boy empowers her and gives her equality, well, I don't agree with it.
[04:32.190 --> 04:35.070]  But if that's what she needs to get her through the night, so be it.
[04:35.690 --> 04:37.370]  I have no idea what they're talking about.
[04:37.570 --> 04:42.850]  I, however, don't need to see this moron or the network, NBC, that's supporting her prosper from it.
[04:43.150 --> 04:51.450]  And considering I now pay for these once-free networks on my cable bill, I would like for you to consider revoking their license or substantially fining them.
[04:51.990 --> 04:53.870]  Okay, I think I know what this is in reference to.
[04:54.030 --> 04:58.390]  There was a writer for SNL that made a joke about Trump's underage son.
[04:59.110 --> 05:00.090]  It was just a joke.
[05:00.250 --> 05:02.050]  It wasn't anything horrible.
[05:02.910 --> 05:04.270]  But kind of off-limits.
[05:04.370 --> 05:05.010]  Kids are off-limits.
[05:05.070 --> 05:06.250]  Yeah, I think we all agree to that.
[05:06.250 --> 05:07.270]  And I think she was fired.
[05:07.290 --> 05:09.550]  So that's really the whole story right there.
[05:09.750 --> 05:10.870]  And it wasn't on air.
[05:11.010 --> 05:12.730]  It was something that was done off-air.
[05:13.230 --> 05:14.010]  Here's another comment.
[05:14.130 --> 05:22.290]  SNL aired a racist statement on their Weekend Update segment calling Trump a bitch and a cracker, which is a highly racist term for whites.
[05:23.950 --> 05:27.330]  Yeah, on behalf of whites, let me just say we are deluged.
[05:27.330 --> 05:29.790]  We are deluged with so many racist attacks.
[05:30.050 --> 05:33.950]  It's just so harmful to us.
[05:34.070 --> 05:38.510]  It's prevented us from doing all the things that we wanted to do over the past thousand or so years.
[05:39.450 --> 05:41.430]  So please, stop being racist to us.
[05:41.910 --> 05:42.250]  Thank you.
[05:43.630 --> 05:47.550]  Continuing here, I find all racism to be highly inappropriate and offensive.
[05:48.150 --> 05:50.510]  Also, calling the president a bitch is not comedy.
[05:50.630 --> 05:51.590]  That should be aired on TV.
[05:51.710 --> 05:53.690]  Apparently, that really rubs some people the wrong way.
[05:54.110 --> 05:55.750]  And here are a couple more.
[05:56.450 --> 06:00.170]  They really latched on to the Michael Che calling the president a cracker.
[06:00.610 --> 06:08.610]  This racial slur is offensive to every non-racist American, regardless of race, ethnicity, or skin color.
[06:09.710 --> 06:11.150]  That's just a fact, apparently.
[06:11.770 --> 06:15.630]  Calling a white man a cracker is the same thing as calling a black man...
[06:15.630 --> 06:17.610]  No, it is not the same thing.
[06:17.610 --> 06:18.850]  And they actually said it, too.
[06:18.850 --> 06:20.210]  Oh, my God.
[06:20.350 --> 06:25.390]  The fact that you would say that shows how clueless so many of us remain.
[06:26.230 --> 06:26.910]  Unbelievable.
[06:27.690 --> 06:40.490]  On the September 30th, 2017 broadcast of Saturday Night Live, during the news report segment, the person used a racial slur cracker in regards to President Trump.
[06:40.490 --> 06:50.590]  This is wholly inappropriate, and I would appreciate a response wherein you detail exactly what will be done regarding punishment to the person that said it and the production company that aired it.
[06:50.730 --> 06:56.770]  They are on a tape delay specifically to be able to catch things like this, and they allowed it to go over the air.
[06:56.950 --> 06:59.070]  This makes them complicit in the act.
[06:59.270 --> 07:00.970]  Thank you, and have a nice day.
[07:03.610 --> 07:05.970]  For some reason, they saved the emphasis to the end there.
[07:07.190 --> 07:07.550]  Yeah.
[07:08.890 --> 07:16.130]  Blatant sexual innuendo to masturbation has completely crossed the line into obscenely disrespectful comments about President Trump.
[07:16.950 --> 07:17.450]  Yeah.
[07:17.630 --> 07:20.210]  If anything came out of the last four years, it's that.
[07:20.810 --> 07:26.150]  Effective immediately, I will boycott all advertisers on NBC and communicate my outrage to each and every one of them.
[07:26.290 --> 07:29.530]  I am also sending this complaint to the FCC for immediate follow-up.
[07:29.530 --> 07:32.410]  This was a complaint to the FCC, so I'm not really sure how that happened.
[07:34.910 --> 07:36.250]  Even comedians... this is a different one.
[07:36.350 --> 07:43.430]  Even comedians such as CNN's use of an SNL skit is being used to insult a president of the United States.
[07:43.430 --> 07:45.270]  That's the most clumsy sentence I think I've ever read.
[07:46.690 --> 07:56.070]  In my younger days, networks and broadcasters feared and followed FCC rules on their content as these rules protected the public from the trash we now have.
[07:56.390 --> 07:59.210]  They were careful not to offend because we have laws.
[08:00.330 --> 08:00.830]  Wow.
[08:02.410 --> 08:04.690]  We can't do this all night, but you can.
[08:04.690 --> 08:07.950]  You can certainly go to governmentaddict.org and read some of those.
[08:08.150 --> 08:10.050]  I'll just finish with this one because it's classic.
[08:10.530 --> 08:15.590]  Another watershed moment that sent people rushing to complain was Jim Carrey's Joe Biden.
[08:16.010 --> 08:17.110]  Yeah, they were upset by that.
[08:17.290 --> 08:19.190]  He used the word goddamn.
[08:20.750 --> 08:21.250]  Goddamn.
[08:25.030 --> 08:28.810]  This really apparently is offensive to some people.
[08:29.250 --> 08:33.490]  NBC ran a Saturday Night Live election special on Monday evening, November 2nd.
[08:33.850 --> 08:37.670]  One of the skits had Jim Carrey playing Joe Biden and Alec Baldwin playing President Trump.
[08:37.670 --> 08:45.230]  It was a funny skit and my wife and I were laughing at some of the lines until Jim Carrey uttered an obscenity by taking the Lord's name in vain.
[08:45.770 --> 08:48.710]  I told my wife that there was no reason for him to use that language.
[08:49.350 --> 08:50.750]  Why did you have to tell your wife?
[08:50.910 --> 08:51.530]  There was no...
[08:51.530 --> 08:52.770]  Can she think for herself?
[08:53.450 --> 08:55.570]  It didn't add anything to the skit.
[08:56.030 --> 09:00.630]  These words are deeply offensive to me and I'm sure that other people of faith feel the same way.
[09:00.850 --> 09:04.070]  And some people of faith did feel the same way and did write in.
[09:05.190 --> 09:05.950]  Here's one more.
[09:06.050 --> 09:07.550]  It was Saturday night.
[09:08.010 --> 09:09.150]  I thought it was Monday night.
[09:09.250 --> 09:11.190]  So they can't even agree on what day it aired.
[09:11.190 --> 09:22.670]  I just got home from my second job and my daughter and I were headed to bed and he said it so loudly and with such emphasis that my daughter looked at me like, what was that?
[09:23.810 --> 09:29.630]  Jim Carrey as Joe Biden saying, goddamn so loud that it startled this girl and she didn't know what it was.
[09:29.730 --> 09:40.230]  I turned off the TV immediately and the next day searched the internet to see if that had created an uproar as I thought it would, but it had not because we're in the 21st century, not the 18th century.
[09:41.290 --> 09:43.550]  I didn't think such words were allowed on TV.
[09:43.730 --> 09:44.750]  Well, you learn something.
[09:44.750 --> 09:46.350]  You learn that they are.
[09:46.770 --> 09:48.830]  Goddamn, goddamn, goddamn, they are.
[09:49.010 --> 09:49.190]  Wow.
[09:50.010 --> 09:51.150]  And radio too.
[09:51.770 --> 09:58.190]  And we're the station that sort of proved which words are and aren't allowed by FCC rules.
[09:58.590 --> 09:59.350]  Go ahead, Rob.
[10:00.170 --> 10:11.430]  Yeah, just speaking as another member of the broadcast media, as, you know, those of us are, you know, if Trump didn't want Saturday Night Live doing things like this, maybe he shouldn't have been such a goddamn cracker.
[10:12.330 --> 10:12.730]  Wow.
[10:13.290 --> 10:14.350]  You didn't say bitch.
[10:14.490 --> 10:15.050]  Well, that's good.
[10:15.250 --> 10:16.930]  That's good for you.
[10:17.010 --> 10:17.490]  Go ahead, Alex.
[10:18.730 --> 10:37.710]  I mean, look, putting aside the merits of the complaints about criticizing this, the poor little supposed billionaire president of the United States, I mean, you have to hand it to these Trump supporters, on the other hand, to actually go through the motions of making an actual FCC complaint.
[10:37.930 --> 10:51.190]  I mean, even though it seems trivial and idiotic, at least it's a form of civic engagement, which is doing a hell of a lot more than posting some kind of quote-unquote hot take on Twitter about this.
[10:51.190 --> 10:56.070]  So, on the other hand, my hat's off to these people for actually going through.
[10:56.150 --> 10:57.030]  Well, hold on a second.
[10:57.910 --> 11:06.930]  You're saying it's better than posting something on Twitter, but it's basically the same thing, because they're going to a web form and simply posting the same words that they probably would have posted on Twitter anyway.
[11:06.930 --> 11:07.950]  I disagree.
[11:08.170 --> 11:08.930]  I don't think it's...
[11:08.930 --> 11:19.630]  I think it's a hell of a lot more involved than going to Twitter and posting some kind of hot take that is just there for retweets or likes or whatever it is.
[11:19.750 --> 11:24.450]  This is something that goes directly over to a government agency and they have to review it.
[11:24.530 --> 11:26.950]  Well, yeah, it does that, but they don't do that.
[11:26.990 --> 11:29.430]  All they do is type the same words into a different form.
[11:29.550 --> 11:34.510]  I mean, yeah, they're doing something by doing that, but they're not writing a letter.
[11:34.650 --> 11:36.470]  They're not going to the post office and mailing something.
[11:36.470 --> 11:38.130]  They're not even calling anybody on the phone.
[11:38.490 --> 11:40.050]  I mean, you know, that's how it works.
[11:40.150 --> 11:40.970]  It's not really their fault.
[11:41.170 --> 11:41.410]  That's...
[11:41.410 --> 11:47.910]  The official channels of the United States government to make a complaint to a federal agency about something that they care about.
[11:48.390 --> 11:52.670]  And frankly, I think more people on the left should be doing this about issues that we care about.
[11:52.830 --> 12:00.730]  If we were as dedicated and less, I think, less obsessed with social media, I think that, you know, maybe we'd get a hell of a lot more done.
[12:00.930 --> 12:03.450]  Well, I'm not sure you're being fair here because we certainly do.
[12:03.650 --> 12:10.090]  Remember, net neutrality, how many comments were filed with the FCC and we found all the fake ones that were filed with the FCC.
[12:10.410 --> 12:13.370]  So certainly a lot of people are engaged and trying.
[12:13.510 --> 12:15.610]  It's just this is the way that people do it these days.
[12:15.870 --> 12:25.750]  And I would, in fact, argue that there's perhaps even a dilution to a degree in some of these being a bit...
[12:25.750 --> 12:45.950]  Well, it's a personal grief, a gripe from an individual viewer, of course, but I think by having such a volume that don't really have something that's sincerely against any kind of FCC guidance, it makes the...
[12:45.950 --> 12:51.410]  It kind of makes the submission just sort of a bit spammy, right?
[12:51.570 --> 12:53.270]  But more in the bureaucratic sense.
[12:53.390 --> 12:54.670]  Do you agree with that, Alex?
[12:54.670 --> 12:55.250]  Or do you think...
[12:55.250 --> 12:55.710]  I don't know.
[12:55.790 --> 13:00.570]  Do you think each of these has really taken that seriously given a large amount of submissions?
[13:00.910 --> 13:02.310]  And likewise on the left, you know?
[13:03.210 --> 13:04.510]  I think you're right.
[13:04.510 --> 13:07.150]  And I agree with it to a certain degree.
[13:07.970 --> 13:13.470]  Because, look, if you overwhelm a federal agency with this non-substant...
[13:13.470 --> 13:23.130]  a mess of these non-substantive complaints that they have to review and assess and respond to if need be, that's a form of denial of service attack, frankly, right?
[13:23.130 --> 13:33.390]  You know, you're preventing the staffers, you're using their resources, you're limiting the ability of that particular federal agency to get other work done with the resources that they have at hand.
[13:33.550 --> 13:34.550]  So, yeah, I agree.
[13:34.670 --> 13:36.350]  I mean, these complaints should be substantive.
[13:36.610 --> 13:39.950]  But I do think, you know, hey, at least they did something.
[13:40.130 --> 13:41.370]  We should hand it over to New Zealand.
[13:41.430 --> 13:42.270]  I'm playing devil's app.
[13:42.350 --> 13:42.570]  Yeah.
[13:42.610 --> 13:43.290]  And I know...
[13:43.290 --> 13:45.450]  Well, I hope the devil's playing you well.
[13:45.450 --> 13:51.890]  The point is, what they're calling for, that is what I wanted to focus on.
[13:52.050 --> 13:53.370]  The fact that they...
[13:53.370 --> 14:01.490]  Because somebody criticizes the president or mocks him or says, you know, a word which is in common usage, they want things shut down.
[14:01.590 --> 14:02.850]  They want things canceled.
[14:03.030 --> 14:04.330]  They want things to go away.
[14:04.690 --> 14:23.390]  And it's very important to identify that kind of mentality that wants basically to control how we speak and how we think because that is unfairly put on the left way too many times that they want to control your kids and what you think and what you say and whether you get a shot and things like that.
[14:23.650 --> 14:31.490]  And it's completely unfair because they are the number one people that do that.
[14:31.870 --> 14:34.350]  They're constantly calling for control.
[14:34.530 --> 14:36.710]  They've had control for so long.
[14:36.850 --> 14:45.250]  And anytime they see something that in any way runs afoul of that, they call for blood in whatever way they can.
[14:45.390 --> 14:45.710]  Go ahead, Rob.
[14:46.870 --> 14:59.230]  We were talking the complaints in here and I'm looking at this file and the complaints in here about what Katie Rich who was the writer on Saturday Night Live who tweeted a joke about Barron Trump and was suspended for it.
[14:59.590 --> 15:23.210]  The fact that they were complaining to the FCC about that reminds me a lot of the story we were talking about I believe it was last week where a school wanted to punish a student for things she was doing outside of school jurisdiction off school grounds just comments she was making on I think Snapchat or whatever it was and you know the FCC has its purpose has its purview but it's kind of
[15:23.210 --> 15:31.010]  fascinating that people saw somebody who works in television do something that they were offended by on Twitter and therefore complain to the FCC.
[15:31.310 --> 15:42.390]  Yeah, I'm not sure how the FCC basically would get involved in a writer saying something that wasn't on the air in the first place that they consider to be you know out of bounds.
[15:42.530 --> 15:42.830]  Go ahead, Gila.
[15:43.250 --> 15:51.410]  No, I absolutely agree but I also elsewhere in the thing I saw my favorite complaint at all which is SNL said the F word please put them in jail.
[15:52.350 --> 15:59.610]  So you know they had like a plan I'm not I think it was everybody they wanted to put everybody in jail was that the plan?
[15:59.810 --> 16:00.850]  I guess the entire show somehow.
[16:00.990 --> 16:16.850]  Everybody but no it's I agree with Rob I think it very much echoes the cheerleader story in that where is the line and absolutely correct that when it's not coming from the left the right's like oh yes why do I have to hear this?
[16:16.990 --> 16:18.830]  I don't want to make it go away.
[16:19.130 --> 16:21.130]  And make everybody else not be able to hear it as well.
[16:21.330 --> 16:31.250]  You know we just found out this week that Trump wanted to execute the person who leaked the information that he his wife and his son went to the bunker during the Black Lives Matter protest in D.C.
[16:31.250 --> 16:53.930]  he wanted to execute somebody for leaking that information when you consider all the other information about him that has been leaked and all the other criticism that has come out against him over the years execution for that that that that mild transgression you have to you have to really get into their minds and realize what a danger they are if you give them this kind of power.
[16:55.610 --> 17:24.650]  all right well that's just an amusing amusing anecdote something to spend some time on here's something else that I think might be a bit problematic you know all these ransomware attacks and intrusions and bad security that we report on week after week well a top lawyer for America's cyber warrior force yeah we have a cyber warrior force it sounds kind of silly but they're calling publicly for
[17:24.650 --> 17:29.630]  military operations against transnational criminal hackers.
[17:30.890 --> 17:36.950]  Kurt Sanger is Marine Lieutenant Colonel serving as General Counsel at U.S.
[17:37.170 --> 17:37.790]  Cyber Command.
[17:37.990 --> 17:43.950]  And that, by the way, is the is the cyber warrior force that we alluded to.
[17:44.830 --> 18:02.830]  In an article published on lawfare.com, that's L-A-W-F-A-R-E dot com, disruptions from ransomware and other criminal hacking threats have become so harmful to national security that using military force against them with lines of code, not bombs and bullets,
[18:03.010 --> 18:05.510]  as weapons is justified and legal.
[18:06.770 --> 18:07.830]  Well, what do you think, Alex?
[18:08.250 --> 18:10.090]  I mean, I don't know what the difference is, really.
[18:10.310 --> 18:16.070]  If it's lines of code, it's a hacking attack, it sounds like.
[18:16.450 --> 18:17.970]  What makes it a military hacking?
[18:18.130 --> 18:21.070]  Because the military are the ones hacking their systems?
[18:21.490 --> 18:31.710]  And how far are we from them saying, you know what, forget the code, let's go back to the bombs and bullets, because that's not working, and we have to show real force?
[18:31.710 --> 18:56.450]  Well, I think what Lieutenant Colonel Sanger is driving at when he's suggesting lines of code rather than kinetic force is the principle of proportionality, because if we are to consider a ransomware event or some kind of influence operation or a breach of,
[18:56.530 --> 19:05.210]  let's say, critical infrastructures as networks, some form of some form of active war, then we can only respond to that in a proportional manner.
[19:05.410 --> 19:10.910]  You know, these are essentially international norms that apply to the law of warfare.
[19:11.150 --> 19:15.050]  This is something I spent some time studying many years back.
[19:15.190 --> 19:26.150]  And so, if we're responding with lines of code to essentially lines of code that would arguably be proportional based on whatever the actual response was.
[19:26.150 --> 19:33.070]  But this kind of thing has been, this idea, rather, has been swirling around for quite a while.
[19:33.410 --> 19:45.770]  Back in, God, I think it was 11 years ago, I gave a talk at St. Mary's University at the Center for Terrorism Law on what's known as active defense, or essentially hacking back, right?
[19:45.770 --> 19:54.050]  Taking these proactive stances and hacking back, and 11 years ago, I argued that this was a bad idea.
[19:54.270 --> 19:57.630]  I think it's still necessarily a bad idea.
[19:57.630 --> 20:19.030]  And if we are to respond militarily, even with lines of code to some kind of ransomware event, I think we have to be damn sure, you know, from an intelligence and a military perspective that this was an act that was sponsored, or sanctioned, or in some way,
[20:19.190 --> 20:31.810]  associated officially with a foreign government intended to disrupt the United States' critical infrastructure, or some kind of critical service or function that could affect lives, that could affect people physically.
[20:32.350 --> 20:44.950]  Because there are so many influence operations or so many ransomware events that they may be, the states may turn a blind eye to these, or they may be acting in a way that could be seen to benefit one particular state.
[20:44.950 --> 21:03.410]  But without direct evidence tying us to an official action of, let's say, a government minister or department or an agency of a foreign power, I think it's very, very dangerous for us to venture down this road, because based on that same principle of proportionality,
[21:03.570 --> 21:06.530]  this very same thing could be done to us in the future.
[21:06.530 --> 21:10.970]  And we are not only, I'm sorry, we're not, we're not just a victim here.
[21:11.130 --> 21:14.130]  Let's think about the United States as sometimes as an aggressor.
[21:14.250 --> 21:17.330]  These are things that are not reported or very often caught.
[21:17.590 --> 21:23.070]  But, you know, we have our own very effective, offensive cyber operations.
[21:23.430 --> 21:30.410]  And we certainly would not want to start this kind of tit for tat between government agencies of foreign power.
[21:30.410 --> 21:32.090]  Well, I agree with what you say.
[21:32.130 --> 21:42.390]  But I wonder, the way these stories are being reported every single day, we always hear it's it's coming from Russia, it's coming from China, it's coming from Iran, even North Korea.
[21:42.750 --> 21:55.070]  Are we not already going down that road of attaching blame, whether it's through the media, through the military, and the only thing absent now is what the appropriate retaliation is?
[21:55.070 --> 22:06.290]  You know, it seems to me that a lot of this data can be faked, and it can be, it can appear to be coming from one place when it's coming from another, or one state can can implicate a different state.
[22:06.950 --> 22:10.890]  And there are many ways to, to get fooled in this environment.
[22:11.750 --> 22:13.370]  Oh, I completely agree with that.
[22:13.450 --> 22:25.490]  And entirely, especially since, you know, the TTPs of one nation, you know, may be very, very well known that TTP stands for the tactics, techniques and procedures of one nation, you know, can be easily imitated by another nation.
[22:25.490 --> 22:31.650]  And so this just, I think, really gets to the issue of, of attribution, and where it's important, right?
[22:31.770 --> 22:35.410]  Now, it's an attribution of who's doing what is extraordinarily important.
[22:35.410 --> 22:46.490]  If you're telling a story, if you are the media, you want to have some kind of attribution that, let's say, North Korea was behind this, or this originates from Ukraine, because otherwise, you don't really have a story.
[22:46.490 --> 22:57.390]  It's very hard to report on cyber security issues without having some form of attribution, which leads, unfortunately, in my opinion, to some less than stellar attribution.
[22:57.490 --> 23:11.390]  And that can be extraordinarily dangerous, because if it's not based on hard evidence, and it's based on, let's say, flimsy TTPs that can be imitated by another country, and that can essentially be a false flag, you know, yes, then we're going down this road,
[23:11.570 --> 23:22.610]  where we may, in our minds, be convinced that, let's say, North Korea is being behind us when, in fact, who knows, maybe it was Thailand, or another, you know, Asian country.
[23:23.110 --> 23:24.930]  And so, yeah, I think, I think it's dangerous.
[23:25.110 --> 23:30.370]  It's also very dangerous, I think, to consider these things too easily to be acts of war.
[23:31.390 --> 23:51.530]  Well, the fact that it's been more overt, I think, is a key takeaway or aspect of this, that there's more talk of it, it perhaps is something that has been investigated, and things may have been strategized, and so forth, in a much quieter sense, but there has been this,
[23:51.530 --> 23:58.850]  like, geopolitical sort of posturing, in, in rhetoric.
[23:59.190 --> 24:30.750]  I do think, speaking to your proportionality, comment, there's a little bit of uncertainty, I think, and, sort of cascading impacts when things are deployed as a weapon, including blowback, people using the same tools, and, you know, finding out about how your offensive capabilities are operating.
[24:31.070 --> 24:37.410]  So that, I think, also speaks to it being more of this sort of, in, in the rhetoric.
[24:38.410 --> 24:49.550]  And, and, of course, the effects of it, I don't know, I mean, do we want to continue to escalate in cyberspace?
[24:49.790 --> 24:56.830]  Because, yeah, there's responding, but, you know, is continuing down that?
[24:56.830 --> 25:03.550]  path, the real, the real, the real kind of solution versus increasing security or awareness?
[25:03.730 --> 25:07.130]  I mean, I think all of those things are going on simultaneously, too.
[25:07.490 --> 25:25.710]  Well, increasing security, obviously, is the most important thing, because, you know, if, if, if you attack Russia for some reason, because you, because somebody from Russia let ransomware loose on a critical server, you're not necessarily attacking the right people.
[25:25.710 --> 25:26.950]  There are a lot of people in Russia.
[25:27.070 --> 25:31.470]  You don't know that everybody united together and decided to do this against this particular entity.
[25:32.030 --> 25:36.170]  And in the end, you still have an insecure system.
[25:36.170 --> 25:37.210]  You haven't fixed it.
[25:37.850 --> 25:42.410]  That is the most important thing, to be able to prevent this from happening in the first place.
[25:42.490 --> 25:43.230]  Have we given up?
[25:43.310 --> 25:49.050]  Have we said that it's not possible to stop ransomware, to stop these people from getting access to our critical servers?
[25:49.070 --> 25:51.750]  Because what if they didn't unleash ransomware?
[25:51.850 --> 25:54.930]  What if they just nestled in and observed?
[25:55.270 --> 25:56.870]  Wouldn't that be a whole lot more dangerous?
[25:56.990 --> 25:58.670]  We wouldn't know who was in there.
[25:59.050 --> 26:03.030]  And they have access to all this information for years, decades, even.
[26:03.030 --> 26:05.710]  And, um, it's kind of a wake up call.
[26:05.810 --> 26:07.130]  You know, I'm not saying it's a good thing.
[26:07.170 --> 26:15.030]  Um, it's not like, uh, benevolent hackers that basically uncover, um, uh, certain security holes and let the world know about them.
[26:15.450 --> 26:18.050]  This obviously it's, it's, it's, it's profit driven.
[26:18.050 --> 26:24.570]  Uh, but at least, you know, that you've got a problem and, uh, hopefully we'll do something about it.
[26:24.810 --> 26:25.570]  Go ahead, Alex.
[26:26.150 --> 26:26.510]  Yeah.
[26:26.710 --> 26:36.970]  I mean, look, I think you hit on a really important topic here too, which is that in not, in not every instance of a breach is ransomware deployed on a network.
[26:37.130 --> 26:39.770]  I mean, this is something that happens, uh, frequently.
[26:40.070 --> 26:44.770]  And I think, uh, and, and I've argued publicly that I think it's going to happen more frequently in the short term.
[26:44.890 --> 26:46.530]  Things are going to get worse before they get better.
[26:46.530 --> 26:50.810]  But what you described, Emmanuel is essentially a form of persistence.
[26:50.810 --> 26:59.130]  If an adversary, some kind of cyber adversary obtains access to, uh, a network, let's say it's a company's network and organization's network.
[26:59.310 --> 27:01.690]  And they sit there and they wait, they establish persistence.
[27:01.850 --> 27:02.690]  They move around laterally.
[27:02.790 --> 27:03.630]  They're collecting information.
[27:03.630 --> 27:08.710]  That's essentially an intelligence gathering operation that happens more often than not.
[27:08.710 --> 27:10.170]  And ransomware.
[27:10.170 --> 27:18.930]  And ransomware we've seen, especially within the last year or so can be deployed essentially as an anti-forensic tool.
[27:19.190 --> 27:27.030]  So that let's say this adversary is discovered in a company's network and they want to burn traces of whatever their activities are.
[27:27.210 --> 27:32.350]  You know, they want to prevent the company from trying to figure out what they've been touching, what they've been doing.
[27:32.350 --> 27:45.270]  And deploying ransomware in that particular instance, uh, is a, is a really effective way to distract from whatever their activities were and potentially destroy a lot of the evidence of the files that they read and touched.
[27:45.630 --> 27:50.690]  So ransomware can happen in the wake of, let's say, an intelligence gathering operation.
[27:50.970 --> 27:55.750]  Um, and bringing it back, I think, to the, to the article here with Lieutenant Colonel Sang, right.
[27:55.750 --> 28:08.910]  You know, you know, on the other hand, in some instances, I think, um, cyber operations are certainly justified in response, but it has to be on the basis of extraordinarily clear evidence.
[28:09.130 --> 28:16.650]  I don't always believe that, uh, restraint is, is, is the, is the best option of the United States.
[28:16.650 --> 28:26.290]  But what I think we need to get away from, especially when it comes to countries like Russia, we want to deter foreign actors, uh, and they may not be state actors.
[28:26.430 --> 28:34.750]  These are very often criminal organizations that are sanctioned by a particular state that may have, uh, the unintended consequence of harming U.S.
[28:34.890 --> 28:37.170]  interests, which helps, let's say, Russian interests.
[28:37.170 --> 28:43.070]  To the extent that we are made to look silly and weak when it comes to cyber operations, that helps the Russians.
[28:43.250 --> 28:55.930]  And it also gives them a reputation boost in allowing the rest of the world to think that they are so effective when it comes to something like misinformation, disinformation, as well as, as compromising other systems.
[28:56.110 --> 29:00.830]  But couldn't it also be criminal organizations within those countries that don't really care about those countries, but only themselves?
[29:01.850 --> 29:02.370]  Absolutely.
[29:02.670 --> 29:11.190]  And so long as they're leaving their countries of origin alone, their governments will often turn a blind eye and refuse to prosecute them for those particular activities.
[29:11.350 --> 29:26.430]  That's why you see a lot of ransomware checking, uh, native language settings so that, you know, if, if, uh, your character sets are in Cyrillic or your language is Russian, it won't deploy ransomware, which, you know, gives rise to the, uh, you know,
[29:26.690 --> 29:35.570]  the, the, the, the, the option of, you know, Hey, if you want to try to prevent the deployment of certain types of ransomware, just set your language setting to Cyrillic.
[29:35.610 --> 29:36.730]  I never heard that before.
[29:36.870 --> 29:38.110]  That's, that's, that's really clever.
[29:38.670 --> 29:39.150]  Yeah.
[29:39.290 --> 29:57.050]  I'm curious also if, um, we mean, we need to be so formal because if the proportional response is sort of doing what they're doing to us, well, shouldn't criminal hacking gangs from, uh, uh, America be activated and, uh, out there, uh, doing their, um,
[29:57.610 --> 30:05.890]  wild, uh, uh, best to, uh, cause all kinds of havoc, you know, as, as there are no criminal hacking gangs in the United States.
[30:06.030 --> 30:06.850]  It is not a problem here.
[30:07.910 --> 30:10.050]  Oh, I forgot about that speech.
[30:10.710 --> 30:11.570]  Not a speech.
[30:12.650 --> 30:13.170]  Continue.
[30:14.890 --> 30:26.690]  But, you know, when it comes to, to trying to deter this type of activity, you know, um, a colleague of mine, uh, with whom I clerked, actually, Matt Rajansky wrote an interesting article about this.
[30:26.770 --> 30:34.510]  And he's, he is a, a Russian diplomacy expert and that he had, he had argued essentially that under the table.
[30:34.670 --> 30:49.710]  And I think softer diplomacy with Russia, as I understand his argument to be, is much more effective, uh, at trying to change behaviors of the Russian state than being so overt and doing something on social media and setting these bright lines in the sand.
[30:49.710 --> 31:01.350]  Because if we try to embarrass Russia, that's only going to embolden Putin and, and other Russian ministers to be seen even more as a strong man in a particular situation.
[31:01.350 --> 31:07.890]  So the more we try to embarrass them, the more lines we draw in the sand, the more likely they are to cross those particular lines.
[31:07.890 --> 31:22.270]  And, and, and that under the table diplomacy, where we don't necessarily try to embarrass the Russian state or claim that there's going to be major consequences, you know, if they continue to do this, that, or the other thing would arguably be more effective.
[31:22.410 --> 31:25.230]  Well, Alex, what you describe is true of almost any conflict.
[31:25.230 --> 31:30.310]  Uh, if you, if you dig your heels in and try to embarrass somebody, they're going to do the same.
[31:31.210 --> 31:34.090]  Diplomacy tends to yield more positive results.
[31:34.090 --> 31:47.490]  And, um, my, my only point was that, um, if you sort of create it as a, a nationalistic, uh, fight, this sort of adversarial thing, you will get vigilantism in, in certain ways.
[31:47.830 --> 31:57.650]  And, um, it's a little, I, along the lines of how you're saying, yeah, you think maybe not always the response is, uh, restraint and, and quiet.
[31:58.070 --> 32:02.710]  Um, I feel, I feel like a lot of what we've covered over my whole life.
[32:02.870 --> 32:12.050]  I mean, just the, the whole history of it is, you know, doing this thing is, is going to get you in trouble or, oh, the, the big corporate entity is going to be mad at you.
[32:12.050 --> 32:14.830]  And now it's being weaponized.
[32:15.450 --> 32:31.250]  So, like, these skills, these interests, these, I don't know, obsessions, all of a sudden have this, like, strategic value, something that people were told is, like, oh, that'll get you in trouble or you have to be careful or all these things we warn and,
[32:31.250 --> 32:35.950]  and try to encourage and, and keep, uh, people out of trouble.
[32:35.950 --> 32:55.350]  And, and, and telling them, you know, about being curious, about figuring out systems, about reporting things, that whole wave of, of responsibility, I feel, is whole, is entirely more responsible than sort of this recklessness and talking about it as something that we can be proportional about.
[32:55.350 --> 33:10.250]  I mean, there are unforeseen impacts, and when you're talking about different systems and complex systems, I don't know, that combined with a sort of nationalistic vigilantism in the air could, could lead to some, some unforeseen consequences.
[33:10.250 --> 33:27.970]  By the way, and something that might be related to all this, according to the New York Times, websites on the dark web used by a hacker, a criminal hacking group in Russia, known as Revil, I believe is the way to pronounce it, used by them to negotiate payment with victims and provide customer support for people trying to transfer Bitcoins to the criminals.
[33:28.610 --> 33:30.790]  They went dark early yesterday morning.
[33:31.030 --> 33:32.530]  They just went away.
[33:32.890 --> 33:35.290]  So, hey, maybe diplomacy is working.
[33:35.510 --> 33:37.790]  Maybe Russia is cracking down.
[33:37.810 --> 33:41.030]  If, if they are, in fact, in Russia, maybe something like that is, is happening.
[33:41.090 --> 33:46.250]  Of course, I don't know what happens to the people who are in the middle of trying to negotiate to get their, their data back.
[33:46.810 --> 33:49.370]  But interesting, interesting development.
[33:49.510 --> 33:50.390]  Did you hear about that, Alex?
[33:51.030 --> 33:53.030]  Yeah, I did hear about it.
[33:53.190 --> 33:54.810]  I mean, look, it could be any number of things.
[33:54.990 --> 34:03.030]  I don't think anybody has pinpointed exactly what happened to Revil or R-Evil or however the hell you say this particular criminal organization's name.
[34:03.330 --> 34:04.930]  But it could be any number of things.
[34:05.090 --> 34:15.970]  It could be some kind of strategic pinpoint, offensive, hacking back strike that Lieutenant Colonel Sanger has been espousing in his lawfare article.
[34:16.510 --> 34:37.870]  But look, if it was one of these things, I think, you know, going back to that, that article, what, what it fails to appreciate as well is that if we are going to be fighting back with lines of code and exploits, well, these types of exploits, especially zero day exploits that are unreported or unknown,
[34:37.870 --> 34:45.870]  if we can, if we use these up to fight back every kind of ransomware event, we're going to burn through them really, really quickly.
[34:46.050 --> 34:59.690]  I mean, these are extremely valuable exploits and vulnerabilities that we can use over long periods of time to collect extraordinarily valuable intelligence of the exact sort that you had just mentioned, Emmanuel, of sitting and waiting and watching data flows,
[34:59.990 --> 35:09.630]  you know, sniffing out traffic on network, doing whatever the hell we want to do on an adversary's network, if we can maintain persistence in there through, but we shouldn't be burning through these zero days.
[35:09.630 --> 35:16.390]  I think it really fails to appreciate the scarcity with which these, quote-unquote, cyber weapons are developed.
[35:16.710 --> 35:20.750]  Yeah, sometimes the wisest move in a card game is to not show your hand.
[35:21.430 --> 35:24.990]  Actually, what card game is that where you don't show your hand?
[35:25.690 --> 35:28.570]  I'm sure there's a strategy that somebody uses somewhere, but...
[35:28.570 --> 35:29.910]  You mean where you do or you don't?
[35:29.970 --> 35:30.430]  You don't.
[35:30.490 --> 35:31.550]  You hold on to it.
[35:31.630 --> 35:34.490]  Well, you save it for a special occasion, which I think is what you're saying.
[35:35.110 --> 35:36.290]  Yeah, maybe go fish?
[35:36.570 --> 35:37.230]  I don't.
[35:37.250 --> 35:37.910]  I don't play cards.
[35:37.970 --> 35:38.270]  I don't know.
[35:38.270 --> 35:48.570]  But, yeah, you know, we're talking about retribution of an equal sort, but there are people who want to take an actual military response.
[35:48.830 --> 35:52.530]  Many of them are the same people that complained to the FCC over SNL.
[35:53.250 --> 35:57.570]  They want to nuke the bastards for taking down their website or something like that.
[35:57.570 --> 36:04.910]  And, you know, we see that kind of disproportionate response in many parts of our average lives.
[36:05.070 --> 36:11.250]  But, you know, video games is another avenue where there's all kinds of abuse.
[36:11.470 --> 36:17.730]  Recently, there's a game called Warzone, which, as predicted, causes all kinds of conflicts.
[36:17.730 --> 36:30.890]  Warzone players are reporting a very odd glitch or hack this week, which is causing them to instantly reach account level 1,000 and have all their skins and calling cards unlocked.
[36:31.190 --> 36:32.290]  They have calling cards in this game.
[36:32.950 --> 36:37.090]  Yeah, the hack appears to take place inside particular hacked lobbies.
[36:37.670 --> 36:38.190]  Okay.
[36:38.370 --> 36:46.430]  Some have surmised that the level 1,000 jump takes place when you kill a cheater inside the hacked lobby, though this fact has not been confirmed yet.
[36:46.610 --> 36:53.930]  I don't know if the cheater is part of the game or is that somebody who hacked the game and you somehow figured it out and somehow killed him.
[36:54.270 --> 37:00.150]  The entire situation is reminiscent of old school hacked lobbies on consoles during the Modern Warfare 2 era.
[37:00.970 --> 37:03.130]  You realize there's a whole universe out there.
[37:03.330 --> 37:05.510]  There's a Modern Warfare 2 era.
[37:05.670 --> 37:08.970]  I have no idea what I'm talking about, but there are people who... you know about this?
[37:09.030 --> 37:09.690]  It's a video game.
[37:09.690 --> 37:14.270]  I'm sure it is a video game, but there are people who measure time based on that era.
[37:14.410 --> 37:16.910]  It's not World War 1, World War 2, you know.
[37:17.050 --> 37:18.510]  No, it's Modern Warfare 2.
[37:18.590 --> 37:19.450]  That's how they live their lives.
[37:19.470 --> 37:20.330]  There's Gears of War.
[37:30.150 --> 37:37.970]  particular hacks and basic foul-ups of video games and virtual worlds.
[37:38.130 --> 37:44.890]  There are people who get very incensed and want to fight back and sometimes want to fight back for real.
[37:45.270 --> 37:49.870]  I mean, you know, we've seen people get kicked out of IRC channels who threaten all sorts of vengeance.
[37:50.170 --> 37:55.110]  You know, at some point we have to realize, hey, this is just a game.
[37:55.370 --> 37:57.310]  This is just a computer.
[37:57.830 --> 37:59.350]  This is reality.
[37:59.350 --> 38:00.710]  This is real life.
[38:00.830 --> 38:06.930]  Let's not cross over too easily between all of this without understanding what it is exactly that we're dealing with.
[38:07.070 --> 38:09.150]  And let's try to understand as much of it as possible.
[38:09.470 --> 38:10.990]  I should know more about video games.
[38:11.090 --> 38:12.390]  I will be the first to say that.
[38:13.270 --> 38:16.350]  My education on that is woefully pathetic.
[38:16.910 --> 38:22.490]  But I do know the difference between the virtual world and the real world.
[38:22.550 --> 38:29.210]  And I think, you know, once we establish that, we might be able to appreciate and understand each of those environments.
[38:29.210 --> 38:30.290]  rather than dismiss them.
[38:30.330 --> 38:31.450]  Does that make any sense?
[38:33.490 --> 38:34.990]  Nobody thinks it makes any sense?
[38:36.190 --> 38:37.510]  You're all nodding your heads.
[38:37.630 --> 38:38.930]  People on the radio can't see that.
[38:38.930 --> 38:38.990]  Yes.
[38:39.610 --> 38:41.710]  It makes its own kind of sense.
[38:41.890 --> 38:45.410]  It's like, I was, I'm, I'm a big fan of Doctor Who.
[38:45.610 --> 38:46.390]  It's a television show.
[38:46.650 --> 38:58.410]  And just today, there was a there was a post on a forum that went by me about how somebody, like has had it with the drama in the fandom online and forums and message boards and things so much that they can't enjoy the actual show anymore.
[38:58.910 --> 39:09.030]  And you know, when when internet drama is interfering with your ability to sit down and watch television and have a good time, maybe it's time to have more of a separation between what's going on the conversation between what's going on on the internet and in real life.
[39:09.250 --> 39:11.210]  Why don't people just sit down and watch television?
[39:11.210 --> 39:12.970]  Why do they need to get on the internet?
[39:13.310 --> 39:18.290]  And, and, you know, I know we want to be social and all that, but if it's not causing you joy, why do it?
[39:18.990 --> 39:28.310]  You know, just just make it a private activity that you enjoy with yourself or friends or, you know, a trusted few, but you're always going to find idiots in any scenario.
[39:28.370 --> 39:31.670]  So, uh, I wouldn't give them that power.
[39:34.740 --> 39:35.420]  Yep.
[39:35.820 --> 39:36.260]  Okay.
[39:36.900 --> 39:57.540]  I just think you're speaking as well to like this, um, handing it over to the handing over breaches and some of this stuff so quickly over to, uh, the military handling it because they're well equipped to escalate and into weapons and things that ordinary security companies or software makers don't have access to.
[39:57.720 --> 40:12.160]  So who decides when things need to become, um, uh, uh, uh, out of the realm of that warfare, I think if they're making, if they're calling all the shots, cause we're trusting them on in every little way, I think that's foolish.
[40:12.300 --> 40:13.260]  You know, it speaks to.
[40:13.900 --> 40:28.620]  It's, you know, a microcosm, uh, you know, us as individuals, you know, you get kicked out of a chat room or defriended by somebody and, and, and your reaction is to, you know, uh, attack the school that did it or somebody in the school that did it, you know,
[40:28.740 --> 40:29.040]  physically.
[40:29.680 --> 40:38.420]  That is the unhealthy society that we live in now, where we take these, um, disproportionate reactions, uh, to fairly trivial events.
[40:38.560 --> 40:46.540]  What I consider to be very, but I, I, I know that people take them very seriously, but there is a point where you have to say, okay, got to calm down a little bit.
[40:46.640 --> 40:50.820]  Got to put this in perspective and do something else for a little while, Alex.
[40:51.900 --> 40:52.380]  Yeah.
[40:52.620 --> 40:57.840]  I mean, look, I, I think that, yeah, everything needs to be put into perspective for sure.
[40:57.920 --> 41:07.860]  But if there's going to be some kind of kinetic response, I think there could possibly be a situation where there's a kinetic response to something that happens in quote unquote cyberspace.
[41:08.440 --> 41:18.640]  That's, that's certainly possible given how vulnerable critical infrastructure is and, and, and how it can affect the physical health and safety of, of, of, of real human beings.
[41:19.360 --> 41:35.760]  But if there is to be any kind of kinetic response, we, I don't think we can simply just hand this over to the military, who's, seems to be, you know, having, having a bit of an itchy trigger finger to use some of these offensive cyber operations that are in their arsenal,
[41:35.980 --> 41:42.360]  because anything that we do is going to be precedent setting for every other nation on this planet.
[41:42.360 --> 41:42.600]  Right.
[41:42.900 --> 42:00.140]  And we need to very, very well document the rationale, the evidence, the reasons, the proportionality, and I think our intended consequences of whatever our response is to a particular cyber attack or a cyber related event.
[42:00.140 --> 42:12.220]  Because that's going to be used to justify operations and actions between every other single country whenever anything similar happens, which will be on a daily basis for the foreseeable future.
[42:12.520 --> 42:22.200]  And especially when things like attribution are already murky in this, you don't want to be like having a trust in people that might be manufacturing it or that it isn't verified and totally known.
[42:23.060 --> 42:27.540]  Okay, I want to move on to another story, because this will likely take us to the end of the hour.
[42:27.960 --> 42:36.640]  And again, you can join us on our YouTube channel, channel 2600 at eight o'clock for off the hook overtime, where you can call us and communicate with us.
[42:37.100 --> 42:38.460]  We are not on next week.
[42:38.600 --> 42:41.960]  So this is your last chance for a couple of weeks to be able to do that.
[42:42.700 --> 42:44.160]  Okay, so this story is interesting.
[42:44.520 --> 42:56.040]  A hacker working for a security firm got the shock of their life last month when they stumbled across what appeared to be a Middlebury College employee's stash of child pornography while hunting for vulnerable computers.
[42:56.060 --> 43:03.700]  It's not clear from this if they were working for the security firm when they hacked into the system or whether they were freelancing.
[43:04.280 --> 43:06.620]  I'm also not sure where Middlebury College is.
[43:06.660 --> 43:08.240]  Anybody know where Middlebury College is?
[43:08.620 --> 43:09.320]  You do, Alex?
[43:09.480 --> 43:11.280]  Yeah, that's in Vermont.
[43:11.380 --> 43:12.060]  It's in the 802.
[43:13.740 --> 43:14.920]  That's where our phone number is.
[43:14.960 --> 43:15.680]  Wow, that's kind of funny.
[43:15.680 --> 43:31.180]  Anyway, the hacker was faced with a moral quandary about law enforcement or alert law enforcement to their findings and risk criminal charges for hacking or say nothing and live with a guilty conscience, knowing a possible child abuser is on the prowl.
[43:32.300 --> 43:43.120]  So they found a picture of the alleged voyeur's driver's license on his computer, and they decided to take a chance with law enforcement and turn the man in.
[43:43.120 --> 43:45.360]  That's according to an affidavit obtained by the Daily Beast.
[43:45.680 --> 43:51.420]  By so doing, the hacker revealed they had broken into the computer and had likely violated the law, but the gamble paid off.
[43:51.860 --> 44:07.060]  Prosecutors eventually offered the hacker immunity for their cooperation, and the alleged voyeur, who was a senior technology specialist, apparently not good enough, from Middlebury College in Vermont, and yes, you're right, Alex, was arrested for possessing child porn.
[44:07.060 --> 44:13.960]  And the court documents do not identify the security researcher whose involvement is somewhat convoluted.
[44:14.260 --> 44:28.540]  Upon finding the explicit images, the hacker who was hunting for machines vulnerable to a specific kind of flaw as part of their work with a security research group, so I guess that answers my question, established backdoor access to the computer before handing off the case to law enforcement.
[44:28.540 --> 44:39.060]  They claim they did so out of a fear that law enforcement officials might not be able to properly investigate the child pornography if they lost access to the trove of pornographic files.
[44:39.260 --> 44:50.180]  Then the hacker submitted a report to the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children that they observed the suspect communicating with a young girl named Jeannie over a Tor network.
[44:50.380 --> 45:00.740]  The researcher told the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children and they suspected the person was either sharing explicit images with Jeannie or in a relationship with her.
[45:01.100 --> 45:01.840]  Okay, interesting story.
[45:02.100 --> 45:06.160]  Do you think this hacker did the right thing?
[45:06.300 --> 45:09.480]  Are we comfortable with this kind of...
[45:10.060 --> 45:14.920]  I guess it is a form of surveillance in the fact that somebody can access your computer.
[45:14.920 --> 45:17.280]  I'm not sure if it's an office computer or a home computer.
[45:17.400 --> 45:19.920]  I'm suspecting it's something that was part of the university.
[45:19.920 --> 45:29.560]  But basically, looking at your files, seeing something that is not acceptable and reporting you for it.
[45:30.120 --> 45:31.780]  Alex, does it stand up legally?
[45:32.720 --> 45:38.440]  I mean, I think, yeah, legally it'll stand up for sure.
[45:38.660 --> 45:54.820]  And the really tricky thing is this hacker, this person reporting it, obviously could get themselves in trouble, negotiated some form of immunity in order for, I think, the report to be taken as evidence.
[45:55.300 --> 46:03.600]  And this is, I think, a really interesting complement to the last issue that we were discussing because this is a form of active measure here, right?
[46:03.600 --> 46:15.200]  This is about going and crossing that line, using some kind of offensive technique, establishing backdoor access to an individual's computer and reporting that individual to law enforcement.
[46:15.480 --> 46:18.680]  I mean, look, it's definitely crossing the line.
[46:18.680 --> 46:32.720]  But here, especially when we're talking about children and the exploitation of children, the act of dissemination of child pornography, there seems to have been a moral imperative to act in one way or another.
[46:32.720 --> 46:47.360]  Now, I think what's interesting to me about this story, though, is why the reporter, why the hacker, the security researcher, whatever we want to call him, had to do it without any kind of anonymity.
[46:47.540 --> 46:56.220]  Why couldn't he simply report that at this IP address or on this network, there is a particular machine that contains child pornography?
[46:57.240 --> 47:03.940]  And leave it at that without having his or her name associated with it or his company's name associated with it.
[47:04.080 --> 47:17.440]  And I think it was because that this hacker felt, again, this very strong moral imperative to preserve the evidence by establishing that backdoor and thereby may have created evidence that led back to himself or herself.
[47:17.640 --> 47:27.360]  Well, if I had to guess, I'd say that they probably felt that it would be ignored or just glossed over in some way, you know, avoid a scandal at all costs, wanted to make sure that something actually happened.
[47:27.460 --> 47:32.280]  But my question is, is this an acceptable way to go about something like that?
[47:32.460 --> 47:38.460]  Seeing that he, you know, the suspect was that he was communicating with somebody who I assume was underage.
[47:38.520 --> 47:42.940]  I didn't say that, but if that is the case, obviously that is of major concern.
[47:43.260 --> 47:57.220]  Over a tour network, which I imagine most people think would be secure, this is evidence that it is not, and that you can definitely be caught doing something on tour it if people with technical knowledge happen to be looking over your shoulder.
[47:57.220 --> 48:03.040]  Are we comfortable, though, knowing that our system might be accessed by somebody?
[48:03.200 --> 48:04.800]  And maybe it's not child pornography.
[48:04.800 --> 48:08.540]  Maybe it's some anti-government propaganda or something like that.
[48:08.660 --> 48:10.480]  Maybe this person's working for a government.
[48:10.480 --> 48:28.540]  You know, with this kind of access, with this kind of follow-up, it seems that we could be under a different sort of surveillance where, you know, our moral high ground is being judged constantly.
[48:29.620 --> 48:30.440]  I don't know.
[48:30.580 --> 48:36.000]  There's something here that just makes me feel like this could be misused down the road.
[48:36.100 --> 48:36.240]  Rob?
[48:36.980 --> 48:41.120]  It could definitely be misused, but it's also like any skill set in the hacker toolkit.
[48:41.360 --> 48:43.840]  And I think it's a very hacker thing to do.
[48:43.960 --> 48:45.520]  It's a very hacker mindset thing to do.
[48:46.080 --> 49:01.240]  If you're using the tools available to you and you see something you want to accomplish, in this case, turning in somebody who seems to be exploiting children, then I think going ahead and using your skills to do that and finding ways to do that while protecting yourself.
[49:01.920 --> 49:07.780]  This person, like, took the initiative and reported it and so on and negotiated their immunity.
[49:07.800 --> 49:09.520]  I think it's a very hacker thing to do.
[49:09.600 --> 49:14.180]  You don't have to put on a Batman suit to, you know, get a little vigilante-ing done if you think it's the right thing to do.
[49:14.220 --> 49:16.080]  Well, it happened in the very first episode of Mr. Robot.
[49:16.180 --> 49:18.180]  So, yeah, it is a very hacker thing to do.
[49:18.180 --> 49:27.740]  But it's also a very hacker thing to question everything and to say, well, is it possible to, say, plant something on someone's computer and then make that report?
[49:28.020 --> 49:34.800]  You know, somebody with the right skills can make you seem guilty of almost anything if, you know, if they have an agenda.
[49:34.800 --> 49:37.140]  And we certainly have seen people with agendas in the past.
[49:37.380 --> 49:37.520]  Kyle?
[49:37.940 --> 49:42.600]  I think that's what you're hitting on is this sense of vigilantism.
[49:42.600 --> 49:44.140]  The same thing I was saying earlier.
[49:44.140 --> 49:51.320]  Like, oh, well, you know, we're potentially at some kind of conflict with this country or these countries or all the countries.
[49:51.320 --> 49:56.060]  And so, therefore, I can just go and act nationalistically.
[49:56.280 --> 50:00.620]  Or in this case, well, you know, everybody probably has...
[50:00.620 --> 50:04.220]  I need to check everybody's computers and all the phones.
[50:04.480 --> 50:07.440]  Me, personally, because I take an interest in this kind of thing.
[50:07.520 --> 50:08.220]  I have the skills.
[50:08.400 --> 50:11.720]  So I just want to make sure no one has this on their phone.
[50:11.720 --> 50:12.820]  It'll only take a moment.
[50:12.820 --> 50:14.820]  When I'm done, we'll know.
[50:15.900 --> 50:16.240]  Yeah.
[50:16.440 --> 50:25.060]  And the other thing that concerns me are conspiracy theorists that believe that there's child exploitation happening everywhere and use that as a vehicle to get...
[50:25.060 --> 50:26.060]  I'm thinking QAnon.
[50:26.180 --> 50:26.860]  I'm thinking Pizzagate.
[50:27.540 --> 50:32.620]  You know, people like that, imagine, with technical ability that say, yeah, there's proof.
[50:32.620 --> 50:33.280]  Here it is.
[50:33.380 --> 50:34.260]  I'll just put it on here.
[50:34.760 --> 50:37.240]  You know, we have to be very careful going down this road.
[50:37.480 --> 50:38.540]  Alex, I'll let you have the last word.
[50:39.140 --> 50:39.520]  Yeah.
[50:40.160 --> 50:42.140]  On that point, I entirely agree.
[50:42.140 --> 50:49.440]  I think we do have to be really careful about going down this road, because I think we don't want to encourage this kind of vigilantism.
[50:50.820 --> 51:02.340]  It's one thing, I think, to be spelunking around or looking and exploring systems, coming across child pornography and reporting it to the authorities.
[51:02.340 --> 51:03.560]  I think that's one thing.
[51:03.560 --> 51:09.920]  But then actively going and hunting for systems, mining people's data, looking for criminal activities.
[51:09.920 --> 51:14.580]  I think that's a really, really dangerous thing to consider, to encourage.
[51:15.320 --> 51:22.860]  And I think that's why prosecutors have to be very, very careful about granting immunity to this type of vigilantism in particular.
[51:22.860 --> 51:38.780]  But also one really, really important thing to remember in this particular case is that if the government wanted access to this individual's computer at Middlebury University in Vermont, they would have had to do so on showing...
[51:38.780 --> 51:40.040]  They would have had to acquire a warrant.
[51:40.120 --> 51:40.460]  That's right.
[51:40.500 --> 51:41.560]  Upon a showing of a problem calling.
[51:41.560 --> 51:42.980]  This is a quick way around all that.
[51:43.320 --> 51:44.420]  We're out of time, unfortunately.
[51:44.640 --> 51:46.300]  We can continue this on Overtime.
[51:46.460 --> 51:52.400]  Join us online, and we will be able to continue it there.
[51:52.560 --> 51:53.680]  Go to 2600.com.
[51:53.720 --> 51:56.060]  Click on the link there to join us at 8 o'clock.
[51:56.180 --> 52:05.020]  Hey, we're about to embark on a really interesting project starting tomorrow, where we're releasing some lost audio from various radio shows and presentations.
[52:05.440 --> 52:07.520]  We'll be doing it every day starting tomorrow.
[52:07.520 --> 52:09.120]  It's going to go into October.
[52:09.120 --> 52:10.140]  That's how much we have.
[52:10.320 --> 52:13.840]  So 2600.com slash audio dash segments.
[52:14.080 --> 52:15.700]  Go there to get updates.
[52:16.140 --> 52:17.340]  Every day we'll be releasing something.
[52:17.920 --> 52:22.040]  We are not on next week, but we'll be back in two weeks.
[52:22.280 --> 52:23.980]  OTH at 2600.com.
[52:24.160 --> 52:24.960]  See you on Overtime.
[52:25.640 --> 52:26.260]  Good night.
[52:30.070 --> 52:33.030]  There's no song for the singer.
[52:34.110 --> 52:36.470]  No words for the tune.
[52:36.470 --> 52:43.290]  There's a mess in the message and a man on the moon.
[52:43.870 --> 52:47.250]  There's no plan in the planet.
[52:48.280 --> 52:50.590]  It's all gone berserk.
[52:51.470 --> 52:54.450]  There's a milk bottle shortage.
[52:54.950 --> 52:57.570]  And the traffic lights don't blow.
[52:57.570 --> 52:59.670]  Lie down and be counted.
[53:00.470 --> 53:02.710]  Don't take any more.
[53:04.030 --> 53:06.410]  Lie down and be counted.
[53:07.250 --> 53:10.070]  What are we standing for?
[53:11.810 --> 53:18.410]  But there's hope for the couple who stroll them apart.
[53:18.410 --> 53:25.230]  There's nuclear power To light up the dawn.
[53:25.810 --> 53:28.690]  There's national health.
[53:29.570 --> 53:32.050]  And ice in the fridge.
[53:32.690 --> 53:38.770]  And the occasional cow On a motorway bridge.
[53:38.770 --> 53:45.750]  There's extended credit On easier terms.
[53:46.290 --> 53:52.630]  There's something to kill On those household jerks.
[53:53.130 --> 53:59.050]  There's sofas and armchairs And washing machines.
[53:59.050 --> 54:18.470]  Stars on sundae Fish fingers and beans Lie down and be counted Don't take any more Lie down and be counted And what are we standing for?
[54:20.130 --> 54:23.410]  There's no song for the singer.
[54:23.950 --> 54:26.790]  No words for the tune.
[54:27.550 --> 54:33.450]  There's a mess in the message and a man on the moon.
[54:34.050 --> 54:37.330]  There's no plan in the planet.
[54:37.890 --> 54:40.550]  It's all gone and preserved.
[54:40.550 --> 54:44.250]  There's an ending surely.
[54:44.850 --> 54:47.410]  And the traffic lights still don't work.
[54:47.610 --> 54:49.430]  Lie down and be counted.
[54:50.530 --> 54:52.570]  Don't take any more.
[54:54.110 --> 54:56.170]  Lie down and be counted.
[54:56.990 --> 54:59.950]  What are we standing for?
[55:00.230 --> 55:02.150]  Lie down and be counted.
[55:03.290 --> 55:05.370]  Don't take any more.
[55:05.370 --> 55:08.970]  Lie down and be counted.
[55:09.730 --> 55:12.770]  What are we standing for?
[00:00.790 --> 00:02.130]  Okay, welcome back, everybody.
[00:02.610 --> 00:09.370]  It's time for Off the Hook Overtime, where we all continue our conversation, hopefully.
[00:11.030 --> 00:14.010]  Welcome back, Alex, Rob, Gila, and Kyle.
[00:14.330 --> 00:14.910]  Over here.
[00:15.070 --> 00:15.370]  Yeah.
[00:15.530 --> 00:20.590]  You know, we only got to mention it for a second, but that audio project, it's been months in the making.
[00:21.610 --> 00:27.550]  And boy, there's a lot of material out there that we have either not aired or aired and forgotten about.
[00:29.310 --> 00:32.370]  And it's been a lot of fun putting it together.
[00:32.370 --> 00:34.350]  I look forward to actually being able to share it.
[00:34.570 --> 00:39.450]  Some of it, as we say on the website, some of it is really, really bad.
[00:41.230 --> 00:47.670]  And I believe showing everything, warts and all, within some boundaries of taste.
[00:47.850 --> 00:48.510]  It's true.
[00:48.510 --> 00:50.570]  I think you have to put it in context, right?
[00:50.730 --> 00:58.970]  Yeah, well, when I first started doing radio back in the late 1970s at my college station, I wasn't very good at it.
[00:59.230 --> 01:02.090]  And, you know, nobody is very good at what they start doing.
[01:03.010 --> 01:05.910]  So I'm glad that I saved that.
[01:06.330 --> 01:11.450]  And I'm able to share some of the worst newscasts ever to have aired over an FM frequency in this country.
[01:12.470 --> 01:14.390]  And there are other things, too.
[01:14.570 --> 01:35.550]  There are all kinds of road trips, whether it's spying on the Clemson football team or driving into the Midwest or going up to a place known as Frobisher Bay in Baffin Island in Northwest Territories, which now, of course, is Iqaluit in Nunavut, also on Baffin Island.
[01:36.250 --> 01:38.070]  All sorts of interviews from there.
[01:38.310 --> 01:44.150]  And basically just a whole lot of different things involving radio of one sort or another from different radio stations.
[01:45.470 --> 01:47.590]  So I hope people find it interesting.
[01:47.930 --> 01:52.850]  Again, the website, 2600.com slash audio dash segments.
[01:53.310 --> 01:58.750]  Right now, you'll just see an intro over there describing what's coming.
[01:58.990 --> 02:03.110]  But starting tomorrow, you'll start seeing daily releases.
[02:03.250 --> 02:04.730]  Some of them will be only a couple of minutes.
[02:05.410 --> 02:06.970]  Some of them will be a few hours.
[02:06.970 --> 02:09.450]  You never know what might be there.
[02:09.450 --> 02:11.410]  Well, yeah, you'll know.
[02:11.590 --> 02:14.070]  But, you know, right now it's nothing.
[02:14.070 --> 02:15.270]  But it will be something starting tomorrow.
[02:15.390 --> 02:15.710]  Yes, Alex.
[02:16.610 --> 02:25.250]  I'm really curious about this and how it came to be, as well as how are these things going to be...
[02:25.250 --> 02:26.970]  I guess the frequency is going to be daily.
[02:27.110 --> 02:28.130]  You're going to release these daily.
[02:28.290 --> 02:31.210]  But are they going to have some kind of curation with them?
[02:31.230 --> 02:34.510]  Or are we going to have to figure out what the hell it was you were up to?
[02:35.230 --> 02:39.210]  Well, if you mean, will there be words attached to it explaining what the release is?
[02:39.210 --> 02:41.690]  Yes, every day there will be a new page.
[02:41.730 --> 02:45.310]  We have a plan with our website where we can have unlimited numbers of pages.
[02:45.790 --> 02:48.390]  And every day we will release another page.
[02:48.650 --> 02:53.550]  And what we figured we'd do is put the date on that page and list it that way by date.
[02:54.670 --> 02:57.270]  Again, these are all unique ideas.
[02:57.570 --> 02:58.830]  We've never tried them before.
[02:58.950 --> 03:00.430]  And, you know, we don't know.
[03:00.830 --> 03:03.670]  And then each day we'll release something else.
[03:03.670 --> 03:06.850]  And then the next day we're going to release something different with a different date.
[03:06.890 --> 03:08.510]  And, you know, we'll see how it goes.
[03:08.510 --> 03:11.190]  And you can also access previous dates.
[03:11.570 --> 03:12.090]  You can stream.
[03:12.230 --> 03:12.790]  You can download.
[03:13.230 --> 03:19.070]  I believe there's going to be an RSS feed, which other greater minds than myself will be setting up.
[03:19.830 --> 03:20.770]  But, yeah, it'll be fun.
[03:20.850 --> 03:21.450]  Starting tomorrow.
[03:21.610 --> 03:22.410]  I don't know what time.
[03:22.610 --> 03:23.490]  Don't ask me what time.
[03:23.570 --> 03:24.310]  I have no idea what time.
[03:24.410 --> 03:25.390]  Probably in the afternoon sometime.
[03:26.170 --> 03:28.390]  And it'll be there, you know, forever.
[03:28.470 --> 03:30.150]  So you don't have to worry about missing it.
[03:31.410 --> 03:34.150]  Were there any really surprising discoveries?
[03:34.630 --> 03:34.990]  Yes.
[03:34.990 --> 03:36.770]  When you went, when you were going through this archive?
[03:37.010 --> 03:37.210]  Yes.
[03:37.750 --> 03:40.270]  Do you want to release any of that surprising information now?
[03:40.270 --> 03:41.170]  Or do you want us to wait?
[03:41.190 --> 03:43.050]  I forgot that I interviewed the Ramones.
[03:43.430 --> 03:44.010]  How about that?
[03:44.050 --> 03:44.550]  Oh, yeah.
[03:44.710 --> 03:45.290]  That's pretty cool.
[03:45.370 --> 03:45.550]  Yeah.
[03:46.210 --> 03:46.910]  That's not bad.
[03:47.010 --> 03:47.490]  Things like that.
[03:47.590 --> 03:47.650]  Yeah.
[04:05.030 --> 04:06.610]  That's the only thing I can think of.
[04:06.950 --> 04:09.510]  So there are some things that I regret.
[04:09.670 --> 04:13.850]  But we also have so many other things that are good, that are cool.
[04:14.650 --> 04:17.190]  And that's why it's important to keep archives.
[04:17.330 --> 04:20.770]  Whether it's pictures, writing, audio, video.
[04:21.490 --> 04:22.470]  Hold on to your stuff.
[04:22.470 --> 04:24.210]  Even if you think it's terrible, hold on to it.
[04:24.230 --> 04:25.950]  Because you'll learn something from it someday.
[04:26.190 --> 04:28.110]  And maybe somebody else will learn something from it.
[04:28.270 --> 04:30.010]  You know, or it can serve as a warning.
[04:30.210 --> 04:30.670]  Who knows?
[04:31.930 --> 04:37.470]  So anyway, our phone number is 802-321-4225.
[04:38.190 --> 04:40.510]  802 being the area code of Vermont, which we are not in.
[04:41.350 --> 04:42.430]  321 is the exchange.
[04:42.690 --> 04:44.130]  4225 spells the word hack.
[04:44.250 --> 04:45.230]  So it's a pretty cool phone number.
[04:45.330 --> 04:46.530]  802-321-HACK.
[04:47.110 --> 04:50.610]  Call us up and share whatever is on your mind.
[04:51.290 --> 04:54.150]  We would like to talk to you as well.
[04:54.710 --> 04:57.650]  We're not able to take phone calls on the radio just as of yet.
[04:57.810 --> 04:58.770]  Because we're not in the studio.
[04:58.770 --> 05:01.590]  And we have no control over the kill button.
[05:01.830 --> 05:06.510]  The kill button meaning if somebody says a bad word, we have to hit that button because we're in delay.
[05:07.470 --> 05:08.950]  But on the internet, nobody cares.
[05:09.150 --> 05:11.450]  So people can say these words.
[05:11.790 --> 05:12.930]  But we'd rather you didn't.
[05:13.170 --> 05:13.810]  All right, we have a phone call?
[05:14.110 --> 05:14.450]  All right.
[05:14.630 --> 05:15.110]  Good evening.
[05:15.290 --> 05:16.610]  You're on Off the Hook Overtime.
[05:16.610 --> 05:16.890]  Go ahead.
[05:18.330 --> 05:19.130]  Oh, my goodness.
[05:19.330 --> 05:19.470]  Hello.
[05:19.710 --> 05:20.330]  Hi, guys.
[05:20.390 --> 05:20.830]  How are you doing?
[05:20.950 --> 05:21.050]  Good.
[05:21.090 --> 05:21.330]  How are you?
[05:22.350 --> 05:23.070]  I'm pretty good.
[05:23.070 --> 05:27.010]  It's been such a long time since I called you guys on BAI, man.
[05:27.010 --> 05:28.850]  I think this is pretty cool, man.
[05:29.570 --> 05:37.710]  YouTube came out in 2006 and it's just come such a long way, even though it's under a lot of scrutiny, Google, and the shady stuff they do.
[05:37.810 --> 05:39.150]  But I think it's wonderful.
[05:39.150 --> 05:39.730]  I love YouTube.
[05:40.330 --> 05:44.790]  And I think every BAI host should do what you guys do.
[05:44.850 --> 05:48.050]  They should have a podcast on the low.
[05:49.110 --> 05:52.270]  So, you know, I think it's brilliant, man.
[05:52.610 --> 05:53.030]  Well, thank you.
[05:53.030 --> 05:53.990]  Thank you for that.
[05:54.550 --> 06:00.850]  It's good to know that our listeners are able to follow us over onto this platform.
[06:01.430 --> 06:01.870]  Okay.
[06:01.890 --> 06:02.350]  I'm sorry.
[06:02.370 --> 06:05.990]  We're having some audio issues, so I'm not sure if we fixed them.
[06:06.310 --> 06:06.470]  Yeah.
[06:07.330 --> 06:07.650]  Yeah.
[06:08.270 --> 06:08.530]  Okay.
[06:08.870 --> 06:12.090]  Bear with us for a second while Kyle figures out what's going on here.
[06:12.410 --> 06:13.330]  Where are you calling from?
[06:15.110 --> 06:17.610]  I'm calling from the Bronx, Park Chester.
[06:18.490 --> 06:19.070]  Wow.
[06:19.210 --> 06:24.610]  Yeah, Park Chester, you know, not far from Castle Hill and Soundview.
[06:24.730 --> 06:28.030]  I live in the condos in Park Chester.
[06:28.170 --> 06:28.450]  Uh-huh.
[06:28.670 --> 06:33.150]  But I've had an issue, man, for like the past 10 years.
[06:33.610 --> 06:35.110]  What issue have you had?
[06:35.850 --> 06:40.510]  It's these computers, man, with the sound recording feature.
[06:41.770 --> 06:52.430]  Now, my first ever computer was a Toshiba 425 CDS back in 95, and I loved that thing so much, man.
[06:52.450 --> 06:53.430]  I had it when I was in college.
[06:53.930 --> 07:03.430]  And all those computers back then, you know, they had the sound recorder app, and you can record directly into the hard drive.
[07:05.730 --> 07:06.170]  Uh-huh.
[07:06.310 --> 07:08.970]  Fast forward to 2001, I upgraded.
[07:09.130 --> 07:13.910]  I got some desktop from Fingerhut.
[07:14.590 --> 07:19.570]  You know, Fingerhut, we used to get, you know, the catalogs in the mail all the time.
[07:19.730 --> 07:19.890]  Right.
[07:20.430 --> 07:26.310]  And, you know, my stepmom ordered one for me that had, we had Windows 2000, and, you know, still had the sound recorder.
[07:27.430 --> 07:33.930]  Upgraded again in 2005, I got me, um, a Microtel, I think that was when Windows XP was out.
[07:34.910 --> 07:38.870]  And, um, you were still able to record sound internally.
[07:39.330 --> 07:41.690]  And I didn't get another computer until 2011.
[07:43.130 --> 07:50.630]  And I think the computers now, you're not able to, um, record sound internally.
[07:50.830 --> 07:52.650]  You have to use that, that damn microphone.
[07:52.950 --> 07:53.150]  Right.
[07:53.150 --> 08:02.330]  Even with all the, even with all the phones now, all the apps, because I'm, I'm trying to find an app to, like, record sound internally.
[08:02.870 --> 08:08.830]  And they're all microphones, all sound, all, um, like, like, um, like my, you know, sound recorders.
[08:09.570 --> 08:17.810]  So I'm like, I think, I think the reason why they stopped that was because of, like, you know, people, like, download the music and some of them, like, with Napst and all that stuff.
[08:17.950 --> 08:18.170]  Uh-huh.
[08:18.170 --> 08:19.190]  I think that's the reason why.
[08:19.450 --> 08:19.910]  It might be.
[08:23.150 --> 08:28.410]  It probably evolves to a point where it becomes harder to use than it should be.
[08:28.470 --> 08:31.090]  For instance, you know, try recording a TV program.
[08:31.370 --> 08:34.670]  You know, you can't just hit record on your, on your TV.
[08:34.850 --> 08:36.570]  You have to, you have to subscribe to a service.
[08:36.730 --> 08:38.950]  You have to, uh, have a remote DVR.
[08:39.310 --> 08:43.850]  Uh, there's all sorts of things that have become difficult that used to be, you know, just a button you hit.
[08:44.250 --> 08:47.470]  Uh, so, yeah, that, that, that's a pet peeve of mine.
[08:47.510 --> 08:48.870]  And I, I hear what you're saying.
[08:51.110 --> 08:57.890]  Yeah, I just want to be able to, you know, cause I'm, I'm actually, um, I'm trying to, like, you know, make music and stuff.
[08:58.070 --> 09:00.990]  Cause I've been, I've been, like, into music for, like, so long.
[09:00.990 --> 09:04.050]  And I just got, I just got, I just got, I just got Magic software.
[09:04.490 --> 09:06.210]  I've been using that for about 15 years.
[09:06.370 --> 09:06.510]  Yeah.
[09:07.330 --> 09:08.270]  Audio cleaning lab.
[09:08.670 --> 09:11.470]  And I just recently got, um, Magic's Music Maker.
[09:11.830 --> 09:12.150]  Uh-huh.
[09:12.910 --> 09:14.510]  And the Samplitude Studio.
[09:15.750 --> 09:17.690]  So, it's something that I want to do for a long time.
[09:17.730 --> 09:19.430]  I kept putting it off because of my schedule.
[09:19.650 --> 09:19.810]  Right.
[09:20.250 --> 09:21.030]  My work schedule.
[09:21.190 --> 09:25.150]  So, I finally made time, you know, to, you know, for my, this, this hobby I have.
[09:25.630 --> 09:28.770]  But I just need something that I can record directly into the hard drive.
[09:28.770 --> 09:33.230]  I don't want to record using the sound recorder and getting, like, out, you know, outside noise.
[09:33.950 --> 09:34.270]  Right.
[09:34.390 --> 09:34.550]  Okay.
[09:34.650 --> 09:38.350]  So, so outline, outline your, your issue, what it is you're looking for.
[09:38.670 --> 09:42.810]  And I'm sure either between us or our listeners, uh, we'll be able to help.
[09:42.850 --> 09:45.630]  And by the way, folks, we're aware that there was an audio issue with this call.
[09:45.890 --> 09:49.550]  Uh, the, um, the archive version of this will include full audio.
[09:49.570 --> 09:49.750]  Yeah.
[09:49.750 --> 09:54.290]  So, you'll be able to hear, uh, what's, uh, what's, I don't know why my voice changed all of a sudden.
[09:54.370 --> 09:55.110]  We didn't even touch anything.
[09:55.390 --> 09:56.430]  Oh, the call was dropped.
[09:56.570 --> 09:57.230]  Can you turn that down?
[09:57.430 --> 09:58.370]  The call was dropped?
[09:58.770 --> 09:59.010]  Okay.
[09:59.330 --> 09:59.790]  Uh, yeah, I think...
[09:59.790 --> 10:00.390]  Paolo, are you still there?
[10:00.550 --> 10:01.090]  No, he's not.
[10:01.310 --> 10:01.650]  Okay.
[10:01.850 --> 10:04.530]  I guess he's going to listen off, uh, uh, uh, okay.
[10:04.770 --> 10:06.890]  So, uh, you want to help explain what's going on?
[10:07.250 --> 10:10.310]  Oh, no, we just lost some of the, uh, monitor...
[10:10.310 --> 10:14.290]  I was monitoring some of the channels, uh, before and during setup.
[10:14.570 --> 10:17.510]  So, uh, I had un, uh, activated...
[10:17.510 --> 10:18.450]  You messed something up.
[10:18.590 --> 10:19.630]  Uh, yeah, yeah, okay.
[10:19.910 --> 10:23.190]  I was trying to make things better and I made them worse, as usual.
[10:23.430 --> 10:24.770]  Which is exactly what we're talking about right now.
[10:24.890 --> 10:26.910]  People trying to make things better and they make things worse.
[10:26.910 --> 10:29.610]  That's why we have software that, that can't do certain things.
[10:29.650 --> 10:30.210]  You're welcome.
[10:30.410 --> 10:31.010]  Yeah, well, okay.
[10:31.010 --> 10:32.650]  And that's how they act as well.
[10:32.830 --> 10:35.670]  Like, they're doing you a favor by giving you something that cripples you.
[10:36.310 --> 10:39.090]  Uh, but anyway, can we help this guy?
[10:39.210 --> 10:40.970]  Alex, I know you had something you wanted to say.
[10:42.510 --> 10:43.910]  But, yeah, you gotta speak, Alex.
[10:44.050 --> 10:44.110]  Yeah.
[10:44.470 --> 10:45.330]  Yeah, perhaps.
[10:45.790 --> 10:53.990]  Uh, I don't know exactly what the caller's issue was because we, we had the audio issue, but he, he mentioned recording in internal sounds.
[10:54.130 --> 10:58.870]  And I think what he means is sounds that are probably flowing through the computer.
[10:58.870 --> 11:02.870]  He wants to record them, perhaps for sampling or, or, or something like that.
[11:03.070 --> 11:14.050]  Uh, a long time ago, I used to use a program called Replay Music, uh, made by a company called Applian, uh, A-P-P-L-I-A-N.
[11:14.570 --> 11:16.810]  And I think it still exists.
[11:16.810 --> 11:18.610]  I'm pretty sure it does.
[11:18.870 --> 11:26.210]  And he may be able to record different streams of data that are sound going through his particular computer.
[11:26.610 --> 11:27.810]  Oh, that's a nice sound.
[11:28.030 --> 11:28.670]  Thank you for that.
[11:28.890 --> 11:29.770]  Speak sounds.
[11:30.250 --> 11:32.250]  Uh, I have to, oh, sorry.
[11:32.490 --> 11:33.210]  Somebody's calling me.
[11:33.210 --> 11:34.470]  Let me introduce you to a four-letter word, Alex.
[11:34.630 --> 11:34.910]  Mute.
[11:35.850 --> 11:37.590]  You use it on yourself a lot.
[11:37.690 --> 11:38.990]  Why don't you use it on your damn phone?
[11:39.390 --> 11:40.390]  Oh, I just want to interrupt.
[11:40.730 --> 11:42.930]  Yeah, let's let Kyle interrupt for a second.
[11:42.970 --> 11:43.730]  I just want to interrupt.
[11:43.890 --> 11:45.650]  We have another call, um, on the line.
[11:45.790 --> 11:53.270]  And, um, I think to answer that caller, they would just need like a, a good quality, uh, USB audio interface so that you can get line level audio.
[11:53.810 --> 12:08.750]  And then, um, if you're not comfortable recording directly to your machine, maybe some kind of like, uh, uh, solid state or SD card, uh, like a flash, uh, audio recorder, a lot of reporters use those and field recording, uh, artists find those great.
[12:08.750 --> 12:14.590]  Cause then you can be portable and, and, uh, maybe get some, some ambiance as well as, uh, whatever you're trying to record.
[12:14.750 --> 12:16.470]  But best of luck with your, uh, endeavors.
[12:16.630 --> 12:16.790]  Yes.
[12:16.850 --> 12:17.570]  Let's take this other call.
[12:17.650 --> 12:17.990]  Good evening.
[12:18.110 --> 12:19.410]  You're on off the hook, off the, over time.
[12:19.410 --> 12:28.870]  Hey, I've got the, uh, answer for, uh, the gentleman who was looking for a program to record audio directly, uh, on the hard drive.
[12:29.070 --> 12:29.810]  Wow, that was fast.
[12:29.930 --> 12:30.750]  Okay, go right ahead.
[12:31.310 --> 12:34.770]  Okay, there are two programs made by the same company.
[12:34.990 --> 12:40.650]  I've used them for years called Total Recorder and TotalRecorder.pro.
[12:40.650 --> 13:04.070]  The Pro has a whole bunch of other features and, but if you just want a simple program to record audio in different formats directly, either from an external source, line source, line in, or direct the digital from, uh, a digital source stream directly onto the hard drive without the intervention of an external microphone,
[13:04.690 --> 13:15.350]  uh, Total Recorder or TotalRecorder.pro, made by a company called HighCriteria.com, or you could go to TotalRecorder.com.
[13:15.570 --> 13:24.890]  I think the Pro version is like 17 or 20 bucks, and the, uh, the regular version is like 11 or 12 bucks, something like that.
[13:25.130 --> 13:26.210]  Very reasonable.
[13:26.550 --> 13:27.270]  You get it.
[13:27.350 --> 13:28.330]  You get it for life.
[13:31.650 --> 13:34.230]  Email them, and get it again, and so on.
[13:34.290 --> 13:37.570]  They're very good that way, so I highly recommend it.
[13:37.870 --> 13:38.130]  All right.
[13:38.190 --> 13:38.430]  Well, thanks.
[13:38.470 --> 13:41.270]  That sounds very helpful, and I think a lot of people will benefit from that.
[13:42.230 --> 13:42.670]  Okay.
[13:42.950 --> 13:43.530]  Thanks for your call.
[13:44.030 --> 13:44.770]  Good enough.
[13:44.990 --> 13:45.210]  Take care.
[13:45.310 --> 13:45.450]  All right.
[13:46.310 --> 13:55.330]  So, the living proof that not only are BAI listeners the most helpful, but BAI Overtime, all the Overtime listeners also have the answer when we need it.
[13:55.490 --> 13:55.790]  Great.
[13:55.890 --> 13:56.390]  Thank you for that.
[13:56.810 --> 14:05.110]  Hopefully that helps the, uh, the first caller, who you will be able to hear on our website, we'll, uh, we'll, we'll fix the audio when we, when we post the archive.
[14:05.590 --> 14:10.790]  Uh, 802-321-4225, 802-321-HACK is our telephone number.
[14:11.750 --> 14:15.790]  Um, anyone else have anything, uh, they, they wish to share before we get our next call?
[14:16.990 --> 14:28.690]  Well, we're, um, just, uh, if you're, if you're into recording audio that's playing on your computer, um, you know, Audacity is very good, but, you know, versions prior to when they messed it up at, uh, at the 3.x version.
[14:28.870 --> 14:30.050]  So, version 2.
[14:30.210 --> 14:32.130]  something of Audacity, uh, should be fine.
[14:32.230 --> 14:33.910]  Did we mention that, the Audacity issue?
[14:34.030 --> 14:34.770]  Did we talk about that?
[14:34.770 --> 14:36.490]  We have not mentioned the Audacity issue yet.
[14:36.490 --> 14:38.030]  Say what you're going to say, and then we'll get into that.
[14:38.130 --> 14:38.470]  So, go ahead.
[14:38.750 --> 14:43.530]  Okay, um, well, you know, pushing open source, as I, as I love to do, you know, you can record stuff with Audacity.
[14:43.610 --> 14:47.290]  You can also record stuff with OBS, which is open broadcaster software.
[14:47.470 --> 14:48.290]  They have OBS Studio.
[14:48.490 --> 14:53.870]  It's mainly intended for video, but you can also record basically any audio that's playing on your computer with it.
[14:54.010 --> 14:55.230]  It's a very powerful piece of software.
[14:55.530 --> 15:01.050]  Um, it can be tough to get into and start using, but once you get into it and get comfortable with it, it's really, really powerful.
[15:01.230 --> 15:03.730]  Hey, their auto setup is outstanding.
[15:03.990 --> 15:04.630]  It's phenomenal.
[15:05.090 --> 15:06.650]  So, shout out to OBS.
[15:07.070 --> 15:08.990]  They, they are doing marvelous things.
[15:10.010 --> 15:12.270]  Okay, so who wants to talk about Audacity and what happened?
[15:14.250 --> 15:15.050]  Oh, boy.
[15:16.870 --> 15:18.190]  Keep it, keep it clean, Rob.
[15:18.310 --> 15:18.690]  Keep it clean.
[15:22.930 --> 15:24.770]  Upset any goddamn, uh, anyway.
[15:25.010 --> 15:25.290]  Oh, my God.
[15:25.570 --> 15:38.110]  The, the, the, the Audacity is the name of a, of an, of a piece of open source software, which has been the standard, uh, open recording and, uh, editing, uh, software out there for audio.
[15:38.430 --> 15:40.130]  Very powerful, wonderful software.
[15:40.310 --> 15:45.610]  I use it for so many things, audio books, uh, podcasts, so many, you know, voiceovers, all these things that I do.
[15:46.050 --> 15:53.130]  And, uh, the, their, a company called Muse Group bought the rights to the domain and the current version of the software.
[15:53.350 --> 16:09.130]  They basically own it now and are taking it forward in a more closed manner, uh, messing with the open source, uh, license of it, uh, uh, uh, collecting information on the users, uh, making all the mistakes that commercial software makes because they're basically taking Audacity in that direction,
[16:09.370 --> 16:11.750]  um, breaking the GPL, which is its own thing.
[16:12.210 --> 16:24.670]  Um, so because Audacity is open source, people can take versions from before it was messed up and fork the project, which means, uh, basically clone everything that's going on and go forward in a different direction.
[16:25.110 --> 16:27.410]  Um, and there are a lot of projects doing that.
[16:27.530 --> 16:39.390]  One of them is Tenacity, um, which, uh, which is seeking to reinvent Audacity as a, as a, as a still completely free and free of the, uh, tracking where, uh, you know, pollution.
[16:39.650 --> 16:41.910]  Now these, these forks are showing up on GitHub, right?
[16:42.390 --> 16:42.690]  Yes.
[16:42.850 --> 16:45.090]  I hear they're being taken down though.
[16:45.230 --> 16:46.410]  Is that, is that, is that accurate?
[16:47.090 --> 17:01.130]  I, I hadn't heard that, but like, I, I wouldn't doubt it, but like the, the, the whole point of GitHub and the way it works and sort and sites like GitHub is, uh, is that anybody can clone it because they're allowed to, because you're, you're publishing open source.
[17:01.270 --> 17:01.430]  Right.
[17:01.710 --> 17:15.250]  So, uh, so, uh, so, you know, the, the, uh, the integrity of the license is maintained because when you clone a project, you're also keeping the information of all the people who contributed, uh, the, the code to it that you're cloning and, uh, you can move on forward from there in any direction you like.
[17:15.830 --> 17:18.250]  Um, you know, a company can do this, an individual can do this.
[17:18.330 --> 17:19.230]  It's very, very powerful.
[17:19.490 --> 17:35.750]  Um, the only, the only real, uh, setback now, um, for the open source community is that there are so many forks out there of audacity because the community is, uh, a large, a large part of the community is in an uproar over this that, uh, nobody knows which of these forks is going to get the,
[17:35.750 --> 17:39.630]  uh, the, the support, the community around it that audacity had.
[17:39.950 --> 17:54.850]  Um, so, so it's now kind of a waiting game to see like who, uh, who manages to get together a powerful enough audacity fork, um, project going with the support, with the community behind it, that it can keep going as a, as a living thing of its own, um,
[17:55.190 --> 17:57.890]  rather than just being, uh, uh, stuck in time as it were.
[17:57.890 --> 18:12.230]  But, uh, yeah, they, it's, it's, uh, it's an, it's an example of a massive company, uh, you know, dipping their hands into open source and basically using it in all the wrong ways and, you know, way against the spirit of, of what it's, what open source is all about.
[18:12.810 --> 18:15.070]  And, uh, yeah, a lot of people are very angry.
[18:15.210 --> 18:19.630]  I feel like I've been betrayed by an old friend because I've been using audacity for maybe 20 years now.
[18:19.790 --> 18:27.470]  The only good I think is that this shows the resilience of these kinds of projects because it can be, it can be, uh, reformed in this way.
[18:27.890 --> 18:40.170]  I know, um, in contrast, some, uh, phenomenal, um, transcoding software that was, um, privately held and then just disappeared and nobody could do anything about it.
[18:40.330 --> 18:43.570]  Your keys stopped working, like your copies of them stopped working.
[18:43.990 --> 18:49.330]  And, um, I enjoyed using it for, for video stuff and, and authoring and that kind of thing.
[18:49.490 --> 19:04.890]  But there was no recourse because it wasn't created under one of these kinds of, um, GPL rich, um, uh, project, uh, um, constructed, uh, styles, you know, of, of, uh, implementing the life cycle.
[19:04.890 --> 19:08.590]  No, this is a great demonstration of what the open source community is capable of.
[19:08.690 --> 19:15.810]  So what happens with audacity in the future, um, I think we'll, we'll reflect that and, and, um, um, let's see how it plays out.
[19:16.150 --> 19:16.550]  Fascinating.
[19:17.490 --> 19:25.610]  And this sort of thing has happened before an open source with, uh, open office used to be a very, uh, popular open source office suite and alternative to things like Microsoft office.
[19:25.710 --> 19:25.850]  Right.
[19:26.070 --> 19:32.530]  And, uh, yeah, a company got hold of that, decided to, uh, mess around with the spirit of what open source is about and it very quickly forked.
[19:32.670 --> 19:37.070]  And now the big open source one out there is LibreOffice, which branched off and forked from that.
[19:37.610 --> 19:39.110]  Um, so yeah, this can be done.
[19:39.210 --> 19:40.790]  It's happened before it'll happen again.
[19:40.830 --> 19:45.210]  It's just, uh, it happened to, to a piece of software that means a great deal to many people.
[19:45.430 --> 19:47.810]  These companies that do this, do they benefit?
[19:48.030 --> 19:52.230]  Do they ever win when they do something which I consider to be kind of stupid?
[19:53.870 --> 19:55.630]  It's hard to gauge.
[19:55.630 --> 19:58.690]  And I think there's many examples of where this has failed.
[19:59.030 --> 20:04.510]  Um, lots of times they come in, they didn't have, um, the vision.
[20:04.570 --> 20:13.390]  They didn't have, uh, maybe some, some of the foundational staff that really knew technically how to move as, um, maybe the market moved.
[20:13.570 --> 20:31.070]  Think of, um, I think of like real player, like when formats were changing so rapidly that like, um, reiterating the company actually may have missed a moment for it to to really seize on whatever technology they had, or they'll try to monetize it maybe too quickly,
[20:31.070 --> 20:40.810]  uh, and have like many failed, uh, uh, public offerings and just really get way over their, um, their ambition gets way ahead of them, that kind of thing.
[20:40.990 --> 20:43.110]  So it's, it's, um, I don't know.
[20:43.190 --> 20:55.210]  There's, there's many different examples of this, but, um, there have been, um, situations where sometimes, uh, private holding has done a, a decent job of it, I think as well.
[20:55.490 --> 20:59.950]  Um, but, but maintained the openness of the software.
[21:00.050 --> 21:01.930]  In other words, like sort of a private project.
[21:02.070 --> 21:03.990]  There's lots of different ways to do it, I think.
[21:04.270 --> 21:12.530]  So I'm thinking of things like, um, uh, Blender, which is a 3D rendering package that's more or less free, but incredibly powerful.
[21:12.530 --> 21:13.990]  Yeah, I think there's two approaches.
[21:14.030 --> 21:29.430]  If you're dealing with, uh, a corporate environment, um, where people don't really do a lot of configuration and follow the rules, okay, you go, uh, you, you, you have it closed and, and, and you, uh, set it up, you know, for your, your corporate profits that way.
[21:29.670 --> 21:34.710]  But when it's individuals, I think you need to have things as open and configurable as possible.
[21:34.850 --> 21:37.810]  And if you go any other route, it's going to backfire on you.
[21:38.250 --> 21:49.790]  Uh, so if that's your clientele, if your clientele are actual individual people, you want them to be able to configure the software to work for their needs, which won't necessarily be the same as someone else's needs.
[21:49.930 --> 21:56.930]  And I can't count the number of times where I've been frustrated by a piece of software that makes decisions for me that are the wrong decisions.
[21:57.170 --> 22:09.070]  You know, I, I don't, I don't want to be able to, you know, just as an example, I was playing around with, um, one of these, um, uh, Amazon show, um, um, devices, the ones it's, it's like an Alexa with a, with a screen.
[22:09.710 --> 22:11.930]  And, um, you know, it, it worked good.
[22:12.030 --> 22:13.370]  It worked, you know, it was fine.
[22:13.570 --> 22:20.810]  I, I, I was setting it up for, for a relative to display family pictures, you know, as somebody who doesn't have use of their hands.
[22:21.330 --> 22:27.670]  And, uh, it just was, was going to be a very pleasant thing to have able to play music and show, uh, family pictures.
[22:28.130 --> 22:35.770]  And then somebody at Amazon decided to change it so that they're going to put a big fat ad in the middle, uh, telling you how to use it.
[22:36.270 --> 22:40.750]  And then they were going to put a clock over the, uh, a quarter of the image.
[22:41.170 --> 22:53.150]  And then they were going to, uh, make the display time a maximum of eight seconds or 10 seconds or something crazy like that when it had been 30 or 60 seconds before, which was better for this person.
[22:53.230 --> 22:54.170]  So it became useless.
[22:54.390 --> 23:01.270]  It became completely useless because somebody in engineering or, or software development made a decision for everybody.
[23:01.970 --> 23:14.130]  And I vowed never to buy one of these Amazon show devices again, because if you look, just look at, at, at feedback, you will see hundreds of people complaining about the very things I'm talking about.
[23:14.530 --> 23:15.670]  Silence from Amazon.
[23:15.690 --> 23:22.750]  They're not changing anything because marketing tells them this will work and we're just going to keep it this way and screw the customers.
[23:23.030 --> 23:24.170]  They already bought it.
[23:24.310 --> 23:25.770]  So what are we going to do?
[23:26.550 --> 23:33.350]  Imagine getting an appliance that, you know, on one setting, you know, cooks your toast or your, your, you know, something just fine.
[23:33.490 --> 23:42.490]  And the other, the other, the next day, that same setting, you know, starts a fire or causes, you know, uh, some other kind of, uh, terrible result that's unexpected.
[23:42.490 --> 23:44.550]  And you keep changing that every day.
[23:44.650 --> 23:47.090]  You do, you can't ever count on it for something.
[23:47.290 --> 23:47.470]  Right.
[23:47.910 --> 24:04.750]  You know, since it's based on some kind of general computer or, uh, uh, microcontroller, or, you know, very much, uh, a process, central processing system, you know, it's infinitely configurable, it's just, it's very much a laziness thing and a lack of,
[24:04.750 --> 24:11.570]  um, uh, uh, sort of loyalty once the product's out the door, you know, caring about, about your customer.
[24:11.710 --> 24:14.930]  You know, I, I know that I can make that clock smaller.
[24:14.930 --> 24:16.090]  I can make that clock disappear.
[24:16.090 --> 24:17.010]  It's possible.
[24:17.210 --> 24:18.450]  They have restricted it.
[24:18.530 --> 24:20.030]  They've made it impossible for that to happen.
[24:20.030 --> 24:27.850]  There are so many examples of software that is unreasonably restricted, where they make the decision for you.
[24:27.950 --> 24:28.810]  No, you can't do this.
[24:28.910 --> 24:29.050]  Why?
[24:29.150 --> 24:29.970]  Because we said so.
[24:30.550 --> 24:32.550]  And that's not how you build loyalty.
[24:32.690 --> 24:36.950]  That's not how people, uh, will stick with your software, uh, through thick and thin.
[24:37.410 --> 24:41.050]  That's how they'll trash you online and, and go somewhere else at the first opportunity.
[24:41.970 --> 24:53.490]  And, and that's why it's always such a, uh, uh, um, uh, a fiasco when this, uh, when this attitude is applied by big companies throwing lots of money at things in the open source world, which they don't understand.
[24:53.690 --> 25:00.350]  They see a thing that's popular, that, uh, works for a lot of people that is celebrated and, uh, they think, well, what if we, what if that was ours?
[25:00.610 --> 25:04.410]  What if we could somehow make, you know, obtain that and then make it work for us?
[25:04.710 --> 25:12.430]  And, uh, you know, completely antithetical to everything that is the open source spirit behind putting that thing out there, behind keeping it working for everybody.
[25:12.690 --> 25:14.710]  Um, we've seen this happen with Audacity now.
[25:14.850 --> 25:21.130]  We've seen it happen with so many things, um, hardware, software companies in, in like the tech sector, particularly.
[25:21.390 --> 25:24.370]  Um, and it's, it's really exhausting to, to keep up with it.
[25:25.010 --> 25:25.370]  Absolutely.
[25:25.730 --> 25:29.270]  As long as I'm talking about Amazon, I've got a story here, which is kind of interesting.
[25:29.590 --> 25:31.090]  Um, a little shocking.
[25:31.270 --> 25:42.030]  Uh, Amazon has received FCC approval, um, to use motion sensing radar sensors in a product designed to monitor your movement while you sleep.
[25:42.790 --> 25:43.470]  Yeah.
[25:43.810 --> 26:06.390]  Uh, the FCC said Amazon, and this is a quote, plans to use the radar's capability of, I'm sorry, I hit the wrong button, of capturing, uh, motion in a three-dimensional space to enable contactless sleep tracing functionalities in a non-mobile device that requires external power to function.
[26:06.390 --> 26:14.210]  If that sounds familiar, it's probably because Google uses similar technology in the second generation Nest Hub.
[26:14.450 --> 26:22.690]  And the FCC noted that Amazon's device would operate at identical power levels and technical parameters as those granted to Google in a 2018 waiver order.
[26:23.570 --> 26:25.550]  So I'm learning a couple of things here.
[26:25.670 --> 26:27.610]  I'm learning that Amazon is being given permission.
[26:27.730 --> 26:29.690]  I've learned that Google already has permission.
[26:29.830 --> 26:37.930]  The Google Nest Hub's ability to monitor your sleep via radar sensors informed the FCC's decision to grant Amazon's request for a nearly identical waiver.
[26:38.150 --> 26:45.590]  The commission said that treating Amazon's request in a similar fashion to our grant of the Google waiver will benefit the American public by fostering added competition.
[26:45.750 --> 26:46.830]  Okay, this isn't about competition.
[26:46.830 --> 26:48.390]  This is about watching me while I sleep.
[26:49.310 --> 26:50.830]  When did this become a good idea?
[26:51.010 --> 26:53.450]  Why are these devices watching us while we sleep?
[26:53.590 --> 26:54.370]  Can we get a waiver?
[26:55.110 --> 26:56.650]  What, you want to watch people while they sleep?
[26:56.650 --> 26:59.130]  I just want the waiver to be able to do it, yeah.
[27:00.290 --> 27:01.070]  It's creepy.
[27:01.310 --> 27:03.510]  I mean, what's with these companies?
[27:03.950 --> 27:05.030]  This is...
[27:06.130 --> 27:06.770]  It's crazy.
[27:06.990 --> 27:22.970]  Amazon said in their request they would also use the radar sensors to offer significant benefits to consumers with mobility, speech, or tactile impairments by allowing them to engage with a device and control its features through simple gestures and movements instead of requiring them to use touch-based controls,
[27:23.070 --> 27:28.770]  which is kind of exactly what I was talking about before, but I don't see how spying on somebody when they're asleep adds to this in any way.
[27:29.050 --> 27:29.490]  Alex?
[27:30.290 --> 27:33.730]  Well, look, I mean, let's put it into perspective, right?
[27:33.810 --> 27:39.730]  I mean, it sounds crazy to introduce radar sensors into your home, right?
[27:39.730 --> 27:45.410]  I mean, it just sounds like it may not be a good idea, right, putting radar sensors in your bedroom.
[27:45.810 --> 27:50.530]  I mean, there's something about radar and home that just seems incongruous.
[27:50.630 --> 27:50.790]  Yeah.
[27:50.790 --> 28:01.870]  However, if you think about what we've already done, this is like the least of our worries because these Alexa devices already have implanted microphones in our home.
[28:02.070 --> 28:08.790]  I think that's worse than radar sensors watching me when I sleep, having a microphone on when I'm awake seems actually a hell of a lot worse.
[28:08.990 --> 28:15.690]  Or putting all of these cameras on our front doors that are connected to Amazon services or around our house or in our house.
[28:15.690 --> 28:25.010]  Just, you know, all of these connected devices that ping back, I think, yeah, you know, think it, let's have a good think about whether or not this is a good idea.
[28:25.030 --> 28:28.550]  But Alex, when we have a camera, we know there's a camera there.
[28:28.670 --> 28:29.190]  We've put it there.
[28:29.310 --> 28:30.370]  You know, it's a camera.
[28:30.530 --> 28:31.430]  We know what cameras do.
[28:31.770 --> 28:36.490]  And the devices, you know, technically they're wake words and not supposed to, you know, monitoring.
[28:36.830 --> 28:37.510]  Well, they monitor.
[28:37.650 --> 28:40.950]  They listen for the wake word, but they're not supposed to be saving what goes on.
[28:40.950 --> 28:44.770]  And if there's abuse on that, we certainly should be talking about that as well.
[28:44.930 --> 28:48.950]  But this, this seems really intrusive.
[28:49.270 --> 28:59.770]  I look, I think it's less intrusive than having something continually listen and record, even in some kind of buffered mode, where the memory overwrites itself, listening for me to say a magic word.
[29:00.070 --> 29:04.310]  You know, that that's creepier to me than having, you know, radar watching.
[29:04.710 --> 29:09.570]  But you bought the device knowing it did that, you know, you bought the device knowing that's how to activate it.
[29:09.570 --> 29:11.870]  So it's kind of on you if you have one.
[29:11.990 --> 29:13.510]  You can't really be shocked that it's listening.
[29:13.810 --> 29:23.750]  Of course, from a privacy perspective, in a legal perspective, obtaining consent of the user to use this thing is going to be pretty important for Amazon.
[29:23.750 --> 29:40.990]  So if this is a new feature that they're enabling based on technology that's built into the device, they're going to have to update their privacy policies and make this really goddamn clear, especially given, you know, there's these, you know, new, more and more laws about collecting biometric data about people.
[29:41.790 --> 29:45.090]  And so this could very easily fall afoul of that.
[29:45.390 --> 29:52.650]  But, I mean, I think we're already doing way too much with respect to the introduction of unneeded technology in our homes.
[29:52.650 --> 29:57.410]  And I think they need to do a really, a much better job of actually implementing it.
[29:57.490 --> 30:13.010]  And if they're sincere about accessibility and making these things work for different scenarios than the average person, just scolding the average person about how they sleep, I think that there may be a future there.
[30:13.150 --> 30:26.850]  But if it's just being like thrown at a lot of these devices wholesale and, you know, giving people no control or granularity of control, specifically with accessibility stuff, because there are different scenarios, you got to customize it for whoever,
[30:26.970 --> 30:31.910]  whomever is going to be using it in whatever way is best for them to actually use it.
[30:32.030 --> 30:33.250]  And it's not there yet.
[30:33.250 --> 30:39.950]  And they keep promising and selling devices, but it's not actually functional in the ways that they're saying it will be.
[30:40.330 --> 30:50.690]  So this, just including the feature, and then not actually making it work for people, or if it's just a nuisance, like, oh, you're sleeping this way, and that's it.
[30:50.830 --> 30:51.830]  They're going to scold you?
[30:52.090 --> 30:53.670]  Well, that's how I look at it.
[30:53.730 --> 30:54.230]  You're sleeping wrong?
[30:54.390 --> 30:58.010]  That's how I think, that's why I think, like, this is not desirable to anybody.
[30:58.270 --> 31:00.050]  Like, who's asking for this?
[31:00.190 --> 31:02.370]  Like, do, am I having such a trouble sleeping?
[31:02.370 --> 31:06.650]  Okay, maybe there's conditions, there's things that you want to look for in sleep studies.
[31:06.770 --> 31:11.490]  I get that there is a market for that, but they're not sincerely implementing the health and configurability.
[31:11.510 --> 31:17.450]  I figured it would just be so that they would know when to display ads, because, oh, he's awake now, okay, now we can, you know, show him a Coke ad.
[31:17.530 --> 31:18.790]  That's what it amounts to, though.
[31:19.130 --> 31:22.770]  But it's being sold and billed as something so much more than it actually is.
[31:22.810 --> 31:23.730]  I don't know, does anybody else see that?
[31:23.730 --> 31:28.870]  What annoys me is that they're basically selling it as accessibility and inclusiveness.
[31:28.870 --> 31:34.490]  When you see how they act, when you say, hey, this isn't working for me, how do I fix it?
[31:34.790 --> 31:38.250]  And instead, they give you the middle finger and say, you know, that's how it is.
[31:38.350 --> 31:38.770]  Deal with it.
[31:38.850 --> 31:39.530]  You already bought it.
[31:40.310 --> 31:40.630]  Aguila?
[31:41.630 --> 31:44.450]  Okay, so I find it actually kind of terrifying.
[31:44.450 --> 31:45.090]  And it's interesting.
[31:45.250 --> 31:49.290]  We have, and we have multiple Alexa devices in our small homes.
[31:49.350 --> 31:49.970]  Don't say the word.
[31:50.070 --> 31:50.850]  Don't say the word.
[31:50.990 --> 31:51.530]  They wake up.
[31:51.530 --> 31:52.590]  That's not our wake word.
[31:52.830 --> 31:54.250]  Oh, well, it's our wake word.
[31:54.310 --> 31:55.130]  And he just woke it up.
[31:55.250 --> 31:56.410]  Well, everybody listening to it.
[31:56.450 --> 31:56.790]  Now they know.
[31:56.790 --> 31:57.630]  Go on, go on.
[31:57.710 --> 31:58.330]  We're listening, yes.
[31:58.890 --> 32:00.090]  Buy a dollhouse.
[32:02.030 --> 32:05.670]  But I will also, I wear a step tracker.
[32:06.470 --> 32:12.950]  And I do not use the sleep tracking capabilities on my step tracker.
[32:13.230 --> 32:15.790]  Because that scares me enough.
[32:16.090 --> 32:19.030]  You know, I don't want it watching me all the time.
[32:19.030 --> 32:31.030]  But at the same time, I can also see how they could turn on other features based on the creepy radar watching you in your house.
[32:31.030 --> 32:35.570]  For example, if you are a sleepwalker.
[32:36.850 --> 32:38.390]  Do those still exist?
[32:38.710 --> 32:40.390]  Are there still sleepwalkers?
[32:40.550 --> 32:41.170]  They're valid.
[32:41.170 --> 32:43.350]  I thought that was in the 1950s and they all...
[32:43.350 --> 32:45.050]  People sleepwalk all over the place.
[32:45.230 --> 32:50.110]  Especially, you know, stress levels, people, their circadian rhythms are disrupted by never leaving their home.
[32:50.110 --> 32:52.170]  Next time any of you see a sleepwalker, call me.
[32:52.290 --> 32:53.790]  I will drive because I want to see this.
[32:53.890 --> 32:54.770]  I really want to see this.
[32:54.910 --> 32:58.070]  I know I shouldn't make fun, but I really want to see a sleepwalker.
[32:58.290 --> 32:59.170]  We'll find a sleepwalker.
[32:59.170 --> 33:01.170]  But I like where you're going with this.
[33:01.410 --> 33:07.310]  So imagine a person is a sleepwalker and they have an alarm system in their home.
[33:07.850 --> 33:23.150]  They're up, they're moving around their home and, you know, the Google Nest hub or whatever can sense that and send a notification to the motion detectors not to set off the alarm because someone's sleepwalking in the house.
[33:24.210 --> 33:31.310]  I'm not saying it's a great plan, but I'm just saying there are other, you know, maybe they're watching you and you don't sleep.
[33:31.610 --> 33:32.250]  Shouldn't they...
[33:32.250 --> 33:36.510]  Isn't that exactly the time when they should make an alarm when someone might fall down the stairs or something?
[33:36.790 --> 33:38.490]  You know, it's kind of a dangerous situation.
[33:39.010 --> 33:39.450]  Right.
[33:39.530 --> 33:41.890]  But if you're walking around, like...
[33:43.250 --> 33:43.690]  Okay.
[33:44.110 --> 33:47.330]  When we were kids, my sister was sleepwalking.
[33:47.490 --> 33:48.790]  Your sister was sleepwalking?
[33:49.110 --> 33:50.610]  You know a sleepwalker firsthand.
[33:50.610 --> 33:51.030]  Wow.
[33:53.150 --> 33:54.910]  It happened while I was in the hospital.
[33:55.090 --> 33:56.790]  She was sleepwalking while I was in the hospital.
[33:57.070 --> 33:57.230]  Wow.
[33:57.610 --> 34:03.750]  And, yeah, she apparently got up out of her bed, got into the kitchen and made herself a snack.
[34:05.310 --> 34:06.150]  While sleepwalking?
[34:06.370 --> 34:07.450]  While sleepwalking.
[34:07.890 --> 34:09.570]  Just like Ed Norton on the Honeymooners.
[34:09.630 --> 34:10.490]  He did exactly that.
[34:12.330 --> 34:18.230]  So, you know, you might want to turn off the motion detectors in the house while the sleepwalking is happening.
[34:18.470 --> 34:18.750]  Okay.
[34:18.990 --> 34:25.910]  Well, in that situation, yes, but there are other situations, you know, let's say you had a spiral staircase in your house, you know, it might not be the best place to sleepwalk.
[34:26.490 --> 34:33.810]  The whole thing is, it's, well, I mean, sleepwalking, I think spiral staircases are just a bad idea in general because if you have to carry things up and down the stairs, it's very bad.
[34:34.030 --> 34:34.930]  I've always been against them.
[34:36.310 --> 34:36.990]  Pure vanity.
[34:37.630 --> 34:40.370]  Clearly, I don't know a lot about sleepwalking, and I'm sorry about that.
[34:40.370 --> 34:46.250]  I had no idea it was a real thing other than, you know, TV plot lines and things like that.
[34:46.350 --> 34:47.770]  But I'm fascinated by it.
[34:47.810 --> 34:48.950]  I wonder if I've ever done it myself.
[34:49.030 --> 34:50.070]  I don't think I have.
[34:50.750 --> 34:51.730]  But how do you know?
[34:52.190 --> 34:53.010]  Did your sister know?
[34:53.270 --> 34:53.810]  Record yourself in your sleep.
[34:53.910 --> 34:55.450]  But did your sister know she sleepwalked?
[34:56.070 --> 34:58.950]  Uh, she was discovered in the kitchen.
[34:59.270 --> 35:01.470]  Okay, but she wouldn't have known herself, right?
[35:01.730 --> 35:02.370]  She would have...
[35:02.370 --> 35:04.090]  No, she was told the next morning.
[35:04.230 --> 35:04.290]  Interesting.
[35:04.290 --> 35:05.290]  Because you don't remember it.
[35:05.630 --> 35:05.770]  Okay.
[35:05.770 --> 35:15.550]  But if you had, you know, creepy radar waves watching you from your, like, your internet-enabled device, then you would know.
[35:15.710 --> 35:19.070]  Does it bother me that Amazon would know I was sleepwalking before I did?
[35:19.410 --> 35:19.890]  Yes.
[35:25.450 --> 35:28.730]  If you could make a snack while being asleep, why couldn't you drive a car while you were asleep?
[35:29.250 --> 35:29.830]  People do.
[35:29.990 --> 35:31.630]  They're, uh, oh, what is it?
[35:31.810 --> 35:32.170]  Ambien?
[35:33.570 --> 35:35.070]  People have been sleep driving.
[35:35.330 --> 35:36.730]  That's not what I mean, but yeah, okay.
[35:36.970 --> 35:37.530]  And sleep eating.
[35:37.730 --> 35:40.230]  Yeah, people do all sorts of things that they're not aware of.
[35:40.390 --> 35:40.530]  Uh-huh.
[35:41.050 --> 35:41.810]  Uh, Rob, go ahead.
[35:42.670 --> 35:46.870]  The thing that, the thing about this is, like, I could see the use for technology like this.
[35:47.010 --> 35:53.230]  I could see, you know, movement detecting, uh, hardware, software, everything being useful for things like accessibility.
[35:53.230 --> 36:03.370]  I really question whether a company that makes its money selling you things should be the ones, um, utilizing this technology and their devices that they sell you.
[36:03.870 --> 36:11.470]  Because, you know, your movements are going to be used to sell you things just as much as, uh, you know, your, your Google searches inform what they try and sell you.
[36:11.610 --> 36:17.690]  And your, you know, searches on Amazon, you look for something on Amazon and you're, you're offered chances to buy more of those forever after.
[36:17.870 --> 36:21.170]  And it's like, no, I don't need three couches in my, in my small, uh, in my small home.
[36:21.170 --> 36:26.330]  Um, but the, the, uh, the whole thing is like, yeah, Amazon is a company that sells things to you.
[36:26.450 --> 36:30.310]  Google is a company that sells your eyeballs based on your, your profiles that builds up on you.
[36:30.830 --> 36:33.630]  And, uh, you know, what are they doing with this information?
[36:33.890 --> 36:36.530]  I want to see some open source implementations of things like this.
[36:36.650 --> 36:46.570]  I want to see something, you know, on a hackaday.io or whatever that I could put together myself out of a Raspberry Pi and learn about my own sleep patterns, but I don't want Amazon to do it for me.
[36:46.730 --> 36:55.690]  I think you raise a very good point in that these companies are, are developing technology, Amazon and Google, but they shouldn't be the ones selling it and using it.
[36:55.870 --> 37:09.250]  Develop the technology and then other, um, other organizations can use that technology to provide services, but having it all wrapped up into this one massive entity, that's scary.
[37:09.510 --> 37:11.990]  And that can, it's just ripe for abuse, Alex.
[37:13.470 --> 37:14.250]  Yeah, sure.
[37:14.450 --> 37:21.950]  I mean, I don't know if I entirely agree with this, you know, communist viewpoint of ownership of, uh, of source code.
[37:22.210 --> 37:22.890]  It's called development.
[37:22.990 --> 37:24.770]  You develop an idea and then you sell it.
[37:24.830 --> 37:25.570]  How is that coming?
[37:25.830 --> 37:26.190]  Oh, licensing too.
[37:26.290 --> 37:27.590]  I mean, there are plenty of things.
[37:28.310 --> 37:29.370]  I'm, I'm joking.
[37:29.590 --> 37:30.250]  I'm being facetious.
[37:30.250 --> 37:38.870]  So of course, you know, there's, there's problems with it, but I wanted to go back to the, um, you know, this radar monitoring of your sleep patterns as well.
[37:38.950 --> 37:53.470]  I mean, if you've got radar monitoring your bed, I mean, it's going to pick up in addition to sleepwalking and sleep patterns and whatnot, other activities that happen on your bed, you know, like, like sexual intercourse, right?
[37:53.630 --> 37:54.550]  It's definitely going to pick that up.
[37:54.650 --> 37:58.630]  It's going to have a distinct, uh, fingerprint, I'm sure.
[37:58.630 --> 38:17.910]  And I mean, look, I know we're only talking about three or four minutes of, of motion data here for, for everybody, but I think, you know, look, the, the frequency, the, uh, duration and all of these other characteristics of the activity that the radar could reveal seem really problematic to me.
[38:18.570 --> 38:19.030]  Yeah.
[38:19.170 --> 38:21.870]  And I can't imagine the ads that would be waiting for you in the morning too.
[38:21.870 --> 38:36.470]  You know, uh, I, I don't even want to venture a guess, but it's intrusive about the majority of course would be to guilt you into how you are inadequate and, uh, they have all the right things to sell you.
[38:36.750 --> 38:41.470]  There's that, that's, that's one thing, but there's many, many roads you can go down, but, uh, it's, it's intrusive.
[38:42.110 --> 38:47.990]  But if they're going to try to spin this as, you know, a positive thing, we're doing this to help you.
[38:47.990 --> 39:00.950]  And now I'm thinking about Amazon having this information and if they see, you know, if they're recording that kind of activity and they're seeing multiple different people coming in and out of your house, if they're seeing a lot of different faces, are they going to be like,
[39:01.450 --> 39:07.530]  Oh, here are, you know, we're going to serve you an ad for prophylactics and STD testing.
[39:08.250 --> 39:17.430]  Like I, I, it's an excellent question of where it's going to end, you know, and if they're going to track, like when you're getting out of bed in the morning, are they going to then tell your smart home to turn on the coffee maker?
[39:18.490 --> 39:20.850]  Like where, where, what's the point?
[39:21.070 --> 39:28.970]  I think that where's the end point and why are we also trying to say, Oh, um, you saw me holding a cake and it's your birthday.
[39:28.970 --> 39:30.710]  And of course it's a cake for you.
[39:30.990 --> 39:31.830]  Happy birthday.
[39:32.270 --> 39:32.750]  Yeah.
[39:32.930 --> 39:33.110]  Yeah.
[39:33.210 --> 39:36.750]  I get annoyed when, uh, insurance companies wish me happy birthday.
[39:36.970 --> 39:39.190]  How dare you leave me alone?
[39:39.430 --> 39:40.450]  You're not a person.
[39:40.630 --> 39:47.170]  You're, you're just a bot and, and, and you're trying to start a relationship of some sort and I'm not having it.
[39:47.330 --> 39:48.470]  Alex, I'm going to take a phone call.
[39:49.290 --> 39:50.190]  Oh yeah, sure.
[39:50.330 --> 39:51.310]  Do we have a call right now?
[39:51.310 --> 39:52.750]  We have a call, but go ahead and say what you want to say.
[39:52.990 --> 39:53.110]  Oh, okay.
[39:53.370 --> 39:57.650]  Uh, well look, I was just going to say, I think this, the sleepwalking subject is more interesting.
[39:57.790 --> 39:58.630]  How did we get into this?
[39:58.730 --> 40:11.070]  Talk about this too, but I wanted to mention that there have been quite a few cases where, uh, defendants have tried to avoid criminal liability by claiming that they were sleepwalking when they committed the crime.
[40:11.130 --> 40:16.650]  See, that I believe, I believe people claim they sleepwalk a lot, but I, I, I, I was just wondering how many people actually sleepwalk.
[40:17.110 --> 40:22.710]  Well, well, yeah, but in some of these cases are successful, you know, the sleepwalking defense, it doesn't fail all the time.
[40:22.850 --> 40:26.310]  There was a case in the 19th century of a guy who I think was in Massachusetts.
[40:26.310 --> 40:28.690]  He slipped the throat of a prostitute.
[40:28.870 --> 40:29.550]  In his sleep?
[40:29.750 --> 40:30.930]  That's what he wanted people to believe?
[40:30.930 --> 40:41.130]  Yeah, he slipped the throat of the prostitute in, in, uh, in a brothel and then set fire to the brothel, invoked the sleepwalking defense and, and was found not guilty.
[40:42.170 --> 40:47.050]  You know, even if you're sleepwalking, okay, you know, I, we don't have time for this, but we've really opened up the Pandora's.
[40:47.050 --> 40:48.770]  Only lawyers know these cases, I swear.
[40:48.770 --> 40:51.170]  Let's, uh, let's, let's take this phone call.
[40:51.250 --> 40:51.590]  Good evening.
[40:51.750 --> 40:52.650]  You're on off the go for time.
[40:52.750 --> 40:52.910]  Go ahead.
[40:54.610 --> 40:55.230]  Speak up.
[40:56.110 --> 40:57.250]  You sure there's somebody there?
[40:58.390 --> 40:58.930]  Well, there's nobody.
[40:59.270 --> 41:00.030]  Well, last chance.
[41:00.290 --> 41:00.830]  Well, okay.
[41:02.890 --> 41:05.950]  Uh, 802-321-4225 is our phone number.
[41:06.730 --> 41:07.730]  802-321-HACK.
[41:08.070 --> 41:08.850]  Please, uh, give us a call.
[41:09.030 --> 41:09.830]  Someone's sleepwalking.
[41:10.070 --> 41:10.970]  Maybe that's what it was.
[41:11.090 --> 41:11.990]  I thought it was a phone call.
[41:12.110 --> 41:12.930]  Well, I heard it ring.
[41:13.230 --> 41:13.350]  It did.
[41:13.350 --> 41:15.090]  And I just saw a caller ID go by, too.
[41:15.230 --> 41:15.510]  So somebody was...
[41:15.510 --> 41:16.370]  Yeah, I saw the caller ID.
[41:16.630 --> 41:18.470]  You saw the caller ID from all the way in Queens?
[41:18.470 --> 41:19.150]  Yeah, she's checking.
[41:19.510 --> 41:19.790]  Wow.
[41:20.290 --> 41:23.390]  Okay, well, um, uh, now we're getting a call.
[41:30.930 --> 41:31.950]  We believe it's from England.
[41:32.150 --> 41:32.830]  Is that true?
[41:34.210 --> 41:34.910]  Yes, it is.
[41:35.130 --> 41:37.010]  Well, and it's a loud person, too.
[41:37.550 --> 41:37.910]  Uh, great.
[41:38.010 --> 41:39.330]  Where in England are you calling from?
[41:40.190 --> 41:40.890]  Or are you...
[41:40.890 --> 41:41.550]  I'm calling from London.
[41:42.110 --> 41:43.030]  Okay, we've heard of that.
[41:43.150 --> 41:43.570]  That's great.
[41:43.570 --> 41:44.670]  What's, what's on your mind tonight?
[41:46.190 --> 41:50.230]  I was just wondering about the, the radar on the device in the bedroom.
[41:50.990 --> 41:51.390]  Okay.
[41:51.810 --> 41:54.830]  Well, we're not experts on this, but go ahead and ask your question.
[41:56.150 --> 41:58.670]  No, it's just if I got a speeding ticket, I would pay the money.
[41:59.570 --> 41:59.930]  Uh-huh.
[42:07.840 --> 42:09.220]  That's a great call.
[42:10.160 --> 42:12.100]  Is it over, or are we still there?
[42:12.560 --> 42:15.060]  No, no, I was waiting for the response, basically.
[42:15.360 --> 42:16.400]  It's all about timing, comedy.
[42:16.400 --> 42:17.420]  No, that was brilliant.
[42:17.880 --> 42:18.060]  Yeah.
[42:18.800 --> 42:19.340]  Well done.
[42:20.840 --> 42:22.500]  It's been a while since I phoned up.
[42:22.560 --> 42:23.520]  This is Zap from London.
[42:23.660 --> 42:24.920]  I thought I'd phone up and say hello to you.
[42:24.960 --> 42:25.800]  Oh, it's Zap.
[42:25.880 --> 42:26.420]  How are you doing, Zap?
[42:26.620 --> 42:27.540]  Oh, it's Zap.
[42:27.620 --> 42:28.160]  How are you?
[42:28.220 --> 42:29.820]  Yeah, it's a vibing, a vibing air.
[42:29.820 --> 42:30.580]  It's not too bad.
[42:30.780 --> 42:35.340]  How is the country dealing with the loss of Euro 2020?
[42:36.840 --> 42:39.360]  Well, I don't know if you heard, but there was riots.
[42:39.540 --> 42:40.760]  There was smashing of bottles.
[42:41.960 --> 42:45.060]  People were putting flares up, orifices in their body.
[42:45.060 --> 42:47.640]  So, no reaction, nothing unusual at all, then?
[42:48.900 --> 42:51.980]  This is pandemonium, and this is before we lost.
[42:53.780 --> 42:56.400]  You know, it was going to be a riot if you won, it was going to be a riot if you lost.
[42:56.400 --> 42:57.000]  We all knew that.
[42:57.180 --> 43:00.340]  The racism was terrible, but again, we saw it coming, right?
[43:01.520 --> 43:03.900]  Yep, I mean, things have changed a little bit.
[43:04.140 --> 43:07.720]  The country is going a bit crazy, especially after Brexit.
[43:07.720 --> 43:09.320]  We survived, more or less.
[43:09.780 --> 43:11.920]  There has been no shortages of food.
[43:12.120 --> 43:16.700]  You guys went through Brexit and the pandemic, basically, at the same time.
[43:17.800 --> 43:20.800]  Yeah, it was like they were distracting us with the pandemic.
[43:22.440 --> 43:23.680]  Wow, I can't imagine.
[43:23.820 --> 43:25.680]  Yeah, I can't imagine what it's like.
[43:25.960 --> 43:28.860]  Apart from that, more or less everything's all right, really.
[43:29.620 --> 43:32.060]  But one thing that is on my mind is the meetings.
[43:32.540 --> 43:32.940]  Yes.
[43:32.960 --> 43:33.700]  Going to a meeting.
[43:35.900 --> 43:37.980]  We're trying to get the London meeting sorted out.
[43:38.680 --> 43:43.820]  And after 28 years, we're going to sort of swap or change the starting venues, the plan.
[43:44.040 --> 43:44.240]  Okay.
[43:45.000 --> 43:46.520]  And move it somewhere else.
[43:47.580 --> 43:49.820]  We're still in discussions about where it's going to be.
[43:50.020 --> 43:55.100]  And, of course, we're not actually coming out of a full lockdown until Monday, the 19th of July.
[43:55.540 --> 44:01.980]  So the earliest we could do it would probably be in August if our percentages on the vaccines are up.
[44:02.180 --> 44:04.600]  Yeah, that's the next meeting anyway would be in August.
[44:05.160 --> 44:09.600]  Last week, you guys weren't above 40%, but I think you might be above 40% now.
[44:09.600 --> 44:10.300]  Is that true?
[44:10.720 --> 44:14.060]  I think we are now because I think we were 39 on the second jab.
[44:14.840 --> 44:17.520]  And I think we had 60 on the first one.
[44:18.240 --> 44:19.660]  So we were just under.
[44:19.800 --> 44:22.960]  So we couldn't do an official meeting, even though we had a renegade meeting.
[44:23.700 --> 44:26.320]  People that have been vaccinated decided to meet in a pub.
[44:26.560 --> 44:30.260]  And you can't stop people from doing things because that's not how a meeting works.
[44:30.440 --> 44:32.760]  But the official meeting was actually held online.
[44:33.720 --> 44:33.900]  Okay.
[44:34.200 --> 44:34.500]  All right.
[44:36.040 --> 44:36.560]  Yeah.
[44:36.800 --> 44:44.160]  We had our first meetings since the pandemic began this month in July in a limited number of places.
[44:44.240 --> 44:44.900]  in the States.
[44:45.200 --> 44:52.560]  But we're looking, as always, to expand to other places that have reached a safe level and where you can gather in person.
[44:54.540 --> 44:55.880]  I unfortunately won't be.
[44:56.280 --> 44:56.700]  Yeah.
[44:56.900 --> 45:00.120]  I see you're at 52.2% right now, according to the stats I'm looking at.
[45:00.240 --> 45:02.660]  So, yeah, you guys are fine, according to this.
[45:04.400 --> 45:06.300]  Yeah, I think the other people will be fine.
[45:06.400 --> 45:09.400]  Unfortunately, I won't be able to go again because I'm not vaccinated.
[45:09.540 --> 45:11.860]  I'm not planning to get vaccinated due to reasons.
[45:12.540 --> 45:13.640]  More medical, really.
[45:14.380 --> 45:14.560]  Okay.
[45:14.800 --> 45:19.960]  Well, have you talked to a doctor that agrees with your assessment?
[45:20.160 --> 45:21.600]  So that you know you're making the right decision?
[45:23.760 --> 45:28.840]  I have mentioned it to my doctor to say this is my decision, and he said it's up to the individual.
[45:29.020 --> 45:29.180]  Okay.
[45:29.580 --> 45:37.320]  But you've asked people that are not vaccinated not really to attend, and I'd like to follow that because it is important that everyone does that.
[45:37.500 --> 45:37.680]  Right.
[45:38.140 --> 45:43.700]  Unfortunately, because we meet in a bar, we can't guarantee that everyone in there is going to be vaccinated.
[45:44.100 --> 45:44.220]  Right.
[45:44.320 --> 45:47.920]  So people are aware of the dangers, and it has to be made clear.
[45:49.320 --> 45:59.300]  But the one thing we do do is we do a mid-month meeting, and maybe I might be able to go to a mid-month because that's held on a Saturday, and it's in a bar, and it's not official.
[46:00.240 --> 46:00.640]  Okay.
[46:00.720 --> 46:02.600]  Well, just be safe whatever you do.
[46:02.600 --> 46:13.020]  I do appreciate the honesty, but you've got to make sure you look out for yourself and make the right decision and let others know so that there's no, you know, misunderstandings or anything.
[46:14.060 --> 46:17.560]  And not only yourself, but you must be aware of your family members.
[46:17.560 --> 46:21.260]  You are putting them at risk if you are attending meetings without being vaccinated.
[46:21.540 --> 46:21.700]  Of course.
[46:22.080 --> 46:23.760]  Even public transport.
[46:24.100 --> 46:29.060]  And from the 19th, I believe you don't have to wear masks in the general public.
[46:29.700 --> 46:34.640]  Luckily, our mayor has had the sense to say that you need to wear a mask on public transport.
[46:34.840 --> 46:37.160]  So you still will have to wear a mask on public transport.
[46:37.360 --> 46:39.360]  That's the tube, the buses, and trains, I assume.
[46:39.480 --> 46:39.740]  Okay.
[46:39.900 --> 46:45.100]  So did he override Boris Johnson, or was that always the policy?
[46:46.560 --> 46:51.660]  No, I think he's overridden it because I think Boris Johnson has said that you don't have to wear a mask if you don't want to.
[46:52.000 --> 46:54.600]  I'm not too sure what the shops and retail are going to do.
[46:54.600 --> 46:55.000]  Uh-huh.
[46:55.140 --> 46:59.540]  Because there's a lot of people that have been ignoring those kind of rules for quite some time anyway.
[47:00.400 --> 47:01.740]  Yeah, we've had the same problem.
[47:03.460 --> 47:10.960]  And then you get the protests, which is just basically a spreader of the disease because they're saying, we're in full lockdown.
[47:11.160 --> 47:11.680]  No, we're not.
[47:11.780 --> 47:13.640]  We can do more or less what we want to do.
[47:14.320 --> 47:15.440]  We just need to be sensible.
[47:15.700 --> 47:20.280]  Unfortunately, as you saw on Monday with the soccer, there's a lot of English people that are not very sensible.
[47:20.700 --> 47:22.920]  Well, we are familiar with people like that.
[47:23.140 --> 47:27.520]  And yeah, I think they all have the same basic agenda, which I'm not sure what it is.
[47:29.180 --> 47:30.460]  Yeah, I don't know.
[47:30.560 --> 47:32.940]  I mean, I know that it's, for me, it's medical reasons.
[47:33.120 --> 47:39.520]  I know one other hacker who's old school, who is not going to take the vaccine for his own reasons.
[47:40.140 --> 47:43.100]  I think with the Pfizer here, you have to have double jab.
[47:43.300 --> 47:47.340]  And they're talking about doing a booster shot come the autumn, like they do the flu shot.
[47:47.480 --> 47:47.760]  Yeah.
[47:47.760 --> 47:49.340]  So that will be three injections.
[47:50.740 --> 47:55.120]  Other people are more or less still on their first one because they did it by age.
[47:55.560 --> 48:05.100]  Now, I'm old, so I was near the top of the list, whereas a lot of our younger attendees are in their 20s, have only recently been offered the vaccine.
[48:05.380 --> 48:06.940]  So they've only got their first one.
[48:07.040 --> 48:09.280]  And everyone really wants to go to a meeting.
[48:09.300 --> 48:16.600]  And I've said, look, the rules state that you need to get double jabbed to go if it's going to be 100% kosher.
[48:16.900 --> 48:19.160]  So, you know, people are complaining.
[48:19.380 --> 48:20.760]  But you can't...
[48:20.760 --> 48:21.620]  It's like herding cats.
[48:22.120 --> 48:24.360]  I was trying to do the job, trying to get the input.
[48:24.800 --> 48:25.720]  And you can't.
[48:25.800 --> 48:26.180]  We're hackers.
[48:26.320 --> 48:28.000]  We find ways to break the rules.
[48:28.160 --> 48:30.280]  And it's like, you're not allowed to ask.
[48:30.360 --> 48:31.440]  You're not allowed to police it.
[48:31.440 --> 48:36.300]  So it's like, look, just assume everyone's not been jabbed.
[48:36.460 --> 48:37.280]  He's got the corona.
[48:37.600 --> 48:44.500]  And that way, you'll just take precautions and your threat assessment will work and just enjoy and try and get on with life again, really.
[48:44.760 --> 48:44.900]  Yeah.
[48:45.060 --> 48:46.240]  Now, you said it very well.
[48:46.420 --> 48:52.180]  And there are precautions to take, even if you are not vaccinated, that, you know, you don't have to be shut in or anything like that.
[48:52.740 --> 48:54.860]  And, you know, keep an eye on what's going on in the world.
[48:55.080 --> 48:55.920]  Follow the science.
[48:55.920 --> 49:01.460]  And, you know, basically act accordingly based on the situations.
[49:02.840 --> 49:03.020]  Yep.
[49:04.220 --> 49:07.480]  Yeah, it's the best thing to do, really, to try to keep on top of it.
[49:07.580 --> 49:17.420]  But anyway, just before you go, apparently, at the Hope Conference last year, I was at the talent show, I think the second one.
[49:17.700 --> 49:22.360]  And apparently, everyone that ended got some kind of prize or swag or something.
[49:22.600 --> 49:26.360]  And I never heard back, even though I was on it, even if I didn't do anything I just said hello.
[49:26.540 --> 49:27.940]  I was just wondering what happened to my swag.
[49:28.780 --> 49:35.800]  You know, I don't remember what exactly we offered to whom, but I can certainly look into that.
[49:37.760 --> 49:44.960]  Because I'm sure it was sent if you were promised something, but we can see if it was or if it was returned or something like that.
[49:45.100 --> 49:47.160]  But email us.
[49:47.240 --> 49:49.260]  I didn't give my address, so I don't know.
[49:49.260 --> 49:50.280]  You have to give the address.
[49:50.460 --> 49:52.540]  How are they going to admit it if you didn't give the address?
[49:52.560 --> 49:53.540]  Well, it was done on Matrix.
[49:53.540 --> 49:55.380]  Some guy after said, get your emails.
[49:55.640 --> 49:57.700]  And I gave my email, I think it was on the Matrix system.
[49:57.920 --> 49:58.160]  Okay.
[49:58.260 --> 49:59.160]  And I never heard anything.
[49:59.360 --> 50:04.240]  But I get a lot of spam and everything comes in there because I have to run 2600 and a few other things.
[50:04.940 --> 50:07.400]  So all the information comes into my account.
[50:07.520 --> 50:08.940]  And then some of you know what it is.
[50:09.400 --> 50:12.920]  And basically, I don't know if I missed it or whatever, but I never heard anything.
[50:13.060 --> 50:15.700]  I tried reaching out on Twitter, never heard anything.
[50:16.140 --> 50:20.060]  Reached out to Jason Scott and basically said, get in touch with 2600.
[50:20.060 --> 50:22.440]  So I thought, just while I'm on the phone, I'll have a little niggle.
[50:23.300 --> 50:27.940]  Send us a reminder, OTH at 2600.com, and we'll definitely follow up on that.
[50:28.080 --> 50:30.180]  Because Twitter is not the best way to get a hold of people.
[50:30.460 --> 50:31.920]  We miss a lot of things on Twitter.
[50:32.100 --> 50:33.720]  But email almost always gets through.
[50:34.940 --> 50:38.960]  And there's nothing we hate to see more than Zap being swagless.
[50:39.100 --> 50:39.800]  Yeah, absolutely.
[50:40.100 --> 50:41.140]  You deserve it more than anything.
[50:41.160 --> 50:41.980]  Oh, come on, guys.
[50:42.300 --> 50:45.480]  You sorted me out in the past, and I've sorted you out in the past.
[50:45.480 --> 50:49.520]  You gave us a lot of UK souvenirs that we still use on a daily basis.
[50:50.640 --> 50:51.840]  2012, I remember it.
[50:51.960 --> 50:55.980]  But just to say, I get my subscription, which I'm very thankful for.
[50:56.080 --> 50:57.080]  So I don't really need anything.
[50:57.220 --> 50:58.820]  I just want to moan, because I'm English.
[50:58.980 --> 51:00.520]  And that's what the English do, we moan.
[51:01.660 --> 51:02.960]  And you whinge, right?
[51:03.080 --> 51:03.640]  You whinge.
[51:04.280 --> 51:04.820]  Yeah, that's right.
[51:04.920 --> 51:05.160]  We whinge.
[51:05.200 --> 51:07.020]  Whinging poms is what the Australians call us.
[51:07.560 --> 51:08.160]  But anyway.
[51:08.860 --> 51:09.420]  Happy to have you.
[51:09.440 --> 51:10.080]  Lovely talking to you, guys.
[51:10.180 --> 51:10.760]  There you go.
[51:10.900 --> 51:11.640]  Great hearing from you.
[51:11.640 --> 51:17.340]  Paul is in, and I'll be in touch, and you know me, I'll always stay informed with you guys and let you know what's happening.
[51:17.680 --> 51:17.880]  All right.
[51:17.880 --> 51:18.880]  Hope to see you again soon.
[51:20.040 --> 51:20.400]  Yeah.
[51:20.720 --> 51:20.940]  All right.
[51:21.040 --> 51:21.340]  Take care.
[51:22.260 --> 51:22.500]  Okay.
[51:22.660 --> 51:22.880]  Bye.
[51:23.100 --> 51:23.240]  Bye.
[51:23.800 --> 51:25.120]  Our friend Zap from London.
[51:25.400 --> 51:26.240]  Good to hear from him.
[51:26.440 --> 51:27.080]  Really good to hear from him.
[51:27.080 --> 51:27.640]  Yeah, he sounds well.
[51:27.920 --> 51:28.140]  Yeah.
[51:28.520 --> 51:30.920]  Our phone number, 802-321-4225.
[51:31.100 --> 51:34.320]  If anyone else is out there who wants to speak to us in our remaining minutes.
[51:34.740 --> 51:36.080]  Again, we're not on next week.
[51:36.360 --> 51:41.560]  We'll be on in two weeks with another exciting edition of Off the Hook and Off the Hook Overtime.
[51:41.640 --> 51:45.840]  You can write to us, O-T-H at 2600.com.
[51:46.580 --> 51:49.280]  You can follow us on Twitter, Hacker Radio Show.
[51:49.820 --> 51:52.740]  Any other points of contact we want to share with people as long as we're doing that?
[51:54.020 --> 51:54.380]  No?
[51:54.540 --> 51:54.840]  That's it?
[51:54.880 --> 51:57.980]  If you see one of us on the street, give us a nice friendly wave.
[51:58.780 --> 51:58.980]  Yeah.
[51:59.180 --> 51:59.360]  Yeah.
[51:59.500 --> 52:00.320]  Here's a phone call.
[52:03.120 --> 52:03.800]  Did we pick up?
[52:03.880 --> 52:04.040]  Okay.
[52:04.460 --> 52:05.000]  And good evening.
[52:05.160 --> 52:06.060]  You're on Off the Hook Overtime.
[52:07.400 --> 52:08.160]  Can you hear me?
[52:08.280 --> 52:08.980]  We hear you fine.
[52:11.640 --> 52:12.220]  I'm from Missouri.
[52:12.440 --> 52:13.460]  I called you a couple weeks ago.
[52:13.620 --> 52:13.900]  Oh, yeah.
[52:13.980 --> 52:14.320]  I remember that.
[52:15.180 --> 52:15.560]  Yeah.
[52:16.600 --> 52:20.060]  While I was listening in, I kind of got in late on the conversation.
[52:20.260 --> 52:31.120]  But while you were talking about Amazon and the Echoes and everything, why isn't there an open source project on this?
[52:31.800 --> 52:44.520]  I mean, all we would take was, like, a Raspberry Pi and, like, you know, some libraries in Python, right, to be able to do voice recognition.
[52:45.140 --> 52:48.620]  Well, are we sure that there aren't projects?
[52:50.200 --> 52:57.240]  Well, I'll keep looking through my repository because I've been wanting to fiddle around with it on my Linux distro, and I can't find it anywhere.
[52:59.960 --> 53:00.920]  Uh-huh.
[53:00.920 --> 53:03.680]  The voice processing is something that's really hard to do locally.
[53:04.300 --> 53:11.600]  Amazon's power with Alexa is that it's all cloud-based, and they can put their massive amounts of computing power behind the AI that generates the voice.
[53:11.720 --> 53:15.680]  But there is a project called Mycroft that's like Sherlock's brother.
[53:15.840 --> 53:16.200]  Mycroft.
[53:16.480 --> 53:22.900]  M-Y-C-R-O-F-T dot A-I is the website that you can go to to get more information on that.
[53:22.900 --> 53:24.280]  And it's been making leaps and bounds.
[53:24.740 --> 53:26.740]  And, you know, I've...
[53:26.740 --> 53:30.760]  Every so often I check in on it because I'm really interested to see if they get anywhere.
[53:30.940 --> 53:36.880]  And I would like to see it grow into something that is as easily usable as the Amazon version.
[53:37.240 --> 53:47.220]  I think if they make the hardware and their platform so undesirable that people will want to jailbreak their Alexa to move on to these other systems...
[53:47.220 --> 53:48.100]  I want to do that right now.
[53:48.100 --> 53:49.060]  Just take the hardware.
[53:49.320 --> 53:58.440]  Can you imagine people that they're just so unhappy with what the manufacturer is providing, they just abandon, like free it and sideload something that works on a different network?
[53:59.540 --> 54:09.060]  Well, as a guy who keeps getting abducted by aliens that night, I welcome the opportunity to be able to set up a system where I can detect intruder aliens coming through my wall.
[54:09.920 --> 54:11.000]  I'm just joking.
[54:11.120 --> 54:11.660]  I'm sorry.
[54:12.060 --> 54:13.300]  Okay, well, we took you seriously.
[54:13.820 --> 54:16.420]  But, you know, alien abduction, that's a serious issue these days.
[54:16.540 --> 54:17.020]  And the radar.
[54:17.200 --> 54:17.960]  That's where the radar...
[54:17.960 --> 54:18.220]  Uh-huh.
[54:18.260 --> 54:18.940]  We'll figure that out.
[54:19.040 --> 54:20.000]  We'll get that library going.
[54:20.860 --> 54:21.780]  Anything else, caller?
[54:22.200 --> 54:23.400]  Anything else you want to share with us?
[54:24.220 --> 54:25.180]  That's something else.
[54:25.320 --> 54:28.360]  This UFO thing with Congress, right?
[54:29.060 --> 54:29.540]  Yeah.
[54:29.600 --> 54:37.900]  Now, I saw that half of the money went to a guy named Bigelow, who runs Bigelow Aerospace, right?
[54:38.160 --> 54:38.500]  Yes.
[54:39.240 --> 54:43.560]  Well, he owns this place called Skinwalker Ranch out in Nevada.
[54:44.060 --> 54:44.860]  No, Utah.
[54:44.860 --> 54:45.340]  I'm sorry.
[54:46.700 --> 55:03.780]  And I just think it's really disingenuous for us to waste taxpayer money on this stuff, when it could be used for something, you know, realistic, like, you know, helping out the needy or something like that.
[55:04.440 --> 55:19.840]  But, I mean, nobody, uh, happy these, um, happy these right-wingers don't have a problem with paying millions of dollars to see if there's a, a green alien, like, hanging out around an aircraft carrier, which is most likely just an out-of-focus, um, infrared camera,
[55:20.080 --> 55:24.580]  which has been proven time and time again from, you know, people debunking it, just on YouTube.
[55:25.680 --> 55:36.700]  But, um, you know, um, it just, it just seems odd that we are so caught up in the weird stuff and we can't just kind of focus on what's really going on around us.
[55:38.560 --> 55:40.740]  Yeah, I think, I think that's true.
[55:41.000 --> 55:57.980]  There's, um, the resurgence of it, I think, has been in part due to the suspicion that maybe, um, the more logical answer is that it is, there is an explanation and it's a lot more, um, it's a lot more near earth.
[55:58.460 --> 56:02.020]  And so that hysteria, to a degree, I think, has fueled it.
[56:02.160 --> 56:04.280]  Is it right-wingers, though, that are mostly interested in aliens?
[56:04.400 --> 56:05.520]  I didn't know it was a right-wing-left thing.
[56:05.520 --> 56:08.180]  I thought that might be one of the few things that wasn't.
[56:08.380 --> 56:09.760]  Well, you'd be surprised.
[56:10.420 --> 56:17.660]  Um, I, I mean, these, these guys are just totally, totally off the wall about things anyway.
[56:17.920 --> 56:35.360]  It's just, don't buy into aliens, like, you know, trying to circumvent our, like, um, defense structure, but, you know, having a, having a, a, a, a boat that is, like, um, legit and everything, you know, um, that's, that's a bridge too far because, you know,
[56:35.360 --> 56:38.380]  it can't possibly happen because poor Trump got his butt kicked.
[56:39.220 --> 56:39.920]  You know what I mean?
[56:40.160 --> 56:40.620]  Yeah, yeah.
[56:41.100 --> 56:43.280]  Definitely, uh, related, I suppose.
[56:43.980 --> 56:45.680]  Um, hey, we're almost at the end of the show.
[56:45.760 --> 56:46.760]  Any, any concluding remarks?
[56:48.380 --> 56:59.080]  Um, well, just, um, I just want to see some more of the source, um, projects with, um, you know, with, um, with something like an Echo or something like that.
[56:59.080 --> 57:00.100]  Yeah, that would be great.
[57:00.120 --> 57:11.840]  I bought one of those, like, yeah, I bought one of those little cheap things from, like, um, uh, uh, micro, micro center, but, uh, you have to use, um, uh, Amazon stuff to be able to run it, and you have to use a push button on it.
[57:11.900 --> 57:18.480]  You can't even use the voice, voice part of it because, you know, I guess they don't want that feature out there for free.
[57:18.820 --> 57:25.380]  Well, actually, um, we, we had one like that where you had to push the button, and then they just introduced a feature that allowed you to bypass that.
[57:25.380 --> 57:29.860]  So check, check your settings, your account, you might be able to get past pushing the button.
[57:30.720 --> 57:31.160]  Okay.
[57:31.660 --> 57:36.340]  Uh, what do you think about the, um, about Apple, like, cracking down on this Hackintosh stuff?
[57:36.760 --> 57:55.180]  I mean, we can build a car, you know, part for part without, you know, Ford or somebody bugging us about it, but if you do the same thing with, you know, stuff that you collect on your own, uh, parts that build something like a Hackintosh, here comes Apple knocking on your door,
[57:55.280 --> 57:56.040]  threatening to sue you.
[57:56.320 --> 57:59.180]  Well, Apple has always been Apple, and this doesn't surprise me at all.
[57:59.300 --> 58:01.240]  That's, that's how they, they run their business.
[58:02.320 --> 58:15.560]  Yeah, they really, uh, really, um, cling to that control of, uh, the hardware and down vertically through to software and end user and customers, and they want to curate that process at every step.
[58:15.700 --> 58:17.620]  And way too many of their customers buy into it.
[58:17.740 --> 58:19.880]  They keep, they keep buying the same products over and over again.
[58:19.880 --> 58:27.480]  You know, people who have iPhones have bought, like, five of them or six of them or more over the years, and it's just, you know, how do you argue with that?
[58:27.500 --> 58:27.760]  It's like my iPad.
[58:27.880 --> 58:33.140]  My iPad doesn't want to install any new software anymore because it's, you know, out of date.
[58:33.240 --> 58:34.080]  Yeah, you gotta get a new one.
[58:34.720 --> 58:35.540]  But they won't...
[58:35.540 --> 58:39.580]  Yeah, it's, it's built in, it's built in, um, um, I won't call it.
[58:40.280 --> 58:41.420]  Well, well, you know what I'm talking about.
[58:41.520 --> 58:42.880]  It's just built in obsolescence.
[58:43.500 --> 58:44.180]  Yes, that's what it is.
[58:44.200 --> 58:44.980]  It shouldn't be around.
[58:45.660 --> 58:46.300]  Planned obsolescence.
[58:46.300 --> 59:05.740]  There's a fantastic book about this called Made to Break, uh, and it goes into how, through history, this has been, um, uh, repeatedly, uh, been a part of, of business and, um, up to and including geopolitics and, uh, various forms of sabotage.
[59:05.860 --> 59:10.260]  Kind of, a lot of, like, what we've been talking to with some of the ransomware and physical infrastructure.
[59:10.400 --> 59:14.000]  I bought a copy of that book, but then the text stopped being readable and I have to buy it again.
[59:14.000 --> 59:15.960]  Now, imagine if that was happening.
[59:16.320 --> 59:18.080]  You, you wouldn't tolerate that, right?
[59:18.120 --> 59:24.160]  Well, I bought, I bought, like, a game, um, off of iTunes back in, like, 2003 or something like that.
[59:24.280 --> 59:26.820]  Just something to watch on, on my computer one night.
[59:26.820 --> 59:27.080]  Uh-huh.
[59:27.820 --> 59:38.560]  And, uh, a few, uh, a few, uh, years later, uh, I couldn't use it anymore because they stopped serving it or whatever or they have some new thing with it and they asked me to buy it again and I was like, nope.
[59:38.980 --> 59:40.520]  No, you never buy the same thing.
[59:40.780 --> 59:41.180]  Yeah.
[59:41.360 --> 59:41.820]  Yeah, twice.
[59:42.080 --> 59:43.720]  Kyle, you found, you found the book.
[59:43.720 --> 59:53.520]  Yeah, this is one, I, I should, like, put together a list of stuff, but when we used to travel, I started grabbing books from, uh, from our, uh, collection people give us.
[59:53.600 --> 59:55.680]  Wait, you make that sound so sad when we used to travel.
[59:55.840 --> 01:00:11.280]  Well, I was being a little jokey there, but no, uh, I, I, I had a pretty good list of things I was reading and this is one of the first ones I grabbed from, uh, from the office and, uh, uh, it's by, uh, it's by Giles Slade, but, um, people give us technology stuff and over the years and,
[01:00:11.380 --> 01:00:15.860]  and, um, there's an enormous backlog of things we want to read and travel.
[01:00:15.860 --> 01:00:17.000]  It's a full room of stuff.
[01:00:17.960 --> 01:00:18.420]  So, this is...
[01:00:18.420 --> 01:00:21.040]  We have, like, a 2600, um, book readers club.
[01:00:21.240 --> 01:00:24.660]  Yeah, we should put lists out, because I, I had a pretty good list going of, of...
[01:00:24.660 --> 01:00:25.220]  Just put it in the magazine.
[01:00:25.240 --> 01:00:26.740]  We have book reviews in the magazine.
[01:00:26.900 --> 01:00:27.440]  We have lots of them.
[01:00:27.560 --> 01:00:29.100]  That's a new feature, yeah, but you're right.
[01:00:29.440 --> 01:00:32.600]  Um, lists of stuff people have been enjoying, but it's great, great insight.
[01:00:32.600 --> 01:00:34.680]  Um, and that is so true.
[01:00:34.920 --> 01:00:37.520]  Sterling releases stuff all the time on Spotify.
[01:00:37.660 --> 01:00:38.340]  Absolutely, yes.
[01:00:38.580 --> 01:00:39.180]  For free on the internet.
[01:00:39.380 --> 01:00:39.560]  Uh-huh.
[01:00:39.800 --> 01:00:41.060]  Well, he has a long tradition of that.
[01:00:41.360 --> 01:00:42.300]  Hey, listen, we've got to run.
[01:00:42.700 --> 01:00:45.900]  We're in overtime on overtime, so, uh, thanks again for your call.
[01:00:46.020 --> 01:00:46.740]  Thanks for your support.
[01:00:46.880 --> 01:00:47.640]  We'll be able to talk to you again.
[01:00:48.600 --> 01:00:50.320]  Okay, hopefully next Wednesday or whatnot.
[01:00:50.640 --> 01:00:51.220]  Not next Wednesday.
[01:00:51.220 --> 01:00:52.720]  We're not on next Wednesday, but in two weeks.
[01:00:53.560 --> 01:00:54.560]  Oh, okay, that'd be fine.
[01:00:54.720 --> 01:00:54.980]  All right.
[01:00:55.180 --> 01:00:56.840]  Uh, hopefully I can call you back again and whatnot.
[01:00:57.160 --> 01:00:57.600]  Yes, definitely.
[01:00:57.820 --> 01:00:58.300]  I like talking to you guys.
[01:00:58.360 --> 01:00:59.480]  All right, well, we're here.
[01:01:00.120 --> 01:01:00.520]  All right.
[01:01:00.560 --> 01:01:00.840]  All right.
[01:01:01.040 --> 01:01:01.360]  Take care.
[01:01:02.600 --> 01:01:09.240]  And, again, you can write to us, O-T-H at 2600.com, either for Off the Hook or Off the Hook Overtime.
[01:01:09.320 --> 01:01:09.920]  We, we share.
[01:01:10.500 --> 01:01:13.120]  And, um, any closing thoughts from you guys?
[01:01:13.300 --> 01:01:15.860]  Anything you want to say before we disappear for two weeks?
[01:01:17.860 --> 01:01:18.860]  It's warm outside.
[01:01:19.060 --> 01:01:19.440]  Stay cool.
[01:01:20.920 --> 01:01:21.380]  Clever.
[01:01:21.500 --> 01:01:22.080]  Very, very nice.
[01:01:22.240 --> 01:01:22.500]  Kyle?
[01:01:24.620 --> 01:01:31.940]  Um, well, you know, don't lose sight of what's important and, um, stay positive.
[01:01:31.940 --> 01:01:32.380]  Uh-huh.
[01:01:32.560 --> 01:01:33.140]  Yeah, that's great.
[01:01:33.280 --> 01:01:33.480]  Okay.
[01:01:33.740 --> 01:01:34.260]  Have fun.
[01:01:34.420 --> 01:01:34.700]  Uh-huh.
[01:01:35.160 --> 01:01:36.720]  Um, be careful what you hack.
[01:01:37.360 --> 01:01:48.720]  Um, and, you know, yeah, obliterate your adversaries, um, take control, destroy all of their data.
[01:01:48.900 --> 01:01:49.240]  Build it up.
[01:01:49.240 --> 01:01:49.700]  Come on.
[01:01:49.820 --> 01:01:50.620]  End with a flush.
[01:01:51.400 --> 01:01:55.940]  Yeah, yeah, because nothing, you know, what is reality anyway?
[01:01:56.660 --> 01:01:56.900]  Gila?
[01:01:57.620 --> 01:02:03.060]  Uh, if you or someone you love have been sleepwalking, please let us know.
[01:02:03.280 --> 01:02:04.500]  Share video if possible.
[01:02:04.940 --> 01:02:06.040]  We'd love to see it.
[01:02:06.400 --> 01:02:09.420]  Yeah, if there's a sleepwalker, like, alliance or something, there's gotta be.
[01:02:09.620 --> 01:02:11.200]  You know, I don't mean to make light of any of this.
[01:02:11.320 --> 01:02:12.060]  Just, this is my ignorance.
[01:02:12.220 --> 01:02:13.460]  I don't know anything about it.
[01:02:13.540 --> 01:02:18.740]  And I just thought it was a TV device that was, uh, but I'm sorry if I offended any sleepwalkers out there.
[01:02:18.920 --> 01:02:19.700]  Uh, Alex, go ahead.
[01:02:20.500 --> 01:02:27.740]  I just wanted to say, if you have been sleepwalking and you have committed a crime, call me if you need a lawyer.
[01:02:28.040 --> 01:02:30.380]  You specialize in sleepwalking cases, right?
[01:02:30.460 --> 01:02:33.640]  I can hardly wait to see this on TV at three in the morning.
[01:02:33.780 --> 01:02:34.640]  Are you a sleepwalker?
[01:02:35.000 --> 01:02:35.900]  We can help.
[01:02:36.480 --> 01:02:37.900]  Call 1-800-whatever.
[01:02:38.080 --> 01:02:38.640]  Okay, great.
[01:02:39.160 --> 01:02:48.460]  Uh, well, uh, my closing thoughts, uh, stay, stay healthy, stay happy, uh, uh, be obnoxious, be alert, share your information, and we will see you in two weeks.
[01:02:49.140 --> 01:02:49.800]  Good night.