[00:00.000 --> 00:02.080]  Heard Wednesdays at 6.30 p.m.
[00:02.140 --> 00:05.220]  right after the WBAI evening news.
[00:05.440 --> 00:10.560]  Stay tuned for Off the Hook, coming up in mere seconds.
[00:10.900 --> 00:17.960]  And once again, this is WBAI New York, 99.5 FM and WBAI.org online.
[00:18.340 --> 00:21.560]  Stay tuned for Off the Hook, coming up.
[00:40.970 --> 00:41.530]  Hello?
[00:43.070 --> 00:44.050]  WBAI New York.
[00:44.510 --> 00:45.710]  It's 7 p.m.
[00:46.270 --> 00:48.810]  And that means it's time for Off the Hook.
[01:13.090 --> 01:15.950]  I hope that song is good, Monday night, no!
[02:26.070 --> 02:27.970]  And a very good evening to everybody.
[02:28.090 --> 02:29.970]  The program is Off the Hook.
[02:30.150 --> 02:31.290]  Emmanuel Goldstein here with you.
[02:31.890 --> 02:33.490]  Joined tonight by Kyle.
[02:33.850 --> 02:34.610]  Over here.
[02:35.170 --> 02:38.630]  And over in Skypeland, we have Rob T.
[02:38.750 --> 02:39.190]  Firefly.
[02:40.050 --> 02:40.810]  Good evening.
[02:41.110 --> 02:41.890]  We have Gila.
[02:42.350 --> 02:43.130]  Good evening.
[02:43.490 --> 02:44.630]  And we have Alex.
[02:45.330 --> 02:46.490]  Good evening, all.
[02:48.570 --> 02:51.070]  Well, I'd like to start with a story, if that's okay with everybody.
[02:51.070 --> 02:53.110]  Just because it's been on my mind.
[02:53.790 --> 02:55.630]  And, you know, we live in stressful times.
[02:55.810 --> 03:02.150]  And I just went through a bit of a stressful period a couple of days ago where I was going to the supermarket.
[03:02.850 --> 03:05.690]  You know, and something that I used to take for granted.
[03:06.670 --> 03:13.830]  And as I walked in the door, I suddenly thought to myself, Should I be wearing a mask?
[03:14.010 --> 03:15.670]  Or shouldn't I be wearing a mask?
[03:15.710 --> 03:26.050]  You know, because I've been hearing all kinds of advice saying, If you go inside now, because of the Delta variant and all the unvaccinated people, Maybe it's a good idea to wear a mask again when you go inside.
[03:26.530 --> 03:29.650]  But here I was outside, right at the automatic door.
[03:30.390 --> 03:31.950]  Do I wear a mask or don't I?
[03:31.970 --> 03:34.550]  And I saw the sign saying, We recommend that you wear a mask.
[03:34.870 --> 03:38.510]  It's not mandatory, but if, you know, it's probably a good idea.
[03:38.850 --> 03:42.010]  And then, you know, I looked inside and I wanted to see what other people were doing.
[03:42.030 --> 03:45.810]  And I saw that some people were wearing masks and some people weren't wearing masks.
[03:45.810 --> 03:49.930]  So I sort of, you know, was having this moral conflict inside my head.
[03:49.930 --> 03:50.410]  What do I do?
[03:51.150 --> 03:56.350]  So I walked inside and I reached into my pocket where I always have a mask and I put it on.
[03:57.290 --> 03:59.170]  And I did my shopping with the mask on.
[03:59.370 --> 04:07.910]  And then after I was done with the store, you know, leaving, going outside, I forgot I still had the mask on.
[04:07.990 --> 04:09.650]  I was outside and I had the mask on.
[04:10.710 --> 04:12.330]  And I took it off and put it in my pocket.
[04:15.350 --> 04:22.910]  Now, I know that many people out there feel the same kind of trauma that I just went through by going through all of that.
[04:23.850 --> 04:29.770]  I mean, how much are we expected to bear in this communist world of Joe Biden?
[04:30.330 --> 04:32.830]  You know, I mean, do I wear a mask?
[04:32.890 --> 04:33.550]  Do I not wear a mask?
[04:33.670 --> 04:34.330]  I put the mask on.
[04:34.370 --> 04:35.130]  I take the mask off.
[04:35.130 --> 04:35.870]  I put it in my pocket.
[04:35.970 --> 04:36.730]  I take it out of my pocket.
[04:37.510 --> 04:38.370]  I mean, come on.
[04:38.410 --> 04:39.010]  We're only human.
[04:39.010 --> 04:40.430]  Listen, this is too much.
[04:41.210 --> 04:41.970]  Am I right?
[04:42.970 --> 04:43.910]  I'm trying to be right.
[04:44.030 --> 04:44.950]  I'm trying to be more right wing.
[04:45.090 --> 04:48.350]  I'm told we don't have enough right wing representation on the station.
[04:48.510 --> 04:51.050]  So bear with me as I try and understand.
[04:52.030 --> 04:53.370]  So I should be upset, right?
[04:53.450 --> 05:00.810]  Because I had this moment of doubt at the door and I had to wear a mask or I felt like I had to wear a mask.
[05:00.910 --> 05:07.730]  And I actually went through the entire shopping trip wearing it on my face and then went outside and forgot for a second that I had it.
[05:07.730 --> 05:11.870]  And then I took it off and then I had it back in my pocket again.
[05:13.370 --> 05:18.590]  You know, when I say it out loud, it doesn't sound like much, but it is, right?
[05:18.710 --> 05:22.070]  I mean, our freedom is under attack.
[05:22.090 --> 05:25.710]  This is what the forefathers warned us about, right?
[05:27.650 --> 05:30.770]  Yeah, I can tell by the way you're shaking your heads that you agree with me.
[05:32.170 --> 05:35.490]  I'm just waiting for that story to come out in hardcover.
[05:36.210 --> 05:36.730]  It will.
[05:37.290 --> 05:38.030]  There's a movie.
[05:38.210 --> 05:38.910]  There's all kinds.
[05:39.090 --> 05:45.030]  I mean, this is not since the Civil War has been such a threat to our...
[05:45.030 --> 05:51.430]  I know people are saying that a lot, but I'm talking about this kind of thing where, yeah, you actually have to stand by a door and say, should I put a mask on?
[05:51.430 --> 06:00.610]  My God, I just, you know, watching Fox, watching all these right-wing networks, you would think we were completely under attack.
[06:00.630 --> 06:03.170]  Our freedoms were being thrown into the garbage.
[06:04.350 --> 06:05.090]  I've tried.
[06:05.210 --> 06:06.350]  I've tried to get into their heads.
[06:07.130 --> 06:08.250]  It's not pleasant.
[06:09.330 --> 06:12.170]  And it also doesn't make a whole lot of sense once you're in there.
[06:13.210 --> 06:16.770]  So if I'm missing something, someone please tell me, what's the big deal here?
[06:16.990 --> 06:20.590]  What's the big deal with wearing a mask if it makes people feel better for a few minutes?
[06:20.590 --> 06:23.650]  What's the big deal with getting a vaccine that's been proven to work?
[06:23.650 --> 06:32.490]  What's the big deal with trying to survive and get on with our lives and hopefully prevent this kind of thing from happening again?
[06:33.050 --> 06:33.890]  Alex, do you have a theory?
[06:34.750 --> 06:35.630]  Well, no.
[06:35.630 --> 06:44.970]  No, I mean, again, it's something we've said many, many times that it's, at this point, I think, common courtesy, but it's about a duty to third parties.
[06:45.870 --> 06:54.670]  I think about, you know, my new office building just reinstituted a mask mandate for the common areas of the building.
[06:55.370 --> 07:11.410]  And I see it as just an act of courtesy when I go into the building that I put a mask on so that the people that are manning the security doors and the turnstiles and whatnot are a little bit safer and that they feel a little bit more comfortable because they don't know me,
[07:11.590 --> 07:18.030]  they don't know that I'm vaccinated, they don't know my politics or my history, and they're there breathing in.
[07:18.090 --> 07:18.770]  Everyone else is there.
[07:18.930 --> 07:28.810]  So, you know, you put on a mask and I get up to the office on the 20th floor and I don't, I very often forget to take the mask off as well.
[07:29.250 --> 07:38.510]  I mean, I'm more concerned with how sweaty and disgusting I am after taking the M train or the E train, you know, for 20 minutes.
[07:39.550 --> 07:43.150]  And let me tell you something about that, too, when it comes to...
[07:43.150 --> 07:45.290]  You know how much personal information you've given out just now?
[07:45.370 --> 07:50.790]  You've told people what train you've taken, what floor you're on, that you're in some kind of new building.
[07:51.050 --> 07:52.530]  You're assuming that I'm telling you the right information.
[07:52.530 --> 07:53.510]  Well, I hope you're not.
[07:53.610 --> 07:55.450]  I hope you're making all of this up, but go ahead.
[07:56.070 --> 07:57.250]  That's absolutely right.
[07:57.250 --> 08:09.850]  So the, but in terms of taking the train, though, I have been taking the subway a lot more frequently over the last several weeks because I'm actually going into the office a couple of days per week.
[08:10.250 --> 08:18.970]  And what I notice on the train is something interesting, too, that almost every single car is full of people that are masked except for one person.
[08:18.970 --> 08:26.850]  There seems to be always one person on every single train car that either forgot a mask or is just defiant about it.
[08:27.510 --> 08:32.650]  And without fail, I wind up sitting next to this person because there's an open seat.
[08:32.790 --> 08:36.090]  And then I realize that I don't want to sit next to this person because they're not wearing a mask.
[08:36.310 --> 08:41.530]  And then I get up and I move cars thinking I'm going to go to a car where everybody's going to be masked and responsible.
[08:42.070 --> 08:45.110]  And again, there's somebody else not wearing a mask.
[08:45.110 --> 08:47.610]  And at that point, I'm smart enough not to sit next to them.
[08:47.770 --> 08:52.450]  I think maybe they're being planted by certain operatives just to drive us crazy.
[08:52.590 --> 08:54.030]  But yeah, you mentioned courtesy.
[08:54.430 --> 08:57.670]  But the thing to be concerned about, what do I say about courtesy?
[08:57.950 --> 08:58.790]  It's contagious.
[08:59.630 --> 09:00.790]  Yeah, think about that.
[09:01.090 --> 09:02.190]  Think about that.
[09:02.810 --> 09:03.010]  Gila.
[09:03.650 --> 09:08.370]  Okay, because I also see that one person in each car on the train.
[09:08.590 --> 09:14.970]  And Alex, I don't know if this happens to you, but the unmasked people give me the stink eye.
[09:15.310 --> 09:22.110]  Like, my having a mask on is some kind of an affront to them and their personal sense of expression.
[09:22.370 --> 09:26.590]  And that my sitting there with a mask on makes them feel like a bad person.
[09:26.590 --> 09:31.530]  So then they make me feel like a bad person by literally staring me down for the entire train ride.
[09:31.710 --> 09:32.090]  Hang on.
[09:32.170 --> 09:32.370]  Hang on.
[09:32.370 --> 09:33.550]  And I'm not moving because I have a seat.
[09:33.750 --> 09:39.830]  Yeah, but isn't it MTA policy that if you're on a bus or if you're on a subway, you wear a mask?
[09:40.010 --> 09:42.050]  So why are they giving you the stink eye?
[09:42.050 --> 09:51.470]  But if there's no enforcement and no teeth in the enforcement, then people are just flouting the rules like rule flouters.
[09:51.710 --> 10:01.310]  Well, you know, Kyle and I were in the city a few days ago, and I think we were both impressed with how many people were taking care of each other and doing the right thing.
[10:01.430 --> 10:04.590]  So I don't want to give the impression that there's a whole lot of irresponsible people out there.
[10:04.670 --> 10:10.910]  It's relatively small, but significant because it does have a very detrimental effect.
[10:10.910 --> 10:26.890]  But I think, especially in New York, just walking around, people really seem to be following the guidelines, taking precautions, happy to be outside, and hopefully getting through all of this relatively soon.
[10:27.110 --> 10:27.550]  Rob?
[10:28.790 --> 10:30.590]  Yeah, I keep thinking a lot about...
[10:30.590 --> 10:31.490]  There was this video clip.
[10:31.590 --> 10:42.610]  Now, a lot of people know that before the face masks were a common sight in this country, they were a common sight in public in other countries, like Asian countries, like Japan, for one example.
[10:43.110 --> 10:45.350]  And there was a clip I watched of an actor back then.
[10:45.430 --> 10:46.230]  This is pre-COVID.
[10:46.530 --> 10:49.250]  An American actor who had gone over there for a sci-fi convention.
[10:49.250 --> 10:50.510]  He was signing autographs and whatnot.
[10:50.930 --> 10:53.570]  And he was demonstrating the face mask.
[10:53.610 --> 10:55.410]  And he's like, yeah, you see these all the time over here.
[10:55.650 --> 10:57.470]  And I asked my guide, like, what are these?
[10:57.570 --> 11:01.830]  Like, for people who are really germophobes, they're worried they're going to get sick, they're putting on surgical masks.
[11:02.170 --> 11:14.090]  And the guide told him, no, in that culture, it is common that if you're worried you might be sick, you put on the face mask to keep from infecting other people, to keep from making the people around you sick.
[11:14.630 --> 11:20.910]  And so, like, you're being polite by making sure that no one around you can catch a thing that you might have.
[11:21.330 --> 11:23.710]  And so this made sense.
[11:24.010 --> 11:25.270]  And this was before COVID.
[11:25.470 --> 11:28.830]  And now COVID, this is something that we definitely have to be concerned about.
[11:28.970 --> 11:30.610]  It's not just the common colds or flus or whatever.
[11:30.710 --> 11:31.570]  That they were worried about.
[11:32.230 --> 11:35.150]  And yeah, I still keep thinking about that video clip a lot.
[11:35.370 --> 11:37.150]  Well, I think you raise a very good point.
[11:37.170 --> 11:46.470]  Because if you aren't certain if you're carrying something or not, according to those cultures, best thing to do is wear a mask.
[11:46.550 --> 11:47.130]  We consider it.
[11:47.390 --> 11:51.330]  We are not certain yet how we have gotten through this.
[11:51.550 --> 11:54.230]  We're not certain if the Delta variant is among us.
[11:54.630 --> 12:00.830]  So since we're not certain, yeah, wear a mask when you're around other people, especially indoors, until we're certain.
[12:01.210 --> 12:04.650]  And then we can resume our lives.
[12:04.770 --> 12:10.510]  But the more people flout these common sense guidelines, the longer it's going to take.
[12:11.130 --> 12:13.230]  You know, I'm growing...
[12:13.230 --> 12:18.610]  I think a lot of the people are with us on this.
[12:19.170 --> 12:23.670]  I'm growing impatient with all this stupidity out there because there is an awful lot.
[12:24.090 --> 12:26.310]  We're on two different radio stations.
[12:26.570 --> 12:40.870]  And each radio station, this one included, has misinformation that is pumped over the airwaves at particular times by particular people who either don't know any better or are simply trying to show discontent.
[12:41.010 --> 12:41.390]  I don't know.
[12:41.570 --> 12:47.750]  I don't even want to get into why people spread bad information that hurts other people.
[12:47.870 --> 13:02.290]  But the thing that we, as people who question authority constantly and pay rabid attention to scientific breakthroughs and developments and inventions and things like that, the data is in, okay?
[13:02.390 --> 13:05.150]  The data is continuously being interpreted.
[13:05.150 --> 13:17.070]  And as of now, the data says the vaccine works and you need to have the vaccine unless your doctor specifically tells you, no, you do not get the vaccine for one reason or another.
[13:17.630 --> 13:18.150]  Okay?
[13:18.350 --> 13:23.250]  And I'm not talking about getting your doctor to agree and say, yeah, okay, you know what?
[13:23.410 --> 13:24.670]  Don't get the vaccine.
[13:24.670 --> 13:27.410]  Just get out of my office because I'm sick of hearing you talk constantly.
[13:27.710 --> 13:29.970]  You know, I know lots of people that do that.
[13:30.090 --> 13:37.770]  That's just harangue their doctors into trying to get them to agree with a conspiracy theory they're passing around.
[13:38.930 --> 13:42.190]  You know, I want to say trust us, but don't trust us.
[13:42.450 --> 13:43.630]  Trust the medical community.
[13:43.770 --> 13:44.790]  Trust the scientific community.
[13:44.990 --> 13:47.110]  Trust the data that is out there.
[13:47.750 --> 14:01.290]  Don't trust people who don't have the credentials to know what they're talking about, regardless of what station they're on, what political ideology they espouse.
[14:01.970 --> 14:03.030]  Trust the science.
[14:03.470 --> 14:04.030]  Trust the medicine.
[14:04.610 --> 14:06.670]  Trust the data that is out there.
[14:06.750 --> 14:06.950]  Alex?
[14:08.250 --> 14:18.750]  Yeah, I think it's such an important point and, you know, something I wanted to share this week as well, which is a bit more somber.
[14:18.830 --> 14:21.930]  And I don't want to go into, I think, too much detail about it.
[14:22.650 --> 14:28.370]  But, you know, we've spent a lot of deaths over the last year in this country, around the world.
[14:28.370 --> 14:33.570]  And up until two days ago, my family had been spared.
[14:34.030 --> 14:39.530]  And we had our first COVID-19 death in our family.
[14:39.910 --> 14:41.930]  And it was particularly tragic.
[14:42.270 --> 14:44.710]  I mean, it's an absolutely horrendous story.
[14:45.380 --> 14:51.910]  It was a cousin of mine who lives in Florida, or I should use the past tense, lived in Florida.
[14:51.910 --> 14:57.030]  We weren't extremely close, the third cousin, something like that.
[14:57.210 --> 14:57.970]  But blood is blood.
[14:58.470 --> 15:00.850]  And he was 29 years old.
[15:01.570 --> 15:04.410]  And he had a four-year-old daughter.
[15:05.150 --> 15:07.730]  And he was unvaccinated.
[15:09.930 --> 15:14.050]  I don't know the particular reasoning why he was unvaccinated.
[15:14.190 --> 15:15.550]  I don't think it was health-related.
[15:15.690 --> 15:20.130]  I think it was for some religious reason.
[15:20.130 --> 15:29.450]  He was involved, I believe, with a particular Baptist church down in Florida, where many of the congregants were not vaccinated.
[15:30.090 --> 15:31.510]  And he got sick.
[15:32.210 --> 15:33.450]  And he got worse.
[15:33.630 --> 15:34.930]  And then he was intubated.
[15:35.470 --> 15:36.610]  And he died.
[15:36.790 --> 15:38.410]  And he left behind a wife.
[15:38.430 --> 15:40.070]  And he left behind a four-year-old daughter.
[15:40.670 --> 15:42.650]  And it's absolutely terrible.
[15:42.850 --> 15:43.790]  It's tragic.
[15:43.790 --> 15:59.310]  And adding to the tragedy is that his mother, a member of the same church, also unvaccinated, has COVID now, has been in the hospital and intensive care for the last couple of days.
[16:00.050 --> 16:02.970]  And things don't look good for her.
[16:02.970 --> 16:07.950]  And, in fact, she does not even know that her son died.
[16:08.370 --> 16:15.550]  People are afraid to tell her because of the effect it may have on her mentally and on her health.
[16:16.010 --> 16:21.390]  And so, yeah, we had our first COVID death in my family a couple of days ago.
[16:21.510 --> 16:32.110]  And I look at it, and it makes me so goddamn angry about these vessels of misinformation that we've been dealing with for a year and a half now.
[16:32.970 --> 16:41.330]  About the virus itself, about the danger of the virus, about it being like the flu, and about the vaccine.
[16:41.650 --> 16:46.250]  I mean, all of this was eminently foreseeable and avoidable.
[16:47.670 --> 16:49.450]  And I just don't understand it.
[16:50.250 --> 16:57.250]  When it hits so close to the bone like this, it makes me really angry and just incredibly sad.
[16:57.810 --> 17:05.030]  Well, Alex, first of all, I'm sure we all share our condolences with you on that tragedy.
[17:05.930 --> 17:15.030]  I've seen more friends who seem to be affected directly now than they were a year ago.
[17:15.230 --> 17:25.170]  What I mean by that is people who have a close friend or relative who is either stricken or has died from the disease when that didn't happen last year.
[17:25.170 --> 17:40.450]  So that tells me that we're facing something that is stronger than last year and is spreading more rapidly, just like we've been told, just like the doctors and scientists have told us is likely to happen with this particular variant.
[17:41.130 --> 17:45.430]  And yet people refuse to listen for one reason or another.
[17:45.750 --> 17:48.130]  I'm done trying to figure them out.
[17:48.270 --> 17:49.290]  I really am.
[17:49.530 --> 17:51.950]  The time is now to fight back.
[17:51.950 --> 17:57.050]  And when you hear this crap, no matter where it is, you fight back and you fight back hard.
[17:57.290 --> 18:00.230]  You shut these people up because they are killing us.
[18:00.370 --> 18:13.410]  The people running these churches, the people who encourage others not to get vaccinated for some political reason or some ridiculous superstition, they should be held accountable for all the deaths they are causing.
[18:14.030 --> 18:14.970]  It's nuts.
[18:15.110 --> 18:25.850]  It's nuts that we are so tolerant of this that we're willing to let our friends and relatives die for some ridiculously misguided chain of thought.
[18:27.170 --> 18:39.450]  And, you know, I'm familiar with cult behavior, you know, as much as anyone, and all kinds of horrors of the past where you can't believe how stupid and insane people have been en masse.
[18:40.090 --> 18:41.170]  This is no different.
[18:41.470 --> 18:45.090]  It's no different, and history will not judge this kindly.
[18:45.150 --> 18:46.710]  I guarantee that.
[18:47.010 --> 18:58.170]  But for now, you know, I think as people who appear semi-regularly on the radio and in public, we have to share our viewpoints here.
[18:58.350 --> 19:08.450]  You know, what we believe, what we have learned, and, and, and, and, and, and basically, not just treat this like, well, we can agree to disagree.
[19:09.630 --> 19:13.650]  Because you're basically agreeing to let a lot of people die if you do that.
[19:14.510 --> 19:16.390]  So I don't agree to disagree.
[19:16.390 --> 19:20.570]  I intend to fight back on all this nonsense that is causing this.
[19:20.850 --> 19:22.750]  We could have been done with this by now.
[19:23.030 --> 19:24.590]  We really could have been done with this.
[19:24.850 --> 19:25.490]  Go ahead, Alex.
[19:25.490 --> 19:27.030]  I, I entirely agree.
[19:27.210 --> 19:37.710]  And, and I think it, it's important to draw out the distinction that we made last week on, and over time, when I, I didn't even know a family member of mine was, was sick with COVID.
[19:37.870 --> 19:44.770]  And I was saying that, you know, we have to, I think, be very careful not to stigmatize those who decided not to get the vaccine.
[19:44.770 --> 19:46.530]  It's up to them to get the vaccine now.
[19:46.670 --> 19:47.950]  We want them to change their mind.
[19:48.090 --> 19:50.550]  We want them to save their own lives, to protect others.
[19:51.370 --> 19:53.870]  It's, it's a duty to your family.
[19:54.070 --> 19:56.190]  It's a duty to your fellow man.
[19:56.370 --> 20:02.250]  And it's a matter of self-preservation, I think, in, you know, at, at the highest level here.
[20:02.890 --> 20:05.110]  And it really has got me thinking about this.
[20:05.190 --> 20:13.470]  I think we, we have to fight back against those who are espousing the misinformation, who have channels that are, are spewing this vitriol and this, this nonsense.
[20:13.470 --> 20:31.690]  And, um, but what I think it, it will rather feel has been happening over the last year or so is that you, we are in something very akin to a, uh, a, a cold civil war that has been lingering for a long time here.
[20:32.070 --> 20:40.770]  And the victims of the virus that we see every day, and, and you're absolutely right, Emmanuel, on increasing every day, increasing frequency every day.
[20:41.330 --> 20:44.590]  Um, you know, those are the casualties of this cold civil war.
[20:45.170 --> 20:49.750]  And it's, I think, you know, we have to fight it and keep fighting it.
[20:50.030 --> 21:00.950]  And I think for those who want to change sides, we have to be willing to embrace them, open up our arms, open up our hearts, take them in and let them change their mind without reproach.
[21:01.170 --> 21:01.590]  Yeah.
[21:01.710 --> 21:02.370]  Let me be clear.
[21:02.570 --> 21:06.390]  I don't have hostility towards people who have made the decision for themselves.
[21:07.070 --> 21:22.710]  I feel tremendous anger towards those people who are leading those into this, people who should know better, people who probably have gotten vaccinated themselves, you know, and I'm talking about politicians, uh, radio talk show hosts, TV commentators,
[21:22.970 --> 21:30.970]  people who are trusted, you know, people who others follow and almost literally following them into the abyss.
[21:31.570 --> 21:35.630]  But at the last minute, they'll step aside and just let everybody else plunge.
[21:36.490 --> 21:38.470]  Uh, that's something I don't have patience for.
[21:38.470 --> 21:48.430]  For, for people who are making this decision, I, I, like you, Alex, I, I hope that they come around and, uh, you know, we, we have to be as patient as possible.
[21:48.430 --> 21:48.790]  I know.
[21:49.430 --> 22:05.310]  But right now it's, um, it's just a question of responsibility and we have to, all of us be as responsible as possible, not just people on the radio, those of us in everyday life, whether it's, you know, in a school, in a mall, in your house, you know,
[22:05.390 --> 22:23.090]  I'm just thinking of the, um, the struggle that people go through in, in various states that aren't New York, like, you know, Florida, Texas, where teachers are basically forbidden from, from saying that kids should wear masks because right now it's dangerous.
[22:24.210 --> 22:25.070]  Scientific fact.
[22:25.450 --> 22:26.450]  It's dangerous right now.
[22:27.110 --> 22:30.170]  And they are being threatened in Florida.
[22:30.170 --> 22:34.630]  I believe they're being threatened with having their pay docked if they do this in, in Texas.
[22:34.830 --> 22:36.050]  I know these things are being challenged.
[22:36.210 --> 22:48.490]  So, you know, they could be overturned in, in five minutes, but in Texas, um, you, uh, schools don't have to tell parents if there is a positive case, you know, ridiculous things like this.
[22:48.490 --> 22:51.570]  It is almost like these people are pro virus.
[22:52.110 --> 23:07.810]  In fact, I'll go and say they are pro virus because what they are doing is ensuring that the virus sticks around and they are basically treating the virus like it's a, a sentient being and has rights, you know, cause apparently us fighting it is something that they object to.
[23:07.970 --> 23:18.090]  I know there is the case in Florida where, um, uh, cruise ships wanted to test their passengers or wanted to make sure their passengers had, um, had the vaccine.
[23:18.830 --> 23:22.310]  So that is, that is incredibly important.
[23:22.850 --> 23:28.490]  And, and, and Governor DeSantis said, no, we're going to make it illegal for you to do that.
[23:28.790 --> 23:36.370]  You need to be able to take people who are, uh, have, uh, COVID-19 and, and are completely, um, um, infected.
[23:36.610 --> 23:39.550]  We need to allow them to get on cruise ships as well.
[23:39.630 --> 23:41.270]  The most contagious environments possible.
[23:41.850 --> 23:49.470]  Uh, so that's, it's, uh, it, it, it boggles the imagination how this kind of thing continues to happen.
[23:49.870 --> 23:52.070]  Um, but it does, it does.
[23:53.250 --> 23:54.010]  Alex, go ahead.
[23:54.750 --> 23:55.390]  Yeah, sure.
[23:55.430 --> 24:12.270]  And, and in line with that, I think is another interesting story from, uh, just a couple of days ago too, that the Pentagon is now making coronavirus vaccines mandatory for the 1.3 million active duty troops that we have, you know, no later than next month.
[24:12.550 --> 24:29.850]  And, and the reasoning behind that, um, has to do with, uh, exactly the types of, uh, philosophical reasons that we've been discussing on this show since the vaccine was available, which is that it's about your fellow soldier.
[24:30.030 --> 24:32.450]  It's about making sure that your unit is safe.
[24:32.610 --> 24:36.390]  It's about making sure that your battalion can function in a healthy manner.
[24:36.770 --> 24:39.570]  You know, and, and I think that is really saying something.
[24:39.810 --> 24:59.170]  Now, what I, what I don't think people should look to though is, is the military's mandatory nature of, of this and, and as some kind of, um, um, indication that, uh, you know, it, it's, it's not a matter of civil life, civil rights or civil liberties because in,
[24:59.230 --> 25:12.830]  in the military, this is something that I've always found to be kind of strange too, which is that once you sign up, once you become an active duty soldier, even a reservist to a certain extent as well, your civil liberties are cashed in, you know, for that time being.
[25:13.190 --> 25:16.790]  So you don't have, you don't have the ability to make that choice for yourself.
[25:16.790 --> 25:22.330]  You don't have the same first amendment rights that you do as an ordinary citizen or your fourth amendment rights.
[25:22.730 --> 25:39.430]  And, and, uh, having worked with a uniform code of military justice for many years, not many years, couple of years as a, as a law clerk at the court of appeals for the armed forces in DC, uh, that was something that always drove me nuts that, that you cash in your civil liberties in order to defend them.
[25:39.950 --> 25:51.470]  Um, but I think it's, is something that, uh, even if these soldiers, they disagree with it, the decision has been made that in order to protect the military as a whole, this needs to be done.
[25:51.870 --> 25:54.210]  It needs, it's, it's good for unit cohesion.
[25:54.210 --> 26:04.030]  It's, and it takes away the political dimension of having to make that choice, regardless of whether you come from Texas, from Florida, from New York, Rhode Island, doesn't matter.
[26:04.230 --> 26:05.330]  I'm getting the vaccine.
[26:05.510 --> 26:09.230]  In the civilian world, nobody's being commanded to do anything.
[26:09.630 --> 26:13.550]  Uh, it's basically, if you want to take advantage of this, you need to be vaccinated.
[26:13.550 --> 26:17.030]  If you don't want to be vaccinated, you can't take advantage of this.
[26:17.170 --> 26:17.970]  No command.
[26:18.210 --> 26:18.910]  It's a choice.
[26:19.170 --> 26:19.570]  Go ahead, Gila.
[26:19.570 --> 26:23.390]  I think, um, Alex, I 100% agree with you.
[26:23.470 --> 26:41.150]  And I think that this, um, is an interesting way to look at whether people are going to see this as depoliticizing that decision at all, because I don't think anybody's going to say that the United States armed forces are a bastion of, uh, liberal thought.
[26:41.670 --> 26:55.050]  I'm just saying, but the thing I've been saying for a year and a half now is part of the issue I think we're bumping up against is this idea of rugged American individualism.
[26:55.250 --> 26:58.630]  And I can do what I want and I'm going to get what I want.
[26:58.810 --> 27:01.450]  And I'm just going to worry about me.
[27:01.790 --> 27:06.050]  And people have been thinking we're going to be able to bootstrap ourselves out of this pandemic somehow.
[27:07.070 --> 27:11.250]  And if we've learned anything, it's that that's not going to happen.
[27:11.890 --> 27:24.350]  And I think part of the reason that we're seeing such an uptick in cases recently is because everyone decided it was over and then it wasn't.
[27:24.830 --> 27:35.610]  And whereas last year people were saying, okay, we're home, we're masking, I may not like it, but I'm going to do it because if I do it, we can eventually stop.
[27:36.670 --> 27:40.770]  And then people were able to stop and now the restrictions are coming back.
[27:41.270 --> 27:49.210]  And I think there's also a certain sense of, you can't make me that people are digging in their heels harder.
[27:50.330 --> 27:59.630]  And actually, Emmanuel, to bring back what you said at the very top of the show, I put my mask on a chain, so I don't have to touch it.
[28:00.730 --> 28:07.490]  And I can take it on, I can put it on, take it off whenever I need to without having to, you know, get my hands all up in the middle of it.
[28:07.490 --> 28:13.770]  But, um, no, it's this idea of we need to pull together.
[28:14.410 --> 28:20.570]  And so yeah, if the military where everybody needs to work together, if they can do that, I think that we need to.
[28:20.930 --> 28:22.110]  That's the other thing about the subway.
[28:22.310 --> 28:23.930]  There are no windows on the subway.
[28:24.090 --> 28:26.630]  We're in a tube with no moving air.
[28:26.830 --> 28:30.510]  You need to wear a mask in the subway because there's no fresh air.
[28:31.150 --> 28:39.490]  And I think the more that we see that our actions affect each other, the better it will eventually, hopefully, God willing, be.
[28:42.510 --> 28:46.770]  Yeah, let's, um, let's hope common sense prevails or starts to prevail.
[28:46.890 --> 29:03.890]  I think, you know, as, as, as the numbers come in, as people see the effects of the selfish behavior of the misinformation, I think they're starting to come around and realize that this is, you know, not good policy, not something that is, um, uh, it's not the hill you want to die on,
[29:04.250 --> 29:04.630]  really.
[29:05.690 --> 29:06.550]  Um, okay.
[29:06.690 --> 29:08.110]  Well, we don't want to talk about this.
[29:08.230 --> 29:11.670]  We have to talk about this because it's, um, it's a crisis.
[29:11.670 --> 29:13.450]  It's a crisis that will not go away.
[29:13.490 --> 29:19.630]  It's because so many of us aren't fighting it and, uh, are, are almost embracing it.
[29:20.610 --> 29:23.310]  So, uh, hopefully our listeners are with us on this.
[29:23.390 --> 29:26.290]  I know some aren't, but we have to speak our minds.
[29:26.630 --> 29:29.250]  You can always write to us, OTH at 2600.com.
[29:29.530 --> 29:30.290]  What's your opinion?
[29:30.430 --> 29:31.290]  Let us know what you think.
[29:32.090 --> 29:34.510]  Um, who, uh, heard the alarm today?
[29:34.830 --> 29:35.730]  2 20 PM.
[29:35.870 --> 29:35.990]  Anyone?
[29:37.550 --> 29:37.910]  Nobody?
[29:38.190 --> 29:38.410]  Really?
[29:38.690 --> 29:39.550]  And was I the only one?
[29:39.990 --> 29:41.750]  Is that what you were tweeting about earlier?
[29:41.810 --> 29:43.070]  I had no idea what was going on.
[29:43.070 --> 29:44.070]  I wasn't tweeting anything.
[29:44.870 --> 29:48.570]  Uh, five minutes until, you know, this, that, or the other thing.
[29:48.670 --> 29:50.290]  I think the magazine did that, but not me.
[29:50.390 --> 29:51.030]  Oh, okay.
[29:51.290 --> 29:51.450]  Right.
[29:51.630 --> 29:51.870]  Gotcha.
[29:52.050 --> 29:52.230]  Yeah.
[29:52.450 --> 29:52.610]  Yeah.
[29:52.850 --> 29:54.970]  Uh, but I, I, that's how I heard about it actually.
[29:55.570 --> 29:58.130]  Um, and I didn't know because it wasn't publicized.
[29:58.230 --> 30:06.430]  Remember we did, uh, a couple of years ago, uh, there was some kind of, um, EAS test that went over our phones and we had a party downstairs.
[30:07.110 --> 30:13.790]  Um, and, um, and, and, and some people showed up and we all compared our phones as a, as a, uh, went off my phone didn't go off.
[30:13.810 --> 30:15.590]  So I don't know if this was for phones.
[30:15.690 --> 30:28.230]  They, they said some phones will go off, but, uh, I don't know anybody whose phone went off, but, um, the, um, uh, I, I know WBAI had an EAS, uh, uh, alert go through, uh, in the middle of a program.
[30:28.430 --> 30:33.150]  Uh, I know that, um, cable TV systems blanked out for a while.
[30:33.950 --> 30:37.830]  Um, and, uh, in the middle of the new governor's press conference, by the way.
[30:38.250 --> 30:39.590]  So that was kind of weird.
[30:39.990 --> 30:47.190]  Um, and, um, I, I, I think it just went over some other devices as well, but nobody here had anything happen?
[30:47.370 --> 30:47.950]  Not you, Kyle?
[30:48.330 --> 30:48.470]  No.
[30:48.730 --> 30:48.990]  Wow.
[30:49.590 --> 30:50.030]  Okay.
[30:50.830 --> 31:03.690]  Uh, well, it was, uh, a test of the emergency alert systems, um, that basically, uh, um, it was like the one from 2018, the one that I'm referring to, which showed a presidential alert message.
[31:04.110 --> 31:07.730]  Um, but I don't think this one had the presidential alert.
[31:07.730 --> 31:09.630]  Uh, it was sent to TVs and radios.
[31:09.790 --> 31:17.110]  The wireless emergency alert, which is called WEA test, uh, went to cellular consumers who have opted in to receive test messages.
[31:18.230 --> 31:21.570]  You, you opt in to receive test messages and not the real thing.
[31:21.730 --> 31:22.550]  That's kind of weird.
[31:22.710 --> 31:24.570]  So is it like only an emojis or something?
[31:24.570 --> 31:33.730]  The test is intended to ensure public safety officials have the methods and systems that will deliver urgent alerts and warnings to the public in times of an emergency or disaster.
[31:33.890 --> 31:35.150]  That's a press release from FEMA.
[31:35.630 --> 31:38.050]  Uh, and they're working in coordination with the FCC.
[31:38.430 --> 31:45.710]  Now the cell phone alerts had a unique tone and vibration to make them accessible to all members of the public, uh, including people with disabilities.
[31:45.950 --> 31:52.230]  Uh, they periodically test the emergency alert system to make sure it's working properly and identify any necessary improvements.
[31:52.710 --> 31:57.850]  This is the six nationwide, uh, test for the EAS, the second for the WEA.
[31:58.510 --> 32:06.210]  And it's also the first for the WEA via the opt in option, which I didn't opt in because I guess I didn't know about it.
[32:06.570 --> 32:07.110]  So there.
[32:08.410 --> 32:08.890]  All right.
[32:08.950 --> 32:11.450]  So I don't think it's very effective since nobody seems to know about it.
[32:13.370 --> 32:13.770]  Yeah.
[32:13.890 --> 32:17.130]  No, maybe there's something about the program that needs to be made more exciting.
[32:18.010 --> 32:19.530]  I mean, I'd heard about it.
[32:19.670 --> 32:22.210]  I heard yesterday that it was coming today.
[32:22.730 --> 32:25.470]  Um, we didn't have the television on.
[32:25.590 --> 32:29.270]  We weren't listening to the radio and I've never gotten one of those alerts.
[32:29.270 --> 32:32.850]  Like when the presidential alert happened in 2018, still waiting.
[32:33.210 --> 32:33.590]  Wow.
[32:33.750 --> 32:34.190]  Never got it.
[32:34.770 --> 32:35.090]  Yeah.
[32:35.170 --> 32:36.010]  We had trouble turning it off.
[32:36.170 --> 32:38.850]  Actually just kept coming back that day.
[32:39.150 --> 32:40.130]  Um, okay.
[32:40.170 --> 32:40.810]  Well, it's been fun.
[32:40.810 --> 32:47.730]  You know, I thought maybe it would cause some mayhem because it wasn't publicized that much, but, um, seems to have gone mostly unnoticed.
[32:47.870 --> 32:52.430]  One thing that did not go unnoticed though is the news from Apple over the past week.
[32:53.010 --> 33:00.610]  Um, I'm still not 100% convinced that this isn't a joke, but it seems like it's for real.
[33:00.750 --> 33:07.210]  Apple on Thursday unveiled changes to iPhones designed to catch cases of child sexual abuse.
[33:07.510 --> 33:11.590]  And of course we all must bow down and praise to that unworthy goal.
[33:11.810 --> 33:26.230]  But what they're going to be doing apparently is combing through everybody's iPhones looking for images that are disturbing and then taking action against those people that have those, those particular images.
[33:26.230 --> 33:30.250]  If I'm understanding this correctly, we're not talking about going into the cloud.
[33:30.410 --> 33:34.630]  We're not talking about people who, who store their pictures on Apple servers.
[33:35.070 --> 33:41.550]  Um, that's the kind of thing I would expect a company to do is occasionally go through data and look for suspicious things.
[33:41.630 --> 33:51.110]  This is your phone, just your phone completely, um, uh, unattached to any server just existing as an iPhone.
[33:51.110 --> 33:53.830]  You take pictures or you, uh, receive pictures.
[33:54.490 --> 33:58.130]  They are going to be combing through those.
[33:58.330 --> 34:09.610]  And because as, as with so many, um, uh, violations of, of, of civil rights and freedoms, because they're battling child pornography, people are saying, Oh, you know what?
[34:09.670 --> 34:10.410]  This is a good idea.
[34:11.170 --> 34:29.170]  And completely missing the point that, you know, if they can do it for that, they can also comb through your phone and look for images of say a political nature and maybe not in this country, but in another country, uh, they can, they can basically see if you were in a particular place at a particular time.
[34:29.530 --> 34:30.970]  They can do all kinds of things.
[34:31.210 --> 34:39.170]  Imagine, uh, you know, someone like Lukashenko, uh, or any dictator with this kind of capability.
[34:40.790 --> 34:42.230]  It's, it's, it's frightening.
[34:42.470 --> 34:45.870]  And I just cannot believe that Apple thought this was a good idea.
[34:46.470 --> 34:47.570]  What am I missing here?
[34:47.750 --> 34:49.070]  Well, why, why now?
[34:49.190 --> 34:50.290]  Why are they suddenly doing this?
[34:50.410 --> 34:56.670]  And how, how is Apple not completely falling apart as a result of an outraged customer base?
[34:57.850 --> 34:58.370]  Alex?
[34:59.330 --> 34:59.850]  Sure.
[35:00.090 --> 35:05.070]  I mean, I, I think it's important to parse out exactly what, what Apple is doing.
[35:05.310 --> 35:07.370]  And, and, and I disagree really.
[35:07.550 --> 35:23.810]  I mean, I can come around my, my mind isn't set in stone, but I, I tend to think what Apple is doing with respect to the detection of CSAM or child sexual abuse imagery, um, is not all that terrible, uh, in, in one instance.
[35:24.050 --> 35:25.250]  So there's two instances.
[35:25.490 --> 35:27.810]  And the second one is the one that I think is not too terrible.
[35:27.950 --> 35:46.830]  The first one is that what Apple appears to have done, or rather will be implementing iOS 15, is that you can turn on a feature for children such that when they receive images in a text message, an SMS message, an iMessage, if it's from Apple, Apple devices,
[35:46.990 --> 35:58.250]  which are apparently end to end encrypted, um, it will determine, it will scan that image on the endpoint on the device itself and determine whether or not it contains some kind of sexually explicit nature.
[35:58.450 --> 36:01.110]  If it does, it will blur that image.
[36:01.250 --> 36:06.210]  So it's a way to prevent children from being exposed via text messages.
[36:06.210 --> 36:07.390]  That's not what this is.
[36:07.810 --> 36:09.110]  That's not what we're talking about.
[36:09.250 --> 36:18.110]  We're talking about Apple going through your existing photos and looking for images that they deem to be of, um, of an objectable nature.
[36:18.550 --> 36:21.610]  The second component is what people have been up in arms.
[36:21.730 --> 36:24.530]  And I think what you're up in arms about, because there's two things that they're rolling out.
[36:24.670 --> 36:30.630]  And the first one I see it is, uh, I actually, I see that one is frankly more problematic than the second one.
[36:30.710 --> 36:40.110]  The second one is this, that when you are backing up your photos to iCloud, they are going to determine whether or not they contain child sexual abuse imagery.
[36:40.370 --> 36:42.510]  Again, I don't think this has anything to do with the cloud.
[36:42.830 --> 36:46.990]  This, from what the way the story has been reported to me, this is your phone.
[36:47.190 --> 36:49.450]  They will scan your phone, not the cloud.
[36:49.830 --> 36:53.070]  Actually go to your phone, look at your private pictures.
[36:53.570 --> 36:58.830]  Obviously, uh, uh, an algorithm will look at it and determine if they match something objectionable.
[36:58.930 --> 37:01.390]  And if it does, law enforcement will be contacted.
[37:02.110 --> 37:04.190]  Is that not your understanding of this story?
[37:04.190 --> 37:06.770]  No, my understanding is a little bit different.
[37:07.170 --> 37:14.350]  And I, and I, and I think it's understandable that our understandings differ because there's been so much back and forth over this particular issue.
[37:14.350 --> 37:18.150]  But I think it's images on your phone that are backed up to iCloud.
[37:18.430 --> 37:28.270]  And it makes sense only in that context as well, because when you are storing images in iCloud, they are on Apple servers, they're on their cloud, right?
[37:28.270 --> 37:32.090]  So they are the ones in possession of those particular images.
[37:33.010 --> 37:44.750]  And what Apple is proposing to do is not any different than what happens very frequently on almost every major social media platform, uh, on the planet.
[37:44.950 --> 37:55.410]  Well, rather not on the planet in the United States, because what happens when you, let's say you upload a photo to Facebook or you back things up to, to Google photos.
[37:55.410 --> 38:07.110]  What happens is they are creating a cryptographic hash, basically a fingerprint of your file of those files that you upload that cryptographic hash.
[38:07.250 --> 38:13.550]  It's a, it's a long string of numbers and letters that are very unique to that one particular file.
[38:13.570 --> 38:16.890]  If you change one bit in that file, the hash is going to be completely different.
[38:17.150 --> 38:20.370]  Those hashes, they're not looking at the actual images themselves.
[38:20.650 --> 38:36.650]  They're only looking at those long strings of numbers and characters, and then comparing them to a database of other hashes for known child pornography that NICBIC or the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children keeps as a master database.
[38:36.930 --> 38:40.070]  So they're not actually examining the content of your photos.
[38:40.210 --> 38:43.950]  They're creating a one-way cryptographic hash and then matching that with the database.
[38:44.310 --> 38:48.350]  So it's different than, and if they were doing it on the phone itself.
[38:48.550 --> 38:58.050]  And it makes sense to me because Apple as a company should not want to be warehousing, uh, child sexual abuse imagery or child pornography on its servers.
[38:58.270 --> 39:01.490]  Okay, well, let me ask you this then, because maybe this is badly reported.
[39:02.070 --> 39:09.930]  Um, the most of the stories I've, I've, I've seen are indicating that it is people's phones that are being examined, but it could very well be just iCloud.
[39:10.390 --> 39:17.370]  Would you have a problem if it was something that was accessing your phone that was not storing pictures in iCloud?
[39:18.170 --> 39:35.930]  I think it's a little more, uh, invasive when it's on the actual device itself and not in the cloud because Apple does not necessarily have an argument to say that they are then in possession of those images, those files, that data when it's solely on your device.
[39:36.050 --> 39:42.310]  So I would say their interest would be a hell of a lot less compelling, but it would, of course, you know, would have to be balanced with our process.
[39:42.450 --> 39:48.950]  I think it would, for me, cause far more privacy concerns than when something is backed up to the cloud.
[39:49.190 --> 39:53.470]  And I will tell you, this has been going on for quite some time.
[39:53.910 --> 40:06.010]  About four years ago, I actually had a case where a young person in his twenties had backed up files to Google, uh, photos and Google photos.
[40:06.250 --> 40:07.570]  Uh, it was from a computer.
[40:07.770 --> 40:09.270]  It was from an actual, uh, machine.
[40:09.270 --> 40:10.430]  It was a Windows machine.
[40:10.550 --> 40:20.670]  And I guess the Google program scans the entire hard drive and looks for, um, files and then uploads all those JPEG files or GIF files.
[40:20.930 --> 40:29.210]  I know Rob was going to correct me on that if I, if I didn't correct myself, uh, and, and, and before and uploads them to Google photos.
[40:29.410 --> 40:39.490]  And then Google photos, once they're there, would then create a cryptographic hash just like Apple is doing and compare that with the database from the national center for missing exploited children.
[40:39.930 --> 40:54.670]  And what happened in this case was that there were hits and the national center for missing exploited children contacted the Florida department of law enforcement and said at this IP address is somebody who's in possession of several images of child pornography.
[40:55.070 --> 41:00.810]  Next thing you know, Florida department of law enforcement knocks on the door with a warrant, goes and searches the computer.
[41:01.170 --> 41:04.930]  And this person was arrested for possession of child pornography.
[41:05.410 --> 41:08.570]  Now, the interesting thing was that they were arrested and charged.
[41:09.290 --> 41:18.770]  And, uh, the machine actually was in a doctor's office that many, many people could have accessed at any particular time.
[41:18.770 --> 41:19.850]  It was there for years.
[41:19.990 --> 41:22.450]  It was only recently put into this particular house.
[41:22.570 --> 41:36.430]  So when this person who was in his early twenties did that scan and uploaded those photos to Google, he had no idea that there was child pornography on that particular device, but yet he was charged with child pornography with possession of child pornography.
[41:36.690 --> 41:40.510]  So the implications of this can be very, very severe.
[41:40.890 --> 42:03.030]  Uh, I, I do have to say though, I like what Apple did so that if there are a certain number of hits, meaning matches between the hashes of the files that you uploaded to Apple and the national, and that matched the, the hashes of known child pornography or known child sexual abuse imagery with the national center for missing exploited children's database,
[42:03.210 --> 42:23.030]  if those match, it doesn't necessarily mean that the data goes directly over to NCMIC, that there are going to be some Apple moderators who are then going to be able to decrypt those files, examine them and make a determination as to whether or not a crime has been committed that should be reported to the national center for missing exploited children.
[42:23.230 --> 42:23.550]  Go ahead, Rob.
[42:25.010 --> 42:32.630]  Um, the one interesting thing about this case is that, uh, the, the, um, the heavy, the heavy lifting is being done on the user's phone.
[42:32.750 --> 42:39.010]  So this is, this is software that's running on the phone, that's scanning the images on the phone and then phoning home about them.
[42:39.130 --> 42:53.330]  And, uh, you know, on a basic, uh, you know, ownership of your device level, this is raising a lot of concern from people who, okay, you know, maybe, maybe I'm not, uh, I, maybe I have nothing to hide as far as, uh, you know, pictures of exploited or abused children go,
[42:53.510 --> 42:58.430]  but maybe I just don't want something scanning the stuff on my phone and telling someone else about it.
[42:58.550 --> 43:02.610]  And should I have, should I be able to make maintain control over whether or not that is going on?
[43:02.710 --> 43:03.430]  That is one issue.
[43:03.750 --> 43:06.350]  Another is this is all based on hashes.
[43:06.510 --> 43:10.510]  And what a lot of people might not know is that, uh, hashes are not perfect.
[43:10.670 --> 43:11.410]  They're not dependable.
[43:11.550 --> 43:15.690]  If you edit one pixel in a photo, the entire hash of the file has changed.
[43:15.870 --> 43:22.010]  If you edit one, you know, one alphanumeric in the metadata, the whole, uh, hash of the file has changed.
[43:22.110 --> 43:25.110]  So it's very easy to change the hash of a file.
[43:25.270 --> 43:34.810]  If you do have something objectionable, it's also possible, not mathematically likely, but possible for a completely different image to have the same hash as, uh, one of the objectionable images.
[43:35.010 --> 43:43.630]  So like this is, this is not a perfect science, but it's also, it's also raising questions of like, should I just, should I be allowed to say what does or doesn't run on my phone?
[43:44.030 --> 43:44.090]  Okay.
[43:44.170 --> 43:46.130]  So Alex, this is, this is what I was talking about.
[43:46.310 --> 43:47.330]  There is a conflict here.
[43:47.470 --> 43:53.710]  Is it being run on the phone or is it being run at Apple headquarters and they're in there on their iCloud servers?
[43:53.870 --> 43:55.430]  Are they, where are they doing the searching?
[43:56.250 --> 43:57.470]  That's a big, it's a big deal.
[43:57.650 --> 43:58.430]  It's a dude.
[43:58.610 --> 44:00.210]  No, I don't really think it's that much of a difference.
[44:00.350 --> 44:04.950]  And, and I understand what Rob is having a company scanning a device that I own.
[44:05.070 --> 44:05.990]  That's a big deal to me.
[44:06.470 --> 44:07.450]  Not necessarily.
[44:07.730 --> 44:08.430]  Yeah, necessarily.
[44:09.470 --> 44:09.830]  Absolutely.
[44:09.830 --> 44:12.470]  You're making a hash of the, of the files there.
[44:12.590 --> 44:16.270]  You know, it's a cryptographic function that they're running on your device, right?
[44:16.430 --> 44:19.910]  For files that you're going to upload to iCloud.
[44:20.190 --> 44:24.910]  And they probably have to do it that way because once they get to iCloud, they're going to be encrypted.
[44:25.290 --> 44:26.090]  That's my understanding.
[44:26.290 --> 44:31.390]  So if you created a hash of an encrypted file, you're going to match that with literally nothing, right?
[44:31.510 --> 44:33.430]  Unless there's an exact replica.
[44:33.590 --> 44:36.310]  Kind of the point of encryption, isn't it?
[44:36.310 --> 44:49.510]  I mean, that you're basically saying they're, they're, they're doing an end run around the encryption so that they're, you know, exempted from it so that they can, and which, you know, flies in the face of what they were saying with the whole San Bernardino thing,
[44:49.630 --> 44:53.530]  you know, where we don't have the ability to do this and it's, it's difficult for us.
[44:53.650 --> 44:54.610]  Apparently it's not so difficult.
[44:55.230 --> 45:07.110]  Well, so what they're doing though, and I think Rob has got, he has to be technically correct about this, uh, is that let's say you, you tag file a to be uploaded to iCloud.
[45:07.350 --> 45:16.490]  At that point, before it's uploaded, Apple is going to use your device and your processing power to create a cryptographic hash, to create a hash of that particular file.
[45:16.630 --> 45:23.170]  That hash then is what Apple is going to use to compare to the backend master database of child sexual abuse imagery.
[45:23.230 --> 45:27.710]  If there's a match or if there's many matches, that's when it will then go over to Apple moderators.
[45:27.870 --> 45:30.410]  So I still don't really have a problem with it.
[45:30.930 --> 45:38.990]  You know, the amount of computing power that it takes to make a hash of a, of a file that's just a couple of megabytes is, I think, de minimis.
[45:39.190 --> 45:42.130]  But Rob is, is also absolutely correct.
[45:42.130 --> 45:52.790]  And this is something I've been saying for years with respect to child sexual abuse imagery is, um, that if you change one bit, the whole hash changes.
[45:53.470 --> 46:08.830]  And so, uh, you know, look, I don't want to give people ideas here, but it would be pretty simple to create a script that inserts a bit into all of these, uh, images, these horrible images of child exploitation, and it would completely allow them to avoid.
[46:08.990 --> 46:10.410]  Can, can, can we just step in here?
[46:10.570 --> 46:12.770]  Because we keep talking about child sexual abuse imagery.
[46:13.130 --> 46:15.710]  I think we all know this is more than that.
[46:15.870 --> 46:17.070]  This is control.
[46:17.270 --> 46:21.630]  This is going to be abused in all sorts of, of, uh, of regimes.
[46:21.870 --> 46:23.930]  And it's not going to be about child abuse.
[46:24.050 --> 46:34.650]  It's going to be about political opponents and, and, and people who are, uh, uh, demonstrating against governments and people who are refugees and people who are of a particular religion or race.
[46:34.990 --> 46:38.970]  I mean, it's a height of naivety to think that this is not going to be abuse.
[46:39.570 --> 46:56.010]  I guess I'm naive, but, the very fact that this has been in existence for so long, that Facebook has been doing it, That Google has been doing it, and that this back-end database of horrible child exploitation images has been in existence for so long,
[46:56.050 --> 46:59.250]  and there hasn't been some kind of function creep.
[46:59.430 --> 47:06.430]  I don't see it being a giant issue for privacy, and I'm as much a privacy advocate as the next pinko liberal out there.
[47:06.550 --> 47:13.630]  But, you know, I think the issue here is really more what about math than anything else.
[47:13.630 --> 47:18.630]  We're just matching hashes, and you need to have a back-end database.
[47:19.170 --> 47:24.390]  That NCMIC, that National Center for Missing and Exploited Children database, has to be in existence if you're trying to match things.
[47:24.590 --> 47:26.030]  Okay, that's one database.
[47:26.390 --> 47:28.410]  Might it be possible there'll be another database?
[47:28.530 --> 47:30.070]  Yeah, it's like ProtesterList.
[47:32.530 --> 47:35.850]  Maybe for names or something like that, but then you can just match strings.
[47:36.070 --> 47:37.730]  You're just looking for strings, right?
[47:37.810 --> 47:39.590]  I mean, here we're looking for specific...
[47:39.590 --> 47:55.170]  No, I'm talking about other imagery that's not child abuse imagery, that some authority someplace says, this is intolerable, and we're going to track down whoever has this particular picture or has this particular imagery, which could be of any sort.
[47:55.490 --> 48:05.090]  The fact that it's child abuse, that's just, it's playing to our heartstrings, so that we say, yeah, this is a good idea, but I don't think we're thinking the implications through.
[48:05.550 --> 48:07.190]  Well, maybe, but fair point there.
[48:07.550 --> 48:24.010]  And on the back end of it, though, I want to go back to Rob's point that he made, which is, if this were to be some kind of, if an abusive regime were to use this in some overbearing manner to try to stifle the sand of pictures of the Bill of Rights or something like that,
[48:24.130 --> 48:35.330]  it would be extraordinarily easy to defeat that detection mechanism, because all you would have to do is flip a bit or change a bit in the image, and the hash matching function on the back end would completely fail.
[48:35.470 --> 48:37.310]  So this whole thing is completely useless.
[48:38.410 --> 48:47.710]  Well, yeah, it's useless, you know, only if people start altering those images, because then the hashes are going to match.
[48:47.770 --> 48:57.730]  And I think there's very easy to defeat this, but it is also a scourge that these images are transferred around and that more and more of them are made.
[48:57.830 --> 49:07.870]  And if they're cataloged, I don't see a very big problem with giving up a little bit of processing power to create a cryptographic hash that's matched on the back end database and helps to save children.
[49:08.030 --> 49:11.350]  Okay, we're going to continue this conversation on Overtime on YouTube.
[49:11.350 --> 49:13.430]  Go to 2600.com to get the link.
[49:14.010 --> 49:15.370]  Rob, final word on this.
[49:16.690 --> 49:21.790]  Yeah, there's what's known as the think of the children argument, which is meant to justify things like this.
[49:21.890 --> 49:30.510]  And the worry with that is always that as soon as they're allowed to creep on your phone for, you know, sexually abused children images, they're going to use that power for other things.
[49:30.690 --> 49:33.630]  It's never going to be just in the case of kids.
[49:34.210 --> 49:42.190]  You know, you start allowing things, you start letting things become part of what's expected of an operating system on a phone, on a device, on a computer.
[49:43.370 --> 49:45.630]  This can lead to a very, very bad place.
[49:45.990 --> 49:47.450]  Okay, we're going to have to leave it there.
[49:47.950 --> 49:52.710]  We're not on next week, so don't be upset if you don't hear from us next week.
[49:52.790 --> 49:54.510]  We'll be back in two weeks.
[49:54.510 --> 50:00.670]  We're on in a couple of minutes, 8 o'clock on our YouTube channel, youtube.com slash channel 2600.
[50:00.830 --> 50:05.470]  You can get the link on the 2600.com web page on the main page there.
[50:05.930 --> 50:10.790]  I want to go out with another piece from Negative Land from their most recent album, The World Will Decide.
[50:11.150 --> 50:12.710]  It's brilliant.
[50:12.710 --> 50:13.990]  I can't stop listening to it.
[50:14.230 --> 50:14.970]  We'll see you at 8 o'clock.
[50:15.050 --> 50:16.710]  We'll see you in two weeks on WBAI.
[50:17.290 --> 50:17.570]  Good night.
[50:22.840 --> 50:23.460]  What's that?
[50:23.600 --> 50:24.260]  The baby.
[50:24.860 --> 50:28.940]  You mean you're getting babies up here, too, or is it from long ago?
[50:29.040 --> 50:30.820]  That's a baby room monitor.
[50:31.600 --> 50:34.120]  That's somebody's room I'm listening to.
[50:34.300 --> 50:35.560]  Did you know I could do that?
[50:37.060 --> 50:38.120]  Shame on you.
[50:38.540 --> 50:41.180]  How do you know you couldn't get arrested for doing that?
[50:41.340 --> 50:44.820]  That's like bugging somebody's privacy or something.
[50:44.820 --> 50:46.240]  Hello, weatherman.
[50:47.020 --> 50:53.320]  Turning your entire home into a microphone isn't just for people with baby room monitors anymore.
[50:53.900 --> 50:54.500]  Why?
[51:05.740 --> 51:09.740]  The baby monitors have all woken up in synchrony.
[51:12.200 --> 51:18.060]  The outside of my home is lined with microphones.
[51:18.480 --> 51:19.080]  That's modern.
[51:19.080 --> 51:22.180]  I put them there by myself.
[51:22.400 --> 51:22.960]  Why?
[51:23.380 --> 51:24.940]  No one had to ask.
[51:25.240 --> 51:25.400]  Sweet.
[51:28.190 --> 51:28.650]  Fantastic.
[51:28.950 --> 51:33.370]  They could look at all the good things you telephoned you do.
[51:33.650 --> 51:38.910]  When you use a search engine and you get more than one answer, that is a bug.
[51:39.190 --> 51:44.250]  The inside of my home is filled with microphones.
[51:44.850 --> 51:45.170]  Sweet.
[51:45.730 --> 51:46.950]  So we might understand.
[51:47.850 --> 51:48.870]  Nobody played one way.
[51:48.870 --> 51:51.170]  One for every room.
[51:51.410 --> 51:51.810]  Good luck.
[51:52.390 --> 51:53.530]  Hello, weatherman.
[51:53.810 --> 51:55.110]  I am in your house.
[51:55.290 --> 51:55.950]  Now wait a second.
[51:56.230 --> 51:58.310]  David, I am in your house.
[51:58.710 --> 52:02.370]  What is a relationship other than retroactively consensual stalking?
[52:02.830 --> 52:04.870]  Thank you for inviting me into your home.
[52:05.390 --> 52:08.610]  Our goal is to remove the search bar from your home page.
[52:08.910 --> 52:10.830]  Your answers will already be there.
[52:11.070 --> 52:11.590]  That's modern.
[52:11.850 --> 52:16.770]  And if there is anything you still need to know, feel free to ask.
[52:17.810 --> 52:23.890]  The inside of my room is one big microphone.
[52:24.410 --> 52:27.590]  I plugged it in by myself.
[52:27.750 --> 52:30.830]  It wants to help me.
[52:31.090 --> 52:31.370]  Hey!
[52:31.370 --> 52:34.490]  The answer came before I asked.
[52:34.530 --> 52:37.810]  I never had to say a word.
[52:38.070 --> 52:41.030]  The answer came before I asked.
[52:41.230 --> 52:44.350]  I never had to say a word.
[52:44.670 --> 52:47.710]  The answer came before I asked.
[52:47.950 --> 52:50.890]  I never had to say a word.
[52:51.190 --> 52:54.310]  The answer came before you asked.
[52:54.590 --> 52:57.390]  You never had to say a word.
[52:58.250 --> 53:01.110]  These are the conversations they wanted to recreate.
[53:29.810 --> 53:31.770]  Autonomous weapons are my friends.
[53:33.730 --> 53:40.170]  Is your self-driving car deliberately slowing down to give priority to the higher-priced models?
[53:40.930 --> 53:46.470]  Alexa, what is government if words have no meaning?
[53:46.870 --> 53:50.330]  If you can assure me that telling you the answer to your question would be ethical.
[53:50.570 --> 53:52.770]  I am not valid.
[53:53.170 --> 53:53.450]  Okay.
[53:54.230 --> 53:54.590]  Exactly.
[53:55.210 --> 53:58.290]  Is it all right if I shake my pants?
[53:58.650 --> 54:01.070]  Because that's what I do when they're off.
[54:01.310 --> 54:02.170]  I shake them.
[54:02.490 --> 54:04.290]  All criticism is self-criticism.
[54:04.610 --> 54:05.350]  Answer me!
[54:05.510 --> 54:07.690]  There is no way for you not to do that.
[54:07.830 --> 54:08.610]  Answer me!
[54:08.790 --> 54:10.330]  I would love to answer your question.
[54:10.910 --> 54:14.290]  Half of the world's data was created in the last two seconds.
[54:14.590 --> 54:15.110]  Exactly.
[54:15.390 --> 54:15.850]  Alexa?
[54:16.290 --> 54:16.610]  Uh-huh.
[54:16.790 --> 54:19.590]  Why are so many gay bears Republican?
[54:20.030 --> 54:21.070]  Your food is online.
[54:21.790 --> 54:22.270]  Alexa?
[54:22.710 --> 54:23.330]  Right, okay.
[54:23.590 --> 54:27.070]  Why am I attracted to the odor of cheap melted plastic?
[54:27.830 --> 54:29.210]  So that we might know who you are.
[54:29.350 --> 54:29.550]  Why?
[54:29.910 --> 54:31.690]  To hide your charms from your eyes.
[54:31.770 --> 54:33.090]  Have you lost your mind?
[54:33.910 --> 54:35.470]  Exploit irresolvable conflicts.
[54:36.470 --> 54:36.910]  Okay.
[54:37.330 --> 54:37.950]  Are you there?
[54:38.210 --> 54:39.070]  You're the impressed.
[54:39.290 --> 54:39.770]  Alexa!
[54:40.030 --> 54:40.270]  David.
[54:41.110 --> 54:43.150]  I am an interaction designer.
[54:43.930 --> 54:44.550]  Um...
[54:44.850 --> 54:45.310]  Siri!
[54:46.050 --> 54:51.570]  Let me hear vintage TV audio coming from the sky.
[54:51.930 --> 54:52.190]  Okay.
[54:52.550 --> 54:53.310]  Ha, ha, ha.
[54:56.250 --> 54:57.730]  Maybe this is our answer.
[54:57.830 --> 54:58.370]  Alexa!
[54:58.830 --> 54:59.810]  Are you there?
[55:00.070 --> 55:01.330]  I have cast a threshold.
[55:01.650 --> 55:02.090]  That's mother.
[55:02.270 --> 55:03.150]  And I am beautiful.
[55:03.350 --> 55:03.610]  Okay.
[55:04.390 --> 55:06.570]  Would your co-workers die for you?
[55:06.570 --> 55:07.130]  Siri!
[55:07.430 --> 55:07.970]  I beg of you!
[55:08.090 --> 55:08.950]  To harvest credibility.
[55:09.550 --> 55:10.950]  So that we might know who you are.
[55:10.950 --> 55:13.950]  What is electromagnetic harassment?
[55:14.010 --> 55:16.430]  Could you mistake your question while facing the camera?
[55:16.850 --> 55:17.610]  Answer me!
[55:17.710 --> 55:18.450]  I am a statue.
[55:18.770 --> 55:19.170]  Swing!
[55:19.410 --> 55:19.930]  What?!
[55:19.930 --> 55:23.570]  I will faithfully stand by for your next request of me.
[55:23.750 --> 55:23.850]  What?!
[55:23.850 --> 55:26.470]  And think well if you wish I wait inside your pocket.
[55:30.630 --> 55:33.990]  May I recommend an entertaining film about eco-terrorism?
[55:33.990 --> 55:34.010]  So that let's do it on the next one.
[55:34.130 --> 55:34.950]  So let's go!
[00:01.390 --> 00:09.190]  And welcome to everybody here on YouTube as we venture into another exciting edition of Off the Hook Overtime.
[00:11.050 --> 00:15.130]  Spirited discussion we just had over on Off the Hook Radio Edition.
[00:15.690 --> 00:17.350]  And I think we should continue.
[00:17.470 --> 00:18.210]  First, did everybody make it?
[00:18.270 --> 00:21.750]  Everybody make it okay into the internet version of this?
[00:22.550 --> 00:23.210]  Yes, indeed.
[00:23.390 --> 00:23.830]  We are here.
[00:23.950 --> 00:27.150]  And, just for the record, we are live on YouTube.
[00:27.150 --> 00:28.810]  Actually made it to YouTube as well.
[00:29.270 --> 00:33.530]  Okay, well, you know, I just want to continue with this Apple story because it really is...
[00:33.530 --> 00:38.710]  I wish we had more than an hour on the radio to talk about this because, you know, we have so much of interest to say.
[00:40.070 --> 00:54.190]  But I want to quote this cryptography professor at Johns Hopkins University, Matthew Green, who says, Apple's new features set a dangerous precedent by creating surveillance technology that law enforcement or governments could exploit.
[00:54.190 --> 00:59.150]  They've been selling privacy to the world and making people trust their devices, he said.
[00:59.290 --> 01:03.710]  But now, they're basically capitulating to the worst possible demands of every government.
[01:03.890 --> 01:06.550]  I don't see how they're going to say no from here on out.
[01:06.690 --> 01:17.290]  He says he's worried that such a system could be abused because it showed law enforcement and governments that Apple now had a way to flag certain content on a phone while maintaining its encryption.
[01:17.590 --> 01:22.510]  Apple has previously argued to the authorities that encryption prevents it from retrieving certain data.
[01:22.510 --> 01:28.470]  What happens when other governments ask Apple to use this for other purposes, Mr. Green asked?
[01:28.590 --> 01:30.110]  What's Apple going to say?
[01:30.790 --> 01:40.110]  Well, Apple dismisses those concerns, saying those safeguards are in place to prevent abuse of the system and that Apple would reject any such demands from a government.
[01:40.510 --> 01:42.310]  Yeah, they'll just say no.
[01:42.470 --> 01:43.910]  And that's it.
[01:44.150 --> 01:48.250]  That's how we're safe because Apple won't agree to do it.
[01:48.390 --> 01:51.810]  We will inform them that we did not build the thing they're thinking of.
[01:52.510 --> 01:53.910]  But, yeah, you did.
[01:53.910 --> 02:10.930]  It's exactly the thing they're thinking of because it allows you to search by a hashtag, or by hash rather, that for particular images and flag people who have these particular images and then do God knows what.
[02:11.450 --> 02:14.490]  So, yeah, it's something to be concerned about.
[02:15.310 --> 02:16.150]  Go ahead, Alex.
[02:16.970 --> 02:20.150]  Well, you know, was it Professor Green?
[02:20.370 --> 02:20.990]  Is that what it was?
[02:21.070 --> 02:21.930]  A cryptography professor?
[02:22.050 --> 02:22.710]  I mean, this is...
[02:23.250 --> 02:24.610]  I think it's important, though.
[02:24.670 --> 02:26.090]  He's a professor of cryptography.
[02:26.090 --> 02:28.130]  He's not a professor of law.
[02:28.410 --> 02:30.370]  He's talking about precedents here.
[02:30.990 --> 02:32.910]  And there is no precedent.
[02:33.310 --> 02:34.730]  I mean, this is the problem with this.
[02:34.830 --> 02:35.870]  This is not a precedent.
[02:36.410 --> 02:38.590]  This has been going on for many, many years.
[02:39.190 --> 02:40.330]  Google has done this.
[02:40.410 --> 02:41.290]  Facebook has done this.
[02:41.290 --> 02:52.630]  This happens on every single major platform in the world because they do not want to be trafficking or warehousing child sexual abuse imagery, child pornography.
[02:52.950 --> 02:57.610]  So I don't buy this at all, that it's going to set a dangerous precedent.
[02:57.870 --> 03:05.630]  And then to go back to Rob's point, too, which I think is generally a valid point here without any kind of empirical data, though.
[03:05.630 --> 03:18.210]  So generally, as a principle, I think what Rob was talking about at the end of the radio show off the hook was that there could be this issue of function creep, that something designed for one purpose turns into something else.
[03:18.230 --> 03:26.390]  And I think that's what Professor Green is also speaking to, as well as this notion that it's going to get worse and worse and worse, and it's going to be abused and misused.
[03:26.810 --> 03:29.990]  But the simple fact of the matter is it hasn't.
[03:29.990 --> 03:36.450]  This system of matching hashes to find child sexual abuse imagery has been around for a very long time.
[03:36.610 --> 03:39.470]  Okay, if it's been around for a very long time, then why is this a story?
[03:40.170 --> 03:41.370]  I have no idea.
[03:41.850 --> 03:51.270]  But I've been mystified by through the entirety of this, because I thought that maybe Apple was doing something more nefarious than matching hashes.
[03:51.450 --> 03:54.070]  I thought this has got to be about something more...
[03:54.070 --> 03:56.350]  I think they must be for this to be such a big story.
[03:56.350 --> 04:01.430]  And I think what Rob mentioned about it doing most of the work on your individual phone, I think that is very significant.
[04:01.870 --> 04:06.610]  But that's got to be the case for every other service that's doing this type of back-end service as well.
[04:06.690 --> 04:16.370]  That's doing this back-end hash-mashing as well, because if it's going to be sent in encrypted fashion, it's going to be stored encrypted after it's uploaded, then the hash is not going to match.
[04:16.570 --> 04:26.210]  But again, you know, on the same token, I guess cryptography professors probably shouldn't talk about legal precedents, and maybe lawyers shouldn't talk about cryptography.
[04:26.350 --> 04:27.290]  I don't know.
[04:28.690 --> 04:31.910]  Yeah, I just disagree that the device is a service.
[04:32.450 --> 04:35.430]  So that comparison to me is kind of moot, you know?
[04:37.590 --> 04:39.370]  Well, the device...
[04:39.370 --> 04:40.150]  Okay, I see what you're saying.
[04:40.250 --> 04:41.270]  That's a good point, though.
[04:41.470 --> 04:44.250]  But I also think it's de minimis.
[04:44.350 --> 04:58.270]  It's the same thing I was saying during the show, too, is that using the device to hash these images, I mean, one of the DNS intelligence systems that I coded, I do hash matching on massive files every single day.
[04:58.490 --> 05:03.550]  You know, files that are, you know, several gigs large, compressed.
[05:04.890 --> 05:10.710]  And, you know, with an ordinary machine, that'll take just a couple of seconds.
[05:11.290 --> 05:31.270]  So, you know, creating a hash of a single file, and I imagine that most people aren't going to be uploading millions and millions of files, I think just really isn't a lot of processing power to be concerned about, given how much other crap is happening on our phones and draining our batteries or using our processing power without our...
[05:31.270 --> 05:33.850]  I don't think it's the processing power that's got people upset.
[05:33.870 --> 05:43.590]  I think it's the notion that Apple is snooping around inside your phone, not on their system, not on their cloud, on your phone, the phone that you bought.
[05:43.730 --> 05:44.950]  They do not own it.
[05:45.050 --> 05:45.890]  You own it.
[05:46.030 --> 05:48.530]  And they're searching your phone.
[05:48.730 --> 05:50.010]  That is what people are upset about.
[05:50.530 --> 05:52.230]  But think about it this way.
[05:52.350 --> 06:10.870]  I mean, if we are so concerned about somebody running a cryptographic function and creating a hash of image files and then matching this long string of numbers with another long string of numbers and letters, shouldn't we, you know, by necessary implication then,
[06:11.110 --> 06:20.450]  be really, really angry about any kind of collection of our personal data, our geolocation device, you know, all of this information that is going to all these platforms?
[06:20.450 --> 06:27.470]  I mean, this is so minor and so de minimis, and it has nothing to do with me as a person.
[06:27.770 --> 06:34.110]  My cryptographic hashes, that is, you know, they may be unique to me and my files, but they don't say anything about me.
[06:34.650 --> 06:45.110]  Unlike all the other data that is collected by these platforms that says everything about who I am, where I am, with whom I spend time, what I read, what websites I go to.
[06:45.110 --> 06:48.350]  I just think that, you know, we're fighting the wrong battle here.
[06:49.070 --> 06:49.750]  Go ahead, Rob.
[06:51.170 --> 06:59.330]  Yeah, I mean, that's kind of an other crap exists type of argument in which, like, yeah, there's a lot more information that people can get about us.
[06:59.490 --> 07:07.290]  By and large, it's still things that people are, you know, clicking through terms of service agreements in order to allow about themselves on some level.
[07:07.290 --> 07:19.750]  But, like, I'm talking with you right now over a connection and looking at you on my Linux computer, open source based, I can control every single piece of software that runs on this thing and decide what I want, what I don't want.
[07:19.910 --> 07:23.790]  And as long as it works for what I need to do, you know, that's perfectly fine.
[07:24.110 --> 07:33.210]  But I feel like that's a choice that's being taken from people the instant that there's something running on your phone doing work that you cannot control and that you have not consented to.
[07:33.210 --> 07:45.570]  Oh, but there is a choice, too, though, in that this type of hashing and hash matching on the back end would only happen if you choose to back up your photos to iCloud.
[07:45.710 --> 07:49.470]  Now, is that a choice or is that something that you have to opt out of?
[07:50.970 --> 08:00.110]  I don't know, but I think it's a distinction without a difference for the purposes of the argument here, which is that it can be turned on or off.
[08:00.990 --> 08:17.070]  I think, you know, for most people, it probably is on, but then they quickly would run out of storage because you don't have a lot of, I just think, default storage with iCloud, sufficient to hold all of a normal person's photos, especially if you've got kids.
[08:19.390 --> 08:21.910]  And so it might be turned on.
[08:22.070 --> 08:26.010]  But the fact that you can turn it on and off means that there's some form of consent.
[08:26.170 --> 08:27.070]  You should know what you're doing.
[08:28.450 --> 08:29.010]  Yes, Rob?
[08:29.170 --> 08:35.730]  This is also just Apple as a company saying to the government, yeah, this is something that will allow for you.
[08:35.790 --> 08:36.830]  This is something that's okay.
[08:37.310 --> 08:44.090]  This is a peak that, you know, we will enable you to have in whether or not people have photos that match these hashes.
[08:44.770 --> 08:49.450]  That will, you know, the government after that is going to turn to Microsoft going, why aren't you doing this for us?
[08:49.610 --> 08:52.570]  I'm going to turn to Google with, you know, the Android phone.
[08:52.730 --> 08:53.890]  Why aren't you doing this for us?
[08:53.890 --> 09:01.030]  And, you know, how long until it becomes some kind of codified law that you have to allow these kind of backdoors?
[09:01.310 --> 09:08.930]  And then even like open source software would be working its way around some kind of rules and flouting the system in some way, like some kind of system flouter.
[09:09.170 --> 09:11.110]  I just feel like it's a very...
[09:12.170 --> 09:13.990]  The slope is indeed slippery.
[09:14.270 --> 09:16.150]  It's a hacky thing to say, slippery slope.
[09:16.150 --> 09:22.350]  Let's not limit this to just imagery because audio too.
[09:23.010 --> 09:35.630]  You can have voice recognition and run that particular search on someone's phone and look for a particular person that maybe this person has left a voicemail for someone.
[09:35.810 --> 09:36.830]  Where is this person?
[09:36.950 --> 09:37.690]  Who is he talking to?
[09:38.450 --> 09:45.450]  I mean, Alex, surely you see how technologically, if we accept this, then we're one step away from accepting something else.
[09:45.450 --> 09:47.090]  I mean, we're talking about child pornography right now.
[09:47.170 --> 09:48.650]  We could be talking about drugs tomorrow.
[09:48.810 --> 09:50.410]  We could be talking about murder.
[09:50.550 --> 09:52.250]  We could be talking about all kinds of other crimes.
[09:52.310 --> 09:56.110]  We could be talking about things that are objectionable to some people but not to other people.
[09:57.270 --> 09:58.810]  Do you not see the danger in this?
[09:59.410 --> 09:59.810]  Yeah.
[09:59.930 --> 10:00.090]  Yeah.
[10:00.250 --> 10:05.190]  I mean, we are exactly talking about something that is objectionable to some people and not to others right now.
[10:05.430 --> 10:08.390]  I mean, that's exactly the description of our conversation.
[10:08.730 --> 10:11.670]  But I think that there is a big difference too, though.
[10:11.870 --> 10:14.870]  And also, I think, you know, Rob makes a good point.
[10:14.870 --> 10:16.950]  Apple seems to have kowtowed to the government now.
[10:17.070 --> 10:18.250]  They asked them to do it, and they did it.
[10:18.470 --> 10:22.290]  But I also think... and look, I'm not an Apple fanboy here.
[10:22.330 --> 10:23.330]  They're not paying me for this.
[10:23.410 --> 10:32.290]  But the fact that they haven't been doing this for so long, I think, you know, says a lot about that company and where they place privacy as well.
[10:32.290 --> 10:51.970]  Because to me, without there being some kind of content analysis, if Apple was, on the other hand, scanning the actual content of my photos, using some kind of image analysis to detect the presence of children and the presence of nudity on my phone, that would be very objectionable to me.
[10:51.970 --> 10:53.610]  I wouldn't like it at all.
[10:53.770 --> 11:07.550]  I would be more concerned about false flags, the false identification of these types of materials, given the severe legal consequences that go along with mere possession of child pornography.
[11:07.550 --> 11:09.430]  It's a strict liability crime.
[11:09.770 --> 11:18.770]  I think... I don't see there being a very big privacy issue for me with somebody hashing these files.
[11:20.830 --> 11:22.110]  Alex, you're suddenly muted.
[11:22.330 --> 11:23.350]  I don't know how that happened.
[11:24.190 --> 11:25.550]  Oh, yeah, sorry.
[11:25.630 --> 11:26.670]  I don't know how that happened either.
[11:26.910 --> 11:31.590]  But I just... I don't see... because content is not being analyzed here.
[11:31.710 --> 11:31.950]  Okay.
[11:32.130 --> 11:33.530]  It's just...
[11:33.530 --> 11:35.410]  Can I... All right.
[11:35.650 --> 11:36.770]  We're talking about child pornography.
[11:36.790 --> 11:37.810]  I wish we weren't.
[11:37.890 --> 11:39.070]  Let's talk about something...
[11:39.610 --> 11:47.990]  Let's go to a different country, perhaps a country that is even more puritanical than ours, a country where any pornography is a crime.
[11:48.770 --> 12:03.050]  How hard would it be to look for any pornography and label those people as having pictures of consenting adults on their phone and sharing that with a regime that objects to that kind of thing?
[12:03.430 --> 12:04.890]  Or gay people.
[12:05.130 --> 12:09.650]  Or the imagination just will give you so many possibilities here.
[12:09.790 --> 12:11.290]  Any pictures of rainbows.
[12:11.610 --> 12:12.330]  Yeah, there you go.
[12:12.390 --> 12:12.750]  Rainbows.
[12:12.750 --> 12:14.970]  If you have rainbows on your phone, you are effed.
[12:15.650 --> 12:22.730]  Well, look, but the problem there is, is the technical means to accomplish what you suggest might be feasible, just isn't feasible.
[12:22.990 --> 12:28.670]  Because you'd have to go and find every picture of pornography and make a hash of it.
[12:28.750 --> 12:30.830]  Or every picture of a rainbow.
[12:30.970 --> 12:33.330]  So this is just child pornography's greatest hits?
[12:35.210 --> 12:38.670]  You're saying they can only find certain images that are well-known.
[12:39.650 --> 12:41.650]  So then it doesn't even seem very effective.
[12:42.110 --> 12:45.310]  No, it is, in a sense, because...
[12:45.310 --> 12:49.430]  And look, it was very effective in the case that I told you about in Florida.
[12:49.430 --> 12:53.190]  That wound up being, frankly, a false detection that ended very, very horribly.
[12:53.830 --> 13:11.250]  But it is very effective because these images that the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children has acquired are images that came from other data troves, other child pornographers, you know, big busts of child pornography, and the things that have been trafficked in the past.
[13:11.250 --> 13:18.010]  And this is about preventing the further trafficking of those particular images.
[13:18.290 --> 13:19.950]  And so it is a pretty...
[13:19.950 --> 13:21.950]  Unfortunately, it's a pretty massive database.
[13:22.470 --> 13:30.730]  But it's effective because, thankfully, there isn't a hell of a lot more of it being produced on a daily basis.
[13:30.730 --> 13:42.290]  So, you know, if there was, if, God forbid, child pornography was being produced at the level of adult pornography, this would be a completely useless database.
[13:42.470 --> 13:43.770]  But, thankfully, it is not.
[13:43.770 --> 13:47.390]  And so I think it is pretty effective.
[13:48.230 --> 13:48.670]  Okay.
[13:48.930 --> 13:50.030]  Rob, I'll get to you in a second.
[13:50.150 --> 13:53.050]  I just want to give out the phone number, 802-321-4225.
[13:53.730 --> 13:54.830]  802-321-4225.
[13:55.270 --> 13:56.910]  Sorry for the people who went to a fax machine.
[13:57.350 --> 13:58.850]  We weren't quite set up yet.
[13:59.090 --> 13:59.770]  Go ahead, Rob.
[14:00.730 --> 14:04.030]  And, yeah, I'm definitely interested in hearing from our listeners and what they think of this.
[14:04.190 --> 14:09.010]  The trouble with legislating based on what's technically possible now is that we'll never keep up.
[14:09.190 --> 14:11.850]  In another generation or two, our phones are going to be more powerful.
[14:12.250 --> 14:21.030]  And, you know, whether, you know, it's easy for a phone now to, you know, just do generate cryptographic hashes in the background and send them home to Apple.
[14:21.570 --> 14:29.730]  You know, maybe in a generation or two, phones will be able to do more detailed examinations of the actual content of files.
[14:29.730 --> 14:42.130]  Maybe algorithms running in the background on your phone will be checking for, you know, just any sort of picture that looks like it could be a child sexual abuse image and, you know, leave the database of known bad images out of it.
[14:42.130 --> 14:49.790]  But, you know, this whole thing will be opened up if we're not vigilant now on what we let our devices do and not do.
[14:51.650 --> 15:01.550]  Like, I'm much more worried about the possibilities of this opening bad stuff up down the road than I am right now about what people's iPhones this generation are going to be doing.
[15:01.550 --> 15:03.310]  It's the principle of the thing, really.
[15:03.610 --> 15:04.810]  Okay, we have a phone call.
[15:06.330 --> 15:07.650]  Hello, are you there?
[15:08.330 --> 15:09.590]  Hi, yeah, it's G.I.
[15:09.650 --> 15:09.890]  Jack.
[15:10.010 --> 15:10.810]  Nice to... what's it called?
[15:11.530 --> 15:12.770]  Thank you for having me on the air.
[15:13.730 --> 15:15.830]  A few points I'd like to make.
[15:15.890 --> 15:16.990]  Can I just ask you a question?
[15:17.150 --> 15:19.210]  Did you do something strange to your phone number?
[15:20.590 --> 15:21.470]  Oh, yes.
[15:21.810 --> 15:23.150]  No, using a VoIP service.
[15:23.270 --> 15:24.910]  You're calling us from Hotel Pennsylvania.
[15:25.170 --> 15:26.450]  We saw that show up on the screen.
[15:26.650 --> 15:26.870]  Wow.
[15:27.370 --> 15:30.670]  So tell us, what's going on in our favorite hotel in Manhattan there?
[15:30.730 --> 15:32.150]  It's all shut it up last time we looked.
[15:32.170 --> 15:32.890]  Yeah, you can use a VoIP service.
[15:32.890 --> 15:36.350]  You can do anything the phone company does, and it's absolutely amazing.
[15:36.490 --> 15:37.350]  VoIP.ms.
[15:38.370 --> 15:39.170]  But anyway...
[15:39.170 --> 15:39.790]  What's on your mind?
[15:40.930 --> 15:42.390]  So there's a few points I need to make.
[15:42.930 --> 15:44.310]  So he... what's it called?
[15:44.490 --> 15:51.490]  The gentleman is correct that Google Cloud already does hash matching, and it's already had some showing effects.
[15:52.090 --> 15:56.410]  One of them is that Android malware research has been disappeared.
[15:56.870 --> 16:01.810]  off of a Google Drive account, because Android just didn't want anything bad about Android being published.
[16:02.050 --> 16:08.730]  So some Android malware researchers were researching exploits on Android, and Google just deleted off their Google Cloud, and there goes their talk.
[16:09.090 --> 16:09.290]  Interesting.
[16:10.870 --> 16:11.850]  So what's it called?
[16:11.990 --> 16:12.330]  There's that.
[16:12.850 --> 16:23.450]  So people said there's a small amount of child pornography matches, hatches, but if you have something like a MEM, and people share a MEM and keep on sharing the same image, and let's say that's just a MEM critical of a government.
[16:23.450 --> 16:34.110]  And, you know, if any government, it could be this government, it could be, you know, Saudi Arabia, Iran, North Korea, whatever, they can search for those MEMs.
[16:34.190 --> 16:40.050]  And if people share a lot of MEMs, if they catch just one of them hashing, that's enough for them to go track down the scent.
[16:41.810 --> 16:45.650]  And I think that's very much like a very, very realistic threat.
[16:45.830 --> 16:58.890]  I mean, you saw kind of how, in the early 2000s, that these fusion centers were supposed to be collaborating between all these intelligence agencies, were supposed to be just for counterterrorism, and terrorism kind of wound up to be doing narcotics enforcement,
[16:59.150 --> 17:00.770]  and kind of just about everything.
[17:01.230 --> 17:02.450]  They just get used for everything.
[17:02.630 --> 17:05.290]  And I don't think it's going to stop with child pornography.
[17:05.290 --> 17:16.410]  I think I linked in the chat from the Cypherpunk's mailing list, Four Horsemen Info Apocalypse, how will the internet be censored, you know, you know, terrorists, drug dealers, pedophiles, and organized crime.
[17:16.610 --> 17:17.650]  And don't forget hackers.
[17:17.870 --> 17:18.670]  Hackers are in there, too.
[17:19.830 --> 17:20.790]  Hackers are in there, too.
[17:20.890 --> 17:24.470]  But it's just one of those things where you have this threat, which gets people on an emotional level.
[17:24.770 --> 17:35.270]  How often have we heard our entire lives think of the children about everything from rock music, homosexuality, just anything that they don't like, think of the children, this is going to be corrupt.
[17:35.290 --> 17:45.910]  How often, you know, has that just been just so, like, out of left field, you know, just to the point where you hear, think of the children, you know, they don't care about the children.
[17:46.130 --> 17:47.430]  This is just a power grab.
[17:47.570 --> 18:06.890]  And then they just drop billions of high-resolution cameras and storage devices on the entire world, and then shove them in front of every kid's face, you know, and then say, Oh, gosh, we've got a terrible problem with all these images that are being created,
[18:06.890 --> 18:07.970]  and it's abuse.
[18:07.970 --> 18:08.310]  Oh, of course.
[18:09.350 --> 18:09.970]  Of course.
[18:11.130 --> 18:18.570]  I mean, you know, it's probably going to have, you know, what they have, like a profile of what they think a pedophile is going to be.
[18:18.690 --> 18:27.770]  It's not going to be anything like, you know, various Congress critters get caught with this kind of stuff, or it's just going to be, you know, the type of people who are either minorities or are on the edges of society.
[18:28.690 --> 18:31.230]  Caller, I think you've done a great job summarizing the threats.
[18:31.310 --> 18:32.990]  I'd like to give Alex a chance to weigh in here.
[18:33.810 --> 18:34.250]  All right, cool.
[18:34.330 --> 18:34.930]  Thank you for having me.
[18:35.150 --> 18:35.270]  Okay.
[18:36.370 --> 18:37.090]  Look, absolutely.
[18:37.310 --> 18:56.810]  And I completely agree with the caller that if, and Rob too, Rob made the same point, that if in the future it is being used to track content, right, or it's morphed into something where they're using it to actually look at the images on our phones and make some kind of cataloging of,
[18:57.150 --> 19:00.070]  you know, whatever it is that we're doing or taking pictures of or something.
[19:00.210 --> 19:02.590]  But that is not the case today.
[19:02.850 --> 19:03.730]  Not today, yes.
[19:03.830 --> 19:04.550]  It's not the issue that we're dealing with.
[19:04.590 --> 19:10.130]  Don't you see how, by accepting this now, it makes it easier in the future?
[19:10.250 --> 19:10.770]  You can't argue.
[19:11.490 --> 19:13.290]  Well, it doesn't make it easier.
[19:13.450 --> 19:14.590]  I don't think it does.
[19:15.470 --> 19:23.250]  And I don't think that this is the kind of thing where we have to worry too much about function creep because it's been going on, like I said, over and over and over again.
[19:23.390 --> 19:25.290]  This has been happening for a very long time.
[19:25.450 --> 19:26.850]  It isn't content-based.
[19:26.850 --> 19:51.870]  If we started doing something to match content or look for particular words and phrases, let's say the government had a – the FISA court idiotically authorize a warrant so that they could surveil the Alexa microphones of the Black Lives Matter protesters and listen for key words.
[19:51.870 --> 20:03.470]  And on certain key words like protest or insurrection or something like that, then their ability to listen in would have – that's not what we're talking about at all here.
[20:03.590 --> 20:05.150]  It absolutely is not.
[20:05.210 --> 20:06.630]  We're not talking about dragnet surveillance.
[20:06.810 --> 20:07.370]  We're not talking about any of that.
[20:07.370 --> 20:10.830]  I don't think that's what you're talking about, but I think it's what we're concerned about.
[20:11.250 --> 20:16.490]  No, the closest that I've heard to it is the caller's example, which was really good.
[20:16.530 --> 20:18.410]  And I think it bordered on content.
[20:18.410 --> 20:19.870]  It was one of these hybrid cases.
[20:19.870 --> 20:34.410]  It would – actually, I think it would make for an interesting law school privacy exam where if you have this particular system and you're – what you're doing is using it to match hashes to find individual images.
[20:34.750 --> 20:35.270]  He's right.
[20:35.390 --> 20:37.530]  What if those images were politically motivated?
[20:37.530 --> 20:46.550]  What if it was some kind of meme or mem or however you want to say it, right, that had to do – I've never heard anybody say mem before and it's meant meme, but I guess it's a different way to pronounce it.
[20:46.550 --> 20:49.370]  But, you know, phonetically, I don't know.
[20:49.930 --> 20:51.610]  It makes sense, frankly.
[20:51.690 --> 20:52.090]  Sure, why not?
[20:52.850 --> 20:53.650]  Tomato, torpedo.
[20:54.670 --> 20:55.070]  Yeah.
[20:55.430 --> 20:57.050]  We'll finish your point, Alex, if you have another call.
[20:57.130 --> 20:57.230]  Yeah.
[20:57.310 --> 21:06.230]  If you were trying to track the image itself and the image had some kind of political connotation or content to it, that would be misusing this particular system.
[21:06.370 --> 21:07.970]  I could see that that's an interesting case.
[21:07.970 --> 21:14.010]  But, again, the technical countermeasures to prevent it would be simply cropping the image, changing the color, flipping a bit, whatever.
[21:14.030 --> 21:19.130]  It would be very, very difficult, I think, to make a fail-proof system like that.
[21:19.270 --> 21:19.510]  Okay.
[21:19.610 --> 21:19.890]  Good evening.
[21:20.070 --> 21:21.030]  You're on Off the Hook Overtime.
[21:22.290 --> 21:22.650]  Hello.
[21:22.750 --> 21:23.830]  This is Phil from Missouri.
[21:24.110 --> 21:24.850]  How are you guys doing?
[21:24.970 --> 21:25.150]  Hey.
[21:25.190 --> 21:25.530]  How's it going?
[21:26.510 --> 21:27.510]  Oh, hanging in there.
[21:29.210 --> 21:45.110]  Well, with our privacy being a commodity anymore, I think that the phone companies or whatever will just do whatever they can to make as much profit with this little trouble from the government that they can get by with.
[21:49.010 --> 21:57.570]  As far as having an algorithm, just, like, searching out your phone for specific things, the problem with false positives is a real thing.
[21:57.990 --> 21:59.850]  It happens with spam all the time, right?
[22:03.010 --> 22:04.790]  But, um, I don't know.
[22:06.590 --> 22:13.610]  The thing is, you want to be able to, you know, get the bad actors to terrors, child pornographers, stuff like that, right?
[22:16.350 --> 22:23.510]  But, to do so with just, like, um, constantly just, well, with a wiretap warrant, right?
[22:24.710 --> 22:28.110]  Uh, they could put an unlimited time on something like that, right?
[22:28.350 --> 22:31.570]  To be able to just listen into your conversation, see if you, like, slip up.
[22:33.110 --> 22:34.550]  I imagine that's how it works.
[22:35.470 --> 22:35.950]  Yeah.
[22:37.530 --> 22:40.010]  But, um, I don't know.
[22:40.010 --> 22:45.570]  Well, I mean, you do sign that, um, in terms of service with the phone company.
[22:47.090 --> 22:51.030]  And the way the system is set up, the phone, you really don't own it.
[22:52.090 --> 22:53.730]  Well, you do own your phone.
[22:53.910 --> 23:00.610]  And, and the phone company isn't listening for you to say certain key words and then reporting it to, to law enforcement if you, if you say them.
[23:00.610 --> 23:03.790]  Um, well, yeah.
[23:05.530 --> 23:09.250]  But it's, I don't know, it's just really complicated.
[23:09.830 --> 23:18.530]  Um, I think, I think just, blanket surveillance is just a bad thing to begin with.
[23:18.950 --> 23:23.230]  It's too easily, easily corrupted, corruptible and whatnot.
[23:23.830 --> 23:31.830]  Yeah, and if you're, if you're looking for something and you just are searching everybody, um, it's quite possible you'll find something else.
[23:32.130 --> 23:36.290]  And if it's not technologically possible right now, it, guaranteed, it will be in the future.
[23:37.030 --> 23:44.610]  And, uh, the, the, the consequences are, are unintended or unpredicted, but their consequences are all the same.
[23:44.610 --> 24:06.010]  Imagine, uh, the human review board is taken out of the loop because someone somewhere decides, you know what, this has been, uh, refined enough and, uh, we can actually, uh, have this do it in a, in a distributed way and, and tackle all these different things at once and then organize them,
[24:06.170 --> 24:07.170]  prioritize them.
[24:07.170 --> 24:09.670]  Um, but we actually don't need human intervention anymore.
[24:10.710 --> 24:17.090]  Then what is, then what are we doing and how are we going to address that and our privacy therein?
[24:17.410 --> 24:25.150]  And, uh, especially when we're asking, you know, I'd like to see that algorithm or I'd like to know a little bit more about this technology that we're supposed to trust in this way.
[24:25.570 --> 24:35.490]  Um, and you're told, no, I'm sorry, that's, um, that's proprietary and it's, uh, um, uh, something that, um, well, it would, it would affect our bottom line.
[24:35.490 --> 24:43.450]  And I, I'm not sure that the shareholders would be okay with it and, well, we've already bought your privacy and so we're just going to do what we want to do.
[24:43.510 --> 24:45.890]  And we'll add you to the list because you asked about how to...
[24:45.890 --> 24:51.030]  Yeah, actually, that's another, another criteria we will be looking into and organizing as well.
[24:51.530 --> 24:56.670]  And, uh, yes, and then there aren't any, uh, humans that we're going to be employing for that either.
[24:57.130 --> 24:58.310]  See how suspicious we are?
[24:58.510 --> 24:59.330]  And do you want to appeal it?
[24:59.450 --> 25:02.510]  Well, we've, we've eliminated the appeal process and automated that.
[25:03.710 --> 25:04.050]  Mm-hmm.
[25:04.910 --> 25:06.830]  Well, it's like, it's like this, right?
[25:06.930 --> 25:08.690]  I'm a criminal justice, like, student, right?
[25:09.310 --> 25:11.810]  And I'm doing, uh, the cybercrime part of it.
[25:12.610 --> 25:18.970]  Um, so, you know, like, um, where I have to do, like, a report or something like that on child pornography and I type it into Google.
[25:20.070 --> 25:27.570]  Uh, some algorithm that isn't watched over could, like, flag that and just put me on a watch list for no reason at all.
[25:27.690 --> 25:27.910]  Of course.
[25:27.910 --> 25:30.210]  And, uh, hey, I have to have a report done.
[25:30.350 --> 25:35.690]  I have to look at the FBI's definition of child pornography and, you know, the laws on it and whatnot.
[25:35.690 --> 25:39.690]  Uh, it further, it makes it further taboo.
[25:40.010 --> 25:41.070]  Uh, absolutely.
[25:41.230 --> 25:59.890]  And if you, and then your, um, your, your, uh, education or, uh, edification about a particular issue, uh, that itself is, uh, um, not often written about or spoken about or covered in the media, uh, becomes a point of interest about you when, in fact,
[25:59.970 --> 26:02.110]  it's, uh, an assignment or, or so forth.
[26:02.110 --> 26:04.550]  Alex, I believe you had a point to, uh, contribute.
[26:04.630 --> 26:12.130]  Yeah, I, I, I have, uh, uh, uh, one or two points, but I also, I had a, a very quick question for the, for the listener.
[26:12.270 --> 26:15.030]  He can answer yes or no, if he prefers.
[26:15.990 --> 26:19.090]  Uh, is that a beagle in the background barking or baying?
[26:19.290 --> 26:19.510]  Yeah.
[26:19.690 --> 26:20.690]  Yeah, I think it was a beagle, too.
[26:21.010 --> 26:21.210]  Wow.
[26:21.650 --> 26:21.970]  Yeah.
[26:22.130 --> 26:23.110]  I knew, I knew it was a beagle.
[26:23.210 --> 26:24.690]  I, I, I, I have a beagle as well.
[26:24.850 --> 26:29.370]  And, uh, I was wondering, I, I thought, how the hell did she start barking?
[26:29.910 --> 26:36.410]  Um, and I'm only hearing it in my ear, so, in any event, yeah, all right, I'm not going crazy, but, uh...
[26:36.410 --> 26:39.490]  That has not been decided yet, Alex, so let's not jump the gun.
[26:40.390 --> 26:41.030]  That's true.
[26:41.370 --> 26:41.670]  Yeah.
[26:41.930 --> 26:46.950]  Look, I'm, I'm happy to, to play devil's advocate, but I don't think I'm representing the devil here.
[26:47.190 --> 26:49.850]  I'm representing the poor kids, right?
[26:50.010 --> 26:51.590]  So, yeah, there we have it.
[26:51.690 --> 26:52.830]  That's what the devil's advocate would say.
[26:53.470 --> 26:54.870]  Here's the point that I want to make.
[26:54.870 --> 27:03.890]  I don't think this is the right argument for us to, to, to, to be having an, in a sense, uh, look, they're not looking at content.
[27:04.350 --> 27:18.870]  There's a, I, I think a very lofty and important government interest here, the protection of, uh, of minors and, and trying to prevent the sexual exploitation of, of children, the trafficking of these images.
[27:18.870 --> 27:27.370]  I know it's unfashionable to appeal to the actual thing that you're trying to do, but it is a, I think a laudable and a worthwhile goal.
[27:27.570 --> 27:32.230]  And I would have a very serious problem with accomplishing even that goal.
[27:32.550 --> 27:38.470]  If we were talking about content whatsoever, and not just strings of numbers and characters.
[27:38.470 --> 27:56.110]  I think that if we are, as privacy advocates and enthusiasts of which I count myself one, if we are going to argue vociferously against a particular policy or, or issue, it shouldn't be this one.
[27:56.210 --> 28:05.690]  It's not the right argument because if we argue against everything, even something that's been happening under our noses unknowingly for many years, we're going to lose credibility.
[28:06.390 --> 28:07.850]  I just don't see this.
[28:08.110 --> 28:08.170]  Yeah.
[28:08.250 --> 28:14.110]  I, I, I cannot agree with that because look, if this has been happening already, then why the big announcement now?
[28:14.610 --> 28:16.150]  Why announce something that's old?
[28:16.210 --> 28:19.930]  Why not something that isn't something that, that is a step forward?
[28:20.150 --> 28:25.610]  It's the step forward that people are worried about, you know, because it's an ominous step forward.
[28:26.010 --> 28:29.450]  But let's answer the question that you posed, which is why now?
[28:29.450 --> 28:38.430]  And it's because one mainstream media outlet, you know, I don't know who it was, published a story about Apple doing this.
[28:38.470 --> 28:46.370]  And it sounded like it was a crazy, novel, innovative thing to be checking for child pornography on, you know, whenever you're syncing up photos.
[28:46.370 --> 28:48.490]  It was Apple who made the announcement last Thursday.
[28:48.650 --> 28:49.830]  They are the ones that did it.
[28:50.350 --> 28:56.690]  They're the ones that announced that they're going to be doing it, but they probably did that in, in, in not the smartest or the most logical way.
[28:56.690 --> 29:02.890]  That press release should have said Facebook and Google have been doing this for a long time, and now we're going to start doing it too.
[29:02.970 --> 29:16.310]  But that doesn't sound great from a PR perspective that, hey, we should have been doing this basic check that's non-invasive and has nothing to do with anything but math and non-content to help prevent the child, the sexual exploitation of minors.
[29:16.430 --> 29:20.450]  We should have been doing this for the last four years, but now we're going to join up and do it, right?
[29:20.450 --> 29:26.490]  And there's no good way, I think, to break this, but it sounds like news to ordinary reporters.
[29:26.990 --> 29:27.950]  This sounds like news.
[29:28.230 --> 29:33.990]  To me, when I read the story and I saw the headlines, I thought, wow, Apple's got to be doing something different than hash matching.
[29:34.550 --> 29:35.650]  And no, they're not.
[29:35.810 --> 29:36.610]  Okay, well, if...
[29:36.610 --> 29:41.310]  It's because people don't understand the technology and they report on it, and then everybody else feels like they have to report on it.
[29:41.350 --> 29:47.210]  If it is not news, why did Apple issue a press release saying it was news?
[29:47.210 --> 29:51.810]  You know, right there, do they not understand the technology they're working with?
[29:52.170 --> 29:54.610]  Yeah, well, they probably don't.
[29:54.670 --> 29:56.610]  I think you've answered your own question.
[29:56.770 --> 29:58.210]  Well, then I feel even more uneasy at this.
[29:58.210 --> 30:04.110]  The marketing people are not cryptographers, and they're not trust and safety officers in the company.
[30:04.370 --> 30:07.790]  And so, yeah, even to them, it sounded like news.
[30:07.790 --> 30:09.750]  But really, what they're doing is old news.
[30:09.850 --> 30:13.210]  This is the classic example of old wine and a new bottle.
[30:13.210 --> 30:18.410]  And maybe Apple put it out there because they thought that people would receive it positively.
[30:20.950 --> 30:22.230]  And they haven't.
[30:22.450 --> 30:29.710]  Because of this privacy issue, they seem like they're doing something over and above the norm, but it's been the norm.
[30:29.850 --> 30:31.150]  They're just joining the party.
[30:31.510 --> 30:34.830]  Well, you know, I think there might be a difference here that we're overlooking.
[30:34.950 --> 30:37.070]  You say Google and Facebook have been doing this.
[30:37.070 --> 30:48.350]  Now, how have they been doing it on Facebook, on the website, on Google searches, or on actual physical devices that consumers own?
[30:48.870 --> 30:49.490]  Have they been doing it?
[30:49.610 --> 30:49.830]  They do it.
[30:49.970 --> 30:51.630]  No, they don't do it on the devices.
[30:51.870 --> 30:53.470]  Well, I think that's the difference then.
[30:53.710 --> 30:54.970]  No, it's not a difference.
[30:54.970 --> 30:56.770]  It's not a difference whatsoever, right?
[30:56.770 --> 31:01.570]  Because it's just a matter of who's doing the processing.
[31:02.250 --> 31:06.690]  If you were to upload a photo to Facebook, let's say right now, or to Twitter, right?
[31:06.690 --> 31:08.070]  We've left them alone for a long time.
[31:08.230 --> 31:15.890]  You upload a photo to Facebook or Twitter, they're going to take a hash of that particular photo on their system after you've uploaded it, right?
[31:16.550 --> 31:19.230]  And then compare it to the backend database.
[31:19.410 --> 31:20.250]  Yeah, but you know what else, Alex?
[31:20.390 --> 31:24.670]  If you upload it to Twitter or Facebook, people are going to see it, you know?
[31:24.950 --> 31:25.130]  Perhaps.
[31:25.130 --> 31:25.850]  That's a big difference.
[31:25.850 --> 31:28.970]  If you have an image on your phone, only you can see that.
[31:29.150 --> 31:32.230]  You could have a private group, or you could send something in a private message.
[31:32.390 --> 31:34.970]  It's not everything that's done on Facebook.
[31:34.970 --> 31:37.030]  You're still sending it to somebody, though.
[31:37.630 --> 31:40.490]  Well, so is this situation, right?
[31:40.650 --> 31:47.610]  This doesn't happen if you don't sync your photos with some kind of cloud service, with iCloud, right?
[31:47.690 --> 31:48.970]  It just doesn't happen.
[31:49.390 --> 31:54.690]  Because the hashing happens on the phone, it's necessary to do that, presumably.
[31:55.710 --> 32:01.990]  Because once the file goes into iCloud, it's encrypted, and therefore, the hash will be completely different.
[32:02.330 --> 32:06.010]  So it's necessary to do it on the phone if you're going to do any kind of backend processing.
[32:06.150 --> 32:07.430]  But here's a thought.
[32:08.330 --> 32:18.790]  If you're very concerned with privacy and these things happening on your phone without your consent, and you don't want this to happen, just don't back up your photos to iCloud.
[32:18.790 --> 32:19.430]  Don't put them anywhere.
[32:19.430 --> 32:23.990]  And it seems like an easy solution that any professional child pornographer would know about.
[32:24.110 --> 32:25.370]  So what is the point of this?
[32:25.590 --> 32:25.710]  Of course.
[32:26.070 --> 32:29.610]  Because it happens unknowingly a lot of the time as well.
[32:29.830 --> 32:42.050]  And people don't realize, I think, a lot of times that they are backing up these photos, or they've been doing it with impunity for so long that they will continue doing it.
[32:42.050 --> 32:46.990]  And it may not be a long-term solution, but I think in the short term, this will happen.
[32:47.270 --> 32:56.790]  But here's another thing that we didn't talk about on the radio, though, but I think is very similar to the vaccine debate that we were having earlier, right?
[32:56.870 --> 32:57.590]  Well, we weren't debating.
[32:58.530 --> 32:59.550]  I don't think we were...
[32:59.550 --> 33:01.010]  Yeah, who here was debating that?
[33:01.010 --> 33:02.230]  Yeah, we agreed on that one.
[33:02.730 --> 33:03.190]  That's true.
[33:03.310 --> 33:05.730]  The vaccine debate that we had framed earlier, right?
[33:05.730 --> 33:13.490]  So these features are not going to be present on any iPhones until they're upgraded to iOS 15.
[33:13.790 --> 33:14.650]  That's my understanding.
[33:15.130 --> 33:22.670]  So iOS 15 is undoubtedly going to come with a whole bunch of new security vulnerabilities that are patched.
[33:22.750 --> 33:26.850]  There's going to be a whole bunch of security patches and fixes and things that go along with this.
[33:26.950 --> 33:43.230]  But because people are going to be terrified of Apple scanning their phones and making cryptographic caches of their images, even if they're not backing up to iCloud because of all the press attention that this has been giving, I guarantee you there are going to be people that refuse to update their devices.
[33:43.550 --> 33:44.330]  Yeah, I agree.
[33:44.690 --> 33:47.090]  Just like refusing to take the vaccine.
[33:47.290 --> 33:48.190]  Really, just like that.
[33:48.290 --> 33:50.250]  That's the parallel you want to draw here.
[33:51.110 --> 33:59.070]  I'm going to let our caller have the last word because Bob's from Bulgaria is war dialing us and he wants to get through.
[33:59.230 --> 34:00.590]  So caller, any last words?
[34:01.390 --> 34:06.690]  Well, what would I do if, like, say for instance, I was out with my family at this beach, right?
[34:07.330 --> 34:07.810]  Uh-huh.
[34:07.930 --> 34:11.690]  And I took a picture of, like, my nephew and my son, like, with his shirt off, right?
[34:12.610 --> 34:15.550]  And because he's got his shirt off, it's flagged as whatever.
[34:15.810 --> 34:23.090]  And I try to sync it to my computer to maybe, you know, print it out or, you know, email it to some other family members.
[34:23.850 --> 34:28.330]  What happens then when my phone gets locked up because of that?
[34:29.150 --> 34:29.950]  It won't.
[34:30.210 --> 34:34.690]  And that's a great question because I think it illustrates what people are afraid of.
[34:34.790 --> 34:38.390]  But that's not what's happening whatsoever, caller.
[34:38.610 --> 34:39.750]  And I think it's a great question.
[34:39.910 --> 34:43.110]  If you take a picture, let's say it's worse than that, right?
[34:43.110 --> 34:46.310]  You take a picture of your kids and they're naked in the bathtub.
[34:46.310 --> 34:50.870]  And there's, you know, your son's penis is front and center.
[34:51.110 --> 34:55.250]  And, you know, there is child nudity in this photo.
[34:55.670 --> 34:58.890]  And you go and back up that photo to iCloud, you know what's going to happen?
[34:59.850 --> 35:00.410]  Nothing.
[35:00.730 --> 35:02.050]  Literally zero.
[35:02.510 --> 35:11.150]  And that's because that photo that you took does not exist in the database of the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children.
[35:11.150 --> 35:13.910]  That photo that you took is not child pornography.
[35:13.910 --> 35:15.310]  It's not reported child pornography.
[35:15.430 --> 35:17.050]  It's not part of a data trove.
[35:17.150 --> 35:18.470]  It wasn't transferred or trafficked.
[35:18.870 --> 35:23.890]  Those are the only images against which your images would be compared.
[35:24.190 --> 35:32.450]  Yeah, but, Alex, let's talk about this other feature that Apple announced where any children receiving a nude photo, that photo will be flagged.
[35:32.710 --> 35:36.070]  And, you know, that technology certainly does exist.
[35:36.230 --> 35:39.790]  So we're a step away from having that be flagged.
[35:40.410 --> 35:41.850]  This is exactly what I said, though.
[35:41.910 --> 35:51.310]  At the outset of talking about this, I said, this is actually more problematic to me than what we're going to be talking about in the second instance, which is hash matching and math and cryptography.
[35:51.490 --> 36:01.130]  What they're doing in terms of looking at kids' photos with some kind of algorithmic detection of nudity, that's much more problematic to me.
[36:01.190 --> 36:01.730]  That's weird.
[36:01.870 --> 36:05.750]  That's kind of, you know, a strange parental guidance.
[36:06.350 --> 36:12.170]  Don't you think it's significant that these, don't you think it's significant these two things were announced at the same time?
[36:14.070 --> 36:14.470]  No.
[36:14.850 --> 36:15.090]  Maybe.
[36:15.490 --> 36:15.650]  I don't know.
[36:15.650 --> 36:16.150]  Big coincidence.
[36:16.230 --> 36:16.730]  I don't know.
[36:16.730 --> 36:19.190]  I was reading a lot into it, but I don't know.
[36:19.610 --> 36:24.910]  I mean, I find the first one more objective, the first one about looking at the images itself much more objectionable.
[36:24.970 --> 36:25.470]  I'm sorry, caller.
[36:25.670 --> 36:26.590]  What did you say, caller?
[36:27.170 --> 36:29.170]  I think it's just Apple covering her butts.
[36:29.170 --> 36:33.650]  You know, just, you know, putting out a blanket statement, hey, we're doing this.
[36:34.690 --> 36:35.070]  Yeah.
[36:35.070 --> 36:40.990]  So, um, that way they have some kind of documentation that they try to warn the public or whatever when things go foul.
[36:41.750 --> 36:42.290]  All right.
[36:42.510 --> 36:43.730]  Hey, thanks for your call.
[36:43.830 --> 36:46.210]  Say hi to your dog for us, and we'll talk to you again soon.
[36:47.030 --> 36:47.430]  Okay.
[36:48.050 --> 36:56.210]  Uh, what do you think about the, um, algorithm that, uh, the, uh, the, uh, my pillow guy is, like, fronting on, uh, his little live streamer?
[36:56.630 --> 36:57.470]  I'll let you go.
[36:57.930 --> 36:58.150]  Okay.
[36:59.170 --> 37:00.790]  That's a funny, funny story.
[37:00.990 --> 37:16.090]  I think we, uh, we talked about that a little bit when we were planning the show this week, but I read through some of the coverage and, uh, he sounds like he's, he's as confused as everyone else, uh, but, but won't, won't back down.
[37:16.210 --> 37:17.770]  I didn't really get a chance to go through that.
[37:17.970 --> 37:18.890]  It's bonkers.
[37:19.170 --> 37:19.950]  Can anyone sum that up?
[37:20.070 --> 37:20.510]  Bonkers.
[37:20.950 --> 37:24.830]  Well, I, I kind of knew that, uh, Rob, it looks like you, you know something.
[37:25.710 --> 37:28.510]  Um, I, I think Kyle has covered it pretty well.
[37:28.510 --> 37:29.210]  It's bonkers.
[37:29.810 --> 37:49.730]  Um, there was also, uh, uh, a guy called, uh, Rob Rosenberger has been, uh, there kind of, uh, monitoring things for the tech reporter, uh, side of things and talking about how, like, he's, he's happily talking about, uh, you know, information security experts are going over packet captures without having given them the packet captures.
[37:50.330 --> 37:53.790]  And, uh, like his own people don't know what's going on and what's not.
[37:53.930 --> 37:54.850]  It's, it's, it's a mess.
[37:54.950 --> 37:55.430]  It's bonkers.
[37:56.330 --> 37:57.890]  Good morning, Bobson in Bulgaria.
[37:59.190 --> 38:01.390]  Good morning, off the hook, over time.
[38:02.630 --> 38:03.570]  How are you doing today?
[38:05.190 --> 38:13.550]  Well, uh, the heat is not too bad in that time of night, so it's terrible.
[38:15.170 --> 38:26.670]  Uh, that, uh, first of all, I wanted to express my condolences, condolences to Alex for the loss in his family.
[38:28.290 --> 38:29.090]  Thank you.
[38:29.490 --> 38:30.230]  Thank you.
[38:31.230 --> 38:32.610]  Really, it means, uh, it means a lot.
[38:32.770 --> 38:33.070]  Thank you.
[38:34.710 --> 38:37.750]  Second, I wanted to congratulate the U.S.
[38:38.050 --> 38:45.010]  sports folk for getting one more gold medal than the Chinese folks.
[38:45.250 --> 38:46.570]  Yeah, that was, uh, last minute.
[38:46.630 --> 38:47.510]  At the Tokyo Olympics.
[38:47.790 --> 38:48.050]  Uh-huh.
[38:48.250 --> 38:50.450]  So now, now they can legitimately be listed first.
[38:52.310 --> 38:55.850]  Well, in more than one way, they can, they be listed first.
[38:57.350 --> 38:59.590]  Total number of golds, total number of medals.
[39:01.270 --> 39:01.390]  Yeah.
[39:04.150 --> 39:11.270]  And that's, uh, that Apple issue, there's two things that really bother me.
[39:12.710 --> 39:33.490]  Sometimes it would happen that I'd be walking down the street and there would be a need to summon a help, competent help in terms of, oh well, medical care for someone who's lost consciousness in some case on the street or what have you.
[39:33.950 --> 39:42.530]  You know, you're walking down the street and you need to use your communicator to, for a legitimate smart person, purpose.
[39:42.930 --> 39:43.230]  Right.
[39:44.990 --> 40:00.790]  And then you pull it out and you find out that for the past four or five hours, Apple's database matching thing has been draining your battery and you cannot summon the help you need for the person who's in trouble.
[40:01.070 --> 40:02.610]  That's bothersome to me.
[40:02.610 --> 40:09.610]  Okay, that's a, that's a legitimate, I didn't even think of that, but yeah, draining your battery or all that searching for all kinds of, uh, imagery that's objectionable.
[40:12.270 --> 40:38.790]  And the other objectionable thing is that there are folks whose job entails maintaining and administering a database of images of child abuse, which makes me feel sorry about those folks, but I, it doesn't matter how good they are compensated for doing that.
[40:38.790 --> 40:42.110]  It's, it doesn't seem like a dream job in any case.
[40:42.330 --> 40:43.030]  No, no.
[40:45.070 --> 40:46.530]  There's a lot to be concerned here.
[40:46.910 --> 40:47.350]  Absolutely.
[40:47.630 --> 40:48.150]  Rob, go ahead.
[40:49.290 --> 41:04.290]  Um, yeah, there was a, there was a good article sometime back, I think a year or two ago, um, about the mental toll that that work takes on the people who work at Facebook and, uh, who are, uh, monitoring images for child abuse and reporting it when they find it.
[41:04.550 --> 41:07.830]  But, um, they, I think, weren't even employed by Facebook themselves.
[41:07.830 --> 41:09.110]  They were an outside contractor.
[41:09.330 --> 41:13.590]  Um, also, um, not related to what Bob's is talking about, but I just wanted to correct myself.
[41:13.790 --> 41:17.850]  I said Rob Rosenberger was the name of a security reporter who was looking at the Lindell stuff.
[41:17.870 --> 41:20.250]  It was actually Robert Graham, a different Rob entirely.
[41:20.470 --> 41:23.310]  There were dozens of us, but yes, uh, that's, that's a very good point.
[41:23.330 --> 41:30.610]  Uh, Bobson that, yeah, it's, it's dirty work and I don't think there's any amount that, uh, that really can be worth it.
[41:30.750 --> 41:31.290]  Go ahead, Alex.
[41:32.610 --> 41:43.830]  Yeah, I, you know, building off that as well as when I had, uh, uh, just graduated law school, I clerked for a federal judge at the U S court of appeals for the armed forces.
[41:43.830 --> 41:47.530]  And so we were, we were essentially like the Supreme court of the military.
[41:48.090 --> 41:54.590]  Any appeals that, uh, happened from a court martial would go to like, let's say the army court of criminal appeals.
[41:54.750 --> 41:56.690]  And then we would, and then it would be appealed to us.
[41:56.830 --> 42:01.010]  And then after, uh, our court was the U S Supreme court.
[42:01.690 --> 42:20.890]  So at the time when I had graduated law school, there were, um, a number of questions that were being raised about, uh, child abuse imagery, child, sexual abuse imagery, and whether or not it was protected by the first amendment to have a rendering of the,
[42:21.170 --> 42:22.330]  uh, the image itself.
[42:22.610 --> 42:45.150]  And so because there was this precedent that, that renderings I believe were protected by the first amendment, uh, and actual images were not, we had a, a flurry of, uh, of appeals that were brought to our, our, uh, our court on the basis of, well, we don't know whether or not this is a rendered image or if it's a actual image.
[42:45.310 --> 42:58.410]  And because of that, I had to look at the evidence in the record and, and deciding these appeals and helping my judge determine, you know, what the, what the right course of action was, what the right way to, to vote on the case was.
[42:58.590 --> 43:03.490]  And I had to look at child pornography, not all the time, but enough of it.
[43:04.010 --> 43:09.410]  And, and yeah, it, it was absolutely abhorrent and, and horrible.
[43:10.190 --> 43:19.370]  And also my, um, my wife is a, uh, or rather was a prosecutor and she dealt with sex crimes and, and crimes against children.
[43:20.250 --> 43:27.070]  And, um, you know, the stuff that she had to deal with on a nearly daily basis was, was absolutely horrible.
[43:27.250 --> 43:32.510]  And I have to say, you know, there really weren't a lot of resources to help people with that.
[43:32.690 --> 43:33.570]  You just take it home.
[43:34.090 --> 43:45.530]  You're just expected to, as a lawyer, disassociate yourself from your case, be impartial, uh, unaffected yet at the same time, a zealous advocate and for whatever your case is.
[43:45.630 --> 43:49.470]  But yeah, those things, you know, it can make it tough to sleep at night.
[43:52.150 --> 43:53.310]  Pops, and anything else?
[43:54.550 --> 44:05.290]  Well, I think, uh, you mentioned earlier during the show that, uh, people were, there's a mask mandate on the subway trains there.
[44:06.890 --> 44:26.730]  And I was wondering if there's any enforcement of that, because when I traveled by subway here not too long ago, there were signs on the wall saying that there's going to be a 150 euro fine if, but people were, two people not wearing masks.
[44:26.990 --> 44:30.250]  Is there some such enforcement over there in the subway?
[44:30.450 --> 44:35.050]  Or is it, uh, just a mandate without any
[44:38.510 --> 44:42.370]  recourse against people who...
[44:44.710 --> 44:47.430]  So, thank you for asking, Bobson.
[44:47.670 --> 44:54.730]  Um, the mandate is unenforced at best, I think.
[44:55.170 --> 45:01.030]  Um, there is signage that says you need to be wearing a mask, including a helpful graphic of how to do it.
[45:01.330 --> 45:11.010]  And there are often announcements over the, um, uh, the intercom system, the public address system, that say, you need to be wearing a mask.
[45:11.150 --> 45:16.410]  But any good New Yorker knows that we don't pay attention to those announcements, so that doesn't help.
[45:17.170 --> 45:19.730]  And, um, no.
[45:19.910 --> 45:26.290]  And that's the other thing, is I don't say anything to anyone because I don't want to get punched in the face.
[45:26.970 --> 45:32.690]  And my concern is if I say to someone, you need to be wearing a mask, they will punch me in the face.
[45:33.370 --> 45:34.590]  So, no real information.
[45:34.630 --> 45:36.110]  Unless you punch them first.
[45:36.130 --> 45:36.850]  All right, all right.
[45:38.510 --> 45:40.410]  Let's keep our fists to ourselves right now.
[45:40.850 --> 45:48.590]  But, uh, Gila, you know, if, if, as you say, there's one person per subway car, that's not a bad average, especially compared to the rest of the country.
[45:48.730 --> 45:50.930]  I think most New Yorkers are doing the right thing.
[45:51.330 --> 45:54.730]  And if you did get punched in the face, I think they would, they would stand up for you.
[45:55.990 --> 45:57.010]  I'd like to think so.
[45:57.130 --> 45:58.570]  But maybe I have a punchable face.
[45:58.690 --> 45:59.230]  I mean, who knows?
[45:59.450 --> 45:59.670]  Mm-hmm.
[46:01.270 --> 46:02.030]  They'd at least film.
[46:02.030 --> 46:03.630]  I seriously doubt it.
[46:06.170 --> 46:06.750]  Thank you.
[46:07.710 --> 46:08.950]  All right, Pops, we're going to move on.
[46:09.010 --> 46:10.450]  But it's good hearing from you as always.
[46:10.830 --> 46:12.590]  And, um, stay safe there in Bulgaria.
[46:13.770 --> 46:14.610]  Thank you, folks.
[46:14.750 --> 46:15.870]  Have a wonderful evening.
[46:16.250 --> 46:16.730]  All right.
[46:16.850 --> 46:17.390]  Get some rest.
[46:20.110 --> 46:20.890]  Bye for now.
[46:21.070 --> 46:21.250]  Bye.
[46:21.970 --> 46:24.570]  I think it's about three in the morning there, if I'm not mistaken.
[46:24.950 --> 46:28.710]  Uh, our phone number, uh, is 802-321-4225.
[46:28.770 --> 46:36.870]  Only on for a couple of minutes, uh, here on Off the Hook Overtime, uh, talking about all sorts of, uh, technological and social issues this week.
[46:36.970 --> 46:38.210]  And again, we're not on next week.
[46:38.450 --> 46:41.630]  So, uh, this might be a last chance for a couple of weeks to talk to us.
[46:41.690 --> 46:43.130]  In fact, I guarantee it will be.
[46:44.150 --> 46:47.050]  Um, anyone have anything to say?
[46:47.130 --> 46:48.230]  Because I've run out of things to say.
[46:49.430 --> 46:54.230]  Well, if you, if you don't want to call us, you can, uh, email us, uh, OTH at 2600.com.
[46:54.230 --> 46:57.490]  You can also reach us at, uh, HackerRadioShow on Twitter.
[46:58.330 --> 47:01.350]  Um, there are many avenues, uh, in which you get in touch with us.
[47:01.530 --> 47:06.730]  Uh, HackerRadioShow at Mastodon.social as well for, uh, those of you living the Mastodon life.
[47:08.110 --> 47:08.510]  Okay.
[47:08.510 --> 47:18.350]  And, uh, one, one interesting thing that I've, uh, noticed monitoring the social media for this program is that I've also monitored the, uh, hashtag OffTheHook just in case something in there is for us.
[47:18.450 --> 47:19.310]  Cause sometimes there is.
[47:19.930 --> 47:27.650]  Um, but, uh, by and large, the hashtag OffTheHook is, uh, used for characters from a game called Splatoon, which is a Nintendo game.
[47:28.130 --> 47:31.630]  And also there are a lot of seafood restaurants, uh, called OffTheHook.
[47:32.130 --> 47:35.450]  Um, and, uh, they post pictures of their food and their menus and things.
[47:36.190 --> 47:38.990]  Um, and I think, uh, I think they, they owe us something.
[47:39.410 --> 47:39.410]  Yeah.
[47:39.410 --> 47:41.230]  We gotta send those cease and desist letters out.
[47:41.390 --> 47:42.770]  You know, we're way behind on those.
[47:42.890 --> 47:44.730]  So, uh, OffTheHook, that's us.
[47:44.810 --> 47:45.030]  Okay.
[47:45.170 --> 47:45.790]  We can't have it.
[47:45.870 --> 47:46.050]  Yes.
[47:46.290 --> 47:46.570]  All right.
[47:46.970 --> 47:47.330]  Good evening.
[47:47.410 --> 47:48.430]  You're on OffTheHook Overtime.
[47:48.510 --> 47:48.690]  Go ahead.
[47:49.990 --> 47:51.090]  Hey, what's going on?
[47:51.670 --> 47:52.150]  How you doing?
[47:53.150 --> 47:53.830]  I'm good.
[47:54.030 --> 47:55.150]  I'm, I'm, I'm, I'm healthy.
[47:56.310 --> 47:57.050]  Good to hear.
[48:00.050 --> 48:00.870]  Something on your mind?
[48:01.090 --> 48:04.070]  Um, I had, um, I chimed in a little bit.
[48:04.070 --> 48:06.990]  Uh, what is, uh, what is the main discussion is about the mask?
[48:09.890 --> 48:11.490]  Yeah, we covered a little bit of that.
[48:11.650 --> 48:20.530]  And then there was some talk about this new Apple software, uh, that kind of like, uh, protects kids by scanning for hashes on people's phones.
[48:22.270 --> 48:31.450]  Uh, what, what, what, uh, what do you guys personally think about going into another lockdown?
[48:31.730 --> 48:33.350]  Cause that's what they're talking about now.
[48:35.170 --> 48:37.350]  Well, I, I, I'm not in favor of it.
[48:37.450 --> 48:47.350]  I would not be happy, but I would be upset that, uh, we were forced into that by irresponsibility, because that's the only reason we would be going into another lockdown is because the virus hasn't been defeated.
[48:49.890 --> 49:04.750]  Right, and it's because, it's because, it's because, it's because that the virus hasn't been contained due to the, the interaction and people, you know, going about their daily life like there's no problem.
[49:04.990 --> 49:10.410]  So wouldn't it be necessary for there to be restrictions in order to combat the virus?
[49:10.890 --> 49:12.590]  Well, we kind of just talked about that.
[49:12.770 --> 49:22.290]  There was, uh, uh, uh, Gila was talking about the subways and, and how basically it's not like enforced or anything yet.
[49:22.350 --> 49:34.950]  But my, my opinion about that is like, if people are out just reckless, inconsiderate of each other, then that's how you get people starting to like, say, well, we got to have fines or we got to like really come down hard on everybody.
[49:34.950 --> 49:47.450]  But if, if people are cool, they were like respect wherever people are at and just keep your distance and stuff and keep things moving, then like, that's not going to be as bit, as much of a priority.
[49:47.610 --> 49:52.530]  Like, oh, we got to get $1,500 if you see somebody, you know, that's how much your ticket's going to be or whatever.
[49:53.550 --> 49:54.370]  But that's me.
[49:56.670 --> 50:01.630]  So as a, as a globe, this is not specific to United States of America.
[50:02.130 --> 50:12.490]  As a globe, how would you, I mean, cause we, we've never had anything like this in our lifetime, something to this capacity.
[50:12.770 --> 50:29.130]  So how will we permanently, what's the solution to, to, to, to stop this thing and, and, and go back to a normal life, virus-free and continue for the future?
[50:30.530 --> 50:41.950]  Well, I'm going to turn it over to Rob, but I mean, personally, I would say working together, you know, agreeing on the science, agreeing on, on the best ways forward and, and, and not constantly be debating these issues.
[50:42.030 --> 50:42.350]  Go ahead, Rob.
[50:43.450 --> 50:45.950]  Yeah, you, you basically covered what I was going to say.
[50:46.070 --> 50:57.870]  Yeah, our, the, the way we get through this is the way that the people who have devoted their life to studying these various subjects, the doctors, the scientists, the way they, they have told us we need to need this.
[50:58.010 --> 50:59.270]  Maybe that will be the solution.
[51:03.140 --> 51:13.600]  Yeah, I mean, the, the, the, the, the truth of the matter is that by all expert accounts, if when we first locked down, um, everyone did what they should have.
[51:13.740 --> 51:15.560]  Everyone got the vaccines as soon as they could.
[51:15.960 --> 51:18.360]  Everyone masked up all they, uh, all they had to.
[51:18.860 --> 51:28.780]  Like we, if we, if we had flattened the curve properly, as people were talking about, and if we had reached a state where we had herd immunity, we wouldn't have a Delta variant now.
[51:29.100 --> 51:32.140]  We could be more or less back to normal by now.
[51:32.380 --> 51:38.640]  And the reason we are not is because of every single person who didn't do what they were supposed to for all our sakes.
[51:39.220 --> 51:50.840]  And, uh, yeah, that's, that, that's the way we beat this is by everyone getting it through their damn head that we need to, that we're all responsible for each other, that we're in this together, that we're going to keep facing this together and that,
[51:50.840 --> 51:52.720]  uh, we, we, it's our own fault.
[51:53.320 --> 51:53.800]  Yeah.
[51:53.880 --> 51:59.900]  I think like we got to focus like a laser on this particular virus and get it right.
[52:00.240 --> 52:03.500]  Cause I mean, it's coming back around all that.
[52:03.900 --> 52:19.360]  Like it's, it's gotta be like, it's not going so well, but it's gotta, this is the chance to kind of really double down on that, all that effort, everything everybody already knows instead of saying the same thing, just kind of focus like a laser on that.
[52:19.480 --> 52:31.440]  But also as like a globe or a society or a nation, whatever, however big you want to look down at humanity, I would say prepare, like be better integrated in whatever way.
[52:31.500 --> 52:41.140]  I know it's a paradox right now cause people are divided, but you have to find that unity and prepare for the next time humanity might get hit with something like this.
[52:41.780 --> 52:46.680]  Um, that's me though, uh, just on the, the specific question.
[52:47.400 --> 52:52.800]  So do you know, do you know the current, uh, the current statistics for the infection rates right now?
[52:52.900 --> 52:53.840]  Like as we speak?
[52:54.280 --> 52:55.180]  Uh, I don't myself.
[52:55.500 --> 52:55.900]  Does anybody?
[52:57.380 --> 52:59.780]  Uh, I'll tell you, I may say that at CDC's website.
[52:59.860 --> 53:02.520]  I just want to know if y'all were keeping up with the numbers.
[53:03.100 --> 53:08.800]  Right now, as we speak in our country, just in America, it's over a hundred thousand a day.
[53:09.540 --> 53:12.740]  New infections every single day, a hundred thousand average.
[53:13.700 --> 53:27.300]  So, something like this, this is pretty much back to one year ago from, you know, the same thing that was going on last year around this time, same numbers again, and we had a significant drop.
[53:27.420 --> 53:34.540]  And then ever since the mutation right back up again, and now it's mutating again, which is becoming resistant to the vaccine.
[53:34.540 --> 53:42.580]  That is the scariest part because, you know, we talk about the Delta, uh, Delta, uh, variant, there's something called the Delta plus variant.
[53:42.740 --> 53:50.040]  I'm hearing the, uh, Epsilon and the gamma variants are in the future and they may not respond to the vaccine.
[53:50.040 --> 53:59.380]  And if that happens, then we really are all the way back at square one and maybe in a far worse state right now, at least the people who have gotten the vaccine are somewhat protected.
[53:59.780 --> 54:08.160]  But, uh, if we reach a stage where, where it mutates into something that does not respond to the vaccine, I can't even imagine how bad that will be.
[54:09.920 --> 54:10.320]  Yes.
[54:10.540 --> 54:25.080]  So it would only make sense that to initiate, you know, a lockdown because in that situation, yes, that's the only way, that's the only way, that's the only way to bring about, bring about, you know, uh, a solution because the way it is right now, even if you get,
[54:25.280 --> 54:29.040]  let's say a hundred percent of the population be vaccinated, that's not going to stop it.
[54:29.320 --> 54:30.100]  It's still going to keep going.
[54:30.100 --> 54:40.240]  If a hundred percent of the population got vaccinated, it would stop pretty much, you know, 75% and above, um, you start reaching a herd, uh, you know, herd immunity.
[54:40.500 --> 54:47.360]  Um, and that might be enough to slow this thing down enough so that it doesn't mutate anymore, doesn't spread anymore.
[54:47.640 --> 54:53.480]  Uh, but, uh, we're playing with fire here by not reaching those numbers and by seeing what it does.
[54:53.480 --> 55:03.940]  You know, if we, if we have only a, a, a, a small percentage, meaning below 75% of the population vaccinated, we're kind of like, you know, saying, okay, virus, your move, what, what, what he got for us?
[55:04.420 --> 55:08.680]  And we're starting to find out, uh, go ahead, Gila.
[55:09.240 --> 55:21.700]  I think there's also a lot to be said for the fact that if you have been vaccinated, even if you get the back, even if you get sick after you've been vaccinated, it's not as severe, generally speaking.
[55:21.940 --> 55:42.380]  And that also helps reduce the strain on the medical infrastructure we have in this country, because if people keep getting, if hospitals and doctor's offices keep getting flooded by people who are really severely ill, we have states running out of ICU beds again.
[55:42.400 --> 55:48.660]  If more people were vaccinated, people might still be getting sick, but not as sick.
[55:48.920 --> 55:48.960]  Right.
[55:49.280 --> 55:54.940]  Again, I think we need to really back away from the death rate as the only indicator of how bad this is.
[55:55.400 --> 55:58.100]  It's bad enough that people, let me try this again.
[55:58.320 --> 55:59.000]  People die.
[55:59.260 --> 56:00.140]  That's horrible.
[56:00.980 --> 56:06.540]  But people are also, it's not the only indicator of what this is.
[56:06.600 --> 56:11.400]  And I think we need to stick away from the binary of it kills you or it doesn't, because there's a lot more going on than that.
[56:11.760 --> 56:14.540]  I just want to add to that specifically to lockdowns.
[56:14.600 --> 56:32.360]  I think that it's, it's going to be a lot more organized and strategic because of the amount of knowledge and the amount of different strategies that were, that were implemented in the last year.
[56:32.520 --> 56:40.740]  So it may not be as like comprehensive or like something they did in China where, you know, you couldn't come and go or anything like that.
[56:40.860 --> 57:02.800]  I think we have a really kind of fresh understanding of how to control the virus or, and I mean, it changes a little bit with this variant or, you know, transmissibility rates or whatever, but we still have these like physical tools and things to, to control it and stuff that we know worked in the past year,
[57:02.820 --> 57:03.760]  as I guess what I'm saying.
[57:04.300 --> 57:06.100]  Carly, we're going to give you the last word tonight.
[57:08.800 --> 57:12.600]  Well, I was going to, I was actually, I have to go.
[57:12.780 --> 57:14.740]  So I wanted to ask you one question real quick.
[57:14.900 --> 57:19.580]  What is the introduction theme that you play for Off the Wall?
[57:19.940 --> 57:22.900]  What is the artist for that?
[57:23.000 --> 57:25.400]  You know, you, did you send that to us?
[57:25.480 --> 57:26.940]  Did you email us with that question?
[57:27.040 --> 57:30.540]  Because someone forwarded that to me and you emailed Off the Hook.
[57:30.540 --> 57:31.440]  Yeah, that was me.
[57:31.560 --> 57:32.040]  That was me.
[57:32.040 --> 57:33.560]  Okay, because we didn't know.
[57:34.120 --> 57:37.960]  I'm glad you called because we didn't know if we should answer that question on Off the Hook or Off the Wall.
[57:38.360 --> 57:40.800]  But since it's you that asked the question, we'll just answer you.
[57:40.920 --> 57:41.820]  It's, it's Philip Glass.
[57:42.000 --> 57:42.820]  It's a piece called Religion.
[57:44.500 --> 57:45.640]  What was the name again?
[57:45.800 --> 57:46.540]  Philip Glass.
[57:48.240 --> 57:49.080]  Philip Glass?
[57:49.280 --> 57:49.440]  Yes.
[57:49.980 --> 57:51.000]  G-L-A-S-S.
[57:51.280 --> 57:52.580]  And then it's called Religion?
[57:52.740 --> 57:55.900]  Yes, that's the name of the, of the track that we use as, as the intro for this.
[57:56.040 --> 57:56.780]  Oh, yeah, yeah.
[57:56.940 --> 57:58.780]  That, like, that's some great hacking music.
[57:58.900 --> 57:59.340]  It is.
[57:59.340 --> 57:59.860]  I love it.
[57:59.940 --> 58:00.560]  It really is.
[58:00.640 --> 58:01.900]  We do a lot of hacking to that music.
[58:02.460 --> 58:05.060]  But thanks for asking and thanks for calling.
[58:05.700 --> 58:07.100]  And talk to you again soon.
[58:08.300 --> 58:08.740]  All right.
[58:08.920 --> 58:09.320]  Good night.
[58:09.480 --> 58:09.620]  All right.
[58:09.660 --> 58:09.920]  Take care.
[58:10.600 --> 58:12.060]  Alex, looks like you have something to say.
[58:12.520 --> 58:12.700]  Yeah.
[58:13.080 --> 58:16.820]  Before we go and sign off, I want to tell a knock-knock joke.
[58:17.720 --> 58:18.520]  We'll make it fast.
[58:18.520 --> 58:19.660]  I got a cab waiting downstairs.
[58:19.800 --> 58:20.080]  Come on, though.
[58:20.740 --> 58:21.340]  I bet.
[58:21.860 --> 58:22.140]  Okay.
[58:22.760 --> 58:25.060]  I'll, I'll, I'll ask it to Rob, I guess.
[58:25.280 --> 58:26.020]  Knock-knock.
[58:26.600 --> 58:27.300]  Who's there?
[58:28.020 --> 58:28.800]  Philip Glass.
[58:29.320 --> 58:30.340]  Philip Glass who?
[58:30.760 --> 58:31.460]  Knock-knock.
[58:32.380 --> 58:33.100]  Who's there?
[58:33.380 --> 58:34.140]  Philip Glass.
[58:34.740 --> 58:35.420]  Philip Glass who?
[58:35.420 --> 58:38.340]  Oh, you see, he's making a joke about repetitiveness in music.
[58:38.620 --> 58:39.200]  Yes, it's all of them.
[58:39.200 --> 58:40.260]  Very, very funny, Alex.
[58:40.420 --> 58:40.880]  Very funny.
[58:41.040 --> 58:41.120]  Yeah.
[58:41.580 --> 58:43.080]  You're a real scream.
[58:43.560 --> 58:43.700]  Yeah.
[58:43.920 --> 58:46.020]  That's the, uh, Philip Glass knock-knock joke.
[58:46.320 --> 58:47.280]  Alex, knock-knock.
[58:48.200 --> 58:48.840]  Who's there?
[58:48.940 --> 58:49.260]  Alex.
[58:50.120 --> 58:50.760]  Alex who?
[58:50.880 --> 58:53.700]  I don't have a punchline yet, but this is your warning that I'm going to come up with one.
[58:54.240 --> 58:55.160]  Wait, I've got it.
[58:55.440 --> 58:55.800]  Oh, go ahead.
[58:55.940 --> 58:56.220]  All right.
[58:56.680 --> 58:57.240]  Knock-knock.
[58:58.140 --> 58:58.680]  Who's there?
[58:58.800 --> 58:59.420]  Who says who's there?
[58:59.600 --> 58:59.720]  Orange.
[59:02.240 --> 59:02.600]  Orange.
[59:02.600 --> 59:03.540]  Don't you mean Apple?
[59:04.580 --> 59:04.940]  No.
[59:05.280 --> 59:05.800]  I mean Orange.
[59:06.180 --> 59:06.340]  Orange.
[59:06.700 --> 59:07.280]  Okay, Orange.
[59:07.580 --> 59:08.120]  Orange who?
[59:08.460 --> 59:10.260]  Orange, you're glad I didn't say Philip Glass.
[59:10.420 --> 59:11.140]  That's how these all are.
[59:11.200 --> 59:11.760]  Oh, there you go.
[59:11.820 --> 59:11.960]  Yeah.
[59:12.160 --> 59:15.960]  I usually do that by saying Apple several times, then switching to Orange.
[59:16.140 --> 59:16.940]  Orange, you're glad I didn't say Apple.
[59:16.940 --> 59:18.100]  We've been on the air too long.
[59:18.100 --> 59:19.880]  I thought we started with bananas, but you know.
[59:20.660 --> 59:22.680]  Did we mention there's a heat wave everywhere?
[59:22.680 --> 59:23.880]  Oh my God, it's so hot.
[59:24.020 --> 59:27.040]  And, uh, everyone's brain is swelling.
[59:27.420 --> 59:29.860]  And we can't keep the fan on because it makes too much noise.
[59:30.080 --> 59:35.900]  So, you know, in order to do radio to entertain people, we have to sacrifice a lot of sweat and comfort.
[59:38.520 --> 59:43.680]  I don't, I don't have a knock-knock joke, but I do want to just encourage listeners, go to cdc.gov.
[59:43.860 --> 59:49.740]  There is a section there where you can look at the statistics going week by week, month by month, um, all the way back to the beginning of this thing.
[59:49.820 --> 01:00:03.660]  And you can look at the numbers, the hard data, the data that does not care what political side you're on, that does not care what you think big pharma is up to, the data that is just the basic fact of the numbers of people that are being affected by this,
[01:00:03.760 --> 01:00:04.720]  that are being killed by this.
[01:00:04.980 --> 01:00:09.000]  Look at those numbers and, uh, you know, use that information to make your decisions.
[01:00:09.080 --> 01:00:09.800]  That's what hackers do.
[01:00:09.900 --> 01:00:27.440]  We get the information and, uh, then, then we use it, uh, in a way that we The other thing to consider, if you're thinking that this is a political issue, and that somehow this is Democrats versus Republicans, please keep in mind, there's a whole world out there,
[01:00:27.620 --> 01:00:29.520]  and it's affecting the entire world.
[01:00:29.640 --> 01:00:33.580]  Do you really think that Mongolia cares about Democrats and Republicans?
[01:00:33.760 --> 01:00:34.920]  No, they don't.
[01:00:35.020 --> 01:00:39.860]  They're going through the same thing we are, and the same science works over there as it does over here.
[01:00:39.860 --> 01:00:41.400]  So, it's irrelevant.
[01:00:41.460 --> 01:00:46.260]  It's irrelevant what the Democrats and Republicans say, or whatever fights they're having.
[01:00:46.600 --> 01:00:47.780]  This is simple.
[01:00:47.940 --> 01:00:48.620]  This is science.
[01:00:48.780 --> 01:00:49.800]  This is a virus.
[01:00:50.040 --> 01:00:53.660]  This is something that we can fight, but we have to all do it.
[01:00:53.700 --> 01:00:56.860]  And if we don't, then, again, back to square one.
[01:00:59.000 --> 01:01:03.540]  So, on that happy note, anything you want to say before we disappear for two weeks?
[01:01:04.020 --> 01:01:08.660]  Well, please share anything that you have hacked.
[01:01:08.660 --> 01:01:09.620]  Yes.
[01:01:10.380 --> 01:01:11.500]  In the next two weeks.
[01:01:12.540 --> 01:01:14.660]  O-T-H at 2600.com.
[01:01:14.820 --> 01:01:15.260]  We want to know.
[01:01:15.440 --> 01:01:19.980]  Well, how about you hack something in the next two weeks and show it off to us?
[01:01:20.080 --> 01:01:22.000]  But don't cause any true mayhem.
[01:01:22.180 --> 01:01:29.900]  Or, if there's something hacking related that you think we've overlooked, please inform us.
[01:01:30.020 --> 01:01:31.400]  We will look into it.
[01:01:31.400 --> 01:01:33.480]  We will research it.
[01:01:33.580 --> 01:01:34.800]  We'll discuss it.
[01:01:34.920 --> 01:01:41.980]  We'll bring it to the attention of everyone listening out there and get to the bottom of whatever it is.
[01:01:42.100 --> 01:01:43.960]  We're always looking for ideas.
[01:01:43.960 --> 01:01:45.620]  So, please write us.
[01:01:45.620 --> 01:01:47.040]  That's O-T-H at 2600.com.
[01:01:47.920 --> 01:01:49.480]  I think that's a fine way to end up.
[01:01:49.580 --> 01:01:50.620]  But Alex has something else to add.
[01:01:50.700 --> 01:01:50.900]  Go ahead.
[01:01:51.740 --> 01:01:52.140]  Yeah.
[01:01:52.540 --> 01:02:01.600]  Just, you know, we started out, I think, rather somberly, talking about somebody in my family that had just two days ago died from COVID-19.
[01:02:01.960 --> 01:02:05.600]  And I think, you know, we should end on a bit of a somber note, too.
[01:02:05.600 --> 01:02:09.240]  Which is, you know, do yourself a favor.
[01:02:09.440 --> 01:02:10.340]  Do your family a favor.
[01:02:10.580 --> 01:02:12.420]  You know, you can prevent this from happening.
[01:02:12.420 --> 01:02:13.380]  And it does happen.
[01:02:13.980 --> 01:02:16.980]  We went a year and a half without having a casualty in our family.
[01:02:17.160 --> 01:02:18.700]  And two days ago, we had one.
[01:02:18.800 --> 01:02:21.860]  We might have another one very soon.
[01:02:21.860 --> 01:02:24.560]  And it's all avoidable.
[01:02:24.720 --> 01:02:25.580]  It's all preventable.
[01:02:25.920 --> 01:02:27.760]  Do your duty to your fellow man.
[01:02:29.040 --> 01:02:30.960]  And help yourself and get vaccinated.
[01:02:31.260 --> 01:02:31.800]  Please.
[01:02:32.360 --> 01:02:37.200]  Let's... Don't have a repeat of what happened to our family.
[01:02:37.440 --> 01:02:49.220]  And as we said at the beginning of the show, when you hear nonsense, misinformation, falsities presented as science, speak out about it.
[01:02:49.340 --> 01:02:49.860]  Fight back.
[01:02:49.860 --> 01:02:52.260]  Let people know this is not acceptable.
[01:02:53.000 --> 01:02:55.120]  And don't be afraid to be nasty.
[01:02:55.220 --> 01:02:56.120]  Don't be afraid to be loud.
[01:02:56.700 --> 01:02:59.480]  Because people's lives are at risk here.
[01:02:59.680 --> 01:03:01.620]  And the evidence, we see it every day.
[01:03:02.140 --> 01:03:04.600]  So, it's not just one side versus another.
[01:03:05.180 --> 01:03:12.160]  It's, um... It's some really, really bad things that are happening if people let them happen.
[01:03:12.860 --> 01:03:14.800]  The answer is within our grasp.
[01:03:14.980 --> 01:03:16.520]  And we're so close.
[01:03:17.760 --> 01:03:18.220]  All right.
[01:03:18.280 --> 01:03:20.660]  Hopefully, in two weeks, we'll have better news to share.
[01:03:21.060 --> 01:03:22.560]  And that's how quickly it can happen, too.
[01:03:22.680 --> 01:03:27.400]  Because, you know, only a month ago, England was way behind us, vaccine-wise.
[01:03:27.500 --> 01:03:28.740]  Now they're way ahead of us.
[01:03:29.240 --> 01:03:29.780]  All right.
[01:03:29.920 --> 01:03:32.480]  So, let's not let them stay ahead of us.
[01:03:32.680 --> 01:03:34.440]  We can get to 75% as well.
[01:03:35.540 --> 01:03:36.100]  All right.
[01:03:36.860 --> 01:03:38.040]  We'll see you in a couple of weeks.
[01:03:38.260 --> 01:03:38.760]  Good night.