[00:00.000 --> 00:01.780] ...speaking with you again next week. [00:05.260 --> 00:11.720] The previous program was Economic Update with Richard Wolff, heard Wednesdays at 6.30 p.m. [00:11.740 --> 00:14.110] right after the WBAI Evening News. [00:14.430 --> 00:16.140] It is now 7 p.m. [00:16.240 --> 00:19.400] Stay tuned for Off the Hook, and that's coming up. [00:38.440 --> 00:39.020] Hello. [00:39.020 --> 00:41.540] You're listening to WBAI in New York. [00:41.540 --> 00:44.960] It's 7 o'clock time for Off the Hook. [00:52.580 --> 00:54.700] So I ripped it off the wall. [00:55.780 --> 00:57.680] I cut myself while shaving. [00:58.360 --> 01:00.240] Now I can't make a cough. [01:01.120 --> 01:03.000] We couldn't get much worse. [01:03.760 --> 01:05.560] But if they could, they would. [01:05.820 --> 01:08.480] Monday, we're on for the best, expect the worst. [01:09.180 --> 01:10.980] I hope that's understood. [01:11.200 --> 01:12.100] Monday, we're on! [01:46.100 --> 01:47.290] And a very good evening to everybody. [01:47.420 --> 01:48.640] The program is Off the Hook. [01:48.720 --> 01:51.520] Emmanuel Goldstein here with you on this Wednesday evening. [01:51.520 --> 01:52.700] Joined tonight by Kyle. [01:53.220 --> 01:53.780] Over here. [01:54.020 --> 01:55.640] And over in Skypeland, we have Rob T. [01:55.760 --> 01:56.200] Firefly. [01:56.840 --> 01:57.600] Good evening. [01:57.980 --> 02:01.070] And over in the alternative Skypeland, we have Alex. [02:02.040 --> 02:03.000] Good evening, everyone. [02:03.510 --> 02:09.230] Well, you know, the transition, the beginning of the show, that's always the most challenging part of the entire program. [02:09.480 --> 02:12.340] And so we're kind of celebrating already because we did that successfully. [02:12.570 --> 02:14.340] And it's cool. [02:14.340 --> 02:15.380] It's neat. [02:15.450 --> 02:22.790] And it's miraculous that we're all here, all on WBAI, sharing all kinds of information. [02:23.040 --> 02:29.680] I'm going to get right to the show in a moment, but I just want to emphasize to folks that WBAI is a non-commercial radio station. [02:30.200 --> 02:33.510] What that means is we don't have commercial... [02:33.510 --> 02:34.290] Did I really have to say that? [02:34.320 --> 02:35.010] We don't have commercials. [02:35.320 --> 02:36.600] We're non-commercial radio stations. [02:36.790 --> 02:37.380] It's kind of obvious. [02:38.120 --> 02:39.480] But we still... [02:39.480 --> 02:41.320] That doesn't mean we don't have to pay bills. [02:41.320 --> 02:44.100] They still send us the bills, even though we don't have commercials. [02:44.260 --> 02:44.680] Imagine that. [02:45.060 --> 02:47.240] And we have to pay them somehow. [02:47.240 --> 02:49.100] And that money has to come from somewhere. [02:49.840 --> 02:51.620] You folks are the somewhere. [02:51.900 --> 02:54.000] You have been the somewhere since 1960. [02:54.440 --> 02:55.900] And we need you to step up. [02:56.200 --> 02:58.280] We always need our listeners to step up. [02:58.340 --> 02:59.780] And our listeners have always stepped up. [03:00.580 --> 03:01.860] It's incredibly easy. [03:02.060 --> 03:09.880] You may have noticed over the past year or so, we haven't been interrupting nearly as much with annoying fund drives, constantly asking for pledges. [03:09.880 --> 03:15.140] So, what we are asking for instead is for listeners to call and pledge whatever they can afford. [03:15.240 --> 03:16.200] Become a BAI buddy. [03:16.340 --> 03:22.280] In fact, if we could see a whole bunch of BAI buddies come out of this hour, that would be great. [03:22.440 --> 03:23.500] That would be great for us. [03:23.500 --> 03:28.340] It would be great for management, who has made it clear that we need to do a little bit more here. [03:28.620 --> 03:30.080] And I agree, we do. [03:31.400 --> 03:32.920] 212-209-2950. [03:32.920 --> 03:35.440] Call that number and say, Hey, I'll say that. [03:35.560 --> 03:36.260] No, say hello. [03:36.260 --> 03:39.120] Hello, I'd like to be a BAI buddy. [03:39.680 --> 03:40.960] And they'll walk you through it. [03:41.040 --> 03:45.500] What that means is you can pledge, I don't know, $5 a month? [03:46.420 --> 03:46.980] $5 a month? [03:47.060 --> 03:49.340] You know, I pledge that for a bunch of kittens. [03:49.860 --> 03:52.820] Yeah, as a kitten academy, I pledge $5 a month for them. [03:53.240 --> 03:54.580] You could do $9.95. [03:55.020 --> 03:57.920] So, I could easily do $5 a month for BAI. [03:58.320 --> 03:59.920] I think I definitely will. [04:00.040 --> 04:01.040] I know why I haven't done this already. [04:01.540 --> 04:03.100] But $5 a month, it's nothing. [04:03.420 --> 04:06.000] And it adds up over the course of a year. [04:06.240 --> 04:07.440] You could do $10 a month. [04:07.560 --> 04:08.400] You could do $50 a month. [04:08.500 --> 04:10.100] Whatever you can afford, it helps. [04:10.260 --> 04:12.060] It makes this place continue to operate. [04:12.560 --> 04:21.520] And it's not easy to operate a full-power radio station in the middle of the FM dial, in the middle of Manhattan, which is what we are doing and what we have been doing since 1960. [04:21.620 --> 04:22.560] It's a miracle. [04:22.900 --> 04:24.530] And you help make that miracle possible. [04:24.700 --> 04:27.460] You can also go to give2wbai.org. [04:27.590 --> 04:29.970] You give the number to wbai.org. [04:30.400 --> 04:32.140] And you can pledge that way as well. [04:32.330 --> 04:35.470] And be sure to say your favorite program is Off the Hook. [04:35.860 --> 04:39.520] That way, people know that Off the Hook listeners are coming through as well. [04:39.590 --> 04:40.650] That is very, very important. [04:41.020 --> 04:42.530] Now, we're not going to be on next week. [04:42.770 --> 04:45.020] Next week, a special program will be on in two weeks. [04:45.410 --> 04:51.580] And we'll be continuing to ask for your support in various ways because that's the only way we stay here. [04:51.700 --> 04:53.770] It's the only way any of this stays here. [04:54.300 --> 04:56.650] You guys want to say anything about that, Rob? [04:57.260 --> 04:58.210] Yeah, absolutely. [04:58.700 --> 05:06.460] It's easy to forget because it's so easy to listen to the radio and listen to online streams and take in the great content that they're putting out for you. [05:06.560 --> 05:08.180] But this does cost money. [05:08.410 --> 05:16.060] Every minute we are pumping what we are doing out into those airwaves and over those networks, meters are running, basically. [05:16.420 --> 05:21.540] And the only thing that has kept the bills for those meters paid is you out there listening. [05:22.180 --> 05:23.540] Yes, since 1960. [05:23.940 --> 05:25.320] That is, what? [05:25.420 --> 05:31.680] That is 61 years of just doing this, just asking for help and getting it from our wonderful listeners. [05:31.680 --> 05:34.600] That is the only thing that has kept the lights on here at WBAI. [05:35.300 --> 05:46.800] You would be hard-pressed to find another radio station in New York City that has been on the air doing basically the same format, which for us is many different formats, for 61 years. [05:46.980 --> 05:49.320] Every single frequency, they've gone through some kind of turmoil. [05:49.460 --> 05:51.100] They've gone through some kind of ownership change. [05:51.100 --> 05:53.440] They've gone from country to classical. [05:54.540 --> 05:56.700] They've alienated their listeners in one way or another. [05:56.780 --> 05:59.500] And I know we do that too occasionally in various ways. [05:59.800 --> 06:06.700] But the basic idea of WBAI has remained the same since that first day in 1960. [06:07.000 --> 06:13.620] And this station, by the way, this station, the frequency, 99.5 FM, was donated to the Pacifica Foundation. [06:14.680 --> 06:20.160] And it's not an easy thing to donate a full-power radio station in the middle of New York City. [06:21.100 --> 06:25.420] You cannot be hung up on because people think you're just joking or just out of your mind. [06:26.080 --> 06:38.100] So after a few valiant calls, the owner of the station, the former owner of the station, was able to successfully convince somebody that, yes, in fact, I have an FM radio station that I'd like to donate. [06:38.420 --> 06:41.340] And that is an incredible story. [06:41.440 --> 06:41.900] One of many. [06:41.980 --> 06:46.600] One of many incredible stories that are part of 99.5 FM in New York City. [06:47.230 --> 06:51.140] We're making it as easy as possible with those programs. [06:51.600 --> 06:53.140] And it automates it. [06:53.320 --> 07:02.540] It takes it out of your hair and really eliminates the operational nitty-gritty and mailing and correspondence and all that stuff. [07:02.720 --> 07:03.760] You're set up. [07:03.860 --> 07:04.860] You're good for the year. [07:04.980 --> 07:05.960] You'll get reminders. [07:05.960 --> 07:11.500] You'll be really happy that your contribution is in progress. [07:11.900 --> 07:23.300] And the rest of the programmers and dedicated volunteers can focus on running the station and really getting great programming out there on the airwaves. [07:23.380 --> 07:24.980] 212-209-2950. [07:25.320 --> 07:26.780] Give to WBAI.org. [07:26.860 --> 07:27.280] Go ahead, Alex. [07:28.220 --> 07:36.860] And I think it bears mentioning, too, that it is not a foregone conclusion that this station is always going to be around because it has been around. [07:36.860 --> 07:42.600] I can't believe it that we're going up on almost 22 years. [07:42.780 --> 07:46.880] But I remember, and I think I remember, I mentioned this quite a bit when we talk about fundraising. [07:47.220 --> 07:52.940] But back in January of 2000, there was a coup that tried to take away the station. [07:53.180 --> 07:53.800] No, no, no. [07:53.800 --> 07:54.920] No, January of 2001. [07:56.220 --> 07:57.080] Was it 2001? [07:57.180 --> 07:58.320] Yeah, you know, I know this. [07:58.320 --> 08:06.400] I know this because I just, I'm scanning my negatives, which is a fun project if you ever want to get involved in something that'll take hours of your time. [08:06.860 --> 08:09.000] I'm scanning negatives of photographs I took. [08:09.160 --> 08:18.040] And just yesterday was the day where the police came to WBAI at 120 Wall Street because we had been taken over and listeners were in the lobby protesting. [08:18.420 --> 08:24.720] And the coup people actually called the cops and had people arrested in WBAI. [08:24.840 --> 08:29.520] And of course, we happened to be on the air at that very moment, broadcasting the entire thing. [08:29.700 --> 08:36.380] And by broadcasting the entire thing, we were basically getting all kinds of listeners to come to the station because they heard what was going on. [08:36.500 --> 08:43.450] But the funny thing is, I took a picture of a no parking sign, you know, one of those temporary ones because of some kind of production. [08:44.240 --> 08:45.690] And they made the same mistake you did. [08:45.780 --> 08:48.740] They said, January 23rd, zero, zero. [08:49.040 --> 08:51.720] Because you know how it is in January, you forget to write the new year. [08:52.070 --> 08:55.100] Well, whoever filled out that no parking thing also did the same thing. [08:55.100 --> 08:56.660] So that picture is very confusing. [08:56.880 --> 09:00.040] I thought it was 2002, but it actually is 2001. [09:00.830 --> 09:01.240] Oh my goodness. [09:01.380 --> 09:03.000] Well, even more to the point then. [09:03.160 --> 09:08.120] I mean, we're talking about literally 20 years to the day yesterday when all of this happened. [09:08.380 --> 09:09.540] I mean, literally, people... [09:09.540 --> 09:12.140] It's not the 23rd, it's the 15th, right? [09:12.140 --> 09:12.450] That's correct. [09:12.480 --> 09:12.690] Okay. [09:12.790 --> 09:15.260] Well, the picture I took was I think on the 23rd, but regardless, yes. [09:15.570 --> 09:15.930] Okay. [09:16.100 --> 09:16.240] Yeah. [09:16.380 --> 09:24.040] So yeah, regardless, I will never forget that day when I was holding up your cell phone, which was a rare thing to have back then. [09:25.220 --> 09:34.260] And the police were in the lobby and they started announcing, the NYPD was announcing that anybody who refused to leave the lobby was going to be arrested. [09:35.000 --> 09:37.960] And so many people there refused to leave the lobby. [09:38.140 --> 09:44.160] I remember there being a woman in a wheelchair that refused to leave the lobby and she was arrested. [09:44.380 --> 09:54.760] And when we left the station that night, that was, it was one of those amazing evenings where we walked out and there were, there had to be easily 100 people Outside the station and they were beating drums. [09:54.940 --> 09:58.480] I mean, people really cared about it because it was going to be taken over. [09:58.740 --> 10:12.240] And there was a lot of organizing that happened on the back end, both in Manhattan, Brooklyn, and especially on Long Island with our friends over at the Cinema Arts Center in Huntington, Vic Skolnick and Charlotte Skye. [10:12.400 --> 10:17.420] I think Vic has passed away, if I recall correctly. [10:17.420 --> 10:19.880] But there are all these wonderful friends. [10:20.140 --> 10:24.940] And without these friends and without the support, the station would have been gone 20 years ago. [10:25.290 --> 10:29.480] And think about what New York would be like if it didn't have WBAI. [10:30.080 --> 10:30.240] Right. [10:30.960 --> 10:33.000] I also realize it's September, it's not January. [10:33.260 --> 10:37.290] So the date was... it's not exactly 20 years yet. [10:37.480 --> 10:39.940] Or actually, no, it was 20 years already in January. [10:40.700 --> 10:42.160] January of 2021. [10:42.780 --> 10:43.290] Right. [10:43.400 --> 10:45.080] So it's 21 years, I guess. [10:45.420 --> 10:45.580] Yeah. [10:46.460 --> 10:48.940] The coup began in December of 2000. [10:48.940 --> 10:51.420] I know because I was overseas listening to it unfold. [10:51.670 --> 10:58.480] And it's really kind of insane to think that's what happens at radio stations, radio stations that matter. [10:58.600 --> 11:00.420] And okay, that was 20 years ago. [11:00.500 --> 11:06.740] You know, we had another one two years ago, where they actually came in and kicked everybody out and locked the doors. [11:06.740 --> 11:11.540] And it was in all the newspapers that WBAI was finished, shut down. [11:12.040 --> 11:18.140] And all the TV stations were there, just basically beating the drums, saying that we were finished. [11:18.340 --> 11:22.020] Any of those papers or TV stations that want to do an update? [11:23.240 --> 11:26.840] They're more than welcome to come and or contact the station. [11:26.880 --> 11:30.440] And they would love to talk about all the great things that WBAI is doing. [11:30.440 --> 11:31.360] They never did that. [11:31.540 --> 11:35.520] A lot of them never gave the update that, hey, we won the station back in court this time. [11:36.380 --> 11:40.760] Because what the people engineering that particular coup did was illegal. [11:41.300 --> 11:43.220] And that's what happens. [11:43.620 --> 11:50.660] There are many more instances of sit-ins and takeovers and things like that have happened over the years. [11:50.660 --> 11:51.280] It's messy. [11:51.900 --> 11:55.180] But in the end, democracy prevails. [11:55.440 --> 11:56.780] And free speech prevails. [11:57.060 --> 12:01.380] And to help that happen, to help that continue, we always need our listeners. [12:02.240 --> 12:08.420] And that's why we ask you to call 212-209-2950 or give to WBAI.org. [12:08.560 --> 12:09.500] Become a BAI buddy. [12:09.500 --> 12:18.260] It's the most painless way to show your support, not only for off-the-hook, but for WBAI and free speech in general. [12:18.500 --> 12:25.500] College whatever you can afford for each month, and it'll just automatically be deducted, and you won't have to worry about it. [12:25.620 --> 12:32.200] When the station's strong, a lot of that dynamic activity is really in the programming, I think. [12:32.440 --> 12:32.820] Oh, absolutely. [12:32.820 --> 12:37.920] And I say that because people see this value. [12:38.080 --> 12:41.240] You talked about being in the center of the city, in the center of the dial. [12:41.600 --> 12:55.880] And when you have, normally, that dynamic change in programming and the change in format, I guess is the correct term, usually that's like a deal or like a corporate handover, you know? [12:56.240 --> 12:57.860] Cash is exchanged, whatever. [12:58.220 --> 13:01.600] As soon as it's all good, the paper's signed, and that's it. [13:01.660 --> 13:01.960] That's it. [13:01.960 --> 13:02.640] You get country. [13:02.900 --> 13:06.020] You get whatever other kind of agenda. [13:06.380 --> 13:10.100] Well, when you have a community station, it runs a little differently. [13:10.840 --> 13:16.780] The oversight, I guess, or the transactional nature really isn't as much of a part of it. [13:16.880 --> 13:19.360] There's no huge opportunity for it. [13:19.440 --> 13:28.240] So those challenges, that cold business angle, has to take different forms, and it comes at the station in different ways. [13:28.240 --> 13:40.000] And a lot of times, it's under the guise of very much trying to mimic the community model so that it seeps in as something that is in the interest of the station, but not actually. [13:40.000 --> 13:50.540] So in a large part, you don't see these sorts of events very often, but as listeners, you're kind of a part of the station. [13:50.540 --> 14:04.660] And when these things happen, we let you know and inform everyone and try to be as loud as possible so that it doesn't come to those kinds of dire moments. [14:04.960 --> 14:06.240] But it can be very scary. [14:06.380 --> 14:06.560] It can be. [14:06.560 --> 14:13.840] I had never experienced it, and it was an incredible change in focus. [14:14.140 --> 14:18.740] I mean, it was all hands on deck, and people really, really had to get the message out. [14:19.040 --> 14:21.600] And it was quite hostile. [14:21.600 --> 14:39.860] So the point is, these things do occur, and people see value and want to have that change in ownership, but often the agenda itself isn't quite clear because it's coming in under this sort of seemingly familiar guise. [14:39.860 --> 14:55.520] And we want the agenda to be about people, the audience, the dedicated volunteers and programmers that come in and do what they can, and other people in the community, community members that are listeners or that haven't even had an opportunity to be on air yet. [14:56.660 --> 15:06.240] Those kinds of things don't happen when you have a changeover in operations, or operations have to be focused on legal battles. [15:06.240 --> 15:07.020] It's crazy. [15:07.140 --> 15:08.540] That's not radio. [15:09.360 --> 15:16.600] So we like to make sure the station's strong in light of those recent historical lessons. [15:17.800 --> 15:27.700] By appealing to you, our audience, and everyone out there that enjoys radio and enjoys our station, our program, no matter where you are. [15:27.820 --> 15:35.220] We're all over the place because of the internet and a lot of contributions just in connecting up today. [15:35.220 --> 15:48.280] So I just want to remind people that you get to set the agenda for now because of many people's valiant efforts to keep WBAI, WBAI. [15:48.440 --> 15:50.120] 212-209-2950. [15:50.320 --> 15:51.860] And you mentioned, you know, you get country sometimes. [15:52.000 --> 16:05.140] Remember when we actually did give them country on April 1st, we did a takeover, a fake takeover, where, thanks to our good friend Laszlo, who works in commercial radio, made a whole big commercial radio teaser, and a countdown thing. [16:05.300 --> 16:07.300] And yes, 99.5 FM is now country. [16:07.380 --> 16:08.740] That went on for a good 15 minutes. [16:08.860 --> 16:09.800] And people were calling. [16:10.220 --> 16:15.760] It was a bit of fun, but also a reminder that nothing is guaranteed. [16:15.980 --> 16:17.000] Nothing is permanent. [16:17.240 --> 16:19.600] And if we don't maintain something, it will fall apart. [16:20.360 --> 16:21.780] You know how society is going now? [16:21.900 --> 16:22.840] That could happen to BAI. [16:22.960 --> 16:24.300] It could be the same thing. [16:24.460 --> 16:26.600] So you got to maintain it. [16:26.700 --> 16:30.080] You got to make sure that it's supported. [16:30.080 --> 16:35.380] And I know, you know, people will always find something to disagree with, to be outraged at. [16:35.540 --> 16:36.520] I know I will. [16:37.700 --> 16:40.140] But that's not a reason not to support the place. [16:40.280 --> 16:42.180] Support the place for what you do believe in. [16:42.880 --> 16:47.020] And that way you're there to stand up against the things you don't believe in. [16:47.140 --> 16:48.260] It's as simple as that. [16:48.420 --> 16:50.020] 212-209-2950. [16:50.220 --> 16:52.040] Give to WBAI.org. [16:52.180 --> 16:52.620] Go ahead, Rob. [16:53.300 --> 16:56.420] Yeah, and Kyle just touched on something which we don't talk about a lot. [16:56.420 --> 17:04.460] But it's not only giving your financial support to the station, but if you become a member of the station, you become a member of the station. [17:04.600 --> 17:07.200] And that comes with a voice in what happens. [17:07.200 --> 17:18.860] If you donate $25 or more, whether that's a one-shot donation or whether you have monthly BAI buddy donations once they add up to $25, you are a full voting member of WBAI. [17:18.970 --> 17:21.530] You get to vote for your representatives on the local station board. [17:21.530 --> 17:27.790] You get to stand for election to the board yourself if you want, and you get a voice in how things go at this station. [17:28.640 --> 17:35.180] And so that's even more important because, yeah, this is a station that is of its community. [17:35.460 --> 17:40.010] We are not doing what some mysterious corporate boss somewhere says. [17:40.010 --> 17:42.880] We are not doing what commercial interests say we should do. [17:42.880 --> 17:48.380] We are doing what you, the listeners, say we should do via your voices on the board and via your donations. [17:48.660 --> 17:53.270] Give to WBAI.org or 212-209-2950. [17:53.510 --> 18:07.970] And, you know, as a good example of that, only a few weeks ago, I don't want to get into particulars, but there was a referendum that came up that would have rewritten the way the – what's it called again? [18:08.180 --> 18:08.730] Community board? [18:08.940 --> 18:09.700] Yeah, the community board. [18:09.710 --> 18:10.470] Local station board? [18:10.470 --> 18:12.160] Yeah, the by-lines? [18:12.290 --> 18:12.850] Is that the right word? [18:13.010 --> 18:13.090] By-laws. [18:13.210 --> 18:13.530] By-laws. [18:13.680 --> 18:14.830] I knew I was looking for it. [18:15.930 --> 18:26.790] And basically by doing that, a lot of power would have been funneled into a very small select group of people and away from listeners, and listeners had the opportunity to vote on this. [18:27.310 --> 18:46.160] And unlike, you know, in our dumbass political scene, listeners voted for democracy and voted for something that would preserve the stations, not just WBAI, but the stations, all five Pacifica stations, and the structure, the governance. [18:46.460 --> 18:49.310] So, yes, you do have a very important say. [18:49.490 --> 18:51.010] It'll come up again, I'm sure. [18:53.210 --> 18:54.400] And it matters. [18:54.680 --> 18:55.380] It really matters. [18:55.970 --> 18:58.900] I don't really think we can say any more on that. [18:59.030 --> 19:00.660] 212-209-2950. [19:01.250 --> 19:02.990] Give to WBAI.org. [19:03.090 --> 19:03.990] Please show your support. [19:04.270 --> 19:07.940] At the end of the night, we want to see – a lot of people have called and become BAI buddies. [19:08.610 --> 19:15.510] And don't forget to say off the hook is the show you're pledging for so that we know you're out there. [19:15.510 --> 19:16.900] It really, really matters. [19:17.970 --> 19:21.970] Okay, so we want to get into the show. [19:22.420 --> 19:24.210] We will not be on next week again. [19:24.970 --> 19:28.770] But we are on overtime after this show on YouTube. [19:29.200 --> 19:31.830] So, youtube.com slash channel 2600. [19:32.460 --> 19:37.830] You can also just click on the link at the top of the 2600.com webpage at 8 o'clock. [19:38.010 --> 19:39.790] And that way you can call us. [19:40.110 --> 19:42.830] You can listen to other things that we might have to talk about. [19:43.680 --> 19:53.290] But for the remainder of this hour, we have a few interesting stories, including – do you remember a couple of weeks ago, the subway was completely shut down? [19:53.610 --> 19:57.200] Now, okay, I should clarify because it's happened a few times. [19:57.590 --> 19:58.920] I don't mean Ida. [19:59.010 --> 20:02.700] I don't mean when Ida came in and basically turned it into a water park. [20:02.700 --> 20:02.920] No. [20:03.440 --> 20:11.050] I mean before that, when it just mysteriously, all of a sudden, the train stopped and people had no idea what was going on. [20:11.810 --> 20:13.400] People thought the system was hacked. [20:13.710 --> 20:15.610] You know, that's always the reaction. [20:15.750 --> 20:18.850] The go-to reaction is something's broken and must have been hacked. [20:19.070 --> 20:19.970] Where was Kevin Mitnick? [20:20.050 --> 20:24.640] You know, basically, anything having to do with technology, it's our fault. [20:25.440 --> 20:25.920] Okay. [20:26.050 --> 20:26.850] Well, it wasn't. [20:27.010 --> 20:27.900] It wasn't. [20:27.900 --> 20:41.070] The recent power outage that disrupted half of New York City's subway system for several hours, stranded hundreds of passengers, was likely caused by someone accidentally pressing an emergency power-off button. [20:41.570 --> 20:42.330] Yeah. [20:42.330 --> 20:54.900] And, you know, I've noticed this over the years, that usually these catastrophes, these mishaps, are caused by similar amounts of human error. [20:55.250 --> 21:06.180] You know, data loss, more data loss is caused by somebody dropping a hard drive than by somebody getting into it and doing all kinds of damage. [21:07.700 --> 21:19.030] The outside investigators who were looking into the disruption, it took place on August 29th, said there was a strong possibility that the button was accidentally pressed since the plastic guard... [21:19.030 --> 21:20.550] Stay with me here. [21:20.830 --> 21:22.350] You know how these buttons look. [21:22.530 --> 21:28.920] The plastic guard designed to prevent accidental activation was missing. [21:29.590 --> 21:32.050] Oh, why don't we have a dramatic sting right now? [21:32.050 --> 21:40.250] So, yeah, the plastic guard for the emergency off button is missing. [21:40.250 --> 21:46.470] If you have seen it or you know where it might be, please contact us. [21:46.590 --> 21:46.880] Why not? [21:47.900 --> 21:58.420] The unprecedented breakdown affected more than 80 trains, giving a black eye to a sprawling transit system that has since been hit with flooding from the remnants of Hurricane Ida. [21:58.420 --> 22:09.090] Governor Huckel ordered a full review of operation control centers across the Metropolitan Transportation Authority to identify and fix potential weaknesses. [22:10.040 --> 22:13.240] And missing plastic coverings are on the top of that list. [22:14.460 --> 22:21.880] Huckel said New Yorkers deserve absolute confidence in a fully functioning subway system, and it is our job to restore that confidence. [22:23.220 --> 22:29.940] The breakdown affected the subway system's numbered lines, plus the L train, for several hours, beginning shortly after 9 p.m. [22:30.420 --> 22:30.850] that Sunday. [22:31.000 --> 22:34.570] Interesting, the numbered lines, meaning IRT, and the L. [22:34.700 --> 22:41.960] I'm not sure why the L train was able to piggyback onto that, or why there's a power switch that will only affect numbered trains. [22:42.140 --> 22:44.880] I'm sure there's all kinds of reasons, and I'm sure our listeners will write to us. [22:44.880 --> 22:49.720] And if you are one of those listeners, OTH at 2600.com is our email address. [22:50.220 --> 22:56.900] But restoration of service was delayed, and here's how we blame you, the public, for this. [22:57.500 --> 23:06.400] The restoration of the service was delayed because passengers on two of the stuck trains walked out onto the tracks by themselves rather than waiting for rescuers. [23:07.040 --> 23:08.000] Yeah, bad. [23:08.000 --> 23:10.460] And that resulted in a much longer delay. [23:10.680 --> 23:26.400] Now, the button was pushed after a power dip lasting several milliseconds at 8.25 p.m., and the subsequent discovery that several pieces of mechanical equipment at the New York City Transit Rail Control Center stopped functioning. [23:26.660 --> 23:29.570] Control center staff worked to get the equipment back into service. [23:29.570 --> 23:38.520] Then someone pushed the emergency button, causing all electrical equipment connected to one of the power distribution units at the center to lose power at 9.06 p.m. [23:38.900 --> 23:42.540] Power was restored by 10.30 p.m., according to the reports. [23:42.540 --> 23:52.180] Now, officials blame the loss of power on human error and the failure to restore power for 84 minutes to inadequate organizational structure and a lack of guidelines. [23:53.200 --> 23:54.290] Yeah, MTA. [23:54.460 --> 23:54.780] There you go. [23:55.070 --> 23:56.520] So that was a bit of fun. [23:57.110 --> 23:57.880] Mystery solved. [23:59.160 --> 24:02.000] Maybe don't blame hackers as quickly as you normally do. [24:02.160 --> 24:02.570] Alex? [24:03.380 --> 24:08.380] It's amazing to me that there's a single button that can cause an outage. [24:08.520 --> 24:09.090] Isn't that great? [24:09.520 --> 24:10.310] Isn't that amazing? [24:10.310 --> 24:12.550] There's a button like that for probably all kinds of things. [24:12.830 --> 24:21.790] But what amazes me more about this button is that people have resisted the temptation for God knows how many years prior to this to push it. [24:22.570 --> 24:27.110] That's some serious psychological fortitude that these people have. [24:27.110 --> 24:30.460] It's like the button in Hitchhiker's Guide that says, do not press this button. [24:30.680 --> 24:31.070] That's right. [24:31.240 --> 24:32.220] That's exactly right. [24:32.480 --> 24:35.960] And if you press it, but someone came out and said, do not press this button again. [24:37.050 --> 24:39.980] I think that's the only thing that it actually did. [24:41.110 --> 24:42.070] Such a great book. [24:42.290 --> 24:42.520] Yeah. [24:42.680 --> 24:43.260] Yeah, absolutely. [24:43.460 --> 24:44.920] We all could read that again, I think. [24:45.440 --> 24:48.140] I'm sticking with actual hacking. [24:48.310 --> 24:49.680] Well, maybe not actual hacking. [24:50.180 --> 24:51.350] Hacking in a sense, I guess. [24:51.480 --> 24:53.330] Web page hacking is hacking, I suppose. [24:54.220 --> 24:57.380] You're taking over something and changing it a bit. [24:57.640 --> 24:59.460] But you're not always using hacking techniques. [24:59.460 --> 25:02.400] You might just be using a script or something like that. [25:02.520 --> 25:06.700] It really depends on what you do with the power that you temporarily have. [25:06.700 --> 25:20.610] Well, the official website for the Texas Republican Party, TexasGOP.org, was hacked on Saturday in retribution for the newly enacted Heartbeat Act that bans abortions in the state after six weeks from conception. [25:21.550 --> 25:32.550] Archived versions of the site show that it was briefly vandalized to display several crude messages and other content mocking and criticizing the Texas Republican Party and GOP as a whole. [25:32.550 --> 25:38.380] The person of persons who defaced the website also made numerous references to Anonymous. [25:39.330 --> 25:41.310] We could use that dramatic sting again. [25:41.830 --> 25:43.110] We really need to get that. [25:44.050 --> 25:47.070] Anonymous, as you may know, is the loose-knit hacktivist movement. [25:47.440 --> 25:52.400] They embedded a couple of specific calling cards, typical of Internet trolls. [25:52.850 --> 25:57.830] I'm not really sure what those are, not being an Internet troll, but I'm sure we'd all recognize them. [25:57.830 --> 26:07.140] This is what Texas GOP chairman Matt Rinaldi said in a statement to the Washington Times, another conservative newspaper on Saturday. [26:07.810 --> 26:09.050] Pro-abortion hackers. [26:09.780 --> 26:14.380] Pro-abortion hackers changed our webpage for a short time before we took it down. [26:14.570 --> 26:19.070] We will be increasing security and appreciate the hackers providing us with a fundraising opportunity. [26:19.310 --> 26:23.960] Funds we will use to promote even more robust pro-life legislation in Texas. [26:24.180 --> 26:25.200] More robust? [26:25.200 --> 26:27.070] How could it get any worse? [26:28.350 --> 26:29.000] Wow. [26:30.350 --> 26:40.780] Side-by-side comparisons of the site from before and after it was compromised made it apparent the hacker or hackers responsible for the defacement made a number of updates and other revisions to its homepage. [26:40.780 --> 26:41.940] Probably updated the software. [26:42.240 --> 26:43.640] Probably improved some things. [26:44.280 --> 26:51.110] Giving Texans a voice to promote conservative philosophy and principles was changed to Texas. [26:51.110 --> 26:57.540] Taking voices from women to promote theocratic erosion of church-slash-state barriers. [26:58.550 --> 26:59.350] Oh, come on. [26:59.420 --> 26:59.780] That's better. [26:59.850 --> 27:01.160] That's more accurate, right? [27:01.440 --> 27:02.140] Not wrong. [27:02.310 --> 27:02.540] No. [27:02.960 --> 27:04.590] I don't understand the complaint. [27:05.310 --> 27:14.920] Elsewhere on the site, the Texas GOP's mission statement was changed to, We are committed to taking away all the rights of women so we can live our prosperous Bible-thumping dream. [27:15.780 --> 27:16.260] Really? [27:16.330 --> 27:17.260] They took offense at that? [27:18.070 --> 27:19.480] I mean, tell me what's wrong. [27:19.640 --> 27:21.940] Tell me what is inaccurate in that statement. [27:22.280 --> 27:23.020] I'm sorry. [27:23.140 --> 27:26.420] You should be paying these people because they're obviously updating your site. [27:27.610 --> 27:37.880] And whoever hacked the site, and this really threw them for a loop, also embedded a YouTube video for the 1987 song, Never Gonna Give You Up, by Rick Astley. [27:38.920 --> 27:39.400] Yeah. [27:39.680 --> 27:44.220] And also placed an image known as Goatseed prominently on the page. [27:44.290 --> 27:45.760] But you just kind of have to do that. [27:45.920 --> 27:50.660] And for those of you who don't know, cherish the fact that you don't know what that is. [27:52.380 --> 27:55.240] A warning was also added to the bottom of the page. [27:55.440 --> 27:55.880] Disclaimer. [27:56.420 --> 28:01.280] Hackers on steroids are 10 times more effective at romance than 100% of Republicans. [28:01.940 --> 28:04.290] Trans demon hackers are coming to get you. [28:04.790 --> 28:06.260] Abortion is a choice. [28:07.240 --> 28:09.880] I like that trans demon hackers are coming to get you. [28:10.000 --> 28:11.140] That's a nice touch. [28:11.850 --> 28:19.380] Hackers on steroids is a reference to how Anonymous was described in the media when the shadowy hacktivist group first emerged more than a decade ago. [28:20.790 --> 28:21.520] So, yeah. [28:23.380 --> 28:33.460] So, and of course, more recently in February, the CEO of fringe social media service Gab blamed a breach of the platform on mentally ill tranny demon hackers. [28:33.460 --> 28:35.180] So that's where the phrase comes from. [28:36.880 --> 28:45.260] It was not immediately clear who vandalized the Texas GOP website, which remained offline as of early Saturday afternoon, or if anyone would take credit. [28:46.050 --> 28:48.290] Basically, a message on the bottom attributes Anonymous. [28:49.050 --> 28:50.920] Look up that word, okay? [28:51.140 --> 28:54.200] And you might have an answer to whether or not someone's going to take credit. [28:56.480 --> 28:59.760] Seriously, though, Texas is out of control. [29:00.020 --> 29:02.980] Just basically making it up as they go along. [29:03.160 --> 29:08.070] And it's such a dumpster fire at this point that it doesn't matter. [29:08.420 --> 29:09.980] The rule of law doesn't matter. [29:10.260 --> 29:11.550] The president doesn't matter. [29:12.660 --> 29:13.920] People don't seem to matter. [29:13.920 --> 29:15.380] Here's something else that they did. [29:15.700 --> 29:20.460] Texas Governor Greg Abbott, who had COVID only a couple of weeks ago. [29:20.610 --> 29:21.810] Is that over? [29:22.020 --> 29:24.920] Or is he just learning to make peace with that? [29:26.480 --> 29:31.520] He has signed a bill regulating how social media companies moderate content. [29:31.520 --> 29:49.790] This new law, which passed, I believe, last week, controversially prohibits banning or demonetizing or otherwise restricting content based on the viewpoint of the user or another person, whether or not that viewpoint is expressed on the social media platform itself. [29:51.440 --> 30:01.590] It also requires social media services to disclose how they promote and moderate content and mandates transparency reports similar to those produced by Facebook, Google, other major web companies. [30:03.550 --> 30:04.290] I don't know. [30:04.380 --> 30:23.160] I'm curious what your take on this is, Alex, because to say that you are not allowed to kick somebody off of the platform that you own based on what someone believes in or stands for, I mean, we're talking about, you know, we're not talking about minor disagreements here. [30:23.220 --> 30:26.240] We're talking about people that are white supremacists. [30:26.350 --> 30:27.280] We're talking about fascists. [30:27.380 --> 30:38.720] We're talking about the kind of people that we've heard so much about in months and years past that Twitter and, to a degree, Facebook has tried to purge. [30:39.980 --> 30:43.900] To say that it's not legal to do that, I don't know. [30:43.980 --> 30:46.280] Is that something that you think is going to hold up? [30:48.130 --> 30:57.590] This is an interesting question, I think, because historically it's always been answered in the negative, meaning no, it's not going to hold up. [30:58.220 --> 31:06.520] Because just about, I think, I don't know, 14 or 15 years ago was perhaps the first time that this was considered. [31:06.520 --> 31:19.400] And almost every single time thereafter, any time that there's been a challenge to the right of a platform to curate or moderate its speech, it's always been a... [31:20.070 --> 31:26.460] The courts have always sided with the platform and its ability to exercise its own discretion. [31:26.740 --> 31:39.220] And it's a matter of the First Amendment as well, because these platforms themselves have the First Amendment right to curate and edit the speech that's on their networks. [31:39.920 --> 31:56.590] But having said that, you know, we have moved more towards this concept, both on the right and the left, that social media platforms have become part of the public sphere or part of the public space in certain respects. [31:56.590 --> 32:18.610] If you recall, a couple of years ago, we had an issue with President Trump banning people from his social media page and that being deemed unconstitutional because it prevented others who were banned from, excuse me, from participating in the political process on Twitter. [32:19.290 --> 32:40.220] And then on the other side of this, we had Justice Thomas come out very recently, I think within the last six or seven months, in a dissent that was actually throwing out the case as a moot that arose to the level of the Supreme Court about President Trump's ability or inability to ban people on social media. [32:40.220 --> 32:59.640] You know, when they, when the case, I'm sorry, when the court tossed this case out as moot, Justice Thomas went so far as to say, well, hey, look, you know, we're tossing it out as moot, but there's something wrong here because on the one hand, we are treating this as a private entity's domain to do whatever the hell they want to do. [32:59.740 --> 33:05.960] And on the other hand, we're treating social media platforms as integral to the democratic process in the public sphere. [33:05.960 --> 33:24.280] And if things enjoy, or even a component of them, enjoy some kind of legal protection that Justice Thomas was suggesting, that social media platforms should be regulated in essence, like a telephone company as some kind of public-private partnership or utility, [33:24.700 --> 33:31.590] then discrimination on the basis of viewpoint becomes constitutionally impermissible in that public sphere. [33:31.590 --> 33:47.760] In the same way that the government couldn't go out a manual and stop you from getting on your soapbox in Prospect Park and, you know, yelling about something, they couldn't stop you in doing something that was the equivalent public sphere in the digital space. [33:47.940 --> 33:49.880] So there's going to be some push and pull in this. [33:49.960 --> 33:54.260] I think on the balance, it will be unconstitutional, but there's definitely tension now. [33:54.540 --> 33:59.830] Well, I can't believe I have to explain this to Justice Thomas, but there's so much that we have to explain to him. [33:59.830 --> 34:03.590] Okay, so you brought up telephones. [34:03.900 --> 34:05.980] Let's use that as a parallel to Twitter. [34:06.520 --> 34:09.300] You know, Twitter is an organization that runs the platform. [34:09.540 --> 34:11.700] Trump is a user, okay? [34:12.020 --> 34:21.220] So if, say, I'm an elected official, all right, and I have a phone number, but I don't allow certain people to call me, ever. [34:21.720 --> 34:23.070] Well, that's not right. [34:23.400 --> 34:24.400] That's not right. [34:26.480 --> 34:28.920] And a phone company is a common carrier. [34:29.050 --> 34:29.660] It's different than Twitter. [34:29.780 --> 34:30.860] Twitter is not a common carrier. [34:31.050 --> 34:32.840] You have to give somebody a phone line, obviously. [34:34.040 --> 34:42.880] But I think, you know, looking at the actual Twitter example, Twitter can choose who they want to have on their platform. [34:42.880 --> 34:45.420] If somebody is violating the rules, they can kick them off. [34:45.520 --> 34:52.110] But if you are on that platform as an elected official, and that is your means of communicating with the populace, it's not a Twitter issue. [34:52.110 --> 34:53.720] It's a democracy issue. [34:54.000 --> 34:59.960] You can't just only speak to certain people and bar everybody else from having any kind of access. [35:00.220 --> 35:00.980] Okay, imagine this. [35:01.070 --> 35:02.840] I'm thinking of analogies as I go. [35:03.610 --> 35:09.260] Imagine you have a meeting room, and you hand out keys, but you only hand out keys to the people you like. [35:10.020 --> 35:14.230] You're giving a public address, but you're not allowing the public into that room. [35:14.340 --> 35:16.070] You're only allowing the people that you've chosen. [35:16.730 --> 35:21.520] Well, you know, the building can get sick of this and say, you know what, we don't want you in the building anymore. [35:21.520 --> 35:22.210] Get out of here. [35:22.420 --> 35:23.520] Play your game somewhere else. [35:23.650 --> 35:31.670] But that's got nothing to do with the elected official refusing to allow people to access what he says or she says. [35:32.520 --> 35:35.040] I'm sure I can come up with better analogies, given some time. [35:35.170 --> 35:37.650] But, I mean, to me, it's a pretty clear difference. [35:38.670 --> 36:00.500] Well, also, there's this argument that the people that are espousing this type of prohibition on viewpoint discrimination on social media platforms are the very people that also hold very much libertarian ideals about anti-regulation and the administrative state, [36:00.650 --> 36:05.980] and that if the government begins to over-regulate things, the country's going to go down the tubes. [36:06.280 --> 36:10.210] This is a form of very specific regulation. [36:10.590 --> 36:13.170] It's regulation of technology, for sure. [36:13.460 --> 36:20.020] But what I see here, Emmanuel, is certainly there's tension here between this notion of... [36:22.130 --> 36:23.270] Uh-oh. [36:23.910 --> 36:26.670] Alex is either lost in thought or lost on the Internet. [36:26.990 --> 36:28.890] You know, Alex, this is actually a good point. [36:28.890 --> 36:33.230] I wanted to just jump in, let you catch your breath. [36:33.430 --> 36:34.250] He's not breathing. [36:34.570 --> 36:35.290] Is he okay? [36:35.550 --> 36:36.770] Well, he's just frozen there. [36:36.850 --> 36:37.250] Look at that. [36:38.310 --> 36:42.750] Why don't you say what you were going to say, Kyle, and hopefully Alex will come back to life somehow. [36:43.970 --> 36:44.730] He's trying. [36:44.970 --> 36:45.090] Yeah. [36:46.470 --> 36:56.890] My thought is that, in a public official sense, on a private platform, in the case of the former president, he had already been given extra leeway, I think. [36:56.890 --> 37:14.590] I think the pile-on effect of private citizens enjoying that and whatever other, maybe people outside the country, bots, who knows, all of that, I think, is distinct because they were not the public official in the same way. [37:14.930 --> 37:18.590] So I think that's important. [37:18.910 --> 37:34.370] The private communications, though, I think it speaks more to the larger tension because in policing this stuff on the private platforms, it's not actually, like, taking away the speech. [37:34.370 --> 37:35.910] It's moving it to other platforms. [37:36.310 --> 37:43.490] Like, you know, hopefully Telegram doesn't break because a lot of this crap is over there, you know? [37:43.490 --> 37:47.010] So that is more of a forgetful network. [37:47.290 --> 37:52.110] They probably would say they don't have any eyes on anything that goes on there, right? [37:52.110 --> 38:00.290] So we push from these pseudo-public squares to private places, and then those ideas don't actually ever get challenged. [38:00.470 --> 38:02.610] They get just reinforced and festered. [38:02.690 --> 38:21.910] So I think we're feeling like we have a comfort in pushing for this, but I think there's a danger as well in pushing in the emergence of workarounds, like platforms that are end-to-end encrypted, platforms that are agnostic of this stuff. [38:22.810 --> 38:25.770] You don't then challenge those discussions. [38:25.770 --> 38:32.150] And was it pleasant to challenge them when Twitter was overrun with it in the middle of a campaign cycle? [38:32.450 --> 38:32.970] No. [38:33.190 --> 38:33.930] It was awful. [38:34.390 --> 38:36.910] But, I mean, are we fixing it? [38:37.110 --> 38:39.030] I think those are all also good questions. [38:39.670 --> 38:41.130] Alex, you're back. [38:41.650 --> 38:46.230] I don't know if you know where you got cut off, but let's try again. [38:46.230 --> 38:50.090] I don't know what happened there, but, you know, I have no idea where I got cut off. [38:50.170 --> 38:50.590] Do you remember? [38:50.830 --> 38:52.070] Was anybody paying attention? [38:53.190 --> 38:58.450] We can't quote exactly what you said five minutes ago, but you were in the middle of a point. [38:59.610 --> 39:26.570] No, look, I think the point I was trying to get to was that there certainly is this tension between common carriers in a public space, but I think where we're going to end up here is a space that makes sense in that what's going to matter is not that there's going to be some kind of prohibition on discriminating against Republicans or discriminating against Democrats, [39:26.570 --> 39:37.810] but what we should be requiring of our social media platforms is some form of due process that's fundamental in making these determinations themselves. [39:37.810 --> 39:53.790] And I don't think that that's too much to expect and I don't think anybody on the right or the left would disagree with that because we just should require some kind of deliberative process, some process by which we can determine whether or not it's right to have that viewpoint on there, [39:53.950 --> 40:00.110] whether it makes sense and that there is an opportunity to be heard with respect to that viewpoint. [40:01.050 --> 40:24.830] because I think, you know, as our old friend and a digital libertarian, John Perry Barlow, called them, you know, governments were these, quote, weary giants of flesh and steel and that were neither competent or able to regulate cyberspace in that sense. [40:24.950 --> 40:28.390] And so, you know, there's a lot, I think, to reconcile here. [40:28.690 --> 40:29.250] Go ahead, Rob. [40:30.510 --> 40:47.910] It's interesting that we have these two stories together because in one of them, we have, you know, the so-called party of small government, the Republican Party, the Texas Republicans in particular, saying we're going to march into, you know, a privately owned website and decide that they're not allowed to choose what they can or can't have on their own platform. [40:48.090 --> 40:53.490] But at the same time, they're going to tell the trans demon hackers that they can't come in and write what they want on their website. [40:54.210 --> 40:58.910] And don't forget what they're telling women in Texas, what they can't do. [40:59.110 --> 41:02.210] So, yeah, there's a lot of overreach here, I believe. [41:04.930 --> 41:05.330] Absolutely. [41:05.770 --> 41:05.990] Okay. [41:06.570 --> 41:13.790] Well, you know, basically, to Alex's point, yeah, there should be due process. [41:14.250 --> 41:16.570] When you get kicked off of a platform, you should know why. [41:16.610 --> 41:18.170] I totally agree with that. [41:18.470 --> 41:22.050] And when other things happen, for instance, it just happened to me this morning. [41:22.330 --> 41:22.910] Oh, my God. [41:23.030 --> 41:32.570] I think I complained about Facebook and Google last week, who freaked out because my Wi-Fi went out and they thought somebody was hacking my account. [41:32.770 --> 41:36.150] And, well, the same thing happened again with Facebook where they just... [41:36.150 --> 41:37.810] This time, there wasn't an outage. [41:37.890 --> 41:41.250] They just decided somebody may have had access to your account. [41:41.730 --> 41:43.830] I'm like, okay, can you tell me something more? [41:44.150 --> 41:44.630] No. [41:44.850 --> 41:45.570] Change your password. [41:45.750 --> 41:49.630] I just changed my password because you told me to do that only a few days ago. [41:49.790 --> 41:50.870] What are you doing? [41:50.870 --> 41:51.650] What's going on? [41:51.750 --> 41:53.830] Do you have any idea how to run your own network? [41:53.950 --> 41:56.930] I don't see any evidence of anybody accessing my account. [41:57.050 --> 42:00.130] I couldn't really care much less than I already do about Facebook. [42:00.310 --> 42:04.050] But, you know, if you think somebody accessed something, at least share with me the information. [42:04.270 --> 42:05.390] But, no, you get nothing. [42:05.390 --> 42:15.750] You just get an accusation that something bad happened and that you have to change a password as a result and go through all these steps when most of us just don't want to be bothered. [42:15.750 --> 42:27.210] But if you get booted from a platform because of an algorithm, and I know this happens a lot on Facebook where the algorithm decides that you violated something, that's not acceptable. [42:27.490 --> 42:28.070] That's not... [42:28.070 --> 42:31.530] You need somebody to tell you this is what happened. [42:31.790 --> 42:34.170] This is why you got kicked off. [42:35.170 --> 42:37.290] And that's going to have to be a human. [42:37.950 --> 42:39.210] I mean, you remember Memphis? [42:40.050 --> 42:45.870] Memphis on Twitter when somebody simply said Memphis and got kicked off of Twitter for 12 hours? [42:46.090 --> 42:47.050] I was one of those people. [42:47.310 --> 42:55.590] We got an apology in the end because something was wrong with the algorithm where anybody who said Memphis was somehow deemed as violating something. [42:57.850 --> 43:00.430] But sometimes, many times, you don't get that. [43:00.690 --> 43:01.470] You don't get anything. [43:01.650 --> 43:04.430] You don't get the ability to appeal. [43:04.430 --> 43:07.350] You don't get the ability to find out why something happened. [43:07.830 --> 43:10.290] And this goes for everybody. [43:10.290 --> 43:13.470] It's not just one particular viewpoint or anything like that. [43:13.590 --> 43:14.730] So that needs to change. [43:14.730 --> 43:16.790] That needs to be improved. [43:17.190 --> 43:19.350] And I hope we see that soon. [43:20.330 --> 43:27.730] Just, it speaks to the layers and layers of theater, sort of UI, user interface theater. [43:27.950 --> 43:36.590] They've had to layer onto their website just to say we take privacy seriously over and over again for years and decades. [43:37.170 --> 43:41.190] but they're making up stories and saying, yeah, we're protecting your privacy and you're not. [43:41.290 --> 43:49.530] You're just throwing out random inconveniences to people and claiming it's got something to do with somebody hacking something when there's absolutely no evidence to suggest that. [43:49.730 --> 43:51.610] Here's a related story out of Australia. [43:51.810 --> 43:59.590] Media companies there can be held responsible for defamatory comments left on their social media pages by members of the public. [44:00.330 --> 44:13.390] Yeah, this decision is part of a long-running defamation case that could have huge consequences for the media industry in Australia forcing news sites to strictly moderate or remove comments on stories shared on Facebook, Twitter, and elsewhere. [44:14.170 --> 44:18.050] Anyone who runs a social media page can theoretically be sued over disparaging comments. [44:18.050 --> 44:43.570] I don't know how I feel about this because honestly if you read news stories on various sites and you know I'm going to name one patch.com you ever read that it's kind of cool you know they have local news on a digital platform but invariably invariably there's a whole bunch of racists and white supremacists that will basically take any story and turn it into blaming Mexicans for something the [44:43.570 --> 45:09.210] hate is just unbelievable we saw the same thing on Newsday years ago they have pretty much disabled their chat feature because it was abused so much people say you know if you stop making things anonymous this will go away that's not true you see people's real names they're attaching their real names to the hatred and to the ignorance and this is not something that we need it doesn't add anything [45:09.210 --> 45:18.550] to the story at all you know news stories are written by people known as reporters that are paid Hopefully, for the job. [45:19.010 --> 45:22.610] And they do research and they interview people and they write it all out. [45:22.750 --> 45:36.570] And to just have some moron come and say something that's completely ignorant and basically takes all the attention away from the work that you've put in, I don't understand why anybody wants to do that on their platform. [45:36.570 --> 45:38.230] Exception, the New York Times. [45:38.470 --> 45:47.050] The New York Times, I think, has people that actually moderate and go through and only allow the intelligent or semi-intelligent comments to be posted. [45:47.650 --> 45:50.870] And yeah, I know people will claim, oh my God, that's censorship. [45:51.010 --> 45:51.870] No, that's editing. [45:52.250 --> 45:58.190] That's making something good and not just having what I call the Usenet effect. [45:58.190 --> 45:59.470] Remember Usenet? [45:59.770 --> 46:10.450] Basically, it was way back in the 90s where there were news groups on the internet and they were completely unmoderated, except for the ones that were. [46:11.010 --> 46:13.910] And people just posted all kinds of garbage. [46:13.910 --> 46:15.170] It was awful. [46:15.390 --> 46:17.290] It was filled with spam, filled with hatred. [46:17.990 --> 46:19.650] And I don't think anybody uses it anymore. [46:19.730 --> 46:20.270] Why would they? [46:20.430 --> 46:21.590] Why would anybody want that? [46:21.590 --> 46:23.050] Same thing here. [46:23.370 --> 46:40.890] So I'm not sure how I feel about this ruling, holding companies liable, but I am in favor of things that get rid of all these damn chat boards or just reduce them to something manageable where the lowest common denominator doesn't always prevail. [46:43.910 --> 46:48.670] Yeah, I think you're on the right track here, too, Emmanuel. [46:48.930 --> 46:54.170] But then again, I think there's also the exception of the egregious case here. [46:54.370 --> 47:10.850] You know, let's say, for example, prominently displayed in the comments of a major media outlet or a major Facebook, you know, are the personal details, including the home address and contact information for a minor. [47:12.310 --> 47:18.910] And the publisher is aware of this, and you can prove that the publisher was aware of it and had the power but refused to take it down. [47:19.070 --> 47:28.510] I think in these types of egregious or grossly negligent situations, some kind of liability for turning a blind eye to it would make sense. [47:28.510 --> 47:39.570] But the power to abuse this type of general law, perhaps this should be the exception to the law and not the law itself, is really what I'm arguing here. [47:39.570 --> 47:56.270] But I think if you were to place this burden on anybody who runs, let's say, a Facebook page for an association or, you know, a movie or a fan club, something like that, you can't possibly be tasked with moderating all of those comments. [47:56.270 --> 47:58.450] It becomes a compliance burden. [47:58.910 --> 48:07.630] It would probably spark a cottage industry for comment compliance that would lead to over-censorship based on key words. [48:07.810 --> 48:17.450] And again, we'll be back to the problem that we had starting in the 90s where we are over-blocking material that we don't want to block and under-blocking material that we do want to block. [48:17.450 --> 48:21.250] So, you know, in that sense, I could see this type of rule... [48:21.250 --> 48:29.890] I think there's a difference, though, between an individual, you know, running a Facebook timeline and a company or a newspaper. [48:30.070 --> 48:32.570] And I think, you know, it's not too much to expect. [48:32.810 --> 48:35.710] Say you're a newspaper, a media outlet of one sort or another. [48:36.090 --> 48:38.590] You hold your writers to a particular standard. [48:38.750 --> 48:39.910] You don't just print anything. [48:40.330 --> 48:43.370] It goes through the editing process, fact-checking, that sort of thing. [48:43.370 --> 48:51.010] Well, why not view the people who are writing comments as kind of a form of writer? [48:51.330 --> 48:53.190] You know, you're not paying them. [48:53.710 --> 48:58.690] They're not really subcontractors, but they are people that are contributing to the overall publication. [48:58.690 --> 49:00.990] Just like someone who writes a letter to the editor. [49:01.170 --> 49:02.250] You don't just print anything. [49:02.250 --> 49:10.910] You print something that is basically factual, an opinion, and doesn't violate your standards. [49:10.910 --> 49:14.670] Why can't the same apply to people who are posting comments? [49:14.930 --> 49:19.290] It takes a little bit of time to basically say, is this good? [49:19.410 --> 49:20.850] Okay, we'll print this. [49:20.950 --> 49:21.510] Is this bad? [49:21.690 --> 49:22.550] Then we won't print it. [49:22.910 --> 49:35.150] I think, you know, that simple act on the part of a media company would get rid of a lot of the unpleasantness and ignorance and just raise the standards a bit. [49:35.690 --> 49:36.690] Oh, I agree. [49:36.910 --> 49:40.810] And just to bounce in, I think that's actually what the Financial Times does. [49:41.370 --> 49:47.130] And I think you actually have to be a subscriber to the Financial Times in order to comment on their pieces, which is interesting. [49:47.310 --> 49:49.350] I've written several articles for them now. [49:49.470 --> 49:54.790] And when I was a non-subscriber, I couldn't even comment in my own article or respond to the other comments. [49:54.910 --> 50:00.250] But all of the comments were substantively acceptable and pretty well formulated. [50:00.250 --> 50:02.590] So I think there is that type of moderation happening. [50:02.950 --> 50:03.310] Go ahead, Rob. [50:04.310 --> 50:09.490] A really important part of this story is that it's not even about the comments on a newspaper's own site. [50:09.670 --> 50:11.410] This is about social media comments. [50:11.650 --> 50:18.130] This is somebody suing news outlets because people left comments on their Facebook pages where they shared the stories. [50:18.410 --> 50:29.370] And so this isn't even about coming in and policing like, okay, you could see holding an organization liable if somebody says something truly terrible on their web property, as it were. [50:29.490 --> 50:30.990] But this is their Facebook account. [50:30.990 --> 50:41.670] I mean, can you imagine being responsible for things that happen on, say, WBAI's Facebook presence in the comments section or things like that? [50:42.470 --> 50:46.630] It's crazy because we know what a cesspool it is in the Facebook comments for anything. [50:47.670 --> 50:49.890] And also, we don't own Facebook. [50:50.090 --> 50:50.730] We don't run it. [50:50.890 --> 50:52.850] That is not a machine to which we have access. [50:53.030 --> 50:56.370] But now Australia would expect us to police that. [50:57.290 --> 51:00.190] Yeah, I don't use Facebook, so I don't really know how it all comes together. [51:00.330 --> 51:05.450] But if you're a presence on Facebook, do you not have control over what people say in your group? [51:07.110 --> 51:10.270] I don't even know because I don't use Facebook either, but social media in general. [51:10.270 --> 51:11.170] We use somebody who uses Facebook, yes. [51:11.310 --> 51:13.470] We have a Twitter account for this program. [51:13.610 --> 51:14.410] It's Hacker Radio Show. [51:14.650 --> 51:19.330] And we enjoy hearing from listeners, communicating with them that way. [51:19.470 --> 51:31.190] But if somebody replies to something we post and says something crappy, it should not be our responsibility to somehow affect the situation, somehow change that, because we are not Twitter. [51:32.010 --> 51:36.830] Well, we could talk about this for a very long time, and obviously, we need to know more about these social platforms. [51:37.030 --> 51:40.550] But I think we all are in need of raising the bar a little bit. [51:40.730 --> 51:43.230] Yeah, I'm just hearing it's either proactive or retroactive. [51:43.510 --> 51:46.210] And I think there is a benefit to stemming that. [51:46.350 --> 51:48.810] Then you don't really have to get into liability issues. [51:49.810 --> 51:57.230] Before we sign off tonight, and again, 212-209-2950, that's the number to call to pledge support for this radio station. [51:57.410 --> 51:58.550] Become a BAI buddy. [51:58.550 --> 52:03.850] Pledge a minimal amount every month, and you'll be supporting this place and really making a big difference. [52:04.050 --> 52:10.270] 212-209-2950 or the website, give2wbai.org. [52:11.270 --> 52:13.050] Here's an interesting story. [52:13.090 --> 52:16.770] We just had the anniversary of 9-11 go by on Saturday. [52:17.410 --> 52:20.550] But get this, Adobe ending support for Flash. [52:20.550 --> 52:23.290] It's once ubiquitous multimedia content player. [52:23.430 --> 52:23.730] Remember that? [52:23.730 --> 52:36.590] Last year, that's when they stopped supporting it, it meant that some of the news coverage of the September 11th attacks and other major events in the early days of online journalism are no longer accessible. [52:37.170 --> 52:42.950] For example, The Washington Post and ABC News both have broken experiences within their September 11th coverage. [52:43.170 --> 52:52.190] Viewable in the Internet Archive, thanks to our friends over there and Jason Scott, CNN's online coverage of September 11th also has been impacted by the end of Flash. [52:52.590 --> 53:08.690] That means it was once an interactive explainer of how the planes hit the World Trade Center, a visually rich story where some survivors of the attacks are now, at best, a non-functioning still image or, at worst, a gray box informing readers that Adobe Flash player is no longer supported. [53:08.850 --> 53:14.010] This is the danger of digitization without maintenance. [53:14.010 --> 53:18.010] And, you know, we always say to ourselves that once something's on the Internet, it's there forever. [53:18.250 --> 53:21.670] It couldn't be less true because things disappear. [53:22.010 --> 53:23.050] Things get outdated. [53:23.350 --> 53:27.110] You know, new versions come out and software becomes incompatible. [53:27.530 --> 53:33.410] And before you know it, you've lost something that you thought was going to be there and are surprised when it's not there. [53:33.690 --> 53:36.330] Whereas, you know, the old analog things, they just remain. [53:36.330 --> 53:37.170] They're always there. [53:37.170 --> 53:47.990] Your vinyl, your pictures, you know, your books, we need a way to ensure that the things that we digitize are kept in the archive. [53:48.350 --> 53:51.450] And thank God Internet Archives exists to do exactly this. [53:51.570 --> 53:56.170] But we need to do more as both users, developers, companies. [53:56.950 --> 53:58.750] This kind of thing happens way too often. [53:59.170 --> 54:27.430] And if you take an interest in this and you've never experienced old formats or something like that, learn about them because these things are happening at an increasing rate and there's so much change all the time, there will be people needed to emulate this stuff or to figure out ways around these kinds of retirement or changes in format. [54:27.430 --> 54:44.870] So it's really sad because they're establishing something that's for creatives and forever they rely on them because that's the kind of tools creatives are using. [54:45.150 --> 54:50.030] And you just eliminate all of this content in the process without really realizing the consequence. [54:50.210 --> 54:51.010] We are out of time. [54:51.370 --> 54:53.930] OTH at 2600.com is our email address. [54:53.930 --> 54:58.030] Uh, we're going to overtime, uh, youtube.com slash channel 2600. [54:58.810 --> 55:03.430] Um, here's, um, here's a song from somebody you might've heard of before. [55:04.070 --> 55:04.890] Lou Reed. [55:05.090 --> 55:06.010] You heard of Lou Reed, right? [55:06.230 --> 55:07.730] But I'll bet you never heard this song. [55:07.970 --> 55:08.430] Good night. [55:09.430 --> 55:14.430] I was sleeping gently napping when I heard the phone. [55:15.110 --> 55:17.950] Who is on the other end talking? [55:18.350 --> 55:19.930] Am I even home? [55:20.650 --> 55:23.710] Did you see what she did to him? [55:23.710 --> 55:25.530] Did you hear what they said? [55:26.470 --> 55:31.050] Just a New York conversation rattling in my head. [55:32.210 --> 55:33.890] Oh, my. [55:34.670 --> 55:36.830] And what shall we wear? [55:37.610 --> 55:39.490] Oh, my. [55:39.870 --> 55:42.430] And who really cares? [55:43.350 --> 55:45.810] Just a New York conversation. [55:45.950 --> 55:48.130] Gossip all of the time. [55:48.550 --> 55:53.530] Did you hear who did what to whom happens all the time? [55:53.710 --> 55:59.090] Who has touched and who has dabbled here in the city of shows? [55:59.690 --> 56:04.210] Openings, closings, bed repartee, everybody knows. [56:04.210 --> 56:09.870] Oh, how sad and why do we call? [56:10.290 --> 56:15.410] Oh, I'm glad to hear from you all. [56:15.850 --> 56:20.770] I am calling, yes, I'm calling just to speak to you. [56:20.770 --> 56:26.270] For I know this night will kill me if I can't be with you. [56:26.630 --> 56:31.290] If I can't be with you. [00:00.380 --> 00:07.200] And welcome to everybody on YouTube as we launch into another edition of Off the Hook Overtime. [00:08.120 --> 00:09.200] Did we all make it, Rob? [00:09.380 --> 00:09.920] I see you there. [00:10.000 --> 00:10.940] We actually are on the air. [00:11.020 --> 00:12.500] You're holding up the sign telling us that. [00:12.580 --> 00:13.760] You can also just tell us that. [00:14.640 --> 00:16.260] That way we can check your microphone, too. [00:18.080 --> 00:19.040] It's not working. [00:20.060 --> 00:21.200] That's why we're testing. [00:21.440 --> 00:21.580] Okay. [00:22.200 --> 00:24.880] And Alex, you just jumped back into your chair. [00:25.320 --> 00:25.840] Welcome back. [00:26.000 --> 00:27.320] I'm present. [00:27.580 --> 00:29.940] And Kyle, you were right in front of me, so I imagine you made it. [00:30.000 --> 00:31.180] Once again, over here. [00:31.400 --> 00:33.080] What are we watching on the TV here? [00:33.180 --> 00:36.120] Apparently, there's a rocket launch that's taking place in less than three minutes. [00:36.400 --> 00:37.740] Okay, I guess we have to watch this. [00:38.100 --> 00:40.580] Yeah, this is the Inspiration 4 launch. [00:41.440 --> 00:42.400] Inspiration 4. [00:42.600 --> 00:43.780] From Pad 39A. [00:43.940 --> 00:45.120] There are three other inspirations. [00:47.200 --> 00:47.680] Sure. [00:47.900 --> 00:48.460] There must have been. [00:48.720 --> 00:48.960] Okay. [00:49.220 --> 00:50.840] Well, hopefully they all turned out okay. [00:50.940 --> 00:56.540] So this is interesting because they have four people strapped in on a SpaceX rocket. [00:56.540 --> 00:57.780] And these are all civilians. [00:58.340 --> 01:00.840] These are all random people picked off the street. [01:00.960 --> 01:03.480] Well, they have no idea where this is going to happen to them today. [01:03.700 --> 01:06.420] They have pretty adventurous stories. [01:06.420 --> 01:08.080] And some are pilots. [01:08.280 --> 01:10.040] Some are mechanically inclined. [01:10.140 --> 01:10.600] There is a doctor. [01:10.600 --> 01:10.920] Do I have it wrong? [01:11.000 --> 01:12.080] So they did know about it. [01:12.180 --> 01:12.560] They're part... [01:12.560 --> 01:12.740] Okay. [01:13.040 --> 01:14.780] So there's a doctor on board. [01:14.920 --> 01:15.420] Months of training. [01:15.700 --> 01:15.800] Okay. [01:15.880 --> 01:18.180] But there's no actual astronaut. [01:18.940 --> 01:19.700] No, right. [01:19.820 --> 01:20.700] They're like unofficial. [01:21.100 --> 01:22.860] Well, this will make them official, I think. [01:23.020 --> 01:24.680] But they're going to be running some experiments. [01:24.760 --> 01:27.360] They're going to be trying to inspire us. [01:27.380 --> 01:28.240] This is the experiment. [01:28.720 --> 01:31.780] This is putting them in a rocket ship and launching them into space. [01:31.980 --> 01:32.680] They're well aware. [01:32.860 --> 01:38.380] It's not just this namby-pamby thing like Richard Branson did, you know, where he just comes right back down. [01:38.480 --> 01:39.960] No, they're staying up for three days. [01:40.100 --> 01:41.300] They're going higher than ever, too. [01:41.660 --> 01:42.500] Higher than ever. [01:42.660 --> 01:43.160] They're going... [01:43.160 --> 01:44.560] They're passing the space station. [01:44.560 --> 01:45.960] They're going to wave as they go by. [01:45.960 --> 01:47.480] Like 500 kilometers, I think. [01:48.520 --> 01:49.820] Yeah, it's pretty high up. [01:49.900 --> 01:50.160] Ish. [01:50.400 --> 01:52.440] And in one minute and 30 seconds. [01:52.780 --> 01:54.720] Are you guys able to see this? [01:54.720 --> 01:57.420] Or are we going to be your voice, Alex and Rob? [01:58.460 --> 02:00.040] I also can see it, yes. [02:00.040 --> 02:00.400] Okay. [02:00.400 --> 02:04.720] And I think there's a chat on the live stream, so I hope nobody says anything that offends Australia. [02:05.080 --> 02:10.660] I see our listenership just dropped off, so I imagine everybody's jumping over to the channel where they can watch this instead of us. [02:11.020 --> 02:12.080] Yeah, that's great. [02:12.080 --> 02:15.360] Thank you, Judas, or all the people out there that... [02:15.360 --> 02:18.180] Like, give us 10 minutes, we'll be on SpaceX talking about this. [02:18.180 --> 02:24.020] Look, it's one minute away, so I really hope this goes well, because this is, you know... [02:24.020 --> 02:38.000] I remember Krista McAuliffe, you know, and the Challenger disaster in 1986, and how horrible that was, because she was a civilian, and it looked like the space program was really going to new places, and unfortunately, it didn't work out too well. [02:39.300 --> 02:40.540] So, why are you over here, Kyle? [02:41.480 --> 02:44.140] He just ran behind me for some reason. [02:44.520 --> 02:45.720] Is there something going on with the feed? [02:47.660 --> 02:51.360] Yeah, I just noticed the clock stopped, so maybe it's on their end. [02:51.560 --> 02:52.500] Oh, the clock stopped. [02:53.100 --> 02:58.280] Yeah, as you were describing it, your valiant description of this wonderful event, and... [02:58.280 --> 03:00.260] It's like talking to Alex on Skype. [03:00.660 --> 03:01.300] He just froze. [03:01.660 --> 03:02.440] They're all frozen. [03:02.440 --> 03:05.720] I think you guys must have frozen, because I'm watching it launch right now. [03:08.640 --> 03:09.940] This is insane. [03:10.080 --> 03:10.320] Wow. [03:10.480 --> 03:11.540] I cannot believe it. [03:11.600 --> 03:12.840] So, they launched, and we missed it. [03:13.000 --> 03:13.200] Hang on. [03:13.260 --> 03:13.580] Let's go to... [03:13.580 --> 03:14.620] I can describe it for you guys. [03:14.620 --> 03:16.320] It's sort of a long rocket-shaped thing. [03:16.600 --> 03:18.320] I've got a news channel on. [03:18.380 --> 03:19.160] You can shut up, Rob. [03:19.160 --> 03:19.700] I got it. [03:20.640 --> 03:22.480] We're watching a news channel. [03:22.720 --> 03:23.340] I should be a commentator. [03:23.540 --> 03:24.300] And they... [03:24.300 --> 03:25.740] 13 seconds left. [03:26.340 --> 03:27.280] It's already in there. [03:27.280 --> 03:28.780] We've got to speak to YouTube about this. [03:29.180 --> 03:29.580] Okay. [03:29.720 --> 03:30.420] Eight seconds. [03:31.780 --> 03:32.500] Five seconds... [03:32.500 --> 03:32.980] I could do this. [03:33.100 --> 03:36.580] Four, three, two, one. [03:38.260 --> 03:38.980] There it goes. [03:39.960 --> 03:41.780] Usually, it does that before you hit one. [03:42.600 --> 03:43.900] The hold-down clamps have released. [03:44.060 --> 03:45.500] Falcon 9, we have begun our flight. [03:45.640 --> 03:47.260] I'm reading what it says on the screen. [03:49.160 --> 03:49.600] And... [03:51.120 --> 03:52.840] Well, it's definitely going in the right direction. [03:52.840 --> 03:54.140] So, that's good. [03:54.980 --> 03:56.600] This is from Cape Canaveral. [03:57.800 --> 04:00.280] SpaceX has launched their first all-tourist crew. [04:00.420 --> 04:00.960] Into orbit. [04:02.300 --> 04:03.800] Well, they're not in orbit yet. [04:03.800 --> 04:04.780] They're on their way to orbit. [04:05.180 --> 04:06.040] So, there they go. [04:06.200 --> 04:06.360] Wow. [04:07.060 --> 04:08.060] This is really cool. [04:08.220 --> 04:13.240] They've got a viewing, sort of like fishbowl, half a fishbowl kind of... [04:13.240 --> 04:23.280] It's called the cupola, but it's basically a double-paned observation window that you could actually fit a couple people together observing. [04:24.340 --> 04:40.680] And it sort of attaches to one of the docking doors, I think, that since they're not actually docking with the space station, like cargo supplies would, so they'll have this attachment to make their observations and document it over the several days they'll be there. [04:40.680 --> 04:41.120] Wow. [04:41.620 --> 04:42.460] That is amazing. [04:42.560 --> 04:43.000] Three days. [04:43.120 --> 04:45.160] Three days in space orbiting the Earth. [04:45.320 --> 04:46.380] So, our best to them. [04:47.400 --> 04:51.440] They can pick us up, by the way, because FM signals travel into space. [04:51.540 --> 04:52.600] So, I don't know. [04:52.780 --> 04:54.580] They're probably busy with other things, but they could be listening. [04:56.420 --> 04:57.780] And they're at Max-Q. [04:58.000 --> 05:00.560] Largest amount of stress exerted on the vehicle right about now. [05:02.560 --> 05:05.980] And I'm not sure how long it's going to take them to get into orbit. [05:06.340 --> 05:07.240] Probably a while, right? [05:07.500 --> 05:09.980] You've got to remember, Emmanuel, we're not on FM anymore. [05:10.820 --> 05:11.640] Oh, you're right. [05:11.920 --> 05:14.040] Yeah, I feel like I'm on radio, and I'm not. [05:15.380 --> 05:23.420] But, you know, we found out there are stations that are simulcasting us on WBAI, but there might be stations that simulcast this. [05:23.460 --> 05:23.900] Who knows? [05:24.380 --> 05:25.160] You have our permission? [05:25.420 --> 05:27.040] Yeah, it's not impossible. [05:27.400 --> 05:27.620] I've always wondered that. [05:28.780 --> 05:30.580] It's not contained on the internet. [05:30.920 --> 05:36.700] I mean, YouTube sort of helps us distribute it, but it could go all over the universe. [05:36.960 --> 05:44.000] We're not trying to limit the use of the sound. [05:44.160 --> 05:44.800] No, not at all. [05:44.980 --> 05:50.240] By the way, our phone number is 802-321-4225, 802-321-HACK. [05:50.580 --> 05:52.860] If you want to be a part of the show, call in. [05:52.860 --> 06:00.620] Give us your opinions, your expertise, your news, as we watch these four tourists go into space. [06:00.620 --> 06:01.920] This has never happened before. [06:02.100 --> 06:03.560] This is really incredible. [06:03.760 --> 06:05.360] Something like this has never happened before. [06:06.020 --> 06:07.980] And here it is happening right in front of us. [06:08.160 --> 06:11.060] So I hope it goes well. [06:11.160 --> 06:23.400] I hope it's, you know, the beginning of something new, where not just millionaires get to go up into space and where we learn a lot more about the world surrounding us and just reach for the skies, I guess. [06:24.580 --> 06:25.120] Absolutely. [06:25.460 --> 06:27.380] They're looking very, very good. [06:27.560 --> 06:30.160] I think the main part cut off. [06:30.380 --> 06:33.980] Dragon capsule has a separator from the Falcon 9 second stage. [06:34.980 --> 06:37.340] And I guess that's supposed to happen, right? [06:37.720 --> 06:37.960] Yep. [06:38.540 --> 06:57.380] So they're, um, on their way now, but it certainly is, um, it's looking more like an actual space line, not an airline, but like, you know, they're building all these things and they've got ones they've already developed that are taking people places and, [06:57.380 --> 07:16.560] um, doing demonstrations and they say, they say we're not too far off from the day where, um, space flight will be as maybe not as common as air flight, but not that unusual where basically you, uh, wind up going someplace on the other side of the world and you actually go into space for a little bit because that gets you there a lot faster. [07:16.980 --> 07:17.260] Yeah. [07:17.380 --> 07:30.140] It just, uh, it's less theoretical, um, very tangible and, um, and, uh, it's, it's great to see, um, some of many people's dreams sort of materialize. [07:30.340 --> 07:30.700] Mm-hmm. [07:31.680 --> 07:33.680] I imagine everyone's transfixed watching this. [07:33.780 --> 07:36.000] That's why they're not calling us or the ringer's off again. [07:36.260 --> 07:39.080] Uh, one of those two, eight zero two, three, two, one, four, two, two, five. [07:39.200 --> 07:45.460] You can be the first caller, uh, just by, um, by, by dialing those numbers and, and, and speaking to us here on overtime. [07:46.100 --> 07:46.720] I'll check. [07:46.900 --> 07:47.600] I'll check the phone. [07:47.680 --> 07:48.180] Check the phone. [07:48.280 --> 07:51.580] Make sure the ringer is on because if it's not on, we can't hear the people calling. [07:51.780 --> 07:52.140] It is on. [07:52.140 --> 07:54.080] I just turn it off ear splitting. [07:54.320 --> 07:55.260] I figured that would. [07:55.640 --> 07:56.000] What? [07:56.520 --> 07:58.180] Well, it was set to ear splitting. [07:58.520 --> 07:59.480] What's wrong with ear splitting? [07:59.700 --> 08:00.740] You want it on ear splitting. [08:00.840 --> 08:04.720] Well, that way people know the phone is ringing, you know, and there's no question about it. [08:09.170 --> 08:10.750] You guys feel free to say anything. [08:12.330 --> 08:23.070] Sorry, I'm, I'm, uh, with one eye, I'm watching the launch, uh, on YouTube myself, which for those of us listening to us on YouTube, you can have two YouTube windows open at once and have the sound on one and the picture on the other. [08:23.190 --> 08:24.150] And that works totally fine. [08:24.150 --> 08:26.950] Can you talk to the people who are just watching the other one and not watching us? [08:27.030 --> 08:27.710] Can you talk to them? [08:28.490 --> 08:29.510] Convince them to come back. [08:30.030 --> 08:31.430] And you can call us while you're watching. [08:32.730 --> 08:35.130] But, uh, but it's, it's a beautiful lunch. [08:35.130 --> 08:43.230] And, you know, uh, the, the implications of, uh, space being explored by various types of people are kind of, is kind of interesting. [08:43.490 --> 08:43.750] Uh-huh. [08:43.990 --> 08:45.010] Yeah, it absolutely is. [08:45.490 --> 08:54.130] Um, you know, while, while we're taking this phone call, Kyle, maybe you could find the Roku remote because I swear I could rant an entire hour about Roku software. [08:54.770 --> 09:03.370] Uh, this, this Roku comes from a very broken factory and it's had a very troubled physical existence. [09:03.710 --> 09:05.250] Wow, I can't even get out of the frozen screen. [09:05.470 --> 09:06.610] It's just, it's... [09:06.610 --> 09:07.550] Do we have to unplug it again? [09:07.650 --> 09:10.130] And then it just reboots for a half hour over and over again. [09:11.310 --> 09:12.190] More like Roku. [09:12.490 --> 09:13.090] I think it needs... [09:13.090 --> 09:13.710] Good one. [09:13.830 --> 09:14.950] I think it needs the treatment. [09:15.910 --> 09:19.050] All right, well, I'm going back to a commercial news network, which I didn't want to do. [09:19.230 --> 09:21.990] I wanted to watch the actual feed, but I guess I can't do that. [09:23.090 --> 09:23.950] All right, we have a phone call. [09:24.030 --> 09:24.350] Good evening. [09:24.490 --> 09:25.650] You're on Off Look Overtime. [09:25.730 --> 09:25.950] Go ahead. [09:35.190 --> 09:40.330] Well, you know, with the Blue Origin, do you think they got Alexa on there? [09:42.330 --> 09:45.470] Blue Origin on it, like, like built-in, you said. [09:45.690 --> 09:46.430] That's funny. [09:46.710 --> 09:47.010] Maybe. [09:48.390 --> 09:50.150] Just think about it, it's like Alexa. [09:50.970 --> 09:52.150] Open garage door or something. [09:52.370 --> 09:56.950] Just something weird being said and, like, it makes it rock and explode or something. [09:56.950 --> 10:12.370] You know, we had a great idea before the show about Alexa, and I want to patent this right here, where basically, if you're hard of hearing, okay, and you have an Echo device, obviously not just the audio device, but the Echo device that can do all kinds of other things, [10:12.630 --> 10:15.310] it can understand sign, you know? [10:15.610 --> 10:18.070] Basically, obviously, the camera has to come on. [10:18.250 --> 10:18.730] Well, there's the... [10:18.730 --> 10:20.010] Did they invent that already? [10:20.110 --> 10:20.810] There's the Echo Show, right? [10:21.230 --> 10:22.750] Does Echo Show understand sign? [10:23.550 --> 10:25.850] I don't know, but it's got a camera on there. [10:25.850 --> 10:27.050] It's got a camera on there. [10:27.070 --> 10:28.170] It doesn't mean it understands sign. [10:28.310 --> 10:32.910] So, I want to patent that idea and make it mine and charge Amazon. [10:35.990 --> 10:40.070] Well, you know, with the Echo, you can, like, make your own stories for it, right? [10:41.350 --> 10:42.810] Yeah, I've heard words to that effect. [10:43.670 --> 10:43.950] Yeah. [10:46.810 --> 10:48.250] I don't see why you wouldn't be able to. [10:48.390 --> 10:52.210] I mean, I guess you could do it with something like a Kinect from the Xbox, too, right? [10:52.930 --> 10:53.770] Yeah, you know... [10:53.770 --> 10:54.090] Posted? [10:55.090 --> 10:58.010] I imagine it's probably already been done. [10:58.210 --> 10:59.970] I probably am late to the game on this. [11:01.530 --> 11:02.710] Well, we can always Google it. [11:03.750 --> 11:05.870] I think it's harder than we might imagine. [11:06.790 --> 11:07.190] Yeah. [11:08.070 --> 11:08.470] Well... [11:08.470 --> 11:13.450] That kind of attitude, Kyle, would not get you into space, like these four people are doing right now, okay? [11:13.670 --> 11:15.390] Yeah, it's harder than you might think. [11:15.490 --> 11:16.790] I'm sorry for my realist... [11:17.650 --> 11:19.670] Are they going to the space station itself? [11:19.670 --> 11:21.370] No, they're dissing them. [11:21.490 --> 11:22.330] They're bypassing them. [11:22.390 --> 11:24.130] They're going higher than the space station. [11:25.270 --> 11:25.670] Wow. [11:26.310 --> 11:26.550] Yep. [11:27.610 --> 11:29.930] I don't know if I trust them enough to do that. [11:30.170 --> 11:32.210] I don't know if you can see this craft. [11:32.270 --> 11:34.770] You can see the space station when it flies over. [11:35.090 --> 11:36.510] But this, I'm not sure. [11:36.730 --> 11:37.610] I'm going to look into it. [11:38.150 --> 11:44.070] Well, I know that you can see the shuttle when the shuttle was going to the space station. [11:44.150 --> 11:45.090] You can see a dock there. [11:45.430 --> 11:46.090] Yeah, you can see... [11:46.090 --> 11:47.930] Sometimes you can see both at the same time. [11:48.070 --> 11:50.010] You can see the shuttle on the way to the space station. [11:50.150 --> 11:50.810] That was really cool. [11:51.710 --> 11:51.930] Yeah. [11:53.750 --> 11:57.810] Did you hear about the Apple exploit? [11:58.710 --> 12:02.170] Some is really like a spyware thing. [12:02.250 --> 12:04.830] Yes, that was one of the stories that we didn't get to tonight. [12:04.830 --> 12:09.170] But yeah, this is the exploit where you don't have to do anything to be exploited. [12:09.370 --> 12:10.810] It just comes onto your phone. [12:11.330 --> 12:12.370] It's pretty scary. [12:12.650 --> 12:15.230] I know, Alex, you're a Mac user. [12:15.530 --> 12:16.810] I don't mean anything bad by that. [12:16.990 --> 12:19.050] But this must have concerned you quite a bit. [12:20.530 --> 12:21.470] Oh, absolutely. [12:21.670 --> 12:26.410] And I think it concerns and should concern everybody who's using an iPhone. [12:27.790 --> 12:33.750] This is a particularly nasty zero-click vulnerability that's built into the iMessaging system. [12:33.990 --> 12:34.470] Zero-click. [12:34.470 --> 12:35.370] That's just amazing. [12:35.950 --> 12:37.170] Yep, zero-click. [12:37.410 --> 12:38.590] I mean, you just sent a message. [12:38.970 --> 12:48.910] And it exploited an image processing vulnerability that was built directly into the iMessage software on iOS devices themselves. [12:50.190 --> 12:54.950] You know, there's a lot of issues, I think, that arise from something like this. [12:54.950 --> 13:00.270] But I think two of them are worth addressing on this show. [13:00.390 --> 13:10.310] And one is that there's always going to be a market for this type of exploit, whether the customer is the United States government, the United Arab Emirates. [13:10.310 --> 13:24.550] I mean, there are other stories that came out about this dark matter group using similar iMessage exploits and involving, I believe, members of the former members of the United States intelligence community assisting with that as well. [13:24.550 --> 13:28.130] So there's two iMessage stories that just came out recently. [13:28.630 --> 13:37.390] But it also goes to the difficulty of regulating and controlling what's done with these particular exploits. [13:37.510 --> 13:40.430] A lot of people are always pointing the finger at the NSO group. [13:40.430 --> 13:45.750] And look, I'm not saying that they are innocent parties here or that they should be completely absolved of guilt. [13:45.750 --> 13:53.330] But to a certain extent, because there's always going to be a market here, it's very difficult to regulate what the end user does with this type of power. [13:53.790 --> 14:05.850] There certainly are legitimate reasons for governments to be interested in these types of exploits for either intelligence collecting purposes or for the lawful collection of evidence. [14:06.570 --> 14:11.290] Let's say if it's properly regulated by a search warrant or some kind of judicial activity. [14:11.290 --> 14:19.170] But the second issue, I think, is more fundamental and more hacker-focused, really, which is that it's about... [14:19.170 --> 14:22.130] This is, at root, an issue of user control. [14:22.530 --> 14:29.990] Because this iMessage application itself is something that's on every single iOS device. [14:30.210 --> 14:33.930] And we have very little power over it as users. [14:34.210 --> 14:38.830] In fact, we can't delete the iMessage application itself. [14:39.490 --> 14:48.910] And the configuration that goes into iMessage is basically whether you want your iMessage account to be connected with the rest of your devices. [14:48.910 --> 14:53.690] I'm not really aware of there being any other control over iMessage itself. [14:53.730 --> 15:03.770] And because it's a consistent vector across every single iOS device, that is going to be a very popular vector of attack. [15:03.770 --> 15:19.090] It's an application that's found on every single iOS device, whether it's an iPhone, whether it's an iPad, and even iMacs or desktop computers themselves have iMessage devices. [15:19.230 --> 15:28.350] But I believe it was the iOS exploit that these bad actors were looking to or actually did, in fact, exploit. [15:29.170 --> 15:37.570] But so I think if we want to get to the root of the cause here, it can really be fundamentally about user control. [15:37.570 --> 15:48.170] If users had more rights over the iPhone's operating system and what default apps were installed on it, then the more security conscious, the more security-minded among us. [15:48.330 --> 16:02.230] And those who had a need, let's say, to have more security baked into an already pretty secure phone, could disable that application, could delete it or configure it in such a way that it didn't even allow images to be sent to it. [16:03.050 --> 16:08.890] Because that's what I meant when I was saying, that that's the consistent vector of attack going across devices. [16:09.270 --> 16:10.910] So, two issues. [16:11.110 --> 16:14.230] One's the marketplace and the other is user control. [16:15.970 --> 16:16.710] I agree. [16:16.850 --> 16:19.190] I think you've got a great point there. [16:19.190 --> 16:39.330] The one thing I've heard, and I'm not sure if there's any clarification of it, but I think in saying that, like, a government needs, in certain situations, I've questioned why they would need an exploit if it's lawful, you know? [16:39.490 --> 16:44.650] I mean, I think there's a little bit of gray there, more gray than being so cut and dry. [16:44.650 --> 17:01.010] And it also puts in a strange position, like, you mean the American government, but wouldn't Apple be allowing, or wouldn't the exploit being a part of a private security platform, wouldn't that allow any government? [17:01.830 --> 17:06.970] If this is the only way for them to do their lawful work? [17:06.970 --> 17:18.150] It seems like it opens it up widely, under the cover of an American jurisdiction, but we're talking about legitimate legal cases. [17:18.290 --> 17:24.070] I mean, don't you have discovery and forensic e-evidence procedures? [17:24.550 --> 17:31.150] Like, wouldn't they be able to go to a telecommunication provider and say, I need logs of something? [17:31.330 --> 17:35.590] I mean, I guess when it's end-to-end in iMessage, that's the distinction? [17:36.370 --> 17:36.770] Right. [17:37.130 --> 17:38.930] Yeah, that's the distinction I'm drawing down. [17:38.990 --> 17:39.590] You're absolutely right. [17:39.590 --> 17:42.490] I think you could use legal process in obtaining a warrant. [17:42.610 --> 17:47.730] Let's say you need to go to AT&T back in the old days, or MCI, and get those communications or that metadata. [17:47.910 --> 17:49.770] But, yeah, you're absolutely right, Kyle. [17:49.870 --> 17:53.670] I think this is an issue that arises primarily from the use of end-to-end encryption. [17:53.670 --> 18:05.510] But also, you're right, too, I think, in that if this type of power, this type of exploit, could be sold essentially to the highest bidder, that becomes a problem, too. [18:05.710 --> 18:12.150] So, you know, it's something we say quite often, I feel like, is, you know, with great power comes great responsibility here. [18:12.570 --> 18:17.190] And you have to be very careful about the end-users to whom you give this power. [18:17.310 --> 18:22.670] And I think, you know, you want to make sure you don't put this power in the hands of a regime that's going to abuse it. [18:22.670 --> 18:23.470] There's going to be more. [18:23.610 --> 18:36.090] And I believe that the NSO group, you know, in the wake of stories coming out over the last couple of weeks, and I think even when I was absent, Raphael Satter of Reuters came on and talked about that issue. [18:37.510 --> 18:40.610] But they pledged to take, I think, more of a... [18:40.610 --> 18:49.230] I believe they have to take more of a look at the end-users who are going to be having this type of power and these types of vulnerabilities in their hands. [18:49.230 --> 18:54.010] And, of course, this is why we have sanctioned regimes to a certain extent. [18:54.310 --> 19:05.390] You know, the international sanctions should apply to regimes that engage in persistent and pervasive human rights abuses, monitoring of dissidents, things like that. [19:05.550 --> 19:15.430] But to a very large extent, our international sanctions and those types of penalties only reach a small handful of those regimes. [19:15.430 --> 19:30.550] And so, perhaps, again, if we get to a more fundamental issue, we should be trying to exert more international pressure over the types of technologies that regimes that engage in human rights abuses more generally have. [19:32.310 --> 19:46.570] I also wonder if we were supposed to know this, or if this was something that was just supposed to be a part of the new OS, because there was much more scrutiny under the circumstances that it was found or found quickly. [19:46.670 --> 19:53.110] Because it sounds like NSO trying to make their old service work on the new platform. [19:54.070 --> 19:55.650] Is that wrong? [19:58.170 --> 19:59.790] You know, I don't know. [20:00.030 --> 20:02.310] Kind of going back to the well for more sort of thing? [20:02.470 --> 20:03.330] I don't know. [20:03.330 --> 20:04.810] Yeah, I don't know. [20:04.910 --> 20:13.530] But again, I think, you know, the latest news on this comes, again, from Citizen Lab, if I recall correctly, which is pretty amazing. [20:13.710 --> 20:22.790] And they're doing an incredible amount of important research coming out of this, you know, Toronto-based Canadian, fairly small outfit. [20:23.290 --> 20:25.810] They're punching, I think, well above their weight. [20:25.810 --> 20:33.550] And the types of research and data that's been coming out of there would certainly make them, in my opinion, a target of foreign governments, too. [20:33.770 --> 20:35.790] They've really been in the news quite a lot lately. [20:35.790 --> 20:48.550] And I think we have to hand it to them for the types of attention to detail and the forensic work that they've been doing, because that's how they identified this particular exploit, was through very, very careful data forensics. [20:48.850 --> 20:49.210] Absolutely. [20:49.490 --> 20:50.610] We need more like them. [20:51.150 --> 20:52.110] We're going to move on, caller. [20:52.270 --> 20:53.290] Anything else you wanted to add? [20:54.330 --> 20:57.850] Well, the LAPD has this data collection thing. [20:58.030 --> 21:04.730] They want to start up, or already started up, that's collecting social networking information. [21:05.510 --> 21:07.270] And I'm trying to remember the name of it. [21:07.330 --> 21:10.770] There's a Guardian, there's an article on it, on the Guardian. [21:11.230 --> 21:15.610] It's kind of like a pre-crime thing, you know, from like Minority Report. [21:16.070 --> 21:17.030] They're trying to protect them. [21:17.150 --> 21:17.350] Yeah, yeah. [21:17.490 --> 21:23.830] They're taking data sets and like, well, this is where crime is committed to most, and yada, yada, yada, and... [21:23.830 --> 21:26.430] This sounds like digital broken windows. [21:27.590 --> 21:29.490] Or digital stop and frisk, you know? [21:30.390 --> 21:35.950] Well, the thing is, it's like, okay, if you're misreporting the crimes, right? [21:36.070 --> 21:40.410] If you're like, misreporting the arrest and everything, the data sets are going to be off anyway. [21:41.970 --> 21:48.130] Social media, you know, it's a private site, and they make everything you say on there public. [21:48.570 --> 21:51.110] Or you can just Google a response you made. [21:52.150 --> 21:55.590] And unless you say your profile's a private, you know, they can... [21:55.590 --> 21:59.090] There's not much you can do about it unless you just quit Facebook. [22:00.090 --> 22:00.730] That's true. [22:01.770 --> 22:03.370] Which I don't think is a bad idea. [22:05.270 --> 22:13.190] Well, you know, with the insurrectionists, I mean, that's why they mostly go to, you know, do their planning or whatever they're doing. [22:13.190 --> 22:13.690] I don't know. [22:14.450 --> 22:19.330] It's like a bad comedy skit when you hear what half these guys are doing. [22:19.430 --> 22:19.670] Uh-huh. [22:19.830 --> 22:20.030] Yeah. [22:20.890 --> 22:23.850] They basically indicted themselves on many instances. [22:24.650 --> 22:26.810] One guy got called in a garage. [22:27.090 --> 22:30.770] The probation officer just happened to show up at the right time. [22:31.850 --> 22:35.050] And he was on his phone in the garage. [22:35.210 --> 22:36.850] He felt hot in the garage. [22:39.310 --> 22:42.470] Getting on Facebook or whatnot when he's not supposed to. [22:42.830 --> 22:45.170] Was going to, like, you know, keep somebody from hiding. [22:45.250 --> 22:47.750] And he just happened to open a garage door or something like that, and there he was. [22:48.410 --> 22:54.530] One dude was spragging about it to an off-duty FBI agent or something like that. [22:54.530 --> 22:56.010] Yeah, the tattoo artist. [22:56.230 --> 22:56.550] Yeah, yeah. [22:59.750 --> 23:03.850] Well, the scariest thing about it is these guys are really violent and everything. [23:04.510 --> 23:08.730] You know, we laugh at it, but the fact of the matter is they're rolling the keel over this stuff. [23:08.890 --> 23:09.090] Mm-hmm. [23:09.170 --> 23:09.510] That's true. [23:09.630 --> 23:10.070] That's true. [23:10.370 --> 23:14.770] You know, we have to laugh to a degree, but we also cannot lose sight of the seriousness of this. [23:14.770 --> 23:20.130] In fact, coming up this Saturday, we might see a repeat of that in cities all throughout the nation. [23:20.390 --> 23:22.810] I know there's going to be a big demonstration in D.C. [23:22.890 --> 23:27.410] of right-wing people, but also this is supposedly happening in state capitals everywhere. [23:28.770 --> 23:33.610] And, you know, obviously people are worried that something bad could happen. [23:33.730 --> 23:36.670] I guess we'll just have to wait it out and see how it goes. [23:37.450 --> 23:55.670] Yeah, and especially with, I don't know, Woodard put out a new book called Parallel, you probably heard about it, where Trump was like, they were worried Trump was going to send in the military to invade China or something like that. [23:55.710 --> 23:55.950] Right, right. [23:56.070 --> 23:57.070] Send nukes that way. [23:58.910 --> 24:02.150] Just keep in power and whatnot, but... [24:02.150 --> 24:13.590] Well, it's kind of good to realize that there are grown-ups in the room that recognize the danger and are ready to step in in case, you know, push comes to shove. [24:13.830 --> 24:15.410] I always thought that was the case. [24:15.830 --> 24:22.410] Didn't see much indication of it over the four years, but I figured after the four years we'd hear about it, and that's kind of what this is. [24:22.410 --> 24:25.670] But there's some real stupid stuff being thrown around around that. [24:25.870 --> 24:35.610] I was listening to callers on Washington Journal this morning, and somebody called in all mad because that convinced them that Nancy Pelosi was really in charge. [24:35.610 --> 24:52.170] And I think that is so unfair because she was asking the chief, the national security team, chiefs of staff, as an equal branch to the executive, the judiciary, and the legislature. [24:52.550 --> 25:01.890] So, I mean, to say she was in control, no, she was concerned, as she should be, doing her job, where the executive was a bit absent. [25:01.890 --> 25:06.070] Well, she was also competent, and that gave her a tremendous advantage, which wasn't fair. [25:06.070 --> 25:07.990] She appeared as though she was running the country. [25:08.090 --> 25:14.670] I could see how you might be confused and perhaps resentful that someone was actually doing work. [25:15.110 --> 25:15.510] Yeah. [25:15.670 --> 25:16.990] No, there is definitely... [25:16.990 --> 25:19.310] There's resentment against people doing work. [25:19.390 --> 25:21.170] There's resentment against people wanting to be healthy. [25:21.330 --> 25:23.350] There's resentment against people wanting to be able to vote. [25:24.070 --> 25:29.430] I don't know what kind of world we're living in, but it's getting kind of weird and scary. [25:29.970 --> 25:30.690] And we call it. [25:30.750 --> 25:31.450] Good hearing from you. [25:31.650 --> 25:32.170] Keep listening. [25:33.230 --> 25:35.450] And we're going to try and get another phone call, hopefully. [25:36.530 --> 25:36.730] Okay. [25:37.090 --> 25:37.370] Take care. [25:37.470 --> 25:39.890] Well, the rocket ship hasn't blown up yet, so we're all good. [25:40.030 --> 25:40.850] Bye to your dog, too. [25:41.930 --> 25:42.750] Yeah, all right. [25:42.930 --> 25:43.510] Thanks, Bob. [25:43.690 --> 25:44.010] Take care. [25:44.130 --> 25:44.470] Go ahead, Rob. [25:44.490 --> 25:44.690] Have fun. [25:45.730 --> 25:54.370] The other side to the social media story, too, is, yeah, the cops are monitoring social media, but also it is so easy to get bad data into that data set. [25:54.490 --> 25:58.870] I mean, you can start up a social media with the name of whoever you want, with a picture of whoever you want. [25:58.870 --> 26:07.850] And so if there happens to be someone in your life who you would like the LAPD to be more interested in, you could very easily make that happen, given this monitoring they're doing. [26:08.770 --> 26:16.190] And so, yeah, you know, not very many social media sites want to see your government ID or something when you sign up for a new account. [26:16.330 --> 26:19.010] And even the ones that do, it's easy to fake that. [26:19.210 --> 26:27.430] So this is dangerous because it's another example of them depending on bad data in order to find reasons to harass people. [26:29.250 --> 26:29.690] Okay. [26:29.870 --> 26:31.110] We've got Connecticut on the line. [26:31.310 --> 26:31.950] How are you doing? [26:32.830 --> 26:33.190] Absolutely. [26:33.530 --> 26:33.890] Hi, guys. [26:33.990 --> 26:35.070] This is Tim from Connecticut. [26:35.350 --> 26:36.030] How are you doing? [26:37.350 --> 26:38.330] Not too bad. [26:38.430 --> 26:38.890] Not too bad. [26:39.070 --> 26:45.730] I wanted to make mention something that used to happen to me when I was working and I was VPNed into work. [26:45.730 --> 27:02.890] If I shut down all my work stuff and left that VPN up and then accidentally started up my Outlook, which automatically logs into my email accounts, I would get somebody hacked your password from Google, from AOL, from anything that I had ever touched before. [27:02.890 --> 27:03.110] Wow. [27:03.610 --> 27:06.290] What do you think they believe is happening? [27:07.710 --> 27:14.010] Well, they just... they see me or somebody using my ID logging in from a different IP address. [27:14.190 --> 27:15.150] A crazy block. [27:15.470 --> 27:17.190] In my case, it would have had... it would have been in the UK. [27:17.790 --> 27:18.070] Okay. [27:18.450 --> 27:21.970] But don't they know about Outlook and things like that before this happens? [27:23.690 --> 27:31.530] I don't think that they can take that as a guess that everybody has to have a VPN that's going across the planet. [27:31.770 --> 27:33.370] Except, you know, I wasn't running a VPN. [27:33.370 --> 27:34.330] I don't know what happened. [27:35.890 --> 27:36.410] Uh-huh. [27:36.870 --> 27:37.970] I wasn't running a VPN. [27:37.970 --> 27:39.930] I was doing everything, you know, nice and normal. [27:40.050 --> 27:41.110] But how about this? [27:41.110 --> 27:44.070] If they do notice something like that, they ask you, hey, was this you? [27:44.130 --> 27:46.690] And if you say yes, they say, okay, sorry to bother you. [27:46.910 --> 27:47.850] And they move on. [27:47.990 --> 27:51.530] Instead, they say, well, now you have to go through all these steps and reset your password and all that. [27:51.530 --> 27:52.450] When nothing happened. [27:53.890 --> 27:57.290] Yeah, I noticed my Google account when it's on my phone. [27:57.830 --> 28:06.850] If I log on to a different PC that it hasn't seen, I'll get a flash on my Google phone saying, somebody logged in at this address. [28:06.850 --> 28:07.610] Was that you? [28:07.750 --> 28:08.230] Yes, no. [28:08.570 --> 28:08.850] Uh-huh. [28:09.950 --> 28:14.210] Yeah, I get that somebody was blocked and that someone has my password. [28:14.770 --> 28:17.010] And yeah, I have my password, Google. [28:17.130 --> 28:20.650] You don't have to freak out, but at least ask me the question and I'll tell you the answer. [28:21.670 --> 28:23.550] Instead, they've just made these assumptions. [28:23.730 --> 28:29.210] And then I get a lecture about how to better protect my security when there's absolutely nothing going wrong in the first place. [28:29.470 --> 28:31.170] I just, I really resent these robotic... [28:32.170 --> 28:34.590] But you're not on anything that would change its IP address often, are you? [28:34.890 --> 28:35.750] No, I'm not. [28:35.890 --> 28:36.350] Not really. [28:36.570 --> 28:38.150] But it does happen occasionally. [28:38.150 --> 28:40.450] If you use your phone, the IP is going to change. [28:40.450 --> 28:42.030] And we all know that. [28:43.170 --> 28:43.610] Right. [28:45.730 --> 28:47.970] That's just one of the ways that it triggers for me. [28:48.110 --> 28:49.210] Not as bad as my bank. [28:49.430 --> 28:55.250] My bank, every time I use my bank, they claim they don't recognize my browser. [28:55.970 --> 28:57.430] I have not moved. [28:57.430 --> 28:58.750] I'm in the same place. [28:58.870 --> 29:00.050] The IP is the same. [29:00.170 --> 29:03.050] But every time I log in, they say, this is an unrecognized browser. [29:03.170 --> 29:08.510] And then they have to send me a code, which I have to my throwaway Gmail account, which invariably sends it to spam. [29:08.790 --> 29:10.530] So then I have to get it out of the spam folder. [29:10.550 --> 29:12.370] And by the time I do that, it's expired. [29:12.390 --> 29:19.150] And I have to send it a second time just to, you know, pay a small bill with my bank. [29:19.530 --> 29:20.790] It's enough to drive you crazy. [29:21.210 --> 29:22.890] I'm wondering if it thinks... [29:22.890 --> 29:26.410] Do you have a maintenance program that goes and clears out cookies or... [29:26.410 --> 29:26.930] No. [29:27.070 --> 29:27.350] ...cashes? [29:27.570 --> 29:29.670] No, I try to mind my own business. [29:29.850 --> 29:31.750] Or, I mean, I try to not cause waves. [29:31.750 --> 29:38.450] I'm thinking it thinks your phone and you logging in are in completely different areas. [29:38.570 --> 29:48.370] Because your phone might be using a booster that has a different geolocation and IP because it may be going through a VPN. [29:48.790 --> 29:49.590] Okay, maybe. [29:49.750 --> 29:50.910] But, you know, it's not that unusual. [29:51.250 --> 30:03.990] But, you know, like it thinks because one might have totally different IPs and they're being used simultaneously that you couldn't possibly be in using two different devices in two different parts of the world. [30:04.270 --> 30:04.730] Does that make sense? [30:04.810 --> 30:07.690] Yeah, but people do things like that all the time, especially these days. [30:07.910 --> 30:08.610] So, I don't... [30:08.610 --> 30:09.370] It was a guess. [30:09.690 --> 30:11.210] It could be the right guess. [30:11.330 --> 30:12.830] But, you know, if they just ask you... [30:12.830 --> 30:13.550] It's becoming more common. [30:14.070 --> 30:15.110] Yeah, it's becoming more common. [30:15.150 --> 30:16.910] If they just ask, was this you? [30:16.950 --> 30:18.370] And you say yes, that should be the end of it. [30:19.650 --> 30:21.010] Oh, but that would take work. [30:21.510 --> 30:22.210] Of course. [30:22.990 --> 30:24.510] Yeah, we all want to avoid that. [30:25.390 --> 30:25.590] But... [30:25.590 --> 30:27.690] Make you change passwords, that's free. [30:27.950 --> 30:28.230] Uh-huh. [30:28.470 --> 30:30.630] I mean, twice in one week with Facebook. [30:30.630 --> 30:31.390] It's really silly. [30:32.110 --> 30:33.570] And here's something interesting. [30:33.830 --> 30:37.490] I changed it to the password I used a year ago and it worked. [30:37.710 --> 30:39.470] You know, they say, don't use a password you used before. [30:39.610 --> 30:41.750] So, now I know how long they store passwords for. [30:41.950 --> 30:42.130] That's interesting. [30:43.090 --> 30:43.390] Uh-huh. [30:43.750 --> 30:44.550] Yeah, yeah. [30:44.770 --> 30:49.370] So, it must have a rollover or timeout on how many times you can keep using a password. [30:49.610 --> 30:54.110] If you use your password and stick a digit on it and just increment the digit, that will work. [30:54.150 --> 30:55.150] It's not very secure. [30:55.390 --> 31:01.870] But at least it'll tell you how long before you can use that digit again, whether it's a six or seven or eight passwords. [31:02.190 --> 31:05.110] It's just funny that they think I care about my Facebook account. [31:05.370 --> 31:06.510] I really don't. [31:06.990 --> 31:09.590] So, if someone did get in, stop bothering me with it. [31:09.770 --> 31:10.930] I just, you know, leave me alone. [31:11.050 --> 31:12.030] I'll get to it when I get to it. [31:13.270 --> 31:16.810] There are people that, you know, Facebook is very, very important to. [31:17.190 --> 31:21.830] I know, and that's kind of what's led us into all the problems, but we'll get into that some other time. [31:21.950 --> 31:22.150] Yes. [31:22.450 --> 31:23.630] Anything else from your end? [31:23.770 --> 31:25.790] Okay, I'll get off the phone and let somebody else call in. [31:25.950 --> 31:27.250] Okay, well, thanks for calling. [31:27.310 --> 31:27.810] Good hearing from you. [31:28.030 --> 31:28.770] And for listening. [31:29.010 --> 31:29.250] Yes. [31:29.370 --> 31:30.030] Have a good one, guys. [31:30.190 --> 31:30.510] Take care. [31:30.730 --> 31:30.930] Bye-bye. [31:32.070 --> 31:35.190] 8-0-2-3-2-1-4-2-2-5. [31:35.330 --> 31:37.770] 8-0-2-3-2-1-HACK is our phone number. [31:37.770 --> 31:38.850] We're on for a few more minutes. [31:38.970 --> 31:41.750] If you have anything to say, share, ask. [31:42.170 --> 31:42.770] We're here. [31:42.850 --> 31:46.330] We're not here next week, so this is your last chance for a couple of weeks. [31:49.110 --> 31:50.450] Operators are standing by. [31:50.690 --> 31:51.070] Yeah. [31:51.350 --> 31:52.270] Well, you're standing by. [31:52.310 --> 31:53.250] You're sort of slouching. [31:53.690 --> 31:53.850] Yeah. [31:54.370 --> 31:56.290] Which you do have turned up really, really loud. [31:56.530 --> 31:58.830] So, and yeah, we do see caller ID. [31:58.830 --> 32:02.130] So, we know that this person is, where's 4-0-2? [32:02.250 --> 32:05.470] Is that, I'm going to guess 4-0-2, maybe Nebraska? [32:05.990 --> 32:06.910] Is that where this is? [32:07.430 --> 32:08.350] I got it right. [32:08.450 --> 32:08.710] Nebraska. [32:09.070 --> 32:09.530] Wow. [32:09.750 --> 32:09.910] Wow. [32:10.050 --> 32:10.290] Okay. [32:10.990 --> 32:11.470] Cool. [32:11.830 --> 32:12.650] How are you doing? [32:13.530 --> 32:14.010] Good. [32:14.470 --> 32:15.190] What's on your mind? [32:15.430 --> 32:39.830] Hey, I just wanted to mention that in addition to your IPs being different and things like that to trigger the security alerts with Gmail, if you have your Gmail account and you have it as configured to be as secure as possible, you can't really use an unsanctioned SMTP or POP3 or IMAP client against the service. [32:39.930 --> 32:58.590] Like if you had just a Python script to send out a monthly newsletter or something, if you have the account bolted down to its highest security level, you'll get a Gmail back, they'll fail, and you'll get a Gmail that said, hey, somebody was trying to hit your account with some unsecure software. [32:58.890 --> 33:03.590] So, if you want to do something like that, you actually have to lessen the security on it. [33:03.970 --> 33:12.150] And then you get kind of naggy emails every once in a while from the folks at Google saying, hey, why don't you secure your account? [33:12.390 --> 33:26.190] And there doesn't appear to be any kind of a process to get a certificate or some kind of a key to use the maximum security and then still be able to automate your emails. [33:26.370 --> 33:31.730] Yeah, that's a pretty valid use, I think, and it should be allowed. [33:32.830 --> 33:33.270] Yep. [33:33.370 --> 33:44.910] And there's a number of scripts that generally, if you go out and search for a script to just send us MTP mail, a lot of the sample scripts use Gmail because it's so ubiquitous as an example. [33:45.250 --> 33:56.150] But you've got to be sure that your account is configured in such a way that what they deem kind of loose security has to be in place in order for those scripts to work. [33:56.510 --> 33:57.330] Alex, go ahead. [33:58.590 --> 34:00.430] Yeah, I've noticed that as well. [34:00.570 --> 34:10.470] And I think there's not just scripts, there's also a command line utilities that are pretty good for sending just regular SMTP email through the command line. [34:10.610 --> 34:12.070] One of them is send email. [34:12.950 --> 34:15.030] You know, there's like send mail, right? [34:15.110 --> 34:16.770] Remember the send mail and the send mail bugs? [34:16.910 --> 34:17.690] Well, there's send email. [34:18.090 --> 34:28.150] So for those of you on Debian, just, you know, apt-get install send email will work and you can send email right from the command line. [34:28.310 --> 34:29.170] It's very exciting. [34:29.550 --> 34:30.490] That is exciting. [34:31.590 --> 34:32.670] Yeah, it is. [34:32.670 --> 34:35.010] So I wasn't, I was only half sarcastic, I guess. [34:36.750 --> 34:37.590] Anything else, caller? [34:38.710 --> 34:39.610] No, that was it, game. [34:39.770 --> 34:40.390] Okay, well, thanks. [34:40.490 --> 34:40.930] That was very helpful. [34:41.510 --> 34:41.770] Take care. [34:42.110 --> 34:42.470] Thank you. [34:43.190 --> 34:47.310] That seems to explain the Outlook software that the other caller was talking about. [34:47.850 --> 34:50.530] I mean, he was talking about third-party email. [34:50.770 --> 34:51.150] Yeah. [34:51.290 --> 34:55.410] And in his case, when he connects with a VPN, it sends off all these alerts. [34:55.870 --> 34:57.070] This is a call from England. [34:58.610 --> 34:59.730] Hello, England. [34:59.770 --> 35:00.390] Go ahead. [35:02.870 --> 35:04.210] I think I freaked him out. [35:04.430 --> 35:04.970] Hey, you there? [35:05.990 --> 35:06.950] Is anyone there? [35:07.470 --> 35:08.110] Anyone from the UK? [35:08.650 --> 35:09.090] No? [35:09.890 --> 35:11.070] That was a call from England. [35:11.230 --> 35:11.990] I saw it on the screen. [35:12.310 --> 35:13.030] Message received. [35:13.230 --> 35:13.330] Yeah. [35:13.590 --> 35:14.390] Country code 44. [35:15.130 --> 35:16.030] Call us back. [35:17.090 --> 35:18.430] We like to hear from... [35:18.430 --> 35:19.030] We miss you. [35:19.150 --> 35:19.370] ...different countries. [35:19.470 --> 35:20.010] Yeah, absolutely. [35:21.150 --> 35:22.730] Ever since you left the planet. [35:24.150 --> 35:27.270] Or ever since things just went crazy on both sides of the ocean. [35:28.810 --> 35:30.210] 802-3214-225. [35:30.690 --> 35:31.330] Here it is again. [35:31.570 --> 35:32.910] Second time around. [35:33.430 --> 35:34.030] Good evening. [35:34.230 --> 35:35.410] You're on Off the Hook Overtime. [35:35.490 --> 35:35.730] Go ahead. [35:37.710 --> 35:38.150] Hello. [35:38.550 --> 35:39.090] How are you doing? [35:39.110 --> 35:39.670] Greetings from London. [35:39.890 --> 35:40.570] Yeah, it's from London. [35:40.730 --> 35:41.250] Who is this? [35:42.290 --> 35:43.450] This is Zap again. [35:43.650 --> 35:44.150] It's Zap. [35:44.270 --> 35:44.770] All right. [35:45.010 --> 35:45.530] How are you doing? [35:47.570 --> 35:49.190] I'm doing okay, I suppose. [35:49.310 --> 35:50.890] But unfortunately, I've got some bad news. [35:51.170 --> 35:51.350] Okay. [35:53.270 --> 35:56.070] One of our hackers has been backed up to the cloud. [35:56.430 --> 35:57.090] Oh, dear. [35:58.890 --> 35:59.230] Yeah. [36:00.010 --> 36:04.410] Reverend Rep passed away on the 16th of August in hospital. [36:04.730 --> 36:05.630] So, suddenly. [36:06.150 --> 36:07.710] I only found out last week. [36:07.870 --> 36:09.990] It was too late to ring up the radio show then. [36:10.850 --> 36:13.130] The main reason I'm on phoning is to let everyone know. [36:13.330 --> 36:14.990] But we've also got the funeral tomorrow. [36:17.190 --> 36:17.630] Okay. [36:19.430 --> 36:20.590] And do you want to give us details? [36:20.590 --> 36:24.350] This is Reverend Ratt from, was it London? [36:25.330 --> 36:26.890] Yeah, London 2600. [36:27.610 --> 36:27.970] Okay. [36:28.190 --> 36:32.250] Do you want to give details as to where this will be? [36:32.530 --> 36:32.770] Yeah. [36:33.450 --> 36:38.850] Yeah, it's at Malt Lake Crematorium tomorrow at 3.20 p.m. [36:40.410 --> 36:47.870] There's more information on my Twitter account, which is at Funsox, F-U-N-S-O-X. [36:48.450 --> 36:52.870] And a bunch of us are going to be meeting in a bar sort of around about 2 o'clock. [36:53.270 --> 36:54.810] And then we're all going to head off down there. [36:54.910 --> 36:57.150] So, there'll be a good representation from London 2600. [36:57.490 --> 36:59.570] Could you tell us something about Reverend Ratt? [37:01.330 --> 37:03.010] Yeah, I'm not too sure if you ever met him. [37:03.190 --> 37:04.310] He was quite a character. [37:04.610 --> 37:06.250] We called him the king of Wi-Fi. [37:06.250 --> 37:08.190] He was very good at Wi-Fi hacking, allegedly. [37:09.330 --> 37:09.970] Mm-hmm. [37:10.870 --> 37:11.210] Wow. [37:11.530 --> 37:17.870] We got some memories of him going to trade shows and doing shenanigans and antics. [37:18.250 --> 37:18.470] Uh-huh. [37:19.890 --> 37:22.770] I still can't really think what we can say on the radio. [37:23.170 --> 37:23.850] I don't know. [37:23.930 --> 37:26.290] We don't have a statute of limitations in the UK, unfortunately. [37:26.770 --> 37:28.350] You're also not on the radio, but... [37:29.890 --> 37:32.790] But yeah, the statute of limitations still would apply regardless. [37:33.470 --> 37:35.390] Yeah, sorry, I forgot you're on YouTube. [37:35.630 --> 37:36.130] Yeah, you're right. [37:37.570 --> 37:39.650] But yeah, I just thought I'd ring in and let everyone know. [37:39.850 --> 37:41.850] And, you know, we're going to have a good day tomorrow. [37:42.210 --> 37:44.210] It'll be the first time I've seen most of the people. [37:44.490 --> 37:44.730] Uh-huh. [37:44.910 --> 37:50.090] Maybe in something just under 20 years or 18 months into the pandemic. [37:50.330 --> 37:51.810] Because I'm not going to the meetings. [37:52.270 --> 37:52.810] Right, right. [37:53.870 --> 37:54.810] Well, uh... [37:54.810 --> 37:55.270] Yes. [37:55.490 --> 37:56.870] Sad to hear this. [37:57.890 --> 38:00.070] It seems like we're hearing news like this all too often. [38:01.070 --> 38:01.430] Um... [38:01.430 --> 38:02.330] But, um... [38:02.330 --> 38:03.170] Thanks for letting us know. [38:04.410 --> 38:06.850] Yeah, well, we all got old, basically. [38:07.010 --> 38:07.870] We used to be kids. [38:08.130 --> 38:10.090] And, you know, as you get older, things like this happen. [38:10.210 --> 38:13.110] First it's the weddings, then the babies, then there's the funnels. [38:13.470 --> 38:15.610] Yeah, I guess that's one way to look at it. [38:15.710 --> 38:19.670] But I like to think that there's still a little bit more that we can do. [38:19.990 --> 38:21.630] Alex, you had something to say? [38:22.330 --> 38:23.090] Yeah, Zap. [38:23.430 --> 38:24.070] Alex here. [38:24.150 --> 38:25.090] I'm sorry to hear this. [38:25.090 --> 38:30.510] And I wanted to ask you, because I met so many people when I went to the London 2600 meetings. [38:30.750 --> 38:34.230] And, obviously, chief among those personalities was, of course, you. [38:35.510 --> 38:37.990] But, you know, did I ever meet him? [38:38.150 --> 38:40.730] Was he around the same time, same years as I was? [38:40.810 --> 38:43.590] 2014, 15, 16, etc.? [38:43.590 --> 38:44.710] No, he wasn't. [38:44.710 --> 38:46.990] He actually dropped out of the scene due to his health. [38:47.790 --> 38:48.230] Okay. [38:48.230 --> 38:50.930] We tried to keep the abs on him to make sure he was okay. [38:51.950 --> 38:55.930] I think it's called stalking or spying, but it's just a concern from fellow hackers. [38:57.530 --> 39:01.870] I actually found out of somebody who else doesn't attend the meetings anymore. [39:01.870 --> 39:05.070] He sent me an email directly and asked me to let everyone know. [39:05.530 --> 39:07.990] And I promised him my words, and that's exactly what I've done. [39:09.050 --> 39:09.230] Yeah. [39:10.370 --> 39:14.170] Well, send our very best to the rest of the crew out there in London. [39:14.850 --> 39:15.230] Yeah. [39:15.390 --> 39:16.250] Yeah, we'll do. [39:16.470 --> 39:17.550] I'll mention it to everyone. [39:17.810 --> 39:19.070] Well, good to hear from you, Zap. [39:19.070 --> 39:24.950] Zap, I wish you were under happier circumstances, and I hope that we have many happier circumstances in the future to look forward to. [39:26.170 --> 39:28.510] Well, if there's any news, I will be ringing in again. [39:28.730 --> 39:29.370] Good, good. [39:29.610 --> 39:29.970] All right. [39:30.910 --> 39:32.430] It's probably late over there, though, right? [39:32.570 --> 39:33.650] So get some sleep. [39:33.830 --> 39:34.530] We do miss you. [39:34.710 --> 39:34.910] Yes. [39:35.070 --> 39:35.230] Yeah. [39:35.850 --> 39:36.150] All right. [39:36.330 --> 39:36.770] Take it easy. [39:36.890 --> 39:37.070] Bye. [39:37.130 --> 39:37.430] Take care. [39:37.490 --> 39:37.710] Bye-bye. [39:49.070 --> 39:49.250] All right. [39:49.550 --> 39:51.270] 802-321-4225. [39:51.450 --> 39:53.530] 802-321-HACK is our phone number. [39:53.670 --> 39:56.130] We're going to be on for a few more minutes, and we're not going to be on next week. [39:56.210 --> 40:02.630] So if it's something you want to say, now is the time to start dialing or pushing buttons or whatever it is you do to make a phone call these days. [40:02.850 --> 40:03.170] You might speak it. [40:03.250 --> 40:04.250] You could speak your phone number. [40:04.250 --> 40:05.550] You could speak the phone number. [40:05.650 --> 40:06.090] That's right. [40:06.110 --> 40:06.730] You could do that. [40:06.730 --> 40:08.970] There's things that hear numbers and will dial. [40:09.170 --> 40:10.910] Hey, Alexa, call... [40:10.910 --> 40:15.890] You could even just tell her to call us, because you've already programmed our number into speed dial somewhere. [40:16.370 --> 40:17.430] You could be in a car. [40:17.590 --> 40:18.990] You could tell your car to call us. [40:19.170 --> 40:19.610] Okay, okay. [40:19.630 --> 40:20.970] We need a different name for these. [40:20.990 --> 40:25.570] You could dial zero and tell the operator, or ask the operator nicely to call us, and she might still do it. [40:25.970 --> 40:28.570] What's like the hacker equivalent voice assistant? [40:28.690 --> 40:29.470] Because it's not Alexa. [40:29.590 --> 40:30.350] Okay, this is... [40:30.350 --> 40:31.390] Doesn't she have like an evil twin or something? [40:31.410 --> 40:33.310] This is actually a call from the same area code. [40:33.350 --> 40:34.870] Intelli-Call Operator Services. [40:35.310 --> 40:36.470] Okay, this has got to be... [40:36.470 --> 40:37.010] Boris Johnson. [40:38.290 --> 40:39.070] Boris Johnson. [40:39.350 --> 40:39.790] He's calling Collect. [40:40.230 --> 40:43.170] However, Collect calls are not allowed to your number. [40:43.450 --> 40:45.990] Would you like to pay for this call with a credit card? [40:46.770 --> 40:47.570] Absolutely not. [40:48.430 --> 40:48.830] No. [40:49.210 --> 40:51.110] If you deny this call, press zero now. [40:51.390 --> 40:52.510] Please enter your choice... [40:52.510 --> 40:54.450] Press zero now, but no offense to the caller. [40:54.630 --> 40:54.870] Go ahead. [40:54.990 --> 40:55.650] Press zero. [40:57.970 --> 40:59.610] Did they just hang up, or did they say... [40:59.610 --> 41:00.710] No, they don't even say anything. [41:00.870 --> 41:01.070] Wow. [41:01.710 --> 41:03.390] Okay, I don't know who that was, but it was clever. [41:03.630 --> 41:06.330] It came from an 802 area code, which is what we're giving out. [41:06.470 --> 41:09.230] But it's what Rebel demonstrated last week. [41:09.630 --> 41:21.070] What I believe, Alex, you also demonstrated, that if you make a call through that IntelliDial, whatever service, you can call Collect to certain places, but apparently our number is not one of them. [41:21.190 --> 41:22.210] Boris Johnson would. [41:24.550 --> 41:26.010] That was a nice touch. [41:26.550 --> 41:29.550] Okay, now we have a call from North Carolina, it looks like. [41:29.630 --> 41:29.950] Good evening. [41:30.070 --> 41:30.910] You're on off-the-hook overtime. [41:31.850 --> 41:32.590] Is that me? [41:32.910 --> 41:33.930] Wait, not North Carolina. [41:34.050 --> 41:35.090] 909 is California. [41:35.090 --> 41:35.650] I'm sorry. [41:35.810 --> 41:36.810] I was thinking 919. [41:36.990 --> 41:37.270] What was it? [41:37.410 --> 41:38.010] And 910. [41:38.390 --> 41:40.090] But yeah, 909, that's California. [41:40.530 --> 41:41.290] That's California. [41:41.490 --> 41:41.750] All right. [41:41.850 --> 41:42.810] Listen, just a quick question. [41:42.930 --> 41:48.270] You guys were talking this afternoon about the situation at the MTA in New York. [41:48.350 --> 41:48.650] Yes. [41:48.650 --> 41:49.750] The wrong button. [41:50.590 --> 41:57.230] Back in December, or maybe it was January, the entire island of Bermuda lost its electric power. [41:57.770 --> 42:02.370] And it was sort of written off as, well, one of these things that just sort of happened. [42:03.310 --> 42:12.610] And at the time, I mean, the coverage kind of, I shared it, I think, with you guys, and it just sort of disappeared into the ether. [42:13.130 --> 42:17.550] And it was sort of, I think, given away that, well, this was an equipment failure. [42:17.550 --> 42:29.570] But I sort of wondered at the time whether it was somebody playing with their, you know, control system, if they could, because it's a small place, but it's an important place. [42:30.410 --> 42:31.710] It's the home of a lot of... [42:32.390 --> 42:34.130] Oh, by the way, this is Eric in California. [42:34.310 --> 42:34.690] I apologize. [42:34.830 --> 42:35.150] Hi, Eric. [42:35.710 --> 42:36.530] Jumping right into this. [42:37.170 --> 42:52.690] And I just sort of wondered if it was something that happened that other people paid attention to, because either it could be that they're showing, that somebody is showing another entity, hey, this is what we can do if you don't, you know, if we want to. [42:52.850 --> 42:57.010] And Bermuda is a place, of course, that's important in the World Finance Network. [42:57.170 --> 43:05.610] Yeah, it could be just, you know, a very subtle message that, yeah, watch what happens tomorrow at 3 o'clock, and all of a sudden something happens at 3 o'clock. [43:05.730 --> 43:06.790] Yeah, how easy is it to... [43:06.790 --> 43:07.770] Or it was something that, you know... [43:07.770 --> 43:10.530] And the thing was, that was the situation where, like, the whole island lost power. [43:10.630 --> 43:11.430] It wasn't just... [43:11.870 --> 43:14.030] It wasn't just people who were connected by a wire. [43:14.150 --> 43:17.130] It was right in the center of the capital. [43:17.130 --> 43:18.010] Well, the capital city. [43:18.150 --> 43:21.470] It's a small place, but it's, you know, the city. [43:21.650 --> 43:22.090] It wasn't... [43:22.090 --> 43:26.130] It was people that might never lose power, even during a hurricane, lost power. [43:26.130 --> 43:31.310] But then here you have that situation in the MTA where somebody pressed the button, and they admitted they pressed the button. [43:31.410 --> 43:43.070] And I wonder if there's also a factor where it becomes so embarrassing as to how this happened that these things kind of get, well, you know, we can't tell you what happened because it was so stupid on our part. [43:43.070 --> 43:49.470] So we'll blame somebody else, or we'll just say it's all secret and you can't learn about this. [43:49.470 --> 43:56.350] Yeah, you know, you see that so many times on an individual basis where something happens, someone does something stupid, and they immediately blame hackers. [43:56.510 --> 43:57.190] They always hacked. [43:57.330 --> 43:58.030] You know, I didn't say that. [43:58.050 --> 43:58.710] Someone else said that. [43:58.830 --> 44:01.750] And of course, it always comes out that, in fact, yes, it was them. [44:01.910 --> 44:05.690] You could be talking about the same thing here where somebody did something incredibly foolish. [44:05.850 --> 44:13.070] I don't know, in the case of the MTA, if the person who pressed the button ever actually admitted it or if they just determined that somebody must have done that. [44:14.450 --> 44:16.190] But yeah, you know, human error. [44:16.350 --> 44:19.990] Human error, I think, is the leading contender for things like this. [44:20.450 --> 44:21.050] Alex, go ahead. [44:22.030 --> 44:31.970] Yeah, I mean, building on the caller's skepticism of the official explanation here, I've had a theory, and again, this is complete speculation, but I think it would make sense. [44:32.250 --> 44:34.350] If you think... [44:36.270 --> 44:37.390] Oh, he did it again. [44:37.390 --> 44:38.030] Look at that. [44:38.210 --> 44:39.670] It's like in the middle of a thought, too. [44:39.710 --> 44:40.710] It looks like he's still thinking. [44:40.970 --> 44:41.830] I'm worried about it. [44:41.870 --> 44:43.170] He's just frozen like that. [44:43.310 --> 44:45.310] And I was looking forward to this. [44:45.670 --> 44:47.490] I hope he remembers what he was going to say. [44:47.490 --> 44:52.790] Carla, will you stay with us until Alex gets resuscitated and he can ask his question? [44:53.790 --> 44:54.170] Wow. [44:54.430 --> 44:55.630] He's been hacked again. [44:55.890 --> 45:00.970] Apparently, that must be it, because the alternative is too foolish to even think of. [45:01.090 --> 45:06.390] I'm wondering if it's getting harder because people expect evidence now when something is blamed on that. [45:06.430 --> 45:08.930] What tells Alex that he's no longer speaking to us? [45:09.090 --> 45:09.890] How does he know? [45:10.290 --> 45:11.570] He could still be going on. [45:17.490 --> 45:20.190] It's not fine for us, but we could be frozen for him as he is for us. [45:20.470 --> 45:21.910] I don't follow. [45:22.050 --> 45:23.410] How could we be frozen for someone else? [45:23.470 --> 45:32.370] Well, assuming, presumably, his connection's poor, he would have trouble seeing us if he was having trouble being seen, right? [45:32.370 --> 45:33.330] Yeah, see, that's where I'm losing you. [45:33.410 --> 45:34.330] I see you moving. [45:34.330 --> 45:35.570] I feel myself moving. [45:35.830 --> 45:38.310] And now I see Alex moving, so that proves that I'm right. [45:38.410 --> 45:39.090] Okay, go ahead, Alex. [45:39.730 --> 45:40.950] Do you remember what you were saying? [45:41.870 --> 45:42.090] Yeah. [45:42.810 --> 45:44.450] Did you hear anything that I said? [45:44.550 --> 45:44.650] No. [45:44.650 --> 45:46.870] You pretty much cut off right at the beginning, so start over. [45:46.870 --> 45:47.630] Oh, my God. [45:47.710 --> 45:53.150] I only even realized and stopped talking when I saw Rob just frozen in a weird position. [45:54.110 --> 45:56.970] And I was thinking, well, he doesn't usually look that weird. [45:57.130 --> 45:58.390] I mean, he looks odd, but why not? [45:58.390 --> 46:02.050] Okay, so you're actually going to accuse us of being frozen when you were the one who was frozen. [46:02.330 --> 46:03.050] I was, yeah. [46:03.270 --> 46:03.910] I was, yeah. [46:04.310 --> 46:04.570] All right. [46:04.730 --> 46:19.290] So here's what I was going to say to our skeptical caller, which is that if you think back to the Cold War, where we had something called mutually assured destruction with the Soviets. [46:19.830 --> 46:27.630] So, you know, if we launched a nuclear strike against them, then they would launch a nuclear strike against us, and it would all end in tears for everyone, right? [46:27.630 --> 46:30.890] So that was this MAD principle, mutually assured destruction. [46:31.110 --> 46:36.650] Well, we don't necessarily have that anymore, but we still have nuclear weapons and things, but we're dealing with a different type of weapon. [46:37.310 --> 46:42.290] These, you know, quote unquote cyber weapons that advanced cyber adversaries are developing. [46:43.010 --> 47:00.710] And, you know, again, this is complete speculation, but one theory about these things happening on a regular basis like this, you know, electrical grids going out, subway systems going out, is that it's a demonstration by another nation that they have burrowed into our infrastructure. [47:00.710 --> 47:16.410] And it's a proof of concept in showing what can be done in the event that, let's say, the United States or another nation were to go into their infrastructure and do something like turn off the lights or turn off the power or shut down a transit system. [47:16.830 --> 47:21.210] And so these are demonstrations of capabilities, perhaps. [47:21.390 --> 47:24.050] Isn't that what we were talking about? [47:24.690 --> 47:26.130] I don't think so. [47:26.170 --> 47:29.650] That the thing in Bermuda might have simply just been showing what could be done? [47:29.750 --> 47:32.910] Well, Alex is saying it's specifically nation state actors. [47:33.110 --> 47:35.870] I think the caller was saying this could be rivals. [47:35.870 --> 47:46.830] This could be someone that knows industrial competition, like a powerhouse in One Electronics or mega company says, we know 90% of your assets are here. [47:46.990 --> 47:51.270] How easy will it be for you to trade quick when there's no power on the island? [47:51.430 --> 47:52.830] Okay, but it's the same thought behind it. [47:52.950 --> 47:57.230] Whether it's mobsters or a nation state, it's still a demonstration of what could be done. [47:57.630 --> 47:59.090] Yeah, that was the only distinction I heard. [47:59.090 --> 48:09.750] It could be each other, but for the principle, not necessarily to demonstrate that it can be done in and of itself, but for the principle of demonstrating that if you do this to me, I will do it for you. [48:09.830 --> 48:11.790] It's a tit-for-tat situation. [48:12.830 --> 48:14.930] Okay, I can accept that that's possible. [48:15.050 --> 48:17.350] It could also just be incompetence or maybe bad infrastructure. [48:17.350 --> 48:18.330] There's all sorts of reasons. [48:18.470 --> 48:19.450] You never really know. [48:20.150 --> 48:20.950] Totally agree, yes. [48:21.170 --> 48:22.730] Caller, anything else you want to share? [48:22.830 --> 48:24.190] Yeah, no, that's just pretty much it. [48:24.190 --> 48:38.170] Because, you know, if this situation with the MTA where it was literally that little plastic dome was missing from the stop switch, the kill switch, and that they, of course, it is interesting that it was finally admitted to. [48:38.750 --> 48:43.930] But then again, look, you just shut down the New York City subway, most of it, for an hour and a half. [48:44.670 --> 48:48.070] And that should never have been able to happen. [48:48.570 --> 48:51.630] And yet it happened again only a couple of weeks later because of weather. [48:52.590 --> 48:53.030] Wow. [48:53.030 --> 48:53.710] Well, that's all. [48:53.770 --> 48:55.290] I just wanted to bring up that point. [48:55.370 --> 48:57.350] I appreciate your show very much. [48:57.430 --> 48:57.690] Thanks. [48:57.850 --> 49:05.010] And by the way, since you're calling from 909, I just wanted to point out that you have the area code that takes the longest to dial on a rotary phone. [49:05.530 --> 49:06.290] That is correct. [49:06.550 --> 49:08.730] So it was the opposite of 212. [49:09.090 --> 49:10.850] It's like you're on the other end of the spectrum. [49:11.050 --> 49:12.110] It doesn't make a difference now. [49:12.270 --> 49:20.130] I think it was one of the last ones to be assigned before the system switched to allowing, you know, other combinations. [49:20.130 --> 49:35.530] That is true because when I was part of a hacker group that was targeting Telenet, they would have, it's a packet switch network, and they would always, the addresses of computers would be area code plus two or three digits. [49:35.530 --> 49:38.910] So 21250 would be a computer. [49:39.170 --> 49:40.630] 21251 would be another computer. [49:41.290 --> 49:46.430] 909 was internal Telenet computers because there was no 909 area code. [49:46.430 --> 49:50.270] And it didn't seem like there ever would be because who would want 909? [49:50.390 --> 49:51.710] So it takes so long to dial. [49:52.490 --> 49:54.170] So it's interesting history there. [49:55.270 --> 49:55.570] Absolutely. [49:55.850 --> 49:59.550] I know, of course, the 310 and the, what was it, 310, 410, and 510 were telex? [50:00.290 --> 50:02.950] Yes, for a while until they became area codes. [50:04.530 --> 50:04.770] Yep. [50:05.210 --> 50:05.950] Anyways, that's all. [50:06.010 --> 50:07.030] I just wanted to bring that point up. [50:07.150 --> 50:08.010] Thank you very much for your show. [50:08.130 --> 50:08.310] All right. [50:08.350 --> 50:08.630] Take care. [50:09.270 --> 50:09.530] Take care. [50:09.590 --> 50:09.730] Bye-bye. [50:10.870 --> 50:13.790] It's always good when you can say something about someone's area code, you know? [50:13.790 --> 50:20.750] It's like visiting a country and saying, hey, I know who was once president here or something like that. [50:20.890 --> 50:21.950] Your national dish. [50:22.070 --> 50:23.210] Or you make cheese. [50:23.770 --> 50:24.750] Something, yeah. [50:25.250 --> 50:27.470] All five of your national birds. [50:27.710 --> 50:28.790] This is Vermont again. [50:28.830 --> 50:30.750] Let's see if it's another funny recording. [50:31.110 --> 50:31.470] Good evening. [50:31.630 --> 50:33.130] In Telecall Operator Services. [50:34.710 --> 50:36.130] The final frontier. [50:36.390 --> 50:37.650] Is calling collect. [50:38.010 --> 50:41.010] However, collect calls are not allowed to your number. [50:41.090 --> 50:43.710] Would you like to pay for this call with a credit card? [50:43.790 --> 50:44.490] Let's not say anything. [50:44.950 --> 50:46.130] To accept this call, press 1. [50:46.450 --> 50:48.890] To deny this call, press 0 now. [50:49.230 --> 50:50.770] Please enter your choice now. [50:50.810 --> 50:51.970] What was the recording? [50:52.150 --> 50:52.490] What did it say? [50:52.650 --> 50:53.330] Something about frontier? [50:54.630 --> 50:55.750] The final frontier. [50:56.110 --> 50:57.870] In Telecall Operator Services. [50:59.370 --> 51:01.850] Despite the fact that last week was Star Trek Day, not today. [51:02.370 --> 51:03.790] You had talked over it, Rob. [51:03.790 --> 51:05.790] Collect calls are not allowed to your number. [51:06.050 --> 51:08.590] Would you like to pay for this call with a credit card? [51:08.810 --> 51:10.950] To accept this call, press 1. [51:11.410 --> 51:13.630] To deny this call, press 0 now. [51:15.190 --> 51:17.410] Now, what if I couldn't enter any choice? [51:17.570 --> 51:20.670] What if, you know, the phone was strapped to my head, and I couldn't even hang up? [51:22.010 --> 51:23.370] This just goes on forever? [51:26.530 --> 51:28.030] Okay, I heard it that time. [51:30.750 --> 51:34.770] This is a good way to annoy somebody forever. [51:40.730 --> 51:45.050] So, if I don't have a touch-tone phone or a way to hang up, I've lost my phone line. [51:46.930 --> 51:47.830] Is it going to hang up? [51:48.410 --> 51:49.030] Oh, good. [51:49.110 --> 51:49.590] It hung up. [51:49.750 --> 51:50.430] It hung up. [51:51.530 --> 51:51.990] All right. [51:52.070 --> 51:53.950] Well, thanks for the fun, whoever is doing that. [51:54.670 --> 51:59.630] 802-321-4225 for people who want to speak to us by voice, the traditional way of making a phone call. [52:00.510 --> 52:06.550] Only less than 10 minutes, I think, before we got to get out of here, because we have lives to lead and other things to do as well. [52:07.470 --> 52:07.990] Rob, go ahead. [52:08.290 --> 52:20.930] While we're waiting, I hate to take the wind out of your sails, Emmanuel, but I did a search on GitHub for the term sign language, and there are so many nice open-source projects that are working on recognizing sign language gestures with a webcam. [52:22.370 --> 52:25.610] Yeah, but mine would be finished. [52:25.910 --> 52:26.210] Okay? [52:26.310 --> 52:27.150] Mine would be complete. [52:27.150 --> 52:29.470] That was what was unique about my idea. [52:29.910 --> 52:32.390] Theirs are in development, but mine would be finished. [52:32.950 --> 52:33.030] See? [52:33.690 --> 52:35.290] They all need to pay you, basically. [52:35.530 --> 52:36.350] Yeah, that's what I'm getting at. [52:36.350 --> 52:36.850] That's what you're saying. [52:36.870 --> 52:37.570] It's the American way. [52:37.730 --> 52:37.910] Here we go. [52:38.490 --> 52:38.790] All right. [52:39.210 --> 52:40.570] 802-321-4225. [52:40.730 --> 52:44.110] 802-321-HACK is our phone number. [52:44.850 --> 52:48.810] And, you know, we can tell people, even on YouTube, to support WBAI. [52:48.990 --> 52:50.490] There's no rule against that. [52:50.790 --> 52:54.370] Give to WBAI.org or 212-209-2950. [52:54.370 --> 52:58.470] Just remember to tell them that you are calling on behalf of OffTheHook. [52:58.710 --> 53:02.570] And it would definitely be a feather in our cap for that to happen. [53:03.090 --> 53:05.670] Yeah, and you sign up for BAI Buddy. [53:05.670 --> 53:08.590] You don't really need to maintain it. [53:09.650 --> 53:11.810] It's just automatically withdrawn. [53:11.810 --> 53:15.350] It can be a nice, easy amount, and it really helps. [53:15.850 --> 53:16.230] All right. [53:16.270 --> 53:19.630] This person figured out how to block that caller ID, so we have no idea where they're calling from. [53:19.810 --> 53:20.330] Good evening. [53:20.550 --> 53:21.270] Yes, hi, Emmanuel. [53:21.590 --> 53:21.930] It's Rebel. [53:22.050 --> 53:24.250] Who else would know how to use caller ID blocking? [53:24.370 --> 53:24.670] Wow. [53:25.030 --> 53:25.450] Congratulations. [53:26.830 --> 53:28.790] I was just wondering, what is Telenet? [53:29.510 --> 53:30.810] What is Telenet? [53:30.810 --> 53:31.130] Really? [53:31.350 --> 53:32.590] You don't know what Telenet is? [53:33.550 --> 53:36.670] I might have known years ago, but just brief me on it. [53:36.810 --> 53:40.450] And by the way, an update, I was calling because I had an update on the collect call thing. [53:40.610 --> 53:41.350] Was that you? [53:42.470 --> 53:43.390] No, that wasn't me. [53:43.510 --> 53:44.210] That was somebody else. [53:44.270 --> 53:44.510] Wow. [53:44.670 --> 53:44.830] That wasn't me calling. [53:44.830 --> 53:45.710] That's kind of scary. [53:45.710 --> 53:51.910] I have an update on when I called my self-collect with that number that Alex gave me, the 321. [53:54.290 --> 53:56.490] It wasn't 1-800-collect, but it was... [53:56.490 --> 53:57.570] Well, I did it with 1-800-collect. [53:57.570 --> 53:59.430] So we're just going to forget about the Telenet question. [53:59.670 --> 54:00.730] You're just going to move on from that. [54:00.750 --> 54:02.230] No, I'm going to ask the Telenet question. [54:02.430 --> 54:08.790] But the update is that I called my self-collect, and I thought I would get a bill with my Sprint bill or T-Mobile bill or whatever on my cell phone. [54:08.790 --> 54:17.610] But they call you, they just call you and saying, I think they email you or text you saying, you accepted a collect call. [54:17.730 --> 54:20.830] The charges are $10 for one minute. [54:20.990 --> 54:23.070] Would you like to pay with a credit card or whatever? [54:23.390 --> 54:25.490] Like, I thought they'd bill my cell phone. [54:25.630 --> 54:30.390] So I'm just going to, you know, what if I just don't answer and can I bill my cell phone? [54:30.570 --> 54:31.550] Well, wait, hold on a second. [54:31.550 --> 54:37.230] You're saying that you already accepted the collect call and they're sending you a message afterwards asking for your credit card? [54:37.650 --> 54:39.970] Right, like a couple of hours there or a day after. [54:40.030 --> 54:43.150] Why didn't they ask you for your credit card number when the call came in? [54:43.230 --> 54:43.830] I don't know. [54:43.930 --> 54:44.450] Like they just did here. [54:45.050 --> 54:46.070] I don't know. [54:46.390 --> 54:48.550] Well, I mean, I just wouldn't answer that message. [54:48.830 --> 54:50.030] Yeah, I would wait that out, Rebel. [54:50.190 --> 54:51.850] Your gut's probably right. [54:52.570 --> 54:54.390] Yeah, but I don't think they can bill your phone. [54:54.710 --> 54:56.870] I'm pretty sure they can't just bill your phone. [54:56.930 --> 54:59.390] That's what I thought they did, that they billed your phone. [54:59.510 --> 55:02.550] They said, we can now make collect calls to cell phones. [55:02.750 --> 55:06.230] I thought they had arrangements with cell carriers that they billed the cell phone. [55:06.230 --> 55:07.310] They do with shortcodes. [55:07.510 --> 55:09.010] Yeah, well, it sounds like... [55:09.010 --> 55:09.610] Yeah, that's true. [55:09.910 --> 55:12.310] But it sounds like there has to be a credit card involved somewhere. [55:12.650 --> 55:13.710] They're saying it up front. [55:13.830 --> 55:14.510] Yeah, it has to be. [55:14.930 --> 55:16.230] So they said, okay, good. [55:16.350 --> 55:19.770] Give us your credit card number to accept that because you accepted a collect call. [55:19.930 --> 55:21.310] I'm just going to skip that part. [55:22.970 --> 55:24.410] I wouldn't expect anything less. [55:25.170 --> 55:26.790] Okay, what about Telnet? [55:27.030 --> 55:28.890] I briefly... [55:28.890 --> 55:30.310] Okay, you're talking about Telnet or Telenet. [55:30.410 --> 55:31.190] They're two different things. [55:31.570 --> 55:33.090] Telnet is how people used to connect... [55:33.090 --> 55:35.230] I know what Telnet is on the internet. [55:35.350 --> 55:35.590] Okay. [55:35.730 --> 55:38.030] But Telnet is like, not fax. [55:38.350 --> 55:39.790] Does anybody still use Telnet? [55:40.090 --> 55:41.470] No, okay, I'll tell you right now. [55:41.550 --> 55:47.190] Telnet was a packet switch network that used to be owned by GTE. [55:47.190 --> 55:51.090] I don't think they're around anymore at all. [55:51.230 --> 55:58.070] But it was a way that you could call a local phone number and connect the computers all around the world, or at least all around the country. [55:58.430 --> 56:10.010] And it's how I got into trouble because I was doing that locally, hacking into systems in various parts of the nation, schools, banks, government agencies, you name it. [56:10.070 --> 56:15.230] You just would enter the area code and either two or three digits after that, and it would connect. [56:15.230 --> 56:21.990] And you'd be at 300 baud or 1,200 baud, and you'd be able to try default passwords and things like that. [56:22.070 --> 56:27.050] So it saved you the long distance charge of calling. [56:27.270 --> 56:27.390] This was in the 80s. [56:27.390 --> 56:31.910] This was in the 80s, and I'm pretty sure a little bit of the 90s. [56:32.670 --> 56:35.030] But this is different to Telnet, though, of course. [56:35.250 --> 56:40.410] Well, Telnet is a function of connectivity on the internet. [56:40.950 --> 56:43.290] I don't know if anybody still uses that protocol anymore. [56:43.830 --> 56:45.130] Well, they shouldn't. [56:45.390 --> 56:46.350] They shouldn't because... [56:46.350 --> 56:47.630] Everything's out in clear text. [56:47.790 --> 56:48.970] Yeah, it's like SSH. [56:49.130 --> 56:50.650] You know, SSH is encrypted. [56:50.810 --> 56:51.750] Telnet is not. [56:52.190 --> 56:52.370] Yeah. [56:52.570 --> 57:02.530] Sometimes it's used when you're doing, like, local stuff to access some kind of embedded device or, like, a switch or some kind of networking equipment or a small computer. [57:03.010 --> 57:06.710] You can get in there and work with the configurations. [57:06.710 --> 57:09.390] But generally, online, you want something better. [57:09.550 --> 57:10.870] I can't remember the last time I used Telnet. [57:12.210 --> 57:13.730] Can you remember the last time you used Telnet? [57:14.010 --> 57:14.750] Like, Telex. [57:15.570 --> 57:18.010] It's got nothing to do with Telex, but that's something else. [57:18.550 --> 57:21.470] Are we just going through the tel prefix tonight? [57:21.490 --> 57:22.170] Is that what we're doing? [57:22.470 --> 57:25.850] Well, actually, yeah, because Telex was, like, one area code. [57:25.970 --> 57:26.990] Like, Telex. [57:27.150 --> 57:29.670] I remember some old business, like, brochures. [57:29.670 --> 57:32.570] It says, hey, our Telex number is 910-something. [57:32.790 --> 57:35.250] Yeah, I think 310-something-10. [57:35.690 --> 57:36.650] No, 710. [57:36.690 --> 57:37.630] That's what it was. [57:38.250 --> 57:38.530] Yeah. [57:38.690 --> 57:39.170] I think that's what it was. [57:39.170 --> 57:40.690] But 710 is now the government's area code. [57:40.690 --> 57:43.070] Now, that's a very mysterious area code. [57:43.170 --> 57:46.790] Rebel, if you can find out something about the 710 area code, I would really appreciate it. [57:47.370 --> 57:47.750] Hmm. [57:47.890 --> 57:49.070] Well, I tried calling it. [57:49.130 --> 57:51.930] It asks for a PIN or a number or something. [57:51.930 --> 57:54.810] I can't reach a single phone number in that entire area code. [57:54.910 --> 57:55.750] I can't figure it out. [57:56.030 --> 57:57.570] So I would like to know more about that. [57:58.430 --> 57:58.830] Right. [57:59.750 --> 58:00.810] That's my identification. [58:01.070 --> 58:02.190] I think it's like government... [58:02.190 --> 58:06.190] Like, if a congressman wants to call another congressman, they use that number or something. [58:06.250 --> 58:18.110] Well, that sounds like the old ARP in that, where there was a different phone network that people inside the military could use and kind of bypass the regular phone network and get priority and things like that. [58:18.270 --> 58:19.990] You know, we need some articles on these things. [58:20.150 --> 58:21.310] This is fascinating stuff. [58:21.310 --> 58:23.130] And it's still around, a lot of it. [58:24.110 --> 58:29.650] Telex was customer to customer and sort of a precursor to the... [58:29.650 --> 58:30.330] It was a fax machine. [58:30.490 --> 58:35.510] So it was connecting teleprinters that would send written messages like post-World War II. [58:35.850 --> 58:36.070] Okay. [58:36.450 --> 58:42.030] So also, GTE was acquired by Bell Atlantic in 2000 and then got gobbled up by Verizon. [58:42.870 --> 58:43.150] Wow. [58:43.710 --> 58:44.410] Remember MCI? [58:44.650 --> 58:46.610] They also got gobbled up by Verizon. [58:47.810 --> 58:48.330] Yeah. [58:48.550 --> 58:49.710] Wasn't it the merger? [58:49.870 --> 58:52.610] I think they merged GTE and Bell Atlantic and formed Verizon. [58:52.790 --> 58:53.270] Was that it? [58:53.890 --> 58:57.810] Um, that might be what they told them, but they swallowed them. [58:57.910 --> 58:58.710] They swallowed them whole. [58:59.450 --> 58:59.650] Yeah. [58:59.830 --> 59:03.270] So, like, Telenet is, like, is Telenet, like, what computer terminals use? [59:03.710 --> 59:04.870] Like, uh... [59:04.870 --> 59:05.970] No, Telenet was a company. [59:06.250 --> 59:09.530] Telenet was a company and this GTE network that he was talking about. [59:09.730 --> 59:09.990] Yeah. [59:10.110 --> 59:11.250] And then Sprint got involved. [59:11.350 --> 59:12.850] And then you had, um... [59:12.850 --> 59:22.030] Uh, what was that service called, uh, where you would, uh, be able to, after a certain time at night, you'd be able to call BBSs, uh, by using the Sprint service. [59:22.690 --> 59:23.930] I forget what it's called. [59:25.510 --> 59:26.310] Nobody remembers. [59:26.730 --> 59:28.510] Because they had nighttime calling, right? [59:28.770 --> 59:30.550] Didn't they have, like, evening rates and stuff? [59:30.590 --> 59:33.110] Well, yeah, all the phone companies did, but you would have... [59:33.110 --> 59:35.210] You'd basically pay a monthly fee. [59:36.010 --> 59:38.010] Uh, PC Pursuit, that's what it was called. [59:38.110 --> 59:38.490] Oh. [59:38.490 --> 59:48.430] Yeah, and, and that would enable you, nights and I think weekends, you could call, um, uh, similar to Telenet, but you would call phone numbers, full phone numbers in other area codes. [59:48.970 --> 59:51.450] And, um, it was a way to avoid toll charges. [59:51.870 --> 59:52.870] Like pre-ISP. [59:52.930 --> 01:00:06.370] Do you remember when, uh, on, back in the 80s, you can pick up a pay phone and dial the operator and can say, like, oh, area code number and say, this is a police call, and give a four-digit number, which would be a badge number, and they'd put the call through. [01:00:06.470 --> 01:00:07.570] Okay, I never heard of that. [01:00:08.490 --> 01:00:14.430] I imagine that's, that's something that you knew about, as well as, uh, uh, uh, privilege calls, you would make privilege calls? [01:00:14.450 --> 01:00:16.890] Yeah, operator privileges to get 800 numbers and... [01:00:17.230 --> 01:00:17.550] Wow. [01:00:18.390 --> 01:00:18.970] All kinds of tricks. [01:00:19.090 --> 01:00:20.470] Rebel, you should write an article about this. [01:00:21.630 --> 01:00:21.950] Yeah. [01:00:22.770 --> 01:00:25.470] I'm just trying to get people to write articles, because I, I'm fascinated by it. [01:00:25.470 --> 01:00:25.870] Or 10. [01:00:26.110 --> 01:00:27.550] You're running out of articles, I guess. [01:00:27.570 --> 01:00:28.210] No, not at all. [01:00:28.410 --> 01:00:33.670] It's just basically, I'm very interested by this, and I'm, I'm just sort of campaigning for the things that I really want to read. [01:00:35.710 --> 01:00:38.230] People are saturated, and there's so much to talk about. [01:00:38.490 --> 01:00:42.810] Um, it's hard to focus, so we want to focus on telephone stuff, because that's what we talk about. [01:00:42.990 --> 01:00:49.710] Yeah, but the hacker community, there are so many things in the hacker community you can talk about, and, and that's, you know, I'm happy that we have a magazine to do that. [01:00:49.770 --> 01:00:53.950] But, you know, like, I just found out today, there's a massive paper shortage. [01:00:54.070 --> 01:00:54.770] Have you heard about this? [01:00:54.930 --> 01:00:55.190] No. [01:00:55.190 --> 01:01:05.730] Because of the pandemic, apparently, somehow this affects paper, so our printer, we're having these weird conversations with our printer, they're our printer, and they say, yeah, we have no paper. [01:01:06.050 --> 01:01:07.650] Like, well, what are we supposed to do about that? [01:01:07.750 --> 01:01:09.670] They're talking to us like we're going to solve the problem. [01:01:09.890 --> 01:01:16.490] And, of course, it's, it's, it's skyrocketing the price for when they do find paper, but my God, it doesn't ever end. [01:01:16.690 --> 01:01:24.870] I just want to get a magazine out, and, um, well, we can always go virtual, but we're also a printed magazine always will be, uh, Rob, go ahead. [01:01:25.610 --> 01:01:26.470] Yeah, it does make sense. [01:01:26.630 --> 01:01:37.570] There's been a, there's been a lumber shortage for, uh, ages, which has affected like the construction industry, because, uh, since the pandemic, you can't get the wood, you know, um, it, and, uh, so I guess paper follows. [01:01:37.730 --> 01:01:41.050] I don't understand why you can't get the wood in a pandemic. [01:01:41.290 --> 01:01:48.030] I mean, it's outdoors, uh, and people can, uh, uh, you know, maybe we can get the, stay away from other people. [01:01:48.210 --> 01:01:50.090] Maybe the Federal Reserve will print our issue. [01:01:51.770 --> 01:01:52.250] Why not? [01:01:52.410 --> 01:01:53.670] You know, these are our problems. [01:01:53.810 --> 01:01:54.330] They have paper. [01:01:54.650 --> 01:01:55.890] Shouldn't be sharing them with the world. [01:01:56.090 --> 01:01:56.650] We'll figure it out. [01:01:56.810 --> 01:01:57.490] We'll figure it out. [01:01:57.610 --> 01:01:58.630] Rebel, any, anything else from you? [01:01:58.690 --> 01:01:59.370] We're going to sign off. [01:02:00.710 --> 01:02:02.990] Um, I'm not, not that I think can think about it. [01:02:03.010 --> 01:02:04.370] They're going to update you when they're collecting. [01:02:04.670 --> 01:02:11.570] They, they keep, uh, you know, messaging, sending me test messages and, you know, calling me with recordings saying, you know, you were expected to collect call and... [01:02:11.570 --> 01:02:16.370] They're going to follow you for the rest of your life, trying to get that, that $1.99 or whatever it is you owe them. [01:02:16.690 --> 01:02:18.350] No, is it $10 or something? [01:02:18.550 --> 01:02:19.690] $10 for one minute? [01:02:19.690 --> 01:02:20.290] $10 works. [01:02:20.630 --> 01:02:24.030] I think it was like, wow, that's the rate. [01:02:24.170 --> 01:02:27.730] If you call them now and ask what the rate is, it's like $10 or $5. [01:02:28.070 --> 01:02:29.730] That's, that's a blast from the past. [01:02:29.870 --> 01:02:31.750] You remember when, when, when calls used to... [01:02:31.750 --> 01:02:32.210] I think $10 was unlimited. [01:02:32.210 --> 01:02:33.790] It used to be long distance. [01:02:34.550 --> 01:02:36.490] What, you can talk forever on a collect call? [01:02:36.690 --> 01:02:37.170] I doubt that. [01:02:37.170 --> 01:02:37.730] Yeah, I don't know. [01:02:38.310 --> 01:02:38.930] I don't know. [01:02:38.930 --> 01:02:40.670] I didn't know you could call the number and I'd call one inch. [01:02:40.790 --> 01:02:46.930] But calling from, from Long Island to Queens would be considered long distance, you know, and it would cost you a huge amount. [01:02:47.070 --> 01:02:47.570] Well, it's from the Hamptons or something. [01:02:47.790 --> 01:02:49.150] If you're in the Hamptons or something. [01:02:49.310 --> 01:02:52.610] No, anywhere on Long Island, because you're crossing over certain zones. [01:02:53.430 --> 01:02:54.650] If you, if you buy a border. [01:02:54.650 --> 01:02:57.290] It's not long distance, it's a toll call. [01:02:57.530 --> 01:03:03.550] Remember when calls used to be $0.30 to call from, like, one end of Queens to Manhattan? [01:03:04.310 --> 01:03:05.090] Yeah, that's true. [01:03:05.270 --> 01:03:05.610] That's true. [01:03:06.650 --> 01:03:06.970] Anyway. [01:03:07.110 --> 01:03:09.750] But if you call from Flushing to Manhattan, it's $0.25 or $0.10. [01:03:09.990 --> 01:03:13.010] Well, I'd like to strip down memory lane, but this is my stop. [01:03:13.010 --> 01:03:15.630] I have to get off and we will talk to you again soon. [01:03:16.370 --> 01:03:16.690] Okay. [01:03:17.010 --> 01:03:17.630] All right, take care. [01:03:17.870 --> 01:03:18.430] Thanks for listening. [01:03:19.430 --> 01:03:20.270] Good to hear from Rebel. [01:03:20.570 --> 01:03:21.610] Always good to hear from... [01:03:21.610 --> 01:03:23.450] So, thank you everybody who called in. [01:03:23.450 --> 01:03:25.070] And we're going to head out. [01:03:25.230 --> 01:03:26.350] We'll be back in two weeks. [01:03:26.510 --> 01:03:28.750] Write to us, OTH at 2600.com. [01:03:28.830 --> 01:03:34.370] Don't forget to keep supporting WBAI so that we can continue doing the radio show, which is a lot of fun. [01:03:34.750 --> 01:03:35.870] There's another launch coming up. [01:03:35.990 --> 01:03:37.230] I think China's... [01:03:37.850 --> 01:03:38.950] They're sending some... [01:03:38.950 --> 01:03:39.330] What, tonight? [01:03:39.610 --> 01:03:40.310] No, not tonight. [01:03:40.610 --> 01:03:42.490] They have some taikonauts going to... [01:03:42.490 --> 01:03:43.090] Okay, well, wait. [01:03:43.310 --> 01:03:43.950] Stop right now. [01:03:44.050 --> 01:03:44.810] What do you call them? [01:03:45.210 --> 01:03:45.610] Taikonauts. [01:03:45.830 --> 01:03:51.290] So, okay, the cosmonauts, if they're from Russia, the astronauts from here, and the taikonauts from... [01:03:51.290 --> 01:03:51.710] Taikonauts. [01:03:52.150 --> 01:03:53.070] And they're going... [01:03:53.070 --> 01:03:53.210] Why? [01:03:53.210 --> 01:03:53.530] Why? [01:03:54.030 --> 01:03:58.210] What other word do you have a different name for it if they're from a different country? [01:03:58.330 --> 01:04:02.430] Okay, well, in fairness, I don't think the next mission has taikonauts on it. [01:04:02.470 --> 01:04:03.330] I think it's unmanned. [01:04:03.710 --> 01:04:08.130] But anyway, they're sending stuff to Tianggang, I believe is how you pronounce it. [01:04:08.150 --> 01:04:08.770] What are some launches from Turkey? [01:04:08.870 --> 01:04:10.030] Do they have a special name for that? [01:04:10.150 --> 01:04:11.110] Or, you know... [01:04:11.110 --> 01:04:12.370] Or Botswana. [01:04:12.710 --> 01:04:13.390] Or India. [01:04:14.310 --> 01:04:15.030] Or India. [01:04:15.690 --> 01:04:16.090] Yeah. [01:04:16.850 --> 01:04:19.430] Okay, well, I'm sure our listeners will have something to say about that. [01:04:24.610 --> 01:04:26.190] Those are you guys I'm talking to. [01:04:26.770 --> 01:04:27.690] Ah, goodnight. [01:04:27.850 --> 01:04:28.070] Traditional. [01:04:28.070 --> 01:04:30.030] I thought you were saying goodnight to the folks out there. [01:04:30.090 --> 01:04:31.110] I already did say goodnight to them. [01:04:31.190 --> 01:04:32.150] Now I'm saying goodnight to you. [01:04:33.850 --> 01:04:34.950] Yes, goodnight, everybody. [01:04:35.510 --> 01:04:36.470] It's nice to be included. [01:04:36.590 --> 01:04:36.830] Thank you. [01:04:36.950 --> 01:04:37.590] But yes, goodnight. [01:04:38.410 --> 01:04:39.150] Thanks for listening. [01:04:40.070 --> 01:04:40.170] Bye. [01:04:40.170 --> 01:04:40.190] Bye. [01:04:40.190 --> 01:04:40.230] Bye. [01:04:40.230 --> 01:04:40.290] Bye. [01:04:41.150 --> 01:04:41.250] Bye.