[00:00.000 --> 00:10.760] Hi, this is Christian McBride and you're listening to WBAI, New York, 99.5 FM and WBAI.org on the web. [00:13.810 --> 00:18.750] It's 7 o'clock here at WBAI in New York, 99.5 FM. [00:19.030 --> 00:21.090] Time now for Off the Hook. [00:30.700 --> 00:32.740] This is Brunei Telecom. [00:33.140 --> 00:35.260] The number you have dialed is incorrect. [00:35.760 --> 00:38.260] Please check the number before dialing again. [00:38.600 --> 00:39.420] Thank you. [00:39.480 --> 00:42.460] Thank you for listening to Off the Hook. [02:25.340 --> 02:27.540] And a very good evening to everybody. [02:27.540 --> 02:28.780] The program is Off the Hook. [02:29.120 --> 02:32.440] Emmanuel Goldstein here with you on this delightful Wednesday evening. [02:32.620 --> 02:33.940] Joined tonight by Kyle. [02:34.500 --> 02:34.660] Hello. [02:35.300 --> 02:38.920] Out in Skypeland, we have Rob T. [02:39.160 --> 02:39.700] Firefly. [02:40.400 --> 02:41.240] Good evening. [02:41.800 --> 02:43.260] Booming in like a thunderstorm. [02:43.360 --> 02:44.720] We have Gila. [02:45.600 --> 02:46.160] Hello. [02:46.760 --> 02:49.860] And I believe we have Alex somewhere in the world. [02:51.960 --> 02:52.760] That's correct. [02:52.940 --> 02:54.140] Good evening, everybody. [02:54.340 --> 02:56.280] I'm in Slovenia tonight. [02:56.580 --> 02:57.160] So, hello. [02:57.740 --> 02:58.720] Oh, I was going to guess that. [02:59.240 --> 02:59.560] Wow. [02:59.660 --> 03:00.100] Slovenia. [03:00.260 --> 03:00.400] Good. [03:00.800 --> 03:01.940] That's pretty cool. [03:02.580 --> 03:03.580] Ljubljana, I believe. [03:05.000 --> 03:07.440] No, I'm actually in Porto Rose tonight. [03:07.720 --> 03:12.740] So, I'm right on the Adriatic Sea, just down the street from Toronto. [03:13.680 --> 03:18.020] And next week, I'll be in another country, if we're on next week, that is. [03:18.460 --> 03:18.600] Okay. [03:18.780 --> 03:19.980] Well, that's okay. [03:20.500 --> 03:26.940] On assignment, Alex over there in Slovenia, looking for maybe some statues to topple over. [03:27.200 --> 03:27.800] We'll see. [03:28.760 --> 03:29.580] We'll see. [03:29.840 --> 03:32.180] We have not one special guest tonight. [03:32.880 --> 03:34.780] Not two, but three special guests. [03:34.800 --> 03:39.220] I don't think we've ever had three guests other than a pre-Hope show at the same time. [03:39.220 --> 03:40.960] But we're going to get to that in just a moment. [03:40.960 --> 03:51.020] I wanted to preamble that just a little bit by calling attention to the fact that you can't do anything on the Internet these days without being monitored in one way or another. [03:51.180 --> 03:51.640] Have you noticed that? [03:52.240 --> 03:54.880] I just started to realize that this week. [03:55.340 --> 03:58.760] You know, obviously, you buy something, you're tracked. [03:58.960 --> 04:01.240] You connect to something, you're tracked. [04:01.500 --> 04:08.480] One of your computers connects to another computer someplace, and it's just constantly giving your information out. [04:10.160 --> 04:14.940] And it just doesn't feel like it used to feel, you know, way back in the good old days. [04:15.680 --> 04:21.100] And that's what we're going to be talking about tonight, is something different, something new that's been introduced. [04:21.100 --> 04:31.380] In fact, The Register had a great headline about this new project, which is called VEILID. [04:31.500 --> 04:34.280] It's spelled V-E-I-L-I-D, VEILID. [04:35.140 --> 04:40.180] A secure peer-to-peer network for apps that flips off the surveillance economy. [04:40.860 --> 04:42.600] How could you not love that right away? [04:43.240 --> 04:51.460] Joining us tonight, we have, and I'm going to use your handles, if you want to inject your real names as well, you're welcome to. [04:51.900 --> 04:53.160] We have Dildog. [04:55.660 --> 04:56.700] Feel free to say hi. [04:56.820 --> 04:57.160] Hey there. [04:57.340 --> 04:57.640] Okay. [04:58.820 --> 04:59.480] I exist. [04:59.760 --> 05:01.080] We have Medusa. [05:03.420 --> 05:03.940] Hi. [05:04.380 --> 05:04.800] How you doing? [05:05.060 --> 05:06.360] And we have The Gibson. [05:08.580 --> 05:09.420] Hi, everybody. [05:09.720 --> 05:10.240] Nice to see you. [05:10.240 --> 05:12.980] And if I mispronounced any of those names, let me know. [05:13.900 --> 05:27.740] But now, you folks just gave a big presentation over at DEF CON in Vegas, introducing this new peer-to-peer network, which seems like nothing I've ever really heard before. [05:28.200 --> 05:29.260] It's very ambitious. [05:29.400 --> 05:30.700] Wikipedia describes it this way. [05:30.960 --> 05:42.620] A peer-to-peer network and application framework released by Cult of the Dead Cow, which, yes, you folks are part of that amazing organization that's existed since 1984. [05:43.660 --> 05:47.920] Described by its authors as like Tor, but for apps. [05:47.960 --> 05:49.400] We'll explain that in a moment. [05:49.580 --> 05:57.800] It is written in Rust, runs on Linux, Mac OS, Windows, Android, iOS, and in browser WASM. [05:57.800 --> 06:04.440] Valid, I'm sorry, Valid Chat is a secure messaging application built on Valid. [06:04.600 --> 06:18.580] It borrows from both the Tor anonymizing router and the interplanetary file system to offer encrypted and anonymous peer-to-peer connection using a 256-bit public key as the only visible ID. [06:18.940 --> 06:22.480] Even details such as IP addresses are hidden. [06:24.100 --> 06:27.160] Well, let's start with where the inspiration for this came from. [06:27.240 --> 06:33.900] And I imagine the inspiration probably came from the incredible surveillance we find ourselves under on a daily basis increasingly. [06:37.700 --> 06:43.200] Yeah, I'll go ahead and start with a little bit of the history here. [06:43.460 --> 06:45.040] It was about four years ago. [06:46.020 --> 06:54.380] I was talking with Metas4 over here about the problems of social media. [06:54.900 --> 06:59.560] And, you know, we had started to see the cracks in the veneer of Twitter. [06:59.860 --> 07:05.460] And we've had a long history of problems with surveillance and monitoring of Facebook. [07:06.380 --> 07:10.100] And the question came around of how do we build something better? [07:10.100 --> 07:17.960] What would be the foundation that we would need to build to make privacy more accessible to everyone? [07:18.560 --> 07:27.020] Because, you know, you've got these great privacy frameworks like Tor and some initiatives around distributed storage. [07:27.020 --> 07:37.660] And you've got, you know, the federation-type social networks like Mastodon starting to come up. [07:39.020 --> 07:43.060] But a lot of the problems that these had were around accessibility. [07:43.320 --> 07:58.960] You know, making sure that, you know, your grandma and, you know, or anybody else, the regular people out there that aren't, you know, Linux system administrators would have a hard time sort of understanding or reaching those things. [07:59.160 --> 08:07.280] So, you know, we talked about this for like a good long year, thinking about how to make something that could reach those people. [08:07.660 --> 08:30.240] And we settled on designing a privacy-oriented framework that people could build apps with, regular apps that look like any other app, except the key difference being that these apps could talk directly to each other instead of relying on a cloud run by some billionaire that's hoovering up all your personal data. [08:31.320 --> 08:40.500] You know, finding a way to use the fact that we all have supercomputers in our pockets these days. [08:41.040 --> 08:48.800] You know, we all have these thousand-dollar iPhones and Android devices with... [08:48.800 --> 08:50.480] And you're paying for bandwidth already. [08:50.800 --> 08:56.980] You know, you're already paid into this, you know, huge computer powerhouse that you carry around with you. [08:56.980 --> 09:05.620] Why not leverage that to build a cloud that is everyone's computer instead of some centralized thing? [09:05.860 --> 09:13.740] You know, there's naturally going to be some challenges around data provenance, like where does the data live? [09:13.740 --> 09:14.980] How do you keep it safe? [09:15.140 --> 09:17.600] How do you keep people's IP addresses safe? [09:19.360 --> 09:31.340] And how do you, you know, give developers a choice, a better choice about how to build applications so that they don't feel the need to monetize every little thing about their users? [09:31.980 --> 09:34.060] I mean, maybe they want to sell ads. [09:34.200 --> 09:35.380] Maybe they want to do that stuff. [09:35.500 --> 09:39.960] But right now, if you have a big cloud bill to pay, you kind of have to. [09:40.160 --> 09:43.880] You can't offer free software because you got bills, you know. [09:43.880 --> 09:52.280] So, let's build a better system that removes some of the sort of perverse incentives to monetize people. [09:53.180 --> 09:59.060] You know, what strikes me is that why did it take so long for somebody to do something like this? [09:59.180 --> 10:01.120] Because this has been a problem for a while. [10:01.280 --> 10:02.940] It's getting to be more and more of a problem, obviously. [10:02.940 --> 10:12.460] But what you described, assuming it's easy to use, and that is key, that it's easy for non-technical people to be able to get a handle on this. [10:12.800 --> 10:17.200] But it would seem like somebody would have come up with an idea like this. [10:17.480 --> 10:20.820] Maybe it's just they didn't have the technical ability to put it together. [10:20.960 --> 10:22.240] Is that possible? [10:24.180 --> 10:26.340] There was some prior art, you know. [10:27.180 --> 10:31.080] You know, there's, you know, other little pieces of this. [10:31.800 --> 10:36.740] And again, you know, you've got a solution for private routing with Tor. [10:37.040 --> 10:42.440] But Tor kind of requires that you know how to set up a proxy and that you know what a proxy is. [10:43.840 --> 10:53.280] You know, there's IPFS, but you, again, have to set up a server someplace, and you don't have to know how all that works. [10:53.540 --> 10:55.880] So really, this is an accessibility thing. [10:56.450 --> 11:06.800] And, you know, there's so many technologists that build great tools but don't focus on accessibility in the end user. [11:07.700 --> 11:20.440] You know, getting all of the right things together in one place, but with the only success criteria being zero configuration, make it accessible to everybody, make it work with every kind of app. [11:20.620 --> 11:26.820] You know, I want VALID in messengers and social networks, but I also want it in video games. [11:27.160 --> 11:33.120] You know, I want it, you know, in every kind of app, you know. [11:33.900 --> 11:56.080] And that's the, you know, it was one of the critical design requirements of VALID was that, you know, it would be a framework that every app could use, not just, you know, pigeonholing us as a, you know, privacy-specific browser or a privacy-specific framework. [11:57.220 --> 12:00.400] It's really got to provide the tools to build any kind of app. [12:01.000 --> 12:03.160] That's what's going to make it successful, I think. [12:03.680 --> 12:03.960] Okay. [12:04.100 --> 12:05.360] Alex, I know you have something to say. [12:09.910 --> 12:10.670] Alex, go ahead. [12:10.890 --> 12:18.510] Yeah, I got a little lag here because I'm on the other side of the world and it's a little late, but I do have a couple of things. [12:18.690 --> 12:25.250] I have a couple of questions for you, Bill Dogg or Gibson or Mathusa, in terms of how this framework works. [12:25.250 --> 12:44.910] Could you explain to our listeners how this framework, this privacy-enhancing framework on which other things can be built would necessarily break this surveillance capitalism system that we see being employed universally throughout social media and throughout every popular app these days? [12:45.450 --> 12:55.490] How does that, excuse me, how does that work with respect to Twitter or Facebook or whatever the newest idiotic thing from Facebook is called, threads or something like that? [12:57.090 --> 12:57.250] Yeah. [12:58.730 --> 13:04.470] Well, I'm going to have everybody answer this alongside me because I think we all have different perspectives on this. [13:04.630 --> 13:13.830] But, you know, from my perspective, it's not necessarily going to be embraced by those who have a vested interest in the data economy. [13:13.830 --> 13:18.530] You're not going to, you know, rehabilitate Facebook or Twitter with this. [13:19.770 --> 13:33.770] But, you know, maybe it's time for people to build accessible alternatives to those services that don't have advertising or tracking built into them. [13:35.110 --> 13:38.430] I can tell you that, you know, I'm working on a chat app right now. [13:38.430 --> 13:42.390] And the chat app has zero cost to me. [13:42.590 --> 13:43.610] I write it. [13:43.750 --> 13:45.150] I publish it on the App Store. [13:45.810 --> 13:48.590] People, you know, it's in beta right now in TestFlight. [13:49.050 --> 13:50.610] My cost is zero. [13:51.250 --> 13:52.630] There is no cloud bill. [13:53.010 --> 13:53.790] There's nothing. [13:53.990 --> 13:58.150] I don't have to make a choice to monetize anything about anybody. [13:58.290 --> 13:59.890] I don't have to sell ads. [14:00.130 --> 14:08.270] It literally costs me nothing to run the infrastructure here because it's all just the users using the app their way. [14:10.930 --> 14:12.570] So, anyway, that's my perspective. [14:12.730 --> 14:13.910] Anybody else want to chime in there? [14:15.730 --> 14:30.130] I think one of the things that, you know, is really underlooked as far as a motivation for people to do things and pour their time and their energy into projects is the desire to do something that's worthwhile. [14:32.090 --> 14:42.570] Greed has kind of taken over our entire Internet, our industry, beyond just keeping the lights on and, you know, taking care of your family. [14:42.810 --> 14:47.370] I mean, these paychecks are getting huge and people are used to that. [14:47.670 --> 14:54.430] And they don't feel like, you know, some, you know, people have the idea that they just need to get paid. [14:54.430 --> 14:58.630] And I think there's a way to, you know, balance that. [14:58.890 --> 15:10.050] I remember when I was invited more recently, just a few years ago, into the Cult of the Dead Cow and how it felt to finally feel like I could maybe make a difference and do something with the platform that I was given. [15:10.050 --> 15:12.690] I wanted to get out there and hack the planet. [15:12.970 --> 15:16.690] And I hope other people feel the same way. [15:16.870 --> 15:24.930] And that's why we wanted to do this, you know, not only as individuals, but as the Cult of the Dead Cow, because I want to feel inspired. [15:25.010 --> 15:28.830] I want to feel motivated to get out there and do something that matters. [15:28.830 --> 15:30.390] And I hope that other people do, too. [15:30.430 --> 15:34.070] And we're building a great community of people that all have that same ideal. [15:34.750 --> 15:37.210] And I'm really excited to see where it's going. [15:37.930 --> 15:39.250] Any thoughts from you, Gibson? [15:40.950 --> 15:44.590] Yeah, I mean, you know, I'm going to kind of double down on what both of you said. [15:44.730 --> 15:46.710] I ran Hackers.Town starting in 2017. [15:47.410 --> 15:53.370] And starting that process and seeing if a community showed up for it was kind of mind-blowing to me that people actually are there. [15:53.670 --> 15:58.470] I know, for example, Rob has an account there and hangs out with us pretty regularly. [15:58.950 --> 16:03.410] One of the things I've been saying since the very beginning, two things I've been saying since the very beginning. [16:03.750 --> 16:08.310] You know, I built that place, Cargo Culting, off the work of the Cult of the Dead Cow. [16:08.310 --> 16:12.170] And I knew it when I did it, and I will freely admit to that anybody that asks. [16:12.510 --> 16:19.110] Because I didn't see enough of that early hacker-era mentality showing up in the modern age. [16:19.510 --> 16:22.690] And I may have been radicalized by political events around that time period. [16:22.690 --> 16:26.610] So, you know, I wanted to build something that was safe and allowed us to collaborate. [16:27.170 --> 16:28.330] And that happened. [16:28.410 --> 16:30.010] And people showed up for the party, and it was great. [16:30.310 --> 16:34.070] But, you know, even federated solutions like Mastodon have problems. [16:34.370 --> 16:40.290] Scrapers, ways that data can be mined off of those sites that are against the will of the people of the site or even the admins of the site. [16:40.290 --> 16:53.850] And having a distributed model like this that doesn't really have exit nodes onto the internet, so to speak, and makes it very difficult to mine that data, makes that data mining experience so expensive at the end of the day that there's no profit in it. [16:54.070 --> 16:56.390] So, to me, there's two sides. [16:56.390 --> 16:57.690] As Dildog said... [16:57.690 --> 17:01.230] Actually, there's three sides, because I'm throwing everything here. [17:01.410 --> 17:06.930] As Dildog said, there's, you know, there's very little cost, if any, to running these apps. [17:06.930 --> 17:12.010] So, it reduces the need for making money on the apps, for the app to survive. [17:13.610 --> 17:15.490] Secondly, it's about community for me. [17:15.650 --> 17:21.510] I want a safe place for my people to go and not feel like they're being watched every second or every day. [17:21.510 --> 17:24.850] And not even necessarily for malicious reasons. [17:25.210 --> 17:31.330] You know, I don't want them feeling like their data is being mined to be used against them or to market to them. [17:31.450 --> 17:32.150] It's not fair. [17:32.150 --> 17:32.910] It shouldn't be there. [17:32.910 --> 17:38.270] And I feel like we dropped the ball 20 years ago as a community when we didn't be louder about this. [17:38.430 --> 17:40.250] Kudos to the people in this room. [17:40.390 --> 17:41.430] I know we were all pretty loud. [17:41.590 --> 17:47.470] But, you know, as a whole, we didn't fight back enough to slow this down and kind of said, oh, that's great. [17:47.610 --> 17:48.470] You know, we've got Facebook. [17:48.610 --> 17:48.910] That's cool. [17:48.990 --> 17:49.930] I don't have to host stuff anymore. [17:50.610 --> 17:52.450] Except at the end of the day, we still did. [17:53.490 --> 17:55.430] Because that data was just being hoovered up. [17:56.430 --> 17:58.390] So, now, we get to this point. [17:58.530 --> 18:06.410] And my last third point here is that, you know, we're restoring the future that was supposed to happen, is the way I look at it. [18:06.510 --> 18:06.910] We are... [18:06.910 --> 18:16.690] We talked about this a lot, but we are in the position now where we're able to give people their own user agency back over their data construct, if you will. [18:16.690 --> 18:25.210] And I don't see a difference between that data construct that you put out on the Internet and your physical or mental self that you contain within you. [18:25.350 --> 18:26.450] They're all part of you. [18:26.510 --> 18:27.950] And those rights belong to you. [18:28.030 --> 18:32.070] And we shouldn't be able to give those away at the click of an agree to EULA button. [18:32.950 --> 18:36.390] So, that's why I'm here and why I think this is such a great turn of events. [18:36.390 --> 18:42.770] Because we have, finally, some tooling that allows us to engender these values in the developer community at large. [18:43.890 --> 18:44.630] Go ahead, Alex. [18:46.690 --> 18:48.690] I love all three of those answers. [18:48.950 --> 18:50.530] I think they're fascinating. [18:50.730 --> 18:59.990] And the way in which you articulated the economic incentives underlying this foundation, I think, is what can really be very disruptive here. [19:00.090 --> 19:15.150] Because if you think about how Twitter works or how any of these massive platforms, it's all about this cloud computing bill that they have at the end of the month that is going to cause them, essentially, to be enslaved to that surveillance economy model. [19:15.150 --> 19:21.450] Because they are indentured servants to AWS, or they're indentured servants, essentially, to Microsoft Azure. [19:21.790 --> 19:39.810] So, if you give developers an economic incentive to use this framework, namely, avoidance of this massive bill every single month, the way I see this is maybe this is going to be something akin to a rebirth or a renaissance for things like free software. [19:39.810 --> 19:43.950] I remember way back in the 90s when we saw shareware coming out. [19:44.070 --> 19:50.870] And it was great because you could play around and you could download shareware where there's a lot of open source things going on. [19:50.990 --> 19:59.330] It was just such a greater sense of collaboration and more communities popping up where people supported each other in these types of endeavors. [19:59.330 --> 20:06.190] And it seems to me like this might create that kind of community again, unless I'm getting it wrong. [20:06.330 --> 20:07.710] I'd love to hear your thoughts on it. [20:09.170 --> 20:14.890] We've jokingly referred to this internally as Web 1.5, instead of Web 3 or Web 2 or whatever. [20:14.890 --> 20:30.330] So, taking it back to kind of those principles that we saw that were good about the Internet back in the 90s and making them modern and setting up a way to succeed at that, and while at the same time respecting user agency. [20:32.930 --> 20:38.950] Now, I have to ask, what has the reaction been so far since you guys introduced this? [20:42.500 --> 20:44.800] So far, the reaction has been fantastic. [20:45.140 --> 20:48.080] We built a small community on Discord for now. [20:49.380 --> 21:02.240] And thus far, it's grown to about 1,400 people that are all working together, that are sharing different ways, that they are, you know, building and putting nodes on different things. [21:02.440 --> 21:04.220] I've seen nodes being put on. [21:04.400 --> 21:07.660] People are kind of trying to put them on the craziest things they can. [21:07.660 --> 21:11.240] And it's been wonderful to see just people come together. [21:11.240 --> 21:16.660] And it's not only the people that are, you know, technically capable enough to put nodes on. [21:16.740 --> 21:32.080] We've also got a lot of people in there that are, you know, want to make sure that they'll be able to help out with accessibility or, you know, marketing and getting this in the right hands and making sure that it's going to be approachable and usable for everyone. [21:32.080 --> 21:40.920] Not just, you know, the people that are in on this phone call or, you know, listening to this, the people that, you know, understand computers. [21:41.160 --> 21:49.100] We, you know, we have an entire generation of people that use maybe one to three websites. [21:49.100 --> 21:52.500] One of them is Facebook, they got Google, and maybe one more. [21:52.820 --> 21:56.080] But it's, they're being tracked in every way, shape, or form. [21:56.220 --> 22:00.400] And we're kind of stuck using those websites because of them. [22:01.280 --> 22:10.820] There's a lot of people that still use Facebook because they, that's the only way they really can connect with, you know, Aunt Sally or their neighbor growing up. [22:10.820 --> 22:18.820] And they can show off pictures of the kids and, you know, share with their, their life with them without, um, having to actually make a phone call. [22:18.960 --> 22:21.020] And we're all kind of stuck using Facebook too. [22:21.320 --> 22:31.600] So if we can get those folks comfortable enough to get off the only social media platform that they've ever used, if we can get our parents off of Facebook, we are free. [22:33.700 --> 22:34.140] Wow. [22:34.580 --> 22:34.980] Kyle, go ahead. [22:35.160 --> 22:46.820] I just, uh, I wanted to ask what, uh, for some of our listeners who may not be developers and may not be working on the project, what, what is it like to, uh, use something that has implemented this? [22:46.960 --> 22:50.780] And, or what can people expect when they do find it in different places? [22:50.980 --> 22:58.720] Is there anything different about using it with all of these different, um, layers having, uh, increased protection? [22:58.720 --> 23:01.980] What, what, what does that look like functionally for, for users? [23:03.940 --> 23:09.320] Well, um, currently there are no practical apps that use the framework yet. [23:09.580 --> 23:10.540] We are working on it. [23:10.740 --> 23:18.020] Um, however, we do have a demonstration app called the valid chat that should be open sourced very soon. [23:18.240 --> 23:21.320] Um, I am just working on cleaning up some of my ugly source code. [23:21.480 --> 23:32.580] Um, but in general, uh, uh, uh, you can expect that the apps that use valid will feel, uh, practically the same, uh, as any other app. [23:32.900 --> 23:41.620] Uh, one of the, uh, sort of primary design constraints was that, uh, that it was mobile first. [23:42.100 --> 23:47.800] Uh, so we're talking Android and iOS as well as Windows, Mac, Linux, et cetera, and web apps. [23:48.140 --> 23:58.140] Um, but for that to really work, you have to be plugging into the kinds of frameworks that, um, mobile app developers expect, you know? [23:58.140 --> 24:04.840] So we chose Flutter as a, uh, sort of first flagship UI platform. [24:05.060 --> 24:12.240] So, uh, Flutter apps are things like, you know, they'll look like your DoorDash app or the Instacart app. [24:12.380 --> 24:18.760] Those, those kinds of apps, uh, React Native is coming along very quickly as well, uh, support for that. [24:18.760 --> 24:36.580] Uh, so all of the sort of professional, smooth, uh, web, uh, uh, web-oriented but mobile first development frameworks that, uh, all these professional apps are written in, Valid is a first-class plug-in for all those things. [24:36.580 --> 24:51.400] So you won't really notice the difference, um, you know, for Valid Chat, maybe signing up is a little different experience because you're not, like, putting in an email and a password and then have it email you to verify that you're at that email. [24:51.700 --> 24:53.760] You don't have to give Valid Chat your email. [24:54.220 --> 25:11.600] Uh, when you sign up, you put in a name you'd like to be referred to as, um, and it creates an invitation, which is like a little QR code or a, a little blob of text that you can paste to your friend and your friend can accept your invitation by, you know, [25:11.680 --> 25:19.480] pasting that into their copy of Valid Chat, um, you know, the, the actual sort of sign-up process is going to feel a little different. [25:19.660 --> 25:26.480] Right now, Valid does not have a concept of identity as, as like a one blessed way to refer to people. [25:27.280 --> 25:33.180] Um, that's sort of a feature as well as, uh, you know, uh, an early development constraint. [25:33.640 --> 25:41.020] Um, but the idea here is that you're not going to be going through a lot of the same authentication systems that you might be used to. [25:41.080 --> 25:43.700] You're not going to log in with Apple or log in with Google. [25:44.160 --> 25:52.660] Uh, you're not going to be using, they're not going to have that opportunity to use your identity, uh, as like a convenient login. [25:53.320 --> 26:03.860] Um, that's sort of where the data collection process starts, you know, and we're trying to make sure that, that isn't part of the apps that, um, that people write with Valid. [26:04.200 --> 26:04.680] Fascinating. [26:04.940 --> 26:05.640] Uh, Gila, did you have something? [26:07.260 --> 26:08.400] Uh, you're muted, Gila. [26:11.330 --> 26:11.810] Sorry. [26:12.050 --> 26:12.750] Let's try that again. [26:13.490 --> 26:21.850] Um, I am actually transmitting a question that we have been asked over Mastodon, um, from a listener who goes by the name Adam. [26:22.370 --> 26:23.730] So here's the question. [26:23.910 --> 26:31.810] Can you explain how Valid is different than I2P and why Valid doesn't leverage I2P under the hood? [26:33.190 --> 26:33.330] Wow. [26:34.550 --> 26:35.110] Okay. [26:35.370 --> 26:37.930] Um, well, I'm no expert on I2P first off. [26:38.310 --> 26:43.250] Um, second, uh, there are a lot of other frameworks, uh, out there. [26:43.410 --> 26:51.730] Uh, I started working on this four years ago, uh, specifically with mobile devices in mind. [26:51.950 --> 27:02.330] None of the other frameworks out there really considered the reality of switching between networks on a regular basis and having really high node churn. [27:02.690 --> 27:11.110] So a lot of these node-based systems have like a, um, an expectation of uptime to some extent. [27:11.750 --> 27:26.610] Um, Valid was designed for something that might be offline and then come online on a cellular network and then get on a Wi-Fi network and then you drive past a Starbucks and then switch to another one and then you get home and you're on your private network. [27:26.970 --> 27:39.950] Uh, having nodes that are actually truly mobile does complicate some of the underlying routing and, um, node liveness checks and things that you have to do. [27:40.490 --> 27:51.950] Um, designing with that in mind, I felt was really important because that's how a lot of the sort of ad hoc nature of networks, um, uh, is going to be going forward. [27:52.190 --> 28:01.230] Um, you're just not always going to have nodes that are static IPs or, you know, um, running on a little server in your house. [28:01.230 --> 28:10.030] You know, I looked at a lot of the sort of web 3.0 style cryptocurrency based, uh, uh, networks like this. [28:10.130 --> 28:23.950] And a lot of them did sort of require some kind of either a device or, uh, um, you know, some kind of server that you run, uh, you know, so they were, they were, they were not designing with this use case in mind. [28:24.470 --> 28:44.750] Um, this way, you know, I got a lot of design flexibility, you know, um, you know, between that and some, uh, you know, I'd say that private routing is one of the big things we do differently and we do, do pretty well, but there's a lot of other design choices we made in valid that did not translate from other, [28:44.970 --> 28:47.970] um, other systems. [28:48.190 --> 28:50.790] Like our distributed hash table model is very different. [28:51.050 --> 28:53.910] Uh, when you get down to it, it's got, it's faster. [28:54.090 --> 28:55.690] It has more data locality. [28:55.850 --> 29:06.650] I could go on and on about the, the technical reasons why I made those choices, but I wanted that creative flexibility and I couldn't get that just embracing IPFS. [29:07.110 --> 29:08.730] Frankly, IPFS is slow. [29:09.410 --> 29:24.710] Um, Tor also kind of slow, but the reasons why they're kind of slow for my use case anyway, uh, kind of fade away a little bit if I can just take all the parts that are, are slow and optimize those down to the, just the parts we need. [29:25.470 --> 29:37.570] Um, you know, so, uh, yeah, it was a performance and, uh, uh, you know, choice, but also you got to get that core small enough that it could, you know, fit into a mobile app without any trouble. [29:37.850 --> 29:40.670] So just a lot of sort of technical design constraints. [29:41.150 --> 29:41.810] Rob, go ahead. [29:43.270 --> 29:56.490] Um, yeah, I, uh, I think, uh, I'd like to go back a little bit to, uh, I think what Kyle mentioned and, uh, some others, which is the, uh, the user end of this and, uh, how this is not an app in itself. [29:56.650 --> 29:57.970] It's a framework for apps. [29:58.190 --> 30:12.750] Um, I think, uh, a lot of the power of this idea is in the security when, when somebody, when a user, even a non-technical user gets hold of an app that's built with this framework, um, it's going to be pretty much push a button and go. [30:13.010 --> 30:15.730] It's, it's not going to require separate things. [30:15.910 --> 30:23.350] Like if you were using Tor or if you were using some sort of proxy or something else, um, the other common privacy protecting methods out there. [30:23.750 --> 30:33.450] Um, so like, could, uh, could you talk a little bit about that as just sort of what it means for the end user to be able to just use something that was developed on this? [30:33.710 --> 30:33.810] Yeah. [30:33.890 --> 30:36.750] And keeping in mind that most of our audience is non-technical. [30:36.930 --> 30:38.570] We're broadcasting in New York city. [30:38.930 --> 30:47.330] So, uh, as if you're talking to an elderly relative, uh, if we can get them excited about this, I think, I think that's the mission here. [30:47.690 --> 30:52.410] Um, I, I mean, ultimately, Caitlin, go ahead. [30:58.110 --> 30:58.530] Okay. [30:58.610 --> 30:59.430] Well, somebody has to go. [31:02.390 --> 31:14.870] Oh, ultimately, um, you know, thus far, a lot of privacy focused, uh, apps have been very just difficult and kind of a pain to use. [31:15.190 --> 31:27.310] Um, you know, it's very difficult to convince somebody that has been using, you know, their method of remembering passwords to even switch to something like a password manager. [31:27.570 --> 31:39.810] Uh, even though they know it's in their best interest, just the, you know, absolute overwhelmingness of it all can be enough to turn somebody off from trying it. [31:40.010 --> 31:46.790] Um, one of the things that we really want to build in from the beginning is, uh, making sure that these apps don't feel any different. [31:47.570 --> 31:54.850] Uh, Mastodon is wonderful in the way that it connects people, um, and the way that they are, you know, handling privacy. [31:54.850 --> 32:04.190] And I'm not here to talk any smack about Mastodon, but they also make it extremely difficult for a person to sign in on mobile. [32:04.350 --> 32:06.550] And they did not put mobile first. [32:06.650 --> 32:09.050] And that's how most of us use social media these days. [32:09.950 --> 32:15.970] Um, they didn't make it easy to, you know, sign back in after you had made a username. [32:16.410 --> 32:21.110] It just was very off-putting for most people. [32:21.230 --> 32:28.730] And that's why it didn't get widely adopted outside of the tech communities or, you know, the generations of people that grew up with the internet. [32:29.410 --> 32:38.410] The difference with Valid is we want to create usable apps and helpful apps, um, that don't feel any different. [32:38.570 --> 32:44.230] There is not going to be a time or a frustration cost to having that extra privacy. [32:47.430 --> 32:47.970] Okay. [32:48.410 --> 32:53.970] Uh, so yeah, to speak to Rob's point too, that's the whole point of the framework, right? [32:54.350 --> 33:03.390] Um, ultimately we're providing that tool so that other developers can come in and develop apps that bake this in right from the layer zero, right? [33:03.530 --> 33:07.110] So whenever they start to build an app, they have a great idea for an app. [33:07.370 --> 33:11.570] They don't have to worry about figuring out how to make it private or secure it. [33:11.830 --> 33:15.030] And they can rely on the Valid framework to do that for them. [33:15.210 --> 33:27.290] So ultimately, uh, it puts us in a position of being able to help anybody that wants to do this, anybody that wants to move into a more private model for, uh, for the data economy, if you will. [33:27.770 --> 33:30.150] Um, it gives them the tools to do that. [33:30.370 --> 33:38.970] So at the end of the day, the ease of use for that privacy becomes much simpler for all users because they're just downloading an app from an app store, right? [33:39.310 --> 33:43.030] And the privacy is baked in because it's at the base layer of everything is correct. [33:44.690 --> 33:57.070] So ultimately the idea is to change the entire way that your personal data's privacy is approached and make it easy for developers to do so, so that everybody can benefit from this in the water. [33:59.570 --> 34:08.170] And something else that I think, um, uh, might be of interest to, uh, some of our casual listeners, uh, you all mentioned call to the dead cow, and we've talked about that, uh, quite a bit. [34:08.170 --> 34:15.090] Um, can, um, uh, can we say anything, uh, perhaps something reassuring about, uh, it's not really a cult. [34:15.270 --> 34:16.630] Uh, there are no dead cows. [34:16.910 --> 34:18.870] Uh, what, what, what, what does it actually mean? [34:18.870 --> 34:22.330] Because we obviously all revere this organization, but, but why? [34:22.770 --> 34:24.110] I guess that's what I'm looking for. [34:24.110 --> 34:26.890] Uh, why call to the dead cow? [34:27.410 --> 34:45.830] Um, CDC having a very long view on the computer, uh, social revolution, uh, acknowledges that there's a lot of opportunity to sort of connect with people over different kinds of media. [34:46.070 --> 34:57.670] You know, CDC's first publications were things that, you know, people would not get from Walden books or your local bookstore. [34:57.910 --> 35:04.610] It was weird text files that you could get only from downloading from a bulletin board system, but it was homebrew publication. [35:04.610 --> 35:17.090] It was a way of reaching people with weird alternative ideas and cool stories and, uh, narrative fiction and, you know, the lyrics to Metallica songs. [35:17.210 --> 35:26.110] I mean, whatever it was, you know, we had a, a, a channel to distribute this, the, the, the, the message of, of CDC. [35:26.610 --> 35:35.450] You know, over the years, we've done our best to sort of constantly, you know, we pull down the pants of Microsoft on a regular basis. [35:35.690 --> 35:44.570] You know, we got to be a thorn in the side of a lot of different organizations, uh, with either security advisories or various hijinks at different conferences. [35:45.350 --> 35:50.130] Um, you know, our members have gotten involved in a lot of different political movements as well. [35:50.750 --> 35:53.190] Uh, you know, CDC is not just hackers. [35:53.710 --> 36:10.370] CDC is about a worldwide artistic and scientific effort to extend people's accessibility to weird information and cool things that they should, you know, be able to build communities around. [36:10.650 --> 36:15.830] Uh, you know, the hacker community is just one, but if you know, we've got, we're full of artists and musicians. [36:16.570 --> 36:23.770] Uh, you know, if anything, CDC is trying to be a worldwide organization and that requires a worldwide skill set. [36:24.070 --> 36:37.210] Um, you don't build the revolution of application privacy on the back of just some hacker privacy mindset. [36:37.490 --> 36:41.310] You have to look at it from people and the way they communicate. [36:41.770 --> 36:45.690] CDC has a fundamental understanding of how people communicate. [36:45.950 --> 36:50.890] We've leveraged it sometimes for our own gain, sometimes for entertainment. [36:51.430 --> 37:03.130] Uh, you know, sometimes just for, uh, you know, for the, for the heck of it, you know, um, we've done some pretty, uh, loud and boisterous things. [37:03.290 --> 37:04.090] People pay attention. [37:04.290 --> 37:05.490] We're leveraging that. [37:05.670 --> 37:16.890] We're trying to, you know, use that pulpit that we have to spread the word that privacy is something that everyone deserves and it shouldn't be as hard get as it is today. [37:17.230 --> 37:20.050] And if I'm not mistaken, you guys have been around for 40 years now. [37:22.010 --> 37:22.370] Yeah. [37:22.610 --> 37:24.450] Some of us, uh, longer than others. [37:24.710 --> 37:28.190] That's, that's, I mean, we have been too, but wow, that's, that's simply amazing. [37:28.310 --> 37:29.870] Alex, I, I believe you had some question. [37:31.870 --> 37:32.970] You're, you're muted, Alex. [37:33.230 --> 37:33.430] Yeah. [37:33.690 --> 37:36.430] Yeah, no, I'm, I'm just, I'm a little bit of a lag here. [37:36.690 --> 37:39.030] Um, I, I love the history of the CDC. [37:39.350 --> 37:50.170] And I mean, I remember revering CDC back when I was 15 years old, uh, and I was so excited to meet CDC members at the first hope conference back in, in 1994. [37:50.710 --> 38:02.210] Um, and I think, was it the first hope conference or maybe the second one when, uh, the CDC revealed back orifice that was, you know, you talked about being a thorn in the side of Microsoft. [38:02.670 --> 38:07.050] That was, that was, was that the first hope that was actually at DEFCON six. [38:07.650 --> 38:12.650] Oh, the surgeon surgistic released it at DEFCON six, uh, in 1998. [38:13.210 --> 38:13.330] Yeah. [38:13.470 --> 38:14.410] So that's quite some time ago. [38:14.430 --> 38:15.230] I thought it was at hope. [38:15.410 --> 38:18.410] I thought we were at hope shortly thereafter that you probably ran into us at home. [38:18.670 --> 38:18.670] Yeah. [38:18.670 --> 38:19.430] We talked about it. [38:19.970 --> 38:20.690] Yeah, we did. [38:20.790 --> 38:21.590] We did have a presentation. [38:21.830 --> 38:21.970] Uh-huh. [38:22.290 --> 38:22.950] Got, gotcha. [38:23.030 --> 38:26.270] We've been celebrating the 25th anniversary of black back orifice. [38:26.570 --> 38:27.230] Oh, wow. [38:28.130 --> 38:28.870] Oh, wow. [38:29.090 --> 38:29.830] That is amazing. [38:29.830 --> 38:36.770] Uh, but, but I have, I know another point to go back to, to Valet for a second, if, if, if we don't mind. [38:37.530 --> 38:41.630] Um, but I think it really does dovetail with the evolution of CDC here. [38:41.890 --> 38:44.910] The point that I'm trying to make is that the times have changed. [38:45.030 --> 38:45.730] Things are different. [38:46.390 --> 38:50.470] Uh, a lot of the original CDC members were all grown up now. [38:50.690 --> 38:57.870] Some of us are, uh, you know, cybersecurity professionals, politicians, lawyers, poets, et cetera. [38:57.870 --> 39:00.390] Uh, but a lot of us have kids, right? [39:00.550 --> 39:11.610] So a lot of, you know, and, and here's where I think Valet could be so interesting and, and really find a niche area because you think back to, God, was it last year? [39:11.950 --> 39:15.010] We're, we're in the throes of, uh, another election cycle. [39:15.390 --> 39:23.210] We're talking about my, he was, uh, eight or nine years old at then, my oldest child, but, uh, watching YouTube videos. [39:23.370 --> 39:26.910] Well, we, we live in New York, but we have a little house over in Pennsylvania. [39:26.910 --> 39:28.450] You're off into the radio show from there. [39:28.850 --> 39:32.870] And he was bombarded because of his IP address being in Pennsylvania. [39:32.870 --> 39:45.790] And it was the midterm elections with political ads on kids, YouTube videos about John Fetterman and how he was going to release criminals out in the wild and destroy the character of Pennsylvania. [39:46.070 --> 39:47.990] You know, and this really upset my son. [39:48.110 --> 39:49.730] He didn't know what the hell was going on there. [39:49.970 --> 40:02.370] And so I see perhaps these apps that could be developed on the valid framework to be very parent friendly or be very child friendly in a sense, because they are anti surveillance. [40:02.590 --> 40:05.150] You know, that your child is not going to be surveilled or tracked. [40:05.290 --> 40:13.470] And just the whole idea that my child has a profile on YouTube and is being tracked and psychologically profiled from such a young age. [40:13.490 --> 40:16.170] And that data will, will track with him forever. [40:16.790 --> 40:20.670] If he's not careful about it, it's really disquieting to me. [40:20.670 --> 40:26.990] But I see valid as something that can break that cycle by not letting it even happen in the first place. [40:29.950 --> 40:30.430] Absolutely. [40:30.810 --> 40:32.730] And it gets more sinister than that, too. [40:32.890 --> 40:41.370] Not only are they, you know, advertising things to our children, but they're also collecting our data and they're selling that off to the highest bidder. [40:41.890 --> 40:43.970] And I'm talking about various platforms here. [40:44.090 --> 40:51.910] But say you join a group, you know, a support group on Facebook about, you know, your depression or a health issue that you have. [40:52.070 --> 40:59.250] Do you think that somehow that's not going to, you know, find its way in the data economy to, you know, insurance carriers? [40:59.590 --> 41:06.410] And then someday generations from now, that may be held against the people that you care about the most. [41:07.650 --> 41:12.190] And we're not really looking at the very sinister aspects of all of this. [41:12.430 --> 41:21.330] We just saw, you know, somebody was arrested recently due to planning to get some health care over Facebook Messenger. [41:21.970 --> 41:28.050] And that that just shows that this is taking a very sinister turn. [41:28.430 --> 41:34.510] And we need to put a stop to it, not only for us, but yes, for the future generations to come. [41:35.190 --> 41:37.050] And we're just talking about this country. [41:37.230 --> 41:40.650] Imagine, uh, in other countries where things might be even worse. [41:40.650 --> 41:44.910] Uh, this, this kind of a tool, uh, could be a lifesaver in many cases, I think. [41:49.740 --> 41:50.220] Absolutely. [41:50.220 --> 41:53.700] We talked about that extensively in the early days of this. [41:54.520 --> 42:03.000] Um, ultimately the idea is to help engender that privacy of communications that we all feel like we can take for granted, but doesn't exist anymore. [42:03.760 --> 42:16.120] And whether that be, you know, someone, uh, in, in an oppressive state, uh, or someone that's just looking to communicate quietly with someone they love, it doesn't matter, right? [42:16.220 --> 42:18.000] Those things all come into play here. [42:18.260 --> 42:20.560] Good use is, uh, is good use. [42:20.720 --> 42:25.420] And I think one of the other jokes we've had internally is calling this chaotic good as a service, right? [42:25.600 --> 42:29.940] Ultimately, we want to empower people to be people. [42:30.840 --> 42:35.020] Now, are there any, uh, safety concerns that you've discussed? [42:35.260 --> 42:38.680] Um, we, we, we know of good people that want to use this tool. [42:38.800 --> 42:40.960] What about bad people who might want to use this tool? [42:41.060 --> 42:47.940] Is there, is there some kind of a freedom that, uh, you might inadvertently be giving, uh, evil people to carry on with their work? [42:50.760 --> 42:54.900] That was one of the things that, you know, Dil had brought to me from the very beginning. [42:54.900 --> 43:11.260] My history, personally, um, as far as any of this, the, where I found myself in life these days, um, and everything was, uh, a few years ago, uh, somebody stole my ex's phone and shared some pictures on the internet that I didn't want to be out there. [43:11.580 --> 43:18.980] And I got angry and I started organizing other victims of what is commonly referred to as revenge porn. [43:19.380 --> 43:26.860] Um, but I prefer to the term non-consensual image abuse, uh, started organizing the victims, helping change laws. [43:27.080 --> 43:33.180] And, you know, essentially without realizing I had done it, I was, I was doing a hacktivism. [43:33.820 --> 43:44.340] And, you know, that was the first time that I was introduced into any sort of community here, um, um, cyber security, hacking, um, any of that. [43:44.480 --> 43:51.000] And, you know, when Dil first approached me, he was, you know, a little concerned about that. [43:51.140 --> 43:56.020] He said, you know, we want to make sure that we are building something that is a net good for the world. [43:56.220 --> 44:04.160] And so we have really spent a lot of time discussing, um, the various, you know, methods that we can use to keep this safe. [44:04.620 --> 44:09.160] And, uh, to make sure that this isn't going to just turn into a big old monster. [44:09.460 --> 44:16.100] And we've got some ideas to address that, uh, when we get there though, because as of right now, it is a framework. [44:16.100 --> 44:19.140] It is something for people to build with. [44:19.680 --> 44:22.760] And, you know, it's just the code. [44:22.900 --> 44:36.660] Once we get to the part where we're actually building apps and working with developers and getting those out there, that's when we're really going to be able to, uh, show some of the unique ways that we have, uh, started to address this issue and that we plan on approaching it. [44:38.080 --> 44:43.920] Yeah, there are, uh, you know, going to be a lot of apps using Valid. [44:44.220 --> 44:50.620] Um, the thing to remember is that Valid itself, uh, is just a framework for building apps. [44:50.840 --> 44:57.180] It doesn't make an effort to somewhat, I don't know, police what apps do with the framework. [44:57.460 --> 45:08.420] That said, uh, uh, it, uh, has been designed, uh, with, uh, sort of data, data provenance in mind. [45:08.620 --> 45:22.220] Uh, the one thing that, if anything, we've decided was a net good for the world, uh, was, uh, to make it difficult to simply drag net the data of a bunch of innocent people. [45:22.880 --> 45:42.980] Uh, there's so many opportunities for people to get mislabeled, uh, or to accidentally stumble, uh, into these sort of, uh, data drag nets, uh, that have become, uh, you know, fashionable letters to Facebook where they just dump everyone's private messages to law enforcement. [45:43.340 --> 45:56.120] You know, uh, you know, you don't get a pass in the law enforcement community for simply, you know, warrantlessly searching everyone's information. [45:56.480 --> 46:15.340] Certain kinds of law enforcement actions should require more care from law enforcement than, than they, you know, and more, uh, more sensitivity to the people being searched than, uh, than they get today. [46:16.420 --> 46:24.540] Um, it is somewhat of a reckless process by which people's data is hoovered into mass surveillance. [46:25.140 --> 46:44.300] Um, this does not mean that, you know, criminals are given a pass to operate over, over valid, um, individual applications that do not adhere to say the, uh, app store policies of Apple or the Google play store will still have their apps removed. [46:44.540 --> 46:50.120] You know, you can't just go in, you know, do whatever you want over valid and get away with it. [46:50.300 --> 46:55.300] You have to still follow the rules of these platforms that distribute the applications in the first place. [46:55.980 --> 47:01.920] Um, so I don't think this makes things more difficult or any worse. [47:02.420 --> 47:23.340] Uh, you know, if people are going to do bad things today, they're going to do it over tour, they're going to do it over other mediums, uh, you know, the, the biggest, you know, non-consensual and underage, uh, you know, pornography and, uh, you know, image abuse, [47:23.560 --> 47:30.200] uh, you know, the, the biggest, uh, offenders here are going to be the large social networks anyway. [47:30.600 --> 47:33.200] It's going to be the Facebooks, you know, they've got all this stuff. [47:33.480 --> 47:49.980] Uh, if anything, You know, they've started to tackle those issues by using technologies like Microsoft Photo DNA to scan people's uploads and, you know, look for missing and exploited children, stuff like that. [47:51.480 --> 47:53.700] You know, those are closed source technologies. [47:53.700 --> 47:56.880] Those are not accessible to every single app developer out there. [47:56.980 --> 47:57.900] And that's somewhat of a shame. [47:57.900 --> 48:07.180] You know, if Valid helps people demand access to libraries like that and tools, [48:19.220 --> 48:39.540] these databases, you know, you know, if you if you get enough people in charge of their own content, instead of just outsourcing it all to Facebook, you're going to see making those kinds of like reports and collaborate. [48:40.920 --> 48:59.940] efforts to, you know, unmask, you know, you know, people committing crimes or whatever you're going to have an opportunity to do that on a more personal level than simply centralizing everything and just dragnetting people who might not actually have anything to do with it. [48:59.940 --> 49:10.560] You know, it's interesting because we talk about how people are being surveilled and monitored and watched, but I don't think people realize the extent of it. [49:10.660 --> 49:20.440] And Dildog, you mentioned Tor just a moment ago, and I believe at DEF CON, you said that the NSA runs 100 Tor exit nodes. [49:20.900 --> 49:23.160] I don't think most people realize that. [49:23.500 --> 49:25.380] What are the implications of something like that? [49:27.980 --> 49:44.280] Well, you know, it's, you know, not, it turns out that it's not as hard as you'd think to, to monitor systems like that when you have control over the, the way people use it from the entry point to the exit point. [49:45.480 --> 49:56.480] You know, with Valid, you're looking at millions and millions of nodes, so it becomes harder to, to monetize, sorry, monetize, I keep saying that word, but to, to monitor, you know, when you have that many nodes. [49:57.880 --> 50:07.680] The more data, the long and short is that if you keep the data in the network, it becomes a lot harder to, to, to monitor it and to, to, to spy on it. [50:07.680 --> 50:21.800] But as soon as you leave the network, then, you know, you're back on the regular internet, unencrypted and, you know, so if there is no edge, you, you don't get anything by monitoring the edge that doesn't exist, you know? [50:21.880 --> 50:28.220] So we're trying to make sure that everything can be done in network and it will make things a lot safer for people. [50:28.580 --> 50:31.320] Last question I have to ask, tell us about the name. [50:35.490 --> 50:38.110] It, this was my, uh, creation. [50:38.530 --> 50:41.690] It is valid, veiled ID. [50:43.330 --> 50:43.790] Okay. [50:46.630 --> 50:50.930] Just a bunch of words that I just put together and it works. [50:50.930 --> 50:58.450] Uh, and there has been a lot of, you know, you asked earlier what the response was, has been thus far, and there's been a lot of talk about our name. [50:58.450 --> 51:04.030] And, and that seems to be the thing that everybody is, you know, the most upset about thus far. [51:04.150 --> 51:07.630] So, Hey, if we're, I like the name, why people have said the name? [51:07.690 --> 51:12.650] I mean, maybe you could, you could capitalize ID if you want to make it more obvious, but I don't, I don't think you need to. [51:13.790 --> 51:20.850] Uh, uh, people keep mispronouncing it or, uh, uh, they just, they don't like the name, but we're rolling with it. [51:21.090 --> 51:21.950] It doesn't matter. [51:22.270 --> 51:25.670] Just say it's a framework and say like, no, it's not an app. [51:25.870 --> 51:27.330] It doesn't have to be, it's like whiz bang. [51:27.330 --> 51:30.210] I didn't like the name 2600 when we started and look what happened. [51:30.410 --> 51:31.810] So it's, uh, yeah, don't listen to them. [51:32.190 --> 51:32.590] Right. [51:33.170 --> 51:33.390] Okay. [51:33.510 --> 51:39.550] We're in our last minute, uh, contact info, uh, ways that people can, can get involved, learn more. [51:40.030 --> 51:40.430] Go for it. [51:41.310 --> 51:43.630] Everything is on veiled.com. [51:43.790 --> 51:47.670] That's spelled V E I L I D.com. [51:47.950 --> 51:49.310] You can check out the code. [51:49.450 --> 51:50.890] Uh, there's links to the community. [51:50.890 --> 51:53.010] We talk about our ideals there. [51:53.250 --> 51:56.690] Um, people that, you know, have questions can always join our discord. [51:56.910 --> 52:01.710] That's also listed on there, or they can follow us on various social media apps. [52:01.870 --> 52:04.690] Uh, if anybody wants to talk about those. [52:07.190 --> 52:07.930] Does anybody? [52:08.410 --> 52:08.590] Yeah. [52:09.170 --> 52:11.970] Yeah, we have, uh, they're all listed on the site. [52:12.210 --> 52:17.890] Um, you know, we actually have veiled networks at hackers.town, uh, uh, which is one of the, uh, one of the official accounts. [52:18.170 --> 52:22.730] Uh, we have accounts on, uh, uh, X slash Twitter, blue sky. [52:23.590 --> 52:34.530] Um, I'm, I'm sure I'm missing some others, uh, because the entire social media landscape is on fire and there's too many, uh, too many offerings, but, uh, those are all listed on the site. [52:34.650 --> 52:37.750] If you choose to follow us there, you can also submit questions to us through any of those accounts. [52:38.490 --> 52:42.810] And you guys, according to your site, you are not looking for investor funding. [52:42.950 --> 52:43.290] Is that correct? [52:44.590 --> 52:46.530] We are purely a non-profit. [52:47.290 --> 52:52.490] Small, small dollar amounts can be donated through the, uh, site, but we are not looking for investor funding. [52:52.610 --> 52:55.790] This is meant to stay non-capitalist and free to the world. [52:56.190 --> 52:56.630] Awesome. [52:56.910 --> 52:57.130] Wow. [52:57.330 --> 52:59.410] I hope you can stick around for overtime at eight. [52:59.770 --> 53:05.470] Um, all three of you or any of you, uh, and, um, uh, best of luck with all this. [53:05.610 --> 53:07.730] Congratulations on, on, on starting it. [53:07.830 --> 53:13.130] I know there's a long road ahead, but what you're doing is, is truly amazing and you're the right people to be doing it. [53:13.270 --> 53:13.810] So thank you. [53:15.570 --> 53:16.770] Thank you for having us. [53:17.350 --> 53:21.950] You can write to us at off the hook OTH at 2600.com. [53:22.470 --> 53:24.170] I believe we're on next week. [53:24.190 --> 53:27.610] And if so, then tune in at seven o'clock on WBAI. [53:27.850 --> 53:31.710] In the meantime, stay tuned to WBAI or join us over on YouTube. [53:31.710 --> 53:36.610] Follow the link on the 2600.com webpage, or just go to channel 2600. [53:36.610 --> 53:38.410] And we'll continue this conversation over there. [53:38.850 --> 53:40.150] And you can even call in. [53:40.690 --> 53:41.530] We'll see you next time. [53:41.630 --> 53:41.790] Good night. [00:00.000 --> 00:04.140] And welcome everybody on YouTube to Off the Hook Overtime. [00:04.660 --> 00:06.020] Let's make sure we all made it. [00:06.560 --> 00:07.760] Kyle, you're with us? [00:08.180 --> 00:08.900] Yes, I'm right here. [00:09.060 --> 00:10.180] Rob, Gila, did you make it? [00:10.840 --> 00:11.460] We're here. [00:11.860 --> 00:12.260] Awesome. [00:12.420 --> 00:13.720] And are we actually on YouTube? [00:14.240 --> 00:15.360] That's always a good question. [00:16.620 --> 00:17.180] We are. [00:17.300 --> 00:17.460] Okay. [00:18.080 --> 00:20.560] And who has... all three of our guests are with us. [00:20.620 --> 00:21.560] And I think we lost Alex. [00:21.680 --> 00:22.420] Is that true? [00:24.700 --> 00:25.300] Yes, indeed. [00:25.480 --> 00:26.100] That is exactly the case. [00:26.300 --> 00:26.500] Okay. [00:26.760 --> 00:26.960] All right. [00:26.960 --> 00:31.320] Alex had to step away and sleep in, you know, Slovenian bed. [00:31.540 --> 00:34.700] So that's a fairly complex, I'm going to understand. [00:34.980 --> 00:36.640] He'll do anything to avoid overtime, won't he? [00:36.760 --> 00:38.360] He'll go all the way to Slovenia. [00:38.980 --> 00:39.420] Wow. [00:39.760 --> 00:47.660] And while staying on with us, we have our special guests from the Valed Project. [00:48.240 --> 00:51.680] And I want to make sure everybody made it as well. [00:51.780 --> 00:53.540] We have Dildog, we have Medusa, and we have the Gibson. [00:56.040 --> 01:04.260] And you're welcome to give us a call if you have any questions concerning this amazing new thing that's being designed right now. [01:04.620 --> 01:10.840] Our phone number, 802-321-4225, 802-321-HACK. [01:11.060 --> 01:12.160] I got it right, didn't I? [01:12.400 --> 01:12.540] Yeah. [01:13.440 --> 01:13.940] You did. [01:15.280 --> 01:17.020] So anybody, anything else I wanted to add? [01:17.100 --> 01:17.440] Go ahead, Rob. [01:19.240 --> 01:28.340] No, I'm just, like, people, the chatter going on on our socials during the show and everything, people are rather excited about this whole thing, as they should be. [01:30.280 --> 01:31.640] It's great that you could all join us. [01:31.660 --> 01:34.860] It's great that you could all hang out for this after show. [01:34.860 --> 01:46.960] And, uh, folks out there, if you have questions for the Valed Crew, uh, the Gibson, Christian, uh, Dildog, Ryu, or Caitlin, Medusa4, Boat, Bowden, sorry, caught myself there. [01:47.340 --> 01:47.820] Um... [01:47.820 --> 01:49.100] Am I supposed to pronounce the four? [01:49.400 --> 01:50.620] Am I supposed to pronounce the four? [01:51.060 --> 01:51.920] Can I say Medusa? [01:52.140 --> 01:53.620] I don't know how to inject the four. [01:54.880 --> 01:55.640] It's okay. [01:56.000 --> 01:56.740] Um, I... [01:56.740 --> 01:57.880] It started as Medusa. [01:58.520 --> 01:58.820] Uh-huh. [01:58.820 --> 02:01.440] But, I don't speak leet. [02:01.780 --> 02:02.800] I am... [02:02.800 --> 02:03.740] I speak user. [02:04.080 --> 02:11.640] So now it has become Medusa4, and I'm really enjoying watching everybody's reaction to it, because they get very angry. [02:12.960 --> 02:15.580] People have to get angry at something, so, uh, yeah, why not? [02:15.780 --> 02:19.820] Uh, this is something to really get angry about, though, and it's a story I didn't get to in the previous hour. [02:20.040 --> 02:25.260] Uh, it's, it's called Verifying Your Identity on Twitter Will Now Require Taking a Selfie? [02:25.760 --> 02:28.640] Uh, and this just speaks to all the things we were talking about there. [02:28.820 --> 02:45.320] They're basically trying to verify users' identities, and what that involves is submitting a selfie alongside government-issued ID, and then having all of that forwarded to some company in Israel that is going to verify your identity. [02:45.940 --> 02:49.540] It's Twitter, for God's sake, or X, if you want to be really silly. [02:50.080 --> 02:52.800] And it's, it's, it's really turning into a nightmare. [02:52.800 --> 02:59.120] I mean, uh, uh, the, the internet used to be completely anonymous, if you chose for it to be anonymous. [02:59.300 --> 03:02.320] And if you wanted to reveal yourself, then, okay, that's, that's your problem. [03:02.760 --> 03:07.480] Um, but this just seems to be coming, uh, the, the norm lately. [03:09.460 --> 03:10.920] Yeah, my problem with all this is... [03:10.920 --> 03:11.620] That's a hard no. [03:12.340 --> 03:13.660] Yeah, it is a hard no. [03:13.740 --> 03:15.720] Hard no for me as well. [03:15.960 --> 03:19.920] You know, it, it used to be that people trusted people. [03:20.600 --> 03:24.260] And that's how you built trust networks, is individuals trusting each other. [03:25.000 --> 03:29.620] When you start seeing these things creep in, what they're asking you to do is trust Twitter. [03:30.360 --> 03:33.000] And then Twitter will tell you who to trust. [03:33.660 --> 03:40.860] It's a man-in-the-middle attempt by these big corporations to inject themselves into personal trust networks. [03:41.300 --> 03:42.400] Completely unnecessary. [03:43.200 --> 03:56.300] You know, if you can just talk to people and invite people you trust and talk to people you trust, and don't talk to people you don't trust if you don't want to, uh, why should there have to be anybody in the middle mitigating and mediating your trust? [03:57.060 --> 04:03.400] You know, it's only a side effect of the construction of these networks that, uh, any of that's even needed. [04:03.940 --> 04:11.720] You know, we got along just fine, you know, making friends in real life and then talking to each other and deciding who we wanted in our circles and who we didn't. [04:13.440 --> 04:14.060] Go ahead, Gil. [04:14.220 --> 04:15.120] I'm gonna... [04:15.120 --> 04:15.900] Oh, sorry. [04:16.500 --> 04:18.440] Oh, um, I mean, Gibson, if you want to keep going. [04:18.440 --> 04:24.060] We have our first question out of the YouTube chat, um, which is very much a question for our guests. [04:24.280 --> 04:24.680] Go ahead. [04:24.860 --> 04:25.040] Go ahead. [04:25.360 --> 04:26.040] One real quick comment. [04:26.280 --> 04:35.460] Yeah, uh, look, that, that verification man in the middle that Chris is speaking about, this is an attack on human free will and humanity in many ways, right? [04:35.620 --> 04:37.900] Ultimately, we should be able to make these choices for ourselves. [04:38.340 --> 04:44.380] And having that, that clearinghouse in the middle of this is offensive to me. [04:44.380 --> 04:53.000] It should be offensive to everybody, but most people are willing to go with that because it's, uh, inexpensive for them to trust and they can kind of offload that decision-making process. [04:53.140 --> 05:00.380] But the truth of the matter is, you know, we, we have to be responsible for who we are and who we choose to trust, right? [05:00.380 --> 05:03.400] And, and, and those decisions should be on each one of us individually. [05:03.940 --> 05:08.320] Um, but when we have a system like this, that takes away that ability to make that choice. [05:08.500 --> 05:10.600] So, you know, like I said, hard no, I'm out. [05:11.680 --> 05:12.400] Mm-hmm. [05:12.800 --> 05:13.280] Go ahead, Gaila. [05:13.460 --> 05:18.200] I mean, I was just going to say, I was looking at the article and I can't believe you don't want to give Twitter your biometric data. [05:18.520 --> 05:23.160] Anyway, the question, because you have to let them keep your biometrics. [05:23.160 --> 05:33.680] Okay, if all users are nodes, is a question, what is the impact and performance like for mobile devices whose routes go through mobile user nodes? [05:35.400 --> 05:37.340] Uh, well, that's a great question. [05:37.740 --> 06:01.260] Um, Valid's, uh, internal routing table, uh, is mostly a statistical exercise to figure out what nodes are up, you know, uh, you know, with what frequency, how reliable they are, how stable they are, um, you know, how frequently they switch around to their IP address and their dialing information. [06:01.760 --> 06:11.700] Um, so that's sort of Valid's job is to figure out what is the best, most private routes you can go through and maintain connectivity. [06:11.700 --> 06:24.120] Um, if your node, for example, is a mobile device and it is on Wi-Fi and it seems like it's been there for an hour, we kind of expect that it might be there for another hour. [06:24.400 --> 06:33.660] If it's only been there for a minute, then we probably aren't going to route anything through you until you've proven that you're going to be stable and not that same IP address for a while. [06:33.880 --> 06:39.520] Um, in general though, we also keep a whole bunch of routes allocated in the background. [06:39.520 --> 06:44.340] So Valid is sort of a call and response protocol at the base. [06:44.700 --> 06:50.260] We can send over one route and if it goes down, we know immediately and we can switch to the next one. [06:50.400 --> 06:55.200] So we have like this, uh, backlog of prepared routes ready to go. [06:55.380 --> 06:59.900] And when routes disappear, we just switch to the next one and it's already there. [07:00.140 --> 07:11.620] Uh, so we kind of have some sort of, uh, bits in our algorithm for the route allocation that make, uh, dealing with high churn environments, uh, less problematic. [07:16.090 --> 07:16.650] Okay. [07:17.050 --> 07:17.390] Thank you. [07:18.930 --> 07:19.490] Fabulous. [07:19.910 --> 07:21.270] Well, I have a question. [07:21.530 --> 07:25.630] Um, now we've talked about the reaction so far from, from people like us. [07:25.990 --> 07:44.070] Um, have you gotten any kind of a reaction from the people we're talking about, namely people in the industry that live for tracking and, and, um, uh, recording IPs and basically turning the internet into some kind of a commercial mall where everybody knows who you are. [07:45.750 --> 07:57.570] Not, not, so at DEF CON, we had a couple of interesting interactions, but not directly in regards to that, but with people who represented some of the larger organizations you would expect to have, uh, a stake in this. [07:58.150 --> 08:07.510] And, uh, you know, some of the questions were very interesting because they, they were unexpectedly kind of, you know, could this be used to reduce cloud cost? [08:07.630 --> 08:12.990] And, and, you know, I know we talked about that earlier, but that's, that's a little ways off in the future for the scale they're talking about, in my opinion. [08:13.490 --> 08:28.430] Um, but we also had people from other ones seeing ways to secure, uh, relatively insecure authentication methods and such that their companies may use by using this, uh, this, uh, routing capability to, to mask that. [08:28.590 --> 08:30.050] So it's been very interesting. [08:30.210 --> 08:38.450] We haven't had anybody directly come to it, at least not to me yet, uh, about, uh, about, you know, the, the data economy, if you will. [08:38.590 --> 08:51.930] But we have had people check in with us wondering if this could be used in kind of innovative ways for business that I don't think I plan on having those questions come at me, but, but certainly, uh, we, we lit some ideas and some people in unexpected places. [08:55.370 --> 08:56.010] Go ahead, Gila. [08:56.890 --> 09:00.110] Uh, next question off of the live chat. [09:00.370 --> 09:05.250] Someone asks, direct quote, does Valid work through the great firewall of China? [09:08.320 --> 09:10.480] We are excited to find out. [09:11.960 --> 09:13.720] Yeah, we haven't actually tried. [09:14.120 --> 09:21.680] Um, we, I, I'm, I'm unaware of any nodes running in China at this point, but that doesn't mean that it hasn't happened. [09:22.020 --> 09:36.260] Um, side effect of running a giant private network is I don't know where all the nodes are, um, we have some idea and we have some people working on, you know, some rough mapping technology that might be able to give us some idea of where nodes are at, [09:36.540 --> 09:37.540] um, generally speaking. [09:37.980 --> 09:41.480] Um, but I can't confirm that as of yet. [09:41.480 --> 09:46.900] Um, again, our phone number 802-321-4225. [09:47.620 --> 09:48.920] Uh, do we have a call Kyle? [09:49.100 --> 09:49.600] No, not yet. [09:50.040 --> 09:51.600] Uh, and our phone line is open. [09:51.840 --> 09:56.960] So if you want to speak to our, our friends here from Valid, um, this is your opportunity. [09:56.960 --> 10:00.020] Andy, and I think we have more online questions. [10:01.300 --> 10:01.460] Yeah. [10:02.760 --> 10:04.380] Um, ooh, okay. [10:04.980 --> 10:06.200] Uh, keep them coming, guys. [10:06.360 --> 10:08.400] Who stores this routing table information? [10:08.640 --> 10:12.140] Would this allow someone to track users' IPs across multiple connections? [10:14.000 --> 10:15.460] Who stores the information? [10:15.660 --> 10:19.960] Uh, well, every node has their own view of, of the Valid network. [10:20.220 --> 10:22.680] Not every node is going to be able to reach every other node. [10:24.000 --> 10:30.020] Um, in fact, uh, I'd say that the routing table itself probably caps out at about 256 nodes per node. [10:30.260 --> 10:33.980] So you only get a view of a small part of the network. [10:34.080 --> 10:36.560] But that's all you really need to be able to construct your own routes. [10:36.940 --> 10:39.820] Um, you only need a couple nodes to hop through, really. [10:40.160 --> 10:46.620] Um, and if you pick ones that are, you know, fast but geographically dispersed, you're going to be bouncing around all over the place. [10:46.760 --> 10:50.660] And, you know, your communications themselves are end-to-end encrypted, Unvalid. [10:50.660 --> 11:02.800] Uh, so, you know, it doesn't really, uh, there's, there's nothing about, uh, Valid's construction right now that prevents people from knowing that you are running Valid. [11:03.200 --> 11:07.320] Like, if you were to do a network scan, yeah, we use port 5150. [11:07.720 --> 11:10.560] And you could probably find Valid nodes out there right now. [11:10.720 --> 11:12.080] But you wouldn't know what they were doing. [11:12.240 --> 11:14.720] And you wouldn't know who was using them. [11:14.720 --> 11:20.380] There's no connection between, uh, a node ID and your actual identity. [11:21.200 --> 11:23.880] That is, uh, completely broken link. [11:24.120 --> 11:28.920] Uh, so, yeah, there, there, you're, you're going to see nodes online. [11:29.180 --> 11:33.980] Uh, that said, you know, you, we know where all the, the Tor nodes are in the world today as well. [11:34.460 --> 11:36.480] You just don't know who's using them or for what. [11:36.700 --> 11:38.980] Uh, but you know if people are running a node. [11:38.980 --> 11:40.980] Um, the same is true for Valid. [11:41.140 --> 11:44.380] You know, you use the internet, you're going to have traffic on the internet. [11:44.660 --> 11:57.140] Uh, that said that we've also got some projects right now to see if we can make it even a little bit harder to detect, um, making us look more and more like random data, um, randomizing ports and things like that. [11:57.740 --> 12:09.660] Um, but basically you're going to stick out running Valid a little bit right now, unless you look just like regular HTTPS traffic going to all of the regular sites that you would go to. [12:09.860 --> 12:16.140] You know, if you're sniffing the network, it's going to look like a different kind of thing than most people's regular web traffic. [12:16.400 --> 12:18.540] We can't really do too much about that right now. [12:18.680 --> 12:19.760] I mean, there's stuck into graphic stuff. [12:19.900 --> 12:26.260] There's a whole field of research around having Valid, uh, or any other thing become deniable. [12:26.780 --> 12:30.840] There's a big difference between deniability and, and anonymity. [12:32.100 --> 12:37.580] Deniability says that you don't, you can say that you weren't even using it and people can't prove otherwise. [12:38.260 --> 12:41.060] Anonymity says that you can say, I wasn't the one using it. [12:41.120 --> 12:41.960] It could have been anybody. [12:42.200 --> 12:49.220] Um, and that's the difference between sort of node level identity and user level identity. [12:49.220 --> 12:52.060] And we are anonymizing that user level identity. [12:55.890 --> 12:56.450] Interesting. [12:56.650 --> 12:56.770] Wow. [12:57.250 --> 12:57.730] Go ahead. [12:59.850 --> 13:01.290] Oh, we're caught up. [13:01.530 --> 13:02.330] I had a question. [13:02.550 --> 13:09.250] Does increased use of it perhaps discourage further surveillance from corporations? [13:09.250 --> 13:18.870] In other words, if more people were using this kind of software, assuming things go great, um, would it have an effect, do you think, on the affordability? [13:19.010 --> 13:36.210] I think you mentioned that a little bit, like making the cost of, of this, just, uh, this rampant spying or dragnet stuff so high to, to, um, make usable that it's just not, it's not worth it, sort of taking the floor out of the theory. [13:36.210 --> 13:46.750] That was one of the, that was one of the original, you know, design concepts that we had going on was we wanted to disrupt the data economy itself. [13:47.110 --> 13:59.150] If we give users the option to, you know, opt out of having their data scraped and sold, then we hope that it will kind of destroy that economy on its own. [13:59.810 --> 14:08.690] Um, that is one of the ideas here is just giving people the option and hoping that they understand what that means. [14:08.690 --> 14:15.470] And, um, also helping them realize the value of the data that's being taken from them. [14:15.470 --> 14:19.730] What is the value of their privacy and what does that mean exactly? [14:20.010 --> 14:25.850] We've been doing a lot of educational work around that so that people can make the right decision when the time comes. [14:26.510 --> 14:28.630] And we do hope to upend that economy. [14:30.430 --> 14:35.230] Also, one of the things that in theory will happen as we get a density of nodes, it starts to grow. [14:35.810 --> 14:45.430] Um, we should see the cost of, of running the network itself, which is effectively zero still because everybody's kind of distributing it, but those resources shouldn't go up. [14:45.470 --> 14:53.690] The speed of the network theoretically could go up and the privacy of the network should get better as more nodes come online because you're going to have more randomized routes. [14:54.050 --> 14:56.470] That was, that was kind of, uh, where I was going with it. [14:56.590 --> 14:59.630] So yeah, that, that answers a lot of where I was headed. [15:00.050 --> 15:01.350] So thanks for clearing. [15:01.350 --> 15:02.430] I believe we have a phone call. [15:02.810 --> 15:03.850] Yeah, there's a call on the line. [15:03.990 --> 15:04.330] Good evening. [15:04.470 --> 15:05.450] You're on off the hook over time. [15:05.590 --> 15:05.810] Go ahead. [15:06.930 --> 15:08.790] Hello, Emmanuel and mom. [15:08.970 --> 15:09.870] Well, I'm famous now. [15:10.030 --> 15:15.370] I'm on a YouTube, uh, radio here, but anyways, um, about, um, obfuscating. [15:15.470 --> 15:22.610] When, uh, the, like you actively run a valid node, would you be able to like, you know, bar in the, the given latency with it? [15:22.770 --> 15:31.810] Could you, um, you know, route that through like a wire guard connection of VPN and, uh, you know, sort of not have to worry about being seen as running a node? [15:34.110 --> 15:36.330] Well, something is going to be seen as running a node. [15:36.330 --> 15:38.250] It'll be the other end of your wire guard. [15:38.430 --> 15:42.130] Um, so something is going to be seen as running a node as it connects to the network. [15:42.270 --> 15:44.270] But yes, in theory, you can tunnel. [15:44.470 --> 15:54.390] If you tunnel at the layer two, um, uh, you know, then yes, anything that you want to do could be passed over a VPN if you wanted to. [15:54.390 --> 15:56.110] Uh, I've accidentally done it. [15:56.410 --> 16:10.470] I thought I was running a, a valid node, uh, from a hotel room, uh, just to test on the wild, you know, crazy hotel networks that exist out there and found myself that I had accidentally been routing it all over my VPN to my house. [16:10.870 --> 16:12.750] Um, it worked great. [16:13.070 --> 16:25.150] I had no trouble running it over, uh, um, you know, open VPN or, or whatever I was using at the time and, uh, yeah, transparently worked over a VPN without any trouble. [16:25.510 --> 16:38.390] Uh, uh, unfortunately for me, it, it, it made me feel pretty dumb because, uh, I didn't realize that it was actually tunneling from my house until, uh, uh, uh, I, I, I was wondering what the heck was going on, but yeah, no, it does work. [16:38.770 --> 16:40.930] I can, I can confirm that finding. [16:42.210 --> 16:43.230] I'm sorry, Carla, go ahead. [16:44.490 --> 16:51.210] I'm just saying that may be a good sign that, uh, you know, that it was a pretty seamless and, uh, you know, didn't, uh, you know, didn't, uh, yeah, painless issues. [16:52.490 --> 16:53.070] Worked great. [16:53.470 --> 16:54.010] Um, yep. [16:54.110 --> 16:55.110] Just tunnel to, you can tunnel. [16:55.210 --> 16:59.030] If you can tunnel your interface, uh, you could have your valiant note appear from wherever your endpoint is. [16:59.950 --> 17:00.270] Cool. [17:00.410 --> 17:01.350] Also, one more question. [17:01.630 --> 17:03.730] Uh, what brand of hot dogs did you throw at us? [17:05.030 --> 17:09.990] Those were kosher, uh, Hebrew national beef franks. [17:10.150 --> 17:15.650] Uh, you know, for those of us who weren't there, I'm not sure if we want to know what this is all about, but that's part of your presentation, I guess. [17:17.330 --> 17:26.090] So a few weeks before, uh, we were going to give the presentation, uh, our esteemed colleague Death Veggie, that's Mr. Vegetable. [17:26.190 --> 17:27.470] No, wait, that's not Mr. Vegetable. [17:27.810 --> 17:29.670] Uh, he, uh, he started... [17:29.670 --> 17:30.630] Hair doctor vegetable. [17:31.070 --> 17:31.230] Uh-huh. [17:31.770 --> 17:33.950] Hair doctor professor Death Vegetable. [17:34.010 --> 17:34.770] He got the doctorate. [17:34.830 --> 17:35.210] Good for him. [17:35.890 --> 17:36.290] Yes. [17:36.510 --> 17:44.890] So he, um, we started talking in our private chats about, uh, we had a, we had a rule set up way back when we first got in touch with DEF CON to do this. [17:44.890 --> 17:49.810] Because of an incident from back in, like, 2002 or three, where they said, no raw meat. [17:50.030 --> 17:51.370] You can't throw any raw meat into the crowd. [17:51.750 --> 17:53.270] And we all kind of said, what? [17:53.770 --> 17:54.570] Okay, sure. [17:54.870 --> 17:55.650] Why was that? [17:56.090 --> 17:56.490] Okay. [17:58.310 --> 18:02.570] Well, it may have happened in the past that some raw meat was thrown into the audience. [18:02.830 --> 18:05.910] It, uh, you had to be there. [18:06.170 --> 18:09.490] But that means you could have thrown, you could have thrown cooked meat at the crowd then. [18:09.530 --> 18:10.290] And that would have been okay. [18:10.290 --> 18:11.650] But that, technically, hot dogs are cooked. [18:11.670 --> 18:12.370] Well, that was the idea. [18:12.670 --> 18:13.690] Hot dogs are pre-cooked. [18:14.190 --> 18:15.010] They are pre-cooked. [18:15.170 --> 18:16.410] So, uh, yeah. [18:16.630 --> 18:29.450] One of the best things to come out of this was, um, uh, somebody who got, uh, one of these packs of hot dogs made the most, quote unquote, cursed DEF CON badge ever by slapping a CDC sticker on one and attaching it to his lanyard. [18:29.450 --> 18:31.890] Uh, and so, we got to be part of Badgel. [18:32.970 --> 18:33.410] Wow. [18:34.410 --> 18:36.290] Does that answer your question, caller? [18:37.350 --> 18:38.690] Uh, yes, sir. [18:39.070 --> 18:40.830] And, man, it's all out there. [18:41.010 --> 18:41.150] Yeah. [18:41.750 --> 18:42.130] All right. [18:42.470 --> 18:43.410] Well, thank you all very much. [18:43.710 --> 18:45.370] Uh, look forward to running the node. [18:46.130 --> 18:46.570] Cool. [18:46.950 --> 18:47.610] Thanks for calling. [18:48.630 --> 18:51.970] And our phone number, 802-3214-225. [18:52.470 --> 18:52.990] Go ahead, Gila. [18:53.850 --> 18:54.250] Okay. [18:54.630 --> 18:55.810] Two more questions have come in. [18:55.810 --> 19:01.110] Uh, uh, first one, does Valid use post-quantum algorithms for encryption? [19:02.610 --> 19:03.590] Not today. [19:03.930 --> 19:10.970] Today, it uses, uh, a Curve 25519-based algorithms, um, as well as Blake 3 for hashing. [19:11.570 --> 19:16.890] Um, these are properly strong for the kinds of use that we have today. [19:17.510 --> 19:24.690] Um, but, uh, we have, uh, built-in crypto upgradability into the protocol. [19:24.690 --> 19:46.330] So, in the event that a practical post-quantum crypto system, uh, is implemented by crypto cryptographers that we trust, um, uh, it's the kind of thing that could be slipstreamed into Valid as, uh, a crypto system without, uh, any of our apps or developers having to do anything differently. [19:46.330 --> 20:00.770] Um, so, you know, I know this is, it's a hotbed of crypto research right now, thinking about what to do when quantum computers change the game for the mathematics behind cryptography and, uh, crypto cryptanalysis. [20:00.990 --> 20:07.750] Um, so we're prepared for that, um, as soon as the cryptographers out there are prepared for, uh, for it. [20:08.730 --> 20:08.910] Awesome. [20:08.910 --> 20:08.930] Awesome. [20:09.450 --> 20:10.070] Okay, that was one. [20:10.250 --> 20:10.890] Here's two. [20:11.350 --> 20:14.250] You talked a little bit about traffic obfuscation. [20:14.450 --> 20:18.090] Are you familiar with V2Ray slash ShadowSox? [20:18.270 --> 20:20.470] And are you going to try to implement their techniques? [20:21.810 --> 20:23.910] Uh, I am not familiar with those. [20:24.070 --> 20:25.270] I've studied a bunch of things. [20:25.490 --> 20:36.170] Uh, we are looking at Elligator, E-L-L-I-G-A-T-O-R, um, as a way to make our traffic look like completely random data. [20:36.610 --> 20:43.290] Uh, so, uh, if you want to look up Elligator, that, that's, that's currently our, our, our focus right now is looking at that. [20:43.590 --> 20:48.210] Um, that may end up being a, uh, a sidecar obfuscator for, for VALID. [20:51.670 --> 20:52.110] Okay. [20:52.650 --> 20:53.330] Go ahead, Rob. [20:54.590 --> 20:55.130] All right. [20:55.270 --> 21:14.250] Um, while we're waiting for our next call, um, someone on, uh, Mastodon is taking issue with our claim during the radio hour that, uh, Tor runs, uh, a hundred, um, I mean, uh, rather, excuse me, I'll start again, that, uh, the NSA runs, uh, a large amount of Tor exit relays. [21:14.610 --> 21:18.290] They're citing a, a talk from CCC Camp 23 by Tor Project. [21:18.730 --> 21:26.710] And of course, we can't watch the video while, uh, broadcasting, so we, I can't address what specifically they're talking about, but, uh, that is being disagreed with. [21:31.250 --> 21:32.010] That's fair. [21:32.230 --> 21:34.830] Uh, we've been working with the information that we have. [21:34.830 --> 21:35.990] Uh, we love Tor. [21:36.250 --> 21:39.390] We're not here to tear down Tor or talk smack about Tor. [21:39.650 --> 21:51.590] Um, we're only acknowledging the fact that Tor has a really big gap to fill when it comes to, uh, its users, its end users and, you know, the, the technology itself. [21:51.590 --> 21:55.010] Uh, and it has a marketing issue to be frank. [21:55.730 --> 22:02.750] Um, those are the only things that we really have said any, that we really have anything negative against Tor. [22:03.110 --> 22:05.710] Uh, we didn't know that, but thank you for sharing. [22:05.730 --> 22:07.410] And I will watch that talk afterwards. [22:07.770 --> 22:10.630] Uh, and we're always open to learning something new. [22:10.750 --> 22:13.430] So if we were incorrect, our apologies. [22:13.590 --> 22:19.270] I mean, what I'm curious about is, uh, is it at least conceivable that the NSA could run a Tor exit node? [22:19.550 --> 22:22.130] And if, if it is, why not a hundred? [22:22.130 --> 22:23.870] It is, it is conceivable. [22:24.210 --> 22:29.810] And, you know, while we obviously can't prove it, they wouldn't be doing their job if we could. [22:29.970 --> 22:32.690] Well, we could call the NSA and ask them, but I don't think they'll tell us. [22:32.930 --> 22:33.330] Exactly. [22:33.590 --> 22:42.110] You know, you're not going to know for sure, but if I go right now and I look up all of the exit nodes that I can find, there's a map of Tor exit nodes. [22:42.610 --> 22:56.670] I can find some odd hundred running out of the Isle of Man off the coast of England right now in some data center that, you know, sure as heck looks like, I don't know, it looks like a concentration point for this stuff. [22:57.050 --> 23:11.170] Uh, you know, I can't tell you, you know, that that's what it is, but, you know, uh, any kind of concentration on a map of exit nodes is going to give me kind of pause a little bit, you know? [23:11.510 --> 23:16.510] Um, again, doesn't have to be the NSA, you know, that's just sort of a straw man, boogeyman. [23:16.610 --> 23:17.190] It could be anybody. [23:17.290 --> 23:17.870] It could be the mob. [23:18.030 --> 23:27.410] It could be any one who has a vested interest in understanding, uh, you know, and monitoring Tor, right? [23:27.630 --> 23:30.610] That's meant to be a good thing though, that anybody can do this. [23:30.830 --> 23:35.450] So NSA, there are any, anybody like anybody else is, so they could be doing this as well. [23:35.650 --> 23:36.810] It applies to anything really. [23:37.870 --> 23:38.310] Yeah. [23:38.490 --> 23:45.270] I mean, so in general, I think that that kind of, uh, correlative analysis is something that we have to fight against. [23:45.510 --> 23:58.530] I think Valid's model of keeping as much as possible in network rather than being a generalized internet proxy is going to have, uh, an effect over time of making things a whole heck of a lot harder to correlate. [23:58.870 --> 24:03.490] You're not going to have external signals as well as internal signals that you can put together. [24:03.710 --> 24:21.350] Uh, it'll all be in network and, uh, uh, you know, it won't be obvious, uh, where the, the, the, the end points of a, of communication are, you know, if it could be that you're in the middle of a, of a route, it could be that you're at the end or the beginning. [24:21.910 --> 24:29.370] Uh, it's going to be a lot harder to monitor unless you're monitoring a whole lot more devices and it's going to become very prohibitively expensive to do. [24:32.300 --> 24:32.860] All right. [24:33.080 --> 24:40.600] Um, just going to invite people, uh, give us a call, uh, get to a phone and, uh, dial us phone number 1-802-321-4225. [24:40.900 --> 24:42.160] That's 802-321-HACK. [24:42.320 --> 24:50.940] And thanks to the Gibson who had to, uh, take off, um, for the evening, but we're, we've still got, uh, Dildog and Meduse4 here to, uh, answer your questions. [24:51.220 --> 24:53.380] I didn't know who left because, uh, we can't see them. [24:54.340 --> 24:57.360] We're, uh, so, so somebody left, but I'm glad you clarified that. [24:57.440 --> 24:57.760] Go ahead, Gila. [24:57.760 --> 24:58.580] Yes. [24:58.920 --> 25:06.500] Um, so another question, which I'm again going to assume is aimed at Dildog and Meduse4, because they're the ones with the answers. [25:06.700 --> 25:12.120] Um, if an app on Valid is doing something problematic, can you stop it from proliferating itself? [25:14.740 --> 25:16.440] Hmm, not really. [25:16.880 --> 25:22.920] Um, we don't really have any control over what Valid nodes do. [25:23.280 --> 25:31.120] There's no, um, it's quite possible that Valid as an organization someday may not even run its own nodes at all. [25:31.260 --> 25:43.400] I mean, we do just cause, you know, I helped making this framework and stuff, but it's going to be the apps themselves that are going to be responsible for the, the content of the, of what their apps enable people to do. [25:44.020 --> 25:51.980] Um, you know, I, we won't have any kind of sort of, we don't have any kind of sort of policing capability over, over this network. [25:52.500 --> 25:58.340] Um, all we can do at this point, and we've released it to the world, there's hundreds of nodes out there right now. [25:58.880 --> 26:00.780] I can't tell what those nodes, what to do. [26:01.300 --> 26:03.660] You know, I can't tell what they're doing and I can't tell them no. [26:04.080 --> 26:16.440] Um, so, uh, if you're going to write a Valid app, uh, we request that you make an effort to adhere to the Valid code of conduct and try to build apps that are for everybody. [26:16.880 --> 26:21.540] And, uh, you know, we're trying to build community that builds responsible applications. [26:21.540 --> 26:23.060] We encourage this behavior. [26:23.260 --> 26:32.560] Uh, we acknowledge that not everyone is going to want to do that, but that is a general social problem and not something that Valid can do much about. [26:32.860 --> 26:37.220] Um, we don't really have, uh, any kind of authority over that. [26:37.380 --> 26:37.560] Right. [26:38.200 --> 26:39.500] A code of conduct for apps. [26:39.700 --> 26:40.320] That's something. [26:41.420 --> 26:49.240] It would be nice if, you know, people built apps that, you know, uh, were built in a, in an open, respectful community. [26:49.700 --> 26:58.100] That said, uh, you know, we willingly acknowledge that, you know, when you put code out in the world, people are going to do what they want with it. [26:58.100 --> 27:06.600] Um, we're trying to move the needle toward, uh, respectful communities, but, you know, the world is what it is. [27:06.760 --> 27:12.680] Um, we're not going to change, you know, all of the social paradigms that exist out there today. [27:13.340 --> 27:15.920] Um, we know, we know what we stand for. [27:16.100 --> 27:16.820] It's on our website. [27:17.200 --> 27:26.520] Um, and we hope that people will follow us, uh, and we encourage, uh, that kind of development, uh, you know, ethos. [27:27.020 --> 27:36.000] Um, but we'll fully acknowledge that, uh, you know, people come in all stripes, all stripes and different colors, uh, you know, different attitudes. [27:36.520 --> 27:40.800] Uh, and you know, we're not the, we're not the police of, of application development at all. [27:40.940 --> 27:45.340] Uh, we just read a tool, a framework and ask that people try to use it for good. [27:45.340 --> 27:50.320] Um, but we aren't also going to be quiet if someone is using it for bad. [27:50.560 --> 28:00.840] One of the nice things about not having, um, you know, VC money or things like that is we don't have to cater to anyone telling us, oh, we'll just, you know, don't make waves. [28:01.140 --> 28:07.640] Uh, we're going to be obnoxious and be a thorn in the sides of people that are trying to use this for bad. [28:07.760 --> 28:08.880] And I'm not afraid of that. [28:09.360 --> 28:20.660] Uh, also, you know, we're building a community of people that we are encouraging to take ownership of, you know, this whole project, feel like it's your own build on it, have fun with it. [28:20.820 --> 28:25.880] It is all based on what the community is, you know, wanting to do with it. [28:25.980 --> 28:27.980] And the community is going to self-select. [28:27.980 --> 28:32.320] And if you do allow people to take ownership over the project, they're going to protect it too. [28:33.140 --> 28:35.000] Uh, and I think that matters. [28:35.000 --> 28:53.780] I think that the community that we are building of people that care, that see the vision, that understand what's at stake here are going to, you know, make this happen in the way that we are hoping it's going to happen, or it may take another route, but it's either way where I believe everybody is here for good. [28:53.940 --> 28:57.960] I believe in the good of people and I'm not going to give up on that. [28:58.260 --> 29:03.940] That's a great starting point, at least until, until they prove otherwise, you know, give people the benefit of the doubt. [29:04.220 --> 29:06.660] And hopefully, uh, we get the best of the people. [29:07.760 --> 29:08.160] Yeah. [29:08.180 --> 29:13.360] We don't, we don't have to, uh, remain quiet for fear of like our funding drying up. [29:13.440 --> 29:14.360] We wrote this for free. [29:14.560 --> 29:15.800] It costs us nothing. [29:16.320 --> 29:17.640] We'll say what we want. [29:18.040 --> 29:23.160] And there's, you know, it's not like, uh, it's going to hit us in the wallet. [29:24.740 --> 29:27.080] That said, has anyone tried to talk you out of this? [29:29.760 --> 29:46.660] Um, the, the only feedback, and I'm going to let some people remain anonymous here, but the only feedback that I've gotten that, um, was somewhat negative came from people that had a vested interest in the data economy and from cryptocurrency folks who feel that, [29:46.760 --> 29:59.680] uh, you know, blockchain solutions and smart contracts and, um, you know, putting, you know, transactions at the base of everything is, uh, the way forward. [30:00.060 --> 30:16.140] Um, so I'm not going to, uh, I'm not going to highlight those projects or those people, but I can say that the biggest pushback we've gotten was from, uh, either big data collectors or people that we know that work at them or, uh, from the cryptocurrency folks who feel that, [30:16.140 --> 30:24.120] um, you know, uh, the way forward is, um, um, monkey pictures and whatever. [30:25.540 --> 30:28.800] And I have heard, I've seen a little bit of pushback. [30:29.020 --> 30:31.900] Uh, this is simply on a home frontier. [30:32.280 --> 30:36.300] Uh, but you know, my husband is also involved in the project, JC. [30:36.780 --> 30:44.560] And, uh, when we went to our parents and he started telling them about this, they both, you know, both sets of parents were like, wait, so there's no money. [30:45.060 --> 30:47.100] You're not making money off of this. [30:47.540 --> 30:49.260] Why, why are you doing it? [30:49.920 --> 31:03.520] Um, and that's kind of the only people that have really tried to talk us out of it in any way, shape or form is just people that, you know, don't really understand the, the points of doing this without, you know, monetization. [31:04.420 --> 31:14.320] You know, uh, talking to that and some of the other things you've mentioned, I just want to, uh, quote from your, uh, frequently asked questions section of your website, uh, is VALIT looking for funding? [31:14.600 --> 31:17.480] Answer, VALIT is not seeking venture capital or investment. [31:17.480 --> 31:22.220] We are accepting tax deductible donations to our nonprofit foundation, VALIT Foundation Inc. [31:22.860 --> 31:24.300] Does VALIT have a cryptocurrency? [31:24.740 --> 31:25.340] Heck no. [31:25.760 --> 31:27.540] VALIT does not have a cryptocurrency. [31:28.220 --> 31:29.460] Does VALIT use AI? [31:30.060 --> 31:30.820] Heck no. [31:31.040 --> 31:32.140] VALIT does not use AI. [31:32.400 --> 31:33.520] Does VALIT use blockchain? [31:34.060 --> 31:34.800] Heck no. [31:34.960 --> 31:36.220] VALIT does not use blockchain. [31:36.380 --> 31:45.680] First of all, I think it can be stronger with the, uh, with the, uh, language there, but, um, yeah, good for you for, uh, for, uh, standing your ground. [31:46.420 --> 31:58.800] Well, those are all things that, you know, sort of ensconce a level of classism into programming and into development. [31:59.920 --> 32:07.480] And we didn't want to build a framework where people had to pay to play, you know, use a blockchain. [32:07.480 --> 32:09.760] At some point, you're going to pay for gas. [32:09.760 --> 32:11.760] You're going to pay for transactions. [32:11.760 --> 32:13.200] You're going to have to have Bitcoin. [32:13.380 --> 32:16.060] You're going to have to have your users sign into a wallet. [32:17.420 --> 32:19.340] To me, that just rubs me the wrong way. [32:19.560 --> 32:27.580] There's a whole lot of investment people already, you know, did when they bought a giant $1,000 iPhone. [32:28.020 --> 32:38.900] You know, it's a slap in the face to require everybody to hook up their wallet to do basic communications, even basic storage. [32:38.900 --> 32:44.380] I mean, there's stuff that we take for granted, like, you know, Valid has storage built into it. [32:44.520 --> 32:46.400] Not a ton of storage, necessarily. [32:46.440 --> 32:49.760] It's not as guaranteed as, you know, your favorite backup service. [32:49.940 --> 33:01.160] But, you know, there's a lot more that can be done for free or cheap that, you know, is being aggressively monetized today by a lot of other solutions. [33:02.640 --> 33:05.200] The most investment we've put into this is time. [33:05.720 --> 33:07.520] And that's all we're asking of anyone else. [33:07.640 --> 33:11.440] Time and energy and passion and putting your skills to use. [33:12.840 --> 33:16.940] And I think that should be the cost here for anything. [33:17.300 --> 33:18.700] I mean, you're spending time on an app. [33:18.840 --> 33:27.360] You're giving your time and energy to, you know, billionaires who are just funding cage fights with each other or sending each other into Mars. [33:28.520 --> 33:38.940] So that is the currency that I feel matters more than anything else is the time, the energy and, you know, our entire lives are put on the Internet. [33:39.300 --> 33:45.660] And that's, to me, the most important, you know, commodity that we're working with. [33:47.840 --> 33:57.260] Okay, we have gotten a bunch of questions for our guests, but just wanted to share something interesting that apparently happened during the show that we didn't know about because we didn't hear it. [33:57.480 --> 34:04.020] But apparently, the emergency alert tones went off during the show for about 15 seconds. [34:04.240 --> 34:04.420] Really? [34:04.620 --> 34:05.580] Well, you see, we don't hear those. [34:06.400 --> 34:06.800] Exactly. [34:06.980 --> 34:07.440] This is what I'm saying. [34:07.640 --> 34:08.480] So over the web stream. [34:09.600 --> 34:10.400] Seems okay. [34:11.420 --> 34:13.760] Wait, just the tones or is it a test? [34:15.700 --> 34:17.200] It seems to be just the tones. [34:17.380 --> 34:18.760] People have only mentioned hearing the tone. [34:19.000 --> 34:24.200] But we've gotten mentions of it both on Mastodon and in the street in the chat. [34:24.520 --> 34:29.720] So that means there's an emergency of some sort, but the way the system is designed, they don't tell you what the emergency is. [34:30.080 --> 34:34.000] Or somebody hit the wrong button or our robot overlords have arrived. [34:34.320 --> 34:37.760] And, you know, Earth, it's been nice knowing you. [34:37.960 --> 34:40.080] Thank you, everybody, for clarifying just the tones. [34:42.880 --> 34:43.320] Okay. [34:43.700 --> 34:46.340] So, several, several questions have come in. [34:46.860 --> 34:50.320] And I'm just going to take them in the order in which they arrived in the chat. [34:50.480 --> 34:52.540] I mean, that debate's coming up at 9 o'clock. [34:52.680 --> 34:55.140] Do you think there could be that, you know, the Republican debate? [34:55.520 --> 34:57.320] That might have triggered somebody. [34:59.220 --> 35:00.240] That's totally fair. [35:00.740 --> 35:00.960] Okay. [35:01.340 --> 35:02.080] First question. [35:02.080 --> 35:08.340] Is anyone in the community working on BSD or Haiku support to run VALID nodes? [35:08.980 --> 35:10.540] The answer to that is yes. [35:10.800 --> 35:14.460] I actually just had a conversation with someone today doing a free BSD port. [35:14.880 --> 35:16.020] It is early. [35:16.340 --> 35:18.300] We have Linux support today. [35:18.620 --> 35:23.360] Obviously, there's low-level operating system differences there, especially around network interfaces. [35:23.640 --> 35:24.860] But they are working on it. [35:24.960 --> 35:27.080] So that's the long answer. [35:27.160 --> 35:28.540] The short answer is yes, absolutely. [35:28.540 --> 35:29.460] People are working on it. [35:29.460 --> 35:33.320] So if you want to join in, join our Discord and work with them. [35:34.860 --> 35:35.380] Okay. [35:35.680 --> 35:39.560] So the next answerable question. [35:41.480 --> 35:43.820] Philosophically, the human rights aspect is interesting. [35:44.060 --> 35:48.640] What benefits do you think could work for people who live in a place with repressive governments? [35:53.650 --> 35:58.150] I think that this will be the answer to their communication needs. [35:58.150 --> 36:06.550] We've seen people over in France that were holding protests against some aspects of their government. [36:06.550 --> 36:08.050] And their Internet got shut off. [36:08.090 --> 36:10.370] And suddenly, they weren't able to connect with each other or talk. [36:10.430 --> 36:11.430] I believe it was France. [36:12.130 --> 36:15.110] It's been a bit of a blur the past few months, to be completely honest. [36:15.610 --> 36:24.890] But I do remember that there was some protests happening where people's ability to connect with each other and organize online was cut off. [36:24.890 --> 36:32.550] And this is going to be one of those things that isn't going to be necessarily able to be cut off so easily. [36:32.750 --> 36:40.130] Because it's not going to be the typical networks that people are used to. [36:40.130 --> 36:43.730] And they are the typical networks that people are used to. [36:43.810 --> 36:47.070] And it's not the typical networks that the government necessarily has access to. [36:48.510 --> 36:55.150] So we foresee this as being a net positive for those who are living in those circumstances. [36:57.610 --> 37:01.150] And we are excited to see what comes of that. [37:01.150 --> 37:07.330] From a pragmatic standpoint, the fact that this is end-to-end encrypted is a big deal. [37:08.530 --> 37:14.250] People on our Discord are actively working on hardware and embedded nodes. [37:14.310 --> 37:16.930] So putting it on smaller and smaller hardware. [37:17.770 --> 37:22.670] Which is going to enable it to be used in ad hoc mesh networks. [37:23.390 --> 37:27.210] Right now, we use the public internet as an overlay routing domain. [37:27.470 --> 37:32.070] But VALID also internally has support for other routing domains like local networks. [37:33.270 --> 37:38.650] You know, Wi-Fi only ad hoc networks and things like that. [37:39.270 --> 37:40.590] Radio networks, etc. [37:42.110 --> 37:54.410] So, you know, as VALID matures, I think you're going to start seeing a lot of the sort of ad hoc network creation stuff. [37:55.490 --> 37:59.930] Immediately being able to just work with all the apps that people have built. [38:00.370 --> 38:03.150] So, you know, the fact that you... [38:03.150 --> 38:07.310] You know, if you have VALID chat and you're just used to using it on your regular home Wi-Fi. [38:07.310 --> 38:10.610] But then you, you know, go and take it into a protest zone. [38:10.790 --> 38:12.710] It'll still work even if they cut off the internet. [38:13.210 --> 38:15.310] Because you'll be routing through all of your friends. [38:15.450 --> 38:19.410] And maybe one of those people has a, you know, a connection to the internet still. [38:20.250 --> 38:22.810] Or just talking amongst the people that are there. [38:23.450 --> 38:24.790] So, yeah. [38:25.050 --> 38:33.530] You know, I think the construction of the network is going to enable a whole lot of interesting developments in the ad hoc networking space. [38:35.230 --> 38:36.510] Also, I want to correct myself. [38:36.690 --> 38:37.370] It was not France. [38:37.370 --> 38:38.110] It was Iran. [38:39.050 --> 38:43.010] Where they did cut off the internet to those protesting. [38:43.810 --> 38:46.210] Those are not very similar countries. [38:47.370 --> 38:51.390] Well, in their handling of encryption policy, they're actually kind of similar. [38:51.670 --> 38:51.910] Okay. [38:52.290 --> 38:53.910] It's kind of sad that that's the case. [38:53.930 --> 38:59.150] You know, I think most governments want that kind of encryption policy or kind of communication policy. [38:59.150 --> 39:00.530] They want to be able to control people. [39:00.650 --> 39:01.950] They want to be able to watch over people. [39:01.950 --> 39:06.950] I don't know of any country that doesn't wish that, even if they don't say it publicly. [39:07.990 --> 39:08.590] That's true. [39:08.710 --> 39:09.270] Government, that is. [39:10.170 --> 39:10.610] Okay. [39:10.710 --> 39:13.870] We have some shy people, I think, that are afraid to call. [39:13.990 --> 39:16.050] So we're just going to issue the number one more time. [39:16.190 --> 39:18.930] Hopefully somebody will give us another call. [39:19.250 --> 39:21.250] 802-321-4225. [39:21.550 --> 39:23.150] 802-321-4225. [39:24.270 --> 39:25.510] You don't have to be an expert. [39:25.530 --> 39:27.450] You don't have to be a technical whiz. [39:27.450 --> 39:32.810] You can ask any question you want or just reveal anything that you want to share with us. [39:33.310 --> 39:35.250] 802-321-HACK is the phone number. [39:35.390 --> 39:37.390] But we're only going to be on for a few more minutes. [39:37.550 --> 39:39.870] So please give us a call if you have something to say. [39:41.650 --> 39:45.210] I do have a question for our listenership. [39:45.210 --> 39:54.970] We are getting the sense that the emergency tones were played on the simulcast, on the live stream. [39:54.970 --> 40:01.970] If anybody actually heard us on the actual FM radio, if you could let us know if you heard the tones. [40:02.270 --> 40:03.490] Now we're just curious. [40:03.710 --> 40:05.650] I hear sirens as you're saying this. [40:05.750 --> 40:07.530] What's going on in Queens there? [40:08.730 --> 40:10.570] We live like two blocks from a hospital. [40:12.870 --> 40:15.590] Or, you know, the world is on fire, robot overlords. [40:16.150 --> 40:17.410] The world is on fire. [40:17.650 --> 40:19.390] I mean, it's been documented. [40:21.250 --> 40:22.130] All of this is true. [40:22.290 --> 40:28.090] But yes, folks who are listening on the actual radio, in your car, your alarm clock, what have you. [40:28.290 --> 40:34.290] If you heard the tones on the radio, please give us a holler. [40:34.290 --> 40:41.470] Also, wouldn't the radio be the only place where emergency alert tones would be sounded? [40:42.550 --> 40:44.790] Apparently, people heard it on the live stream. [40:44.930 --> 40:46.390] They heard it on their Amazon devices. [40:46.390 --> 40:48.350] They heard it on the website. [40:48.730 --> 40:50.310] So now I'm curious. [40:51.390 --> 40:56.310] Also, someone wrote in, and I'm going to absolutely butcher this word. [40:57.230 --> 40:58.650] Thank you for calling. [40:58.810 --> 40:58.950] Okay. [40:59.130 --> 41:00.350] Apparently, it was on the radio as well. [41:00.970 --> 41:02.470] Someone says, just join the show. [41:02.470 --> 41:05.430] Are we speaking about the Cybic Co? [41:07.050 --> 41:11.190] Page 56, 2600, Volume 40, Number 2, from 2000. [41:12.490 --> 41:14.390] We expected to just call that up? [41:15.850 --> 41:16.670] I don't know. [41:16.890 --> 41:17.390] I don't know. [41:17.490 --> 41:18.150] I don't write some. [41:18.230 --> 41:18.830] I just read them. [41:18.970 --> 41:19.410] I don't know. [41:19.550 --> 41:21.670] Sounds like they're referencing an article from 20 years ago. [41:23.110 --> 41:23.550] 23. [41:24.090 --> 41:24.930] Three years ago. [41:24.950 --> 41:25.210] 23 years ago. [41:25.830 --> 41:27.690] Which is weird because volume... [41:27.690 --> 41:28.930] Oh, I think I loaned that issue out. [41:29.130 --> 41:30.070] So otherwise I check it right now. [41:30.070 --> 41:32.110] Volume 40, Number 2, was pretty recent. [41:33.090 --> 41:37.370] Um, but I understand nothing. [41:37.570 --> 41:38.430] You said 2000. [41:38.770 --> 41:39.690] Yeah, what was the 2000? [41:39.850 --> 41:40.950] Is that a type of equipment? [41:41.150 --> 41:41.950] Is that a model number? [41:42.050 --> 41:43.410] Or is that... [41:43.410 --> 41:43.510] Okay. [41:45.330 --> 41:52.970] I am going to copy this and paste it into our chat so you guys can see because apparently I murdered the syntax. [41:53.850 --> 41:58.790] Um, and if anybody wants to call us, by the way, and, um, again... [41:58.790 --> 41:59.330] We have a caller. [41:59.510 --> 42:00.010] We have a call? [42:00.090 --> 42:00.270] Yes. [42:00.330 --> 42:00.450] Great. [42:00.890 --> 42:04.530] So calling us now, you'll wind up being transferred someplace and we can't get you back. [42:04.530 --> 42:07.170] So, uh, let's, uh, let's say hi to this caller. [42:07.230 --> 42:07.510] Good evening. [42:07.610 --> 42:08.510] You're on off the cover time. [42:08.610 --> 42:08.830] Go ahead. [42:09.730 --> 42:10.150] Hello. [42:10.650 --> 42:10.870] Hi. [42:11.250 --> 42:11.410] Hi. [42:11.490 --> 42:11.830] How are you doing? [42:12.690 --> 42:13.230] Um, good. [42:13.390 --> 42:13.730] Thank you. [42:13.850 --> 42:13.990] Yeah. [42:14.850 --> 42:17.190] I, I mean, I, I don't know. [42:17.370 --> 42:22.070] I, I've listened to you guys on and off for, I guess, like two years now. [42:22.070 --> 42:30.510] Uh, I guess just whenever I have time, I've never called in, I don't know, um, felt like it today. [42:30.750 --> 42:31.630] So, hi. [42:32.590 --> 42:33.030] Um. [42:33.130 --> 42:33.350] Welcome. [42:34.530 --> 42:35.130] Yeah. [42:35.490 --> 42:35.870] Hi. [42:36.310 --> 42:45.970] Um, just out of curiosity, is there any reason to switch to Valid Chat from Signal right now? [42:46.730 --> 43:01.470] Um, just because I try and use Signal as a private messaging app and, I mean, other than the lack of SMS verification as, you know, being required. [43:02.730 --> 43:03.210] Yeah. [43:03.490 --> 43:07.130] I mean, well, I don't know. [43:07.750 --> 43:13.590] First off, Valid Chat is not fully released yet, so I wouldn't switch to it because you're not going to be able to download it. [43:13.590 --> 43:19.230] Um, but when it does show up, I, you know, I encourage you to try it, see if it works for you. [43:19.590 --> 43:24.090] Um, there are going to be some environments maybe where Signal is a better choice for the short term. [43:24.490 --> 43:27.970] Um, we are designing it to be a full replacement for that. [43:28.570 --> 43:33.890] Um, it does not require phone numbers or any other kind of identifier. [43:34.330 --> 43:38.490] Um, it may make you a little bit harder to find as a result. [43:38.750 --> 43:41.690] Uh, you'll have to invite people over another medium. [43:41.690 --> 43:43.490] Um, I would keep Signal around. [43:43.710 --> 43:50.490] Um, there's nothing inherently wrong with it other than, uh, you know, the, the bit with the phone numbers. [43:50.490 --> 44:01.390] And, uh, I could say that there's been issues with them not choosing to encrypt certain things that were saved to your, your phone, like the attachments you receive were not being encrypted. [44:01.790 --> 44:10.150] Um, so, I mean, there are some aspects of the, of the app itself that I, I personally disagree with some of the choices that were made there. [44:10.950 --> 44:17.870] Um, but for regular daily driver chat use, I'd say try them both, see how you feel about it. [44:18.330 --> 44:27.750] And, uh, you know, if there's ways that you want to improve valid chat, um, we're all ears, uh, we'll make it the best, uh, chat program that we can. [44:27.750 --> 44:36.830] So one difference that I think is going to be key with between signal and valid chat is we're not going to ask for access to your contacts. [44:37.090 --> 44:41.550] So your contacts aren't going to get a little pop-up, letting them know that you have joined signal. [44:41.730 --> 44:42.690] Oh, that's so annoying. [44:42.910 --> 44:43.810] That was so annoying. [44:43.950 --> 44:44.730] That there is that. [44:45.050 --> 44:45.910] I forgot about that. [44:46.030 --> 44:46.210] Jesus. [44:47.170 --> 44:47.390] Yeah. [44:47.390 --> 44:48.310] We don't ask for anything. [44:48.590 --> 44:53.310] I don't need to know every time one of my exes that I haven't spoken to in years has joined signal. [44:53.570 --> 44:53.750] Thanks. [44:53.750 --> 44:59.630] Uh, or one of your exes thinks that you're sending them a message by saying you're on signal and then they contact you. [44:59.770 --> 45:00.230] That's the worst thing. [45:00.230 --> 45:06.130] Or one of your dead relatives that still is in your contact list that had their phone, uh, number reassigned to somebody else. [45:06.290 --> 45:07.490] I mean, that's happened too. [45:07.690 --> 45:08.070] Wow. [45:08.910 --> 45:09.230] Yeah. [45:09.490 --> 45:09.630] Yeah. [45:10.550 --> 45:11.350] Signal is wonderful. [45:11.350 --> 45:16.170] And we've done a lot of our work, um, communicating with each other through that medium. [45:16.170 --> 45:18.250] So, um, we're not going to sit here and bash it. [45:18.330 --> 45:20.770] We encourage everybody to try it out and see what works for them. [45:21.250 --> 45:24.690] Um, and we're also going to be taking community feedback. [45:24.690 --> 45:31.370] So if you, you know, see something that we can improve on, we hope you join the discord and talk to us and maybe we can make that happen. [45:33.050 --> 45:33.450] Okay. [45:33.810 --> 45:33.990] Yeah. [45:33.990 --> 45:37.930] I mean, I'm, I'm not, I can't, I don't know how to code at all. [45:38.310 --> 45:39.630] Um, I didn't want to learn. [45:39.850 --> 45:40.330] Me neither. [45:40.670 --> 45:40.790] No. [45:42.050 --> 45:42.450] Okay. [45:43.670 --> 45:44.070] Okay. [45:44.210 --> 45:47.290] So it's not like I'm going to be a problem. [45:47.370 --> 45:47.930] I don't know. [45:47.930 --> 45:50.610] Uh, it's not going to be too tough. [45:50.610 --> 45:51.110] I promise. [45:51.290 --> 45:52.870] I am not a coder myself. [45:52.870 --> 45:57.990] A lot of the tech explanations about Valid go over my head. [45:58.210 --> 46:05.210] Uh, but I will, I assure you, I will be testing every bit of it to make sure it is, you know, easy for us regular folks to understand. [46:06.490 --> 46:06.890] Cool. [46:07.250 --> 46:08.610] Okay, cool. [46:09.150 --> 46:09.510] Thank you. [46:09.630 --> 46:09.790] All right. [46:09.870 --> 46:10.410] Thanks for your call. [46:11.670 --> 46:11.990] Yeah. [46:12.230 --> 46:12.730] Thank you. [46:12.910 --> 46:13.090] All right. [46:13.190 --> 46:13.430] Take care. [46:13.790 --> 46:14.050] Yeah. [46:14.550 --> 46:14.850] All right. [46:14.950 --> 46:15.330] See ya. [46:16.370 --> 46:16.650] All right. [46:16.650 --> 46:18.990] Okay, we did get clarification. [46:19.230 --> 46:26.370] Thank you to listeners, Optical Phoenix and Knicker000 for clarifying. [46:27.050 --> 46:37.750] The Cybeco or Cybeco, I don't know how to pronounce it, was a handheld personal messaging tool that was released in the year 2000. [46:38.130 --> 46:40.130] And you could like, yeah. [46:40.130 --> 46:40.170] Yeah. [46:40.470 --> 46:41.510] I remember that. [46:41.770 --> 46:42.770] Uh, created ad hoc. [46:42.770 --> 46:43.790] I just don't remember this. [46:44.070 --> 46:44.310] Mm-hmm. [46:44.410 --> 46:46.650] Ad hoc local networks for people close by. [46:47.030 --> 46:47.350] Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. [46:47.450 --> 46:49.870] And the picture on Wikipedia is purple. [46:49.870 --> 46:51.130] It's very spiffy. [46:51.230 --> 46:55.670] And apparently you could like, put a memory card into it and play MP3s. [46:56.150 --> 47:00.290] Um, so the short answer is no, that's not what we're talking about. [47:00.490 --> 47:02.810] But thank you for that awesome blast from the past. [47:03.410 --> 47:05.190] Um, and now I kind of want one. [47:06.550 --> 47:10.930] I think we should be bringing back that colored plastic aesthetic myself. [47:11.590 --> 47:15.310] Uh, so I'm all about it. [47:17.490 --> 47:18.010] Absolutely. [47:18.330 --> 47:22.910] It's really, real, uh, cyber deck, uh, uh, vibes right there. [47:24.750 --> 47:25.670] We have another call? [47:26.170 --> 47:27.910] There is another caller, yes. [47:28.070 --> 47:28.650] Another caller. [47:28.810 --> 47:29.150] Good evening. [47:29.310 --> 47:30.110] You're on Off.Covertime. [47:30.210 --> 47:30.410] Go ahead. [47:31.450 --> 47:34.030] Uh, yeah, I had, uh, I had two questions, actually. [47:34.030 --> 47:38.050] One about, uh, running a valid node and one about, uh, valid chat. [47:38.450 --> 47:53.250] About the valid node, like, will there be a way to throttle the resources you contribute to the network, like, you know, CPU, GPU, uh, like IPFS storage or bandwidth for people who are on metered connections or people who have limited resources? [47:54.270 --> 48:00.070] And, uh, for the chat, will there be a namespace for, uh, users? [48:00.070 --> 48:03.130] Or will there, uh, are you just going to be, like, a key pair? [48:03.490 --> 48:04.230] Like, say, with session? [48:06.530 --> 48:07.050] Okay. [48:07.510 --> 48:09.330] Um, two questions. [48:09.610 --> 48:10.710] First one, um, [48:14.500 --> 48:14.800] yes. [48:15.960 --> 48:17.920] Um, let me see. [48:18.820 --> 48:22.900] Uh, let me get to the valid chat question first. [48:22.900 --> 48:34.860] First, the, um, as far as a key pair, uh, your key is only shared to the people that you contact. [48:34.860 --> 48:38.760] You know, if you want to do it, the way this works is you create a contact invitation. [48:39.340 --> 48:41.060] The invitations are encrypted. [48:41.640 --> 48:44.780] The invitations are placed onto our distributed hash table. [48:45.800 --> 48:54.240] And the way this works is you basically pass a decryption key for that invitation to your friend over some other medium. [48:54.240 --> 48:56.780] So, iMessage or Signal or whatever you choose. [48:56.780 --> 49:07.360] They're not getting the key to your node or to you or to your identity over that, over that, uh, non-valid medium. [49:07.580 --> 49:14.840] They're just getting a password, basically, that can be used to decrypt the invitation off of our distributed hash table. [49:15.020 --> 49:21.900] So, when you connect with people, um, you, it's, there's no such thing as a real, like, a namespace per se. [49:21.900 --> 49:24.240] Everything is done on the main valid network. [49:24.620 --> 49:29.840] That said, if you wanted to, you could set up your own valid network today. [49:30.140 --> 49:33.520] Uh, there is nothing special about any valid node. [49:34.180 --> 49:40.020] All of the valid nodes right now are on the, the main valid network, but you could set up your own valid network. [49:40.500 --> 49:43.900] Uh, and we do have this notion of network keying. [49:44.100 --> 49:48.540] So, if you wanted to set up a private valid just for you and your friends, you could do that. [49:49.180 --> 49:55.580] That would allow you to run a group of nodes that is not connected to the main, big, huge valid. [49:55.860 --> 49:57.960] Now, there might be security implications for that. [49:58.140 --> 50:00.580] Obviously, it's a pretty advanced use case. [50:02.500 --> 50:11.200] But yes, when you just run valid chat by default, you are in the same namespace, if you would, as everybody else. [50:12.000 --> 50:13.220] Because there is no server. [50:13.340 --> 50:15.480] Session does have this notion of servers. [50:15.480 --> 50:19.980] It's basically federated, not completely distributed. [50:22.200 --> 50:30.200] Session also has this thing where you have to buy $8,000 worth of cryptocurrency to run a node because they don't want people just setting them up. [50:31.520 --> 50:33.720] So we don't really subscribe to that. [50:34.820 --> 50:38.500] If that's what it takes to get their network up and running, that's fine. [50:39.300 --> 50:41.420] Just that's not how we choose to do it. [50:44.040 --> 50:45.860] And I didn't think I answered your first question. [50:45.960 --> 50:46.940] What was the first question again? [50:47.980 --> 51:02.640] I was just asking, like, say if you were to run a valid node, say if somebody were to be on like a metered connection or have resources or would just like to have it running in the background and not have it affect their bare metal hardware very much, [51:03.100 --> 51:03.800] are you able to... [51:03.800 --> 51:05.400] You could run a low-resource node. [51:06.460 --> 51:07.080] Yep, yeah. [51:07.140 --> 51:08.240] There's a configuration file. [51:08.400 --> 51:10.080] You can tweak how much storage. [51:11.560 --> 51:17.760] You can tweak what services you choose to offer if you don't want to do DHC storage at all, if you just want to do routing table stuff. [51:18.160 --> 51:20.140] You could also choose not to private route. [51:21.060 --> 51:23.700] You could turn on and off capabilities in the config file. [51:23.700 --> 51:28.380] So all of the limits and stuff like that are all tweakable. [51:29.220 --> 51:36.900] In a future release available, it's also going to detect whether or not you're on a metered connection, if you have on a mobile device, for example. [51:37.220 --> 51:40.300] And it's going to automatically throttle back those capabilities. [51:40.300 --> 51:57.540] Right now, if you're on a slower connection or you're on like a symmetric carrier-grade NAT, which is what you're going to get when you use a mobile device on a cellular network that's metered, it already throttles back today based on the type of network you're on. [51:57.540 --> 52:12.200] So if you're not on like a static IP or a dynamic one that has UP and P, like your home router, but you're on some kind of like carrier-grade symmetric NAT, it's going to notice it's automatically going to throttle back so it doesn't blow your bandwidth up. [52:13.900 --> 52:14.340] Cool. [52:14.520 --> 52:15.160] Thanks for the answers. [52:15.360 --> 52:16.680] Good and concise. [52:16.900 --> 52:17.440] Appreciate it. [52:18.180 --> 52:18.360] Yep. [52:18.520 --> 52:18.680] Cheers. [52:20.020 --> 52:21.120] Thanks for your call. [52:21.500 --> 52:26.980] And I'm going to give out the phone number one more time, 802-321-4225. [52:26.980 --> 52:40.840] But we're running low on time, so if you have any questions for our guests concerning VALID and the future of the internet and all sorts of other things, give a call now, 802-321-4225, 802-321-HACK. [52:41.480 --> 52:42.520] Yes, Gila, go ahead. [52:42.720 --> 52:43.320] We got another one. [52:43.960 --> 52:47.120] How do you protect the private key on the device? [52:47.120 --> 52:51.100] Can it be placed in a YubiKey or similar secure element? [52:52.640 --> 52:53.340] All right. [52:53.580 --> 52:54.980] Well, I gave this a lot of thought. [52:54.980 --> 53:05.960] Right now, you cannot use a YubiKey or an external hardware token. [53:06.900 --> 53:16.980] The private key is encrypted with another key that is stored on, let's say, a mobile device in the keychain. [53:16.980 --> 53:21.060] A keychain, and that itself can be encrypted with a password. [53:21.420 --> 53:25.700] So if you were to use a YubiKey, you could have it, like, generate a password or something like that. [53:25.780 --> 53:30.120] But we don't have support for, like, a time-based token or anything for that kind of unlock. [53:30.120 --> 53:56.700] That said, if you use the device-protected store, the hardware-protected store in your device, the keychain, and you do not back that up along with the rest of the on, you know, your iCloud storage or whatever, you are protected from iCloud backup dump attacks and from attacks where people might try to siphon off your backups from, [53:56.700 --> 53:58.760] say, the lightning port on your phone. [53:58.760 --> 54:08.000] They would have to crack the password that you use to unlock the device key that we bake into the protected store. [54:08.860 --> 54:24.080] So keychain or keystore on Android or Windows protected store or Linux secret service, those all have, you know, hardware enclaves that they store those keys in. [54:24.960 --> 54:26.300] So that's the answer. [54:26.300 --> 54:29.120] So we do... we give it a lot of thought. [54:29.380 --> 54:45.080] Our threat model was, you know, backup attacks and, you know, making sure that when you backup your device that there's at least a password between the attacker that downloads your backups and their ability to get at your stuff. [54:46.240 --> 54:46.700] Okay. [54:47.000 --> 54:47.520] And we have... [54:47.520 --> 54:48.080] Do we have a call? [54:48.260 --> 54:49.020] Another call, yes. [54:49.600 --> 54:49.640] Okay. [54:49.640 --> 54:50.600] Calls are coming in now. [54:56.300 --> 54:56.580] Good. [54:56.600 --> 54:56.700] Good. [54:56.700 --> 54:56.880] How are you? [54:58.020 --> 54:58.600] All right. [54:58.820 --> 55:01.500] I just wanted to give you the heads up as a fellow techie. [55:02.560 --> 55:10.960] At about 48 minutes is when you had your emergency tone and there was no warning beforehand and no warning after it. [55:11.700 --> 55:12.100] Yeah. [55:12.160 --> 55:13.300] That's how they design these things. [55:13.340 --> 55:14.560] You're supposed to somehow know. [55:15.060 --> 55:22.320] You send across that tone and, yeah, if you're not digitally tied in to what you're listening to, you don't have a clue. [55:22.320 --> 55:28.040] You know, it's another example of how, you know, the old days, the EBS system was very verbal. [55:28.200 --> 55:29.420] They tell you what it was. [55:29.640 --> 55:34.080] And EAS, they just send out these tones and they're supposed to activate something. [55:34.260 --> 55:38.100] But if they don't, then you're kind of left wondering just what the hell was that. [55:39.380 --> 55:40.220] It's really... [55:40.220 --> 55:41.840] So, you know, we have a cable system. [55:42.140 --> 55:57.580] People who use Optimum might notice at 3 in the morning what they almost always do is just have a blue screen over all channels and PVRs that just say that they're testing a system for about five minutes and you can't watch anything. [55:57.780 --> 55:59.500] And if you're watching something live, you're going to miss it. [55:59.940 --> 56:00.660] It's ridiculous. [56:01.000 --> 56:03.380] And they think that's how you're supposed to test the system. [56:03.520 --> 56:04.300] And it's not. [56:04.540 --> 56:06.140] Believe me, that's not how the system works. [56:06.360 --> 56:07.380] Anyway, that's not what you called it. [56:07.500 --> 56:10.120] And what do people do during the night shift if you work in the night shift? [56:10.220 --> 56:11.260] I have a question as well. [56:11.340 --> 56:11.600] Go ahead. [56:13.240 --> 56:17.040] I'm designing something that I believe is going to be really, really big. [56:17.640 --> 56:27.760] And I love what your female friend was saying before, that you all agree with it's about the people and you don't want to have any money commandeering and stuff like that. [56:27.800 --> 56:28.500] I so agree. [56:28.740 --> 56:30.740] And I'm doing something along those lines. [56:31.040 --> 56:33.400] My only problem is I've had so many digital problems. [56:33.400 --> 56:38.880] And I've had a guy who was designing software for a specific thing that I found a secret. [56:39.180 --> 56:41.980] Take three problems from every person you know. [56:42.220 --> 56:45.420] And I am a professional technician for 50 years. [56:45.480 --> 56:47.440] And I have a really good success rate. [56:47.840 --> 56:49.800] And I said, how would I fix it? [56:50.180 --> 56:51.660] And I've come up with something. [56:51.940 --> 56:53.760] And I want to design some software. [56:54.000 --> 56:58.160] And my software guy who lived in Canada bailed out and never called me back. [56:58.240 --> 57:00.600] And he sounded like a good guy until we almost got done. [57:01.180 --> 57:08.980] And then when he couldn't reflect the software to work right, I think he didn't really know what he was doing as a young guy. [57:09.300 --> 57:10.220] And then that was it. [57:10.280 --> 57:11.180] I never heard from him again. [57:11.460 --> 57:13.800] Would you happen to know anyone who can do software? [57:16.920 --> 57:20.380] There's a lot of software development professionals out there. [57:20.860 --> 57:30.740] If you're looking for a contractor of some sort, your best bet is to probably go through an app development service. [57:30.940 --> 57:32.360] There's a lot of those online. [57:32.900 --> 57:34.280] Personally, I roll my own. [57:34.700 --> 57:39.660] That's because I've been coding for 35-something years now. [57:39.980 --> 57:41.960] So I write all my own stuff. [57:42.160 --> 57:44.980] But I know there are a lot of contract programmers out there. [57:46.260 --> 57:51.900] Feel free to hit up LinkedIn and places like that for software development needs. [57:54.140 --> 57:56.440] I also just want to chime in to say that I'm sorry. [57:56.620 --> 57:57.340] That really sucks. [57:57.820 --> 57:57.980] Yeah. [57:58.200 --> 57:59.300] I was a ham operator in the past. [57:59.420 --> 57:59.700] I'm sorry. [57:59.860 --> 58:00.500] I cut you off. [58:00.580 --> 58:01.040] I'm sorry, guys. [58:02.060 --> 58:02.500] Oh, no. [58:02.540 --> 58:03.680] I just wanted to say I'm sorry. [58:04.020 --> 58:04.500] That sucks. [58:05.540 --> 58:06.120] Yeah, it does. [58:07.500 --> 58:08.400] What were you saying, caller? [58:10.760 --> 58:14.520] What would it take for me to interest the gentleman who was just speaking to be involved? [58:15.000 --> 58:19.480] If you're interested in things for people, I'm looking to do something on a very large scale. [58:19.600 --> 58:23.440] And I think if I was off air, find it better, but I don't want to do it on air. [58:23.720 --> 58:32.640] My recommendation is if you want to pitch ideas to Valid developers because you think Valid is a relevant technology, come join our Discord. [58:33.040 --> 58:38.960] We have a lot of places where there's a lot of people that program and a lot of people that have the same kind of ideals. [58:39.320 --> 58:42.760] And they might be looking for things to do with Valid. [58:43.320 --> 58:48.680] And if your idea lines up with some of the people that are there, it's a very welcoming community. [58:48.840 --> 58:50.040] Feel free to join the Discord. [58:50.040 --> 58:52.640] You can find it on our website on Valid.com. [58:53.280 --> 58:59.780] Click in there and pitch your idea to some of the people in some of our ideas channels. [59:00.580 --> 59:02.120] You know, we're always... [59:02.120 --> 59:05.720] We'd love to hear about ideas people have for apps. [59:05.940 --> 59:10.060] And again, that's Valid, V-E-I-L-I-D.com. [59:10.200 --> 59:11.200] That's the website. [59:11.800 --> 59:13.440] So thank you for that call. [59:13.700 --> 59:14.060] I appreciate it. [59:14.240 --> 59:14.900] Thank you. [59:15.000 --> 59:15.860] Keep up the great work. [59:16.140 --> 59:16.540] Thank you. [59:16.540 --> 59:17.360] Thank you for calling. [59:18.360 --> 59:22.060] And that's going to do it for calls tonight because we had a bunch of them in the end. [59:22.680 --> 59:23.500] Gila, did you have more? [59:24.200 --> 59:25.160] I do. [59:25.460 --> 59:29.680] This has actually been a very active evening on the chat. [59:29.680 --> 59:32.240] We've had people involved who have not been here before. [59:32.400 --> 59:33.200] So thank you very much. [59:33.540 --> 59:33.720] Okay. [59:33.940 --> 59:34.600] Question number one. [59:34.920 --> 59:37.820] Will an MVNO add any issues? [59:40.620 --> 59:42.780] I don't know what an MVNO is. [59:42.780 --> 59:44.360] I'm so glad someone else doesn't. [59:45.160 --> 59:46.560] I was feeling so stupid. [59:46.920 --> 59:47.300] Yeah, I have no idea. [59:47.300 --> 59:48.040] I googled it. [59:48.200 --> 59:50.340] A mobile virtual network operator. [59:50.420 --> 59:50.820] Of course. [59:51.080 --> 59:51.340] Oh, yeah. [59:51.420 --> 59:52.000] We all know that. [59:52.140 --> 59:59.880] Is a company that does not own a mobile spectrum license but sells mobile services under its brand name using a network of a licensed mobile operator. [59:59.980 --> 01:00:16.680] So this is basically subletting mobile network space so that, like, you know, FUBAR telecommunications could sell services but it would actually be backhauled out to, say, Verizon, you know, for the actual mobile network. [01:00:17.780 --> 01:00:19.940] I don't think that's gonna... [01:00:19.940 --> 01:00:26.540] Because this is an overlay network on top of the internet protocol, it's not really gonna matter what the underlying topology is. [01:00:27.340 --> 01:00:33.160] They're probably gonna use Symmetric NAT because that's what all these, you know, big carrier-grade networks do. [01:00:33.420 --> 01:00:45.340] We do support that completely and, you know, it won't be the most, you know, feature-rich node that you're running, but, you know, it'll run all the apps that you care about without it being an issue. [01:00:47.100 --> 01:00:47.460] Okay. [01:00:48.860 --> 01:00:52.940] We had one additional question that was actually answered in the chat, so we are gonna skip it. [01:00:53.080 --> 01:00:53.960] So last one. [01:00:55.340 --> 01:01:01.960] Before I say that, though, Tim in Connecticut, yes, if it had been the old way, they would have said if this were an actual emergency, you would have heard news. [01:01:02.100 --> 01:01:02.780] We don't do that anymore. [01:01:03.560 --> 01:01:03.920] Okay. [01:01:04.060 --> 01:01:05.540] Last question for our guests. [01:01:05.540 --> 01:01:10.540] How difficult would it be for a malicious coder to build a map of all VALID nodes? [01:01:10.760 --> 01:01:15.240] Could that have dangerous implications for people using VALID under oppressive regimes? [01:01:15.920 --> 01:01:17.100] I'm sure it could. [01:01:18.060 --> 01:01:23.820] Right now, because the number of VALID users is somewhat small, [01:01:27.200 --> 01:01:33.020] it would be like, you know, back in the 80s, you know, how many people had modems at home? [01:01:33.580 --> 01:01:42.340] You know, if you were dialed and you found people's home modems listening or something, it would be a pretty small population and they're pretty easily exploited. [01:01:43.580 --> 01:01:52.840] You know, if you're looking for somebody in a particular area code that did a digital crime or something, you just look and find all the people who had modems at home and go hunt them up. [01:01:53.040 --> 01:01:54.860] It wasn't that common. [01:01:55.800 --> 01:01:58.360] The same is gonna be true right now. [01:01:59.500 --> 01:02:06.180] People are building mapping mechanisms for VALID because at the IP layer, it's not, again, not trying to be deniable. [01:02:06.920 --> 01:02:16.940] But when you start looking at having millions or hundreds of millions of nodes eventually, building a map of those hundred million nodes isn't gonna get you much. [01:02:17.100 --> 01:02:20.560] It's just gonna be like, oh, look, everyone who has a computer is using VALID. [01:02:21.080 --> 01:02:31.140] You know, as soon as we reach that level of, you know, of saturation, it's gonna be prohibitive to try to build a map of it. [01:02:31.820 --> 01:02:33.220] I had kind of a follow-on. [01:02:33.360 --> 01:02:36.240] I was curious what your thoughts were about, [01:02:39.340 --> 01:02:46.500] I guess, actors that create versions that are maybe intentionally broken in some way. [01:02:48.440 --> 01:02:58.860] And so, like, say it gets popular, say, you know, Section 702 gets reauthorized and everybody freaks out and all of a sudden they get popular. [01:02:58.980 --> 01:03:00.780] It turns out the popular one's broken, you know. [01:03:00.920 --> 01:03:09.580] We all have scenarios in our head, I think, from even this show talking about news stories of different apps and so on and so forth. [01:03:09.620 --> 01:03:12.580] So, it just struck me that are you auditing in some way? [01:03:12.660 --> 01:03:14.860] Is there a way that you're encouraging? [01:03:15.220 --> 01:03:25.560] I know you mentioned a little, you touched on it a little bit, but how do you make sure that that continuity throughout, like if it's in all different types of software that people are building, how are you even able to know? [01:03:25.720 --> 01:03:32.740] Is it just going to be naming and shaming that, hey, this is a broken, busted implementation of this, don't use it, or that kind of thing? [01:03:32.740 --> 01:03:37.900] How do you get the word out on what's good and what's really maybe a little shabby in the future? [01:03:38.620 --> 01:03:42.020] Yeah, you know, it's going to be sort of like Linux, you know. [01:03:42.980 --> 01:03:52.760] You've got this big kernel that's sort of like valid core, you know, and then there's going to be distributions that show up where people have packaged it with some libraries that they like or whatever. [01:03:53.080 --> 01:03:56.340] You know, I liken it to the sort of Linux kernel. [01:03:56.580 --> 01:03:59.480] There are little forks that you can find of Linux. [01:03:59.920 --> 01:04:03.020] Your mileage may vary if you don't choose the big supported one. [01:04:03.700 --> 01:04:05.200] But there's a lot of distributions. [01:04:05.520 --> 01:04:07.040] There's a lot of different ways that it's packaged. [01:04:07.320 --> 01:04:19.080] I have a feeling that Valid is going to do for networking and cloud, you know, mobile, modern software development what Linux did for operating systems. [01:04:19.280 --> 01:04:20.920] It's going to democratize things. [01:04:21.060 --> 01:04:27.000] It's going to open it up It will have all a lot of the same problems in terms of like forks happening and whatever. [01:04:28.720 --> 01:04:36.280] But the one thing that we've got going for us is that no node in Valid has to trust any other node. [01:04:36.680 --> 01:04:48.300] So if you build an adversarial version of Valid that does bad things or, you know, doesn't perform the way you expect it to, other nodes are going to ban that node and not talk to it. [01:04:48.300 --> 01:04:54.400] So, you know, we've designed it for, you know, adversarial nodes existing. [01:04:54.820 --> 01:04:56.940] And in fact, we encourage that. [01:04:57.080 --> 01:05:09.260] We have people on our Discord right now building adversarial node technology and committing it to our repository because we believe in building a better, more secure Valid. [01:05:09.460 --> 01:05:16.360] We have people actively hacking our stuff and producing security advisories. [01:05:16.360 --> 01:05:22.880] we already have a CVE on the MITRE database for a bug that we had that we got fixed in 24 hours. [01:05:23.060 --> 01:05:36.180] You know, so there's already a very hacker-friendly adversary, you know, adversarial development accepting ethos going on here. [01:05:36.820 --> 01:05:39.680] You know, we're not going to wait around and hope people don't hack this. [01:05:39.800 --> 01:05:40.740] We're going to hack it ourselves. [01:05:41.140 --> 01:05:41.360] Wow. [01:05:41.560 --> 01:05:43.380] I just love the phrase adversarial nodes. [01:05:43.380 --> 01:05:44.760] I'm making trophies. [01:05:45.040 --> 01:05:46.220] We are making trophies. [01:05:46.360 --> 01:05:50.580] trophies for the people that break it in the most creative way. [01:05:50.740 --> 01:05:54.120] I'm actually going to send them literal trophies to put on display. [01:05:55.080 --> 01:05:56.780] Wait, I am allowed to swear here, right? [01:05:56.920 --> 01:05:57.280] Yeah, you can. [01:05:57.380 --> 01:05:57.600] Go ahead. [01:05:57.700 --> 01:05:58.080] Go for it. [01:05:58.400 --> 01:05:58.840] Yeah, it's you too. [01:05:58.840 --> 01:06:00.980] I'm making fuck around and find out trophies. [01:06:01.040 --> 01:06:01.620] There you go. [01:06:01.740 --> 01:06:02.020] Wow. [01:06:02.520 --> 01:06:04.460] Because that is the scientific method. [01:06:04.740 --> 01:06:08.080] I'm encouraging people to fuck around with our stuff. [01:06:08.280 --> 01:06:09.100] Mess them out with the code. [01:06:09.200 --> 01:06:10.000] See what you can do. [01:06:10.560 --> 01:06:16.680] That way we know what we're expecting when we get this stuff on apps and in the hands of everybody. [01:06:17.700 --> 01:06:26.320] You know, we are really encouraging people to, you know, think outside the box and be creative and be a part of this. [01:06:26.320 --> 01:06:28.900] And, yes, breaking it is a part of it. [01:06:29.640 --> 01:06:39.420] Yeah, this reminds me so much of the early days of the net where it was all in front of us and this is the kind of tone that we had. [01:06:39.600 --> 01:06:45.280] You know, it was basically break something or, you know, we'll make it better. [01:06:45.620 --> 01:06:46.920] It wasn't all about profit. [01:06:47.060 --> 01:06:47.880] It wasn't all about tracking. [01:06:48.000 --> 01:06:53.660] So, I can't thank you guys enough for bringing that back and I sure hope it succeeds. [01:06:55.240 --> 01:06:55.900] Thanks a lot. [01:06:57.060 --> 01:06:57.700] Thank you. [01:06:57.920 --> 01:06:59.660] I mean, that's what we're here for. [01:06:59.920 --> 01:07:00.620] We hope. [01:07:01.360 --> 01:07:04.240] Well, thanks, Dildog and Medusa. [01:07:04.480 --> 01:07:04.800] I'm going to... [01:07:04.800 --> 01:07:05.600] How do you pronounce the four? [01:07:06.360 --> 01:07:06.920] Medus four. [01:07:07.180 --> 01:07:07.960] Medus four. [01:07:08.160 --> 01:07:08.820] Medus four. [01:07:09.120 --> 01:07:11.760] You changed the syllables that way, too. [01:07:12.120 --> 01:07:22.660] Okay, and also thanks to the Gibson who had to leave before and everybody else who called in and wrote questions and, of course, Kyle and Rob and Gila and Alex. [01:07:23.620 --> 01:07:25.920] Write to us O-T-H at 2600. [01:07:26.340 --> 01:07:28.440] We'd love to hear from you with any good thoughts or comments. [01:07:28.580 --> 01:07:30.860] If you have more questions, we'll forward them along. [01:07:31.140 --> 01:07:32.620] We will follow the story, of course. [01:07:32.740 --> 01:07:33.100] Absolutely. [01:07:33.360 --> 01:07:34.340] Any innovations. [01:07:34.520 --> 01:07:37.760] We'll figure out what emergency is going on where those crazy tones came across. [01:07:37.940 --> 01:07:40.900] I'm not sure if the archive will have that or not. [01:07:42.180 --> 01:07:43.080] It was valid. [01:07:43.440 --> 01:07:43.880] We have it. [01:07:44.220 --> 01:07:44.760] It could have been valid. [01:07:44.760 --> 01:07:47.480] I would believe that. [01:07:47.820 --> 01:07:51.000] But we might have an archive copy without it or we might have the tones. [01:07:51.260 --> 01:07:52.420] Maybe people want to hear the tones. [01:07:52.700 --> 01:07:54.020] It's kind of cool. [01:07:54.980 --> 01:07:58.360] If anyone else has any questions, we are super active in the Discord. [01:07:58.800 --> 01:08:00.500] I jump in voice chat all the time. [01:08:00.820 --> 01:08:04.060] I know Dil does as well because this is a community. [01:08:04.280 --> 01:08:07.740] So feel free to join the Vela Discord and get a part of this. [01:08:08.000 --> 01:08:10.540] And together, I think we can take back control of our internet. [01:08:10.940 --> 01:08:12.600] And how can people get to the Vela Discord? [01:08:14.920 --> 01:08:15.640] Velaid.com. [01:08:15.760 --> 01:08:19.280] V-E-I-L-I-D.com. [01:08:19.440 --> 01:08:21.580] And there should be a link right there on the Discord. [01:08:22.340 --> 01:08:22.700] Cool. [01:08:23.080 --> 01:08:23.820] Or to the Discord. [01:08:24.520 --> 01:08:24.980] All right. [01:08:25.020 --> 01:08:26.620] Well, we'll be talking about this more in the future. [01:08:26.640 --> 01:08:27.460] I know it. [01:08:28.400 --> 01:08:31.800] So thanks to all you do and best of luck for everything in the future. [01:08:32.960 --> 01:08:33.500] All right. [01:08:33.640 --> 01:08:34.020] Thank you. [01:08:34.320 --> 01:08:34.600] All right. [01:08:35.580 --> 01:08:36.120] Good night, everybody.