

APPENDIX A

Deception Operations

This appendix covers deception concepts, operations, and measures, as well as PSYOP considerations in support of deception activities. Deception can support military operations across the operational continuum. Historical examples illustrate how deception has influenced various participants during peace, conflict, and war.

Deception Concepts

Deception is the deliberate misrepresentation of reality to gain a competitive advantage. Political deception is achieved through diplomatic or international relations; military deception, through the acts of military forces.

The offensive is the better position from which to succeed at deception. The initiators of action define the nature of the encounter and thereby have the greater degree of control over it. A major advantage the initiative confers for successful deception is time. Although the target audience may ultimately choose not to act upon the deceptive theme, the additional time it spends evaluating deceptive scenarios or searching for further information benefits the initiator.

Deception (military or political) includes manipulating, distorting, withholding, or falsifying evidence available to an opponent. History has shown that it is far easier to deceive by reinforcing an opponent's existing preconceptions than it is to persuade him to change his mind. PSYOP personnel should encourage the opponent that the most likely way of achieving the objective will in fact be adopted (thereby diverting his attention from an alternative plan). Given two options, one of which reinforces our existing point of view, people are more likely to believe what they already suspect. Psychologically, they are gratified by evidence that confirms their preconceptions. People generally attach undue importance to evidence supporting their point of view and reject that which does not. PSYOP personnel should avoid deception that requires persuading a target audience of something it is not already predisposed to believe. In World War II, the Allies exploited Hitler's (the target audience with the power) conviction that because of

the problems of air cover and the need for a major port, any Allied invasion of Europe would occur at Calais.

Deception Types

Deception may be strategic, operational, or tactical. Deception, regardless of type, may be active (designed for the target audience to discover) or passive (designed to withhold selected items from the target audience for operations security [OPSEC]).

Strategic deception refers to instances during war or peace when countries attempt to mask their diplomatic and military strategy either by confusing or misleading their opponents. This level of deception involves a nation's highest decision makers using diplomacy, economics, intelligence, and virtually every conceivable dimension of modern conflict to mislead or confuse opponents.

Strategic deception may extend political deception by using military activities. It may also be large-scale, long-term projections of false intelligence to aid theater objectives. Although the objectives may be military, strategic deception supports national policies and plans and may be supported by nonmilitary agencies. The various participants from across the operational continuum can be illustrated in the following example.

As part of Operation Barbarossa, Hitler told the Soviets that a large-scale German buildup along the Soviet border was an exercise linked to the invasion of Britain. Operation Sea Lion (a seaborne invasion of Britain) was a deliberate German exploitation of the war with Britain as a deception for the beginning of Barbarossa. Also, the German operations in the Balkans, although involving the occupation of Yugoslavia and Greece, were directed against the British while supporting the military buildup for the upcoming invasion of Soviet Union. This deception also built upon Stalin's expectation that Germany, based on precedent, would never attack without an ultimatum. The Soviet Union was still hoping to stay out of the war while Britain and France fought. Thus, Germany deceived its wartime opponent (Britain) while, at the same time, deceiving its future opponent (Soviet Union), who was trying hard to avoid the conflict.

Operational deception is within the purview of theater Army component, Army group, field Army, and in some cases, corps commanders. The objective of deception operations at the operational level of war is to influence the decisions of opponent commanders before battle occurs. This type of deception is done so that the tactical outcome of battles and engagements is favorable and, subsequently, operationally exploitable. The goal is to maintain operational fluidity. For this reason, operational deception has a much larger potential payoff than deception at the tactical level.

During peacetime, a unit's true and deceptive efforts concerning how the force is organized, equipped, trained, and maintained directly contribute to the—

- Strategic aim of deterring war.
- Operational requirement to win campaigns and major operations if deterrence fails.

During peacetime and wartime transition periods, the unit's true and deceptive efforts concerning how the force is allocated and sustained directly contribute to—

- Delaying final opponent war-waging decisions so that political intervention or war-avoidance processes can be engaged.
- The operational requirement to induce the opponent to reexamine its already-made force allocation and sustainment decisions if political intervention fails.

The core of operational deception is the identification of the opponent's center of gravity and the design of campaigns that expose the opponent to attack and destruction. Opponent operational centers of gravity-political, economic, military, sociological, ideological, or psychological (or combinations thereof) have been characterized as—

- The mass of the opponent force.
- The boundaries between two major opponent combat formations.
- Vital command and control centers.
- Vital logistic bases.
- Cohesion among opponent alliances.
- Mental or psychological balance of a key commander.

A center of gravity is a fundamental source of opponent power and strength. In most cases, it will have to be attacked in phases over time.

A campaign plan's ultimate objective should be the destruction of the opponent's center of gravity. Deceptions supporting the campaign plan should be consciously designed to expose the opponent's center of gravity to increasingly higher levels of risk.

Deceptions that are developed around branches and sequels to campaigns and major operations plans weaken the strength with which the opponent can preserve its center of gravity.

Lines of operation define the direction of a force in relation to the opponent. Multiple lines of operation in a campaign are not uncommon, although often there is usually only one per campaign or major operation. This line, or lines, connect the friendly operational base or bases geographically with the operational objective. By manipulating these lines, it is possible to mislead the opponent into adopting inappropriate COAs.

All offensive operations reach a point—the culminating point—when the strength of the attacker no longer decisively exceeds that of the defender. Continuing to operate beyond that point risks overextension, counterattack, and defeat. The aim of attack is to achieve decisive objectives before reaching the culminating point. While on the attack, deception operations make it easier to move supplies forward and to preserve—

- Available stocks.
- Numerical advantage of the attacking force.

- Reserve forces.
- Local air superiority.

Offensive deception operations can take the form of displays, feints, or demonstrations (which reduce opponent maneuver or fire-induced force attrition), or a combination of displays, feints, and demonstrations. All forms contribute to delaying premature achievement of friendly culminating points.

Operational commanders who are attacking can manipulate the indicators the opponent commander uses to perceive friendly culminating points. This manipulation can induce the opponent to—

- Miscalculate which major operation is the main effort (where the decisive battle is sought).
- Miscalculate which branch of the major operation is then assuming main effort emphasis.
- Miscalculate postbattle disposition, objectives, and missions.
- Shift to the offensive prematurely.
- Commit reserves prematurely.
- Hold forces in reserve too long.
- Adopt hasty defensive postures.
- Be logistically underprepared for the impending battle.
- Inappropriately over-weight a sector logistically, or with fire support, where a decision is not sought.
- Inappropriately exhaust or withhold close air support or battlefield interdiction sorties.

Defense hastens culmination of the opponent attack and then exploits it offensively. While on the defensive, deception operations are employed to—

- Induce the allocation of numerically inferior forces to the offensive (feign or demonstrate weakness).
- Dilute the opponent's ability to concentrate its main effort with fires and maneuver (notionally threaten its flanks and rear areas).
- Canalize opponent movement into special or conventional (air and ground) weapon kill zones through notional means.

Tactical deception is deliberate action to achieve surprise on the battlefield. Tactical deception actions may support a strategic or operational effort. Although the line between tactical, operational, and strategic deception is not always clear, tactical deception here refers to the short term actions of corps or lower units within the battle area. Militarily, preconceived ideas seem to flourish at the operational level. Perhaps the reason is because planners and decision makers at this level do not have access to the same amount of information as planners and decision makers at the strategic level.

Common Elements in Successful Deception

Experienced deceivers on either side of the conflict during World War II arrived at similar conclusions on how to succeed at deception. The common elements were—

- Secrecy, organization, and coordination.
- Plausibility and confirmation.
- Adaptability.
- Predispositions of the target.
- Factors in the strategic situation.

Deception is controlled by the highest-level headquarters conducting the tactical operation. Each subordinate command, however, may play apart or be responsible for its own deception within the overall projection of the deception story. When a commander elects to use deception, he directs subordinate units to carry out one or more deception tasks. A deception staff should have access to, and direction from, the supreme commander of the operation it supports. Only by avoiding being absorbed within large operational staffs can deception planners incorporate the current information and intentions they need to keep their deception real. The commander should be as closely and as constantly informed about his deception operations as he is about his real ones.

A deception operation requires the most careful centralized control and coordination. The timing of a deception plan is crucial. All deception has a relatively short life span before it is exposed. The target must be given enough time to react to the false information but not enough time to analyze it so that the true purpose of the deception operation becomes apparent.

The commander must know the target audience and the intelligence system (provided by friendly intelligence agencies). He must also know the status and efficiency (technological state) of the nation's military machine. For example, in August 1990, after international uproar over the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, Saddam Hussein assured the world that Iraqi forces were withdrawing from Kuwait. Iraq produced a videotape showing convoys of troops supposedly moving out of the country. However, the sophisticated U.S. and allied electronic surveillance correctly indicated that no such troop movements had taken place. The technological capabilities of the opponent and opponent alliance exceeded the attempt of the deceiver.

The commander must determine the deception objective. For example, he must determine what he, the deceiver, wants the target to do or not do.

The deception operation must have a believable deception story. The target audience is provided evidence of false intentions or capabilities, thereby concealing the TRUE tactical intent. (Deception measures are recommended by briefing intelligence agencies, approved by command authority, and achieved by all concerned.) The deception must be reasonable. False indicators must be

presented to the target audience through as many intelligence and surveillance sources as possible. However, confirmation from multiple sources must not produce too complete a picture as to arouse suspicion. Deception must never seem incompatible or illogical with events that opponents have reason to expect.

The true dispositions and intentions must be denied to the target audience(s). Everyone participating in deception must be proficient in information denial to maintain OPSEC. There must be no simple way of checking what the facts in the case really are. Even though deception involves the release of information to the target audience, it must be released in such a way that a supposed lapse of security precautions does not arouse suspicion.

The use of deception should not discredit a source who may have valuable future potential. In World War II, the "black" Allied station, Operation Annie, was once used to direct a Nazi column into Allied hands. The deception was excellent, but it completely destroyed the future of the station. It is usually unwise to use a newspaper, radio, or television with a large established audience as media for deception operations.

Deception Target Audience

The target audience of the deception effort is the opponent or participant with the authority to make the decision that will achieve the deception objective. To be successful, deception must achieve a desired impact on the thinking of—

- The deception target audience.
- Either a national or military decision maker.
- The intelligence analyst working for the decision maker.

Deception Tasks

Four types of deception tasks may be used in deception feints, demonstrations, ruses, and displays. A combination of some or all of these tasks may be used.

Feints are limited objective offensive actions that require contact with opposing military forces to give the realistic appearance of a main attack. To be termed a "supporting" attack, feints should have some valid offensive objective.

Demonstrations are "shows of force" on the battlefield where a decision is not sought. It is similar to a feint with one exception no contact with the opponent is intended.

Ruses are tricks of war. They are generally single actions-planned or impromptu-that may be part of a tactical deception supporting political or strategic efforts. The ruse is characterized by the deliberate placing of false information into the hands of the target audience.

Ruses range from simple tactical tricks employed by soldiers to strategic actions employed by nations. Tactical tricks by soldiers are applicable under any condition of warfare where combat forces are in contact.

A ruse may lull an opponent into a false sense of security. The mind has a tendency to be lulled by regularity and routine. It tends to pay less attention to events that occur again and again and is not good at spotting marginal or gradual changes. Historical examples include Joshua at Jericho and the successful crossing of the Suez Canal by the Egyptians in the Yom Kippur war of 1973. During the year preceding the attack, the Egyptians conducted 40 major water-crossing exercises to set the stage for the actual offensive. During World War II, Japanese in the Pacific Islands used propped up dead or wounded British and American soldiers to lure comrades into rescue attempts, thus inflicting greater casualties on the Allies.

Displays may be conducted to project the deception story. Displays may include one or more of the following:

- Simulations are projections of objects or systems that do not actually exist.
- Disguises are altered objects made to look like something else.
- Portrayals are presentations of units or activities to represent nonexistent units or activities. Although considered acts in themselves, portrayals usually include disguises and simulations.

Deception Measures in Support of Deception Tasks

Deception measures may be used to provide false "indicators" to an opponent in support of deception tasks. Information passes back and forth between opposing forces on a battlefield by what is seen, heard, smelled, and picked up by communications-electronics (CE). Types of deception measures are, therefore, classed as visual, sonic, olfactory, and electronic.

Visual Deception

Much of an opponent's intelligence is based on what is observed. Hence, effective visual deception is critical to the projection of the deception story.

Two items commonly used in visual deception are dummies and decoys. A dummy is an imitation of something on the battlefield. A decoy is used to draw the attention of hostile military forces away from a more important area.

Camouflage is an important element in deception actions. If visual evidence of a deception story is going to be projected, the opponent must not observe evidence of the true operation. Visual deception must present realism and completeness. It requires realistic progression to give the opponent what he expects to see—for example, vehicle "tracks" where vehicles supposedly have traveled.

Sonic Deception

Sonic deception is the projection of sound to produce battlefield noise. It is directed against the target's sound ranging sets and the human ear. Sonic measures convey to the target audience the identifiable sounds of a specific activity in accordance with the deception story.

Because the target audience will seek to confirm what has been seen by other means, sonic measures must often accompany visual deception. For example, air

photographs maybe confirmed by reconnaissance patrol and vice versa. If a unit is being displayed to opponent surveillance, vehicle sounds and equipment noises should match those the opponent knows are used by the unit being projected. In addition, the sounds should originate from logical places the target audience can accept as occupied by the unit.

Whether the source of noise is real or simulated, the purpose is the same-to project the sonic characteristics of specific activity or material to the target. Several principles are always applicable to the use of sonic deception:

- Confuse and mislead.
- Blend the real with the false.
- Use logic.
- Reduce opponent observation.
- Consider the environment.
- Maintain OPSEC.

Although an individual with normal hearing can recognize several separate sounds (vehicle engines, weapons firing, voices) that arrive simultaneously, his estimate of the distance from the source is unreliable. He deduces that a sound rising in frequency is coming toward him, one lowering is receding. Specially prepared recordings can mislead or confuse him, although the sound is emanating from a fixed location.

A false sound by itself will seldom be successful on the battlefield. It is necessary to blend true sounds with those reproduced artificially. For example, the sound of firing projected electronically should be accompanied by some real fires; otherwise, the lack of trajectory overhead may reveal the deception.

Sounds must be compatible with their purported origins. For example, the opponent will doubt the sound of tanks in a dense swamp. Sounds should also coincide with visual measures being presented. In projecting the sounds of indirect fire support, for example, the sound must seem to come from a defilade position.

Obviously, the less effective the target's visual observation, the more effective the projection of sonic deception measures. Therefore, sonic effectiveness is increased at night or when the point of origin is obscured by artificial means such as smoke.

The range of sound signals depends on such factors as climatic conditions, vegetation, topography, temperate, and humidity. Although distances cannot be predicted, a cool, humid, still atmosphere and water surfaces carry sound best. Since each area must be evaluated when devices are employed, sonic measures should be tested in surroundings similar to the deception area.

Deception must also provide for the prevention of sounds that will give away the true operation. At night, strict enforcement of basic light and noise discipline is necessary. "Padding" can also be used when the primary interest is concealment. The operations area can be saturated with indicators to obscure sounds of preparation or movement associated with the true tactical intent.

Olfactory Deception

Simulated battlefield odors maybe used to deceive. Pending the development and standardization of olfactory agents, munitions, and devices, commanders in the field must apply ingenuity and resourcefulness to improvise means for simulating battlefield odors.

Factors that must be considered when planning the use of olfactory deceptions include—

- Consistency.
- Distance.
- Environment.
- OPSEC.

Olfactory measures must be consistent with other deception measures or activities portrayed. Olfactory measures depend on the proximity of the target. Olfactory effectiveness depends on climatic conditions (wind, humidity, light, dark). The activity odors should be masked or eliminated.

Electronic Deception

Electronic deception is the deliberate radiation, reradiation, alteration, absorption, or reflection of electromagnetic radiations. The intent is to mislead an opponent in interpreting data received by his electronic equipment and to present false indications to electronic systems.

Careful integration of electronic deception with visual, sonic, and olfactory actions is critical to the successful projection of a deception story. What the opponent intercepts and locates electronically must agree with what he has seen, what he has **heard**, and what he has **smelled**.

Electronic deception falls into two broad categories: manipulative electronic deception and initiative electronic deception.

Manipulative electronic deception occurs when a friendly force passes false data between its own stations or emits it from noncommunications devices to take advantage of the target SIGINT capability. It can be described as the use of friendly electromagnetic radiations to falsify information the target audience can obtain from electromagnetic radiation analysis.

Imitative electronic deception occurs when a friendly force enters the opponent's system posing as one of his stations or devices. It can be described as intrusion into the opponent's channels and introduction of matter in imitation of his own electromagnetic radiation to deceive or confuse him.

During electronic deception, all PSYOP personnel must review electronic activities (those in support of ongoing activities as well as those that will support the deception operation). All activities must be integrated and mutually noninterfering. CE officers exercise principal responsibility for integration and coordination of electronic deception.

Notional Activities in Deception

The adjective "notional" is combined with other military terms—for example, notional plans, notional weapons, and notional order of battle (OB)—to indicate false objects or plans the friendly force wishes the opponent to accept as real.

Notional describes a false activity conducted to project the deception story to the opponent analyst. Thus, tasking a company to perform as a "notional battalion" directs it to organize, or geographically deploy, and using deception measures, display the characteristic signature of a battalion to opponent surveillance. The purpose is to place a friendly battalion in the opponent's estimate of the friendly forces' OB at the time and place called for in the deception story. The notional unit or activity is an economy of force measure to support the deception, causing the opponent to obtain a false appreciation of friendly strength, composition, and intentions.

To avoid confusion, a notional OB is constructed when a deception is planned. It explains how the opponent should conceive the friendly forces' task organization if he is to accept the deception story and react IAW the deception objective. A notional OB provides guidance on which units, according to the story, are attached for the main effort. Some units must project attachments to the opponent, while others must conceal attachments of units. To be credible, notional units must—

- Occupy the right amount of terrain.
- Conduct the appropriate activities.
- Have the right indicators: visual, sonic, olfactory, and electronic.
- Follow accepted operational patterns.

PSYOP Considerations in Support of Deception Activities

PSYOP are effective only as long as they are credible. They may actively or passively support deception stories by—

- Providing information (actively) for opponent analysis.
- Withholding information (passively) from opponent analysis.

PSYOP support of deception stories must be limited to providing credible information in support of the deception story—via audio, visual, or audiovisual means—to selected target audiences.

PSYOP personnel must not be the principal planners of deception operations. The planning and conducting deception operations are the responsibility of the J3/G3/S3.

U.S. Army PSYOP personnel will be concerned primarily with tactical deception stories, although they may be used to extend the projection of a strategic deception story.

PSYOP can support all tactical deception stories by developing and disseminating credible information in support of deception tasks or by identifying and withholding actual information inconsistent with deception tasks. Figure A-1, page A-11, gives examples of PSYOP deception tasks.

PSYOP units can support tactical deception measures through use of their video, audio, and audiovisual assets. See Figure A-2, page A-12, for examples of PSYOP deception measures.

Countering Deception

According to a study of surprise military attacks, the incidence of surprise might be reduced if estimates of impending attack accorded greater weight to tactical indicators as opposed to strategic assumptions. The following five cases represent the failure of appropriate personnel to foresee a surprise attack: Pearl Harbor, the German attack on the Soviet Union in 1941, the Chinese intervention in the Korean conflict, the Chinese attack on India in 1962, and the Arab attack on Israel in 1973. In each case, tactical indicators of impending attack were present but were discounted because they conflicted with analyst's and decision maker's preconceptions. Strategic assumptions were not revised in the presence of the increasing flow of contrary tactical information. Whenever strategic assumptions of intent to attack and tactical indicators of impending attack converge, an immediate threat is perceived, and appropriate measures are taken. When there is a divergence between strategic assumptions and tactical indicators, the strategic assumptions prevail. Such assumptions reinforce the fact that people err by rejecting information that does not conform to their preconceptions.

A study of 93 cases of Western strategic military battles from 1914 to 1973 indicates that there was a high probability that the deception target audience received one or more warnings of impending attack (78 percent), yet the surprise achieved remained high (93 percent). Because deception was present in most cases cited, the study suggests that warnings do little to help expose deception operations. To counter deception, analysts must constantly question their side's expectations, for these are their greatest vulnerabilities.

TASK	PSYOP SUPPORT
Feint	Reinforcement of unit operational patterns before attack. Step-up of radio traffic or enforcement of silence; distribution of ammunition, supplies, and fuel prior to enemy contact.
Demonstration	Use of increased radio traffic and highly visible troop and vehicle movements, but no actual contact.
Ruse	Publication of credible overlays for capture by enemy. Provision of credible, corroborating information in theater publications (3ID Engineers Build A Ball Field for Camp _____).
Display	Dissemination of articles, pictures, sounds, rumors. Use of simulations confirming unit vehicles, equipment, and weapon systems. Use of disguises altering the appearance or confirming apparent objects. Portrayals of existent or notional units and activities.

Figure A-1. PSYOP deception tasks.

MEASURE	PSYOP SUPPORT
Visual	Use of visual information (convoy dust, fuel spills, decoys, and dummies) confirming other deception measures.
Sonic	Use of loudspeaker — As the deception measure. To confirm other deception measures. Simulation of — Test-firing of crew-served and individual weapons. Movement of notional units (convoy sounds of tracked or wheeled vehicles, troop voices, and associated activities).
Olfactory	Use of the odor of POL products, expended munitions, and vehicle exhaust to confirm portrayed activities.
Electronic	Development of content for broadcasts (radio, television), cassettes, and records to confirm other deception measures. Dissemination of tapes showing purported locations and movements of actual or notional units.
Manipulative	Dissemination of credible information via electronic means designed to be overheard and result in a false conclusion (radio traffic to support the existence of notional units or troop movements).
Imitative	Dissemination of credible information via electronic means, while posing as an opponent unit, to create a false conclusion.

Figure A-2. PSYOP deception measures.

Countering deception is difficult, and certain factors must be considered. Some cultures, through rhetoric and actions, are more predisposed to deception than others—for example, Arabic and Chinese. Experience with successful deception generally promotes the use of deception among competitors. The type of political system in which competitors operate is important. The availability of doctrine and apparatus for performing deception is important.

PSYOP Equipment Support in Deception Operations _____

For loudspeaker operations, experience shows that projection of sound from fixed-wing or helicopter aircraft is feasible up to 3,200 meters slant range with conditions of good audibility. A successful method is to circle the target with the loudspeakers pointing a beam 20 degrees below horizontal. Also, warm ground generally bends sound up away from the surface, causing it to miss the target area. See Figure A-3, page A-13, for equipment PSYOP units can provide in support of tactical deception operations.

LIN/NSN	NOMENCLATURE	CHARACTERISTICS
M57460	AN/MSQ-85B, Mobile Audiovisual Unit	Creates and provides audiovisual and video programs (photographic and VCR equipment). Receives, processes, and disseminates audiovisual program information. Also receives TV, AM, FM, and short-wave programs for editing, storage, and local presentation by loudspeakers.
	AEM/HPS-250, Loudspeaker System	Man-portable. May also be mounted on light vehicles. Can accompany parachute personnel during airborne drops. Has a maximum range of 700 meters.
	AEM/HPS-450, Loudspeaker System	Can be mounted on watercraft, aircraft, and land vehicles. Although larger than the AEM/HPS-250 system, is man-portable and has maximum range of 1,100 meters).
	AEM/HPS-900, Loudspeaker System	Can be mounted on all types of land vehicles, aircraft, and watercraft. Has a maximum range of 1,500 to 1,700 meters.

Figure A-3. PSYOP equipment in support of deception operations.