STILL MORE PRETTY MUCH INCOMPREHENSIBLE, INCONCLUSIVE GOSSIP ABOUT RADIO FREQUENCY WEAPONS: Dept. of Defense civil servants and one salesman go before Congressmen to discuss the chupacabras of information space.

Victor von Doom: a.k.a Dr. Doom, an arch villain in the Marvel Comics universe often portrayed handcrafting a variety of directed energy weapons -- ray guns -- with which to smite enemies; now used by Crypt Newsletter as a catch-all designation for computer security snake-oil salesmen and assorted crackpots spreading freaky tales of non-existent electronic death rays.

Usage: Victor von Doom, a faculty member at the University of Gobble-Wallah in Brisbane, Australia, warned frightened businessmen that a raygun capable of surreptitiously smashing networked corporate computers from a distance of half a mile could be easily fashioned from parts including a cattle prod, two potato knishes, one satellite TV dish and four car batteries.


While Crypt Newsletter thought it would be able to give the legend of the EMP gun a rest this month, Congress passed a law forbidding such action. On February 25, Jim Saxton's (R - NJ) House Joint Economic Committee resumed hearings on the potential threat of the much heard of but still never seen non-nuclear electromagnetic pulse weapon.

Indeed, the news of emp is cyclic, coming in waves, usually concomitant with annual computer security conferences or in this case, last June, when Saxton conducted similar hearings.

At that time, Congressman Saxton produced an old warrior from the American arms trade -- Robert L. Schweitzer, a retired general -- who warned of EMP hand grenades and other munitions leaking from Russia, as well as electromagnetic ray guns assembled from RadioShack equipment, although no examples were produced.

But before going further it becomes necessary for Crypt Newsletter to bore you with the story of the French scientist, Rene Blondlot. Blondlot claimed discovery of a new form of electromagnetic radiation he called "N-rays" at the beginning of the 1900s. Since the French were suffering from a brief inferiority complex over a misconception that their science was lagging behind that of Germany's -- Max Planck and Wilhelm Roentgen had just made enormous contributions -- other French scientists immediately took the bit in their teeth and also began publishing on N-rays. However, by 1904, the work on N-rays was discredited by an American physicist, Robert W. Wood, who went to France to observe Blondlot's experiments. Wood secretly removed a part of Blondlot's N-ray detecting machine and watched as the scientist claimed to detect them anyway. Although a number of scientists, including Blondlot, continued to cling doggedly to their claims for a short time, since their work was irreproducible, it was tossed onto the junk heap of science where it remains an interesting farrago.

Partly as a result of this, Irving Langmuir, an American physicist and Nobel laureate, developed a set of laws in 1953 that he said applied to such stories, which he called "pathological science." Some of them easily fit the written statements presented to Saxton's Joint Economic Committee, as we shall see.

Congressman Saxton's panelists included Alan Kehs of the U.S. Army Laboratories, James O'Bryon, Director of Live Fire Testing with the Office of the Secretary of Defense at the Pentagon, David Schriner, Ridgecrest, California; a consultant for the northern Virginia company, Electronic Warfare Associates and a former engineering technician at the navy's testing facility at China Lake, California, and Ira Merritt, a scientist at the Missile Defense Space Technology Center in Huntsville, Alabama.

The nut of O'Bryon's written statement is a vague, uninformative reference to a Joint Live Fire Test conducted against a Cobra gun ship. Crypt Newsletter did a search of the Net centered around the Economic Committee's panelists and found a document on the live fire test - entitled "EM Experiments for Computational Model Validation of AH-1 Cobra Helicopter" -- performed at Junction Ranch on the China Lake Naval Air Warfare Center under the direction of a Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory scientist, Scott Nelson. (A hyperlink to it is included in the hypertext issue of the newsletter.)

O'Bryon's statement, however, mentions neither where the testing was performed or who was involved. (Interestingly, David Schriner was a China Lake technician at the trials.) O'Bryon's statement to the Saxton committee also mentioned nothing of the protocols involved in the test. (Essentially, they were low power broadcasts of microwaves directed at a helicopter mounted on a tower ten meters from the broadcast source at the facility's radar range. This was done in order to obtain empirical results employed to validate a computer model simulation of the same test. The simulation, once validated, was supposed to provide information on future weapons platforms about to enter production. The range would seem to be hardly meaningful as one at which any potential weapon could be deployed but possibly useful if one is trying to get a general feel for the vulnerability of such a machine to a certain type of electromagnetic flux. If Crypt Newsletter is reading the original report correctly, the test was designed primarily to give scientists an idea of the cross-section of electromagnetic flux through the body of a helicopter by the use of radio frequency probes and sensors arranged throughout the Cobra. Higher power broadcasts were also part of testing conducted through last summer. The high power broadcasts, again performed at relatively close ranges -- apparently 10 and 90 meters -- were done to gain readings of electromagnetic fluxes through the helicopter as well as gather some idea about impact on the machine. The report says some measurements were not able to be made because the helicopter remained "operational all the time." Curiously, most of the test team thought it prudent to remain "one kilometer" away from the high power microwave broadcast trailer, even though distance to target was only a fraction of this. The report also makes a recommendation that future tests of potential weapons should have to demonstrate some stand-off capability -- ranges at several hundred meters.

O'Bryon's statement to the Saxton committee said the test produced "significant results" but did not elaborate. At best, his testimony was needlessly cryptic since the tests, one of which was presented at a meeting held at the John Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory in 1997, are available on the World Wide Web.

David Schriner's statement alluded to homebrew work he has conducted after retiring from China Lake and presumably under the auspices of a consultancy with Electronic Warfare Associates, a Pentagon contractor.

Schriner wrote he had manufactured an emp weapon at home using anywhere from $200 - $800 worth of sundry electronic equipment salvaged from cars or a nearby RadioShack. While Schriner did not produce his weapon for Congressional inspection, he did take the opportunity to make a sales pitch to the military and emphasize that he already holds the proper security clearances.

Of all the statements provided for Saxton's hearing, Ira Merritt's was the most detailed. Merritt goes into the interest in radio frequency/emp weapons as an consequence of claims emanating from Russia that such weapons in the form of electromagnetic pulse hand grenades and artillery shells -- were developed.

Central to these claims are the assertions of Russian scientist A. B. Prishchepenko, who has been delivering lectures on the subject at international conferences since 1994.

Merrit writes in his statement that the U.S. military sent a team to Nalchik, Russia, in 1997, to test Prishchepenko's claims.

"The test results," writes Merritt, "left Russian claims unconfirmed, since most U.S. measurement equipment was not allowed by Russian authorities to reach the test site and since Dr. Prischepenko's team claimed that the radio frequency munitions that were tested radiated in a band that could not be measured with equipment at the site." In essence, it was a wild goose chase. The science of Blondlot's N-rays was similar. Only Blondlot could detect his discovery.

Sampling from another report, Merritt writes "There is no confirmed evidence of employment of a [radio frequency weapon] to date . . . available in open sources.'

Nevertheless, Merritt's statement does discuss the vulnerability of electronic components to a variety of electromagnetic pulses. An assortment of devices that might cause electromagnetic effects at extremely short ranges are mentioned: A Russian jammer with a range of only five meters -- no quantization of effect given; an electron accelerator called RADAN that had an unspecified effect on calculators and electronic watches at short range; and a powerful Russian radar called NAGIRA, purchased by the British in 1995 -- helicopters warned not to come within "several" miles of it.

It should be mentioned that the short range effects on computer equipment could just as easily, more effectively and more cheaply be achieved by a vandal wielding a ballpeen hammer.

In conclusion, Merritt writes, "We cannot now precisely quantify the risk presented by radio frequency weapons, but we know that risk is growing."

Langmuir's laws of "pathological science," inspired in part by the Blondlot N-ray experiments, state that the magnitude of the observed effect is always independent of the intensity. While the detrimental effect of electromagnetic pulses on electronic equipment has been demonstrated, the effects attributed to alleged emp or radio frequency weapons are always widely variant with respect to the scale of the potential weapon. All of the statements delivered to the Saxton hearings fall into this category.

Another Langmuir law states the "effect" is of something that is close to the limits of detectability. The U.S. military's attempt to look into the claims of Prishchepenko neatly fit this law.

And, in another of Langmuir's laws, there are always claims of great accuracy.

Although Irving Langmuir did not envision this in 1953, one is tempted to add another law of "pathological science": It comes adorned with a sales pitch and a classification wrapper.

Postscript: Interestingly, David Schriner showed up on ABC's 20/20 in mid-February 1999 to demonstrate his electromagnetic pulse gun for an overawed Diane Sawyer. After donning fancy protective suits and unusual-looking copper mesh headgear, Schriner tested his weapon on Sawyer's corvette and a white limousine. At a range of about 5-10 feet and with the weapon pointed directly into the automobiles' open engine compartment, Schriner's electromagnetic pulse gun made Sawyer's idling corvette . . . run roughly. [Crypt News notes it can make any car's engine stop permanently, not just hesitate, at a range of five feet with a sledgehammer aimed directly into an open engine compartment.] Once, said Sawyer, the electric locks in her car's doors went up and down, too. While Sawyer stood well away from her car, farther away from it than Schriner's contraption, electronic videocameras inside the car continued to work during the firing of the "weapon."

During the segment, Sawyer claimed "results" of testing of electromagnetic pulse on a Cobra helicopter at Junction Ranch in China Lake were "classified." Crypt Newsletter must now assume posting a paper on the World Wide Web constitutes "classification."


Notes:

1. In 1981, Robert Schweitzer was a staffer on Ronald Reagan's National Security Council -- that is, until he gave a speech to the Army Association in which he declared the Russians were "on the move" . . . they are going to strike." Schweitzer was fired and later worked for GeoMilitech, a Washington arms brokerage. In 1987 Schweitzer again was in the news, this time with Major General John Singlaub, hunting for lost Japanese gold said to be sunk near the Philippines.

Last June, Schweitzer spoke extensively about electromagnetic pulse weapons before Saxton's committee. He started his presentation by seemingly making a joke about the gaffe that resulted in his 1981 firing. "Now, I am not a 'the Russians are coming' speaker, today," Schweitzer said.

Schweitzer's June testimony alluded to the Live Fire Test against a Cobra helicopter without specifically mentioning it. [Crypt Newsletter finds this kind of testimony reflexively secretive and characteristic of the majority of Congressional discussions held on the subject. Without being an insider, it's almost impossible for the average citizen to determine precisely what is discussed, except that it is, of course, menacing and in the good hands of the military or government.]

During the June hearing, Schweitzer made seemingly contradictory claims during the course of his presentation. At different times, Schweitzer claimed that electromagnetic pulse guns could be made for $800, that they could be made for $35, that they had been used against London banks although he was informed this was a hoax, and such weapons were now capable of disrupting Wall Street.

" . . . the cost is about $800 to do this," Schweitzer said at one point.

As for knocking out Wall Street, Schweitzer later commented to Congressman Saxton, "[It] can be done with going to RadioShack and buying the components . . . And the prices are from $35 to $200 to buy components and do a number on Wall Street." Schweitzer also alluded to, but did not mention by name, a generic hacker tech catalog that claimed to sell parts and schematics for such a weapon.

Further, Schweitzer testified that London banks were attacked by radio-frequency weapons, a myth that has been touched on in Crypt Newsletter.

"I was told that was a hoax," Schweitzer said to Saxton. ". . . and it's disputed in the Intel community and elsewhere but I think, frankly, and having gone into this in great detail, the dispute is to protect the fact it happened."

Schweitzer added later: "I validated [this]. It isn't just taking rumors or drivel off of the tabloids. These are solid facts that I'm giving you."

Almost without exception, however, Congressional testimony from the June Saxton hearings reads like gossip.

As an independent example, consider from the same sessions, other testimony -- presented by author Dr. Peter Leitner on alleged Communist Chinese "yellow peril"-like subterfuge: "I've heard rumors . . . One I found particularly disturbing . . . [and] I haven't seen any recorded documentation of these incidents . . . where very young-looking Chinese students were going to the United States and placed in high schools in the U.S. except their ages were 24 - 25 years old . . . They were brilliant students . . . Well, it turns out it's an example of a sleeper agent, somebody who is put in position. He already has advanced degrees before coming in, then is put into the position as a seed and then is allowed to flourish in a totally unfair competition with U.S. student counterparts."

Don't you take Crypt Newsletter's word for it, though! Secure a copy of "Economic Espionage, Technology Transfers and National Security" by the Joint Economic Committee (June 17, 1997, ISBN 0-16-055880-8) for yourself.


2. "Red mercury," another alleged product of Soviet weapons scientists is of some interest when considering testimony on electromagnetic pulse weapons. As another alleged instrument of terror, red mercury started showing up in big newspapers around 1991 - 92. Most of the stories, like every bit of information surrounding the "substance," were never specific about what red mercury was, except that it was red (Duh!), and a mixture of mercury (Duh! Duh!) and other materials, maybe tellurium, maybe this, maybe that, maybe marshmallows. You get the idea.

The kicker was that red mercury somehow, as a new ingredient in fusion bombs, made it possible for terrorists to make nuclear weapons easily and shrink their size to that of a briefcase. The descriptions were always couched in pseudo-scientific mumbo-jumbo.

Anyway, all the stories published pointed to the eastern bloc where smugglers -- always unnamed, and Crypt News has a collection of newspaper reports that bear this out -- were trying to sell it on the black market as technology looted from the nuclear weapons shops of the old Soviet Union. The details in red mercury pieces were always, almost by definition, indeterminate and vague -- completely unverifiable. However, they made for great thriller reading.

A good example of the result of this mania manifested itself around 1995-96, when a Beverly Hills writer and former journalist for the Los Angeles Times and ABC by the name of Ben Sherwood popped up with a book called "Red Mercury." Hung on the tale of a terrorist who made a bomb from the material, the book was produced by Dove, a Beverly Hills publishing house run by Michael Viner and responsible for a tell-all about Hollywood celebrity hookers, Faye Resnick's take on the life of Nicole Brown Simpson and the O.J. case, a tattler by Dennis Rodman's ex-wife and other similar . . .scientific tomes.

Very soon Sherwood was doing interviews and writing the occasional non-fiction editorial on terrorism, based upon the reputation of the "research" for "Red Mercury." One which appeared in the Los Angeles Times addressed security concerns at the Atlanta Olympic games. Ironically, the sample editorial was based on the plot found in "Red Mercury." Sherwood also showed up on television as a security expert, selling an identical message.

"Fiction and reality instantly collided in my brain," Sherwood said to the Los Angeles Times, in an interview separate from the editorial. "I was thrust into a very troubling place."

"The hideous red mercury . . . is not a fictional substance . . . ," claimed the Los Angeles Times in its Sherwood interview.

Sherwood, and others, never actually explained what red mercury was. In fact, like everyone else involved as a source, no one could precisely explain what it was or how it would be fashioned into a football-sized nuclear weapon with the power to incinerate a Hiroshima-sized city. Of course, it was a great tie-in for Sherwood's novel, he made a spell-binding interview and Dove had an excellent talent for timely publicity.

Stories on red mercury finally petered out around 1996.

The lesson from red mercury is that it pays to be skeptical. Tales about mythological superweapons crop up regularly and satisfy some inner editorial desire in poor journalists for tales of Tom Clancy-like intrigue. A dead giveaway is the absolute absence of rational scientific discussion coupled with anonymous sources, gossip, claims of involvement with criminal netherworlds and the inability to produce any evidence stronger than hearsay. Throw in an author of fiction (or, sometimes a concurrent non-fiction book that reads like fiction) represented as an expert on the subject while simultaneously cultivating interest in the published work and you have the icing on the cake.


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