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Editor: Mike Coyle Assistant Editor: Rick Lawler Research: Darrell Bross ================================================================ NONLETHAL WEAPONS AND OPERATIONS September 1995 ---------------------------------------------------------------- 95-974 S September 14, 1995 CRS Report for Congress -------------------------------------------------------- Congressional Research Service * The Library of Congress Nonlethal Weapons and Operations: Potential Applications and Practical Limitations John M. Collins Senior Specialist in National Defense Office of Senior Specialists SUMMARY Nonlethal weapons and operations (NLW), whether employed for offensive or defensive purposes, usually supplement rather than replace lethal instruments.(1) They are designed to minimize fatalities among belligerents and non-combatants as well as unplanned damage to property during wars and so-called operations other than war. One important purpose, which accommodates policies of restraint with overwhelming power, is to expand options, complicate enemy decision making, and thereby promote greater freedom of action in the gap between relatively benign pressures (diplomacy, economic sanctions, military posturing), and deadly force. This brief report summarizes technological progress, potential operations, and practical constraints, then presents a series of questions that seem to merit better answers before senior DoD officials and Congress determine which NLW programs to support and which to defer or discard.(2) NONLETHAL WEAPON TECHNOLOGIES A few nonlethal weapons now are available for use by U.S. Armed Forces or could be in short notice, but a rich variety of innovated additions deliverable by manned aircraft, missiles, remotely piloted vehicles, motor transports, ships, and/or individuals is under development (see table). NONLETHAL WEAPONS Selected by Types and Characteristics Categories Typical Types Primary Land Field Targets(1) Mobile(2) Testing Feasible(3) -------------------------------------------------------------- Biological Biodegrading I, M Variable 1-4 yr Microbes Chemical Irritants (CS; Pepper Spray) P Yes Complete Calmatives; Tranquilizers P Yes 1-4 yr Adhesives M,P Variable 1-4 yr ("Stickums") Antitraction ("Slickums") M,P Variable 1-4 yr Binding Agents (Fibers, Polymers) I Variable 1 yr Combustion Modifiers I,M Yes 1-3 yr Metal Embrittle- ments/Caustics M Yes > 5 yr Odiferous Agents P Yes 1-4 yr Specialty Foam P Variable < 1 yr Electro- magnetic High-powered Microwave I,M Variable 1-4 yr Nonnuclear Electro- magnetic Pulse M,I Variable 1-4 yr Conductive Ribbons M,I Variable Complete Directed Energy Particle Beams M,I Variable 3-5 yr Thermal Counter-Sniper Counter Mortar P,I,M Yes 1-4 yr Barriers P Yes 1-4 yr Acoustics High Intensity Sound P Yes Complete Infrasound, Ultra- sound (VLF, VHF) P Yes < 1 yr Electric Stun Stun Guns; TASERS P Yes Complete;<1yr Water Cannons P Yes Complete Kinetic Nonpenetrating Projectiles P Yes < 1 yr Optical Low Energy Lasers M,P Yes < 1 yr Strobe Lights P Yes < 1 yr Holographs P Yes 1-4 yr Directional & Omni- directional Flares M,P Yes 2 yr Infor- mational Computer Software Corruption M,I Unnecessary Now Voice Cloning P Unnecessary 2 yr --- 1. I = Infrastructure; M = Material; P = Personnel 2. Land Mobility varies with models. Weight volume, distance to target, and enemy defenses are key considerations. 3. Feasible test dates may a bit optimistic. Availability commonly depends on complexities and funding. NOTE: This table was compiled from several sources. See Note 1, plus "Disabling Technologies: A Critical Assessment," _International Defense Review_, July 1994, p. 33-39; Evancoe, Paul, "Tomorrow's Weapons of Choice?," _Military Technology_, June 1994, p. 68-71; "Draft Concept for Non-Lethal Capabilities in Army Operations," _Inside the Army_, July 31, 1995, p. 18-19; Kokoski, Richard, "Non- Lethal Weapons: A Case Study for New Technology Developments," _SIPRI Yearbook 1994_, NY, Oxford University Press, 1994, p. 373-378; Major Joseph W. Cook, III, et. al., _Non-Lethal Weapons and Social Operations_, a Study Conducted for HQ USAF/XOXI in association with the USAF Institute for National Security Studies at the Air Force Academy, June 27, 1994, p. 6-13. Nonlethal antipersonnel weapons such as malodorous substances, nonpenetrating projectiles, stun guns, water cannons, and ear- splitting noises need no explanation. High-powered microwaves can melt electronic components; strobe lights may disorient individuals; holograms may confuse them; aqueous foams can fill enclosures and form barriers. Voice cloning makes it possible to simulate radio broadcasts by enemy officials as a specialized form of psychological operations. Embrittlements that break down molecular bonding in metals, super caustics that attack many otherwise immune materials, biodegrading bacteria that "eat" products such as petroleum, and low energy lasers that blind hostile sensors typify nonlethal weapons that primarily attack inanimate targets. Multipurpose implements like "slickums" and "stickums" could engage personnel and property. Each type, if and when perfected, will possess unique strengths and weaknesses compared with other lethal and nonlethal tools. POTENTIAL APPLICATIONS U.S. Armed Forces have as yet put few sophisticated nonlethal weapons to practical tests. Marines, for example, deployed with a small assortment during the February withdrawal of U.N. peacekeepers from Somalia, but use was limited to a little sticky foam. Nearly all NLW, however, hypothetically may be applied under conditions short of armed combat and to deter, defend against, or defeat military aggression of any kind, sometimes independently, but most often as ancillaries to other arms (lethal means might often constitute essential "insurance policies"). Operations Other Than War NLW would be politically attractive during humanitarian operations and are potentially valuable in other situations short of war, because they avoid military bloodletting that could strengthen enemy resolve and precipitate domestic/international censure. The U.S. Government might enhance economic sanctions by conducting nonlethal blockades or clandestinely employing computer viruses to cripple the offenders' financial system. Psychological operations specialists able to "capture" enemy radio and television frequencies would posses a powerful lever with which to influence public perceptions and attitudes during crises. Peacekeepers might profitably employ acoustic "barricades" to help keep hotheads apart during crises. Peace enforcers would welcome nonlethal weapons to disperse or otherwise control crowds and deny them access to sensitive areas such as embassies, arsenals, power plants, and telecommunications centers. Lasers that temporarily dazzle, but do not permanently blind, could discretely disable snipers who use noncombatants as human shields. Nonlethal weapons also could simplify the evacuation of U.S. citizens and close associates from unfriendly soil. Counterterrorists might apply adhesives, antitraction substances, and combustion inhibitors to isolate hostage rescue sites, then tranquilize captors without jeopardizing captives. Special operations to neutralize enemy nuclear, biological and chemical warfare facilities could benefit from high-powered microwaves to suppress enemy defenses; super caustics and metal embrittlements could disable nuclear reactors, other processors, and finished weapons; compact particle beams in the hands of special operations forces could irradiate and neutralize nuclear, chemical, and biological munitions; aqueous foams could fill storage rooms thereafter. Wartime Operations Large-scale combat operations offer opportunities to employ nonlethal weapons independently or as complements of lethal power. Strategically significant warfare against enemy officials, their supporters, and infrastructure theoretically is feasible on a grand scale. High tech sabotage might insert biodegrading bacteria into petroleum storage tanks and use high-powered microwaves to disable fuses in ammunition depots. Adhesives or superlubricants liberally applied on seaports, air base runways, highway intersections, steep railway grades, key bridges, and other bottlenecks could impede enemy military traffic or bring it to a standstill. Missiles and aircraft might deposit conductive ribbons (fine carbon fibers) on power grids to short-circuit switches and transformers, as they did during Operation Desert Storm. Nonlethal weapons also could be tactically advantageous. Counterinsurgents, whose main aim is to win hearts and minds, could minimize collateral damage and noncombatant casualties if armed with incapacitants. Foes in custody rather than body bags could furnish valuable intelligence as a bonus. Various nonlethal implements could favorably influence urban combat by blocking avenues of approach and escape, channel enemy formations into ambushes, flush out strong points while preserving sites of great cultural value, and simplified reconstruction problems after armed conflict ceases. PRACTICAL LIMITATIONS Practical factors constrain NLW applications. Weapon characteristics (size, weight, range, rates of fire, maintainability), legal limitations, ethics, rules of engagement, public opinion, arms control, and costs all impose limits. Technological Limitations Whether technologically complex nonlethal weapons will work as advertised awaits conclusive tests, some of which have not yet been devised. U.S. officials remain uncertain concerning the incidence of inadvertent fatalities (calmatives may render bystanders comatose; omnidirectional flares may blind friendly forces; infrasound can cause concussions if the setting is too strong). Neither is it clear whether all allegedly reversible effects indeed are. No one is sure how often U.S. Armed Forces must reapply "slickums" to particular surfaces or what solvents would best remove adhesives that stick. Experiments to ascertain how fast embrittling agents will weaken metal are permissible, but test on people are limited to stringent controls. The likely influence of tranquilizers on factious crowds thus will remain speculative until using units accumulate practical experience. Some theoretically valuable nonlethal devices may prove difficult to deliver on targets. Strategic petroleum reserves stored in huge, widely separated tanks, some of which hold more than one million barrels apiece, are not readily accessible to infiltrators armed with flagons containing biodegrading microbes. Huge energy requirements frustrate attempts to develop man-portable EMP and microwave weapons. Metal embrittlements in many instances might have to be applied by brush-wielding humans in harm's way. Battle damage assessments may demand creative techniques (how, for example, can stun gunners and pulse weapon operators verify whether human targets that bear no visible scars are incapacitate or playing possum?). Scenarios that envisage a mix of lethal and nonlethal weapons could overload ground troops unless separate NLW units are formed. Logistical burdens and costs would increase in any case. Deployability prospects depend in large part on funds that might otherwise purchase, operate, and maintain traditional capabilities. Policy Limitations Policy limitations affect the choice of nonlethal weapons as much as (perhaps more than) technological constraints and costs. _Department of Defense Instruction 5000.2: Defense Management Policies and Procedures_ specifies that U.S. weapons and munitions must undergo legal reviews during development, procurement, and deployment to ensure compliance with laws of war and moral/ethical obligations. No other nations save the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany seem to have similar stipulations. The mention of biological and chemical warfare weapons raises red flags among arms control specialists and on Capitol Hill. Law enforcement units may use riot control agents against U.S. citizens, whereas _Executive Order 11850_ of April 10, 1075 forbids first use, "in war except in defensive military modes to save lives such as:...situations in which civilians are used to mask or screen attacks...or to protect convoys from civil disturbances, terrorists and paramilitary organizations..." The benign use of biodegrading bacteria to clean up oil spills is permissible, but actions to contaminate enemy petroleum reserves might not be if narrow interpretations of the Biological Weapons Convention prevail. Dr. Matthew Meselson, Professor of Biochemistry at Harvard University, represents many who believe it would be unwise for nonlethal weapons to blur the line between use and non use of chemicals by U.S. Armed Forces, regardless of purposes. An independent task force sponsored by the Council of Foreign Relations, however, expressed a different opinion: "It would, of course, be a tragic irony if nations used lethal means against noncombatants because nonlethal means were banned by international convention. Computer viruses could infect enemy software in "peacetime" and in war. Plausible denial might prevent retaliation in kind but, if that ploy failed, the United States, being an information intensive society, could well be vulnerable to ruinous counterattacks. U.S. policymakers accordingly should proceed cautiously lest they inadvertently open Pandora's Box. SUGGESTED INQUIRIES Some nonlethal weapon proponents tend to harbor excessive expectations. Some opponents tend to reject NLW for emotional reasons. Positions that objectively compare nonlethal options with lethal alternatives probably occupy some as yet undefined middle ground. Solutions to unsolved problems consequently should precede decision to develop, acquire, and deploy particular systems. The following questions might prove useful: * Which nonlethal weapons appear most attractive to commanders in chief of U.S. combatant commands? * What would be the best mix of lethal and nonlethal weapons in DoD's arsenal? * Should special units be formed within each Service to employ some or all nonlethal weapons? What role should U.S. Special Operations Command play? * What rules of engagement should determine the choice between lethal and nonlethal weapons in emergencies? * Would strong U.S. reliance on nonlethal weapons strengthen or weaken deterrence? How would U.S. allies view this trend? * How would NLW alter strategic and tactical intelligence requirements? * Would nonlethal weapons impose unreasonable logistic burdens? * Which biodegrading and chemical non-lethal weapons are permissible given arms control conventions to which the United States is party? * Should research, development, and acquisition activities as well as oversight be centralized under on authority? If so, who? * Could the Department of Justice (DoJ) defray a larger share of DoD's nonlethal weapons costs? Would DoJ be willing? * What size stockpiles of expendable munitions, such as adhesives, antitractions, and specialty foams, would be required at what costs? * To what extent could costs be confined by modifying lethal weapon systems to handle nonlethal munitions as well? Hostile nations, non-state adversaries, and criminal organizations may acquire nonlethal weapons regardless of U.S. restraint. Prudent countermeasures consequently seem advisable whether DoD embraces selected systems or abstains. 1. Various overviews include Morris, Janet and Chris, _Nonlethality: A Global Strategy_, Revised Ed., West Hyannisport, MA, 1994, 11 p; Swett, Charles F., _Strategic Assessment: Non-Lethal Weapons_, Washington, draft report, Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense (Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict), November 9, 1993, 20 p; Colonel John L. Barry, et al, _Nonlethal Military Means: New Leverage for a New Era_, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government, 1994, 86 p; _Non-Lethal Technologies: Military Options and Implications_, NY, Council of Foreign Relations, 1995, 16 p; Gray, Jan M., _Uses of Nonlethal Force in Army Operations_, a White Paper (draft), Fort Monroe, VA, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, July 17, 1995, 43 p; _Policy Study: Non-Lethal Technologies_, Washington, JAYCOR, September 19, 1994, 28 p; Colonel Frederick M. Lorenz, "Less-Lethal Force in Operation United Shield," _Marine Corps Gazette_, September 1995, p. 69-76. 2. Some definitions of nonlethal weapons exclude parapsychological operations, deception, electronic warfare, and information warfare. This document concentrates on new technological developments. CRS Reports are prepared for Members and committees of Congress.