US Military Non-Lethal Weapons
Source: http://www.cdsar.af.mil/apj/mcgowan.html November 10, 1997
ACOUSTIC ENERGY PROPERTIES:
Infrasonic:
Target effects Propagation characteristics Sonic: 20 Hz to 20 kHz
Target effects Propagation characteristics Ultrasonic: 20 kHz
Target effects Propagation characteristics ACOUSTIC WEAPONS GRADUATED EFFECT:
Effect on personnel inherently graduated by range and
power level Detection (infrasonic/sonic) at medium to long range
Hear/feel presence of energy Annoyance, irritation, interference with
performance Infrasonic/sonic at medium power Ultrasonic at medium to
high power Pain (a) Auditory (sonic/infrasonic) at medium to high
power (b) Other organs (infrasonic/sonic/ultrasonic) at high power
Incapacitation (very high power) Death Potential as area exclusion
devices.
Vortex Ring Generator Objective:
Integrate concussion, flash, chemical, and impact
methods of crowd control into a single vortex ring delivery system,
with the intent of improving nonlethal effectiveness as well as
reducing weight, cost, and logistics associated with stockpiling
different cartridges.
Vortex Ring Generator Description:
o Concept of operation o Desired performance Nonlethal Testing Conclusions/Observations:
o Determining target effects on personnel is greatest
challenge to testing community NONLETHAL WEAPONS: From A.D. 1200 to 1500 a group of mercenaries on the
Italian peninsula called the condottieri waged what has often been
regarded as a form of nonlethal warfare. They were hired by the
various mercantile city-states to protect vital interests. Many of the
major engagements between these city-states' condottieri were almost
comical for their lack of casualties.
According to Niccolo Machiavelli, the battle of Zagonara
in 1424 was a "defeat, famous throughout all Italy, [in which] no
death occurred except those of Lodovico degli Obizi and two of his
people, who, having fallen from their horses, were drowned in the
mire."1 Several reasons have been extended for this low lethality. One
of the more plausible reasons was the simple fact that the armor of
the day was much superior to most offensive weaponry. A more personal
reason is the fact that the surest way for a mercenary to lose his
source of livelihood was for the condottieri to obliterate his
enemies. As a result, mercenaries rarely sought setpiece battles,
choosing instead to fight relatively minor and extended campaigns.
Engagements between mounted warriors often resembled jousts and those
between infantry often turned into shoving matches.
In the past, nonlethal warfare did not rely on the use
of nonlethal weapons; rather, it was the fortuitous result of the
superiority of body armor over offensive weaponry or the mutual
lackadaisical approach of opposing soldiers and leaders. Today,
nonlethal weapons might offer the ability to wage nonlethal warfare
without relying on such fortuitous circumstances. The use of nonlethal
weapons would serve as a means of keeping the level of conflict low
and of dissuading belligerents from resorting to more forceful
weapons. Also, the prospect of resolving conflict with low levels of
lethality is especially exciting to a country that has a warfighting
doctrine
of minimizing friendly as well as enemy casualties. Sun Tzu espoused a
similar doctrine when he said:
* Generally in war the best policy is to take a state
intact; to ruin it is inferior to this.
* To capture the enemy's army is better than to destroy
it; to take intact a battalion, a company or a fiveman squad is better
than to destroy them.
* For to win one hundred victories in one hundred
battles is not the acme of skill. To subdue the enemy without fighting
is the acme of skill.2
Nonlethal weapons are defined as "weapons that are
designed to disable personnel, weapons, supplies, or equipment in such
a way that death or severe permanent disability to personnel are
unlikely." However, some proposed "nonlethal" weapons are not
authorized under the international law governing weapons.
Additionally, some nonlethal weapons are not truly nonlethal in all
employment scenarios. Some government organizations such as the
National Institute of Justice prefer the term less than lethal3 to
emphasize the point that "enough marshmallows will kill you if
properly placed."4 Others have coined the phrase "nonlethal weapons of
mass destruction" to emphasize the fact that nonlethal weapons span
the spectrum of warfare from low intensity conflict through theater
conventional warfare and all the way to strategic global war.
Biological or chemical agents that destroy crops without directly
affecting people would still be considered lethal if starvation is the
likely result. A microwave weapon that disables a truck that
subsequently drives off a cliff, killing the driver, would be
nonlethal. The same weapon used against a helicopter in flight would
have to be considered lethal.
Some nonlethal technologies may offer new options to our
armed forces; others may prove to be more useful to our enemies
because of our advanced society's many vulnerabilities. For example, a
terrorist group with rudimentary knowledge of our information switches
could shut down our stock market with several well placed
electromagnetic pulse generators. Regardless of a weapon's potential
worth or our relative vulnerability, however, there is some value in
pursuing these technologies if only to develop appropriate
countermeasures and policies. In this article, we will examine the
various nonlethal weapons in three contexts-potential technologies,
legalities, and potential policies.
Proposed Nonlethal Weapons and Their Legality:
In 1868, the Russian government issued an invitation to
the International Military Commission "to examine the expediency of
forbidding the use of certain projectiles in time of war between
civilized nations." At issue was the use of certain light explosives
or inflammable projectiles. When used against human beings, the new
projectile was no more effective than an ordinary rifle bullet;
however, it caused greater wounds and thus greatly aggravated the
sufferings of the victim. The resulting document, the Declaration of
St. Petersburg, prohibited the use of explosive projectiles under 400
grams of weight. It was the first international treaty imposing
restrictions on the conduct of war.
Legal Framework:
The Declaration of St. Petersburg is a significant
document because it develops a line of reasoning governing the
legality of weapons. This reasoning is found in the preamble to the
declaration:
"Considering the progress of civilization should have
the effect of alleviating as much as possible the calamities of war.
The only legitimate object which states should endeavor to accomplish
during war is to weaken the military forces of the enemy. It is
sufficient to disable the greatest possible number of men, and this
object would be exceeded by the employment of arms which uselessly
aggravate the sufferings of disabled men or render their death
inevitable. The use of such weapons would therefore, be contrary to
the laws of humanity."
Although it may appear to be an incongruous concept, the
nations of the world have recognized the need to impose restrictions
on the waging of war. War will necessarily result in death and injury
to humans and the destruction of property; however, in the eyes of the
international community, it need not be an unlimited exercise in
cruelty and ruthlessness.5 The necessities of war must be conciliated
with the laws of humanity. The resulting restrictions are regarded as
the international law of armed conflict (LOAC), or the law of war.
These concepts did not originate in Russia. They can be
found throughout man's history. The ancient Hindu laws of Manu
prohibited the use of barbed arrows because they exacerbated the
injury upon their removal. The Romans considered the use of poisoned
weapons to be unlawful. During the Middle Ages, the Pope condemned the
crossbow, noting the appalling injuries it caused.
While most cultures saw a need to restrain the horrors
of war, it was not until the nineteenth century that these concepts
were codified. The Declaration of St. Petersburg was followed by the
Hagueconventions, which codified the "laws and customs of war on
land."6 The Geneva conventions of 1929 and 1949 focused on
ameliorating the conditions of civilians, prisoners of war, and the
sick and wounded.7 The latest amendments to the law of armed conflict
are contained in the 1977 Protocol.8 Additionally, a number of
treaties address the
legitimacy of specific weapons.9
The legality of a weapon and the legality of the
specific use of a weapon are determined by international law. The
sources of international law are international conventions,
international customs, general principles of law, as well as the
writings of publicists.10 International law is part of the domestic
law of the United States. Treaties are regarded as the supreme law of
the land in the Constitution.11 Those practices of states that are
regarded as custom are binding on all nationstates. A large part of
the law of armed conflict is recognized as custom and must be observed
by all nations.12
To examine the legality of nonlethal weapons, it is
necessary to understand the wide array of legal principles and
restrictions governing their use.
[I]n considering the use of any weapon, new or old, two
questions must be answered. First, can this weapon legally be use?
Second, if the first question is answered in the affirmative, is the
proposed use of this weapon legal?13
We will review the general principles governing the law
of armed conflict, restraints imposed by custom and treaty, and
specific bans on weapons in order to review the legality of some
proposed nonlethal weapons.
General Principles of the Law of Armed Conflict:
International law does not enumerate those acts that may
be committed in the name of military necessity. Guidance is found in
United States v. List, when the international military tribunal at
Nuremberg determined that ...
"Military necessity permits a belligerent, subject to
the laws of war, to apply any amount and kind of force to compel the
complete submission of the enemy with the least possible expenditure
of time, life, and money. . . . There must be some reasonable
connection between the destruction of property and the overcoming of
the enemy."14
Military Necessity:
The rules of international law must be followed even if
it results in the loss of an advantage. Kriegsraison, the German
doctrine of military necessity, was the belief that the ends justified
the means. A matter of urgent necessity could override the LOAC. This
principle was rejected in United States v. Krupp, when the Nuremberg
tribunal held that ... "to claim that the law of war can be wantonly
and at the sole discretion of any one belligerent be disregarded when
he considered his own situation to be critical means nothing more than
to abrogate
the laws and customs of war entirely."15
Humanity:
The principle of humanity calls for the mitigation of
human suffering.16 As an example, an enemy soldier should not be
subjected to unnecessary suffering. A wound should be inflicted to
heal as painlessly as possible.17 Humanity's position in the law of
armed conflict was also preserved by the "Martens' Clause," which
specified that ... "the inhabitants and the belligerents remain under
the protections and the principles of the laws of nations as they
result from the usage's established among civilized persons, from the
laws of humanity, and from the dictates of the public conscience."18
The Rule of Proportionality:
The concept of proportionality calls for a reasonable
relationship between the amount of destruction caused and the military
significance of the attack.19 The principles of humanity and military
necessity are applied together. Proportionality requires that the loss
of life and the damage not be disproportionate to the expected
military advantage. "Proportionality represents a movable fulcrum on
which necessity humanity scale may be balanced."20 The law recognizes
that a military activity will result in some loss of life and
property, but the action is illegal if the loss exceeds the military
advantage.
Principles Governing Weapons:
International law establishes certain principles
governing the prohibition of weapons. Two such principles are
unnecessary suffering and indiscriminate effects caused by certain
weapons.
Unnecessary Suffering:
Article 23(e) of the 1907 Hague Convention prohibits the
use of "arms, projectiles or materials calculated to cause unnecessary
suffering."21 This concept has been the subject of much concern as
there is no precise definition of unnecessary suffering. As stated in
Air Force Pamphlet (AFP) 11031, International Law: The Conduct of
Armed Conflict, all weapons cause suffering.22 The St. Petersburg
Declaration speaks in terms of arms that uselessly aggravate "the
sufferings of disabled men or render their death inevitable."
Indiscriminate Effects:
A primary concern of the law of armed conflict is the
protection of noncombatants. A belligerent may not attack a
noncombatant and must cancel an attack on a legitimate military target
if the injury to the noncombatant population would be
disproportionate. Belligerents cannot employ a "blind" weapon, one
that cannot discriminate between noncombatants and combatants.
Restraints Imposed by Custom or Treaty:
A weapon that complies with the general principles of
the law may not be used in a manner that is restricted by custom or
treaty. The Hague conventions underline that there are restrictions on
the conduct of war in Article 22, which provides that "the right of
belligerents to adopt means of injuring the enemy is not unlimited."
Weapons may be used only against military objectives. An
object is considered to be a military object if its use, nature,
location, or purpose make effective contribution to the military
action.23 Some objects are considered dual use objects. They meet the
needs of the civilian population but also effectively contribute to
the enemys military action. These objects may be attacked if there is
a military advantage to be gained by their attack. During Desert
Storm, the coalition forces bombed bridges across the Euphrates River,
not only to restrict the movement of enemy forces but to sever the
communications systems. The bridges contained fiberoptic links that
provided Saddam Hussein with a communications system to his forces.24
The attack produced a military advantage for the coalition forces.
The attack may only be against lawful combatants. The
LOAC prohibits attack against noncombatants or civilian property.
Again, attacks against military targets may result in injury to
protected persons and property. It is the attackers' responsibility to
minimize collateral damage against protected persons and property.
Places such as buildings dedicated to religion, art, science,
charitable purposes, historic monuments, and hospitals are protected
from attack.25 The Hague Convention also prohibits the use of
poison,26 treachery, and perfidy.27 Emblems of protection such as the
Red Cross must be respected.28 There are rules governing the use of
uniforms and certain signals.29 Assassination is prohibited.30
Technologies:
Man is constantly using technology to devise new weapons
that international law must address. These weapons range from the very
deadly to the nonlethal.
Biological Weapons:
Biological warfare is defined as "the technique of
destruction by disease."31 Biological agents are living organisms
(bacteria, viruses, fungi, protozoa, and rickettsiae) or the toxins
derived from such organisms. These organisms or toxins can be targeted
against animals, plants, or material.
The idea of using bacteria and toxins to harm an enemy
is not a new one. During the fourteenth century, the Tatars catapulted
bodies of plague victims into a Crusader fortress to spread contagion.
The Crusaders, weakened by disease, lost their stronghold.32
Historically, biological weapons have been regarded as so horrible
that they should be prohibited. The objections are based on a number
of grounds.
Bacteriological agents owe their effects to the
multiplication of their organisms within the victim. Their
multiplication after dissemination is hard to control. They are
unpredictable in scale and duration.33 They increase the possibility
of epidemics that would indiscriminately strike noncombatants. They
may also indiscriminately attack the disseminator's own troops. The
medical profession, entitled to protection, would suffer at the same
rate as the combatants, decreasing chances of survival for the whole
population.34 Bacteriological warfare may be impossible to defend
against. This type of warfare does not destroy property but strikes
against personnel, animals, and crops. Suffering may be prolonged due
to the destruction of crops.35 An important consideration was that
toxins are technically poisons, and poisons have historically been
prohibited.
Although it is conceivable that under limited
circumstances biological weapons could be employed in accordance with
the generally accepted principles of the LOAC, they have been banned
by international treaties. In 1925, the Geneva Protocol prohibited the
use of bacteriological methods of warfare. In 1975 the United States
ratified the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development,
Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin
Weapons and Their Destruction. Under the terms of the convention, the
parties undertake not to develop, produce, stockpile, or acquire
biological agents or toxins "of types and in quantities that have no
justification for prophylactic protection and other peaceful
purposes."
The impact of these two conventions is the clear
prohibition of the use and development of biological weapons. Attempts
to employ biological warfare, even in a nonlethal capacity, would be
prohibited under international law. The drafters of the Biological
Convention focused on the development of biological weapons for
hostile purposes.
One of the methods of nonlethal warfare under
consideration is the use of recombinant DNA technology to attack an
ethnic population. This would be a prohibited hostile use of
biological agents. In addition, such an action could be a violation of
the Convention of the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide.36 The use of biological agents even to cause mild sickness
or destroy a food crop would be unlawful. The criteria for the use of
the biological agent is whether or not it is a hostile use, not
whether or not the use will result in death.
Some bacteriological agents have genuine medical uses,
and stockpiling for these purposes is not objectionable. Accordingly,
it would follow that the use of bioremedians, biological agents that
break down material, to clean up oil spills would be legal under these
treaties, but the use of these same agents to destroy an enemy's fuel
supply would be considered hostile intent and therefore illegal.37
Although the original impetus for the prohibition
against biological warfare was the damage or injury to man, the
conventions have been written to prohibit any hostile use of
biological agents, even those which are nonlethal.
Chemical Weapons:
The end of the nineteenth century saw the development of
chemical weapons on a significant scale.38 Chemical weapons were
frequently used during World War I in the form of toxic chemicals such
as chlorine, phosgene, and mustard gases. Phosgene has a slow effect
on the victim. "The person will have increasing difficulty in
breathing as the lung tissue is slowly destroyed and fills up with
bodily fluids. Death, which is slow in coming, is by asphyxiation."39
Since death was slow in coming, the victims damaged lungs would suffer
bacterial infection that would be the actual cause of death.40 Sulfur
mustard gas also destroys tissue. If the gas contacts skin, the skin
is destroyed. If the gas is inhaled, the lung lining is destroyed.41
The military and the general population were horrified
by these weapons, which had the same treacherous characteristics of
poison that had been prohibited by custom and international treaties.
The weapon could not be seen, and defenses were limited. Its
effectiveness was subject to the whims of the wind. Gas was released
to cover an area, and would indiscriminately strike all in the area,
be they combatants or noncombatants. And last, the weapon caused
unnecessary suffering.
The 1925 Gas Protocol was drafted in response to the
horrors seen during World War I. A number of nations reserved the
right to retaliate against the use of chemical weapons with chemical
weapons. The United States had several objections to the Gas Protocol.
It believed chemical weapons did not include chemical riot control
agents. The United States has historically argued the dichotomy of
allowing riot control gases by a nations police force against its own
citizens while prohibiting their use against enemy combatants in
battle.42 Again, it argued that the use of herbicides and defoliants
may be more humane in some cases than the use of conventional
weapons.43 Fifty years later, in 1975, the Senate abandoned these
arguments and unanimously ratified the treaty. In 1975, President
Gerald R. Ford issued an executive order renouncing first use of riot
control gases and herbicides except in limited noncombatant
situations.44
The Gas Protocol has been subject to a number of
criticisms.45 Following the United States's lead, the United Nations
took efforts to develop comprehensive arms control of chemical
weapons. The Draft Convention on the Prohibition of the Development,
Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their
Destruction46 prohibited the use, development, production, acquiring,
or stockpiling of chemical weapons. It also prohibited the use of riot
controls as a method of warfare.
The Convention defines chemical weapons to include
"Toxic chemicals and their precursors, except when intended for
purposes not prohibited under this convention" (emphasis added). Toxic
chemical is defined to mean "any chemical which through its chemical
action on life processes can cause death, temporary incapacitation or
permanent harm to humans or animals." Prohibited toxic chemicals have
been listed in schedules contained in the "Annex of Chemicals":
"Riot Control Agent" means any chemical not listed in a
Schedule, which can produce rapidly in human sensory irritation or
disabling physical effects which disappear within a short time
following termination of exposure."
Article II, Section 9, goes on to define "Purposes Not
Prohibited Under this Convention" to mean:
c) Military purposes not connected with the use of
chemical weapons and not dependent on the use of toxic properties of
chemicals as a method of warfare
d) Law enforcement including domestic riot control
purposes.
Following are some of the chemical antipersonnel
nonlethal weapons under consideration.
Tear/Riot Gases. The domestic law enforcement community
possesses and uses riot gases. However, in a warfare situation, the
use of tear gas is currently strictly limited by an executive order.
When the chemical convention is entered into force, the use of tear
gas and other riot controls will be completely forbidden.
Calmative Agents. These agents, sometimes called sleep
agents, can be made more effective by combining them with dimethyl
sulfoxide (DMSO), a chemical that promotes transmission of the
calmative through the skin and into the bloodstream. Calmative agents
were allegedly used by the Soviets in Afghanistan. The reports
indicated that the mujahideen would lie down and sleep until they
awoke later in Soviet custody. The reports are discounted because such
a chemical has not proven effective.47 If the chemical that comprises
the calmative agent is not listed on the prohibited chemical schedule,
then a further determination of whether the agent constitutes a
prohibited
riot control agent must be made. Under the definition of "riot control
agent," calmative agents would be prohibited because they cause
disabling physical effects.
Sticky Foam. These polymer agents will hopelessly stick
a person to anything. It can be argued that these weapons amount to
prohibited riot control agents under the convention since they are
"chemicals... which can produce rapidly disabling physical effects."
Markers. These chemical agents come in numerous forms
and are currently used in law enforcement. A covert variety can
surreptitiously expose a criminal to an invisible dye that shows up
under special lighting. An overt dye that is impossible to wash off
can be sprayed on a fleeing felon.
Nonlethal chemical agents that attack material are
promising and diverse. If the chemical that comprises the weapon is
limited on the schedule of prohibited chemicals, it may be possible to
claim that the weapon is exempt. These chemicals are "not dependent on
the use of the toxic properties of chemicals as a method of warfare."
"Toxic Properties" means using chemical action on life processes that
cause death, temporary incapacitation, or permanent harm to humans or
animals. This category of weapons would include the following agents.
Combustion Alteration Technology (CAT). CAT agents
change the viscosity or combustion characteristics of fuel to degrade
engine performance. Nearinstantaneous engine failure is possible if
the agent is applied in appropriate quantities.
Smart Metals. These special metals, formed with chemical
additives or blended in a particular form, could be introduced to
control certain activities while allowing legitimate ones. For
example, a notional metal designed to perform satisfactorily in a
legitimate chemical plant might be designed to fail or give off
telltale signs to inspectors if the plant is used for more insidious
purposes.
Super Caustics. These super acids can be used against
weapons, tires, roads, roofs, optical systems, or even shoes. They
could also be used to deny human contact and can be stored in a
harmless binary form.48
Metal Embrittlement. These agents severely weaken metals
by chemically changing their molecular structure. They are clear,
leave imperceptible residue, can attack almost any metal, and can be
applied with a felt tip pen.49
Antitraction Technology. These super lubricants severely
reduce traction. They are specially blended to attack specific targets
such as roads, runways, rails, and the like.50
Polymer Agents. These agents are similar to sticky foams
but are designed to target material instead of personnel. They can
foul engines or ventilation systems and can also deny the use of
weapons and facilities.51
Electromagnetic Weapons:
Nonlethal electromagnetic weapons span the spectrum from
simple to exotic. Many can be employed (or can have collateral
effects) against both personnel and equipment. Blinding and shocking
effects are the most common nonlethal results of the use of this class
of weapons. We will now look at potential nonlethal applications of
certain technologies for which there are presently no specific
prohibitions but which could certainly have LOAC implications.
Electrified Baton, Stun Gun, Taser. These weapons
deliver immobilizing, lowenergy pulsed shocks either at close range
(baton and stun gun) or at long range (taser). They are used by police
in criminal enforcement. The taser has electric currents of high
voltage and low amperage that cause the muscles of the body to
contract forcefully.52 The individual experiences spasms.53 The
contractions may fracture bones. If the individual collapses, he may
suffer further injury.54 If an individual is repeatedly shocked, he
may be rendered unconscious. The individual may suffer electrical
burns that may be difficult to treat.55
Highintensity Light. These omnidirectional bombs or
flares can flashblind personnel even in existing intense lighting
situations. They can also degrade sensors and night vision devices.
Lasers. Lowenergy lasers can be directed or aimed at
specific targets to blind personnel or sensors either temporarily or
permanently. They can also be used to make a gun or other weapon too
hot to hold. The most advanced blinding lasers oscillate between
numerous colors to make goggles and other countermeasures ineffective.
One factor in the assessment of the legality of a weapon
is discrimination. A weapon that injures the civilian population or
civilian property along with military personnel and objects, without
distinction, is considered indiscriminate and thus illegal.
Electromagnetic weapons, and most specifically the laser, can "almost
always be directed very precisely against specific targets."56
A second factor of assessment is "unnecessary
suffering." Several electromagnetic weapons, such as the highintensity
light and laser, may produce temporary or permanent blindness. These
weapons have been the subject of much discussion. Sweden has been
actively condemning the use of lasers as antipersonnel weapons on the
grounds that they cause unnecessary suffering.
Several sophisticated types of military equipment, such
as sensors and optics, are rendered useless when subjected to laser
weapons. These pieces of military equipment are legitimate targets.
Their destruction, however, may result in injury to personnel. Such
injury would be incidental to the primary target of the weapon.57
The controversy surrounding lasers focuses on the
legitimacy of deliberately blinding human beings. Exposing a pilot's
eyes to a laser may result in the destruction of the entire plane.58
Intentionally blinding an attacking infantry unit would render them
unable to fight. Some scholars, in particular experts from Switzerland
and Sweden, argue that intentionally using a laser to permanently
blind a combatant is a disproportionate injury to the gained military
advantage.59 The essence of their argument is that the Declaration of
St. Petersburg authorized the incapacitation of an opponent only for
the duration of the conflict. "Although it is permitted to kill
combatants under the law of war, and thus to put them permanently out
of action, it is not permitted to use methods or means of warfare
exclusively designed to injure soldiers with injuries lasting not only
the duration of the conflict but for the rest of their lives."60 It is
their position that intentional irreversible permanent blindness by a
laser constitutes "unnecessary suffering."
The United States rejects this position. In a memorandum
of law, it noted that there was no legal obligation to limit wounding
so that the opponent would be temporarily disabled for the period of
the hostilities and no longer.61 Additionally, it noted, "Blinding is
no stranger to the battle field." The use of a number of conventional
weapons could result in blindness.62 However, these conventional
weapons are more likely to cause death. It is the United States'
position that lasers do not cause unnecessary suffering but are more
humane because the victim is likely to suffer less injury than that
caused by conventional weapons.63
The injuries suffered as a result of electromagnetic
weapons are typically less severe than those injuries resulting from
conventional weapons. Although it is possible that a belligerent may
be permanently injured or killed as a result of the use of these
weapons, there is no evidence that the suffering experienced is
greater then that experienced from conventional weapons.
Acoustical Weapons:
Nonlethal acoustical weapons also range from the mundane
to the extraordinary as described below.
High-intensity Sound. High-intensity sound sets the ear
drum in motion. These vibrations cause the inner ear to initiate nerve
impulses that the brain registers as sound.64 The inner ear regulates
the spatial orientation of the body. If the ear is subjected to
high-intensity sound, the individual may experience imbalance.65
Low-frequency, high-intensity sound may cause other organs to
resonate, causing a number of physiological results, including
death.66
The British use high-intensity sound as a means of riot
control in Northern Ireland. The Curdler is a device that emits a high
"shrieking noise at irregular intervals."67 The sound is emitted at
levels lower than the pain threshold.
The assessment of high-intensity sound as a legal weapon
must be reviewed in terms of "unnecessary suffering." If the
acoustical weapon emits sounds below the pain threshold, then
unnecessary suffering is not an issue. If the sound does inflict pain,
the suffering must be balanced against military necessity. It may be
lawful to use high-intensity sound against an attacking force,
although some of the attackers may experience dis-orientation, pain,
or even death. As noted earlier when discussing the legality of
blinding soldiers, it is permissible to injure a combatant even with a
wound that may incapacitate the soldier for a period exceeding the
term of the hostilities. Combatants have been rendered deaf from
conventional warfare, or have even been disoriented from the confusion
of the battle. The use of high-intensity sound as a weapon to
disorient, or to cause pain or death, does not constitute unnecessary
suffering.
However, acoustical weapons run the risk of being an
indiscriminate weapon. The release of highintensity sound would impose
the same degree of damage on the noncombatant as the combatant. It may
be used only in circumstances in which the damage to noncombatants is
merely incidental in proportion to the necessity of the military
objective.
Infrasound. This is a powerful ultralow frequency (ULF)
sonic weapon that can penetrate buildings and vehicles and can be
directional and tunable. As a weapon infrasound, lowfrequency sound
entails the same concerns as highintensity sound. After being exposed
to highintensity infrasound, a subject suffers from disorientation and
reduced ability to perform simple sensorymotor tasks.68 At elevated
levels, experimental animals cease breathing temporarily.69 The
principles and findings regarding highintensity sound would apply to
infrasound. The suffering would be no greater than that experienced by
conventional weapons. The suffering must be proportionate to the
military objectives. The sound must be applied so that damage to
noncombatants is incidental in light of the military objective.
Unfortunately, large banks of speakers are required to
provide directionality, and the power demands are enormous.70 Area
denial is a very plausible mission for such a device as the level of
pain or damage increases predictably as range decreases.
Sonic Bullets. These are packets of sonic energy that
are propelled toward the target. The Russians apparently have a
portable device that can propel a 10-Hertz (Hz) sonic packet the size
of a baseball hundreds of yards. When employed against humans, the
energy can be selected to result in nonlethal or lethal damage.71 The
sonic bullet uses direct sonic energy. If the energy can be controlled
so that it is used only against lawful combatants, the concerns
surrounding acoustical weapons may be reduced or eliminated.
Deference Tones. These are sophisticated arrays that can
project a voice or other sound to a particular location. The resulting
sound can only be heard at that particular location.72 Deference
tones, a means of projecting sound, would not directly cause injury
upon the enemy. Its use must be in accordance with the constraints of
the law of armed conflict. For example, if the tone is generating a
sound such as an SOS signal, the enemy has an obligation to respond to
that sound. If the SOS sound is used to lure the enemy to a place
where they will be ambushed, such a use of the tone would be
perfidious and therefore illegal.
Informational Weapons:
Recently, a new class of nonlethal weapons has drawn
considerable interest in defense circles as well as in international
law. Two types of such weapons are discussed below.
Voice Synthesis. This is the ability to clone a person's
voice and broadcast a synthesized message to a selected audience. The
propaganda value of this technique in our highly mediadependent world
would be enormous. We currently have the ability to control the
broadcasts of foreign radio and television stations by using orbiting
platforms packed with electronic gear.
In considering whether it is legal to clone a persons
voice in order to gain a military advantage, it is important to
determine whose voice is being cloned. In most cases, it would be
realistic to expect that the voice cloned would be that of a political
leader or a military officer. The cloned voice might give orders to
the enemy combatant that might prove detrimental to the combatant. The
combatant would most likely be under an obligation to follow these
orders. That obligation, however, is owed to his own chain of command
and is not under the law of armed conflict. Treacherous acts, those
which abuse an obligation to be truthful under the law of armed
conflict, are illegal. But if there is no obligation to be truthful
under the law of armed conflict, then the misinformation amounts to a
lawful ruse. Morris Greenspan, a prominent writer in the field of
international law, notes that examples of legitimate ruses are "making
use of the enemy's signals, bugle and trumpet calls, watchwords, and
words of command."73 Giving orders by voice is analogous to giving
orders by bugle calls or signals. Cloning a voice would not violate
the law of armed conflict.
Computer Viruses. The ability to severely disrupt
computer operations with viruses has already been demonstrated by
amateur American hackers. A more sophisticated and professional effort
might be that of being able to produce viruses that can be injected
into enemy hardware at long range.
When planning to disrupt computer operations, it is
necessary to distinguish whether the computers are military
objectives. If they are civilian property or their loss would impact
only the civilian population, then they are not legitimate targets.
However, if the computers serve a dual use (for both the civilian
population and the military population), they may be considered valid
targets. The next step in the analysis calls for applying the rule of
proportionality to determine if the military advantage outweighs the
impact upon the civilian population.
Potential Policies:
In this section we will discuss several possible
scenarios for the employment of nonlethal weapons. These include
special operations missions such as counterterrorism,
counterinsurgency, peacekeeping, and peacemaking, as well as more
conventional forms of warfare. We will also examine the potential for
nonlethal weapons to lower or raise the threshold of war and the issue
of escalation.
Special Operations:
Special operations forces typically operate in a highly
volatile political environment. They must often minimize the use of
force if they intend to complete the mission without alienating
international as well as domestic political players. Such alienation
would make future missions much more difficult.
Hostage Barricade Situation. One counterterrorism
scenario that must be resolved with a maximum degree of control is the
hostage barricade situation. The ideal nonlethal weapon for a hostage
barricade situation would be one that instantaneously and selectively
disables the hostage takers. Unfortunately, any feasible weapon would
probably disable the hostages as well. Therefore, any disabling effect
should be controllable so that the hostages could cooperate in their
rescue. At the very least, if the weapon is indiscriminate, the effect
must not permanently injure the hostages. The use of lasers to
temporarily blind personnel could cause permanent blind spots
depending on range and weapon intensity. In the final analysis,
however, any nonlethal weapon must be judged against the normally
lethal alternatives. A typical hostage rescue operation involves a
violent plan that results in the death of the hostage takers and the
rescue of the hostages. The weapons employed are concussion grenades,
flashbang devices, and
conventional small arms. The tactics involve the so-called "double
tap" - one bullet to the chest and one to the head. Even a
well-executed mission can result in the deaths of one or more
hostages. The primary potential usefulness of nonlethal weapons is the
decreased chance of lethality for the hostages and the
possibility of increased safety for the rescuers.
The worst-case hostage situation would involve an in
extremis assault. This would occur if the terrorists start executing
hostages. In most situations, the result would be an immediate and
violent raid by special operations forces to resolve the situation.
The level of violence and lethality acceptable in this circumstance
would increase drastically. Ironically, this might also be the
situation most conducive to the use of nonlethal technologies. If
hostages are already dying, then the advantages of instantaneously
incapacitating everyone are obvious. Some unwanted permanent injuries
to hostages who would otherwise have surely died are probably
acceptable. In
contrast, injuries to hostages that occur when rescuers preempt the in
extremis situation are inevitably attributed to the rescuers and may
not be acceptable.
Each hostage situation is so unique that one universal
course of action cannot be recommended. Variables include the
condition of the hostages, potential access by rescuers, the
capabilities and proven intentions of the terrorists, the use of
deadman triggers, and other factors. The solution seems to be the
development and testing of a repertoire of possible nonlethal
technologies that gives the mission
planner more options. Cooperation with domestic law enforcement in the
development of nonlethal weapons could yield synergistic benefits for
the resolution of hostage situations.
Counterinsurgencies. The key to winning a
counterinsurgency is winning the hearts and minds of the affected
population. In this scenario, any weapon that reduces collateral
damage to innocent people or property is advantageous. Insurgents who
are interspersed with innocent civilians are especially hard to
target. However, it is not even necessary or even desirable to kill
the insurgent in order to defeat him. Certain nonlethal weapons might
offer solutions to these tactically difficult situations. In Vietnam,
for example, the only options available to a patrol under fire from a
"friendly" village were (1) return fire and risk generating friendly
casualties, or (2) withdraw. Both options have the potential of
further alienating a largely friendly population. The ability to
incapacitate the insurgents would enable troops to sort out the good
from the bad without killing anyone. A secondary advantage of
capturing an insurgent rather than killing him is the intelligence
that can be garnered from the prisoner, a critical element in
defeating an insurgency.
Some nonlethal technologies that offer promise in
counterinsurgencies include chemical defoliants and tear gasses,
calmative agents, blinding weapons, and acoustical weapons. Of course,
as discussed earlier, the weapon chosen must be a legal one.
Additionally, such practical issues as portability, training, and
effectiveness must also be addressed before relying on such weapons in
the hands of troops facing a mortal enemy. Insurgents might be
emboldened and able to attract more (though less dedicated) followers
if they know that death is a very unlikely prospect. The insurgency
could deteriorate into a game in which the insurgents are
incapacitated and captured while counterinsurgents are killed.
Peacekeeping and Peacemaking. Peacekeeping and
peacemaking are rapidly expanding roles for special operations as well
as conventional forces. The use of minimal lethal force may be
desirable in both situations. Nonlethal technologies may offer some
solutions. In Somalia, soldiers confronted with a hostile crowd often
had no options other than to fire upon the crowd. Effective nonlethal
crowd control techniques might have been used.
One potential role for nonlethal weapons in a
peacemaking scenario would be the ability to defeat the "iron sight."
For example, in spite of all our technological successes in countering
infrared and electronic threats, we have not developed a technique to
defeat a lone sniper with a rifle, or a radar precision guided (RPG)
or other optically guided weapon. Small numbers of snipers can wreak
havoc on an entire city as they did in Sarajevo. They can also bring
down helicopters as they did in Mogadishu, and they can also destroy
the morale of a normally effective combat force. Lasers might offer an
effective means of point defense and could even be used to counter
snipers. For example, a relatively simple laser device strapped on a
helicopter could be scanned to blind anyone looking in the direction
of the aircraft. Likewise, a laser scanned around a compound or guard
shack could blind anyone attempting to target the site. Indeed, by
using the unique optical reflection signature from the back of the
eye, a low power laser could be used to locate anyone persistently
looking at a specific target.74 A human operator (or an automated
system) could then decide whether to target the detected signature
with a higherpowered laser weapon or even a lethal weapon.
Disadvantages of this sophisticated antisniper device include possible
indiscriminate targeting, adjustment of power levels to account for
environmental conditions, and the possibility that the laser itself
may provide a more sophisticated enemy with an emission
source that could be targeted.
The role of peacekeeping (as opposed to peacemaking)
troops does not generally involve combat. Many UN observers are
required to be unarmed. Perhaps nonlethal weapons could be used to aid
in separating warring factions or as antisniper devices to protect the
peacekeepers.
Conventional Warfare:
Nonlethal weapons can also be used in conventional
conflicts. Electromagnetic pulse (EMP) weapons can be used to disable
grounded aircraft or vehicles rendering them useless on a temporary or
even permanent basis. These weapons can also be used to down airborne
aircraft although this would hardly be considered nonlethal. One key
to effective warfighting doctrine is to attack an enemy's critical
nodes of command and communications as well as other infrastructures.
While smart weapons can attack specific complexes and bunkers,
nonlethal weapons offer the opportunity to disable entire nodes on a
much grander scale. For example, the remote injection of a computer
virus into an enemy's command and control system could be devastating.
Likewise, certain biological agents that are designed to attack
silicon or other computer components could effectively destroy
computerized warfighting equipment. Super caustics can be sprayed on
roads to deteriorate tank tracks and truck tires. Antitraction
compounds can render mountain roads impassable, and embrittlement
compounds could be sprayed on virtually any mechanical device --
rendering them ineffective over a period of time. Combustion
alteration technology agents could be used to shut down an entire
harbor or airfield. Of course, practical matters such as method of
delivery, persistence, concentration, and efficiency of these agents
versus more lethal weapons must be considered.
One advantage for using nonlethal technologies in combat
is the possibility of reducing fratricide. Nonlethal weaponry that
disables a tank rather than killing it enables friendly forces the
option of "shooting first and asking questions later." Additionally,
nonlethal weapons such as acoustical and laser devices might offer
good point defense options for high security areas, further reducing
the chances
of fratricide.
Threshold of War:
Raising the threshold of war is a consistent overarching
goal of most arms control negotiations. In light of the fact that many
hostile countries possess weapons of mass destruction, quick
escalation from rhetoric to shooting could prove disastrous. Indeed,
conventional weapons in the hands of fairly skilled armed forces often
result in significant casualties. Therefore, a primary concern in the
employment of nonlethal weapons is the possibility that they might
lower the threshold of war. What one country might consider a "normal"
economic sanction, another country might consider an act of war. Even
if such a sanction was not considered an act of war, it
could, nonetheless, provide a path for escalation. National
sensitivities and vulnerabilities are too variable to accurately
predict a response to the employment of a particular nonlethal
weapon. For example, if a third world country brought down our stock
exchange and electronic funds transfer system with a computer virus,
we may consider this an act of war. The world community, however,
would probably condemn us if we retaliated with lethal weapons-perhaps
our only option against a less-developed society.
The most tempting use of some nonlethal weapons would be
in the area of clandestine operations. With computer viruses, for
example, an attacking country would almost certainly enjoy plausible
(if not total) deniability. In some cases, the targeted country might
never realize they were attacked at all. For example, a liquid metal
embrittlement agent introduced clandestinely in an industrial plant
could cause a catastrophic failure that might be attributed to normal
wear and fatigue. Clandestine operations of this type might muddy the
international waters to the point that nobody knows when or by whom
they are being attacked.
Conclusion:
Nonlethal weapons offer new possibilities in warfare,
especially in the arena of special operations. However, it is not an
unlimited exercise. Each newly developed weapon must be designed and
used in compliance with international law. We must then consider the
practicalities of the weapon's use. Nonlethal weapons show promise,
but they are not bringing us to a new golden age of warfare. Carl von
Clausewitz lambasted the idea of nonlethal warfare outright when he
remarked, "Let us not hear of Generals who conquer without bloodshed.
If a bloody slaughter is a horrible sight, then that is a ground for
paying more respect to War, but not for making the sword we wear
blunter and blunter by degrees from feelings of humanity, until some
one steps in with one that is sharp and lops off the arm from our
body."75
Likewise, Robert E. Lee remarked during the Battle of
Fredericksburg, "It is well war is so terrible, or we should grow too
fond of it."76 The condottieri largely avoided terrible battles and
thus apparently grew fond enough of war to elevate it to a game.
Modern nations might also be tempted to engage in a game of nonlethal
warfare only to see it escalate to something much more terrible.
Notes:
1. Joseph Jay Deiss, Captains of Fortune: Profiles of
Six Italian Condottiere (New York: Crowell, 1967), 28. Contemporary
scholars almost universally agree that Machiavelli's contempt for the
mercenaries caused him to exaggerate the nonlethality of their
encounters. Nevertheless, many engagements were indeed devoid of
significant casualties. See also Geoffrey Trease, The Condotteri:
Soldiers of Fortune (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1971), 18-22.
2 .Sun Tzu, The Art of War, trans. Samuel B. Griffith
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1971), 77.
3. "NIJ Initiative on LessThanLethal Weapons," National
Institute of Justice Research in Brief, March 1993.
4. "NonLethal Weapons Give Peacekeepers Flexibility."
Aviation Week & Space Technology, 7 December 1992, 50.
5. Frits Kalshoven, Constraints on the Waging of War
(Norwell, Mass.: Kluwer Publications, 1991), 12.
6. The Convention with Respect to the Laws and Customs
of War on Land, 29 July 1899 (hereinafter cited as Hague 1899), in
Treaty Series (TS) 403 (Washington, D.C.: US Department of State), and
the Regulations Annexed to Hague Convention No. IV Respecting the Laws
and Customs of War on Land, 18 October 1907 (hereinafter cited as
Hague 1907).
7. Following are these conventions, which can be found
as noted in Treaties and Other International Acts Series (TIAS)
(Washington, D.C.: US Department of State, 1956): Geneva Convention
for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in the
Armed Forces in the Field, 12 August 1949, TIAS 3362. Geneva
Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and
Sick and Shipwrecked Members, 12 August 1949, TIAS 3363. Geneva
Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, 12 August
1949, TIAS 3363. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of
Civilian Persons in Time of War, 12 August 1949, TIAS 3365.
8. The 1977 Protocol Additional to the Geneva
Conventions, 8 June 1977 (hereinafter Protocol I), in Dietrich
Schindler, The Laws of Armed Conflict: A Collection of Conventions,
Resolutions, and Other Documents (Rockville, Md.: Sijthoff &
Noordhoff, 1981), The United States has not ratified Protocol I.
9. These include the following agreements: The 1925
Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use of Asphyxiating,
Poisonous, or Other Gases and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare,
17 June 1925 (hereinafter Gas Protocol), in United States Treaties and
Other International Agreements (UST), vol. 26 (Washington, D.C.: US
Government Printing Office, 1976), 571 (26 UST 571), TIAS 8061.
Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, and
Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on
Their Destruction, 10 April 1972, 26 UST 583, TIAS 8062. Convention on
the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental
Modification Techniques, 10 December 1976 (hereinafter ENMOD), 31 UST
333, TIAS 9614. Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use
of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively
Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, 10 October 1980, in
Schindler, 179. Protocol on Non Detectable
Fragments, 10 October 1980, in Schindler, 179. Protocol on
Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby Traps, and
Other Devices, 10 October 1980, in Schindler, 179. Protocol on the Use
of Incendiary Weapons, in Schindler, 179.
10. Gerhard von Glahn, Law among Nations: An
Introduction to Public International Law (New York: Macmillan, 1992),
17-22.
11. Article VI, Section 2.
12. Von Glahn, 12-23.
13. Maj William J. Neinast, "United States Use of
Biological Warfare," Military Law Review 24 (1964): 17.
14. United States v. List et al., in Trials of War
Criminals before the Nuernberg Military Tribunals, vol. XI, The High
Command Case; The Hostage Case (Washington, D.C.: US Government
Printing Office, 1950), 1253.
15. United States v. Krupp, Ibid., vol. IX, The Krupp
Case, 1433-48.
16. Jean Pictet, Humanitarian Law and the Protection of
War Victims (Rockville, Md.: Sijthoff and Noordhoff, 1985), 28-29.
17. Ibid.
18. Hague 1907, Preamble.
19. Judith Gail Gardam, "Proportionality and Force in
International Law," American Journal of International Law 87 (1993):
391; and Brown, "The Proportionality Principle in the Humanitarian Law
of Warfare," Cornell International Law Journal 10 (1976): 134.
20. G. J. Adler, "Targets in War: Legal Considerations,"
University of Houston Law Review 8 (1970): 1, 17-18.
21. Hague 1907.
22. Air Force Pamphlet (AFP) 11031, International Law:
The Conduct of Armed Conflict and Air Operations, November 1976, par.
63(b)(2).
23. Ibid., par. 53(b).
24. Conduct of the Persian Gulf War: Final Report to
Congress, vol. 1 (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, April
1992), 9.
25. Hague 1907, art. 27. See also Convention for the
Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, 1954.
26. Hague 1907, art. 23 (a).
27. Ibid., art. 23 (b).
28. Ibid., art. 23 (f).
29. Ibid.
30. Assassination is considered a treacherous act. See
Patricia Zengel, "Assassination and the Law of Armed Conflict,"
Military Law Review 134 (1991): 123.
31. W. F. Biddle, Weapons Technology and Arms Control
(New York: Praeger, 1972), 281.
32. Hilaire McCoubrey and Nigel D. White, International
Law and Armed Conflict (Brookfield, Vt.: Dartmouth Publishing Co.,
1992), 245.
33. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute,
The Problem of Chemical and Biological Warfare: A Study of the
Historical, Technical, Military, Legal, and Political Aspects of CBW,
and Possible Disarmament Measures, vol. 4, CB Disarmament Negotiations
(New York: Humanities Press, 1971-1975), 268. Hereinafter cited as CBW
Negotiations.
34. Neinast, 9.
35. CBW Negotiations, 270.
36. Article II of the Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 9 December 1948, defines genocide
to mean any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in
whole or in part, a national, ethical, racial, or religious group such
as: a. killing members of the group; b. causing serious bodily or
mental harm to members of the group; c. deliberately inflicting on the
group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical
destruction in whole or in part; d. imposing measures intended to
prevent births within the group; or e. forcibly transferring children
of the group to another group See United Nations Treaty Series (UNTS),
vol. 78
(New York: Secretariat of the United Nations, 1951), 280.
37. Harald Mhuller and Richard Kokoski, The
NonProliferation Treaty: Political and Technical Prospects and Dangers
in 1990 (Stockholm: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute,
c. 1990).
38. CBW Negotiations, 270.
39. Hugh D. Crone, Banning Chemical Weapons: The
Scientific Background (New York: Cambridge University Press), 18.
40. Ibid.
41.Ibid.
42.CBW Negotiations, 23; and W. Hays Parks,
"Classification of Chemical Biological Warfare," University of Toledo
Law Review 13 (1982): 1168.
43.Ibid., 285. The use of herbicides must be in
accordance with the 1977 Environmental Modification Convention
(ENMOD). The convention requires that parties not engage in
modifications being widespread (an area of several hundred square
kilometers), be long lasting (a period of months or approximately a
season or more, or have severe effects (serious or significant
disruption or harm to life, nature, or economy).
44. Executive Order 11,850, Renunciation of Certain Uses
in War of Chemical Herbicides and Riot Control Agents, 8 April 1976.
45. The Gas Protocol lacked any verification or
enforcement means. Chemical weapons have been used a number of times,
including by the Italians against the Ethiopians, by the Japanese
against the Chinese, and by the Soviets against the Afghans. Phillip
Louis Reizenstein, "Chemical Biological Weapons: Recent Legal
Developments," Brooklyn Journal of International Law 95 (1986): 105.
46. Draft Convention on the Prohibition of Chemical
Weapons, 156 UN Doc. CD/500, 8 April 1974.
47.Crone, 80-81.
48.Paul R. Evancoe, "NonLethal Technology Enhances
Warriors Punch," National Defense, December 1993, 28.
49.Ibid.
50.Ibid.
51. Ibid.
52. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute,
Antipersonnel Weapons (London: Taylor and Francis, 1978), 203.
53.Ibid.
54.Ibid.
55.Ibid.
56.Bengt Anderberg and Myron L. Wolbarsht, Laser
Weapons: The Dawn of a New Military Age (New York: Plenum Press,
1992), 207.
57.Ibid., 209-12.
58.Ibid.
59.Ibid.
60.Ibid., 211.
61. "Memorandum of Law: The Use of Lasers as
Antipersonnel Weapons," The Army Lawyer, November 1988, 3.
62. Ibid.
63. Ibid.
64. Antipersonnel Weapons, 203.
65. Ibid.
66. Ibid.
67. Ibid., 204.
68. Ibid.
69. Ibid.
70. Evancoe, 28.
71. "NonLethal Weapons Offer New SO/LIC Capabilities,"
Tactical Technologies, 3 February 1993, 5; and "Russians Continue Work
on Sophisticated Acoustic Weaponry, " Defense Electronics 26 (March
1995): 12.
72. Ibid.
73. Morris Greenspan, The Modern Law of Land Warfare
(Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1959), 317-22.
74. This phenomenon can be observed using visible light.
Anyone who has spotlighted a deer or a cat in their headlights has
witnessed this retroreflection in the form of glowing eyes.
75. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. Anatol Rapoport
(Baltimore, Md.: Penguin Books, 1968), 345.
76. Quoted in Douglas Southall Freeman, R. E. Lee: A
Biography, In vol. 2 (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1941),
462.
-- Mild to severe discomfort
-- Organ functional disturbance
-- Organ disruption
-- Ground or structure penetration
-- Long-range propagation
-- Nondirectional
-- Hearing interference
-- Performance degradation
-- Pain
-- Hearing loss
-- Tissue damage
-- Moderate propagation
-- Moderately directional
-- Possible diffuse psychological effects
-- Pain
-- Surface tissue damage
-- Tissue destruction
-- Limited propagation
-- Highly directional
-- Attach muzzle adapter to barrel
-- Add a chemical tank
-- Fire blank flash-bang rounds to generate vortex rings
-- Impact targets by integrated chemical-flash-concussion impulses
-- Knock down human target with single shot
-- Incapacitate via resonance effects
-- Incapacitate by single shot employing entrained chemical agent
o Wide variety of potential effects requires evaluation
o Potential for injury or death severely limits human testing
o Animal testing is limited
o Extrapolation of surrogate target test data not consistently
reliable
o Antimaterial systems present difficult challenges
o Details of temporary upset mechanisms not readily measurable
o Human presence (integral and collateral) limits testing scenarios.
Technologies, Legalities, and Potential Policies
Maj Joseph W. Cook, III,
Maj David P. Fiely, Maj Maura T. McGowan