The United States and North Korea Reach Agreement on Nuclear Program

US Department of State Dispatch, Oct 31, 1994

Statement at a White House briefing, Washington, DC, October 18, 1994.

Good afternoon.  I am pleased that the United States and North Korea yesterday reached agreement on the text of a framework document on North Korea's nuclear program.  This agreement will help to achieve a long-standing and vital American objective - an end to the threat of nuclear proliferation on the Korean Peninsula.  This agreement is good for the United States, good for our allies, and good for the safety of the entire world.  It reduces the danger of the threat of nuclear weapons spreading in the region.  It is a crucial step toward drawing North Korea into the global community.

I want to begin by thanking Secretary Christopher and our chief negotiator, Ambassador-at-large Bob Gallucci, for seeing these negotiations through.  I asked Bob if he had had any sleep - since he is going to answer all of your technical questions about this agreement - and he said that he had had some sleep.  So be somewhat gentle with him.  After meeting with my chief national security advisers, and at their unanimous recommendation, I am instructing Ambassador Gallucci to return to Geneva on Friday for the purpose of signing an agreement.

The United States has been concerned about the possibility that North Korea has been developing nuclear weapons since the 1980s.  Three administrations have tried to bring this nuclear program under international control.  There is nothing more important to our security and to the world's stability than preventing the spread of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles.  The United States has an unshakable commitment to protect our ally and our fellow demurest - South Korea.  A total of 38,000 American troops stationed on the peninsula are the guarantors of that commitment.

Today, after 16 months of intense and difficult negotiations with North Korea, we have completed an agreement that will make the United States, the Korean Peninsula, and the world safer.  Under the agreement, North Korea has agreed to freeze its existing nuclear program and to accept internal inspection of all existing facilities.

This agreement represents the first step on the road to a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula.  It does not rely on trust.  Compliance will be certified by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).  The United States and North Korea have also agreed to ease trade restrictions and to move toward establishing liaison offices in each others capital.  These offices will ease North Korea's isolation.

From the start of the negotiations, we have consulted closely with South Korea, Japan, and other interested parties.  We will continue to work closely with our allies and with the Congress as our relationship with North Korea develops.

Throughout this Administration, the fight against the spread of nuclear weapons has been among our most important international priorities, and we have made great progress toward removing nuclear weapons from Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus.  Nuclear weapons in Russia are no longer targeted on our citizens.  Today, all Americans should know that as a result of this achievement on Korea, our nation will be safer, and the future of our people more secure.

Now I will ask Ambassador Gallucci to come up, make a statement, and answer your questions.  Robert Gallucci.

I would like to make a few comments about the agreement itself.  The President put it in a broader strategic context of our national interests in non-proliferation and regional security.  I want to say a word or two about the substance of the agreement and then try to answer your questions.

The agreement addresses concerns we have had about the North Korean nuclear program with respect to past activities, current activities, and future activities.  The question of what North Korea did in the past - how much plutonium it separated - is the issue that arose between the IAEA doing its inspections and DPRK finding that it would not accept what they called special inspections.  That was brought to the Security Council, and that resulted in a number of Security Council presidential statements and resolutions.

The question of what North Korea did in the past can be resolved by the IAEA only if the IAEA has access to the information in sites it needs.  Under the terms of the agreement, that access will be provided.  The DPRK will agree to the implementation of its full-scope safeguards agreement and whatever is required by the IAEA - whatever the IAEA deems necessary to resolve the questions of the past.

The implementation of that portion of the framework document takes place over a period of time.  The implementation must be completed before significant nuclear components of the first nuclear reactor that would be constructed in North Korea are delivered.

The agreement envisions the provision of two light-water reactors - and the first point I am making is that in the course of the delivery of component for that reactor, before any nuclear components are delivered, the question of past nuclear activities and the full compliance of North Korea with its IAEA safeguards obligations will be taken care of - will be addressed.  That is the question of the past.  With respect to the present, North Korea has an operating, small, five-megawatt reactor that produced the plutonium - however much plutonium they now have - produced the spent fuel that is now in the storage pond which contains 25 to 30 kilograms of plutonium.  North Korea has also a reprocessing facility that they have expanded in capacity.  These are the most significant components of the current nuclear program.  Under the terms of the agreement, the current nuclear program is frozen.  That means that the five-megawatt reactor will not restart.  That means that the reprocessing facility will be sealed and will not be operated again.  That means that the fuel that is in the pond will stay in the pond.  All of these provision will be monitored by the International Atomic Energy Agency, as the President said.  That addresses the current problems of both further separation of plutonium from spent fuel and further production of plutonium in a nuclear reactor.

With respect to the future, the North Korean nuclear program includes two large gas graphite reactors.  One rated at 50 megawatts electric; the other at 200 megawatts electric.  If these reactors were to be completed, they would produce hundreds of kilogram of plutonium a year.

The spent fuel, as I said, that is in the pond - if that were to be reprocessed - would right away be a source of plutonium for four or five nuclear weapons.  This is the future problem that we are seeking to address, and under the agreement, the facilities that are under construction would be frozen.  Under the agreement, all the facilities the ones under construction and the ones currently existing in North Korea - would be dismantled over the course of the construction of the light-water reactor project.

The spent fuel that is in the pond not only will not be reprocessed, according to the terms of the framework document, but the North Koreans will agree to cooperate in the shipment of that spent fuel out of North Korea so that there is no source of plutonium in North Korea.  This is the way we propose to address our concerns, as I said - grouping them into past, present, and future.

The agreement, of course, provides that the North Koreans receive assistance from the international community in achieving legitimate energy objectives.  A light-water reactor project roughly on the order of 2,000 megawatts or two 1,000-megawatt light-water reactors will be provided over a period of years.  We would hope in the near term to move to a contract phase and then for construction to begin.

As I think you know, the United States has been consulting with a number of governments about the financing of this project.  We envision the Republic of Korea and Japan playing essential roles in the financing and construction of that facility.

In addition to the light-water reactor project, the framework document provides that the energy needs of North Korea that arise from the freezing and ultimate dismantlement of the nuclear reactors that would have produced energy - that those energy needs be addressed by the international community.  Again, the United States will take the lead in supplying heavy oil over the next 10 years, or that period of time between now and when the light-water reactors might be expected to come on line.  So we will, with other countries, attempt to meet the North Korean energy needs that they forego - energy that they forego as a result of the freezing of the reactor either extant or under construction In addition, the framework document provides for what we call negative security assurance, assuring that the United States, with respect to a party - North Korea - to the Non Proliferation Treaty will not, in essence, suffer the threat or use of nuclear weapons.

At this point I will stop.  I will say with respect to the status of the agreement again, so you will understand we are in ad referendum posture with respect to the agreement.  As the President said, I will return on Friday for the purpose of signing the agreement