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Date: Mon, 21 May 2007 08:25:28 -0400
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From: "James M. Atkinson" <jm..._at_tscm.com>
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http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2007/05/17/60minutes/printable2823448.shtml
The Troubled Waters Of Deepwater
May 17, 2007
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
(CBS) After 9/11, few government entities were as
poorly prepared as the U.S. Coast Guard to take
on an expanded mission. Already charged with sea
rescues, drug interdictions and immigration
enforcement, the Coast Guard became the primary
maritime force for homeland security, tasked with
protecting 95,000 miles of coastline and 361
ports with an old and antiquated fleet.
So five years ago the Coast Guard undertook a
massive modernization program called Deepwater
and ended up way over its head. As correspondent
Steve Kroft reports, the $24 billion project has
turned into a fiasco that has set new standards
for incompetence, and triggered a justice department investigation.
A promotional video for the biggest project the
Coast Guard had ever taken on looked impressive
enough: Deepwater would include 91 new ships
and 124 smaller boats, plus new planes and helicopters.
But five years into the program, the Coast Guard
has fewer boats and ships now than it did before
it started. Congressman Elijah Cummings, chairman
of the Coast Guard oversight subcommittee calls the program, a mess.
Here it goes to the national security of this
country, Rep. Cummings says. That's serious
business. Particularly after 9/11. And so, you
know, it pains me. It really does.
Asked if he thinks the Coast Guard in worse shape
now than it was before it began Deepwater, the
congressman tells Kroft, They say they're not. But I think they are.
You can begin with the fact that the Coast Guard
spent nearly $100 million to ruin eight patrol
boats. The plan was to take the aging workhorses
of the fleet, the 110-foot Island Class patrol
boats, and lengthen them by 13 feet, adding a
launch ramp for small inflatable boats and
expanding the superstructure. But something went
drastically wrong at the Bollinger Shipyard near
New Orleans, where the first eight boats were extended.
When I stepped on board the ship I knew
something was wrong, Cummings recalls. What you
see is a lot of buckling. In the floor. And
spaces where you know something is bending that
shouldn't be bending in other words it should be flat.
After just a few weeks on the water, all eight
boats experienced severe structural problems and
had to be pulled out of service. They are
currently tied up at a pier at the Coast Guards
Baltimore yard waiting to be decommissioned.
Their problems, the Coast Guard says, are too serious to be fixed.
Rep. Cummings wanted to show Kroft the cracks and
buckling himself, but the Coast Guard refused to
let him take 60 Minutes on its base.
We should not allow situations to occur where
you spend $14 million for a boat that doesn't float, Cummings says.
You don't think it was seaworthy? Kroft asks.
No. And they don't either. Thats why when I say
they, I'm referring to the Coast Guard, the congressman replies.
How does that happen?
Says Cummings, I don't know. The thing I'll tell
you and I think I know partly. It started with
some people not either paying attention. Or
people who didn't care. Or people who were
greedy. Or people who were incompetent. Or people
who lacked integrity. Or a combination of all.
That pretty much sums up the sentiments of just
about every government organization that has
taken the time to investigate Deepwater and its
problems, which go far beyond the patrol boats.
And there has been no shortage of whistleblowers
shouting May Day. Some of the blame can be
traced to the original Deepwater contract.
From the outset, the Coast Guard didnt have the
resources to run a $24 billion project. So it
outsourced the entire program to the private
sectornot just the constructionbut the
day-to-day management of the contract. It went to
a company called Integrated Coast Guard Systems,
a joint venture of Lockheed Martin and Northrop
Grumman, that had been formed specifically for
this job. Not surprisingly, the joint venture
picked Lockheed Martin and Northrop Grumman to do
the lions share of the work.
One of the first people to send up a warning
flare about the contract was Captain Kevin
Jarvis, who, until his retirement last fall,
commanded of the Coast Guards Engineering and Logistics Center.
People have told us, Look, the people that were
supposedly managing the contractors were, in many
cases, the contractors themselves. The same companies. Correct? Kroft asks.
Correct. Correct. People say that this is like
the fox watching the henhouse. And it's worse
than that, Capt. Jarvis says. It's where the
government asked the fox to develop the security
system for the henhouse. Then told 'em, You're
gonna do it. You know, by the way, we'll give you
the security code to the system and we'll tell
you when we're on vacation. It was, in my
opinion, it was that bad. And that's why we have
some of the problems we have.
Captain Jarvis, one of the Coast Guards top
naval engineers, had questions about extending
the patrol boats from the very beginning. But
when he asked the Coast Guard and the contractors
for the specifics of the plan, he got an e-mail
from the Coast Guard acquisition team.
"The contractors' engineering work was good
enough. We don't need to pursue this any further.
It's gonna compromise the cost and the schedule
so it's good enough. Thank you very much," Jarvis recalls.
They weren't that interested in what you had to say? Kroft asks.
We were looked upon as being impediments to the
progress of the contract, the captain replies.
Jarvis wasnt the only person frustrated with the
failures of Deepwater; Michael DeKort was
Lockheed Martins lead engineer for electronics on the patrol boats.
It may be very hard for you to believe that our
government and the largest defense contractor in
the world is capable of such alarming
incompetence, DeKort said in a video. He was so
angry, that last summer, while still employed by
Lockheed, he made the video and posted it on YouTube.
DeKort acknowledges it is an unusual venue for a
whisteblower. I was trying to be resourceful and
keep the issue going, he says.
Why not go to the press? DeKort says he did.
Their response? Says DeKort, Because the press
had told me they were not gonna print because
they thought my allegations seemed a little too fantastic actually.
To believe? Kroft asks.
To believe. Yes, sir, DeKort replies.
What was so outlandish that they had trouble believing you? Kroft asks.
We actually ordered radios for the very small
boats that go on the 123s that were not waterproof, DeKort says.
That is hard to believe, Kroft remarks.
Yes, sir, DeKort replies.
Asked if it was true, DeKort tells Kroft, Yes, sir.
Did you tell Lockheed Martin about this problem? Kroft asks.
Yes, sir. All the way through to the CEO and the
board of directors, DeKort replies.
How did the radios get changed? Kroft asks.
Because, coincidentally, one day during testing
it rained and four of the radios failed, DeKort explains.
Asked if they offered him any apologies, DeKort
says, Oh, no. I was actually removed from the project shortly after that.
The radios, which were vital for communications
with other boats and helicopters, werent the
only problem. DeKort says the antennas and
electronics components on the exterior of the
boat wouldnt survive in the extreme weather the
Coast Guard has to operate in, a fact that was
later backed up by the Department of Homeland Securitys inspector general.
Even something as simple as the placement of security cameras made no sense.
We installed the camera system with two very
large blind spots that were directly over the
bridge. About 15 feet wide on each side, DeKort explains.
That's not an area you want a blind spot? Kroft asks.
No, I should think if one wanted a security
system for their home, they might have a camera
over their front door, DeKort says, laughing.
But no ones laughing about the boats electronic
communications systems, which failed to meet
government security standards. Voice and data
transmissions could leak out and be monitored by
anyone, jeopardizing not only the Coast Guards
own secret messages, but those of every
government agency the boats communicated with.
Asked how serious these communications problems
were, Rep. Cummings tells Kroft, Very serious.
Very serious. ... What happens is if you don't do
the wiring in a certain way countries like Cuba
can eavesdrop on our communications. ... I mean,
secret communications. I mean, and that's not good.
So if you'd had an enemy ship, a terrorist ship
that was trying to smuggle a dirty bomb into the
United States. And they were able to listen to
the Coast Guard traffic at the port. They could
conceivably weave their way through the boats, Kroft asks.
I would think so. Yes those are the kind of
problems that we're talking about, Cummings says.
Once the Coast Guard decided to deep-six the
extended patrol boats, it stepped up the schedule
for its long-term replacement, the Fast Response
Cutter. It was to be built at a Northrop Grumman
facility in Gulfport, Miss. And instead of having
a steel or aluminum hull, it would be made of a
composite material, which made the cutters much
heavier and required four engines instead of two.
We used to call it a brick. It was just so
heavy. And even a brick, if you put enough
horsepower on it, you could make it plane on the
water. Well, that's exactly what they did here, Capt. Jarvis explains.
Why did they decide to make it out of composite
and not out of steel or aluminum?
Says Jarvis, I really don't know that answer
other than the fact that one day it was a
traditional hull, and the next day its gonna be composite.
Do you think it had anything to do with the fact
that the contractor had built this big, huge
shipyard to do composite hulls? Kroft asks.
One could really make that inference. I don't
know if that was part of the decision. But once
can sure make that inference, Jarvis says.
Asked if one of those composite cutters was ever
built, Jarvis says, No. Thank goodness.
After tests showed technical and design problems,
the Coast Guard finally pulled the plug, and
another $38 million in developmental costs went down the drain.
But the huge National Security Cutter is still
going full speed ahead. At 418 feet long, it is
by far the largest ship the Coast Guard has ever
had, and the most expensive. Its supposed to be
able to monitor 56,000 square miles of ocean
every day. The Coast Guard expects to accept
delivery of the first one by this fall.
This was like a Navy ship? Kroft asks Jarvis.
It's supposed to be able to run with the Navy battle groups, he replies.
Asked if it will be able to, Jarvis says, In my
opinion, no. Our models show it's not gonna meet
the speed requirements. It's gonna miss.
Is that a problem? Kroft asks.
It'll be good enough, Jarvis replies.
But speed wasnt the only problem for the
National Security Cutter. Coast Guard engineers
found serious flaws in the structural design that
could lead to premature metal fatigue and even
structural failure. A second opinion from the
Navys engineers concurred. But that didnt stop
the Coast Guard from christening the first
National Security Cutter last year. A second one
is now being built. The cost, so far, is nearly $800 million.
This is a story the Coast Guard didnt want 60
Minutes to tell. It refused to make Commandant
Thad Allen or any other officer available for an
interview. The contractor, Integrated Coast Guard Systems, also declined.
They did, however have to appear before Congress.
And Mississippi Rep. Gene Taylor, who spent 12
years in the Coast Guard, wasnt much more
successful than 60 Minutes was at getting
answers, particularly when he asked the
contractors about those eight patrol boats that proved to be unseaworthy.
So at what point does one of you step forward
and say, We made a horrible mistake, the congressman asked.
The response? Dead silence.
I think the stakes are pretty high, folks. I'm
giving you an opportunity to tell me what went
wrong and who's going to accept responsibility, Rep. Taylor said.
Eventually, James Anton, Northrop Grummans
Deepwater Vice President, spoke up. We need to
determine the cause of the failure, sir, and when
we determine the cause of the failure, we'll
determine accountability, and when we determine
accountability, we'll know who needs to stand up, Anton said.
How long does that take? What was it, two years ago? Rep. Taylor replied.
Besides serving on the Coast Guard oversight
subcommittee, Congressman Taylor knows a few
things about extending the length of boats. He
did it with an old shrimp boat in his hometown of Bay St. Louis.
And I pretty well drew it out on the back of a
napkin. Went and found some guys, some welders,
and we did basically the same thing they did that
Coast Guard, on a smaller scale, Taylor says.
My boat works fine. In their case, they didn't think it through.
Asked if these boats are good for anything, the
congressman tells Kroft, No. I've even asked if
they could be used on river environments, if we
couldn't give 'em to the Colombians or the
Hondurans, just go use 'em for a river patrol boat. And they didn't
have the confidence that the vessel could get
down to Latin America to be given away.
Has anybody been fired or demoted? Kroft asks.
To the absolute best of my knowledge, no one in
the Coast Guard was demoted. No one was fired,
Taylor says. The taxpayers have not been given
their money back, and of course, the ships havent been fixed.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
On Thursday, the Coast Guard officially revoked
its acceptance of the converted patrol boats and
told the contractor Integrated Coast Guard
Systems it wants at least some of the money
back. It has also removed Integrated as the
Deepwater program manager and assumed those responsibilities itself.
Late last week, after our story had been
completed, the coast guard finally offered to
make Commandant Thad Allen available, but only
for a live unedited interview, which we declined
to do. In a separate letter the Commandant said
he has changed the course of Deepwater, and that
the program is turning around.
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