Re: [TSCM-L] {1406} Harddisk destroy in les then 30 sec ?

From: Peter Capek <ca..._at_ieee.org>
Date: Wed, 21 Mar 2007 16:30:34 -0500

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Date: Wed, 21 Mar 2007 23:10:06 -0400
From: "David I. Emery" <d..._at_dieconsulting.com>
To: TSCM-L2006_at_googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: [TSCM-L] {1411} Re: {1406} Harddisk destroy in les then 30 sec ?
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On Wed, Mar 21, 2007 at 07:56:15PM -0700, cont..._at_yahoo.co.uk wrote:

> So you erase it first...if no time or possibilty for that...it would
> still be encrypted.

        Certainly simple game analysis leads to the conclusion that you
are often better off doing something that actually indisputably destroys
the data irretreivably if there is any chance of coercion being applied
to you later on (either legal or the rubber hose/waterboard type).

        If you adversary knows the data is gone and cannot be gotten
back he has much less incentive to torture you to death or blackmail you
into revealing the key or providing him with a means of obtaining it.

        The real hazard with the encryption with a backed up key
solution is that this may leave you confronting some very tough choices
later on - while if the data is simply gone and nothing can recover it those
choices may be quite different.

        Occasionally, of course, the possiblity that you could still
provide access to the wanted information might be a bargaining chip to
save your life or get you out of a jam, so the probabilities have to be
carefully weighed.

-- 
   Dave Emery N1PRE,  d..._at_dieconsulting.com  DIE Consulting, Weston, Mass 02493
"An empty zombie mind with a forlorn barely readable weatherbeaten
'For Rent' sign still vainly flapping outside on the weed encrusted pole - in 
celebration of what could have been, but wasn't and is not to be now either."
Received on Sat Mar 02 2024 - 00:57:18 CST

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