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Subject: Perils of the polygraph #4 of 5 parts
From: reginal..._at_hotmail.com
To: TSCM-L Professionals List <TSCM-..._at_googlegroups.com>
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Continued from Part 3.
"So, if Prouty were working on behalf of Hezbollah and its Iranian
masters, she would have been able to gather a significant amount of
information regarding the FBI's domestic counterterrorism capabilities
and programs, as well as information pertaining to investigations it
was running against Hezbollah. More importantly, she would have had an
insider's view of how the FBI conducts such operations, which would
allow her to determine how a group such as Hezbollah could use gaps
in that capability and coverage to avoid detection. If Prouty was used
to translate Arabic conversations from telephone taps or other
listening devices, she could have learned the targets of such devices
and the locations where the device were planted. Furthermore, if she
were asked to interview Arabic-speaking sources, she would have little
trouble identifying them.
As a CIA case officer, Prouty would also be able to provide Hezbollah
and Iran with a detailed look at CIA training and intelligence
tradecraft, in addition to a wide variety of information pertaining to
the U.S. Embassy in Bagdad, as well as the CIA station and its sources
of intelligence there. Just the classified cable traffic she would be
privy to would be a treasure trove to a hostile intelligence agency,
especially the operational reports that might be useful in identifying
sources. Even though sources are identified by codes rather than their
real names, the characterization of the source, the information
provided and the timeframe in which the source provided the
information can be very useful to a counterintelligence service. Such
revalations can, and do, lead to the deaths of sources.
In the past, it was thought that only nation states such as Russia or
Israel had the potential to send agents into another country to
infiltrate their most sensitive government agencies. In this case, it
could turn out that a militant group (perhaps with a little help from
its Iranian mentors) was able to accomplish this feat. In this case,
the agents might not only have penetrated those agencies, but
maneuvered themselves into positions and locations of critical
importance to Hezbollah and the Iranians. It would be quite a coup for
Hezbollah to pull off such a feat while the United States and Iran
were in the midst of a covert intelligence war.
Flaws in the System
These cases highlight the gaps in U.S. immigration policy and
demonstrates the ways in which individuals -- an militant
organizations -- can exploit those vulnerabilities to enter or remain
in the United States fraudulently.
Furthermore, the cases demonstrate that the FBI, CIA and Marine Corps
all failed to detect the web of sham marriages when they conducted
background investigations on the women in question, especially since
the marriages were within the seven-year investigative window required
for Prouty's FBI clearance and Spinelli's enlistment in the Marine
Corps. A full background investigation should have been able to
determine the nature of the sham marriages, given that the women never
lived with their purported husbands.
The problem, however, is that background investigations often are seen
as mundane tasks, and thus are not given high priority -- especially
when there are so many other 'real' cases to investigate. Furthermore,
the work is most often done by contract investigators whose
bureaucratic bosses emphasize speed over substance, meaning important
leads can be ignored because of a case deadline. The contractors who
do dig deaply sometimes are accused of trying to milk the system and
acquire more points (the basis upon which contract investigators are
paid.)
Of course, in cases involving Lebanese citizens (and many other Middle
Easterners) it is extremely difficult to investigate their lives prior
to their arrival in the United States. Even verifying the identity of
such a person is difficult, not to mention that it would be relatively
easy for a Lebanese Shi'i to claim to be a Maronite or a Druze.
Furthermore, even if the person is who he or she claims to be -- and
has entered the United States with good intentions - the powerful
militias back home, such as Hezbollah, still could force that person
to provide them with information by threatening his or her relatives
in the home country."
End of Part 4 of 5 Parts
Reg Curtis
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Subject: Hardware key-loggers and a few other bits
From: "pauls..._at_faberbrent.com" <pauls..._at_faberbrent.com>
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Do you guys all check for these kind of threats (you can be sure the
IT guys don't)?
http://faberbrent.blogspot.com/2009/08/black-hatter-shows-how-to-utilise.html
Received on Sat Mar 02 2024 - 00:57:19 CST