Re: [TSCM-L] {5917} Well Aint that a Bitch from seda köksal on 2012-01-29 (file.mbox)

From: seda köksal <sedako..._at_gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 30 Jan 2012 07:34:47 +0200

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Date: Sat, 24 Dec 2011 11:12:51 -0200
Message-ID: <CAMXW0MsZ79jOAcBAHzy45Kz=CmFYRWr_qku5RnNwj+CWAwYBiw_at_mail.gmail.com>
Subject: Re: [TSCM-L] {5943} Well Aint that a Bitch
From: Humberto Sodre <hrs..._at_gmail.com>
To: tscm-l2006_at_googlegroups.com
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John,

Your considerations are more realistic and objective. In many cases the way
your law treats some issues is almost a paranoia and do not prevent most
serious attacks to your safety as happened years ago.
After all, we foreigns only want TSCM equipment for sweeps and moreover the
sophisticated equipment that you Americans produce are beyond our needs. In
fact, these exportations contributes more to your business than put your safety
at risk. Nobody here will open a TSCM equipment to do reverse engineering or
remove a chip for use in weapons systems.

2011/12/24 John Young <j..._at_pipeline.com>

> Not to diminish Jim's claims about "ZERO legal exports of
> TSCM equipment out of the United States in the past six
> months," but the Federal Register document he refers to covers
> only large, multi-million dollar transactions which must
> be reported to Congress. The large dollar amount items
> usually are for expensive weapons systems.
>
> Smaller dollar amounts are excluded, and it is likely exports
> of TSCM equipment would fall into this category along with
> thousands of other less expensive items.
>
> For example, I follow exports of encryption products and
> crypto-systems. Over ten or so years these items, also
> categorized as munitions, have not appeared in the Federal
> Register as a report to Congress except when they are part
> of expensive systems.
>
> Another example, small arms are not usually reported to
> Congress although they are used to kill and maim far more
> people than expensive weapons systems. Law enforcement
> and espionage equipment do not appear.
>
> There are other substantial gaps in export controls of all countries
> which are there to allow government-sponsored defense industries
> to thrive by direct sales and through intermediaies, government,
> commercial and private arms merchants -- white and black.
> Arms and export control treaties condone this lucrative slaughter
> and espionage market and provide whitewash for venality.
>
> "Dual-use" is a favored and abused gap through which huge
> amounts of officially-sanctioned contraband are openly and
> secretly smuggled.
>
> It should be no surprise that there is official-criminal cheating
> in TSCM equipment, a small part of a large racketeer influenced
> organized criminal enterprise.
>
>
>
>

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<div>John,</div><div>=
=A0</div><div>Your=A0considerations are more realistic and objective. <span=
class=3D"hps">In many cases the way your law treats some issues is almost =
a paranoia and do not prevent most serious attacks to your safety as happen=
ed years ago.</div>
<div>After all, we foreigns =
only want=A0TSCM</spa=
n> equipment=A0for=A0=
sweeps and moreover the soph=
isticated equipment that you Americans produce are beyond our needs. <=
span class=3D"hps">In fact, these e=
xportations contributes more to=A0your business than put=A0your safety at risk. Nobody <spa=
n class=3D"hps">here will open a TSCM equi=
pment to do reverse engineering or remove a chip for use in wea=
pons systems. 
 </div><div class=3D"gmail_quote">2011/12/24 John Young <<a href=3D"mailto:j..._at_pipeline.com">j..._at_pipeline.com</a>>=
 <blockquote style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;padding-left:1ex;border-l=
eft-color:rgb(204,204,204);border-left-width:1px;border-left-style:solid" c=
lass=3D"gmail_quote">
Not to diminish Jim's claims about "ZERO legal exports of 
TSCM equipment out of the United States in the past six 
months," but the Federal Register document he refers to covers 
only large, multi-million dollar transactions which must 
be reported to Congress. =A0The large dollar amount items 
usually are for expensive weapons systems. 
 
Smaller dollar amounts are excluded, and it is likely exports 
of TSCM equipment would fall into this category along with 
thousands of other less expensive items. 
 
For example, I follow exports of encryption products and 
crypto-systems. Over ten or so years these items, also 
categorized as munitions, have not appeared in the Federal 
Register as a report to Congress except when they are part 
of expensive systems. 
 
Another example, small arms are not usually reported to 
Congress although they are used to kill and maim far more 
people than expensive weapons systems. Law enforcement 
and espionage equipment do not appear. 
 
There are other substantial gaps in export controls of all countries 
which are there to allow government-sponsored defense industries 
to thrive by direct sales and through intermediaies, government, 
commercial and private arms merchants -- white and black. 
Arms and export control treaties condone this lucrative slaughter 
and espionage market and provide whitewash for venality. 
 
"Dual-use" is a favored and abused gap through which huge 
amounts of officially-sanctioned contraband are openly and 
secretly smuggled. 
 
It should be no surprise that there is official-criminal cheating 
in TSCM equipment, a small part of a large racketeer influenced 
organized criminal enterprise. 
 
 
 
</blockquote></div> 

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