Re: [TSCM-L] {6626} From NPR News

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Date: Tue, 18 Aug 2015 13:42:19 -0400
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Subject: Re: [TSCM-L] {6626} From NPR News
From: Edward Michaels <ejmic..._at_gmail.com>
To: tscm-l2006_at_googlegroups.com
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Some of this explains the armed security details I posted when fiber optic
was just becoming known to the public. We were using Colt AR15s and
Remington 870s with folding stocks in addition to sidearms.
On Aug 18, 2015 1:13 PM, "James M. Atkinson" <jm..._at_tscm.com> wrote:

> AT&T Started to collaborate with AT&T to take part in unlawful
> eavesdropping on American citizens in 1984, shortly after (literal minutes)
> after the division of what was AT&T took place that year.
>
> Due to the ECI relationship, the technicians for AT&T had to possess a Top
> Secret security clearance to actually just access the fiber, because they
> might "accidentally" discover the tap, or discover data being diverted out
> of the fiber optic multiplexers. By the way "ECI" means that the company is
> given a code name to conceal their involvement in illegal activities. For
> example, AT&T has a code name, MCI has a code name, Sprint has one, and so
> on. The ECI codename for AT&T is "FAIRVIEW" and also US-990, but pay
> attention to the US-990 SIGAD code and it tends to indicate when a code and
> alias was initiated. US-990 dates form the day AT&T was broken up. On that
> date, each of the "baby bells" was given a ECI codename and SIGAD code name
> in the manner of that of AT&T.
>
> The ECI BLARNEY was initiated on AT&T prior to the breakup, and it referes
> to the 1977 and 1978 era fiber optic switches that serviced regions, but
> which also routed international calls to undersea cables. BLARNEY was the
> pre-AT&T network, and after the AT&T break-up BLARNEY remained in place for
> FISA reasons, then a new ECI was created called FAIRVIEW for the netly
> borne AT&T that handles undersea fiber optics. But, BLARNEY was still the
> program for FISA intercepts on AT&T until the Clinton Era CALEA program. Of
> course by that time MCI and Sprint were major carriers, and both were
> assigned an ECI for domestic facilities, and then a different ECI for
> undersea fiber optics. As each fiber optic company sought a new undersea
> cable landing license from the FCC they were required by the NSA to enter
> into a classified contract with the NSA for TWO access point for each
> undersea cable. The first access point had to be right at the optical
> multiplexer which duplicated the optical pulse into the undersea cable, and
> then a second into a fiber optic cable that fed NSA gear. Then, behind the
> multiplexer and the switching systems a second access point where the
> signals exited the cable station to enter the AT&T, Sprint, MCI, etc
> backbones. In this manner the NSA had access to all data entering or
> exiting the cable landing station form the United States (illegally), but
> they also had access to the cable as it left the United States. The reason
> for TWO access points is that data can be relayed form cable station to
> cable station without exiting the cable station other then to hop through
> the cable station and the data in this case never hits the backbone. Then
> there is data sent to a cable station via an ocean route that is routed
> from another cable station but without access the network backbone. In each
> case it creates a "relay effect" where the cable stations are not "routing
> through" the station as normal traffic, but is goign round-robin form
> station to station. For example, someone in England can lauch data out of
> London, to an undersea cable to Long Island, which bounces it underseas to
> NJ, and then undersea to Florida, and thence to Cuba without the packets
> ever entering the domestic backbones of the carriers. So, for the NSA to
> operate the most effective network access they have to hit both the front
> side and the back side of the undersea cable stations.
>
> Additionally, as there has been some resistance and push back form the
> carrier from time to time, the NSA, operating through fake FBI search
> warrants issued under FISA has had installed on domestic backbones a fiber
> optic tap on each side on the cable landing stations, but these intercept
> points are only suitable when the 1983 to 2001 era carriers were
> "uncooperative" and they started asking 4th Amendment related questions.
>
> Once 9/11/2001 happened, the Executive branch and the Legistative Branch
> bullshit each other to such a massive level that the Patriot Act was passed
> (which was done unlawfully), but it forced each of the carriers to provide
> full access to all billing records, all account recoreds, all switching
> records, dual access to all forms of transmission, and the establishment of
> special ECI SIGAD codes across every potential carrier of any signal, of
> any type, at any time, with no warrant, and no showing of probable cause.
>
> The next question down the list shoudl be what is the name given to MCI
> and what is the SIGAD, and then Comcast, Sprint, and so on.
>
> Clue1: There were FIVE companies who just after 9/11 were blackmailed by
> the Oversight Committee on Intelligence into cooperating with the NSA
> without ANY warrants being issued... AT&T is one, then MCI, and so on.
>
> There are many questiones to be asked.
>
> -jma
>
> On 8/15/15, 10:38 PM, Edward Michaels wrote:
>
> As if we had not known, this kind of "news" would make me throw up.
>
> Report: AT&T Had Long, 'Highly Collaborative' Partnership With NSA
> http://n.pr/1IS13rM
> --
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>
> --
> ---
> James M. Atkins..._at_tscm.com
>
> --
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>

--089e01493e7892589a051d997030
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<p dir=3D"ltr">Some of this explains the armed security details I posted wh=
en fiber optic was just becoming known to the public. We were using Colt AR=
15s and Remington 870s with folding stocks in addition to sidearms.</p>
<div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Aug 18, 2015 1:13 PM, &quot;James M. Atkinson=
&quot; &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:jm..._at_tscm.com">jm..._at_tscm.com</a>&gt; wrote:<=
br type=3D"attribution"><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0=
 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><u></u>


 =20

<div text=3D"#000000" bgcolor=3D"#ffffff">
AT&amp;T Started to collaborate with AT&amp;T to take part in unlawful
eavesdropping on American citizens in 1984, shortly after (literal
minutes) after the division of what was AT&amp;T took place that year.<br>
<br>
Due to the ECI relationship, the technicians for AT&amp;T had to
possess a Top Secret security clearance to actually just access the
fiber, because they might &quot;accidentally&quot; discover the tap, or dis=
cover
data being diverted out of the fiber optic multiplexers. By the way
&quot;ECI&quot; means that the company is given a code name to conceal thei=
r
involvement in illegal activities. For example, AT&amp;T has a code
name, MCI has a code name, Sprint has one, and so on. The ECI codename
for AT&amp;T is &quot;FAIRVIEW&quot; and also US-990, but pay attention to =
the
US-990 SIGAD code and it tends to indicate when a code and alias was
initiated. US-990 dates form the day AT&amp;T was broken up. On that
date, each of the &quot;baby bells&quot; was given a ECI codename and SIGAD=
 code
name in the manner of that of AT&amp;T.<br>
<br>
The ECI BLARNEY was initiated on AT&amp;T prior to the breakup, and it
referes to the 1977 and 1978 era fiber optic switches that serviced
regions, but which also routed international calls to undersea cables.
BLARNEY was the pre-AT&amp;T network, and after the AT&amp;T break-up
BLARNEY remained in place for FISA reasons, then a new ECI was created
called FAIRVIEW for the netly borne AT&amp;T that handles undersea
fiber optics. But, BLARNEY was still the program for FISA intercepts on
AT&amp;T until the Clinton Era CALEA program. Of course by that time
MCI and Sprint were major carriers, and both were assigned an ECI for
domestic facilities, and then a different ECI for undersea fiber
optics. As each fiber optic company sought a new undersea cable landing
license from the FCC they were required by the NSA to enter into a
classified contract with the NSA for TWO access point for each undersea
cable. The first access point had to be right at the optical
multiplexer which duplicated the optical pulse into the undersea cable,
and then a second into a fiber optic cable that fed NSA gear. Then,
behind the multiplexer and the switching systems a second access point
where the signals exited the cable station to enter the AT&amp;T,
Sprint, MCI, etc backbones. In this manner the NSA had access to all
data entering or exiting the cable landing station form the United
States (illegally), but they also had access to the cable as it left
the United States. The reason for TWO access points is that data can be
relayed form cable station to cable station without exiting the cable
station other then to hop through the cable station and the data in
this case never hits the backbone. Then there is data sent to a cable
station via an ocean route that is routed from another cable station
but without access the network backbone. In each case it creates a
&quot;relay effect&quot; where the cable stations are not &quot;routing thr=
ough&quot; the
station as normal traffic, but is goign round-robin form station to
station. For example, someone in England can lauch data out of London,
to an undersea cable to Long Island, which bounces it underseas to NJ,
and then undersea to Florida, and thence to Cuba without the packets
ever entering the domestic backbones of the carriers. So, for the NSA
to operate the most effective network access they have to hit both the
front side and the back side of the undersea cable stations. <br>
<br>
Additionally, as there has been some resistance and push back form the
carrier from time to time, the NSA, operating through fake FBI search
warrants issued under FISA has had installed on domestic backbones a
fiber optic tap on each side on the cable landing stations, but these
intercept points are only suitable when the 1983 to 2001 era carriers
were &quot;uncooperative&quot; and they started asking 4th Amendment relate=
d
questions.<br>
<br>
Once 9/11/2001 happened, the Executive branch and the Legistative
Branch bullshit each other to such a massive level that the Patriot Act
was passed (which was done unlawfully), but it forced each of the
carriers to provide full access to all billing records, all account
recoreds, all switching records, dual access to all forms of
transmission, and the establishment of special ECI SIGAD codes across
every potential carrier of any signal, of any type, at any time, with
no warrant, and no showing of probable cause. <br>
<br>
The next question down the list shoudl be what is the name given to MCI
and what is the SIGAD, and then Comcast, Sprint, and so on.<br>
<br>
Clue1: There were FIVE companies who just after 9/11 were blackmailed
by the Oversight Committee on Intelligence into cooperating with the
NSA without ANY warrants being issued... AT&amp;T is one, then MCI, and
so on.<br>
<br>
There are many questiones to be asked.<br>
<br>
-jma<br>
<br>
On 8/15/15, 10:38 PM, Edward Michaels wrote:
<blockquote type=3D"cite">
  <p dir=3D"ltr">As if we had not known, this kind of &quot;news&quot; woul=
d make
me throw up.<br>
  </p>
  <p dir=3D"ltr">Report: AT&amp;T Had Long, &#39;Highly Collaborative&#39;
Partnership With NSA <a href=3D"http://n.pr/1IS13rM" target=3D"_blank">http=
://n.pr/1IS13rM</a></p>
-- <br>
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Groups &quot;TSCM-L Professionals List&quot; group.<br>
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send
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et=3D"_blank">https://groups.google.com/d/optout</a>.<br>
</blockquote>
<br>
<pre cols=3D"72">--=20
---
James M. Atkinson
<a href=3D"mailto:jm..._at_tscm.com" target=3D"_blank">jm..._at_tscm.com</a></pre=
>
</div>


<p></p>

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